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LENIN'S PHILOSOPHIC NOTEBOOKS
OUTLINE OF HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

pp. 1-2

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EXCERPTS FROM LENIN'S NOTES
ON HEGEL'S HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, pp. 1-9

*1949
1953
1971* editions
CD-ROM

Rough v. of F.D.*

*Should include instead of Excerpts
from Hist. Phil. the 3 pages
already in a Dial; appearing
in Feb. 1950*

1 4 9 3

ROUGH TRANSLATION OF LENIN'S PHILOSOPHIC NOTEBOOKS
exactly as published from Lenin's handwriting
by M-L Institute, 1st in 1929 & then 1947

Hegel's Werke

- Bd. I-Philosophische Abhandlungen
- II-Phenomenology of Mind
- III-V-Science of Logic
- VI-VII (1 and 2) Encyclopaedia (
- VIII-Philosophy of Right
- IX-Philosophy of History
- X-(3 parts) Esthetics
- XI-XII-History of Religion
- XIII-XV--History of Philosophy
- XVI-XVII--Miscellaneous Works
- XVIII-Philosophic propaedeutics
- XIX (1 and 2) Letters of Hegel and to Hegel

OUTLINE OF HEGEL'S SCIENCE OF LOGIC

(Berne:Logic I, 1975)

(Berlin, 1885)

Full title: Works

G.W.F.Hegel, Vol. III (pp. 468)

Complete edition by a few friends
of the deceased: Marginalke, Schulze,
Gans, Henning, Hoffe, Michelet, Forster

Science of Logic

- Part I. Objective Logic
- Part I. Doctrine of Being

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION.

p. 31--profound about logic: the "prejudice" that it "teaches
how to think" (like physiology "teaches one how to digest"??)
..."the logical science which is the true content of
genuine Metaphysic or pure speculative philosophy"... (35)

..."Philosophy...cannot borrow its Method from a subordinate
science, such as Mathematics..." (36)

"But it is the nature of the content, and that alone which
lives and stirs in philosophic cognition, while it is this
very reflection of the content which itself originates
and determines the nature of philosophy." (36)

(The movement of scientific cognition--that is the essence) ✓

and maintains them
"Understanding (Verstand) makes determinations (bestimmt)
Reason (Vernunft) is negative and dialectical because
it dissolves into nothing the determinations of
Understanding (in Nichts auflöst)." (36) The unity of
the one and the other----"Reason which understands or
Understanding which reasons" = positive.

or rather
Negation of the "simple" or "movement of the Mind".

"It is...along this path of self-construction) alone that Philosophy can become objective and demonstrated science," (37)

("path of self-construction" = path (here lies the nub, in my opinion) of true cognition, knowledge, movement).

Character-istic! Movement of ~~new~~ consciousness "like the development of all physical and intellectual life" rests on "the nature of pure essentialities which make up the content of Logic" (Natur der reinen Wesenheiten).

*Amorality
Apokalyptik*

In reverse: logic and theory of knowledge must be deduced from the "development of all physical and intellectual life".

Until this point: introduction to first edition.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND EDITION

"... to present the realm of thought in its philosophic aspect--that is, in its own (NB)*immanent activity, or development" (which comes to the same thing) in its necessary (NB)* development"... (39)

"well-known forms of thought"--an important beginning, "lifeless bones of a skeleton." (39)

What is necessary is not lifeless bones but full-blooded life.

The connection of thought to language (the Chinese language, by the way, and its undeveloped state: (40) the formation of substantives and verbs. In the German language words sometimes have "opposed meanings" (40) (not only "various but opposed)--"a joy to thought"... idea

history of thought = history of language?

*integrated
functioning*

The concept of force in physics--and polarity ("opposites are inseparably bound up (emphasis Hegel's)** together" (41). Transition from force to polarity--a transition to "higher relations of thought". (41)

Denken heisst

NB yet p. 90.. "But if Nature in general is opposed, as physical, to what is mental, then it must be said that Logic is rather that something Super-natural..."

Nature and "Spirit"

The logical forms are generally known, but..."what is familiar is not on that account necessarily understood." (41)

"Infinite progress" --"freedom" "forms of thought" from material (von dem Stoffe) desire, will, etc. the working out of the universal (Plato, Aristotle): the beginning of knowledge. (41)

*Parathetical comment VIL's--tr.
**Despite parathetical remark of L's, the emphasis is not Hegel, or at least not in English translation.

"It was only," says Aristotle(42), "after nearly everything that was necessary...had been obtained, that people began to trouble themselves about philosophic knowledge." He also(assigns) the beginning of the mathematical sciences to the leisure of the priestly caste. (42) Preoccupation with "pure thought" pre-poses "a long stretch of road already traversed by mind of man". In such thinking

Interests "move the lives of people"

((("interests are hushed which move the lives of peoples and individuals." (41)

Categories of logic are essentially abbreviations ("abbreviated in another place) or "an endless multitude", "particulars of external existence and of action..."(43) In their turn these categories serve people in practice ("in intellectual exercise upon living content by production and inter-change...")

And about the forms of thought (Denkformen) it is impossible to say that they serve us because they ~~seem to~~ permeate "through all our sensations", they are essential "the Universal ~~itself~~"

P.N. Objectivism: categories of thought are not an accessory (posobiye) of man, but an expression of the law and nature of man--cf. later contrast (protivopolozheniya) *(generalizatsiya)*

--"as subjective thinking" and "objective concept of things constitutes their own reality". We cannot "get beyond that own act of ours".(44)

And the remark against "Critical Philosophy" (44). It understands the relation between "the three Terms" (us, thought, things) so that we stand as an "intermediary" between things and thought, that this intermediary "excludes" (abschliesst) us rather than "connects us with them" (zusammenschliessen). That, says Hegel, it is necessary to answer "by the simple observation" that "these very things which are supposed to stand beyond ourselves (*Jenseits*) and beyond the thoughts referring to them, at the opposite extreme, are themselves things of thought (Gedankendinge)...."and "the so-called Thing in itself the product of empty abstraction."

C. J. ...

In my view the conclusion essentially is: (1) in Kant knowledge hedges off (separates) nature from man; in actuality, it unites them; (2) in Kant "the empty abstraction" of the thing-in-itself is put in place of the living procession (sheetviya), the movement of our ~~knowledge~~ ever deeper knowledge of things.

Doing an action -4-

12/11/68

In Kant the thing in itself is an empty/abstraction, and Hegel demands abstractions corresponding to essence: "the objective concept of things constitute their own reality", corresponding --materialistically speaking-- to the genuine deepening of our knowledge of the world.

It is not true that the forms of thought are only "a means" "for our use". (44)

NE *It is not true, either, that they are only "external forms" forms attached to the content, and not the content itself: (44) // NB*

Hegel, then, demands of logic forms which are full of content, forms of the living, real content inseparably tied up with content.

And Hegel concerns himself with "ideas of all natural and spiritual things", with "substantial content"...(45)

--"To bring into clear consciousness this logical character which gives soul to mind and stirs and works in it, this is our problem." (45)

Logic is the doctrine not of external forms of thought, but of the laws of development "of all material, natural and spiritual things," i.e. of the development of the total concrete content of the world and of its knowledge, i.e. the totality, sum, conclusion of the history of the knowledge of the world.

"Instinctive action" (instinktartig *Tun*) "is broken up within the meshes of its Categories into an infinitely various material". "Intelligent and conscious action", on the contrary, draws out of "the content of that which stirs in the mind" (den Inhalt des Treibenden) from its immediate unity with the Subject, and made an Object for it" (for the subject).

"In this web strong knots are formed now and then which are foci of arrest and direction (of the spirit or subject)* in mental life and consciousness..."(46)

How should one understand this?
Man is faced with a web of the phenomena of nature. Instinctive man, a savage, does not separate himself from nature. Conscious man draws out categories, the essence of the steps of separation, i.e. the knowledge of the world, knots, foci of arrest in the web, which enables him to understand and master it.

*Parenthetical remark is VIL's, -tr.

Development

"truth which is in itself infinite" (46)--its finitude is its negation, "its end". Forms (of thought), if we are to look upon them as "forms, distinct from Matter and ~~very~~ attached to it" are incapable of attaining truth. The emptiness of these forms of ~~formal~~ logic makes it worthy of "contempt" and "ridicule". The law of identity, $A = A$, is an "insufferable" emptiness. (47)

It would be incorrect to forget that these categories have "their place and validity in cognition". But as "indifferent forms" they can be "instruments of error and sophistry" (47), not of truth.

~~Thinking consideration~~ Not only the "external form" but also the "content" must be brought before ~~thinking consideration~~ "logical consideration". (47)

Content

NB // "With this introduction of/into logical consideration" // NB
the object of thought are not the things, but the essence, the concept of things.

not thing, but the laws of their movement, materialistically speaking.

"...Logos, the reason of that which is." (48)

And on p.(48) in the beginning of the subject of logic there is the expression:

... "the development of Thinking in accordance with its own necessary Laws"

"Development" of thinking with its own necessary laws

Categories must be brought out (and not arbitrarily or mechanically taken) (not "describing", not "believing", but proving), using one's point of departure the simplest basis (Being, Nothing, Becoming (das Werden) (not taking them)--there, ~~where~~ is "enclosed in this germ, the whole development of the science. (50)

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

INTRODUCTION: GENERAL CONCEPT OF LOGIC

Ordinarily by logic we ~~under~~ mean "science of thinking", merely the bare form of "cognition". (54)

Hegel rejects this view. Against the thing-in-itself as "something on the other side of thought." (55)

Forms of thought allegedly "have no application to things in themselves" (57) A true knowledge that would not know the thing in itself would be an absurdity. And prejudice--is it also a thing in itself?(57)

"Transcendental Idealism, carried more consistently to its logical conclusion, has recognized the emptiness of that spectre of the Thing-in-itself which the critical philosophy left over--an abstract shadow, detached from all content--and had it in view to demolish it altogether. Also this philosophy (Fichte?) made a beginning of letting Reason produce its own determinations out of itself. But the subjective attitude of this attempt did not admit of its being carried to completion." (58)

Logical forms are essentially dead forms--since they are not looked upon as an "organic unity", "their concrete living unity" (ibidem).

