

Theory/Practice

Whither China?

by Raya Dunayevskaya

Chairwoman, National Editorial Board

The December 1986 month-long student demonstrations in China brought into the open the present turmoil, but they were neither the cause nor the consequence of what is bringing the crisis to a climax. Behind the in-fighting within the Communist Party leadership trying to shift the blame for the present crisis from itself to the rank-and-file, there is a great deal more involved than either finding scapegoats, or the "West's" dogmatic and vulgar glibness about economic "reforms" and political "democracy."

Clearly, in one respect, it is a question of the succession to Deng Xiaoping which will be on the agenda in the fall when the Thirteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is held. But even that is only a partial answer, for it is not a question of who will follow Deng, but what will follow any successor. To avoid the answer to that type of burning question, Mao Zedong had called the near-civil war of the 1971 Lin Biao affair "the great disorder under Heaven."

There is no doubt that that had been the most serious crisis since winning power, and that the crisis came not from the outside or from capitalist elements within the country, but from within the ruling Communist Party leadership, from the very one Mao had constitutionally designated as his successor ("closest comrade in arms").

A whole decade has passed since Mao's death. The disasters of his final decade called the Cultural Revolution have been halted. Yet the "new" world stage he set in motion by rolling the red carpet out for Nixon in 1971 is exactly what happens to national questions in a global world when two nuclear Behemoths are struggling for single world mastery and you do not unfold a truly independent challenge.

THE 1985 YOUTH CHALLENGE TO DENG'S OPENING TO JAPAN AND OTHER STRUGGLES

The Youth have always had a very special role in the Chinese revolutionary movements, and none more im-

portant than the 1960s (to which we will return). But to fully understand the ongoing demonstrations in 1986-87, we have to turn to the demonstrations the year before, to the final quarter of 1985. The demonstrations in China in 1985 were not on any youth problems; they were a challenge to Deng's new policy on Japan. The students read Prime Minister Nakasone's militaristic visit to the shrine where World War II officers lay buried as signifying the same retrogressionist move as Reagan's visit to the Bitburg cemetery in Germany, which produced the same type of outcry against this so-called conciliationism with the Nazi-Japanese militarist past. It was a direct challenge to Deng's deviationism, not only on Japan but globally, and not only on "foreign affairs" but nationally, from the labor/capital relationship at work (witness the steel workers' strikes) as well as reflecting the continuing restlessness in the People's Liberation Army.

That the CCP leadership understood that's what the students were doing could be seen as early as Oct. 9, 1985, when the Japanese Foreign Minister, Shintaro Abe, arrived in Beijing to discuss the new Peace and Friendship Treaty that had been signed between China and Japan. The Chinese Vice-Premier Li Peng agreed with him that relations between China and Japan were now on an even keel, but nevertheless reminded the Japanese Foreign Minister of all the difficulties that there have been between the two countries.

Indeed, the Japanese news agency Kyodo reported that "Li obliquely blamed" the Japanese government for having caused certain "unstable elements in their relationship." Since clearly the student demonstrations against Japan continued, it certainly cannot be considered an accident that the CCP official at that moment confirmed that "rapprochement talks were going on between it and the Japanese Communist Party."

1. See the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation Section of the China Quarterly, no. 105, March 1986. Indeed, the Documentation Sections of the magazine from the whole period of Oct. 1983 through Sept. 1986 are important both for military affairs and foreign affairs, with Japan on the one hand and Russia on the other, as well as actual economic developments in the country.

At the same time there were contradictory reports, (more or less deliberately contradictory) so that the reader didn't know which one set the direction for the year. Was it, for example, a fact, denied by China, that it and the United States engaged in joint naval maneuvers, or was it a fact that China itself was undergoing great technological and militaristic developments in the Pacific? (See nos. 106 and 107 of the Quarterly Chronicle and Documentation Sections of the China Quarterly).

FROM MARX TO MAO

To fully understand what 1987 has in store for China, in light of what has been developing in the objective situation on one hand and the wrestling with the Mao legacy on the other, we have to turn to 1983. The significance of 1983 rests on the fact that it was both the Marx Centenary Year and the 62nd anniversary of the founding of the CCP.

What is of more immediate importance is Mao Zedong Thought. On Nov. 27, 1981, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party finally passed a resolution entitled, "Mao Zedong's Historical Role and Mao Zedong Thought." To prove that though Mao had made "gross mistakes in the 'Cultural Revolution'...his merits are primary and his errors secondary," they summarized Mao's Thought as follows: "Mao made a theoretical synthesis of China's unique experience in its protracted revolution in accordance with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism...many outstanding leaders of our party made important contributions to the formation and development of Mao Zedong Thought and they are synthesized in the scientific work of comrade Mao."

By 1983 there was a great deal more than just the continuation of Mao's Collected Works. The question was what is that collectivity that produced Mao Zedong Thought? They have now issued the Selected Works of the present-day recognized leaders—Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Deng. Deng is the only one living, the one with the power, the one who is bringing about the most challenges to his own rule. The first who had to fall as these demonstrations reached a climax was his protegee, Hu Yaobang.

Let's never forget that youth have a very special role in China in the 20th century. Back in the mid-1960s they even thought that they could use the Cultural

continued

Revolution as a point of departure, not just for democracy, but, as they put it, for having a real Paris Commune type of government. That is to say, a communal non-state form of government.²

The Western commentators rushed all too fast to compare the 1986-87 demonstrations to the movement of Democracy Wall. There is no doubt that it was closer to it in time than to 1968, when youth unfurled an altogether new demand in Sheng Wulien's "Whither China?" manifesto that called China the centerpoint of world revolution precisely because it was the point of greatest world contradiction. But the placards for democracy that the 1986-87 demonstrators carried were not just for Democracy Wall, but covered the labor struggles, the arts struggle, the really massive, ongoing opposition to the regime for altogether new human relations.

IS DENG DOING THE OUSTING, OR IS HE BEING OUSTED?

