

# UNITED FRONT TACTICS

(A paper prepared for the Stalin Society, London, by Bill Bland)

## THE MARXIST-LENINIST TACTICS OF THE UNITED FRONT

In January 1921 the Central Committee of the United Communist Party of Germany published an Open Letter which

" . . . called on all workers, trade unions and socialist organisations to unite their forces in combatting reaction and the capitalists' offensive against the working people's vital rights". (Central Committee, United Communist Party of Germany: Open Letter, in: 'Die Rote Fahne' (The Red Flag), 8 January 1921, in: Note to: Vladimir I. Lenin: 'Collected Works', Volume 32; Moscow; 1965; p. 32).

At the 3rd Congress of the Communist International in June/July 1921, Lenin expressed strong support for the tactics embodied in the Open Letter:

"The 'Open Letter' is a model political step. This is stated in our theses and we must certainly stand by it". (Vladimir I. Lenin: Speech in Defence of the Tactics of the Communist International, 3rd Congress of Communist International, (July 1921), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 32; Moscow; 1965; p. 470).

And in a letter to Grigory Zinoviev\*, he said:

"The tactic of the Open Letter should definitely be applied everywhere. . . . All those who have failed to grasp the necessity of the Open Letter tactic should be expelled from the Communist International within a month after its Third Congress". (Vladimir I. Lenin: Letter to Grigory Y. Zinoviev (10 July 1921), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; Moscow; 1969; p. 321).

In December 1921, the name of 'united front tactics' was applied to these Marxist-Leninist tactics, which were in essence to work for the formation of united fronts of all workers around specific limited objectives. All workers, and organisations composed predominantly of workers, were encouraged to take an active part in a united front with the aims of which they were in agreement, irrespective of their views and policies on other questions:

"The interests of the communist movement generally require the communist parties and the Communist International as a whole to support the slogan of the united front of the workers and to take the initiative in this matter. . . .

The united front of the workers means the united front of all workers who want to fight against capitalism, which includes those who still follow the anarchists, syndicalists, etc". (Executive Committee of the Communist International: Directives on the United Front of the Workers (December 1921), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1943: Documents' (listed henceforward as 'Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971)'), Volume 1; London; 1971; p. 311, 316).

"The world situation and the situation of the international proletariat . . . demands . . . the establishment of a united front of

all parties supported by the proletariat, regardless of the differences separating them, so long as they are anxious to wage a common fight for the immediate and urgent needs of the proletariat. . . . It calls on the proletarians of all parties to do everything they can to see that their parties are also ready for joint action. . . .

Tear down the barriers erected between you and come into the ranks, whether communist or social-democrat, anarchist or syndicalist, to fight for the needs of the hour. . . .

Proletarians of all countries, unite!"  
(Executive Committee of the Communist International and Red International of Labour Unions: Manifesto on the United Front (January 1922), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): *ibid.*, Volume 1; p. 317, 318, 319).

United front tactics were not only supported by Lenin who moved in the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party

" . . . that the line of joint action with workers of the Second International proposed by a number of communist parties of the Communist International . . . be approved".

(Vladimir I. Lenin: Draft Decision of the Politburo of the CC, RCP (B) on the Tactics of the United Front (December 1921), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; Moscow; 1969; p. 367).

they were elaborated under his direction:

"These theses on the united front . . . were elaborated under Lenin's direction".

(Nicos Poulantzas: 'Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism'; London; 1974 p. 157).

The tactics recognised that some organisations and parties composed predominantly of workers and claiming to represent their interests in fact served the interests of capital. Indeed, the fundamental aim of united front tactics was

" . . . to convince the socialist rank and file that 'their leaders do not want to fight, not even for a piece of bread'".

(Franz Borkenau: 'World Communism: A History of the Communist International'; Ann Arbor (USA): 1971; p. 224).

For this reason, the emphasis of united front tactics was laid on building the united front from below, by appealing to workers over the heads of their leaders:

"The united front is not and should not be merely a fraternisation of party leaders. . . . The united front means the association of all workers, whether communist, anarchist, social-democrat, independent or non-party or even Christian workers, against the bourgeoisie. With the leaders if they want it so, without the leaders if they remain indifferently aside, and in defiance of the leaders and against the leaders if they sabotage the workers' united front. . . .

