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UNCHAINING THE DIALECTICS OF REVOLUTION: IN HEGEL, IN MARX, IN LENIN, IN
MARXIST-HUMANISM Notes from Feb., 1935 talk by Eugene

I. Hegel's Dialectic: Unchaining in Thought and the Historic Barrier

Hegel's dialectic was born in deed -- the heaven stormers of the French Revolution, the sans culottes -- before it was born in thought -- The Phenomenology of Mind. Breaking the chains of unfreedom in reality, 1789-1793, birthed the breaking of chains of unfreedom in thought -- from consciousness to self-consciousness to reason to spirit to religion to Absolute Knowledge. Both in life and in thought the unchaining of the dialectic comes from no external source, but from the very nature of a dialectic of freedom, a dialectic of revolution. Unchaining the process of becoming free is in truth the very innards of dialectics. It is the full being of dialectics, and its being is an absolute movement of becoming, an absolute movement of unchaining.

In life the French Revolution brought that unchaining to a high point -- the unshackling of feudalism's hold. In thought, the unchaining reached a discerning of the ideas of freedom from the Greek times forward to Hegel's Absolutes. That is, Hegel's unchaining brought history, even if limited to a history of thought, into philosophy. But just as the unchaining of the dialectic in life at the time of the French Revolution could go no further than the birth of capitalism in its industrial form, the unchaining of the dialectic in thought by Hegel could not transcend, could not reach, the point where thought and reality could finally unite.

Why? The historic subject who could carry out that deeper unchaining of dialectics in life, and at the same moment create the ground for that deep unchaining of the dialectic in thought, was only in embryo at the beginning of the 19th century. The proletariat had not yet made its initial full appearance on the world scene.

Some three and a half decades would pass between Hegel's Phenomenology and the emergence of the proletariat as a class capable of challenging capitalism. It was on that historic barrier that Hegel's dialectic remained -- and thus its mystical veil -- until the 1840s gave birth to the proletariat as subject, and a philosopher of a proletarian unchaining of the dialectic, Marx.

II. Marx -- Unchaining of the dialectic as a unity of thought and reality, theory and practice, BUT the 30-year post-Marx dialectic in new mind-forged manacles

Marx's initial unchaining of the dialectic was at once two-fold. It was a critique of Hegel's mystical veil, his refusal to confront the reality of a newly emerging industrial capitalism. Marx transcended this by hailing a new subject of revolution, the proletariat, whose action in life was creating the ground for a new leap in thought. At the same time Marx also critiqued the vulgar-materialist concepts of a Feuerbach and those of the vulgar communists, who were only the opposite side of the same coin as the upholders of private property. And it was precisely with the use of Hegel's dialectic that he was able to accomplish this. The dual rhythm of Marx's revolutionary unchaining of 1843-44 -- the consciousness of a new objective stage and the emergence of a specific revolutionary subjection, on the one hand, the working out of a new stage of cognition as part of the fullness of philosophic expression on the other -- was to characterize not only these magnificent Humanist Essays that broke the binding ties of any mystical veil, as well as providing a critique of vulgar materialist solution, utopian dreams or bourgeois economic thought, but was as well to characterize each unchaining Marx worked out to the end of his life in 1883. Whether it was the class struggles in Europe, the Civil War in America -- both of which provided points of departure for Marx's concept of what is revolutionary theory, for the tremendous creative labor Marx underwent to create those categories of Capital, labor as activity, labor power the

commodity, as well as constant and variable capital -- or whether it was the Paris Commune and Marx's subsequent full development of the fetishism of commodities section of chapter one, -- the point was that the unchaining of the dialectic was not exhausted in a single moment, but was constantly renewed as new objective situations arose, as subjects of revolution found new forms of struggle, as the revolutionary philosopher Marx dug deeper and deeper into the new continent of thought. And thus in the last decade of his life, the dialectic becomes reconcretized as he strove to find the unity of philosophy and organization in his Critique of the Gotha Program, as he was working out the possibility of revolutions in non-capitalist lands without going through capitalism, as he was looking at human relations in so-called primitive societies. (For a discussion of historic barriers in Marx's day see Jim's article in the first pre-Plenum bulletin.)

What happened after Marx? Raya speaks of the lapse of some 31 years between Marx's death, 1883, and Lenin's 1914 encounter with Hegel's Science of Logic. In Marxism and Freedom she refused to put that chapter on the Second International, "Organizational Interlude", into the heading of a part. It was established Marxism, not capitalism alone, which during the 30 year interlude, rechained the dialectic. They did so with their own mind-forged manacles. They were the ones who said of Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program, that it was "a contribution to the discussion." They were the ones who chose to ignore that first of 20th century revolutions, Russia 1905, as unimportant and only occurring in a backward country. They were the ones who were blind to the newly emerging revolutionary forces in the technologically underdeveloped world. Without a recognition of what was the new objective situation, who were the newly emerging subjects of revolution and without seeing the necessity of rooting oneself in Marx's unchaining of the dialectic, 1843-1883, there could be no possibility of a new stage of cognition, a new unchaining for your historic moment.

The void was not limited only to those who remained mainline 2nd Internationalists. Even someone as great as Rosa Luxemburg, who did see a new objective stage, who both participated and analyzed brilliantly the first of the 20th century revolutions, who heard the cries of the Herero and Nama people in the Kalahari desert -- even she, because her rooting in the Marxist-Hegelian dialectic was not total, was not seen as the humus for revolutionary thought and action, even she could not move to unchain the dialectic in the first decade of the 20th century. Only Lenin moved to do so.

III. Lenin's Unchaining -- The Process, Its Ramifications and Its Limitations AND a new void -- but this time a very DIFFERENT and even more DANGEROUS one

The new objective situation which laid the ground for Lenin's return to the Hegelian dialectic -- the outbreak of the First World War and the betrayal of the 2nd International. A new subject of revolution as well emerged in the midst of the war, the national question in the form of the 1916 Easter Rebellion in Ireland. But before the latter occurred Lenin had dug into Hegel's dialectic. Lenin's unchaining was specific -- transformation into opposite. In fact every unchaining must of necessity be a concretization on one's own age. There is no unchaining of the dialectic if it remains an abstract question. That is not to say that you don't need a consciousness that what in fact you are doing is such an unchaining. Lenin certainly had that in terms of analyzing the objective situation of capitalism's transformation from competition into monopoly, and with it both the transformation of a section of the working class into the aristocracy of labor, and its relationship to the betrayal. And he certainly was conscious of concretizing his discovery of movement and self-movement of the dialectic in seeing the emergence of a new subject of revolution, the national question. So the ramifications of his unchaining of the dialectic ranged nationally and internationally, meant a recognition of the Soviets in 1917, and the beginnings of a grappling with what happens after you gain power. But that unchaining of the dialectic had barriers in Lenin's day, and most particularly it had a limitation as to what it would mean in terms of

the Party to lead, the vanguard party. Here there was no unchaining. And in an all too brief period, Lenin died.

The next void, 1923-24 to our post World War II period is certainly a period of a chained dialectic. But it is not the same as the organizational interlude of the 2nd International. It is a much more dangerous binding of the dialectic, because where the 2nd International's interlude and then betrayal meant in the end their becoming errand boys for capitalism's continuation; the counter-revolution within the revolution that occurred in Russia led to the ushering in of a new world stage of capitalism -- state-capitalism -- and its first establishers were in fact those who had been Marxist revolutionaries. This was in fact no mere failure to unchain the dialectic. No, it was the actual binding of the dialectic in new manacles -- both mind-forged and in the form of naked state-capitalist power claiming to be Marxist.

In addition, the one who did have a direct connection with the Russian Revolution and with Lenin, Leon Trotsky, was blind to seeing the necessity of his own labor at unchaining the dialectic as any pathway forward. Rather, building the party, building a cadre, exposing Stalin, became the pathway he chose. He did not meet the objective situation of the new age of state-capitalism, nor did he embrace the new subjects of revolution emerging in the 20th century, particularly the peasantry in non-capitalist lands. He certainly saw himself as the continuator of the Russian Revolution, but did not work out what it meant to be the continuator of the Marxian-Hegelian dialectic, and thus the continuator of the revolution.