Once, however, the gates were opened to a "collectivity," it was not just a question of Mao or Mao's successors, but the Marx Centenary, and that meant Marx's Humanism. That brought back the old theoretician-propagandist Chou Yang, who in 1957 had unleashed the theoretical fight against Marx's 1844 Humanist Essays; in 1993 he announced that he now welcomed them but perverted them "to include even bourgeois Humanism." At this point, the issue is muddled enough not to know which side of the fighting Chou is on—with the so-called "hardliners" who consider themselves true Marxists, or "reformers" who want to shift from Sinification of Marxism to rejection of it.³

What has happened objectively? The foreign affairs and the theoretical disputes are not the only crises. What is the determinant is the crises at home on the production lines, the poor living conditions, and unemployment of the masses, as well as the restlessness in the "technologically reorganized" Army, while seeing the emergence of a new kind of profiteer. This is most evident in the five so-called special economic zones. Re-

cently⁴ the New York Times reported one such area, Shenyang, the industrial capital of Manchuria, which is evidently so high on "reform" that it emboldened one manager to announce that he had cut the work force at his factory from 1,000 to 800, adding, "I've still got 200 people too many."

The 1986 demonstrations only brought to the front the myriad crises that have been boiling up throughout the 1980s as China tried to catch its breath from Mao's last disastrous decade. But China has found that once again it is facing the two nuclear Behemoths and it dare not go to build an independent path. Has Deng, as well as "hardliners" and "softliners," given up hope that there is an independent Third World that would lead to independence from both Russia and the U.S.?

Integral to that is the international question: where to globally? Had one merely to choose between U.S. and Russia? Was Russia really enemy number one, so that Reagan could consider China his card? The latest thing that China was very quick about denying was the Kyodo news account that China and the U.S. were participating in joint naval maneuvers. China said: absolutely no; they were just "exchanging greetings." Somebody's head will roll. Will it be Deng's?

Feb. 10, 1987

2. For Sheng Wulien documents see *Philosophy and Revolution*, p. 176. A 1982 edition of *Philosophy and Revolution* has a new point of departure in its Introduction with my answer to Prof. George Armstrong Kelly's critique in his *Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis* (Princeton University Press, 1978).

3. This is not the place to work out Mao Zedong Thought as he tried transforming his substitution of guerrilla warfare for proletarian revolution into a new universal. First was the Great Leap Forward. This was followed by the challenge to Russia as head of the international Communist movement. By the mid-1960s we were witness to the great disasters which Mao called the Cultural Revolution (1966-71), which was the Great Substitution for Marx's revolution-in-permanence. See the two chapters "The Challenge of Mao Tse-tung" and "Cultural Revolution or Maoist Reaction?" in my *Marxism and Freedom* (1982 ed.), and as well "Post-Mao China: What Now?" in my *New Essays* (1977).

4. See *New York Times*, Jan. 30, 1987.

One word that is not mentioned at all, that is ~~XX~~ pouring forth from China these days on the new crisis, whether the concentration is on the student demonstrations, or the ~~intellectuals~~ ^(party) especially in the Science and Technology field, not to mention the steel strike and general labor restlessness, is the army. Yet it is precisely there where there has been ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ^(since) 1969, when Lin Biao was ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ^(as the head of the Army) and only the one who claimed that it was the army rather than the Party that is the model for the Youth to follow. That was the first time in any country that called itself Communist that the Army ~~was~~ ^(had been) designated by the Constitution itself as primary. Naturally, Lin Biao was part of that, which to ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ any good vanguardist meant building its own faction, so that when two short years passed, Lin Biao was named as the enemy, Mao was faced with ~~an~~ armed factions and indeed have continued throughout, first to put down the Red Guards and then in general to plan a game for power.

Is this the case now?
~~fundamental issues~~
~~need to be~~

The context in which we need to examine this have two fundamental poles; One, is the strategic or more correctly philosophic concept which has ~~driven~~ ^(only) China, not ~~XXXX~~ to independence from imperialism, but ~~XXXXXXXX~~ distinctly unique from all other Communists, is the concept n that the workers should put down their arms, should remain at their benches producing, while the Army, the peasant Army, surrounds the

cities and occupies them; Two, this concept was then extended to the International scene with the birth of the Third World, where the "internationalism" was equated with the Third World, technologically backward, that would surround the whole advanced world, and when this was named the peoples war. ^(Though) Lin Biao made that speech, ~~XXX~~ it was supposed to be Mao Thought, but perhaps Lin Biao was the only one who believed in it.

In any case, September 1971 brought about the crisis

Quotations from The Rise and Fall of Lin Piao, by Jaap van Ginneken (New York: Avon, 1974) (1977)

The interesting thing is the last three ^(Parts) ~~XXXXXXXX~~ beginning with Conflict on p. 369, continuing with the "Plot", the supposed Lin Piao plan, . . . 571; and ending with the visit of Nixon. Insofar as the question of the Conflict is concerned,

"Before the Cultural Revolution Lin Piao had set himself up as the strategist of the Third World countries, by proclaiming the invincibility of the people's war. His enthusiasm for China's avant-garde role in the world had, however, caused him to be regarded very much as a Chinese chauvanist." (p. 251).

As soon as they announced the invitation to Nixon (7/23/71??) Lin visits many Army divisions on a supposed inspection tour, which Mao immediately decides is totally factional and starts the campaign against him.

Handwritten notes:
of Lin Biao
23 July 1971
Hence

Insofar as the next Part is concerned, which is the background of the "571" Plan, I am not interested in the theory that it is his son rather than Lin Piao himself who organized it. Then there is an epilogue on the Shanghai faction of the gang of four which is where it ends, but I am more interested in the 80s, especially since the Democracy Wall

*Since last 1986
Oct plenary party*

From Baltimore Sun, printed in the Chicago Sun Times, Sunday Jan. 20, 1987. "China Backs Off" by John Woodruff.

*Jan 19/10/87
Hu*

This commentary from Peking begins with what has been happening since last October when the CCP had a plenary meeting. If anyone thought that so-called modernization means political democracy because the December issue of the Red Flag carried an article by the new Culture Minister, Wang Meng hailed the new democracy, including evidently "other" schools of thought". Other of course meant non-Marxist. That was the date, 12/15/86, when obviously ~~XXXX~~ ^(Deng) had now decided that there had already been too much freedom as was clearly seen from the fact that the demonstrations by students had begun and by late December and early January a campaign was unloosed against so-called "bourgeois liberalization". More heads began to roll since the coming to power of Deng; 1) Hu Yaobang who was supposedly Deng's own heir ~~XXXX~~ apparent, resigned from the chairmanship of the CCP;

- 2) Fang Lizhi was expelled as was
- 3) Wang Ruowang who had questioned the single party

4) Liu Binyang, a reporter who exposed corruption has been expelled.