"In the Phenomenology of Spirit...I have set forth the movement of consciousness, from the first crude opposition (Gegensatz) between itself and the Object, up to absolute knowledge. This process goes through all the forms of the relation of thought to its object." (59)

"Truth as Science, is pure Self-Consciousness unfolding itself..." (60) "objective thinking",
...
... "Truth as it is, without husk in and for itself." (60)

(p. 61: priesthood, God, kingdom of truth, etc. etc.)
(62) Kant gave an "essentially subjective signification" to "logical determinations". But thought-determinations have their objective value as they are in and for themselves. (62) overhauling
The old logic came to be neglected. Needs alterations...

(63)--The old, formal logic is "like the child's game of trying to fit into their right places the various pieces of a picture-puzzle" and became contemptible.

64) The method of philosophy must be its own (not the method of Mathematics, contra Spinoza, Wolf and others).

64) "since the method is the consciousness of the form taken by the inner spontaneous movement of the content of Logic" and further the whole page (64-65) a good explanation of the dialectic.

*Paranthesical word VIL's--tr.

"(Method, tr) is no-ways different from its object and content; -for it is the content in itself the dialectic which it has in itself; that moves it on."

"The very content of the realm, of the dialectic moves forward the given sphere of phenomena, which it (the content) has in (an)itself", (i.e. the dialectic of its own movement)

~~Negation, something, has a determinate content, the inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the older content by a new, a higher one.~~
The negative is the positive also--the negation is a determined something, has a determinate content, the inner contradictions lead to the replacement of the older content by a new, a higher one.

In the old logic there is no transition, no development (of concepts and thinking), no "inner necessary connection" (66) NB of all parts and "transition" of one into another.

And Hegel poses two fundamental premises:

- 1) the necessity of connection *die Notwendigkeit des Zusammenhangs*
- 2) the immanent emergence of the difference *die immanente Entstehung der Differenz*

Very important!! This is what it means in my opinion:
 1) Necessary is the connection of the objective tie-up of all sides, forces, tendencies, etc. of the given sphere of phenomena.
 2) "the immanent emergence of the difference"--the inner objective logic of the evolution and the struggle of the differences of polarity.

Inadequacies of the Platonic dialectic in "Parmenides"

"Dialectic is generally regarded as an external and negative procedure, that does not pertain to the subject-matter, that is based on a mere idle subjective craving to disturb and unsettle what is fixed and true, or that at best leads to nothing except the futility of the dialectically treated matter." (66)

(66)--the great merit of Kant is that he freed the dialectic "from the semblance of arbitrariness".

Two important things:

- (1) Die Objectivitat des Scheins (NB: unclear, must return here!!)
 - (2) die Notwendigkeit des Widerspruchs
- self-moving soul... ("inherent negativity")... "the principle of every physical and spiritual life." (67)

Is not this the thought, that appearance is also objective, since it is one of the sides of the objective world? Not only Wesen, but also Schein are objective. Even the distinction between subjective and objective has its limits.

Dialectic = *Wesen der Entgegensetzung in einem Einheit*
= "comprehension of the unity of opposites"...

Fine and Deep! Logic is like grammar, in this that it means one thing for the beginner and another for him who knows the language (and languages) and their spirit. "It is one thing to him who approaches Logic and the Sciences in general for the first time, and another thing to him who comes back from the Sciences to Logic." (68)

Then logic gives "the very essence of wealth (wealth of the determinations of the world), the inner nature of the spirit and of the world..."

Cr "Capital" || "not a mere abstract Universal, but as a Universal which comprises in itself the full wealth of Particulars;" (69)

A beautiful formula: "not a mere abstract universal but a universal which comprises in itself the wealth of particular, individual, separate (all the wealth of the particular and the separate!!! Très bien!

"just as a proverb, in the mouth of a youth who understands it quite accurately, yet fails of the significance and scope which it has in the m^o of a man of years and experience, for whom it expresses the full (materialistic)

the result from knowledge of the sciences" "force of its content. Thus the value of Logic only receives due appreciation when it is seen to result from knowledge of the particular science; so regarded, it presents itself to the mind as Universal Truth, not as a particular department of knowledge alongside of other departments and other realities, but as the very essence of all these other Contents." (69)

very essence of all other knowledge" (Es-sence) "the

"The System of Logic is the realm of shades", freed from "all concretion of sense..." (69)

... "not abstract, dead stationary, but concrete"...

[Characteristic! The spirit and essence of dialectic!]

-9-

(73) The remark...the results of the philosophy of Kant...that reason can cognize no valid content, and with regard to absolute truth must be referred to faith."

Kant: to limit reason and strengthen faith

(#4) Once again, the thing-in-itself = abstraction, the product of abstract thinking

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I. BOOK ONE: THE DOCTRINE OF BEING
 Volume III, Part I. Objective Logic
 Book I: Doctrine of Being (Berlin 1833)

BEING

(79)...(en passant)...
 "the behaviour of cog-
 nition" (idem p.81)

The theme of logic.
 Compare with current
 "gnoseology".

(80)... "there is nothing (Hegel's emphasis)* in Heaven, Nature, Spirit, or anywhere else, which does not contain immediacy as well as mediacy!..

NB

- 1) Heaven-nature-spirit. Away with Heaven: materialism.
 2) Everything vermittelt = is mediated, tied in one, connected through transitions. Away with Heaven-- the connection of everything (the p r o c e s s) of the world through law. (zakonomernaya svyaz)

(this is Hegel's - not my own)

(81) "Logic is pure science, that is, pure knowledge of the whole extent of its development"...

the 1st line is nonsense.
 the 2nd brilliant.

With what to begin? "Pure being" (Sein) -- "to presuppose nothing", the beginning. "To hold within itself no determination" ... "to be free of mediation"...

NB [] "Development (of knowledge)... must be determined by the nature of the things themselves and their content" ..

(85) The beginning contains in itself "nothing" and "being", it is their unity:

... "that which is-beginning, as yet is not: it is advancing towards Being" ...
 // (from Not-being to being: "not-being which is instead of being").

Nonsense about the absolute (pp.85-6). In general I try to read Hegel materialistically: Hegel is materialism standing on its head (according to Engels) -- i.e. for the most part I throw out God, the absolute, pure idea etc.

88-89. It is impossible to begin philosophy with the "I". It does not permit "an objective movement" (88)

SECTION ONE: DETERMINATRESS (QUALITY)

(94) Pure being--"without any further determination".
(Determination is already quality.)

Transition (finite being) --and this in Fursichsein
Sein --into (on the face of) (being for itself?)
Dasein (it?)

Being--Nothing-- Becoming.

"Pure Being and pure Nothing are, then, the same." (95) (98): This appears "paradoxical". Their unity is the becoming.

"this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other..."
generally

Observation!

Nothing is/opposed to ~~Something~~; but Something is an already determinate existent distinguished from another Something, but here we speak of simple Nothing. (95)

(The Elastics and Parmenides particularly were the first to arrive at this abstraction of Being. In Heraclitus "~~everything~~ all things flow" (96)..i.e. "everything is Becoming."

Ex nihilo nihil fit? Out of Nothing Being (becoming): comes

(97) It would not be difficult to demonstrate this unity of Being and Nothing in every ~~xxxx~~. (emphasis Hegel's) "fact and thought" ... neither in heaven nor on earth is there anything not containing both Being and Nothing. Objections push under d e t e r m i n a t e being (do I have 100 thalers or not (98), but this is not the problem...

"A necessary ** connection of the whole world"
... "mutually determinant connection of the whole"

"A determinate or finite being is such as refers itself to another; it is a content which stands in a relation of necessity with other content or with the whole world. In view of the mutually determinant connection of the whole, metaphysics could make the assertion (which is really a tautology) that if the least grain of dust were destroyed the whole universe must collapse." (98)

NE (101: "What is first in science has had to show itself first, too historically."

Sounds completely materialistic!

(105) "Becoming is the subsistence of Being as much as of Not-being."
... "Transition is the same thing as Becoming..." (106)

*Parenthetical remark VIL's; that word is not emphasized in the English text; the rest of the emphasis in that question is VIL's. --tr.

**Within the quotation that phrase of course appears as "(a content) which stands in a relation of necessity with ... the whole world." --tr.

(107) "Parmenides, equally with Spinoza, will not admit progress from Being, or the absolute Substance, to the negative or finite."

With Hegel, on the other hand, unity or inseparability (p.104, this expression is sometimes better than unity) of "being" and "nothing" ^{determine} give the transition, becoming.

Absolute and relative, finite and infinite = parts, steps of one and the same world. Is that not so?

"For the mediation of being we preserve the name: existence."

(107) With Plato in "Parmenides" the transition from Being and One = "external reflection." (113)

(114) It is said that darkness is the absence of light. But "as little is seen in pure light as in pure darkness."

(117) References to infinitely small magnitudes, which are taken in the process of their disappearing...

"there exists nothing that is not a mean condition between Being and Nothing." NB

Non-understanding
"Misunderstanding of the beginning"-if Nothing and Being exclude each other, but that is not dialectic, but sophistry. (117)

"For sophistry is an argument proceeding from a baseless supposition which is allowed without criticism or reflection; while we term dialectic that higher movement of Reason where terms appearing absolutely distinct pass into one another because they are what they are, where the assumption of their separateness cancels itself." (117) NB Dialectic

Becoming. Its moments. ~~XXXXXXXX~~ Arising and Passing Away. (118)

Das Aufheben des Werdens---das Dasein.

concrete, ^{is} determine being?

119: aufheben = ein Ende machen (aufbewahren zugleich)= erhalten

NB (121) Existence being is determinate (NB) "concrete" (122) Being--quality, separated from the other, --fickle and finite.

