

Excerpts from the History of Philosophy by Hegel

III, 158: "This gives us an example of the slow operation of the world-spirit in overcoming this externality. It sets away the inward substance, but the appearance, the outward form, still remains; at the end, however, it is an empty form, the new form breaks forth. In such times, this spirit appears as if it - having so far proceeded in its development at a snail's pace, and having even retrograded and become estranged from itself - had suddenly adopted seven-league boots."

ibid: "With the discovery of gunpowder the individual passion of battle was lost."

160: "the false infinite" - dissipated and diffused investigation

161: "The principle of modern philosophy is hence not a free and natural thought because it has the opposition of thought and nature before it as a fact of which it is conscious."

162: "Philosophy hence falls into the two mainforms in which the opposition is resolved, into a realistic and an idealistic system of philosophy."....Realism - experience, idealism - inward content. "The two methods, overlap one another, however, because experience, on its side desires to derive universal laws from observations, while, on the other side, thought proceeding from abstract universality must still give itself a determinate content."

165: "The bringing about in thought of the reconciliation which is accepted in belief, now constitutes the whole interest of knowledge"

166: Philosophers of ancient times were self-sufficing individuals. In modern times "we no longer see phil. individuals who constitute a class by themselves...the external he leaves to be determined by the order which is present in the particular sphere in which his lot is cast...he must seek to act in connection with others only a common mode of existence is possible in any calling or condition...a special calling like their sinks into the ordinary commonplace of state or class relationships, because admission thereto is outwardly determined."

173: Bacon - "external reasoning of a man of the world." "concrete experience and investigation...thinkingly applies itself to nature certain of finding the truth in it, since both are in themselves harmonious." Empiricism "~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ prepares the empirical material for the Notion, so that the latter can then receive it ready for its use."

181: "Those who make experiments and observations do not realize what they are really doing, for the sole interest taken by them in things, is being to the inward and unconscious certainty which reason has of finding itself in actuality."

185: "The end of the animal in itself as an individual is its own self-preservation; but its true end in itself is the species."

III, 191: Jacob Boehme, b. 1575 - "The matter of Jacob Boehme's phil. is genuinely German; for what makes him out and makes him noteworthy is the Protestant principle already mentioned of making placing the intellectual world within one's own mind and heart, and of experiencing and knowing and feeling in one's own self-consciousness all that formerly was conceived as beyond." 198: God "not as the empty unity, but as this self-separating unity of absolute opposites."

170: Bacon and Boehme belong to the first statement of modern philosophy - both agreeing that mind operates in its content (i.e., the concrete natural realm of the inward life) as in its own ~~own~~ domain.

217: After Bacon and Boehme comes the period of the thinking understanding, which is characterized by discarding of authority of others, emphasis on self-conscious certainty of every man, each man a judge. The content is derived either from inward or from outward experience, and rendered abstract through reflection and meditation.

220: Descartes, b. 1596 - began in a popular way. 226: "What is recognized as true should be able to maintain the position of having the thought therein at home with itself." "Nothing is true which does not possess an inward evidence in consciousness, or which reason does not recognize so clearly and conclusively that any doubt regarding it is absolutely impossible."

228: "In the celebrated cogito ergo sum, we thus have thought and being inseparably bound together" - immediately posited as one.

252: Spinoza, b. 1632: "With Descartes corporeality and the thinking 'I' are altogether independent beings; this independence of the two extremes is done away with in Spinozism by their becoming moments of the one absolute Being. This expression signifies that Being must be grasped as the unity of opposites." 258: What "constitutes the grandeur of S's manner of thought is that he is able to renounce all that is determinate and particular and restrict himself to the One, giving heed to this alone."

Concept of the causa sui: "The cause of itself is the cause which, while it operates and separates and 'other', at the same time produces only itself and in the production therefore does away with this distinction." 258

Concept of the finite as that "which can be limited by another of the same nature." -259

S's concept of the mode as the individual is inadequate :: he doesn't see the individual as being-for-itself, sees it in external relation to what is other. Therefore doesn't understand negation of negation. The particular is merely privative; when we negate it, we return to the absolute substance, and do not arrive at the individual. (289) The negative is conceived altogether as a vanishing moment, not as necessary. S's inability to see the individual as significant, both in objective reality and in self-conscious individuality must be remedied. From the former aspect it is taken up by Locke; from the latter by Leibniz.

