

Part I Chapter 2 -- The French Revolution and Classical
German Philosophy

Of the three revolutions--the Industrial, the American and the French--which laid the foundations of modern society, the French Revolution made the greatest impact on philosophy thought.

This does not mean that the Industrial Revolution which undermined the very structure of the old feudal order did not shatter to smithereens the theories of the Enlightenment that knowledge and science, released from despotism would bring about a harmonious world. Quite the contrary. Industry and science were not only breaking up the old feudal order but showing at its very birth the new antagonisms. G. W. F. Hegel, the greatest bourgeois philosopher sensed the irreconcilable contradictions of modern society. The "spirit of contradicting" characterized the Hegelian philosophy from the start. It is the main spring of the dialect. In his First System (1801) Hegel himself boldly faced this great new negative phenomenon--alienated labor:

"The more mechanized labor becomes, the less value it has and the more the individual must toil."

"The value of labor decreases in the same proportion as the productivity of labor increases. The faculties of the individual are infinitely restricted, and the consciousness of the factory worker is degraded to the level of dullness."
(Q by Marcuse, p.79)

His description has the pathos of Marx's own works. Hegel, however, did not, and could not,

have seen the positive ² elements of alienated labor.

It would be some 40 years before the factory worker would reveal all his great creative energies and be ready to challenge the new order of capitalism. All Hegel saw was a wild animal. There is no more dramatic moment in the history of thought than that described by Herbert Marcuse (Reason and Revolution) when the young Hegel, describing the conditions of workers in capitalist production, breaks off the manuscript of his First System, which forever remained unfinished.

In contrast to the fragmentation of the laborers and the social institutions as a system of contradictory forces and relations, there was the excitement of the unfurled banner of the French Revolution: Liberty, Equality, Fraternity. This is not to say that the new land of America had left no impress. "America" Hegel said, "is therefore the land of the future in which in times to come... world history shall reveal itself... But... as the country of the future does not concern us here. For in history our concern must be with what has been and with what is." (tr by Carl J. Friedrich)

As the creator of a philosophy which gains its structure from actuality itself, he felt most the impact of nearest to him and of world-shaking importance, and because it was the Great French Revolution both because it was a Revolution not alone of institutions but of ideas. That is to say the acknowledged leaders openly avowed the ideas of the

philosophes. All of modern philosophy--from Bacon and Descartes through the encyclopaedists and Rousseau to Kant--was certain that it had worked out all fundamental problems, and that unencumbered by the feudal order and the authority of the church which trespassed the rights of science, the millenium would bring itself. Even Rousseau and Kant who doubted the automaticity of happiness resulting from sciences progress, who sensed contradiction, and appealed to human emotions and powers, could go no further than the reconciliation of opposites through the practical reason of men behaving according to a universal law, "the general will." Robespierre was to put Rousseau's Social Contract into practice and thus the Age of Reason would be realized. Kant had written his Critique the year before the revolution and he never wavered in his enthusiasm for it. But he could not meet the challenge to his philosophical premises. Whatever Robespierre meant by the Age of Reason, the ^{quest} ~~concrete~~ to be faced was not the cult of Reason as "the Supreme Being", but that of bread and work, and a political life which does not stop with the vote, but realizes itself in the daily activity of the people. The Revolution, whose motive force comes not from philosophers scientists and politicians but from great masses of men in motion against great obstacles to their development, revealed a development through contradiction, a dialectic all its own. Hegel alone met the challenge to reorganize all hitherto existing philosophy.

I. The Men in Shirt Sleeves and the Great French Revolution

July 14, 1789 opened the most thoroughgoing bourgeois revolution history had yet seen. It was not a foreign enemy that the people were struggling against. All its enemies and all its contradictions and suffering was from its own anointed rulers. The monarchy, corrupt to the marrow of its royal bones and blue blood, kept the masses ~~in~~ poverty and restricted the movements of the young burghers; the nobility, landlords and clergy lived in wanton luxury on the bent backs of the peasantry still held in feudal bondage. This regime attempted to maintain a serfdom and thought itself by compelling the scientists not to ^(by their disciplines) overstep the limits set by faith just at a time when in England science had already been put into practice by the rising industrial and commercial class. All these contradictions and antagonisms reached both a point of explosion and a point of unity with the storming of the Bastille. Classes and nations were fused to rid itself of the old order. In the country side the peasantry burned deeds, sacked chateaux, refused to pay dues, and repossessed the commons. ^{the urban poor, as well as the petty bourgeoisie} In the town they organized themselves into committees, clubs, societies, Communes to assure the destruction of the old and the creation of the new social order. Different from the American Revolution which had no feudal order to contend with, the French was marked at once by great daring and continuance, permanence of its revolutionary actions. There were great mass mobilizations not alone against

the royalist, nor even the ^{ruling} right wing of the bourgeoisie (Girondists), but also the left wing (the Montagnards) led by the best known of all bourgeois ^{leaders} ~~states~~, Robespierre.