(123) "Determinates, taken thus isolated and by itself as existent determinateness, is Quality"... "Quality which is to count as something separately existing is Reality..."

* *Handwritten note:* "determine" is not the explanation.

(125) "Determinateness is negation" (Spinoza). Omnis determinatio est negatio, this expression is of infinite importance...

(127) Something is the first negation of negation...

Here the analysis is somewhat desultory and doubly nebulous. Abstract and abstruse Hegelianism--Engels

(129) Two pairs of determinations: (1) Something and an Other; (2) Being-for-Other and Being-in-Itself

(133) The thing-in-itself--"very simple abstraction". The proposition seemed like a piece of wisdom that we do not know what the things-in themselves are

The thing-in-itself is an abstraction quite without (Being-for-Other) (from every relation to Other), i.e. Nothing. Consequently, things in themselves are "mere abstractions, void of truth and content." (134)

This is very deep: the thing-in-itself and its transformation into the thing for Other. (Cr. Engels). The thing in itself, in general, is an empty, lifeless abstraction. In life in this movement all and everything is used to being "in itself" and "for other" in relation to Other, transforming itself from one condition (sostoyaniye) to another.

Sehr gut!! when we ask, what is the thing in-itself, "the question, in sheer thoughtlessness, is so put as to render an answer...impossible" (133)

(136): Incidentally; dialectical philosophy "the metaphysical (which includes the Critical) philosophy is unknown"

Kantianism = metaphysics

Dialectic is the doctrine about of the identity of opposites --how they can be and how they become --under which conditions they become identical, transforming one into another--why the mind of man must not take these opposites for dead, blocked, (zastyvshiy), but for living, conditioned, mobile, transforming one into the other. En lisant Hegel...

(139): "Limit" is simple (or first) negation" (Something. Every something has its limit) "while Other is negation of negation..."

(141-2): "But when this negation is developed to show that the opposition between its Determinate Being and negation as its immanent limit, is itself the Being-in-Itself of Something, and that thus this latter is in itself just Becoming, then these facts constitute its Finitude."

*"mpheisil VIL's.tr

(Something, taken from the point of view of immanent limits-from the point of view of its contradiction with itself; which contradiction drives it (this Something) and leads it beyond its limits, that is finitude.)

When it is said that things are finite, then it is thereby acknowledged that their Non-being is their nature ("their Not-being constitutes their B. Being").

"They (the things) ^{are} ~~are~~, but the truth of this being is their end." (142)

NB

Thoughts of dialectic enlisant Hegel

acute Sharp and wise! Hegel analyzes concepts which usually appear dead and he shows that there is movement in them. The finite? That means movement has come to an end! Something? That means not what Other is. Being in general? That means such indeterminateness that being = Not-Being. All-sided universal flexibility of concepts--flexibility reaching to the identity of opposites. This flexibility, subjectively applied = eclecticism and sophistry. When this flexibility is objectively applied, i.e., reflecting the all-sidedness of the material process and its unity, then it is dialectic, it is the correct reflection of the eternal development of the world

(142) Infinite and finite, it is said, are opposites? (cf. p. 152) (cf. p. 154)

(145) Ought and Barrier -- moments of the finite.

(146) "At Ought the transgression beyond finitude, Infinity, begins."

(146) It is said that Reason has its own ^{barrier} limits. "When this assertion is made it is not seen that by the very fact that something has been determined as barrier, it has already been surpassed."

Sehr gut!

(147) A stone does not think, and therefore its restrictedness (Beschräntheit) is not a barrier (Schranke) for it. But even a stone has its barrier, for example. oxidization, if it has a caustic base.

Evolution of the stone

(148) Everything (human) goes beyond the limit (appetite, pain, etc.), but reason, we are told, "cannot pass beyond the barrier".

But "It is true that not every passage and existence beyond the barrier is a veritable emancipation from it."

A magnet, if it had consciousness, would consider its direction to the north as a determination of its will (Liebnitz). -- ~~rather~~, he would then know ~~that~~ all directions of space, and only the one direction would it consider the limit of its freedom, limiting it.

(151).. "It is the nature of the finite to pass beyond itself, to negate its negation and to become infinite."

Dialectic of the things themselves, of the very nature, the very course of events.

It is not the external (fremde) force (Gewalt)(151) which transforms the finite into the infinite, but this is its (finite) nature (seine Nature)

152. "Bad infinity"--infinity qualitatively opposite to the finite, not connected with it, separated from it, as if the finite was on this side, and infinite on the other side, as if the infinite stands beyond the finite, outside of it..

155: In actuality ~~they~~ (finite and infinite) are inseparable. They are essentially one.

to atoms vs. electrons. In general, infinity of matter in depth...

158-9: ... "the unity of finite and infinite is not an external juxtaposition of these terms, nor an improper connexion contrary to their determination, and binding together entities separate and opposed and mutually independent and hence incompatible; on the contrary, each in itself is this unity, and is so only in transcending itself, neither excelling the other in Being-in-Self and affirmative Determinate Being. It has been demonstrated above that finitude exists only as a passing beyond itself; it thus contains infinity which is its Other.."

(than simple comparison of finite & infinite)

Connection of all parts of infinite progress.

"..The infinite progress, however, asserts more than this: in it is also posited the connexion (emphasis is Hegel's)* of terms which also are distinct." (159)

165: "The nature of speculative thoughts shows its characteristic method in this example just worked out: it consists solely in seizing the opposed moments in their unity."
passes beyond

The question, how does the infinite ~~passes beyond~~ finite, is sometimes considered the essence of philosophy. But this question resolves itself to the explanation of their connection..

166: "In other subjects, too, the art of putting a question demands some education; still more so in philosophical subjects, if a better answers be required than this, that the question is idle."

Bien dit

*Emphasis and paranthetical expressions VIL's--tr.

(Relation to Other has disappeared; there remained relation to Itself.)

170-1: Fürsichsein--Being-for-Self = infinite being; determinate qualitative being. Quality reaches the limit (auf die Spitze) and becomes quantity.

The idealism of Kant and Fichte--(176)"remains in the dualism ((unclear)) of Determinate Being and Being-for-Self..."

i.e. this transition of things-in-themselves (the following proposition reminds us of this) to phenomenon? object to subject?

Why Being-for-Self is One is unclear to me. In my opinion Hegel here is very obscure.

The One--the old principle (and Void). Void is considered the source of ~~movement~~ motion(179) not only in the ~~this~~ sense that ~~the explanation~~ no room is left open for it, but "contains this profounder thought that the negative in general contains the ground of Becoming, the unrest of self-movement,"(180)

NB: Selbsbewegung

(181) "The ideality of Being-for-Self, as totality transformed into reality, and precisely the simplest, abstract thing as the One."

Dark waters / Dunkel ist der tiefe Sinn

The idea of the transformation of the ideal into the real is profound; very important for history. But also in the personal life of man it is evident that there is much truth in this. Against vulgar materialism. NB. The distinction of the ideal from the material is also not unconditional, not excessive.

182. Observation. The monads of Leibnitz, The principle of the One and its incompleteness in the hands of Liebnitz.

Evidently Hegel takes his self-development of concepts, categories in connection with the entire history of philosophy. This gives yet a new aspect to the whole Logic.

(185).. "It is an old proposition that One is Many, and more especially that the Many are One."

(187)"The distinction of One and Many has determined itself to be that of their relation to one another; this is divided into two relations, Repulsion and Attraction."

In general this entire Being-for-Self perhaps in part suited Hegel for the deduction from it, "of the transformation of quality into Quantity" (191)--quality is determinateness, determinateness for self, the positedness, is the unit--this gives the impression of belaboring and emptiness.

the Observation on
Note that/p.(193)is not devoid of irony against

"the procedure of knowledge reflecting on experiences, which first perceives*determinations in the phenomenon, next makes them the basis, and finally assumes for their so-called explanation* corresponding fundamental materials or forces which are supposed to produce these determinations of the phenomenon."

*Aml emphasis VIL's-tr.

SECTION TWO: MAGNITUDE (QUANTITY)

Kant has 4 "antinomies". In actuality every concept, every category is just as much an antinomy. (205)

"The old scepticism did not shrink from the labour of demonstrating this contradiction or antinomy in every concept which it found in the sciences." The role of scepticism in

completely richly the history of philosophy
Analyzing Kant/captiously (and ~~xxxx~~ sharply), Hegel comes to the conclusion that Kant simply repeats the assumptions in the conclusions, that is, repeats that there is the category of Kontinuitat and the category Diskretion. Out of this merely follows "that taken alone, neither determination has truth, but only their unity. This is the true dialectic consideration of them, and the true result." True dialectic

(p.214): Discreteness, like continuity is a moment of Quantity...

(translation? dissection)

continuity

(217): "Quantum--which first means Quantity having any determinateness or limit at all--is, in its complete determinateness, Number."

(218) Amount and Unit constitute the moments of Number."

Amount? enumeration?

(229-30)

The question of the role and significance of Number (Much about Pythagoras, etc. etc.)

Incidentally, a pointed ~~xxxxxx~~ observation:

"The richer in determinateness, and hence in relation, thoughts become, the more confused and more arbitrary and senseless becomes their representation in such forms as numbers." ((Evaluation of thoughts: richness of determinations and consequently relations.))

Regarding the antinomies of Kant (world without beginning, etc.), Hegel again demonstrates in details that that which must be proven is assumed in the propositions. (247ff)

Further, transition of quantity into quality in abstractly theoretical analysis is so obscure that it is impossible to understand anything. To return here!!

NE (256): the infinite in mathematics. Up until now vindication consisted only in correct results ("demonstrated on other grounds"),...and not in clarity of the object. cr. Engels

(258): In the calculation of the infinite an admitted inexactitude (known) is ignored, and the result achieved is not just tolerable, but absolutely exact!