There has suddenly been a new stress on what they call "The 4 cardinal 原则 principles".

John Woodruff is the Chief of the Peking Bureau of the Baltimore Sun, does not spell out the 4; instead, he stresses that the most important of course is maintaining a total "monopoly on political power." Actually what he is talking about is evidently a new "middle class"; it's actually state-capitalism, even though what he goes back to as an example is 4,000 years of dynastic history. Evidently what the Western reporter is talking about is what we call "Yuppies" and "competent managers" instead of "power in the hands of Communist Party secretaries." That that is what the West is talking about, is that one of his conclusions is, "Deng himself may be a long way from fully committed to opening China's politics in the ways that would be needed to make a modern economy workable." He then talks about the thousands of students studying abroad; "there is a generation of returning students waiting & just behind the current top Chinese Communist leadership..."

1/21/77
7/22/77

A Few more disconnected thoughts, but this may actually return me back to the China topic because I've now decided that in actuality, what Deng is doing is moving away from Reagan.

This doesn't mean that there is no crisis in China, indeed there is the great troubles under heaven, ~~XXXXXXXX~~ as Mao ~~XXXXX~~ said in a very similiar situation when the crisis became so total in China that he issued an invitation to Nixon to visit China. That ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ transformed the crisis into an outright civil war between Mao Tsa-Tung and Lin Piao, that is to say, between the party and the army.

if anything
What is paramount now? The point is that what Deng discovered within the top ~~XXXXXX~~ CCP leadership at the very time when the youth were demonstrating loudly for demanding freedom and democracy, was that that top bureaucracy were warning Deng that that's exactly what was due to happen if there continues to be such a looseness in the "principles", i.e., ideology, of the vanguard itself, the CCP, that all we will get out of this ~~NEW~~ seeming opposite but actual similiar attempt as Mao of achieving in one year 20 years progress. Nixon ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~xx~~ who already rhetorically announced us a superpower hadn't brought that prosperity to us and Reagan who never intended any such thing has no intention whatever of making it easy for us to achieve either high technology or loans, his privatization is only sending some individual profiteering rules to Canton and now Shanghai; and next Manchuria? Or will Japan? Reagan is certainly busy arming that old enemy in violation of the

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very Constitution they imposed on Japan.

No, all that he is ~~XXXXXXXX~~ inspiring is a Chinese version of the so-called new middle class they call the Yuppies, who are interested in only one thing, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ profiteering, careerism and that's the generation that's knocking at your E door Deng, when you retire next Fall. So you'd better have Hu Yaobang resign first.

The first important MH analysis was that one single new paragraph that cost me \$200, to add to M&F already in ~~XXXXX~~ galleys as Mao made the speech 'How to Handle Contradictions Among the People'. It was followed in the 2nd (1964) edition with a new chapter on the challenge of Mao Tse-Tung that detailed Mao's development, with stress on philosophy and the Yanan period on Contradiction, but actually returning to his very first original departure from Marxism, the Hunan Report, ending with Two Types of Subjectivity. ~~XXXX~~

1973 F&R

Also fnt 165

+

all the essays
in N&L on 60s,
incl. Letters
from Hong Kong

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Mao Zedong: A Preliminary Reassessment by Stuart R. Schram
(Hong Kong: The Chinese Universities Press, 1983).

I will begin with the appendix which is actually the one thing that's important, On Questions of Party History, resolution adopted 11/27/81. The first sub-title is "Comrade Mao Zedong's historical role and Mao Zedong Thought". It starts with no. 27, so there must have been very much on history before Mao came along. With no. 27, it establishes that Mao "was a great Marxist and a great proletarian revolutionary, strategist ~~EMER~~ theorist. ~~It~~ is true he made gross mistakes in the 'cultural revolution'...His merits are primary and his errors secondary."

No. 28 writes of Mao having "made a theoretical synthesis of China's unique experience in its protracted revolution in accordance with the basic principle of ML...many outstanding ~~EMER~~ leaders of our party made important contributions to the formation and development ~~of~~ of Mao Zedong thought and they are synthesized in the scientific work of comrade Mao Zedong."

No. 29 then lists the number of books which deal with his contribution: (A) "The New-democratic Revolution"; B) The two kinds of Bourgeoisie, comprador or bureaucratic and national; C) The "united front ~~is~~ and armed struggle are the two basic ~~EM~~ weapons of defeating the enemy' with party building, they constitute the 'three magic weapons'. The listing of the contributions then goes on to the point of "socialist revolution" and "socialist construction." And

again a bunch of books are mentioned; (1) "on the building of a revolutionary army and military strategy, comrade Mao methodically solved the problem of how to turn a revolutionary army, chiefly made up of peasants, into a new type of peoples army which is proletarian in character, observes strict discipline, and forms close ties with the masses!" And here they have listed several on strategy, especially Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against Japan, on protracted war and problems of war strategy. Listed too and made into a category are New Democracy

✓ On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People;
 ✓ the
 ✓ On Question of Whether Imperialism and all reactionaries are real Tigers

On Party building, there is listed a whole series of books.

No. 30. "The living soul of Mao Zedong Thought is the stand, viewpoint and method embodied in its component parts mentioned above. This stand, viewpoint and method boil down to three basic points: to seek truth from facts, the mass line, and independence. Comrade Mao Zedong applied dialectical and historical materialism to the entire work of the proletarian party, giving shape to this stand, viewpoint and method so characteristic of Chinese Communists in the course of the Chinese revolution and its arduous, protracted struggles and thus enriching Marxist-Leninism. They find expression not only in such important works as 'Oppose Book Worship'

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'On Practice', 'On Contradiction', 'Preface and Postscript to Rural Surveys', 'Some Questions Concerning Methods of Leadership' and 'Where do Correct Ideas come From?', but also in all his scientific writings and in the revolutionary activities of the Chinese Communists."

No. 31. The last paragraph, they simply remind us all over again of the "valuable spiritual asset of our party by having Mao Zedong Thought."