IV. Marxist-Humanism and the Unchaining of the Dialectic

A. The 1940s -- A Decade Long Battle to Unchain the Dialectic

The analysis of state-capitalism on the part of Forest (Dunayevskaya) of the Johnson-Forest Tendency was not unseparated from a striving to reconnect with the Marxism of Marx. Thus in 1941, as part of her study on the nature of the Russian economy, Raya discovered a part of Marx's 1844 Manuscripts, though she did not know that that was what they were. Her essay, "Labor and Society," takes this writing up as part of her analysis of the Russian economy. A glance at the Marxist-Humanist Archives for the mid 1940s will show how crucial for Raya were the newly emerging forces of revolution. A number of essays were written on the Black struggle, studies which two decades later would form the basis for American Civilization on Trial. There was a consciousness of other subjects of revolution in those war years -- from the miners in wartime strike, to the revolt in Madagascar against French rule, to the Warsaw ghetto uprisings of '43 and '44 which led to the Johnson-Forest statement which included All Roads Lead to Warsaw. Philosophically the crucial points were Raya's first English translation of Lenin's Abstract of Hegel's Science of Logic in 1949 and the three-way correspondence of Raya, CLRJ and Grace Lee Boggs of 1949-50. It was in this period that Raya points to the sharp difference between James' Notes on the Dialectic and Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks, especially on the Doctrine of the Notion. This was occurring at the same time as the Miners' General Strike of 1949-50 which signaled both a new stage of production, Automation, and a new stage of revolt. However, the major document of the period, written by the Tendency, "State-Capitalism and World Revolution," made no category either of the Miners' General Strike, nor the philosophic highpoint that had been reached in the translations from Lenin on Hegel and Raya's commentary. The philosophic section written by Grace was instead on Contradiction, and very far away from the Doctrine of the Notion. When Raya did write her Letters on the Absolute Idea in May, 1953, Johnson had no response to that philosophic breakthrough. Organizationally, the split for the SWP did not mean that the tendency went public. In fact it had a private mimeoed practice paper for one and a half years before it would even start a public paper.

The point here is that the more than a decade's existence of the state-capitalist tendency can be viewed as one long battle by Raya to begin to unchain the dialectic which had for so long been bound. It took a recognition of the new age of post-World War II as production and as revolt. It took a new digging into the dialectic in and for itself. And finally it took a recognition that those who were so close as to have been co-thinkers in terms of state-capitalism, and who had at least initially wanted to begin a philosophic journey, would not be able to make the leap to unchain the dialectic. Raya in her January 27th talk summarized this period as follows: "The vicissitudes of state-capitalism would show that only when the philosophic structure is fully-developed can one present the theory of state-capitalism in a way that would answer the quest for universality and what Marxist-Humanism called the movement from practice."

B. 1953. The Dialectic Unchained in Our Age

That new stage of production and new stage of revolt that marked the post-World War II period could only take on real definition once there became a new stage of cognition -- Marxist-Humanism's unchaining of the revolutionary dialectic in those May, 1953 Letters on the Absolute Idea -- signified by the expression "a movement from practice that is itself a form of theory." This breakthrough became the basis for all our work. It became the form for the new book Marxism and Freedom from 1776 until today. It became the basis for our committee form of organization; for our newspaper News & Letters, with Charles Denby, a Black production worker as editor; it became the basis for a whole range of pamphlets that followed Marxism and Freedom, including Workers Battle Automation, Freedom Riders, Free Speech Movement, American Civilization on Trial. What perhaps we didn't realize in full at the time was that the new, was not alone all the new voices that we were making sure were being heard in our newspaper, in our organization, but that an idea, Marxist-Humanism, had arisen at this historic moment, which was determined to see that the movement from practice that was itself a form of theory, was a category that would become practiced; that the new of the age was the new voices, but as well the new of News and Letters Committees, the new of Marxist-Humanist philosophy. Now Raya states that as new as this conception was, of the movement from practice as a form of theory, its newness rests on us making it into a category, on us actually practicing it. And she says it was implicit in our Marx's own practice. And certainly the question of masses in motion has marked every historic turning point. This does not mean that it was not a tremendous unchaining of the dialectic, which meant a very new way of practicing what it meant to be as a Marxist organization; a Marxist newspaper. But at the same time that this unchaining released a new kind of organization, a new kind of Marxist practice, that movement from practice that is itself a form of theory, released the basis for a still deeper stage of cognition, a further unchaining of the revolutionary dialectic for our age.

C. 1973, but also 1960-61 and 1964: The Dialectic Unchained in a New Historic Way

If the workers' own practice, and that of other subjects of revolution was a form of theory, then what was the form of theory for the revolutionary theoretician? If the practice of the masses contained a form of theory and we were determined to make that theory then what became of the theory of the theoretician? That question took Marxist-Humanism two full decades, 1953-1973, to express in a total way. And it was a long hard journey to do so. It meant a new confrontation with Hegel -- the 1960-61 summaries of Hegel's major philosophic works. It meant a dialogue with intellectuals such as Herbert Marcuse on the nature of the dialectic. It meant battles with many inside our own organization for whom the movement from practice as a form of theory meant activity, activity, activity and nothing else. It meant a concluding section to the 1964 edition of Marxism and Freedom on two kinds of subjectivity, Mao's and a revolutionary sub-

jectivity, with the realization that that revolutionary subjectivity included ourselves as Marxist-Humanists. It meant our seeing the failure of a movement from practice alone being able to achieve revolutionary transformation by the end of the 1960s. Only after almost two decades of struggle did the role of the theoretician, of the revolutionary organization, culminate in a new unchaining of the dialectic -- one implicit in 1953, but made explicit with the publication of Philosophy and Revolution with its chapter F on "Absolute Negativity as New Beginning." Only then could we see clearly that yes, the movement from practice was a form of theory, but not the form of theory, and that as crucial a form of theory was that of the theoretician who refused to let her or his theory be only a reflection of practice or only a prescription for practice, but theory that reaches to the fullness of a philosophy of revolution, and thus aims to unchain the masses praxis to the fullness of social revolution.

But Absolute Idea as New Beginning is not simply the movement from theory, that is both a reaching for and a manifestation of philosophy. That indeed would make it one-sided. If Absolute Idea as New Beginning is the ceaseless movement of ideas and of history, then it is at once a jamming together of the movement from practice that is itself a form of theory, and the movement from theory that is rooted both in philosophy and practice, and this not only as a unity of theory and practice, but as manifested in a new beginning. That is, Absolute Idea here is not just the totality of a movement from practice and a movement from theory, but in our epoch, which has the living presence of revolutionary forces -- labor, women, Black, youth, Third World -- and the Promethean vision of Marx's Marxism recreated as Marxist-Humanism, the two are jammed together in such a way that there is a continuing, ceaseless movement, a constant unfolding and explosion of new beginnings. So Absolute Idea as New Beginning takes the movement from practice and the movement from theory, and demands, not that they lie side by side, but that they so clash, even to the point of a discontinuity with the old, so that a new beginning becomes manifest, a manifestation which is in truth a continuity with the revolutionary unchaining of the dialectic.

D. A New Decade of Struggle -- from P&R through the publication of RLWLKM and the Marx Centenary -- Our Unchaining of the Dialectic versus Post-Marx Marxists.