(258): All the same to search here for vindication is not "as superfluous" "as to ask in the case of the nose for a demonstration of the right to use it."

The answer of Hegel is complex, abstruse, etc. etc. The point under discussion is that of higher mathematics; cf. Engels about differential and integral calculus.

Interesting is the observation of Hegel made incidentally (mimokhodom) -- "transcendent", i.e. really in a subjective and psychological manner "... transcendent manner, that is, in the subject." (260)

(256-291) ff--334
The most detailed examination of differential and integral calculus, with quotations from Newton, Lagrange, Carnot, Euler, Leibnitz, etc. etc., demonstration how this "disappearance" of infinitesimality; this "mean between being and non-being" interested Hegel. Without the study of higher mathematics all this is not understandable. Characteristic is the title of Carnot's work: "Reflections on the Metaphysic of Infinitesimal Calculus"!!!

the mathematical infinite

The development of the concept Verhaltnis (339-344) is doubly obscure. To make note only, (p.344) of the remark about symbols, that it is impossible to have anything against them. But "against every symbol" it is necessary to state that it sometimes "a convenient means of escaping the trouble of seizing, proclaiming, and justifying the conceptual determinations" (Begriffsbestimmungen). And here precisely is the field of philosophy.

|| "the common determinations of force, or substantiality, cause and effect, and others, are themselves too only symbols used to express other relations, that is, they are untrue determinations of those relations." (344)

It remains that as symbolical expressions they are undogmatic. But they are a "repeatable as all symbolical" once they are ^{repeated} "a concept"

SECTION THREE: MEASURE

"Abstractly the statement may be made that in Measure Quality and Quantity are united. Being as such is the immediate self-identity of determinateness. This immediacy of determinateness has transcended itself. Quantity is Being which has returned upon itself in such a manner that it is simple self-identity as indifference to determinateness." (345) The third member is Measure.

Kant introduced the category of Modality (Possibility, Actuality, Necessity), and Hegel observes that with Kant:

"The category there means that it is the relation of the object to thought. In this ~~xxx~~ idealism though is essentially external to the thing-in-itself... (344) objectivity, which is stated to be a quality of other categories, is lacking in the categories of modality. (345)

Incidentally: (346-7)

The Indian philosophy, in which Brahma is transformed into ¹ ~~stra~~ (change = disappearance, emergence)...

Mankind

People revered Measure. (348)

Measure passes into essence (Wesen)/

(Regarding measure, it is not without interest to note ~~xxxxxxx~~ the observation made by Hegel, that "in developed civic society aggregates of individuals belonging to different trades are in a certain relation to one another. (350)

The question of the category of gradualness (Allmähligkeit) Hegel observes:

"Recourse is so readily made to this category in order to render intelligible to the eye or to the mind the disappearance of a Quality or of something; for thus the illusion is created that one can almost be eye-witness of disappearance; for, Quantum being posited as limit external and variably by its very nature, change (as a change of Quantum only) needs no explanation. But in fact nothing is thereby explained; the change is also essentially the transition of one Quality into another, or (a more abstract transition) of one existence into a non-existence; and this contains a determination different from that of 'gradual', which is only a decrease or increase and a one-sided retention of magnitude.

"But already the ancients were aware of the connexion by which a change appearing as merely quantitative turns into one which is qualitative, and they illustrated the confusions which arise from ignorance of this connexion by popular examples (365) ("bald": removal of a hair; "heap"--removal of one grain...)" "what is refuted is the one-sided clinging to abstract determinateness of Quantum" (i.e. without considering the all-sided changes and concrete qualities etc.)

"...these divagations are not idle and pedantic joke; they are in themselves correct and the product of consciousness which takes an interest in the phenomena which occur in thought.

"Quantum when it is taken as indifferent limit is that side from which a Determinate Being can unsuspectedly be attacked and destroyed. It is the cunning of the Notion to seize it from this side, where its Quality does not appear to come into play;--and this so much so that the aggrandizement of a State or of a property, and so on, which leads in the end to disaster for the State or the owner of the property, may at first actually appear as their good fortune." (pp.363-4)

"It is a great merit to become acquainted with the empirical numbers of nature (as the distances from one another of the planets), but an infinitely greater merit to cause the empirical Quanta to disappear and to raise them into a universal form of quantitative determinations, so that they become moments of a law or Measure;.. that is the merit of Galileo and Kepler... "They demonstrated" the laws which they discovered by showing that with them the totality of details corresponds with observation." (362) Nevertheless it is necessary to demand still higher proof of these laws; that their quantitative determinations be known from the qualities or determinate concepts which (like time and space) are related.

The development of the concept of measure, as a specifying determinate quantity and as real measure (including elective kinship--for example, chemical elements, musical tones) is very obscure.

A lengthy observation about chemistry, with a polemic against Berzelius and his theory of electro-chemistry. (376-385)

"A line of relations of measure" (Knotenlinie von Massverhältnissen)--transitions of quantity into quality... Gradualness and leaps.

And (p. 388?) that gradualness explains nothing without leaps

In the observation Hegel, here as everywhere, brings in facts, examples, the concrete (Feuerbach therefore dares once to assert that Hegel reduced Nature to an observation, Feuerbach, Works, II, p. 2)

Pp. 388-390, Observation, title in contents (not in the text!! pedantry!!): "Examples of such nodal line; as if Nature did not make jumps."

Examples: chemistry, musical tones; water (steam, ice.) (pp. 388-9)--birth and death.

Interruptions to gradualness. (p. 389)

Leaps!

Interruptions in gradualness

* jumps leaps

"It is said, natura non facit saltum; and ordinary imagination when it has to conceive an arising or passing away, thinks it has conceived them (as was mentioned) when it imagines them as as a gradual emergence or disappearance. But we saw that the changes of Being were in general not only a transition of one magnitude into another, but a transition from the qualitative into the quantitative, and conversely: a process of becoming over which breaks off graduality and is qualitatively other as against the preceding Determinate Being. Water on being cooled does not little by little become hard, gradually reaching the consistency of ice after having passed through the consistency of a paste, but is suddenly hard; when it already has quite attained freezing point it may (if it stands still) be wholly liquid, and a slight shake brings it into the condition of hardness.

Leaps
 100%

"The gradualness of arising is based upon the idea that that which arises is already, sensibly or otherwise, actually there, and is imperceptible only on account of its smallness; and the gradualness of vanishing on the idea that Not-being or the Other which is assuming its place equally is there, only is not yet noticeable;--there, not in the sense that the Other is contained in the Other which is there in itself, but that it is there as Determinate Being, only unnoticeable. This altogether cancels arising and passing away; or the In-itself, that inner somewhat in which something is before it attains Determinate Being, is transmuted into a smallness of external Determinate Being, and the essential or conceptual distinction into a difference external and merely magnitudinal. The procedure which makes arising and passing away conceivable from the gradualness of change is boring in the manner peculiar to tautology; that which arises or passes away is prepared beforehand, and the change is turned into the mere changing of an external distinction; and now it is indeed a mere tautology. The difficulty for such Understanding which attempts to conceive consists in the qualitative transition of something into its Other in general and into its opposite; Understanding prefers to fancy identity and change to be of that indifferent and external kind which applies to the quantitative."

"In Ethics, in so far as it is considered in the sphere of Being, the same transition from quantitative to qualitative takes place, and different qualities appear to base themselves on differences in magnitude. A more or less suffices to transgress the limit of levity, where something quite different, namely, crime, appears; and thus right passes over into wrong, and virtue into vice.-- Thus too do State--other things equal--derive a different qualitative character from magnitudinal difference!". (389-90)

Further: Transition of Being to Essence (Wesen) is analyzed doubly obscurely.
 End of Volume I.

BOOK II: DOCTRINE OF ESSENCE (Berlin 1834)

SECTION ONE: ESSENCE

Theory of knowledge

"The truth of Being is Essence." (15) Such is the first sentence, which sounds thoroughly idealistic, mystical. But immediately a fresh wind begins to blow, so to speak. "Being is that which is immediate. Knowledge seeks to understand that truth which Being is, in and for itself", and therefore pressing beyond (NB) the immediate and its determinations penetrates further (NB), assuming that behind emphasis is Hegel's "this Being there is something other than Being itself, and that this background ~~is something other than Being itself~~ constitutes the truth of Being. This cognition is mediated knowledge, for it is not lodged immediately with and in Essence, but begins at an Other, Being, and has to make a preliminary passage, the passage of transition beyond Being, or rather of entrance into it..."

with "passage"

This movement, passage of knowledge appears as "an activity of cognition" (Tätigkeit des Erkennens) "external to Being".

"However, this movement is the movement of Being itself." Objective meaning

"Essence... is what it is... by virtue of its own movement, which is the infinite movement* of Being." (16)

"..Absolute Essence has no Determinate Being* Into this, however, it must pass." (16)

Essence stands in the centre between Being and Notion, as a transition to Notion (= absolute).

Subdivisions of Essence: appearance (Schein), show (Erscheinung) actuality (Wirklichkeit).

The Unessential, the show has a moment of non-Being. (22)

i.e. the unessential, the show, the superficial often disappears, not so "solid", does not "sit so firmly" as "essence". Example: movement of river--foam from above and deep currents below. But foam too is the expression of essence!

Appearance and scepticism respective* Kantianism:

"Show then is the phenomenon of scepticism; or again the appearance of idealism is such an immediacy, which is neither Something nor Thing, and, generally, is not an indifferent Being which could be outside its determinateness and relation to the subject. Scepticism did not dare to affirm "it is"; modern idealism did not dare to regard cognition as a knowledge of the Thing-in-itself; with the former, Show was supposed to have no basis at all in any Being; with the latter, the Thing-in-itself: with the former, Show was supposed to have no basis at all in any Being; with the latter, the Thing-in-itself was supposed incapable of entering into cognition. But at the same time scepticism admitted manifold determinations of its show."