This 1983 reassessment by one of those super-spets on China to a Chinese audience (Stuart Schram talking to the United College on April 1982) covering no less than the whole period from 1917 to the end of his life in 1976, and the preface actually dated 6/20/83, has exactly one sentence on Lin Piao, who was named in the Constitution itself as the one closest in ~~XXXXXX~~ arms to Mao, certainly produced the greatest crisis that China lived through in all its years since gaining power, not to mention what is still going on in the military now. This is the man who was the first to write on the political ~~XXXX~~ thought of Mao, and x sent me his book on Mao's Theory of Permanent Revolution. Indeed, he was so Maoist that he also idealized the Wan-sui Documents which talked of the ants living on after the nuclear holocaust.

At the end of p. 70, in the 3rd section, "From Apotheosis to Oblivion?" three words, "struggle against Lin Biao" and this single sentence: "In the domain of modernization and economic development, after the upheaval of 1966-69, and the further disruption caused by the struggle against Lin Biao, a new compromise appeared to be emerging in 1971-72."

On p. 76, there is a reference to the PLA without ever mentioning Lin Biao: "What I do not know, as a foreign observer, is how much residual attachment to the Maoism of the Cultural Revolution there may be in the countryside--where I have spent relatively little time--and in the PLA--with which I have had no contacts at all." And finally what he didn't do though that is what he said he would do are the four fundamental: In assessing particular aspects of Mao's Thought, I propose to look now at four points, all of which, as we have seen, have a history extending back beyond 1949: the
 (A) relation between China and foreign countries; the role of
 (B) human and subjective factors in the revolutionary process;
 (C) the relation between democracy and centralism; and the analysis
 (D) of contradictions in Chinese society."

Jan. 29, 1987

In order to both try to single out something current for the T/P column that is going to press this weekend and that I would compete Saturday with Peter to hand to Eugene, and give an Outline on Monday to Mike what to choose from the Archives on China that would be dealt with as ongoing and constitute the next (#3 biweekly) NYL.

1st

The few current things that do mention new elements that are not played up: 1/29/87 from Beijing.

NYT, by A. Gargan, entitled "In China, from marches to leadership crisis". Actually, the new is not what sounds so general, Leadership Crisis, but specifically, contrasting the demonstrations to ~~YMA~~ what happened the month before in the State. Thus, the shake-up is by no means ~~finished~~ ^{shd} finished, precisely because it is not just the leadership crisis, but a question of which arm of the government --

1/30/87 NYL
tries to
say so

Party, State, Politics (Ideology) -- and I would say that that is the contradiction that has characterized Chinese Communism from its very birth. Not only was ~~XX~~ the Army decisive long before Communism, but the guerilla form it took under Mao became the XX 20th Century ~~XX~~ Great Contradiction between War and Revolution ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ (in a form)

Small State
P. 12
last
from
Guangdong

when a section of War considers it to be Revolution, which we've always called the shortcut that ends in the long defeat and which Mao has called the protracted war.

Insofar as the present Gargan article is concerned, the factional presentation, both by the Chinese intellectuals

Long ago liberalism

NYL
intellectuals
is what

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and the Western diplomats, as if it were a question between rapid economic change and slow, is wrong. By relying on the Japanese news agency, Kyodo, he seems to be ~~more~~ closer to the facts when the news he's describing is a meeting of the Central Military Commission in November, when both Hu and the military differed with Deng.

Handwritten notes:
 Tokyo Japanese news agency
 have more facts esp military
 but they are full w/ military know "foreign affairs" steering with technology rather than

~~XXXXXXXX~~ (First student protest was Dec. 9) (N&L says Dec. 5)

~~XXXXXX~~ (In Sept. Hu had berated the politicians (the Party) for interfering with the managerial independence . . .)

Dec. 19 Shanghai; Dec. 21 becomes massive; Jan 1 a march to Tienanmen Square, which broke through the police lines. ^(not only) Gargan stops where he should have begun, but he doesn't move from that statement on the military to an ideological debate, as if all ideology is whether the so-called economic reform is fast or slow. Considering the reduction of philosophy to numbers, the Chinese leadership is likely to discuss the two factions -- military and party -- as, are we going to have two or one.

Bourgeois Liberalism.

The Time Magazine, 2/2/87, surprisingly captures a little bit of ~~XB~~ at least the military too and at least mentions that

"an ideological campaign gathered force to rescind many of the political and economic freedoms permitted recently by Hu."

The constant totally wrong transfer of Western expressions,

Handwritten notes:
 with matter or left in CH - but really a shift in

Handwritten notes:
 Japan esp heated up not only last year 1985 but now militarized plus US army

like "hardliners" and "conservatives" makes it very nearly impossible to know what is really at stake, but at least this one mentions some names, and the three singled out as "conservative resurgence" are: Peng Zhan, 84; and mentions that the Peoples Daily published two reports by him singling out the "4 cardinal principles" of China, and that that did happen last November.

Was that the military Commission?

Is Party and State now to become one by Zhao retaining both the Premiership and now assuming, supposedly temporarily, Hu's Party status? Otherwise, there is going to be two, not one, then the paper seems to say that Li FAN HONG, 58, a Soviet-trained engineer who speaks fluent Russian and closer ties with Moscow, becomes the leading candidate. And if that isn't confusing enough, it mentions that George Bush will be in Peking in March.

*Towards end
Li Peng
Moscow
ground*

Schutz

Foreign Affairs.

The Le Monde section of the Manchester Guardian, 1/25/87, but the specific article is dated 1/15, 1/19, has an article by Patrice Beer entitled "Deng Throws Hu to the Wolves", has so far as I'm concerned only one interesting, but quite mystifying new word and that is "200" campaign--i.e., he combined 100 flowers and 100 schools of thought contend. According to this, there was a national Conference of the CP in Sept. 1986, when the so-called conservatives who actually were the Left re-surfaced in another campaign against "spiritual pollution," even though that had been stopped early in 1984.

This is the time when the 100 Flowers, 100 Schools ~~and~~ Slogans.

What is interesting is that the same reporter in writing
up Shen Yang, the Industrial capital of Manchuria, is flying
way ahead with economic reform and obviously economic reform
has so emboldened the managers that one Lin proudly announced
that he had cut the total ~~the~~ work force from 1,000 to 800,
and added, I've still got 200 people too many.

found

conservative conf. Sep 1986

*vs "spiritual
pollution"*

11103

Jan. 30, 1987

The 1st notes on Jan. 20 were concentrating on the fact of what noone was saying, as they were writing on the student demonstrations, and that is the Army and labor unrest, with the Army being essentially important both because it has always characterized Mao from the start, and because in 1969 he had actually made Lin Piao head of the Army and designated him his closet comrade-in-arms. I then cited the 1971 plan and fall of Lin Piao.