The decade that followed the publication of P&R was a way of practicing this new unchaining of the dialectic. It was manifested in how we analyzed world events in the Political Philosophic Letters in which Raya was determined to show the philosophic ground behind the concrete political analysis of events. No movement from practice without a theoretical-philosophic framework from which to view it. One saw it in the kind of pamphlets we were trying to produce such as Frantz Fanon, Soweto and American Black Thought which refused to separate the Black struggle at home and abroad from the philosophic underpinning in both Fanon's theoretic labor and in the way Marxist-Humanism posed the Black struggle in our age. In the decades of the seventies we were determined to show not only forces of revolution as reason, but philosophy of revolution as force. We wrote of the emergence of a Women's Liberation Movement and of a developing Latin American Revolution. Our analysis of Today's Global Economic Crisis was unseparated from our philosophic analysis of Marx's Capital. We were constantly singling out new forms of organization, from apartidarismo in Portugal to the shoras of workers and early women's resistance to Khomeini in Iran. But where Marxism and Freedom was often hailed by the young activists in the movement who were looking for a Marxism unstultified with vulgar communism in the 1960s, Philosophy and Revolution was not greeted in any such manner in the 1970s, not even by those who had suffered defeats of post 1968. They were as yet unwilling to undergo the theoretical-philosophic reorganization that P&R demanded. By the late seventies it became clear that we needed new pathways to express how we had unchained the dialectic as Absolute Idea as New Beginning. Raya undertook this task in Rosa Luxemburg,

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Women's Liberation and Marx's Philosophy of Revolution in three ways: 1) by expressing the fullness of Marx's own revolutionary unchaining of the dialectic. Here we both went to "pre-Marx Marx" of the 1841 doctoral thesis to show how he was creating a new opening for what would become his break and new continent of thought three years later, and we went to his last decade, what Raya termed his new moments, to see how Marx continued to unchain the dialectic of revolution in non-capitalist lands, on the relation of organization and philosophy, on his digging into so-called primitive societies, especially the role of women. By this time you have now journeyed through how Marx was taken up in M&F, P&R, and now in RLWLKM. Yes, you do indeed see Marx's unchaining of the dialectic, but you do this unseparated from a realization of Marxist-Humanism's unchaining of Marx's Marxism. This leads us to those who ended up not developing Marx's Marxism, but buried Marx -- the post-Marx Marxists.

(2) Post-Marx Marxists is the second crucial category in RLWLKM. The refusal to grapple with what P&R had raised as the philosophic dimension of our age was in part due to these post-Marx Marxists who continually truncated Marx and substituted their analysis for his, rather than doing the hard labor of developing their thought out of Marx's Marxism. It is the heritage of post-Marx Marxism which is constantly presenting a truncated Marx, that stands as one barrier to today's unchaining of the dialectic. RLWLKM takes up the post-Marx Marxists, who were not betrayers, as a way of helping us clear the debris from what became of Marx's thought after 1833. Only in this manner can we begin again to grasp Absolute Idea as New Beginning as today's unchaining of the dialectic.

3) Finally, Raya choses Women's Liberation as a living subject of revolution, as one other pathway for us to come to grips with Absolute Idea as New Beginning. In "The Unique and Unfinished Task of Today's Women's Liberation Movement" she certainly shows women's liberation as part of a movement from practice that is itself a form of theory. But she refuses to leave the question there. She also shows that the women's movement has yet to develop theory rooted not only in that movement from practice, but rooted in the Marxism of Marx, and thus having as yet not fully confronted the age we live in.

The period of working out RLWLKM was also the period when within our newspaper we tried to practice the ground that P&R chapter one had laid out in a new way. We expanded to 12 pages to allow ourselves to have the room to truly practice Theory/Practice as one manifestation of Absolute Idea as New Beginning. It meant a chance to develop essay articles, new columnists and the concept of theory/practice both in the paper as a totality and striving to have individual articles achieve such a unity.

We have reached 1984 -- the world center of Marxist-Humanism moves to Chicago, and a new fourth book is born: Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution: Reaching for the Future.

E. Marxist Humanism Today -- Marxist-HumanISTS need to become fully conscious of Marxist-HumanISM'S Unchaining of the Dialectic -- A Consciousness Born of Praxis

Raya's July, 1984 "Not By Practice Alone" section of her Perspectives Thesis, her Dec. 30 speech to the expanded Resident Editorial Board Meeting of News and Letters Committees on "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror: A Revolutionary Critical Look," her Jan. 27-Feb. 3 Talk on "Dialectics of Revolution and of Women's Liberation" seem to me to be one long letter addressed to ourselves as Marxist-Humanists. It is a letter which says to us: now that we have our trilogy of revolution which has shown us Marx's Marxism, Lenin's Marxism and the Great Divide that established Marxist-Humanism, now that we have practiced that Marxist-Humanism for some three full decades as an independent tendency, as paper, as pamphlets, as organization, as living Marxist-Humanists engaged in freedom

struggles, then how can we so fully absorb what we have, not as alone sum-up, as magnificent, as laborious, a task as that in and of itself would be, but how can we sum-up with such a full consciousness of what we have done that it becomes, the concrete universal, the revolutionary human praxis, the new beginning that would be our revolutionary reaching for the future? How can the unchaining of the dialectic be an unchaining of ourselves as fully practicing Marxist-Humanists?

To me this is what "Not By Practice Alone" means. That the unchaining of the dialectic also means how Marxist-Humanism unchains itself, gains a full consciousness of its own contributions. If it took us 10 years of the vicissitudes of state-capitalism to finally unchain the dialectic, I would argue that it has taken us a necessary 30 years more to come to the point where that unchaining has reached the level of being able to overcome all barriers to our revolutionary practice as Marxist-Humanists.

In the Big Move section of "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror," Raya shows it is not geography, but philosophy that determines. And yet a philosophic breakthrough demands geographic considerations. With this view of a movement from practice, didn't it mean moving out of New York and finding a proletarian center to locate in? With P&R didn't it mean a return to try and establish a different kind of local in New York as cultural and intellectual center in the battle of ideas? Have we come to grips with what the Center's move to Chicago at the time following RLWLKH, following the Marx Centenary, and most important, in the period when we face the necessity of Marxist-Humanism becoming fully conscious of what it represents as a world-historic-philosophic tendency and practicing it?

Several times in the "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror," Raya summarizes who we are as this world-historic-philosophic tendency: "There is no substitute for the Idea itself, and the Idea itself for this epoch is Marxist-Humanism." (p.4) "The whole now is not just the Absolute Method, but the Absolute Idea itself and its concretization as Marxist-Humanism and as News and Letters Committees." (p.8) "Today I declare that Absolute Method, thought it is the goal from which no private endeavor can escape, is still only 'the road to' the Absolute Idea or Mind. This is still the only answer which transcends method -- or expresses it, if you wish. And that needs concretization. That concretization is the name of the Absolute Idea of our age: Marxist-Humanism further pinpointed as News and Letters Committees in the U.S., but by no means limited to the U.S. It is a world concept, a world concretization. And it is that historic look at it, and the looking at ourselves, that will assure revolution-in-permanence to be."

It is that looking at ourselves that we need to be aware of. Not in isolation, but as part of a world, and historic look. And as part of the newly emerging forces of revolution on the scene today. That is, our look at ourselves is an objective one.

That is I believe where Raya was taking us in the third part of her Dec. 30 presentation, "The Dialectics of Revolution and of Reason" when she undertakes a presentation of her new book by giving us an overview of her introduction. It is not alone a summation, it is a discussion of forms of the dialectic within her introduction. Let us look at them: 1.) Women's Liberation 'when it is in relation --when it comes out of -- the new epoch itself.' 2.) Reason as the new consciousness and the revolutionary forces of the new consciousness. 3.) Masses in motion transforming reality. 4.) The return to Hegel. 5.) Without revolution in permanence as ground for organization, it doesn't make any difference whether you have an organization or not, you will fail. 6.) The need for a total uprooting, including that of the family.

Now these six dialectics are really something. You can't "categorize" them in

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any simple manner. They are subjects of revolution, they are consciousness, they are masses in motion, they are return to Hegel. In short, with all these "determinations" of the dialectic -- and each epoch, country, movement, has its own specific determination, -- they must all end as concrete universals. That is, they must have an inseparability of thought and revolution.

Thus this new introduction is not only a summary of the book, but a new creation. It says look, I will show you how Absolute Idea as New Beginning is manifest in our age, as determinations of the dialectic. So what we are left with as we end Dec. 30th, what we are left with as we view the unchaining of the revolutionary dialectic from Hegel to Marx to Lenin to 30 and more years of Marxist-Humanism, is not some pinnacle to worship and hold fast, saying this is the dialectic. No, we instead have a revolutionary critical look, including of ourselves. We are left with new determinations of the dialectic, new manifestations, new beginnings that are such because that is the nature of the unchaining of the revolutionary dialectic -- Absolute Idea, Absolute Negativity as New Beginning.

On Raya Dunayevskaya's "The concrete-Universal: a retrospective look at thirty years of News & Letters" by Kevin, Chicago

"The confrontation with the counter-revolution within the revolution demands new beginnings greater than any Hegel searched for philosophically. This is what makes Hegel a contemporary."