*Emphasis and paranthetical remarks VIL's.-tr

or rather its Show had for content all the manifold riches of the world. In the same manner the 'appearance' of idealism comprehends the whole range of these manifold determinateness.

You include all the manifold riches of the world in Schein and you reject the objectivity of Schein's!!

* Thus both Show and 'appearance' are immediately determined as manifold. The content may then have no basis in any Being nor in any thing nor thing-in-itself: for itself it remains as it is: it has only been translated from being into Show; thus Show contains these manifold determinateness, which relatively to one another are immediate, existent, and other. Show itself is, then, immediately determinate. Its content may be this or that; but whatever content it has is not posited by itself but belongs to it immediately. The idealism of Leibniz, Kant or Fichte or any other form of idealism did not reach beyond Being as determinateness, beyond this immediacy; and scepticism also failed. Scepticism allows the content of its Show to be given it: for it, it is an immediate datum ("immediate datum"!!), what content it is to have. The monad of Leibniz develops its presentations out of itself; but it is no creative and combining force,--the presentations arise in it like bubbles; they are indifferent and immediate relative to one another, and therefore to the monad itself. Similarly Kant's "phenomenon" is a given content of perception: it presupposes affections, determinations of the subject which are immediate to one another and to the subject. The infinite "resistance-principle" of Fichte's idealism refuses, perhaps, to be based on any thing-in-itself, so that it becomes purely a determinateness in the Ego. But this determinateness is immediate and a barrier to the Ego, which, transcending its externality, incorporates it with itself; and though the Ego can pass beyond the barrier, the latter has in it an aspect of indifference by virtue of which it contains an immediate Not-being of the Ego, though itself contained in the Ego. (22-23) [appearance]

immediate Show

Did not reach beyond

immediate

"... the determinations which distinguish it from Essence are also determinations of Essence..." (23)

"But the immediacy or indifference which this Not-Being contains is the proper and absolute Being-in-Self of Essence. The negativity of Essence is its self-identity, or its simple immediacy and indifference."

"It is the immediacy of Not-being which constitutes Show;...In Essence, Being is Not-being. Its nullity in itself is the negative nature of Essence itself." (23)

Show = negative nature of Essence

"Two moments thus constitute Show: Nullity, which however persists, and Being, which however is Moment; or again negativity which is in itself, and reflected immediacy. Consequently, these moments are the moments of Essence itself..."

"Show is Essence itself in the determinateness of Being..." (23-4)

Show is (1), ^{Nullity} nothing, / non-existence (Nichtigkeit) which exists ^{as moment} as moment.
--(2) being as moment.

"Thus Show is Essence itself, but Essence in a determinateness, and this in such a manner that determinateness is only its moment: Essence is the showing of itself in itself." (24)

What shows
Show is Essence in one of its determinations, in one of its sides, in one of its moments. Essence ~~never~~ appears thus. Show is the phenomenon (Scheinen) of Essence in itself.

"Essence...contains Show in the form of that infinite internal movement...." (25)

"In this self-movement Essence is Reflection. Show is the same as Reflection..." (25)

Show (what shows) is the reflection of Essence in itself.

"Becoming in Essence--its reflective movement--is hence the movement from Nothing to Nothing and through Nothing back to itself..." (26)

This is acute and profound. There are in nature and life movements "to Nothing". Only "out of Nothing", if you please, there is none. Out of something always.

~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~

"Commonly Reflection is taken in the subjective meaning of the movement of judgment which passes beyond a given immediate presentation, seeking universal determinations for it or comparing them with it." (Citation from Kant--Critique of Judgment, (p. xxiii) sq)
.... "Here, however, neither the reflection of consciousness nor the more determinate reflection of understanding, which has the particular and the universal for its determinations, is in question, but only Reflection in general" (p. 31)

Thus here also Hegel accuses Kant of subjectivism. This NB. Hegel is for the "objectivity, validity" (sit venia verbo) of show, "of the immediate given" (the term "given" is common with Hegel in general and here cf. p. 30) (31). The little philosophers ~~fight~~ dispute whether one should take as basis the essence or the immediately given. (Kant, Hume, the Machists.) Hegel substitutes ~~an~~ "and" for "or" and explains the concrete content of this "and".

"Reflection is the showing of Essence into itself." (35) (translation? Reflectivity? Reflective determination? Reflection does not suit.)

"...it(Essence) is a movement through different moments, absolute self-mediation." (35)

Identity -- difference -- contradiction
(+ in particular (ground) / opposition)

Therefore Hegel explains the one-sidedness, incorrectness "law of identity" (A = A), the category (all determinations of the determinate existence are essentially categories) -- p. (35)

"If everything is self-identical, it is not distinguished: it contains no opposition and has no ground." (37)

"Essence is...simple Self-identity." (37)

Ordinary thinking places side by side ("daneben) identity and difference, not understanding "this movement of transition of one of these determinations into the other."

And back against the law of identity (A = A) of its adherents:

"..since they cling to this rigid* Identity which has its opposite in Variety, they do not see that they are thereby making it into a one-sided determinateness*, which as such has no truth." (40) Terms emphasized by me

(Empty tautology (39-40))

("it contains only formal* truth, which is abstract* and incomplete." (40))

[Forms of reflection: external etc. are developed very obscurely.]

Principles of difference: "All things are different"... "A is also not A..." (48)

"There are no two things which are entirely alike..." (48)

Difference is in this or that side (Seite), relation etc. "in so far" etc.

"...the customary tenderness for things, whose only case is that they shall not contradict one another, forgets here as elsewhere that this is no solution of the contradiction, which is merely planted elsewhere, namely, into subjective or external reflection*; and that the latter does in fact contain the two moments--which this removal and transplantation proclaim to be a mere positedness--in one unity as transcended and related to each other." (50) Bien dit!

(This pretty irony! "tenderness" with nature and history (with philistines)--the strive to them from contradictions and struggle)...

* The result of adding + and - is zero. The result of contradiction is not only Nought. (60) 1518

The solution of contradiction, svedeniye of the positive and negative to the "merely determinate" (62) transforms Essence (das Wesen) into Ground (Grund) (ibidem).

NE || ..."Resolved Contradiction is, then, Ground, that is, Essence an unity of Positive and Negative."...(62)

"Even a slight experience in reflective thought will perceive that, if anything has just been determined as Positive, it straightway turns into Negative if any progress is made from that base, and conversely that a Negative determination turns into Positive; that reflecting thought becomes confused in these determinations and contradicts itself. Insufficient acquaintance with the nature of these determinations thinks that this confusion is a fault which should not occur, and attributes it to a subjective* error. And in fact this transition does remain mere confusion in so far as the necessity for this metamorphosis is not present to consciousness." (63)

"The opposition of Positive and Negative is especially taken in the meaning that the former (although etymologically it expresses being posited or positedness) is to be an objective entity, and the latter a subjective, belonging only to external reflection and in no way concerned with the objective sphere, which is in and for itself and quite ignores it." (63-4) And indeed if the Negative expresses nothing but the abstraction of subjective caprice!..(then it, this negative, does not exist for "the objective Positive")...

"And truth*, too, is the Positive, as knowledge corresponding with its object*; but it is this self-equality only in so far as knowledge has already taken up a negative attitude to the Other, has penetrated the object* and transcended that negation which the object is. Error is a Positive as an opinion affirming that which is not in and for itself, an opinion which knows itself and asserts itself. But ignorance is either indifference to truth and error, and thus determined neither as positive nor as negative,--and if it is determined as a deficiency, this determination belongs to external reflection; or else, objectively and as proper determination of a nature, it is the impulse which is directed against itself, a negative which contains a positive direction.--It is of the greatest importance to recognize this quality of the Determinations of Reflection which have been considered here, that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and therefore in the fact that each contains the other in its own concept. This must be understood and remembered, for without this understanding not a step can really be taken in philosophy." (64-45--From Observation 1)

Truth and Object

The existing in & for itself

Observation 2. Law of the Excluded Middle
postulate

Hegel cites this proposition of the excluded middle: "Something is either A or not-A: there is a third." (65) and "takes it apart". If by this it is demonstration that "everything ~~that is~~ ~~has~~ a term of Opposition", everything has its positive and its negative, then good. But if we are to understand this as it is understood ordinarily, that out of all predicates, either some particular predicate or its not-being, then this is "trivial"! Spirit... sweet or not sweet? green or not green? A determination is supposed to go to determinateness, and in this triviality it ~~goes~~ leads to nothing.

And then --Hegel cuts sharply--it is said: there is no third. There is a third in this very thesis. A itself is the third since A can be both +A and -A. "The something thus is itself the third term which was supposed to be excluded."

This is not profound at all.
is not correct. Every concrete thing, every concrete something stands in diverse and often contradictory relations to all others, ergo, it is itself ~~and~~ other. *

Observation 3 (at the end of Ch. 2, Section 1, Book II of the Logic)
The Law of Contradiction.

"The primary Determinations of Reflection--Identity, Variety, and Opposition--are established in a proposition; therefore the determination into which they pass over as into their truth (namely Contradiction) should much more be comprehended in a law; it should be enunciated that all things are contradictory in themselves, in this meaning, that this proposition as opposed to others expresses the truth and essence of things.--Contradiction, which emerges in Opposition, is no more than developed Nothing; and this is already contained in Identity, and occurred in the expression that the law of identity states nothing. This negation further determines itself into Variety and into Opposition, which now is posited Contradiction.

"But it has been a fundamental prejudice of hitherto existing logic and of ordinary imagination that Contradiction is a determination having less essence and immanence than Identity; but indeed if there were any question of rank, and the two determinations had to be fixed as separate, Contradiction would have to be taken as the profounder and more fully essential. For as opposed to it Identity is only the determination of the simple immediate, or of dead being, while Contradiction is the root of all movement and life and it is only in so far as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.*

*Emphasis VIL's.--tr.