2nd notes, the next day -- but actually just p.5 of these same notes -- the 1st and central new point was: "I've now decided that, in actuality, what Deng is doing is moving away from Reagan." It is backed up by the fact that that's exactly what happened in 71 when the carpet was being rolled out for Nixon and Lin suddenly decided that, whereas it's true Russia is Enemy #1, he doesn't want to be in the hip pocket of Nixon either. Nowadays is Deng saying the same thing in relationship to Reagan? And I cited 2 of my own Chinese turning points, 1st in M&F (that ftn. on Mao's "On Contradiction") and the 2nd edition having a new chapter that ended with "Two Types of Subjectivity", and in P&R summing it up once we had the exact opposite in Sheng Wu-lien.

3rd and I believe that will be the form, and that is what I dictated on 1/29/87 and I'm now including the very latest --

It is 1st which was near civil war

or rather further away from Russia as
Kodov US
the Soviet
13 m...
all...
= free...
Rather it
1st is...
quartz
of is god the
as tech... not
prod...
as stripes

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New York Times

today's NYT which reports a gathering of senior Party and military leaders in the Great Hall of the People to celebrate the Chinese New Year, where he talks of "socialist democracy" and assure them that supposedly there is going to be a limit to the campaign against dissent; "a very limited number will be disciplined". What is interesting in this article is that not only is Hu and Li (China's president) absent, but so is Deng. And again, there is assurances that the campaign will "not be conducted in rural areas". This brings to the fore that not only is the dissent in the Party, in the Youth, in the Military, but among the peasantry. Supposedly, there will be a reduction of the role of the Party in economic management.

Peasant Army

That 1 thing, management, vs. Party discipline, or rather, "ideological interference", is actually against labor and demand for greater and greater production, which was seen very prominently in one of the reports in the Le Monde section of the Manchester Guardian in the regional section - Shenyang, the industrial capital of Manchuria. One of the ~~local~~ managers (bosses) was emboldened enough to announce that he had cut the total work force in his factory from 1000 to 800, adding "I have still got 200 people too many." (MG 1/25/87 -- the article itself dated 1/19/87 and/or 1/15/87).

What I mean by the form of 1/29 (YP) is that, here, the context is that the shakeup is by no means ended, that the actual ~~XXXX~~ continuing struggle that has characterized Maoism, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXX~~ whether the spokesman ~~XXXX~~ was Liu, that is, clearly the Single-Party-State that is characteristic of capitalism calling itself communism; or Lin, where the shift came from Party to Army,

which, after all, characterized Mao's deviation from when he wasn't yet the leader of the CP, and, indeed, his historic name -- he ~~has~~ has gone down in history as the ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ strategist of guerrilla ~~war~~ war as the shortcut to revolution. Indeed, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ Mao's historic role -- and that is the nationalist revolution of China -- was the deviation which ~~XXXXXXXX~~ first of all held that the peasantry, not the proletariat, would conquer power, and would do so through a protracted nationalist war, which would have the workers remain at their work places, unarmed, while the peasant army surrounded the city and conquered the state power. When this was expressed by making Lin the head of the Army, as the Constitutional ~~XXXXXX~~ the Helmsman closest-comrade-in-arms, of Mao/himself, everybody was asking whether that was one more military dictatorship. Mao's answer that "no, the Party still controls the gun, not the gun that Party" was hardly the most convincing.

*Extra
T.D. to
evolve
a just
system*

Kyodo, the Japanese news agency, is much more accurate in its facts and understanding of them than far as the military question is concerned, but they fail to connect with what is inseparable from it, and that is foreign affairs, preferring to keep the reports within the technology debate and as if it were a question of intellectual vs. managerial instead of managerial vs. proletariat. What, however, may be the key to them not focusing on foreign affairs is that it is Japan, that Japan has been "the ~~long~~ long enemy" and hasn't remained something only of the past, as was clear ^{in 1985} ~~in 1985~~ when all of the student demonstrations in ~~the~~ September, 1985 against Japanese militarism, and what students actually termed the "invasion" of China by Japanese consumer goods. ~~Therefore~~ In 1986, the demonstrations were not openly directed against Japan. Yet there is no doubt that part of the turmoil was on that same question of militarization as U.S. was encouraging Japan to violate its own Constitution and militarize itself. What Reagan called having sufficient to "defend" itself, echoed by Japan

That the whole ideological campaign has been made to sound as if it were a question of what they call conservatives, which

~~See LA Times~~ See LA Times 12/5/85

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The Chinese consider left, orthodox Marxists vs. what the West calls reformists and equates all with economics, hungering for "political freedom", in fact the economics that is important has nothing to do with so-called reformism or so-called intellectualism, and everything to do with good old capital/labor relations. Politics has nothing to do with private trade freedom and everything to do with foreign affairs. And none, even the Japanese who have had better reports, have so much as breathed a word about the anti-Japanese feeling in the 1985 demonstrations against Deng's openings to Japan. Above all, it did not end in 1985. It definitely has continued into 1986, and is no doubt remaining, not merely as so-called revengism or any kind of chauvinism, but anti-militarization, anti-war, in Japan and in China itself, and all of that impinging on so-called foreign affairs, specifically, even Deng, who signed the so-called new peace treaty, is backing off a little not only from Japan but from the U.S. Whether that has anything to do with the restlessness in the army, which is also related to the so-called modernization, as well as the near-civil war, occurring between Mao and Lin having been not "treachery" or what they called illicit relations with a foreign ~~country~~ ^{country}, meaning Russia, but Mao's rolling out the Red Carpet for Nixon. Yes, they want to be against both poles of the super powers -- Russia and U.S. -- but they don't want to be considered in the hip pocket of U.S. imperialism just because they named Russia as Enemy No. 1. They certainly haven't gotten from Reagan any of the promises they got from Nixon when he suddenly decided they were a big power.