Locke and Leibniz: "The one fact which is common to both phil. is that they, in opposition to Spinoza and Malebranche, take for their principle the particular finite determinateness of the individual." For Sp. "all that is determined and individual is merely annihilated in his system." 296

Locke, b. 1632: Psychological approach, deserts system of mere definitions. "The universal to Locke, is, therefore, merely a later result, the work of our minds; it is simply something pertaining to thought, as subjective." 299 "The reason that the positive point of view which he (Locke) opposes to any derivation from within is so false, is that he derives his conceptions only from outside and thus maintains Being-for-another, while he quite neglects the implicit." 302 310 "Locke is far back in the nature of knowledge, further back than Plato, because of his insistence on Being-for-another." 312 "With Locke, the truth merely signifies the harmony of our conceptions with things."

"To the English, Philosophy has ever signified the deduction of experiences from observations; this has in a one-sided way been applied to physical and eco. subjects. General principles of political economy such as free-trade in the present day, and all matters which rest on thinking experience; the knowledge of whatever reveals itself in this sphere as necessary and useful, signifies philosophy to the English. The scholastic method of starting from principles and definitions has been rejected. The universal, laws, forces, universal matter, etc. have in natural science been derived from perceptions, ... The other side is that in practical phil. regarding society or the state, thought applies itself to concrete objects such as the will of the prince, subjects and their ends and personal welfare. ... It is in this way that rational politics took their rise in England, because the institutions and government peculiar to the English led them specially and in the first place to reflection upon their inward political and eco. relationships. Hobbes must be mentioned as an exemplification of this fact. This manner of reasoning starts from the present mind, from what is our own, whether it be within or without us, since the feelings which we have, the experiences which fall directly within us, are the principles."

Hobbes, b. 1588 - derived philosophy of state from psychological and natural condition of men.

Newton treated notions like sensuous things, and dealt with them just as men deal with wood and stone. 324. Derived his conclusions from his experiences

Leibniz, b. 1646: - Multiplicity and individuality; harmonious association of externally related individuals due to pre-established harmony.

The philosophy of 16th and 17th century dealt with contradiction between thought and being or extension, God and the world, good and evil, necessity and freedom, etc. This contradiction runs through all the philosophers, and was solved only in an abstract way through positing God as the solution. The ancients, on the other hand, posed as the solution to problems "a concrete centre-point which meets all the problems set by thought as these are comprehended."

In the 18th Century, the solution is no longer sought in the Beyond, but in that which is by nature implanted in man's breast. The principle of resolution becomes immanent rather than transcendent. Being-for-self. (363)

Berkeley, b. 1684: - idealism in which all external reality disappears.

Hume, b. 1711 - custom and conventionalism.

Scottish philosophers - common sense as the ground of truth

French philosophy - "In the French phil. writings, which in this respect are of importance, what is worthy of admiration is the astonishing energy and force of the Notion as directed against existence, against faith, against ~~the~~ all the power of authority that has held away for thousands of years. On the one hand, we cannot help remarking the feeling of utter rebellion against the whole state of affairs at present prevailing, a state which is alien to self-cons., which would fain dispense with it, and in which self-cons. does not find itself; there is a certainty of the truth of reason, which challenges the whole intellectual world as it stands aloof, and is confident of destroying it. French atheism, materialism, or naturalism has overcome all prejudices, and has been victorious over the senseless hypotheses and assumptions of the positive element in religion, which is associated with habits, manners, opinions, determinations as to law and morality and civil institutions. With the healthy human understanding and earnestness of spirit, and not with frivolous declamations, it has rebelled against the condition of the world as legally established, against the constitution of the state, the administration of justice, the mode of government, political authority and likewise against art." 384

"In their political constitutions the French have, it is true, started from abstractions, but they have done so as from universal thoughts, which are the negative of reality; the English, on the other hand, proceed from concrete reality, from the unshakably structure of their constitution; just as their writers even have not attained to universal principles." 385

The Negative Aspect of French Philosophy -

Vs. degeneracy of religion and civic life - "those who enforced these views were therefore agents of destruction against that alone which was in itself already destroyed." 389 "These philosophers" never even thought of a revolution, but desired and demanded reforms alone, and that these should be subjective mainly; they called on the Government to sweep away abuses, and appoint honorable men as ministers." 390 "The French Rev. was forced on by the stiff-necked obstinacy of prejudices, by haughtiness, utter want of thought, and avarice."