"Ordinarily Contradiction is removed first of all from things, from the existent and the true in general; and it is asserted that there is nothing contradictory. Next it is shifted into subjective reflection, which alone is said to posit it when it relates and compares. But really--it is said--it does not exist even in this reflection, for it is impossible to imagine or to think anything contradictory. Indeed, Contradiction, both in actuality and in thinking reflection, is considered an accident, a kind of abnormality or paroxysm of sickness which will soon pass away.

"With regard to the assertion that Contradiction does not exist, that it is non-existent, we may disregard this statement. In every experience there must be an absolute determination of Essence ~~in every actuality~~ --in every actuality as well as in every concept. The same remark has already been made above, under Infinity, which is Contradiction as it appears in the sphere of Being. But ordinary experience itself declares that at least there are a number of contradictory things about, contradictory arrangements and so forth, the contradiction being present in them and not merely in an external reflection. But it must further not be taken only as an abnormality which occurs just here and there: it is the Negative in its essential determination, the principle of all self-movement, which consists of nothing else but an exhibition of Contradiction. External, sensible motion is itself its immediate existence. Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself.

"And similarly internal or self-movement, or impulse in general (the appetitive force or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple Essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is itself and is also deficiency or the negative of itself, in one and the same respect. Abstract self-identity has no life; but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself and to change. Something therefore has life only in so far as it contains Contradiction, and is that force which can both comprehend and endure Contradiction. [But if an existent something cannot hold fast the one in the other and contain Contradiction within itself, then it is not living unity, or Ground, but perishes in Contradiction.] Speculative thought consists only in this, that thought holds fast Contradiction, and, in Contradiction, itself, and not in that it allows itself to be dominated by it--as happens to imagination--or suffers its determinations to be resolved into others, or into Nothing." (66-68)

Movement and "self-movement" (this NB! arbitrary (independent) spontaneous, internally-necessary movement), "change", "movement and life", "the principle of every self-movement," "impulse" (Trieb) to "movement" and to "activity"--opposite of "dead-being"--who would believe that that is the core of "Hegelianism", of abstract and abstruse (difficult, absurd?) Hegelianism?? We must disclose this core, grasp it, save, shall it out, purify it--which is precisely what Marx and Engels have done.

The idea of universal movement and change (1813, Logic) was disclosed before its application to life and society. It was proclaimed in reference to society ~~in 1813~~ earlier (1847) than it was in relation to man. (1859).**

Disguised in simplicity

"In movement, impulse, and the like, the simplicity* of these determinations hides the contradiction from imagination; but this contradiction immediately stands revealed in the determinations of relations. The most trivial examples--above and below, right and left, father and son, and so on without end--all contain Contradiction in one term. That is above which is not below; "above" is determined only as not being "below", and is a "below", and conversely: one determination implies its opposite.

Father is the Other of son, and son of father, and each exists only as this Other of the other; and also the one determination exists only in relation to the other: their Being is one persistence...

(69) "Thus although imagination everywhere has Contradiction for content, it never becomes aware of it; it remains an external reflection, which passes from Likeness to Unlikeness, or from ~~negativity to positivity~~ negative relation to intro-reflectedness of the different terms. It keeps these two determinations external to each other, and has in mind only these and not their transition which is the essential matter and contains the Contradiction.--On the other hand intelligent reflection, if we may mention this here, consists in the understanding and enunciating of Contradiction. It does not express the concept of things and their relations, and has only determinations of imagination for material and content; but still it relates them, and the relation contains their contradiction, allowing their concept to show through the contradiction.--Thinking Reason, on the other hand, sharpens (so to speak) the blunt difference of Variety, the mere manifold of imagination, into essential difference, that is, Opposition. The manifold entities acquire activity and liveliness in relation to one another only when driven on the sharp point of Contradiction; thence they draw negativity, which is the inherent pulsation of self-movement and liveliness."

NB

- (1) Ordinary perception ~~may~~ grasps the difference and the contradiction, but not the transition of one to the other, but this is the most important.
- (2) Acuteness and understanding. (says it out?) Acuteness grasps the contradiction, expresses it, brings things in relation to one another, compels the "concept to shine through the contradiction" but does not express the concept of things and their relation.
- (3) Thinking reason (understanding) sharpens the blunted difference of variety, the mere manifold of imagination, to the essential difference, to Opposition. Only the contradictions at their peak does manifoldedness become mobile (regsem) and lively in relation to the other,-- acquire that negativity which is the i n n e r p u l s a t i o n of s e l f m o v e m e n t and l i f e.

Handwritten note: Dialectic is the transition from the one to the other.

1522

** ¹⁸⁵⁹ *Notes on the Philosophy of Language* by Hegel, trans. by G. W. Hegel, p. 117

Subdivisions:

Der Grund -- (ground)

(1) Absolute Ground--die grundlage (basis). "Form and Matter."
"Content".

(2) Determined Ground (as ground (for) determinate content)

Its transition into conditioned determinations
die bedingende Vermittelung

(3) The thing in itself (transition into existence)

Observation: Law of Ground.

Ordinary saying: "Everything has its sufficient Ground."

"Ordinarily this just means that what is must be considered not as an existent immediate, but as a posited entity. We must not remain at immediate Determinate Being or at determinateness in general, but must pass back to its Ground." (75)...It is superfluous to add: sufficient ground. Insufficient is not Ground.

Leibniz, having made a law of sufficient ground the basis of his philosophy, understood this deeper. "Leibniz"...opposed the sufficiency of Ground to causality*in its strict meaning of mechanical efficacy." (75) He searches for "relation" of causes (74)--"the whole as essential unity"
final cause

He sought purpose, but Teleology belongs not here, but in the study of the Notion

"...The question cannot therefore be asked, how Form is added to Essence; for form is only the showing of Essence in itself--it is its own immanent (sic!)*Reflection..."(77)

Form is essential. Essence is formed. Thus or otherwise in dependence also upon essence...

Essence as formless identity (with itself) becomes Matter. (78)

"...it (matter) is the real foundation or substratum of Form..."(78)

"If abstraction is made from every determination and Form of Something, indeterminate Matter remains. Matter is a pure abstract. (--Matter cannot be seen or felt--what is seen ~~xxxxxxx~~ or felt is determinate Matter, that is, a unity of Matter and Form.)"(78)

Matter is not the essential ground of form, but unity of Ground and Grounded. (79)Matter is passive, form--active. "Matter must be formed, and Form must materialize itself..."(79)

NB // "Now this, which appears as the activity of Form, is equally the proper movement of Matter itself..."(80-81)

Often in Hegel the word "moment" is used in the sense of moment of connection, moment in the concatenation.

A river and drops in this river. The situation of each drop, its relation to others; its connection with the others; the direction of its movement; rapidity; line of motion--straight, crooked, circular, etc.,--above, below. The totality of movement. Concept, as accounting of individual sides of movement, individual drops (= "of things"), individual separate "streams," etc. This is approximately the picture of the world according to Hegel's Logic--naturally minus God and the Absolute.

"When all the Conditions of a Fact are present, it enters into Existence." (105)

Very good! What have the Absolute Idea and Idealism to find here?

Remarkable this "derivation"...of existence.

SECTION TWO: APPEARANCE

The first phrase: "Essence must appear." (107) the appearance of essence is (1) Existenz (thing); appearance (Erscheinung). ("Appearance is what the Thing is in itself, or its truth." (107); "the intro-reflected self-existent world stands opposed to the world of Appearance" (108)... (3) Verhaltnis (relation) and Actuality.

Incidentally: "Demonstration in general is mediated cognition..." (109)

"The various kinds of Being demand or contain each its own kind of mediation; consequently the nature of demonstration too is different for each." (109)

And ^{totally} ~~partly~~ about the existence of God!! This poor God, no sooner is the word existence mentioned than he gets insulted.

Existence is distinguished from Being by its mediation (Vermittlung: 112). (?the concrete and the connection?)

"...the Thing-in-itself and its mediated Being are both contained in Existence, and each is an Existence; the Thing-in-itself exists and is the essential Existence of the Thing, while mediated Being is its unessential Existence." (112)

[?The Thing-in-itself relates to Being like Existence to non-Existence?]

"...The latter (the Thing-in-itself)* is not supposed to contain in itself any determinate multiplicity, and consequently obtains this only when brought under external reflection, but remains indifferent to it. (---The Thing-in-itself has colour only in relation to the eye, smell in relation to the nose, and so forth.)" (113)

"A Thing has the Property of effecting this or that in an Other, and of disclosing itself in a peculiar manner in its relation." (116) "The Thing-in-itself thus exists essentially." (117)

The Observations deals with "Thing-in-itself of transcendental idealism"...

"...the Thing-in-itself as such is no more than the empty abstraction from all determinateness, of which it is admitted that nothing can be known because it is meant to be the abstraction from all determinations." (117)

places
all determinations
Transcendental idealism... transfers into consciousness every determination of things "(both with regard to form and to content)" (117)... "and accordingly, from this point of view, it falls within me, the subject, that I see the leaves of a tree not as black but as green, the sun as round and not as square, and taste sugar as sweet and not as bitter; that I determine the first and second strokes of a clock as successive and not as simultaneous, and determine the first to be neither the cause nor the effect of the second, and so forth." (117-8)... Hegel later makes the reservation that he ~~was~~ considered here only the question of the thing in itself and "external reflection."

"The essential inadequacy of the standpoint at which this philosophy halts consists in this, that it clings to the abstract Thing-in-itself as to an ultimate determination; it opposes Reflection, or the determinateness and multiplicity of the Properties, to the Thing-in-itself; while in fact the Thing-in-itself essentially has this External Reflection in itself, and determines itself as an entity endowed with its proper determinations, or Properties; whence it is seen that the abstraction of the Thing, which makes it pure Thing-in-itself, is an untrue determination." (118)

Essence = against subjectivism & the rupture of the Thing-in-itself

"...many different Things are in essential Reciprocal Action by virtue of their Properties; Property is this very reciprocal relation, and apart from it the Thing is nothing..." (119)

passed over

Die Dingheit is transformed into property. (119) Property into "Matter" or "Substance" ("things consist of them" (Matters) etc

~~Unity in appearance~~

"Existence is the immediacy of Being as which Essence has reconstituted itself..." (128) "Appearance consequently is the unity of Show and Existence..." (129)

Unity in appearance: "This Unity is the Law of Appearance. Law (of Law therefore is the positive element in the mediation of appearance) the Apparent."