This, in fact, was the greatest of all the achievements of the Great French Revolution--the workers' discovery of its own way of knowing. It is a popular pastime of liberal historians to say that 1789 which brought the Mountain into power was "only" a work of circumstance and necessity." Outside of the fact that ~~the~~ revolution of 1793 which brought the two wings of the bourgeoisie are dealt with as if they were two different classes in the manner in which Republicans ^{newspapers} speak of The New Deal as "socialism", the inference seems to be that because the masses had no "theory" it didn't leave its imprint on history. The truth is that precisely the ^{spontaneity} ~~spontaneity~~ of the uprisings--both of 1789 and 1793, especially of 1793--stamped the seal not alone of their demands but of the method by which the masses were to construct a new society in place of the old.

There is a sort of double rhythm of destroying the old and creating the new which bears the unmistakable stamp of the truly proletarian way of knowing--self-activity.

Despite the mountain of books on the French Revolution there is not to this day a full account of the depth and breadth of the mass activity. Recently Daniel Guerin has written a monumental work which is soon to be translated into English on "The Class ^{struggles} ~~struggles~~ in the First French Republic". In it he says:

felt instinctively the necessity of opposing to parliamentary democracy, with its indirectness and abstractions, forms of representation very much more direct, more simple, more transparent. The sections, communes, popular societies, day after day, express immediately the will of the revolutionary vanguard. The feeling that they were the most effective instruments and the most authentic interpreters of the Revolution conferred on them the boldness to dispute for power with the sacrosanct Convention. The people were so little guided by a preconceived idea, they were so far removed from all formalism, that the forms of the second power varied at each instant".

It is true that prior to the Revolution the sans culottes had no theory of direct democracy. Neither did anyone else, least of all philosophers. It is true that the townspeople did not organize themselves as a conscious substitute for that of parliament. But they did spontaneously infuse old institutions such as the Commune with a new content while entirely new forms of association, clubs, societies, committees sprung up everywhere. By the simple act of not going home after voting, but remaining at the polls and talking, the electoral assemblies were transformed into genuine communal assemblies of deliberation and action. The Sections of Paris began to seethe with life. For one thing, they remained in permanent sessions. They met daily (opening at 5 or 6 p.m.). Secondly, they elected a committee of correspondence to assure contact between the various sections of capital so that they would be informed and could coordinate their action. Thirdly, they watched and

tracked down suspects and saw that the revolutionary spirit is not controverted. Thus on January 1790 they opposed the arrest of Marat and made their views known through actions to consolidate the gains of the revolution. On June 18, 1791 they adopted the suggestion of Robespierre for abolition of distinction between so-called "active" citizens (who could pay the tax for voting) and "passive" citizens who could not. Indeed some sections began to take matters in their own hands and just abolished this distinction which gave the bourgeoisie ^{the} first lesson in democracy. By July 1792 their sessions became public with women and young people not eligible to vote in ^{the} galleries.

It was the sections of Paris that prepared the insurrection of August 10, 1792. After the final and complete overthrow of the monarchy, the legislature finally decided that the new assembly, the Convention would be elected by universal suffrage. Democracy was not an invention of philosophic theory or bourgeois leadership but a discovery of the masses, their method of action.

The masses did something fought for concrete objective things, like bread and clothes, arms to fight the enemy at home and abroad, control of prices. The established leaders opposed. The masses who created committees of their own, now used them to impose their will on the assembly. They began to associated their demand for bread and work with their demand for political ^{needs} ~~for~~ full citizenship ~~and political freedom~~. If sheer necessity not theory thus made its debut and attempted to take part in the shaping of the world, the necessary action not only

gained them their demands, but taught them who truly represented them. By 1793 it was not Robespierre and the Jacobins. The true representatives were the antagonists: Jacques Poux, Theophile Leclerc, Jean Varlet.