"The concrete Universal manifests itself as absolute activity, activity without restriction, either external or internal; for the method is the form of the Absolute Idea, self-movement as method. It allows no opposites merely to coexist peacefully or, to use Hegel's words, to come 'before consciousness without being in contact,' 'but engages in battle.'"

"It was because the masses had found a new way to freedom that a new leap in cognition was also possible. Moreover, what the Soviet as the new form of organization was in November 1917, the new decentralized form of workers' control of production through Workers' Councils became in 1956."

"Put differently, just as Marx's Humanism in East Europe was brought onto the historic stage in the mid-1950's, torn out of academia as well as away from the intellectualistic debates among Existentialists, Communists and theologians in West Europe, so there came actual new forms of human relationships. The decentralized non-statist form of human relations through councils became a concrete universal, not only for workers, but also for intellectuals and youth."

--Philosophy and Revolution, pp.29,39
(emphasis added)

I am not suggesting that the above passages from P&R include the fullness of the 1985 concept of the "concrete-Universal", with its stress on Marxist-Humanism as "the Idea", as in the Dec. 30, 1984 talk on "Responsibility for Marxist-Humanism in the Historic Mirror": "...even Absolute Method is now stressed as only the 'road to' the Absolute Idea. And the Idea is Marxist-Humanism." But they do show the road to that 1985 concept of "concrete-Universal", particularly on the relationship of the "concrete-Universal" of Marxist-Humanism to the objectivity of the mass creativity of the 1950's.

What the essay on "30 Years" explores is the "birth-time" of the "concrete-Universal" of Marxist-Humanism as the paper N&L, then tracing its full development. Only with the eyes of 1985 can a recollection of those early years see them in their full originality and creativity, now that we have the trilogy of revolution and Women's Liberation and the Dialectics of Revolution. Our recollection is a 1985 one also in the sense of taking as its ground world objective events, from Poland to South Africa to Central America.

In fact, it is certainly Ronald Reagan today who "causes" us to look back at 30 years of N&L, as shown in paragraph 1 of "30 Years". Throughout there is the concept of practicing dialectics, but what is dialectics? One answer is to look at the historic Black/Red conference report, originally called in 1968. There, RD presented on P&R after two serious statements on Marxist-Humanism were made by Denby and by the young Black Marxist-Humanist Raymond McKay. There, RD said: "Dialectics originally meant 'dialect' or talking - and the Greeks had a very opinion of it if it was the philosophers who were doing the talking. They had the first democracy for the citizens, but not for the slave laborers. What was different about when Hegel got to re-establish it for our age? We had moved from 500 B.C., when there was a slave society, to 1789, when there was a French Revolution, the greatest revolution that had

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ever taken place. And the people, the sans-culottes, the enrages, the indignant hearts - they had something to say about things... They wanted to know why they wouldn't be able to discuss things... So that when he began to talk about dialectic, it didn't mean only - thoughts bumping up against each other, it meant action. It meant development through contradiction, the development of ideas, and of actual history, and of the class struggle."

RD tells us in the third paragraph of "30 Years" that especially the first issue of N&L "will reveal, first, what we heard, and second, the meaning we gave to what we heard by declaring it to be 'a movement from practice that is itself a form of theory.'" There are two central points here: 1) The MGS pamphlet and the question of "what type of labor"; 2) June 17, 1953 as the first general strike under totalitarianism, in the heart of Europe, East Berlin. Issue #1 of N&L was dedicated to June 17, while issue #2 in that year 1955 contains RD's column on 1953 in Russia, "The Revolt in the Slave Labor Camps in Vorkuta."

Paragraphs 7-14 of "30 Years" show us the principles of N&L as practiced in Issue #1: Two worker editors, including CD; the picture of Njeri, African revolutionary woman; WL as reason with 3 columnists; youth as idealism vs. concept of 'beat generation'; MD's column; RV's; the philosophical column TW by RD.

Look at worker editor CD we see in a 1955 issue a very original column on "peace" in a debate with a Stalinist worker in the shop, where the Stalinist has peace as between rulers and CD raises the concept of constant war on the masses even in so-called peacetime by all rulers. Or look also at the October 26, 1955 lead "Women in the News the World Over", which takes up U.S. working women and Moroccan women throwing off the veil to fight French colonialism on the streets. The article states that working women in the U.S. "are rebelling not only against the companies and against the labor bureaucracy, but against the traditional domination of their husbands in their own homes as well."

Paragraph 15 stresses how our first 1955 Conference established N&L and assigned RD to complete M&F, but we did not wait to issue Lenin's Philosophic Notebooks and the 1953 Letters on Hegel's Absolutes as a pamphlet. The sharp differences between N&L and another journal which had broken with Trotskyism from the Left, Socialisme ou Barbarie, is shown as early as RD's August 5, 1955 column on them - long, long before they degenerated into leading French sociologists of an increasingly rightward bent. That journal, even when revolutionary, was anti-Leninist, thus denying themselves a grounding in the Philosophic Notebooks. They also never learned to listen to the workers, despite breaking somewhat with vanguardism, as RD shows in her 1955 column.

Paragraph 18 shows the relation of N&L to M&F: that quotes from American workers in the final chapter on "Automation and the New Humanism" in fact came from N&L. So great and new was the concept of N&L as paper, that our founding 1956 Convention's Perspectives had to caution: "To this day, some of us fail to see this book on Marxism as something as new in its field as News & Letters is in its." Yet our 1985 view of the originality of N&L is different from the 1956 view, having practiced those Marxist-Humanist dialectics ever since. The 1957 Plenum resolved to sell M&F "as founders", an idea returned to in 1985, with WLDL and the whole trilogy.

In 1956, two new types of labor stories appeared: the Feb. 29, 1956 report "Montgomery Negroes Show the Way" by CD, and Angela T. Terrano's January 6, 1956 article on automation which concretized further "what type of labor should man do?" as: "Under a new society, work will have to be completely new, not just work to get money to buy food and things. It will have to be completely tied up with life."

That is of course quoted in M&F, but it first appeared in N&L. It was also her first column to appear on the labor page.

The next section of "30 Years" on 1952-59 focuses on our dialogue with the European independent Left. This was discussed in the 1980 pamphlet 25 Years of MH, but not with the fullness of today's analysis. The July 1958 Lead and TW on the rise of De Gaulle in France point to private capitalism wanting to copy from the labor relations of state capitalism. RD in "30 Years" ties the Left's failure to meet the challenge of De Gaulle to its disregard also of M&F: "What 1958 had made clear to me was that the disregard of Marxism and Freedom by these tendencies was not a mere factional attitude, but an actual failure on their part to face the new objective reality."

The 1959 pre-Plenum bulletin #4 contains "On International Relations" by RD, which relates the 1959 trip to the 1947 one and to the new type of relations with Africa and E. Europe of the 1960's, and the failure to grasp all that history in the problems with some of our relations with the French Lefts in 1968-69. It states that the 1959 meeting did at least result eventually in the Italian edition of M&F, but it quotes from Bess's serious report reproduced this year on 1959: "It was a voyage of discovery of the radical groups since the Hungarian Revolution. It was clear then that these radical groups had not become the polarizing force for the thousands who had torn up their CP membership cards in disgust."

During this period 1953-59, we had critiqued Mao in M&F as well as in N&L, such as in the September 30, 1958 TW with the subhead "Not Mao, but the creative untapped energy of millions." The January 1959 TW discussed the 1957 meeting with the Camerounian, while the June and July issue published NCMHAAR.

RD embarked on her major U.S. lecture tour in spring 1959, and as reported by Robert Ellery's youth column of May 1959: No less than 5000 heard her - including 300 in Berkeley, with the next biggest being the turnouts of 200 and 250 in audiences in Chicago. This was while McCarthyism was still rampant. She also refuted the media's characterization of the 1959 youth as "delinquent", "beat" or "conformist", writing that "youth by the thousands turned out to hear and participate in discussions of a theory of liberation that would underline an entirely new society." The "30 Years" points up also the Iraqi revolution of 1958 and the failure of Marxists to try to work out what that signified." It points to today with a discussion of the Shiites in Iraq.