Here in general it is very abstruse. But a living thought is apparent in it. The concept of Law is one of the steps of the cognition of ~~the~~ unity and connection, of reciprocal dependence and totality of the world process. The "break-up" and "tearing out of" words and concepts which Hegel here does is the struggle with transforming the concept of law into an absolute, simplifying it, making it into a fetish. NB for contemporary physics!!!

NB Law is the enduring (persistent) in appearance "This enduring persistence which belongs to Appearance is Law..." (131-2)

identity in Appearance) Law is the reflection of Appearance into identity with itself..." (132) (Law is the identity in appearance: "the identity of Appearance itself and of its Reflection...")

Law = the quiescent reflection in Appearance NB "..." This identity, the foundation of Appearance, which constitutes Law, is the peculiar moment of Appearance... (133) "Consequently Law is not beyond Appearance, but is immediately present in it: the realm of Laws is the quiescent (emphasis Hegel's) counterfeit of the existing or appearing world..." (133)

This is a remarkably materialistic and remarkably neat (in a word "quiescent") determination. Law takes the quiescent--and therefore Law, every Law is narrow, incomplete, an approximation.

NB
Law is essential
~~existence~~
appearance

"Existence passes back into Law as into its Ground; Appearance contains them both--simple Ground and the dissolving movement of the appearing universe, of which movement Ground is the essentiality."

"Law, then, is essential Appearance.." (133)

Ergo, Law and Essence of concept are homogeneous (of one order) or, more correctly, odnostepennye, expressing the deepening of man's knowledge of appearance, the world, etc.

(The movement of the universe in appearance (Bewegung des erscheinenden Universums), in the essence of this movement, is law

NB
(Law is the reflection of essential in

the movement of the universe)

"The realm of Laws is the quiescent content of Appearance; Appearance is this same content, but presents itself in unquiet change and as Reflection into other... Appearance, therefore, as against Law is the totality; for it contains Law but also more, namely the moment of self-moving Form." (133-34

(Appearance totality, wholeness) ((Law = part) (Appearance is richer than Law)

But further, although it is not clear, it is acknowledged, it seems (p.135 (especially p. 135)) that law can overcome this inadequacy, embrace also the negative side, and Totalitat der Erscheinung. Must return here!

which is for
The world/in itself is identical with the world of appearance, and at the same time is opposite to it. (139-40) That which is positive in one is negative in the other. That which is evil in the world of appearance is good in the world which is in and for itself. Cf. What Hegel says here with what he says in the Phenomenology of Mind, pp.121ff* (Evidently the ref. is to pp 171-243 - H.)

"..the Appearing and the Essential World. Both in the first instance are independent, but they are independent only as ~~totalities~~ totalities, and they are this in so far as each essentially has in itself the moment of the other." 140

~~Each is the independent whole of Existence.~~

The essence here is that both the World of Appearance and the World which is for itself are essentially moments of knowledge of nature by man, ~~steps~~ changes or deepening (of knowledge). The ~~development~~ development of the world in itself ever further and further from the world of appearance--that is what not yet visible in Hegel. NB. Do not the "moments" of conception with Hegel have the significance "of moments" of transition?

1528

SECTION III: ACTUALITY

"Actuality is the unity of Essence and Existence." (160)

Subdivisions: 1) "Absolute" -- (2) Actuality proper. "Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity constitute the formal moments of the Absolute..." (160) (3) "Absolute Relation": Substance.

"There is no Becoming in it (Absolute), ~~XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX~~ and other nonsense about the Absolute..."

Absolute is absolute-Absolute (!!)
attribute is relative ~~absolute~~

In the "Observation" Hegel deals with (very abstrusely and obscurely) with the inadequacies of the philosophy of Spinoza and Leibnitz.

Incidentally note this:

"The one-sidedness of one philosophic principle is generally faced by its opposite one-sidedness, and, as everywhere, totality at least is found as sundered completeness." (170)

Ordinarily: from one extreme to another
Totality = (in form) sundered completeness

Actuality is higher than Being and Existence.

- (1) Immediate Being. "Being is not yet actual*" (173)
It passes into another.
- (2) Existence (it passes into appearance) -- comes out of ground, from conditions, but there is not yet in it the unity of "reflection and immediacy."
- (3) Actuality unity of existence and being-in-itself (Ansichsein)

"Actuality also stands higher than existence." (173)

"...Real Necessity is a relation which is full of content*..." (182)
"But this Necessity at the same time is relative." (182)

"Absolute Necessity then is the truth into which Actuality and Possibility in general pass back, as well as Formal and Real Necessity." (184)

Book (The end of ~~XXXXXX~~ II of Logic, Doctrine of Essence)...

Note that in the smaller Logic* (Encyclopedia) ~~XXXXXXXX~~ the very same is explained very often/clearer, with concrete examples, Cf. idem Engels and Kuno-Fisher.***

*Emphasis, as always where there is one star, is Lenin's. --tr.
**The reference is to The Logic of Hegel from the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, which was translated by William Wallace into English and will serve as the source for the quotations here.

***The M-E Institute notes that this refers to the letter of Nov. 1 1891 where Engels recommends the study of Hegel to begin with the "Small Logic" this letter is included in English Selected Correspondence.

Regarding the question of "Possibility" Hegel notes the emptiness of this category and in the Encyclopaedia writes:

"Whether a thing is possible or impossible, depends altogether on the subject matter: that is, on the sum total of the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be necessity." (Encyclopaedia Vol. VI, §143 Observation.) (p.262--tr)

"The sum total of the elements in actuality, which, as it opens itself out, discloses itself to be necessity."
The unfoldments of the whole totality of moments of actuality NB = essence of dialectic knowledge.

Cf. also in the Encyclopaedia Vol. VI, p. (264) the eloquent words about vanity of the admiration for the richness and variety of the appearance of nature and of necessity

"..one should advance to a closer insight* into the inner harmony and uniformity* of nature." (264)

Ibidem. Encyclopaedia. p. (267): "Developed actuality, as the coincident alternation of inner and outer, the alternation of their opposite motions combined into a single motion, is Necessity."

Encyclopaedia. Vol. VI, p. (269): "Necessity is blind only so long as it is not understood."

Ibidem. p. (269) "often (man) finds his acts turn out something quite different from what he had meant and willed."

Ibidem, p. (?) "Substance is an important stage in the process of the development of the Idea..."

Read: important stage in the process of development of human knowledge, nature and matter.

Handwritten: Substanz (I, 294)
Logic, Vol. IV (Science of Logic, Book II, tr.)

"it (Substance) is the being of all Being"...(188)

Relation of Substantiality passes into relation of Causality. (191)

"...Substance attains Actuality only when it has become Cause." (192)

On the one hand, we must deepen the knowledge of matter to the knowledge (to the concept) of substance, in order to find the causes of appearance. On the other hand, actual knowledge of causes is the deepening of knowledge from externality of appearance to substance. Two types of examples should explain this: (1) out of the history of natural science and (2) from the history of philosophy. More precisely: not "examples" should be here --comparaison n'est pas raison,--but the quintessence of the one and the other history + the history of technique.

"...Effect contains nothing whatever which Cause does not contain," (192) and conversely...

Cause and effect, ergo, only moments of the universal interdependence, connection (of the universal), the concatenation of events, only links in the chain of the development of matter.

NB.

"It is the same fact which displays itself first as Cause and then as Effect,--here as peculiar persistence and there as positedness or determination in an Other." (193)

All-sidedness and all-embracing character of world connection, only one-sided, separated and incompletely expressed by causality.

"But we may here and now observe that, in so far as the relation of cause and effect is admitted (although in an improper sense), effect cannot be greater than cause; for effect is nothing further than the manifestation of cause." (196)

And further about history. There it is an accepted/to cite anecdotes about how great effects spring from small "causes"--in actuality, this is only on occasions, merely an external impulse "the inner spirit of the event would not have required it." (196) .."these arabesques of history, where a huge shape is depicted as flowing from a slender stalk, are a sprightly but a most superficial treatment." (Ibid) (196)

In history "small causes of big events"

This "inner spirit"--cf. Plekhanov--is the idealistic, mystical, but very profound indication on the historic causes of events. Hegel successfully leads up to history under causality and 1,000 times deeper and richer understands causality, than the crowd of the "learned" now.

"Thus a stone in motion is cause; its movement is a determination which it has, while besides this it contains many other determinations of colour, shape and so on, which do not enter into its causal nature." (197)

Causality as ordinarily understood, by us, is only a small part of the universal connection, but (a materialistic addition) the small part is not subjective but the objectively real connection.

"But the movement* of the Determinate Relation of Causality* has now resulted in this, that the cause is not merely extinguished in the effect--and with it the effect too (as happens in normal Causality), but the cause in its extinction, in the effect, becomes again; that effect vanishes into cause, but equally becomes again in it. Each of these determinations cancels itself in its positing and posits itself in its cancellation: what takes place is not an external transition of causality from one substance to another, but this its becoming other is at the same time its own positing. Causality then, presupposes itself." (199)

**M-E-L Institute notes reference is to Plekhanov's "On the 60th Anniversary of Hegel's death".

"The movement of the Relation of Causality" = in actuality: the movement of matter respective the movement of history, the discerned, assimilated in its internal connection to one or another degree of width and depth...

"At this point Reciprocity presents itself as a reciprocal causality of presupposed and self-conditioning substances; each is, in relation to the other, at once active and passive substance." (203)

"In reciprocity, original Causality presents itself as an arising out of its negation (or passivity) and as a passing away into it--as a Becoming...."