"Deputies of the Mountain," said Jacques Poux, it is a pity that you have not climbed from the third to the ninth floor of the houses of this revolutionary town; you would have been softened by the tears and groans of the vast masses, lacking bread and without clothes, reduced to this state of distress and misfortune by the gambling on the Stock Exchange and speculation in food. Leclerc invited the legislators to rise at three in the morning and to go and take their place among the citizens who besieged the doors of the bakeries: "Three hours of his time passed at the door of a bakery would do more to train a legislator than four years spent on the benches of the Convention."

Reason was the Supreme Being.

To Robespierre, ~~antagonists~~. But reason, said Varlet, lived not on top, but among the masses: "During four years, constantly on the public square among groups of the people, among the sansculottes, among the peoples whom I love, I have learnt how naively and just by saying what they think, the poor devils of the garrets reasoned more surely, more boldly than the fine gentlemen, the great talkers, the bumbling men of learning; if they wish to gain scientific knowledge let them go and move about like me among the people."

The French working class of France 1789 was numerically weak--some 600 thousand of the population of 25 million had accomplished miracles in the thorough des-

struction of the old. It did not and could not at this nascent stage of capitalist development, separate itself off completely from the revolutionary bourgeois leadership. It had learned that only by their own mass mobilizations and constant activity could it obtain their demands. But Robespierre who had learned so effectively to mobilize those enormous energies against feudal and royal reaction, worked to canalize the revolution. It could not in any case, in the material and historic circumstances of the time, have realized the equalitarian principles for which the true representatives of the Parisian masses fought for. We cannot follow Robespierre in the course he charted. For our purposes it is sufficient to note that thereby he opened the door to the White Terror which took his life as well as laid the ground for Napoleon.

The Great French Revolution, begun for "Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity" or its Declaration of the Rights of Man, even as the American Revolution fought under the banner of the Declaration of Independence, ended in the consolidation of a new ruling class, an exploitative class which, however, had a wider popular support than the feudal order it so thoroughly destroyed: 1) feudal dues were exterminated without indemnification, 2) where the peasants had taken the land, the property of the church and the emigres was nationalized, 3) the king was deposed and universal male suffrage established the first modern republic in Europe. So solid was the economic foundation of the new capitalist class--the Industrial Revolution and the peasantry taking the land*assured that--that no matter what the form of the future political power--republic or empire--it remained the ruling/
class.

*Friedrich Engels has pointed out that where at an earlier historic period the peasants had not taken the land, as was the case when the peasant revolts in Germany were betrayed by the German Reformation, that country itself "disappeared for three centuries from the ranks of countries playing an independent part in history."

Half a century afterwards the young Marx drew from the French Revolution, from the mass movement, the principles of revolutionary socialism. Before Marx's birth, however, Hegel had already met the challenge of the French Revolution completely to reorganize the premises of philosophy. Hegel called the new way of knowing "the dialectic". The French Revolution had revealed that the overcoming of opposites is not a single act, but a constantly developing process demanding all "the labor, patience and suffering of the negative." It is through contradiction, however, that the forward movement is won. As Hegel formulated it in his ~~History~~ Philosophy of History, it was not so much from, as through slavery that man acquired freedom. Hegel was not content to affirm the principle of self-movement and self-activity through opposition. He examined all of human history in this light. His patient tracing of the specific forms of the creating and overcoming of opposites was a landmark and has never been equalled since.

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II. A NEW WAY OF KNOWING: THE HEGELIAN DIALECTIC

1) Three false approaches to Hegel

It is necessary to divest Hegelian philosophy of the heavy ballast both of academic tradition and of Communist snobbery to get to his revolutionary theory of dialectics which Friedrich Engels, the collaborator of Karl Marx, summed up as "the laws of motion of the external world and of human thought."

Official Marxism has repeated ad nauseum that Marx stood Hegel right side up, that is, on his feet. As Lenin was to discover during World War I (Of Part III), paying lip service to the dialectic, while tirelessly repeating that, without Marx, Hegel is gibberish, is a trap to transform Marx into a vulgar materialist. It is today the greatest perversion of all Marx stood for. Russian Communism is a past master of such total perversion of history. But what is one to think of the way in which most academic Hegelians have ~~it~~ aided it in barring an approach to Hegel through their insistence on, and the keeping of, "the secret" of Hegel?