This part of "30 Years" concludes by returning to the 1959 conference in Milan; "Unfortunately, what was revealed at the 1959 conference of those who had rejected both poles of world capital since World War II was that without dialectical philosophy, the state-capitalist theory was inadequate, and this inadequacy was not limited to the state-capitalist tendency in the U.S." Bess's report reproduced this year in Pre-Plenum Bulletin #1 shows that it was only the British who wanted serious philosophical and organizational relations with M&F. She states that what they needed at that time was "to get M&F in their bones as we have had" and cites both the British page in N&L and the forthcoming British NCMHAAR.

RD's presentation in 1959 in Milan shows the ground for all international trips. (1955 Pre-Plenum Bulletin #1). But it is more than that: it is a concretization of M&F and N&L for West Europe and especially for Left intellectuals. It shows the difference between what the Stalinists wanted to reduce dialectics to, struggle of opposites, and the MH concept of "absolute freedom". It points to Zhdanov's 1947 "attack on dialectics" and the 1955 attack on the young Marx by Karpushin, trying to convince the independent but anti-philosophy Left that "the totalitarian planners didn't just 'happen' upon Humanism. The truth of MH forced itself onto the historic scene the world over from Hungary to Asia to Africa."

Relatedly, in 1972, the Guide to Marxist Philosophy by Catholic intellectuals calls M&F's "attack on the Soviet position" on philosophy "of real interest", and quotes M&F on how the Russian attack on the Humanist Essays "continues to spend incredible time and energy and vigilance to imprison Marx within the bounds of the private property versus state property concept." They did not quote another sentence on that same page 53: "It is the revolutionary method of the dialectic and

the Humanism of Marx that threatens their existence in theory even as the working class does in life." This is what was rejected at the Milan meeting.

Later, in 1961, RD summed up the 1950-59 dialogue in the Perspectives: "The independent Marxist groupings in Western Europe did not contribute much to the search for a total philosophy by those who had broken from Communism, because by now they stood naked in their empiricism, and in the despair over the smallness of their number, were ready to cast ashore on any new ship, even one that had no rudder."

The section on the 1960's of the "30 Years" shows the link between K&F, I&L as a concept and the pamphlet W&A on the one hand, and our critique of Castro on the other. In 1960 we also produced the magnificent I&L Lead on Sharpeville and the U.S.: "South Africa, South USA". See also the 25 Years of I&L for the photo we ran in 1960 on the 30,000-strong PAC demonstration in the heart of Capetown. It is pointed out in "30 Years" that Angela Terrano becomes Associate Editor just after her view on work as caught up with I&L is published in W&A.

The year 1963 saw both ACOT (at a high point of Black in America) and RD's public call for a new International of U.S., East European and African Marxist-Humanists, published in I&L and in Presence Africaine, where she wrote: "Just as the fight for freedom on the part of the Hungarian revolutionaries... has made them theoretical Marxist-Humanists, the plunge into freedom has made the African revolutionaries the activist Marxist-Humanists of today. The Marxist-Humanists of other lands are ready to listen and, with your help, to establish that new international which will be free from state-control and will aspire to reconstruct the world." The 1962 Africa trip was recorded in I&L, in Africa Today, in the WFL's and in the 1962 Perspectives, where the African experiences led to new developments on the Marxist-Humanist concept of organization. As the 25 Years of I&L shows, it was also while in Africa in 1962 that RD received the letter from an East European who had read K&F and who "wanted to establish relations with Marxist-Humanists abroad." January 1962, it is also pointed out in "30 Years", also saw the publication in I&L for the first time of the critique of Mao in K&F, which ended with the "two kinds of subjectivity" which were so central to P&R - Mao's voluntarism versus Marx's concept of subjectivity which had "absorbed objectivity." The latter concept was referred to as well in the earlier January 1961 summary of the Science of Logic, now in D of L, but it was not then named yet as Marx's own concept.

The last section of "30 Years" is actually on 1960-69, but it begins by showing us in a very new way, the philosophical failure of the 1964 FSM, which underpinned the New Left's empiricist 1965 decision to abandon the Black movement in order to jump into the antiwar movement. But Royce here gives a strictly philosophical critique of the FSM: "Thus, I spoke to activists within the Free Speech Movement (FSM) on 'Marx's Debt to Hegel: The Theory of Alienation'. But, in practice, they gave the theory of alienation so existentialist a twist and so nearly Communist a bent that they ended up as hardly more than hangers-on to the elitist-party wing of the FSM... They insisted that activity as just activity was all that was required, and that philosophy was no Great Divide. Indeed to them, theory could be caught 'en route'."

Up to now, I had in my mind counterposed the high, near Marxist humanist level of the interest in Marx's Humanism of the FSM to what followed for example in the SDS of 1965-69, which was my own introduction to the movement. SDS explicitly rejected humanism by 1969 in favor of Mao's voluntarist version of Stalinism, despite its massive numbers and explicit embrace of the word "revolution". Even the more independent youth revolutionaries of the time, one of the best of which was Cohn-Bendit in France 1968, showed himself not to have gone beyond the 1950 type of Left with his "pick up theory en route". That was hardly a development beyond 1959. In fact, the main influence on him was Socialisme ou Barbarie, a tendency also present in Milan in 1959, but which rejected Lenin as well as philosophy.

In that period 1965-69, I&L instead struck out in some new directions, creating a very different type of merging of Marxist-Humanism with Black on the basis of P&R at the 1969 Black-led conference, and with the newly-emergent MLK. But the

activity of the period seemed so exciting and massive that even some Marxist-Humanist youth refused to face that 1969 was not 1968, leading to the 1969 pamphlet, "The Hewness of Our Historic-Philosophic Contribution", which was central to that book in process, F&R.

That book is in fact the transition point from the Marxist-Humanism of the 1960's to that of today. The new F&R introduction of 1981 states: "Only when the ideal of a new classless society no longer remains simply an 'underlying philosophy' but becomes social practice...creating new human relations, beginning with the Man/Woman relationship - can we say we have met the challenge of our age both in philosophy and revolution." That sentence followed a full discussion of the revolutionary humanist character of Hegel's Absolute Method, in a debate with S.A. Kelly.

In place of a conclusion, I would like to illustrate how a continuing confrontation with Hegel marks not only the period of F&R, but Marxist-Humanism in the 1930's as well, where there has been a constant return to Hegel as "source of all dialectic".

Let us look for a moment at the NEW CATEGORY developed first in 1931, as RD reorganized the RLSIKM book to have a separate Chapter 12 on those new moments in Marx's last decade. That concept is in the 1935 Plenum Call, termed there "Post-Marx Marxists as a pejorative of all Marxists beginning with Engels." To more fully grasp this concept we have I think to begin looking at it as a process within Marxist-Humanism. The first public mention I have found of this new category is in RD's December 1931 T/P column "On the 150th Anniversary Since Hegel's Death: How Valid for Our Day Are Marx's Hegelian Roots?" There, RD states that Lenin's return to Hegel "separated him from all other post-Marx Marxists." But she says that none followed him on Hegel, although many did on vanguardism. Then RD states very simply: "In my new work, RLMLKH, I go into detail on the whole question of post-Marx Marxists." (emphasis added) Of course, her Dec. 13, 1931 talk developed this in much detail, as can be seen in MLDR. But for Marxist-Humanism, once again it appears that the birth of a new category, "post-Marx Marxists", seemed to be related to a "return to Hegel".

This return to Hegel is not, as Marxist-Humanists know, to flee from Reaganism to some Ivory tower. Rather, because of Reagan as a new stage in the objective world for the period 1979-85, it is as seen at the beginning of this discussion piece on F&R, which quoted that work on "the counter-revolution within the revolution" which "demands new beginnings greater than any Hegel searched for" which for us Marxist-Humanists, "makes Hegel a contemporary." It also makes Marxist-Humanism "the Idea" that can become the transition to a new society in the 1990's if we can learn to project it by "practicing dialectics."