The Positive aspect -

"The positive source of knowledge and of justice is placed in human reason and the common consciousness of mankind, in the healthy human reason, and not in the form of the notion..... They said, for instance, that Nature is a whole, that all is determined by laws, through a combination of different movements, through a chain of causes and effects and so on; the various properties, materials, connections of things bring everything to pass" 392-

Metaphysics of French Philosophy

Emphasis on concrete presence as necessary to validity. Hence materialists, emphasis on social instincts, laws of nature. Sensationalists, reduction of thought to feeling, will. Rousseau's conception of the free-will as having the power of thinking - transition to Kant.

The German Illumination - borrowed ideas from others, lacked vitality etc.

Jacobi in 1743 - sprung from French, while Kant sprung from English. Jacobi that we should occupy ourselves with proximate causes rather than remote ones (the most remote of which is God) Comprehension can only be of the conditioned. The understanding is the revelation of the finite, while the reason is the knowledge and revelation of absolute truth. 418

"France possesses the sense of actuality, of promptitude; because in that country conception passes more immediately into action, men have there applied themselves more practically to the affairs of actuality. But however much freedom may be in itself concrete, it was as undeveloped and in its abstraction that it was there applied to actuality; and to make abstractions hold good in actuality means to destroy actuality. The fanaticism which characterized the freedom which was put into the hands of the people was frightful. In Germany the same principle asserted the rights of consciousness on its own account, but it has been worked out in a merely theoretic way. We have convulsions of every kind within us and around us, but through them all the German head quietly keeps its nightcap on and silently carries on its operations beneath it." 425

Kant, b. 1724.

The Aufklärung made its way to Germany "in such a manner that all existence, all action, was called upon to serve a useful purpose, i.e., the implicit was done away with and everything had to be for another; and that for which everything had to be in man, self-consciousness, taken, however, as signifying all men generally." 426 "The consciousness of this action in abstract form is the Kantian philosophy. ... Theoretically the Kantian philosophy is the "illumination" or Aufklärung reduced to method."

Universality not in external things (Hume); hence must be in mind.

We must examine our faculty or instrument of knowledge.

Synthetic function of a priori thought - implies that thought is concrete in itself (altho Kant doesn't work this out) 430

Theoretically, reason is merely regulative; it is only practically that it is constitutive.

As a moral being man is free, raised above all natural law and above all phenomena 457

From Hegel's History of Philosophy, v.III

"While Hume attacks and universality and necessity of the categories generally, and Jacobi their finitude, Kant merely argues against their objectivity insofar as they are present in external things themselves, while maintaining them to be objective in the sense of holding good as universal and necessary, as they do, for instance, in math. and natural science." 427

"Universality and necessity "must rest on reason itself, and on thought as self-conscious reason; their source is the subject, I in my self-consc." 428

Kant showed that happiness theory, a vogue of his time, was founded on heteronomy.

"Since Kant shows that thought has synthetic judgments a priori which are not derived from perception, he shows that thought is so to speak concrete in itself." 430

Reason becomes transcendent if it tries to make its regulations constitutive of objects. So long as one studies reason as regulative, one has a transcendental philosophy.

Psychological stages - sensuousness, understanding, reason.
Sensuousness is the capacity of being affected by conceptions as external. 433 "It is the act of a priori sensuousness to project the content" externally. 434

"What the nature of time and space is, it does not occur to the K. phil. to inquire. To it what space and time are in themselves does not signify 'what is their notion,' but 'are they external things or something in the mind.'" 436

Sensuousness is receptivity; understanding is spontaneity.

"With K the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and they are only united in an external superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together by a cord." 441

"The knowing subject does not with K really arrive at reason, for it remains still the individual self-consciousness as such, which is opposed to the universal." 443

"Understanding is hence for him thought in finite relations; reason on the contrary is thought which makes the unconditioned its object" 444 "It is a great step forward to say that reason brings forth Ideas; with K, however, the Idea is merely the abstract universal, the indeterminate."