It is almost like a conspiracy the way in which modern intellectuals have joined with this twosome in transforming the dialectic into sheer sophistry. These intellectual cynics, from the Existentialists in France to those in America, have learned to manipulate the dialectic to fit arguments both pro and con of any subject. For example, they maintain that Hegel is both the theorist of the counter-revolution and the permanent revolution. As Hegel himself dealt with such type of philosophical lawyers who can argue either side of the case: "For Sophistry has nothing to do with what is taught:--that may always be true. Sophistry lies in the formal circumstances of teaching it by grounds which are as available for attack as for defence." (SL #122) In our day and age to declare that all Hegel's ~~absolute~~ Absolute means is "knowing the whole past of human culture is not only to make a mockery of the dialectical development of the world as well as of thought and thus bar a rational approach to Hegel. It is something much more self-paralyzing: it is to bar a rational theoretical approach to the world itself.

Herbert Marcuse is absolutely right when he says that the historical heritage of Hegel's philosophy did not pass to the "Hegelians". There is a dynamism, and, if you please, a contemporary ring to Hegel's philosophy which breaks through his abstruse language. In his time Marx acknowledged it as the necessary pre-requisite to the proletarian view of world history. It is more than that now. It concerns all of humanity. For in Hegel's Absolute there is imbedded, though in abstract form, ~~the full individual development of the social~~ individual, or what Hegel would call the individuality "purified of all that interferes with its universalism, i. e., freedom itself." (#388)PM This is the objective and subjective means of how a new society is going to be born, which is the concern of our age.

Every epoch has had something to learn from this most original thinker. Every epoch has had something to contribute, and ours most of all. We have known two world wars and are living under the threat of a third in which the very survival of civilization is in question. Our age is an age of ^{absolute opposites, of} revolution and counter-revolution.

2) ~~Magat~~ Our Age and Hegel's Absolute

We have lived through a successful proletarian revolution-- the Russian Revolution of 1917--and saw it end in the Stalinist counter-revolution, or counter-revolution of state-capitalism. It is our age therefore which is preoccupied with the question: What Happens After? Are we always to be confronted with a new form of state tyranny against the individual's freedom? When all previous struggles for freedom (the American and French revolutions of Hegel's time) ended in another form of class

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domination, Marxists said that it was a case where the method was democratic and revolutionary, but not the end and aim. In socialism, however, the method was to become the method, the aim, and the end. Yet it was the socialist revolution/^{out of} which came the first workers state in history which also brought in its wake the counter-revolution of state capitalism. Not only did the socialist state become transformed into the greatest barbarism, but it was led by some of the authentic leaders of the revolution itself. We are therefore faced with the problem: Can man be free. It is the totality of the present world crisis which enables us to see the solid ground under the most abstract part of Hegel's philosophy, the Absolute--Absolute Knowledge, the Absolute Idea, ^{the Absolute Method} and Absolute Mind.

Freedom is the animating spirit of Hegel's greatest works. The Phenomenology of Mind, Science of Logic (including the Smaller Logic of the Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences) and the Philosophy of Mind have to be considered as a whole. Freedom is not alone Hegel's point of departure. It is his point of return:

"When individuals and nations have once got in their heads the abstract concept of full-blown liberty, there is nothing like it in its uncontrollable strength, just because it is the very essence of mind, and that as its very actuality. Whole continents, Africa and the East, have never had this idea, and are without it still. The Greeks and Romans, Plato and Aristotle, even the Stoics, did not have it. On the contrary, they saw that it is only by birth (as e.g. an Athenian or Spartan citizen), or by strength of character, education or philosophy (--the sage is free even as a slave and in chains) that the human being is actually free. It was through Christianity that this idea came into the world." (EM)

The young Hegel may have had a lot of reservations as to whether it was through Christianity that the idea of freedom was born. But whether you take that as your point of departure

or the Industrial and French revolutions which created the material conditions for freedom, it really matters little. The point is, as Engels once pointed out, IF man were in fact free, there would be no problem, no Phenology, no Logic. The "negative character" of modern society from its beginnings is that man has to fight to gain freedom. What is crucial, both to Hegel and to Marx, is that there are barriers in contemporary society to the full development of man's potentialities, or, as Hegel would call it, his "universality."