STUDIES IN DIALECTICS OF THE CONCRETE: Absolute Idea as new beginning,
as a new Humanism, as a "new Hegel" --Lou, Chicago

Philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstraction, and it leads
back to the concrete. --Hegel, History of Philosophy

The first and fundamental thing that one who wishes to adequately un-
derstand and master philosophic teaching of Hegel must do is to ex-
plain to oneself his relation to the concrete empirical world...the
term, 'concrete' comes from the Latin 'concrecere.' 'Crescere' means
'to grow': 'concrecere', to coalesce, to rise through growth.

--Ilyin, The Philosophy of Hegel as a Doctrine of the Concreteness of
God and of Man

* * *

Hegel's Absolutes, especially his reworking of the final result
of his philosophy in the syllogisms at the end of his Philosophy of
Mind the year before his death in 1831, is the subject of Theodore
Geraets' essay, "The Impossibility of Philosophy...and its Realiza-
tion," in the Fall 1984 issue of The Owl of Minerva. Hegel's Abso-
lutes have been the subject of analysis by Hegel scholars since the 1960s.
Prof. Geraets' essay occupies a conspicuous but unenviable position
in the discussion of Hegel's Absolutes, for as his title indicates,
Hegel's dialectic of Notion and Reality is being "articulated" (to use
Prof. Geraets's term) as more a question of Kantian modalities than
as determinations of Hegelian dialectics. It is not philosophy's
reality, but its "never ending process of actualization," in Prof.
Geraets' view, which allows him to abstractly counterpose what in
Hegel's Absolutes makes philosophy impossible and what constitutes
its realization.

Because it is the concrete and not the impossible which is at the
core of Hegel's Absolutes, it becomes all the more imperative to take
seriously Prof. Geraets' observation that Hegel's dialectic "mobil-
izes the efforts of each of us to comprehend our times, the new rea-
lities and new conquests of the sciences." (p.37) However, Hegel's
dialectic, taken thus seriously, cannot escape being taken as any-
thing but a dialectic of the concrete. With that in mind, this es-
say, in response to the questions raised by Prof. Geraets, will look
at the "labor of philosophizing" of one contemporary thinker
whose practicing of the dialectic as a concrete-Universal has been
a philosophic mobilization to not only "comprehend our times" and
"the new realities," but to change them.

That the very categories which are the subject matter of Prof.
Geraets' essay have centrally intervened in the works of the Marxist-
Humanist philosopher, Raya Dunayevskaya, is not without import for
determining the direction of the renewed discussion of Hegel's Abso-
lutes. Consequently, counterposing Dunayevskaya's projection of
Hegel's Absolutes as "new beginnings" to Prof. Geraets' "articulation"
of them as either categories of the impossible or the expression of
a "process of actualization" will help to illuminate their true deter-
mination, especially their final result in Absolute Mind. The argu-
ment presented here is that though Prof. Geraets wants grasp Hegel's
philosophy as "essentially historical and innovative, because it mo-
bilizes the efforts of each of us to comprehend our times," he, in

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fact, makes such a comprehension impossible; and that Dunayevskaya's view of Hegel's Absolutes not only does disclose the historic-philosophic structure of our epoch but reveals a "new Hegel."

I.

It would appear, at first, that Prof. Geraets's essay, "The Impossibility of Philosophy...and its Realization," attempts to invoke Marx's famous admonition to the Left Hegelians that "you cannot abolish philosophy without realizing it." However, it becomes quite clear that in choosing such a provocative title to discuss the final result of Hegel's philosophy, Prof. Geraets' intention was not to invoke but to dispel any "subversive" relationship that Marx might have to Hegel's Absolutes. For immediately following his description of Hegel's ridiculing the empty abstractions of the Possible and the Impossible as found in the Kantian philosophy, Prof. Geraets resorts to the familiar, and by now unprovocative, counterposing of Hegel to "Marxists of various kinds." The incantation, "Marxists of various kinds," is for the purpose of conjuring up the false dichotomy between Marx and Hegel that has come to be associated with Communist ideologues, especially those of the current "structuralist" variety.

Moreover, in a strict philosophic sense, there is certainly more to Hegel's treatment of possibility than what Prof. Geraets cites from the annotation to para. 143 of the Smaller Logic. What the "more" underscores is the fact that Prof. Geraets seems more confident that he has shown "the contradiction, in Hegel's own philosophy" (p:31) than Marx ever thought he had. The truth is that Marx felt compelled at each turning point in his development to return to Hegel's philosophy in his labors to recreate the Hegelian dialectic as a philosophy of revolution for what Marx called "epochs of social revolution." Indeed, it was Hegel's discernment of the actual in the possible which led Marx to conclude that the greatest contribution of the Hegelian dialectic was that it revealed "transcendence as an objective movement." This is of the essence, for though Marx's Economic-Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 show that he did not take up the final syllogisms of Hegel's Absolute Mind, later, when we look at the manner in which Prof. Geraets does treat them, we will see that Marx's profound, critical appreciation and grasp of the Hegelian dialectic did reveal that he had caught, instinctively, its final result.

Because the one contribution Prof. Geraets does make with his provocative abstraction, "impossibility," is to impel us to reconsider the relationship of Hegel's concept of actuality to his Absolutes, especially as Hegel distinguished his concept of the actual from Kant's (a distinction which Prof. Geraets disregards), we need to turn briefly to that question, before confronting Hegel's Absolutes in-and-for-themselves.

To Hegel, Kant's characterization of Actuality, Necessity and Possibility as Modalities, rather than treating them dialectically, signified that the Kantian philosophy had not shown "how null and meaningless" the abstractions possible and impossible actually are in philosophy. As against "the import of Possibility which induced Kant to regard it along with necessity and actuality as Modalities" (para. 143), Hegel argues that "it is otherwise with Actuality and Necessity.

They are anything but a mere sort and mode for something else; in fact the very reverse of that. If they are supposed, it is as the concrete, not merely supposititious, but intrinsically complete." In further distinguishing actuality in his dialectic of the concrete from Kant's modalities, Hegel ends his annotation to para. 143 as follows:

"Whether a thing is possible or impossible, depends altogether on the subject-matter; that is, on the sum total of the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be necessity."

We thus see that Hegel wants to distinguish his conception of actuality in philosophy from Kant's merely phenomenological view. Why, however, does Prof. Geraets want to make a distinction between Hegel and Marx? Could Prof. Geraets have sensed in Hegel's Absolutes, especially in their final result, the beginning of the Marxian "subversion" of the dialectic into a philosophy of revolution, as fulfilling the imperative to realize philosophy?

II.

It is necessary, at this point, to turn directly to Geraets' analysis of the Absolute Idea and Absolute Mind, not only to answer these questions, but because the Absolute Idea and the three final syllogisms of Hegel's Absolute Mind contain the final result of the dialectic.

From the start there is the problematic of Prof. Geraets' "articulation" of the Absolute Idea. First, it is not true that Absolute Knowledge is Absolute Idea, in the strict philosophic sense. At each pinnacle, whether in the Phenomenology of Mind, the Science of Logic or the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel necessarily turns thought back upon itself, in what appears to be a "remembrance of things past." In each case, this recollection/summation of the whole course produces different results or arrives at a different content. Each is, however, differentiated in-itself, and in each inheres the impulse and power to transcend, i.e., to make a new beginning.

Secondly, the moment of recollection at the climax of the dialectic would appear to follow the Platonic method of recollecting the Universal forms and ideas out of the movement of the soul. Indeed, Hegel's greatest appreciation, outside of Heraclitus, is for Plato and Aristotle (whose philosophic systems happen to correspond to Hegel's first two syllogisms in Absolute Mind). That appreciation extended to Hegel's use of Platonic terminology when referring to the "dialectic soul" which everything has.

Hegel arrives at the pinnacle of the Logic, however, wherein the whole course of thought is made to undergo a compressed recollection of the forms of the whole movement, not for the subjective reason that Hegel wants to make his philosophy the absolute end of all philosophy. Nor, is it in order to follow Plato's method. On the contrary, it is at this point that Hegel distinguishes his method from Plato's and Kant's. Hegel's philosophic recollection is not only necessary for the "questions of method," but because his critique of the history of philosophy showed that its Absolutes became fixed as endings rather fluid, leading to new beginnings. Though it is true that beginnings

in Hegel's dialectic are always made with the absolute, they only become concrete in the end, in the process.