(* China Quarterly of 3/86 chronicles and documents the overt, public anti-Japanese signs. P. 195)

11108

is Party and State now to become 1 by Zhao retaining both the Premiership and now (supposedly temporarily) Hu's Party status? The paper seems to say that Li Peng, 58, a Soviet-trained engineer who speaks fluent Russian and has closer ties with Moscow, becomes the leading candidate. And if that isn't confusing enough, it mentions that George Schultz will be in Peking in March.

11109

2/2/87

SEQUENCE

to be followed rather than chronology

(though chronology will become the form at certain periods for China study):

1. We begin with Dec. 1986 student demonstrations and its ~~extension~~ Jan. 1987.

2. To see that the demonstrations ~~were~~ did not first appear in 1986, but in the last quarter of 1985 and, far from being on reforms, they were on foreign affairs, specifically Japan, but actually global. Go to the demonstrations against Nakasone's visit to the Japanese war shrine and the return all the way to 1931.

3. At that point, i.e. anti-militarism, one has to also consider a very different type of anti-Deng movement within the Chinese army, which may actually go back all the way to 1971, but for the present, we will only take it up in relationship to technology and modernization of the army. Actually, it is the whole question of Maoist deviationism on war and revolution.

4. Now then, let's go to the China Quarterly #s 98 and 99 from 1984 and #s 105 and 106 from 1986. The most important is #98, June 1984, by Tang Tsou, a U. of Chicago professor reviewing the Selected Works of Deng, (actually writing a review-essay.) It is no less than 27 pp., taking up the critical years 1975-82, and entitled, "The Historic Change in Direction and Continuity with the Past". I imagine it is also the beginning of the anti-Deng rumbles since obviously this was the attempt of Deng to become, if not as important as Mao himself, certainly the fact that this 1983 publication, on the 62nd anniversary of the founding

Placed to the left of the page
1985 vs 1986
1985 vs 1986
1985 vs 1986

1st 12/86

Japan
Global
Military

1991
in 1991
today

1989 not just of Mao
but Mao thought
of CCP

Change
"Ly"
Past =
Mao Thought
Party
Army
People

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of the CCP, and therefore also of the leaders like Chou
 en-lai, Liu Shao-chi, their selected works. The point is
 that it came after the 1981 finally historic summation of
 Maoism which ~~is~~ this year, 1986, ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ has been
 revised. The essence of this is that the historical per-
 spective in which Mao is being viewed "combines political
 and ideological study in order to establish the development
 of Mao's (but also other) viewpoint and so explain the
 causes of major historical events... since Mao Zedong
 Thought, since the annotations on the resolution "Certain
 Historical Questions of the Party since the Founding of
 the ~~Party~~" is the crystallization of the collective
 wisdom of the Chinese Communists, represented by Mao Ze-
 dong." [#106, 6/86, from the Quarterly Chronicle and Doc-
 umentation Section of the China Quarterly.

collect

25

22

Now then, so far as the author of the review-essay,
 Tang Tsou, is concerned, though the Deng collection begins
 in 1975, he begins it in 1971-76 as the first of the 3
 crucial periods; including the Lin Biao affair, which
~~BRNG~~ brought Deng to his greatest power, because what fol-
 lows is the reorganization of the PLA, and the strenghtening
 of the Party, rather than the Army as the spokesman for
 Marx/Lenin/ Mao Thought. With Deng becoming chief of
 the PLA staff, chairman of the militray commission and

Deng
the Org
Han

The 2nd period is 1976-78, when ~~Ma~~ ^{Deng} loses all these
 posts; and the 3rd is ~~the~~ Dec. 1978 when Deng returns
 with a "Greet Historic Change of Direction".

Deng
regnum

11111

5. ^{the} ~~and~~ telling sequence, which means the ^{phil} ~~theoretical~~ 3

~~grounding~~ not only for all that has happened this year which has just begun, and ~~may very well end with the ouster of Deng~~, can be seen in 1983 the Marx Centenary, when, by no accident whatever, we suddenly got a plethora of theoretical articles that ~~brought us back~~ ^{both illuminated} what has been happening in the 1980s, brought us back to the 1960s, when Quou Yang, who was then the main theoretician, unfurled a campaign against Marx's Humanism because the 1956 Hungarian Revolution was still so very alive and not at all cowed by Mao's talk of endless contradictions among the people. ~~Now~~ ^{Now} reappears as being for Marx's Humansim indeed, for Huamanism, even bourgeois Humanism. Clearly, the restlessness that was being shown, in the army or amongst the peasantry, among the youth or among labor, within the leadership, or the people in general was not for more exploitative capital/labor relationships, whether by Party or management, but for truly human relations.

1963
1956
1985-4
1981-6
1985-6

Integral to that was the ^{international} question: where to globally? Had one merely to choose just between US and Russia? And was Russia really enemy #1, so that Reagan could consider China his card? ~~What~~ ^{The latest thing that} China was very quick about denying was the ~~announcement~~ ^{new account} that China and the US were participating in joint military maneuvers. China said: absolutely no; they were just exchanging greetings. Somebody's head will roll. Will it be Deng's?

Does being
superior
mean
choosing US/
Rus

Handwritten marks: a circle and a scribble.

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1963
1956
1983-4
1981-6
1985-6

Does being
superior
mean
choosing US/
Ru

Q - 30

Deng
Is ~~he~~ being ousted, or is he doing the ousting?

The question I asked in "Mao's Last Hurrah" on the glorification of Mao in his last years was: Is Mao being deified or mummified? ~~It~~ Just as that didn't mean that Maoism would ~~disappear~~ from China's history, so I don't mean that Deng's "reforms" would disappear. Quite the contrary. Though very short-lived, and with none of the charisma of Mao, and hardly deserving the name "reform", it does mean objectively do retrogressive a step towards some form of "mixed economy", i.e. state capitalism, that that will go on. What I do mean, however, -- and again just as the question was posed with "Mao's Last Hurrah", and I called Chou-en-lai's speech Maoism without Mao, ~~this~~ is exactly what we are ~~in~~ witnessing now.