Build the united front locally too, without waiting for the permission of the leaders of the Second International . . . in every factory, in every mine, in every district, in every town. . . . The communist party is ready to fight shoulder to shoulder with any workers against the capitalists",

(ECCI Statement on the Results of the Berlin Conference (April 1922), in:

Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 1; p. 341, 342).

"The resistance of the leaders of the Second International has frustrated the attempt to organise the proletarian united front from above. That makes it a duty to rally all forces to organise the proletariat for the common struggle in opposition to the leaders of the Second International. . . .

Build the united front from below".

(ECCI Statement on the Meeting of the Committee of Nine (May 1922), in: Jane Degras (Ed.)(1971): ibid., Volume 1; p. 351).

Nevertheless, the Communist International at this stage firmly rejected a policy of accepting a united front only from below, since such a policy would have hindered the exposure of organisations and parties which were in fact opposed to united front tactics:

"Our congresses . . . instructed our executives to use every favourable opportunity to approach Amsterdam and the social-democrats with the demand for a common fight against capitalist attack. . . . And if they stand out stubbornly against it, to bring about a united front over their heads".

(Appeal from the ECCI and RILU to All Workers on the United Front (January 1923), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 2).

"Once more we propose to the leaders of the Second and the Amsterdam Internationals a united front with the communists. We are ready to negotiate with the social-democratic and trade union leaders, although our opinion of them has been again confirmed, and most strikingly, by recent events".

(ECCI: Letter to the Franco-German Workers' Conference at Frankfurt (March 1923), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 2; p. 15).

This was, indeed, Lenin's policy:

"The purpose and sense of the tactics of the united front consist in drawing more and more masses of the workers into the struggle against capital, even if it means making repeated offers to the leaders of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals to wage this struggle together". (Vladimir I. Lenin: Draft Resolution on the Report of the RCP Delegation in the Comintern (March/April 1922), in: 'Collected Works', Volume 42; p. 411).

#### THE NEED FOR AN ANTI-FASCIST UNITED FRONT IN GERMANY IN 1930-33

Between 1930 and 1933 the basic strategy of European imperialism was to secure the establishment of a German state dominated by the Nazi Party (the National Socialist German Workers' Party).

At the Parliamentary elections of July 1932, the voting figures were as follows:

<u>Party</u>	<u>Votes Polled</u>	<u>% of Vote</u>	<u>Deputies Elected</u>
Social-Democratic Party:	8.6 million	24%	133
Communist Party:	4.6 million	13%	89
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Total:	13.2 million	37%	222
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Nazi Party:	6.4 million	18%	230
Other parties:	15.4 million	45%	155
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Grand Total:	35.0 million	100%	607

('Keesing's Contemporary Archives', Volume 1; p. 415).

In these circumstances, where the threat of a fascist dictatorship had clearly become acute, it is clear that the correct tactic for German Marxist-Leninists to have adopted would have been to strive to form a defensive anti-fascist united front of all those prepared actively to resist fascism, whatever their views on other questions.

The German revisionist leader Wilhelm Pieck\* admitted at the 13th Plenum of the ECCI in December 1933 -- after the imposition of the Nazi dictatorship

"The sole force which could have prevented the fascist dictatorship, or can defeat it, is the German working class united".  
(Wilhelm Pieck: 'We are fighting for a Soviet Germany', in: '13th Plenum of the ECCI'; London; 1934; p. 57).

Striving to form an anti-fascist united front is not a diversion from the revolutionary struggle for socialism, but an essential feature of that struggle.

As, with the increasing decay of capitalism in its imperialist stage, the movement for socialist revolution grows, the limited political freedoms existing under bourgeois democracy become too dangerous for the ruling class to accept. And since the growth of the revolutionary movement for socialism cannot be completely concealed from the ruling class, it is inevitable that the latter will seek to strike a pre-emptive blow against the revolutionary movement and against bourgeois democracy.

In this situation, the movement for socialist revolution needs the protection of a broader movement embracing all those who, whatever their views on other matters, are firmly opposed to fascism. When, therefore, the fascists launch an offensive against bourgeois democracy, this broad defensive anti-fascist front can, under Marxist-Leninist leadership, be transformed into an offensive revolutionary socialist front which can carry through the socialist revolution.