Therefore, in order for the Absolute Idea to be, it has to "hear itself speak" and this is its realization. At the moment when the logical course of thought reaches back into-itself, through its philosophic recollection, the Idea takes on the onto-logical life of Being, i.e., it becomes a concrete Notion. There is no transition in this movement, when the Idea realizes itself, rather it "freely releases itself."

Hegel's great achievement is to have deduced the Idea from itself, i.e., the self (being) of the Idea is the movement of thought. As against Plato's immortal mythological forms and Kant's a priori thing-in-itself, Hegel makes finite historical movement the active and creative principle of the dialectic because he has discovered the infinitude of mind as the revolutionary subversion of finite reality. The French Revolution illuminated this relationship of Notion to reality for Hegel. Thus, the Absolute Idea stands as the absolute truth and only authentic standpoint because "history and its process," to borrow Marx's expression, is a ceaseless confrontation with human thought. Its significance revolves around the fact that dialectics has arrived, 2500 years after its birth in Greek thought, at the point where an absolute identity exists between theory and practice, which is at the same time an absolute opposition that entails the transcendence of transition and recollection as the determination of the Idea.

Recollection, at this point, is for the purpose of showing that the human power of thought, in Hegel's view (praxis in Marx's), has now attained the absolute ground form which to begin from itself the development of its own universals. Hegel's reconstruction of thought out of the history of philosophy, in its final result, is not only light years away from Plato, but signalled a great divide between Hegel and his contemporaries, beginning with Kant. Thus, Hegel's is an idealism at whose pinnacle begins a "new Humanism."

As a consequence, the Absolute Idea and its comprehension becomes itself a philosophic divide in the Hegelian dialectic. The mere totalization of the Hegelian Absolutes -- Phen. of Mind, the Sc. of Log. and the Phil. of Mind -- is insufficient to disclose that divide. Rather, grasping differentiation in the Absolute Idea at the moment of its transcendence, as the "self-liberation" of mind, is the break through in thought needed to fully comprehend the syllogistic self-thinking Idea and its final result. The epochal significance of achieving that breakthrough in dialectics is set forth by Raya Dunayevskaya in her analysis of Lenin's "discovery" of the Hegelian roots of Marxian dialectics in the midst of World War I. Such a breakthrough is, in fact, Dunayevskaya's unique contribution to dialectical reason.

III.

"It is unfortunate that a man can still write today that the absolute is not man."
--Sartre, Situations

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In setting the unlikely context for the discovery of the new dialectic of the capitalist-imperialist epoch, Dunayevskaya characterizes

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Lenin, its discover, as the "most militant materialist." The characterization of Lenin as a "militant materialist," at the moment of his encounter with Hegel's "idealism" accentuated the fact that even the subjectivity of the discoverer appears to be at total odds with the discovery. What flowed from this absolute encounter was stated by Lenin himself: "Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism...Dialectical idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, vulgar, static instead of stupid."

According to Dunayevskaya, the absolute eruption of capitalist world war and the absolute collapse of world Marxism was the historic ground from which a new beginning emerged, as a consequence of Lenin's return to the Hegelian "dialectic proper" in the Sc. of Log. The new beginning in the dialectic appears in Lenin's study at the point where he recognizes that "Cognition not only reflects the objective world but creates it." That, however, was left undeveloped, and was not made the concrete universal of the epoch until it was worked out and projected by Dunayevskaya as a "new humanism."

Again, it appeared that Prof. Geraets had an intimation of the new humanist beginnings in Hegel's Absolutes when he referred to the "subjectivity" of the Idea being in-and-for-itself. When we come to the final syllogism and Absolute Mind it will be clear that that was not his intention: "subjectivity" is used as a substitute for Hegel's "self-thinking Idea." In other words, rather than encountering Hegel at that seemingly stratospheric level, Prof. Geraets reduces Absolute Idea to "subjectivity." That retreat from encountering Hegel on the ground of that most problematic of categories, however, diverts from the kind of absolute confrontation with the power of dialectic negativity that Dunayevskaya contends Lenin experienced (a "shock of recognition) when returned to Hegel. In other words, Hegel's dialectic demands that thought experience a breakthrough in order to grasp its final result. There is nothing quiescent in grappling with Hegel's absolute negativity, is Dunayevskaya's point.

The absolute as Method is the form and movement of the Notion of the subject matter. It is the soul and substance of objective reality. This, on the one hand, is the dual alienation in the Absolute Idea which Marx criticized as disclosing Hegel's uncritical positivism. On the other hand, however, it is the "active side" of materialism which Marx criticized Feuerbach and the materialists for having failed to develop. By not grasping this, Marx concludes that Feuerbach has not grasped the significance of the dialectic as "revolutionary, practical-critical activity." Ironically, Feuerbach's critique of the Hegelian dialectic was that it made philosophy "impossible", also.

The only thing, as we shall see, that would make philosophy an "impossibility" with Hegel would be if his absolutes were not grasped as new beginnings growing out of its final result, the resolution of the contradiction between the Notion and Reality. That kind of grasp entails the resolve of the (social) individual to overcome the barriers to that emergence. The subjective end, expressed in Hegel's formulation on "free mind" as "individuality which lets nothing inter-

tere with its universalism, i.e., freedom itself," signifies that Hegel saw that overcoming in the movement for freedom. Thus, the new beginning deduced from the Absolute Idea is, in embryo, the "logic" of a new social individual. More, then, is involved in the Method of the Absolute Idea than a hermeneutical return to the beginning, or a mere recollection of the past. The intimation in the final two paragraphs of the Absolute Idea (which forms the opening syllogism of Absolute Mind) of new spheres (Nature and Mind) involves a new theoretical practice. Marx's first thesis on Feuerbach spells this out as "revolutionary, practical-critical activity."

The individual resolve to make a beginning on Hegel's new foundation, on the ground of the revolution that Hegel made in Philosophy, is the absolute manifestation of the Idea's true and final result. Upon this rests not only the sublation (absorption) of the Logic which Hegel labored to organize as a new foundation; this entails the sublation of the Hegelian system itself.

Again, the question is not whether Hegel has made philosophy impossible, but whether the world-historic "birthtime" which brought forth the recreation of the dialectic, as a dialectic of negativity, had also produced the social individual to realize, i.e., concretize the absolute-Idea of all philosophy as freedom itself. It is the nature, or rather the maturity of the age, in which a new social individual arises to work out and project the historical/logical imperative of practicing the dialectic of the epoch that makes Hegel a contemporary, according to Dunayevskaya. In other words, Hegel's dialectic is the very structure (and, as such, movement) of Reality, because the dialectic carries its own imperative to transform reality and thought. The movement, then, is from the philosophic abstraction that Marx criticized Hegel's absolutes for having enclosed the individual in, to the social individual who is the resolution of the contradiction between Notion and Reality.

IV

(A note needs to be made concerning Hegel's concept of the new, before going on to Absolute Mind and the final syllogisms. The newness of the Absolute's beginning entails the creation of a new philosophic standpoint through absorbing the old. Thus, in Hegel, the new is more than a temporal designation, it expresses the absolute ground that the logical and phenomenological beginnings that thought must labor through to arrive at its final result as an absolute beginning -- a new beginning.)

The movement of the Notion has been cognized through the course of the Sc. of Log., it is only, however, in the Absolute Idea that it is re-cognized in-and-for-itself, in its universal activity as Absolute Method. It represents a new kind of totality, for Method becomes the means of exhibiting the self-movement of the Notion as a completed totality. That is to say, the totality of the Notion -- the Notion of totality of Notions -- produces an overflowing of the end which creates a totally new means for comprehending the universal activity of the Idea. This is not only what Hegel meant by philosophy "ending" with his, it is what makes his Absolute Method a path-

way to the Absolute Idea. It is only with such an "ending" that all future philosophy becomes possible as "the spirit of its time cast in thought."

This explains not only why Hegel labored over the question, "With what must science begin?" but why he concludes in the Absolute Idea that the entire course of the Logic was to found a new beginning for thought. Thus, the doctrine of Hegel's Absolute Idea is a doctrine of new beginnings in the philosophical sciences. If the beginning of the Logic is determined by the final result of what flowed from it, the absolute as new beginning is determined by what has led up to it. There is no room for any a priori separation of ends and means because method begins from what has made it absolute, the universal activity of absolute negativity.