(INSTEAD after first sentence on Deng) Two quite different versions have surfaced on what happened at a meeting between Deng and Hu: one has it that Hu asked Deng to step down now instead of waiting for the next Congress; that ~~that~~ ^{had Hu} so enraged Deng that he ~~was~~ removed; the other version is that ^{since} the student demonstrations actually were a threat to the whole leadership, and Hu had encouraged them, with his demand for political as well as economic "democracy", that he had to sacrifice his apparent choice of heir, Hu. ^{Both} ~~the~~ versions, and for that matter, all that pours forth from China now, via Western reporters who are as

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dogmatic and subjective ~~is~~ in their pragmatism and use of language of ^{political} "democracy, reform, free trade", as are

~~the Chinese in~~ on so-called "bourgeois liberalism" -- rather than the party have the last word, and the party is "ideological interference" the managers tell you nothing, either about what

is really happening or how it is related to anything else that has happened ~~before~~ the day before or the day after. No word is mentioned for example, in foreign policy be it Russia, Japan or the U.S. Nor is a word mentioned on the students' relationship to other strata, especially the workers, who have been striking. Finally, and that is most important, both because that dates itself back to the near-civil war and what Mao called "the great disorder under heaven," between himself and Lin Biao, and because, whether or not Lin plotted to "assassinate" Mao, he certainly knew enough to build his own faction, from which China is still not without proof, although this is nearly 20 years later.

Furthermore, Deng's power begins in earnest at that very point when Lin loses his. Deng becomes chief of the staff of the PLA, ~~Military Commission~~ vice-premier ~~next~~, that is, second only to Mao, of the Military Commission, and

After he has accumulated all that power, Mao makes another 180° turn and casts his vote against Deng, and for what became the Gang of Four, and Hua.

The managers and the Party both demand greater production

6

The 1/25 issue of the Manchester Guardian weekly
has 2 separately dated articles in the Le Monde section.
12/30/86 speaks of the industrial capital of Manchuria, Shenyang
as the example of "total economic reform". Where one factory
owner by the name of Lin brags about the fact that he has cut
his workforce from 1,000 to 800, adding "I've still got
200 people too many."

The second article, dated 1/18-19/87, is ~~about~~ titled
"Deng throws Hu to the wolves".

If, however, we turn the clock back to 1985 to see
that the restlessness of the students is neither about
"student affairs", or so-called democracy, or economic
reforms, rather, it is about changes in global direction,
especially the move to Japan. The tremendous demonstrations
that everyone seems to have forgotten about occurred in
the last quarter of 1985, and were ~~xxxxxxxx~~ a reaction to Nakasone's
visit to the Japanese shrine of war heroes. Clearly, that
re-
kindof/conciliationism, far from being chauvinistic,
is very much like the demonstrations here and throughout
the world against Reagan's visit to Bitburg. Indeed, the
youth demonstrations in ~~Japan~~ China, especially in Tiananmen
Square, were in commemoration of the 1931 Japn attack
on Mukgen which opened up the invasion of Manchuria. The
students' banner read: "Down with Japaese militarism".
As these demonstrations continued into December, they were
against Deng's opening to Japan.

(Quote Li to his counterpart in Japan).

11116

FINAL DRAFT

① Is Deng Being Custody, or is He Doing the Custody?

② Brought into the open
The present turmoil in China which came into the open by the month-long student demonstrations in CH December, 1986 was neither the cause, nor is it bringing the present dispute to a climax. The subject is not just the infighting within the Communist Party leadership, which all are trying to shift the blame to the rank-and-file, though it is clearly over the question of the succession when Deng is to remove himself from direct leadership in the fall at the 13th Congress of the CCP.

Even that answer to what is really behind the myriad crises is not only a question of who will follow Deng, but what will follow Deng. That is to say, the myriad crises now besetting China since Mao, ever since the near-civil war of the "Lin Faip Affair" which Mao had designated as "the great disorder under heaven."

Mao himself -- and Mao not only on the crises in China after the victory of the National Revolution but he tried to substitute the ramifications of his new concept of revolution as guerilla warfare in peacetime where he had all the power, first with the Great Leap Forward in 1957 and then with the whole decade of disasters with the Cultural Revolution.

To avoid the answer to this definitive question has to be a while decade has passed since Mao's death. The disasters of his final decade have been halted. Why they are not still facing the question of Mao's thought?

Yet the new stage he set by rolling back carpet for Nixon is exactly what

11117

Revolution -- but China in a global context. Put
 differently, whatever were the true facts of the
 Mao-Lin Piao Affair, which we certainly do not know,
 the point that is clear beyond a shadow of a doubt
 is that it all happened when Mao decided to roll
 out the Red Carpet for Nixon. ~~It is one thing to~~
~~oppose with nuclear superpowers, it's quite another~~
~~to choose one against the other~~ It's not out of
 the question that right now (Feb. 1987) ~~is that~~ the
 question of Foreign Affairs is quite a decisive issue
 (we will return to this later).

The present ramifications of the Dec. 1986
 student demonstrations with today's headlines (2/3/87)
 trying, at one and the same time, to say that dissent
 will be tolerated but not from any rank-and-file
 who are members, only further beclouds the issue.
 Actually, we need to go further back than December
 of this year, ~~XXXXXX~~ first to the final quarter
 of 1985 to see what it was that was stirring the
 student demonstrators.

Even if we cannot divert all the way back
 to 1971 except to say that clearly that ~~was~~ tremendous
 crises required Mao to accept the restoration of many
 of the old organization ~~people~~ leaders, like Deng
 whom Chou en -lai insisted on reinstating in 1973.

11118

Footnote for p. 1, last paragraph after first sentence:

1) This is not the place to work out Mao's Thought as he tried transforming his substitution of guerrilla warfare for proletarian revolution into a new universal, first with the Great Leap Forward, followed by the challenge to Russia as the head of the international Communist movement, ^{see Hong} by the mid-1960s causing the great disasters which he called the Cultural Revolution ~~XXXXXXXX~~ (1966-71) that was the Great Substitution of Marx's ~~XXXX~~ revolution-in-permanence. See the chapters 'The Challenge of Mao Tse-Tung' in McFand and the 'Cultural Revolution' as well as New Essays on Post-Mao China: What Now?

2 See also the Feb. 9, 1987 report of Vice-Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, reported in an Associated Press dispatch of Feb. 9, that China and Russia had opened discussions on their border ~~is~~ dispute.

3 ~~Concretely spelled out, in 1983 it meant the works of other than Mao were published, though Mao's were his Collected Works while the others are Selected Works. These included Zhou en-Lai, Liu Shao-Chi and Deng. Deng is the only one living, the one with the power, the one who is bringing about the most challenges to his rule. The first had to fall ~~and~~ these demonstrations was his protegee Hu Yao-bang.~~

Quarterly
Chronicle

U.S.A.