REVISIONIST DOMINATION OF THE COMINTERN

In December 1922 Lenin suffered a second stroke which effectively ended his active political life. He died in January 1924.

Stalin played an active role in the leadership of the Communist International for several years, but his 'Works' contain no contribution to Comintern affairs after 8th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern in May 1927. Anti-socialist historians generally attribute this fact to 'a loss of interest' in Comintern affairs on the part of Stalin. Robert McNeal\*, for example, alleges:

"Stalin did not share Lenin's commitment to the idea of the Communist International and was not active at its seven 'World Congresses'".  
(Robert H. McNeal: 'Stalin: Man and Ruler'; Basingstoke; 1968; p. 218).

The historical truth is that in 1927 Stalin was removed from active leadership of the Comintern by a dominating coalition of concealed revisionists. Revisionists are defined as 'elements posing as Marxist-Leninists, but in fact distorting Marxism-Leninism in such a way as to serve the interests of capital'.

Thus, the leading body of the Comintern -- the Political Secretariat -- elected in September 1928, following the 6th Congress, consisted of the following eleven members:

Henri Barbé\* (France);  
Thomas Bell\* (Britain);  
Nikolay Bukharin\* (Soviet Union);  
Chu Chiu-pai\* (China);  
Jules Humbert-Droz\* (Switzerland);  
Otto Kuusinen\* (Finland);  
Vyacheslav Molotov\* (Soviet Union);  
Osip Piatnitsky\* (Soviet Union);  
Hermann Remmele (Germany);  
Bohumir Smeral\* (Czechoslovakia);  
Angelo Tasca\* (Italy);  
(Jane Degras (Ed.): 'The Communist International: 1919-1243: Documents', Volume 2; London; 1971; p. 575).

Of these eleven, two (Bell and Molotov) were more or less solid Marxist-Leninists, while the remaining nine (Barbé, Bukharin, Chu, Humbert-Droz, Kuusinen, Piatnitsky, Remmele, Smeral, and Tasca) were concealed revisionists.

However, since the Marxist-Leninists in the Soviet Union retained control of Soviet security it was unsafe for the revisionists in the leadership of the Comintern to pursue openly counter-revolutionary policies. They were, however, able to distort Marxism-Leninism in such a way as to make Comintern policies serve, to a limited extent, the interests of a capitalist class

In July 1929

" . . . Bukharin was ousted from the presidency of the Comintern. No new president was nominated".  
(Franz Borkenau (1971): op. cit.; p. 339).

In the next period, the Communist Parties of Western Europe were directed by Dmitry Manuilsky\*:

"In the West, at any rate, Manuilsky was now sole leader of the communist parties".  
(Franz Borkenau: 'European Communism'; London; 1953 (hereafter listed as 'Franz Borkenau (1953)'; p. 65).

THE PSEUDO-LEFT REVISIONIST DISTORTION OF UNITED FRONT POLICY (1930-33)

The basic strategy of revisionists -- of phoney Marxist-Leninists, who are really opposed to socialism -- in the period of the rise to power of Nazism was to oppose fascism in words, while working in practice to prevent the formation of a genuine anti-fascist united front which would disrupt their real aims. This strategy was achieved by securing the adoption by the Communist International of a pseudo-left deviation from Marxism-Leninism in the tactics of the united front.

In September 1924, Stalin defined social-democracy as 'objectively' the 'twin' of fascism, as 'the moderate wing' of fascism:

"Social-democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism. . . . These organisations (Social-Democracy and fascism -- Ed.). . . are not antipodes, they are twins".  
(Josef V. Stalin: 'Concerning the International Situation' (September 1924), in: 'Works', Volume 6; Moscow; 1953; p. 294).

At the 10th Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, in July 1929, Otto Kuusinen distorted Stalin's thesis to identify social-democracy with fascism under the name of 'social-fascism'..

"The aims of the fascists and social-fascists are the same. . . . Social-fascism openly shows itself up as fascism".  
(Otto Kuusinen: Report to 10th Plenum of ECCI, in: 'International Press Correspondence', Volume 9, No. 40 (20 August 1929); p. 848).

Indeed, the very term 'social-fascism' implies

" . . . a straight identification of social-democracy with fascism".  
(Nicos Poulantzas: op. cit.; p. 148).