"According to K, Reason is not capable of procuring reality for its ideas - otherwise it would be transcendent, its limits would be overstepped; it produces only paralogisms, antinomies, and an ideal without reality." 446

"The necessity of these contradictions is the interesting fact which Kant has brought to consciousness....this transcendental idealism lets the contradiction remain, only it is not Being in itself that is thus contradictory, for the contradiction has its source in our thought alone...But the K. phil. does not go on to grapple with the fact that it is not things that are contradictory, but self-consciousness itself....K. shows here too much tenderness for things; it would be a pity, he thinks, if they contradicted themselves.....But that mind, which is far higher, should be contrad. - that is not a pity at all.....The true solution would be found in the statement that the categories have no truth in themselves, and the Unconditioned of reason just as little, but that it lies in the unity of both as concrete and in that alone." 450-1.

In the Critique of Pract. Reason, "Kant accepted Rousseau's conclusion that the will is absolutely free." 457

① "The first postulate in Practical reason is thus free, indep. will which determines itself, but this concrete is still abstract." 461

② The second point is the connection of the Notion of the will with the particular will of the individual. "The unity that man should be moral, is postulated; but beyond the 'should' and this talk of morality, no advance is made. It is not said what is moral; and no thought is given to a system of the self-realizing spirit." 461

③ "The third point is the highest concrete, the Notion of the freedom of all men, or the natural world has to be in harmony with the notion of freedom. That is the postulate of the existence of Good.....in the thought of the highest good, in which Nature is conformed to rational will, and happiness to virtue." 462

"The defect of K's philosophy consists in the falling asunder of the moments of the absolute form; or, regarded from the other side, our understanding, our knowledge, forms an antithesis to being-in-itself; there is lacking the negative, the abrogation of the ought which is not laid hold of. But thought and thinking had become once for all an absolute requisite that could no longer be set aside. It was consequently in the first place demanded by consistency that particular thoughts should appear as if produced of necessity from the original unity of the ego, and in that way justified. But in the second place, thought had spread itself over the world, had attached to everything, investigated everything, introduced its forms into everything, and systematized everything, so that on every hand thought-determinations had to be followed, instead of any mere feeling or routine or practical common sense, or what is evidenced in the extraordinary lack of understanding on the part of so-called practical men."

Fichte, b. 1762.

"The shortcoming in the K. phil. was its unthinking inconsistency thru which speculative unity was lacking to the whole system; and this shortcoming was removed by F. It is the abs. form which F. laid hold of, or in other words, the abs. form is just the abs. Being-for-self, abs. negativity, not individuality but the Notion of individuality and thereby the Notion of actuality... He maintained the ego to be the abs. principle, so that from it, the direct and immediate certainty of self, all the matter in the universe must be represented as produced, hence, according to F. reason is in itself a synthesis of notion and actuality. But this principle he once more in an equally one-sided manner set aside; it is from the beginning subjective, conditioned by an opposite, and its realization is a continual rushing onward in finitude, a looking back at what has gone before." 481

"The claims of phil. have advanced so far that in the first place self-consc. refuses any longer to regard abs. essence as immediate substance which does not in itself possess difference, reality, and actuality. Against this substance self-consc. every struggled for it does not find its explicit Being there, and consequently feels the lack of freedom."

"The great necessity in Phil. is to possess one living Idea; the world is a flower which is eternally produced from one grain of seed." 483

"The present standpoint of phil. is that the Idea is known in its necessity; the sides of its diremption, Nature and Spirit, are each of them recognized as representing the totality of the Idea, and not only as being in themselves identical, but as producing this one identity from themselves." "The deeper the spirit goes within itself, the more vehement is the opposition, the more abundant is the wealth without." 545

"In this lengthened ^{process} spirit (25 centuries) the Notion of Spirit invested with its entire concrete development, its external subsistence, its wealth, is striving to bring spirit to perfection, to make progress itself and to develop from spirit. It goes ever on and on, because spirit is progress alone."

"It has been the work of modern times to grasp this idea as spirit, as the Idea that knows itself. In order to proceed from the conscious idea to the Self-conscious, we must have the infinite opposition, namely the fact that the Idea has come to the consciousness of being absolutely sundered in twain."