All of Hegel's Absolutes contain differentiation. Hegel, thus, makes two beginnings, one concrete (empirical), the other abstract (logical). The dialectic of the former is phenomenological, in that it moves from the concrete to the general with Absolute Knowledge as the final result in the Phen. of Mind; the other is ontological, and moves from an abstract universal to the concrete universal with the Absolute Idea as the final result of the Sc. of Logic. The Ency. of Phil. Sc. contains the syllogistic uniting of these two beginnings, and, as such, is the final result of the new beginning that culminates in the Logic as Absolute Idea.

For the Idea of Philosophy to return to itself on the ground of a new beginning is the self-thinking Idea which has absorbed the Logic as a principle of mind. This act of self-reflection is a logical/historical mirror which brings us back to the Absolute Idea as a social and historical principle, a new epochal imperative. Thus, the final result of the Absolute is not only a social individual but a new human society, a whole new human dimension. The social individual has absorbed Absolute Idea as the Notion/Reality dichotomy which elicits the Method for overcoming the opposition.

Finally, Hegel explains the subject's absorption of the Notion and Reality as the determination of a new social individual, who even unifies time and space in a new way:

"...the word 'have,' employed in the perfect tense, has quite peculiarly the meaning of presence; what I have seen is something not merely that I had, but still have, something, therefore, that is present in me. In this use of the word 'have' can be seen a general sign of the inwardness of the modern mind, which makes the reflection, not merely that the past in its immediacy has passed away, but also that in mind the past is still preserved." (para. 450, zusatz)

Marx, as profoundly, formulates this as "time is the space of human development."

V

"...the greatness of the Hegelian philosophy of its final result -- the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creative principle -- lies in the first place in the circumstances that Hegel...grasps... the collective action of man, only as a result of history."

--Marx, "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic"

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We now turn to Hegel's final result in the Phil. of Mind where the universality of free mind interpenetrates that of time/space in Nature. Immediately, we see that not only is the figure of the first syllogism -- Logic-Nature-Mind -- the description of the Ency. of Phil. Sc., it is the externalization of the Idea as Nature. Because the movement and determination of this syllogism is the source of the syllogistic movement, and has become problematic in its interpretation, it will be helpful to quote Hegel's view of the "dialectic of Nature." The following passage recalls Hegel's formulation on dialectics as a quadruplicity rather than a triplicity which appears in the penultimate section of the Absolute Idea, just preceding the Idea's transition to Nature:

"...the cause why that which in the rational conclusion is merely three-fold, passes in nature to the four-fold, rests in what is natural, because what is thought is immediately the one, becomes separated in Nature. But in order that in Nature the opposition should exist as opposition, it must itself be a two-fold, and thus, when we count, we have four... (W)hen we apply it to the world, we have nature as mean and the existent spirit as the way for nature: when the return is made, this is the absolute Spirit."

Nature-Mind-Logic, the second syllogism, contains the dual standpoint or is rather philosophy's transcendence of the phenomenology of mind. Thus, the sublation (absorption) of the natural standpoint of the first syllogism proceeds via thought's subordination of the phenomenological thing-in-itself in Nature to the philosophical Idea of the second syllogism. Mind in the position of mediation in the second syllogism contains both the the phenomenological aspect of mind in relation to its presupposition in Nature, or materialism, and the philosophical aspect of mind in relation to Logic, or idealism. It represents the implicit break down of the syllogistic form itself.

The second syllogism contains equally the problematic of Hegel's Third Attitude to Objectivity, which is presented in the Smaller Logic for the first time, i.e., "immediate knowledge" masquerading in the phenomenal world as philosophy. Thought descends in a reactionary retrogression from the dialectic realization of the Idea to the phenomenological standpoint of the thing-in-itself sans method, i.e., to intuitionism.

Because the freedom of mind found in the first syllogism is still bound by the conditions of natural necessity, it gives rise, in the second syllogism, to two kinds of subjectivity: the subjectivity of Personality which has not superseded the phenomenological world of the thing-in-itself, and to "subjective cognition of which freedom (Freiheit) is the aim, and which /philosophy/is itself the way to produce it."

Hegel recognizes this splitting of Spirit (Mind) in the Phen. of Mind: "The sphere of spirit at this stage breaks up into two regions. The one is the actual world, that of self-estrangement, the other is that which spirit constructs for itself in the ether of pure consciousness, raising itself above the first. This second world, being constructed in opposition and contrast to that estrangement is just on

that account not free from it." (p.513, Baillie) That such a reactionary and retrograde mode of thought as intuitionism should appear at the penultimate stage of the Hegelian dialectic "far from signifying any sort of 'synthesis', signals a dismemberment" of the dialectic, according to Dunayevskaya. It is what Marxists call the counter-revolution within the the revolutionary movement. If, then, the first syllogism is the source from which the movement issues, the second syllogism, as an absolute splitting in two, is most critical because it contains the greatest pitfall.

That is involved is more than a question of logical or historical development, but is rather a question of methodological comprehension. Indeed, Hegel underscores the "barbarous procedure" of intuitionism as its disdain for method. To comprehend Hegel's absolutes, not as syntheses of a static triadic form, makes imperative the need to grasp the absolute method of a new subjectivity. Hegel's transformation of the philosophies of Nature and Mind into the dialectic discernment of "the nature of the facts" and the "action of cognition" as a single movement, is reduced by intuitionism to pure subjectivism. To Dunayevskaya, "the trap that awaits all who fail to grapple with what transforms philosophy into a science, how it all emerges from actuality -- the historic process -- is that of the transformation of the personal consciousness 'into a fact of consciousness of all and even passed off for the very nature of mind.'" (Philosophy and Revolution, p.21)

The quadruplicity of moments contained in Hegel's premises, to the extent that number is applicable, is the natural, practical figure of mind. The self-determination of the Idea through which it returns to reality is through human actuality, praxis. Nevertheless, Hegel's absolutes arrive at the problematic encountered by any science, that of proof. Since the premises decide the boundary of any problem, we need to look at Hegel's premises in the final syllogisms.

The proof of absolute negativity as movement having a quadruplicity of moments is deduced from the the premise of the first syllogism. It is the moment of the Idea's exteriority as Nature. According to A.V. Miller, the original translator of the Phil. of Mind, Wallace, mistranslated the following key passage: "Nature, standing between Mind and its essence (Logic), sunders itself, not indeed to extremes of finite abstraction, nor itself to something away from them and independent." (emphasis added, LT) Miller notes that Wallace translates "sie" (them) mistakenly as "sich" (itself). Thus, Hegel's actual wording is that Nature sunders Logic and Mind. The logical presupposition of Nature thus contains the highest contradiction within itself in the form of the opposition between the theoretical and the practical idea. At the other extreme, Nature's mediated result, Mind, divides itself into its phenomenological and philosophic aspects. Nature, therefore, appears in this form as the idea of transition.

In its determination (power) as transition, the Idea assumes the natural "course of necessity." It is an unelicited power, a being in-itself. Nature is the phenomenological world of transition in which negativity is a pent-up force, which first realizes itself as the law of motion. Upon this first premise, through which dialectic

negativity is a moving but still implicit power, the sundered extremes of Logic into the theoretical and practical Idea and Mind into the reflective phenomenal and philosophic self-relation of Spirit assumes the appearance of transition. It is a movement from Logic to Nature, and from Mind to itself.

The latter transition of Mind to itself is thus circular, or self-winding, and transforms transition into the moment of self-comprehending reflection. The dialectic self-develops, thereby, to the second syllogism. Necessity appears as transition in the dialectic of Nature; its overcoming represents a sundering of Mind. Mind's presupposition, then, is necessity, and this as its very actuality is the self-determination of the Idea of freedom. Split asunder, Mind's necessity, its imperative, is to re-unite itself out of its self-estrangement, and that as its own determination becomes the Notion of comprehension. The re-unification of mind is the absolute problematic in the history of philosophy, not only as a question of discerning the missing link between ancient and modern thought, but also as the return of modern to himself out his fragmentation in the modern capitalist epoch. It represents the imperative of the age.

(End of part one)