"Down to the end of 1933, Moscow called the socialists (social-democrats -- Ed.) 'social-fascists'".  
(Franz Borkenau (1953): op. cit.; p. 74).

On this incorrect assumption -- that all social-democrats were in reality fascists -- were developed the pseudo-left tactics known as 'class-against-class':

"A new tactic was gradually evolved in the Comintern, which subsequently became known officially as the 'class-against-class' tactic.

. . . .  
The tactic of 'class-against-class' was based on the assumption that the reformist organisations as a whole had already gone over completely to the side of the bourgeois class. No proper distinction was drawn

between the Right-wing leaders and the rank-and-file Social-Democrats".  
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, Central Committee, CPSU: 'Outline History of the Communist International'; Moscow; 1971; p. 269-70).

The period of the 'class-against-class' tactics became known in the Comintern as 'the third period':

"The switch from united front' to 'class against class' tactics inaugurated what came to be known . . . as 'the third period'",  
(Jane Degras: 'United Front Tactics in the Comintern', in: David Footman (Ed.): 'International Communism'; London; 1960; p. 22).

or. more correctly, as

" . . . the third period of the general crisis of capitalism".  
(Agitprop Department of the ECCI: Theses on the 15th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Communist International (March 1934), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 317).

The social-democrats were now presented as 'the main bulwark of the capitalist class' and so as 'the main enemy' of the working class, against whom the main blow should be directed.

The 12th Plenum of the ECCI, in August/September 1932,

" . . . reaffirmed the need for directing the main blow against Social-Democracy as being the social pillar of the bourgeoisie".  
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p.329).

and at the same Plenum Otto Kuusinen declared:

"Social-Democracy still remains the main social support of the bourgeoisie. . . .

The main blow . . . must in the present period . . . be directed against social-fascism and the reformist trade-union bureaucracy".  
(Otto Kuusinen: 'The International Situation and the Tasks of the Sections of the Comintern', in: '12th Plenum of the ECCI' London; 1932; p. 105, 141).

Even at the 13th Plenum in December 1933, after the Nazis had seized power, Wilhelm Pieck was still insisting that

" . . . Social-Democracy is fulfilling its task today as the main bulwark of the bourgeoisie".  
(Wilhelm Pieck: 'We are fighting for a Soviet Germany', in: '13th Plenum of the ECCI' London; 1933; p. 7).

Indeed, the 'class-against-class' deviation expressed the view that the left-wing of Social-democracy (that which supported united front tactics) was 'more dangerous' than the right-wing (that which opposed united front tactics). For example, at the 10th Plenum in July 1928

" . . . the communist parties were set the task of decisively intensifying the struggle against Social-Democracy and especially against its 'Left' wing. . . . Equating Social-Democracy . . . with fascism and advancing the slogan of dealing the main blow against its left elements, who could become the allies of the Communists in the fight against

reaction and fascism, was a mistake".  
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p.291).

Under the 'class-against-class' tactics, a united front was therefore permissible only from below, that is, with the rank-and-file of the social-democratic party:

"An important question . . . is the question of the consistent operation of the united front from below".  
('Guide to the 12th Plenum, ECCI'; London; 1943; p. 53).

"What we now need is the united front from below".  
(ECCI: May Day Manifesto (April 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 267).

"The 13th Plenum of the ECCI calls upon all sections of the Communist International persistently to fight for the realisation of a united militant front with the social-democratic workers, in spite of and against the will of the treacherous leaders of social-democracy".  
(13th Plenum, ECCI: Theses on Fascism, the War Danger and the Tasks of the Communist Parties (December 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op.cit., Volume 3; p. 303).

In accordance with this policy, even when, in November 1931, the leader of the Social-Democratic Party, Rudolf Breitscheid\*, offered a united front against fascism to the Communist Party of Germany, 1931, it

" . . . was rejected by the CPG as a 'demagogic manoeuvre'".  
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 213).

An open letter from the CPG Central Committee, published in 'Rote Fahne' of 5 January 1932, charged that

" . . . the social-democratic leaders and the SWP (Socialist Workers' Party -- Ed.) were proposing a united front in order to create confusion and to undermine the proletarian united front under CPG leadership".  
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): ibid., Volume 3; p. 214).