4 Sheng-wu Hsien's challenge from the Left in Hunan Province which was established during what was known as the 'January Storm' in the Shanghai Commune, wrote 'Whither China'. It was first translated/produced by Survey of Mainland China Press, no. 4190, June 4, 1968 and ~~xxx~~ ~~reprinted~~ in P&R, ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ chapter 5, 'The ~~XXXXXX~~ Challenge of Mao Tse-Tung'. The 1982 edition of P&R has ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ new point of departure in its Introduction by answering Prof. George Armstrong Kelley's critique in Hegel's Retreat from Kleusis (Princeton Univ. Press, 1978).

5 excerpted

11120

Feb. 17, 1987

Fpr Possible inclusion, as new 3rd Paragraph on p. 1, re Lin Biao -- no footnote.

There is no doubt that this was the most serious crisis since ^{getting} ~~the~~ ^{power} and the crisis came not from the outside or capitalist ^{elements} ~~the~~ within but from ^(within) ~~the~~ the ruling Communist Party. ^{Not only that, but} ~~the~~ ^(philosophical as well as political) from the very ~~the~~ leader Mao had made ~~it~~ a category of, ~~the~~ creating a constitutional new phenomenon that ~~the~~ ~~was~~ was a total perversion of what Marxism is. In making the head pf the Red Army the head of the State, his closest comrade-in-arms successor at that famed ninth national congress ^{heading} in 1969, was the one ~~the~~ the so-called Cultural Revolution and then destroying it (the Red Guards). Mao indeed ^(totally) had to not just explain but ^(reverse) the course of the whole decade of the 1960s. No wonder it took two full years -- from Sept. 12, 1971 ~~the~~ when a Chinese military aircraft on which Lin Biao is supposed to have been on and which crashed in Outer Mongolia, to Aug. 24, 1973 when the 10th National Congress of the CCP met and finally announced Lin Biao by name and gave the official version, in an 8, 000 word political report by Chou en Lai.

The only word of truth we know, is that report, is that ^(what Lin called) there was something from Plan 571. What is of great relevance

11121

to us ~~know~~ still, is 1) that all this didn't happen overnight, that in fact when Lin ~~was~~ was supposed to be inspecting many divisions of the Army "coincided" with the announcement of an invitation to Nixon, 7/23/71,

(Either ~~was~~ here, or perhaps at the very 1st Paragraph of the New, Expanded version, the following would appear:)

There is no doubt whatever that the greatest or lowest original contribution of Mao was his very first Human Report where the peasant appeared much more successful and having a greater role to play than the proletariat. Of course it wasn't really the peasant, but the Peasant Army, and it wasn't the army of a social revolution but of protracted guerrilla warfare. It is this that brought him to power, a protracted, very protracted war. Actually it meant that once the first attempt at the revolution in China, 1925-27 had failed, the alternative that Mao came up with was to substitute guerrilla warfare for social revolution, was to create an army that he called revolutionary, ~~revolutionary~~, and indeed he even created a philosophy of On Practice and On Contradiction, a new idea of Education and Propaganda. By the end of the 50s he was ready to challenge Russia itself as the center of world revolution, and put himself as the leader of the ^(newly born) Third

World. Whatever it was that Mao believed could be transposed of his principle, that the workers remain at their production line while the army surrounds the cities and wins the power, all of which he ~~was~~ called the Peoples Revolution, Lin Biao took seriously the fact that not only was that a truth for China but that the Third World would surround all the metropolises and win power worldwide; in a word, he was the strategist of the Third World Peoples War. The whole leadership was opposed to the two superpowers, but it was abstract in the sense that it didn't mean, or they didn't take it to mean, to side up with one of them as against the other rather than striking out completely for independence.

The great shock of all came with the that Mao and X Chou had extended an invitation to President Nixon just ~~as~~ Nixon was releasing bombs on the Third World. It is that rolling out of the red carpet that brought about the "great disorder under heaven". The fact that it was by no means just a question of Lin Biao, but a good part of the ~~the~~ whole general staff of the Army ~~was~~ ^{they} likewise removed, and that to this day K as Deng is continuing with his so-called reforms, not only modernizing weapons but in ~~the~~ ^{"rationalizing"} the army.

(Naturally this will all have to be cut very sharply, but what I intend to do ~~at~~ at that point is go along with the original 3rd paragraph of the Theory/Practice)

11123

February 17, 1967

Dear Kevin,

I heard you thought that you'd want to find an outside journal that would want to publish my China article; I don't know whether you have anything concrete in mind, but here is what I thought I'd do if it were concrete and if I didn't change my mind if I thought it would require too much re-organization:

If I were brave, the title now would become a sub-title of the last section with an entirely new title, like "Whither China?" as the title. Because there is such a special role in the concept of Youth in China, I felt that I would start with something like: Far from the present turmoil in China being just a passing phenomenon, the Youth in China have always anticipated great divides. During the Cultural Revolution it was not the Red Guards which garnered all the headlines that was important, but a little group called Sheng Wulian with its thesis 'Whither China?'

Whether or not I also transpose some of the paragraphs on that special role from the end to the beginning, the point is that what I want to add would be the Lin Biao Affair. Instead of as a footnote, as it appears presently, that would come in directly after the second paragraph on page 1 and would probably occupy two pages that would deal with the concept of the Army in Mao Zedong Thought, the actual capture of Lin Biao taking a himself seriously as the strategist of the so-called Peoples Wars surrounding the cities, only this time meaning the Third World surrounding the metropolis. When the announcement was made to the invitation to Nixon, all things fell apart.

I don't know whether I'd ~~have~~ want to develop another point I just figured out, and that is there was one more faction fight we haven't heard about since the fall of Biao and the death of Chou en Lai, and that is the quiet fight between Mao and Chou, which Mao did his best to try to destroy in the few months left between their two deaths. So we had one more tragedy of errors instead of comedy of errors -- Hua Kua-feng and the Gang of Four. But finally came Deng whom Chou had "dominated".

Instead of coming back hail and hearty from vacation, I'm beset by a bad cold but still I hope the cold would be gone and I would come down a week from Wednesday to the Local.

Yours,

R

11124