All these contradictions resolve themselves in the Absolute. In the Phenomenology Hegel begins with the sphere of daily experience and ends in Absolute Knowledge: the unity of history and science. Hegel describes the development of the world as manifestations of the World Spirit. In the Science of Logic he begins where the Phenomenology ends, Hegel has "Thinking" go in search of truth until he reaches the Absolute Idea: the unity of theory and practice. In The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences, which gives the whole of his philosophic system, ends with Absolute Mind: the unity of object and subject. It is true he has worked out all these contradictions in thought alone while in life all contradictions remain, multiply and intensify. Yet it would be a complete misreading of his philosophy to think that because he has ~~worked out~~ resolved the contradictions of life in thought alone that thereby his Absolute is a mere reflection of the separation between the intellectual world and that of material production, or that thereby he has sealed himself off from the world in a closed, ontological system. Hegel broke with the whole tendency of introversion

which characterized German idealism. Where all other philosophers put the realization of truth and freedom in the soul, or in heaven, Hegel drew history into his philosophy. For every stage in the development of thought there is a corresponding stage in the development of the world. Take the Phenomenology which Hegel called his "voyage of discovery."

Anyone who gets a headache grappling with the metaphysical struggle of consciousness and self-consciousness leading to the Absolute is due to only two facts: 1) he has failed to hold firmly to the actual historic period Hegel had in mind when he was describing the development of "pure thought" from the development of the Greek city-state through the French Revolution, and he failed to heed the warning of Hegel who separated himself from all the mystical conceptions of the Absolute:

"It is certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of senseless declamations about the idea absolute. But its true content is only the whole system of which we have been hitherto examining the development." (ES)

This genius achieved the seemingly impossible. Because to him there was one Reason, and one Reason only--whether he called it World Spirit or not it was to him the actuality of freedom--he succeeded in breaking down the division between the finite and infinite, human and divine, thought and life. His Logic moves. Each of the previously inseparable divisions between opposites--between thought and reality--is in a constant process of change, disappearance and reemergence, coming into head-on collision with its opposite and developing thereby. It is thus and thus alone that man finally achieves true freedom, freedom, not as a possession, but as a dimension of his being:

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"If to be aware of the idea--to be aware, i.e., that man are

aware of freedom as their essence, aim, and object--is matter of speculation, still this very idea itself is the actuality of men--not something which they have, as men, but which they are." (PM)

It is Hegel's presupposition of the infinite possibilities of the expansion of human capacity which enables him to present the stages of development of mankind, even when only in thought, as stages in the struggle for freedom, to present the past and present as a continuous development to the future, from lower to ever higher stages. This bond of continuity with the past is the lifeblood of the dialectic. The grandeur of his vision of a society where man realizes all of his human potentialities and thus achieves consciously what the realm of nature achieves through blind necessity--"The Truth", freedom as part of his very nature, is not something added by him as a rhetorical flourish. It flows from the very nature of the Absolute Method, the dialectical philosophy: "To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition." (Sl, II, p. 476)

In his First System, which likewise ended in the Absolute Mind, labor, as we saw earlier, was central to it. As he retired to his ivory tower away from the realities of the day, the central theme of alienation was abstracted from the productive system. So profound, however, was the impact on Hegel himself that it remained integral to the system as we can see from the section on Lordship and Bondage in the Phenomenology where Hegel shows how, through his labor, the bondsman gains "a mind of his own", and stands higher than the lord who lives in luxury, does not labor, cannot really gain true freedom. Marx did not know Hegel's early writings, which were not published during his lifetime, but

he caught the critical impact: "Thus the greatness of the Hegelian philosophy and of its final result--the dialectic of negativity as the moving and creative principle--lies in the first place in the circumstances that Hegel...grasps the essence of labor...the true active relating of man to himself...as human essence is only possible...through the collective action of man, only as a result of history." (Critique of Hegelian Dialectic)

Marx pointed out that insofar as the Hegelian philosophy "holds fast the alienation of man, even if man appears only in the form of spirit, all elements of criticism lie hidden in it and are often already prepared and worked out in a man extending far beyond the Hegelian standpoint." It was a matter of ^{Hegel's} ~~the~~ method being greater than Hegel's use of it.

Individual sections of the Phenomenology will have a special urgent meaning for each epoch. For our times the sections on Absolute Freedom and Absolute Terror ~~mark~~ has imbedded in it the whole Russian development, as we shall show later. (Part IV) The Phenomenology contains not alone the tragedy of our times, but the most profound comedy. Who hasn't seen the Alienated Soul or Unhappy Consciousness among his restless friends, the tired radicals, who can find no place for themselves in or out and creating "a giddy whirl of self-perpetuating disorder" of the bourgeois fold? Who hasn't witnessed "the true and virtuous" among the labor bureaucracy who ~~think~~ ^{are under the illusion} they have given their all for "mankind" turning away from the masses in "a frenzy of self-conceit"?