The new tactic implied the abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist tactic of the united front:

"The new left policy summarised in the 'class against class' slogan . . . implied the abandonment of united front tactics".  
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 2; p. 424).

Indeed, a number of parties in this period put forward the slogan of a 'Red United Front', i. e., a front limited to conscious revolutionaries:

"A number of communist parties at this period put forward the slogan of a 'Red United Front' . . . This in effect implied that the united front could unite only workers who consciously supported the Communists, leaving the workers who followed the lead of the reformists beyond the pale of the united front. . . .

In lieu of the slogan of a united workers' front this group (the Neumann\*-Remmele\* group -- Ed.) proposed the slogan of a 'red workers' front', which narrowed beforehand the limits of unity policy".  
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 313, 323).



During this period, the Communist International rejected the concept that there was a qualitative difference between bourgeois democracy and fascism, so that the working class had an interest in defending bourgeois democracy against the threat of fascism. The 11th Plenum in April 1931

" . . . came to the conclusion that it was necessary to put an end to the practice of drawing a line 'between fascism and bourgeois democracy, and between the parliamentary form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and its open fascist form'" .  
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 313).

And a resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Germany in May 1931 stated:

"Any attempt to draw a contrast, in liberal fashion, between fascism and bourgeois democracy . . . would in effect but help Social-Democracy to deceive the workers".

(CC, CPG: Resolution of May 1931, in: Ernst Thaelmann: 'Some Mistakes in Our Theoretical and Practical Work and the Way to overcome Them', in: 'Communist International', Volume 8, No. 22 (December 1931);p. 754).

In consequence of this incorrect formulation, some existing right-wing bourgeois governments were wrongly labelled as 'fascist', so that the danger of genuine fascism was underestimated and 'defence against fascism' was held to be no longer necessary:

"The identification of bourgeois-democratic methods of rule with those of fascism led to a certain underestimation of fascism, to various bourgeois parliamentary regimes being defined as fascist regimes. This obscured the real dimensions of the danger which the actual fascist forces represented".

(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 313).

"The von Papen\*-Schleicher\* Government . . . has established a form of fascist dictatorship".

(ECCI: Theses of 12th Plenum on the International Situation and the Tasks of the Comintern Sections (September 1932), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 224).

The mistaken concept that the Social-Democrats and not the Nazis were the principal enemy of the working class even led to a degree of collaboration between the Communist Party of Germany and the Nazi Party against the Social-Democratic Party -- as in the case of the referendum for the dissolution of the Prussian government in 1931:

"The Nazis and nationalists, in 1931, launched a referendum for the removal of the Prussian state government -- a coalition of social-democrats, liberals and catholics".

(Franz Borckenau (1953): op. cit.; p. 75).

The leadership of the CPG decided that the Party would abstain in this matter:

"The leaders of the CPG decided to abstain".

(Edward H. Carr: 'The Twilight of the Comintern'; London; 1982 (hereafter listed as 'Edward H. Carr (1982)'); p. 42).

"At the end of July 1931, to the astonishment of its members, the CPG

made a completely unexpected volte-face".

(Arthur Spencer: 'National Bolshevism', in: 'Survey' , No. 44-45 (October 1962); p. 148).

and, on the instructions of the Communist International, supported the referendum:

"The . . . instruction was sent by telegram on July 20. . . . The central committee of the CPG bowed to the will of Moscow".  
(Edward H. Carr (1982): op. cit.; p. 42).

"In August 1931 the CPG supported the referendum initiated by the NSGWP (the Nazi Party -- Ed.) against the social-democratic Prussian Government. The central committee had at first decided to oppose the Nazi move, but were persuaded by the ECCI to reverse their position".  
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 153-54).

At the 12th Plenum of the ECCI in August/September 1932, Osip Piatnitsky reported:

"You know that the CPG leadership was opposed to participation in the referendum on the dissolution of the Prussian Landtag. Some party newspapers had published articles against participation. But . . . the central committee, in consultation with the Comintern, reached the conclusion that the party should take an active part in the referendum".  
(Osip Piatnitsky: Speech at 12th Plenum of ECCI, in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 155).

One possible barrier to the imposition of a Nazi dictatorship remained: the German trade union movement. Steps were accordingly taken by the revisionists to render this effectively impotent. These steps were the withdrawal of Communists and communist supporters from the mass trade unions to form new tiny 'revolutionary' splinter unions.

Lenin had already ridiculed this pseudo-left deviation in April 1920 in "'Left-wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder'

"We cannot but consider the ponderous, very learned and frightfully revolutionary disquisitions of the German Lefts on why Communists cannot and should not work in reactionary trade unions, why it is permissible to refuse to do such work, why it is necessary to leave the trade unions and to create in their stead brand-new, clean little 'workers' unions', invented by exceedingly nice (and, for the most part, probably very youthful) Communists, etc., etc., to be equally ridiculous and childish nonsense".

(Vladimir I. Lenin: "'Left-wing" Communism, an Infantile Disorder: A Popular Essay in Marxian Strategy and Tactics' (April 1920), in: 'Selected Works', Volume 10; London; 1946; p. 90).

Now the pseudo-left line on the trade unions was put forward once more, this time by the revisionist Solomon Lozovsky\*:

"Early in 1928 the Comintern received a proposal from S. Lozovsky concerning some fundamental questions of tactics in the trade union movement. He stated that 'work within the reformist unions, given the existence in the country of a revolutionary centre, should have as its

logical aim the affiliation to the revolutionary centre".  
(Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC, CPSU: op. cit.; p. 270-71).

In August 1930 the 5th Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions

" . . . ratified the decision of the revolutionary trade union opposition in Germany and Poland to drop the slogan 'into the reformist unions'. 'Parallel red unions' were to be established wherever the situation warranted this step".  
(Resolution of 5th Congress of RILU, in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 142).

"The trade unions . . . had to be split, and minute and irrelevant communist splinter unions were created everywhere".  
(Franz Borkenau (1953): op. cit.; p. 71).

As a result of this step, when the Nazi coup took place in 1933

" . . . the CPG call for a general strike aroused no response whatever".  
(Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): op. cit., Volume 3; p. 216).

At the 7th World Congress of the CI in 1935, it was admitted that this move had been a sectarian mistake:

"A sectarian mistake was committed: the revolutionary trade union opposition was transformed into new trade unions and as a result found itself isolated".  
(Wilhelm Pieck: Report of the ECCI to the 7th World Congress of the CI (August 1935), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): *ibid.*, Volume 3; p. 350).

For some time after the Nazi coup in Germany, the Communist International insisted that its 'class-against-class' tactics loyally followed by the Communist Party of Germany -- tactics which had paved the way for that coup -- had been correct. In April 1933 the ECCI Presidium resolved that

" . . . the political line and the organisational policy followed by the CC of the Communist Party of Germany . . . was completely correct.  
(ECCI Presidium: Resolution on the Situation in Germany (April 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.): *ibid.*, Volume 3; p. 257).

Indeed, the ECCI maintained that the Nazi coup had 'accelerated the development of the socialist revolution in Germany':

"The establishment of an open fascist dictatorship, which is destroying all democratic illusions among the masses and liberating them from social-democratic illusions, is accelerating the rate of Germany's advance towards the proletarian revolution".  
(ECCI Presidium: Resolution on the Situation in Germany (April 1933), in: Jane Degras (Ed.) (1971): *ibid.*, Volume 3; p. 262).

### Conclusion

After the successful Nazi coup of January 1933, the needs of the imperialist powers in Western Europe changed. The basic need was now to encourage appeasement of the German imperialists, that is, to reprove them for aggression in words, while encouraging them in deeds to expand towards

the Soviet Union.

IN 1934 THE REVISIONISTS WHO DOMINATED THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL OBLIGINGLY REVISED THEIR POLICIES TO MEET THE NEW NEEDS OF THE IMPERIALISTS.