But towering above the tragic and the comic is the vision of the future, the Absolute. Whether you accept it as the new society, or think of it only as the ontological unity of the human and the divine, the simple truth is that this unity of the human and divine is not up in heaven, but on earth. If

the logical categories of his Science, such as, Being and Becoming, Essence and Appearance, Necessity and Freedom do not, as Hegel imagined, have eternal existence independent of man, but are in actuality the reflection in man's mind of processes going on in the material world, it is, nevertheless, true that the signation of Hegel's analysis that the true form of reality requires freedom. His doctrine of the Notion develops these categories of freedom and the true potentialities of mankind are thus counterposed to the apparent reality. It is this which gives the material ring to this idealistic philosophy. In fact the Science of Logic may be said to be the philosophy of history established by the French Revolution that man in temporal history, that is, on this earth, can achieve freedom. Even though it is only thought Hegel deals with, practice is of the essence. Indeed the Practical Idea stands higher than the Idea of Cognition in the Hegelian system because it has not only the dignity of the universal, but is the simply actual. In the transition from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature and from the Nature to Mind, the climax to his whole system, we can today see a movement not alone from theory to practice but from practice to theory. In the materialistic reading of this final chapter of Hegel is where our age can make its greatest contribution.

3) The positive and and the negative of the Hegelian philosophy

"In my view...everything depends on grasping and expressing the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well."--Phen., p.80

If Hegel went so far as pose what is in reality the logic of a new society, why did he end in the sponsorship of the bureaucratic state? Hegel himself tells us the political

reasons (we are not concerned with his personal reconciliation). Society is broken down into opposing classes and interests, the state purely as the embodiment of reason is not sufficient to maintain authority. It is necessary to have a caste whose only function is to rule and mediate between "the government in general on the one hand, and the nation broken up into particulars (people and associations) on the other. Marx told us the philosophic reasons. In the Hegelian system humanity appears only through the back door so to speak since the core of self-development is not man, but only his "consciousness", the self-development of the Idea. It is this de-humanization of the Idea as if thoughts floated between heaven and earth instead out of the human brain, which Marx castigates mercilessly: "In place of human actuality Hegel has placed Absolute Knowledge."

It is here where Marx took Hegel who was thus standing on his head and put him on his feet, thereby creating the Marxian world view of history, dialectical materialism. ^{The Hegelian phil.} ~~the Hegelian phil.~~ though it ~~was~~ had replaced the viewing of things as things in themselves, as dead, impenetrable matter, and viewed everything as living subject met his historic, class barrier when he could not conceive the masses as "Subject ~~which~~ themselves creating the new society. Hegel had destroyed all dogmatism except the dogmatism of the backwardness of the masses. So that in the end the most encyclopaedic mind that Europe had produced, the founder of the dialectic, was recaptured in the rationalist trap from which he had sought to extricate European thought and himself returned to Kant's idea of an external unifier of opposites.

development of the Hegelian dialectic and, to use a Hegelian expression, "perished".

Once again, however, it is necessary to restate our ABC's. Marx's didn't reject idealism. "Thoroughgoing naturalism or Humanism", as the young Marx designated his own philosophic outlook, "distinguishes itself from idealism and from materialism, and is at the same time the truth uniting both." (Critique of Hegelian Dialectic) Marxism may be said to be the most idealistic of all materialistic philosophies and Hegelianism the most materialistic of all idealistic philosophy. Hegel's method was greater than his use of it. Hegel, said Marx, could not carry out his dialectical logic consistently because he remained from first to last a philosopher seeking to trace the logical movement, not of the worker, but of the intellectual. Hegel had established the principles. He had discovered them out of the devastating critique which the French Revolution had made of all previous philosophy. But the philosopher working only with ideas in his head and in the heads of others cannot solve the problems of society. He cannot create new unities, but only summarize those already reached. He is always standing apart from the real process of nature which is human nature working on nature and constantly transforming it into a new unity with himself. To develop the dialectical movement further it was necessary to turn to the real world and its labor process. This is what Marx did. The development of the dialectic method on new beginnings is to be found in Marxism.