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(Part two of this paper will deal with the Reichstag Fire and the Role of Georgi Dimitrov in the change of policy referred to above)

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

- BARBÉ, Henri, French revisionist politician (1902-66); Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1927-31); expelled from French CP (1934); Secretary-General, fascist French People's Party (1936-39); imprisoned as war criminal (1945-49).
- BELL, Thomas, British Marxist-Leninist politician (1882-1937); Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1928-29); President, Association of Friends of the USSR (1930-35); worked for International Red Aid (1936-39).
- BREITSCHIED, Rudolf, German social-democratic politician (1874-1944); Prussian Minister of Interior (1918-19); Chairman, Communist Fraction in Reichstag (1922-33); to France (1933); arrested by Nazis (1940); died in Buchenwald concentration camp (1944).
- BUKHARIN, Nikolay I., Soviet revisionist politician (1888-1938); Deputy Chairman, ECCI (1919-26); Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1926-29); Editor-in-Chief, 'Izvestia' (1933-37); found guilty of treason and executed (1938).
- CHU Chiu-pai, Chinese revisionist politician (1899-1935); Secretary, CPC (1927-28); Member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1928-31); to China (1930); Commissar for Education in Chinese Soviet Government (1934-35); executed by Kuominmang troops (1935).
- HUMBERT-DROZ, Jules, Swiss revisionist politician (1891-1971); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1926-28); to Switzerland (1931); expelled from Swiss Party (1943); secretary, Swiss Social-Democratic party (1947-58).
- KUUSINEN, Otto V., Finnish revisionist politician (1881-1964); member, ECCI Political Secretariat, (1928-43); President, Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (1940-58).
- LOZOVSKY, Solomon, Soviet revisionist politician (1878-1952); Secretary-General, Red International of Labour Unions (1921-37); Director, State Literary Publishing House (1937-39); USSR Deputy Commissar/Minister of Foreign Affairs (1939-46); deputy chief, Soviet Information Bureau (1941-48); arrested and found guilty of treason (1949); died in prison (1952).
- McNEIL, Robert H. American historian (1930- ); Assistant, later Associate, Professor of History, University of Alberta (1954-58); Associate Professor of History, University of Toronto (1964-69); Professor of History, University of Massachusetts (1969- ).
- MANUILSKY, Dmitry Z., Soviet revisionist politician (1883-1959); Secretary, CP Ukraine (1921-22); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1926-43); principal representative of RCP on CI (1923-43); Ukrainian Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1944-50).
- MOLOTOV, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Marxist-Leninist politician (1890-1986); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1928-30); USSR Premier (1930-41); USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs (1939-49); USSR Deputy Premier and Commissar/Minister of Foreign Affairs (1953-57); Minister of State Control (1956-57); Ambassador to Mongolian People's Republic (1957-60); USSR Representative on International Atomic Energy Committee (1960-62); expelled from CPSU by revisionists (1962); readmitted (1984).
- NEUMANN, Heinz, German revisionist politician (1902-37); CPG representative on CI (1925-32); to Soviet Union (1935); arrested, found guilty of treason and executed (1937).
- PAPEN, Franz von, German diplomat and politician (1879-1969); Chancellor (1932); Vice-Chancellor (1933-34); Minister/Ambassador to Austria (1934-38); Ambassador to Turkey (1939-44); acquitted of war crimes, Nuremberg Tribunal (1945).
- PIATNITSKY, Osip A., Soviet revisionist politician (1882-1939); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1926-35); arrested (1937), found guilty of treason (1938); executed (1939).

- PIECK, Wilhelm, German revisionist politician (1876-1960); member, ECCI Political Secretariat (1931-43); to Berlin (1945); President, Socialist Unity Party (1946-60); President, German Democratic Republic (1949-60).
- REMMELE, Hermann, German revisionist politician (1886-1939); member, ECCI Secretariat (1926-33); to Soviet Union (1933); expelled from CI (1933); arrested (1937); charged found guilty of treason (1938); executed (1939).
- SCHLEICHER, Kurt von, German military officer and politician (1882-1934); lieutenant-general (1931); Minister of Defence (1932); Chancellor (1932-33); murdered by Nazis (1934).
- SMERAL, Bohumir, Czechoslovak revisionist politician (1880-1941); member, ECCI Presidium (1922-35); to Czechoslovakia (1935); to Soviet Union (1938); died in Moscow (1941).
- TASCA, Angelo, Italian revisionist politician (1892-1960); member, ECCI Secretariat (1929-209); expelled from ICP and CI, to Paris (1929); editor, social-democratic newspaper 'Populaire' (1934-37); director, Italian service, French radio (1937-40); died in Paris (1960).
- ZINOVIEV, Grigory E., Soviet revisionist politician (1883-1936); Chairman, ECCI (1919-26); expelled from Party (1926, 1932, 1934); found guilty of treason and executed (1936).

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