"Con-
tion and
relation
of substan-
tial var-
iety"
Relation
mediation
Neces-
sity
does not
disappear,
it becomes
freedom

"Necessity and Causality have, then, vanished in it; they contain both the immediate identity (as connexion and relation) and the absolute substantiality of distincts; and therefore their absolute contingency,--the original unity of substantial variety, in other words absolute contradiction. Necessity is Being, because it is, conversely, because it has a ground; it is not Being, it is nothing whatever but Show, relation or mediation. Causality is this posited transition of original Being, or cause, into Show or mere positedness, and conversely of positedness into originality; but the identity itself of Being and Show is, still, inner Necessity. This internality (or Being-in-Self) transcends the movement of Causality; and, concurrently, the substantiality of the sides which are in relation is lost--Necessity unveils itself. Necessity does not become Freedom because it vanishes, but only because its identity (as yet an inner identity) is manifested...." (204)

When you read Hegel on Causality, ~~then~~ it seems at first sight strange why he stops so comparatively little on this theme loved by the Kantians. Why? Yes, because for him causality is only one of the determinations of universal connection which he early grasped much deeper and all-sidedly than in all its analyses, always and from the very beginning emphasized this connection, connecting points, etc. etc. Very instructive it is to put alongside of the travail of neo-empiricism (respective "physical idealism") with the decisions, more accurately with the dialectic method of Hegel.

Note that in the Encyclopaedia Hegel emphasizes the inadequacy and emptiness of the bare concept of "Reciprocity".

Fol. VI, p. (281, & 156)

"Reciprocity is undoubtedly the proximate truth of the relation of cause and effect, and stands, so to say, on the threshold of the notion; but on that very ground, supposing that our aim is a thoroughly comprehensive idea, we would not rest content with applying this relation. If we get no further than studying a given content under the point of view of reciprocity, we are taking up an attitude which leaves matter utterly incomprehensible. We are left

Only "recip-
rocity" = emp-
tiness

Demand for mediation, (connection) that is the subject relating to the application of the relation of causality

with a mere dry fact; and the call for mediation, which is the chief motive in applying the relation of causality, is still unanswered. And if we look more narrowly into the dissatisfaction felt in applying the relation to reciprocity, we shall see that it consists in the circumstance, that this relation, instead of being treated as an equivalent for the notion, ought, first of all, to be known and understood in its own nature. And to understand the relation of action and reaction we must not let the two sides rest in their state of mere given facts, but recognise them, as has been shown in the two paragraphs preceding, for factors of a third and higher, which is the notion and nothing else. To make, for example, the manners of the Spartans the cause of their constitution and their constitution conversely the cause of their manners, may no doubt be in a way correct. But, as we have comprehended neither the manners nor the constitution of the nation, the result of such reflections can never be final or satisfactory. The first satisfactory point will be reached only when these two, as well as all other, special aspects of Spartan life and Spartan history are seen to be founded in this notion." (281-22)

NB
All special aspects and the whole ("notion")

At the end of the second volume of Logic, vol.IV, (Vol.IImp.205-tr before the transition to the Notion a definition is given: "The Notion, the realm of Subjectivity or of Freedom."

NB Freedom = subjectivity ("or") goal, consciousness, striving NB

III: BOOK THREE: SUBJECTIVE LOGIC

THE DOCTRINE OF THE NOTION

(Vol. V: SCIENCE OF LOGIC: Part II: Subjective Logic or The Doctrine of the Notion)

ON THE NOTION IN GENERAL*

For the first two parts I "there was not much work done in the field while here, on the contrary, there is "ossified material" in which it is necessary "to rekindle the life-spark"... "(209)

"Being and Essence are the moments of its (=the Notion's) becoming." (211)

Obernut: Notion is the highest product of the brain, the highest product of matter.

"Accordingly, Objective Logic, which considers Being* and Essence*, really constitutes the genetic exposition of the Notion." (211)

(215): The great significance of the philosophy of Spinoza, as a philosophy of Substance (this point of view is very high, but incomplete, not the very highest: in general, to refute a philosophic system does not mean to cast it aside, but to develop it further, not to replace by another, one-sided, opposite, but to include it in something higher). In the system of Spinoza there is not the subject of free, independent, conscious (it lacks "the freedom and independence of the self-conscious subject"), but Spinoza already has Thought as the attribute of Substance. (215)

just as Incidentally - there was a time when it was the fashion to "heap calumny" on imagination and memory - so now it is to deprecate the importance of "Notion" (= "the summit of thought") and to exalt "the not-to-be-understood" (217?) (a hint at Kant?)

Going over to a criticism of Kantianism, Hegel considers his higher merit (218) to be the conception of "the transcendental unity of apperception" (unity of consciousness in which notion is created), but reproaches Kant for his one-sidedness and subjectivism:

From contemplation to knowledge of objective reality... "But the object is truly in and for itself only as it is in thought; as it is in intuition or ideation it is appearance." (219)... (Hegel raises the idealism of Kant from a subjective to an objective and absolute one)...

Kant acknowledges the objectivity of Notions (truth is their subject) but yet leaves them as subjective. His premises for Understanding (Verstand) he has "feeling" and "opinion". Of this Hegel says:

"Now, first, with regard to this relation of the understanding or the Notion to the stages which are supposed to precede it, it is of importance what science it is that is being treated, in order to determine the form of these stages. In our science, since it is pure logic, these stages are Being and Essence.* In psychology, sensation and intuition and also ideation (Vorstellung) in general precede understanding. In the Phenomenology of Spirit, since it is the doctrine of consciousness, the ascent was made through the stages of sensuous consciousness and, next, perception, to understanding." (220) This analysis in Kant is very "incomplete".

Then--the important thing--

"Ev of the transformation of objective idealism into materialism.

"...the Notion must not here be considered as an act of self-conscious understanding, or as subjective understanding: what we have to do with is the Notion in and for itself, which constitutes a stage as well of Nature as of Spirit. Life, or organic nature, is that stage of nature at which the Notion emerges." (221)

Further on there is a very interesting place (221-9) where Hegel refutes Kant precisely in a gnostic manner (Engels, evidently, had this place in mind in "Ludwig Feuerbach" when he wrote that the the most important things against Kant have already been said by Hegel to the degree that it was possible from the idealist point of view),--revealing the duality, inconsistency of Kant, his, so-to-speak, vacillations between empiricism (= materialism) and idealism, in addition to which Hegel conducts this argumentation completely and exclusively from the point of view of a more consistent idealism.

Notion is not yet highest
Idea = the unity of notion and reality.

"It is only a notion"--is a thing commonly said, counterposing to the Notion something superior, not only the Idea, but sensuous, spatial and temporal palpable existence. And the abstract is counted of less worth than the concrete, because from the former so much of that kind of material has been omitted. To those who hold this, the process of abstraction means that for our subjective needs one or another characteristic is taken out of the concrete in such a manner that, while so many other properties and modifications of the object are omitted, these lose nothing in value or dignity. They are the real and are reckoned as counting in full, only they are left on the other side; and it is only the incapacity of understanding to absorb such riches that forces it to rest content with meagre abstraction. But if the given material of intuition and the manifold of ideation are taken as the real in opposition to that which is thought and to the Notion, then this is a view the renunciation of which is not only a condition of philosophy, but is assumed even by religion; for how can these be needed but is assumed even by religion; for how can these be needed and have significance if the fugitive and superficial appearance of the sensuous and the individual are taken for the truth?... Consequently abstracting thought must not be considered as a mere setting-aside of the sensuous material, whose reality is said not to be lowered thereby; but it is its transcendence, and the reduction of it (as from mere appearance) to the essential, which manifests itself in the Notion only." (221-2)

Kant degrades the power of understanding

The more consistent idealist suddenly remembers god!

Hegel is essentially entirely right against Kant. Thought, emerging from the concrete to the abstract, does not go away--if it is correct (NB) (and Kant, as all philosophers speak about correct thinking)--from truth, but goes toward it. Abstraction of matter, law of nature, abstraction of value, etc., in a word

all scientific (correct, serious, not absurd) abstractions reflect nature deeper, truer, fuller. From living observation to abstract thinking, and from this to practice--such is the dialectic road to knowledge of truth, the knowledge of objective reality. Kant degrades knowledge in order to make place ~~(to clean the place for it)~~ for belief: Hegel elevates knowledge believing that knowledge is knowledge of god. The materialist elevates knowledge of matter, of nature, throwing God and the philosophic rabble defending him into the dunghill.

"The principal misapprehension here is that the natural principle or the beginning which is the starting point in the natural development or in the history of the individual in its formation is taken as the true and as that which is first also in the Notion," (22-3) --This is true, that people begin from this, but truth lies not in the beginning, but in the end, or more correctly in the continuation. Truth is not a first impression... "But philosophy is not meant to be a narrative of what happens, but a cognition of what is true in happenings..." (223)

With Kant it is "psychological idealism" (224): with Kant categories are only determinations which are derived from self-consciousness. Climbing from understanding (Verstand) to reason (Vernunft), Kant lowers the importance of thought, denying it the capacity "to reach full truth." (224)

(idealistic phrase!)
(true!!)

"It is declared (by Kant) to be an abuse if logic, which ought to be merely a canon of judgment, is regarded as an organ* for the production of objective discoveries. The notions of Reason, in which a higher force and a deeper content were of necessity divided, are less constitutive ~~than even the categories~~ (objective is needed)* than even the categories; they are mere ideas. Their use may certainly be permissible, but these intelligible essences, which should wholly unlock the truth, are to signify no more than hypotheses; and it would be completely arbitrary and reckless to ascribe any truth to them in and for themselves, since they can occur in no kind of experience. --Could it ever have been thought that philosophy would gainsay the validity of the intelligible essences because they are without the spatial and temporal material of sensuousness?" (224)

Here too Hegel is essentially right: value is a category which "is devoid of the stuff of sensuality", but it is truer than the law of supply and demand. Only Hegel is an idealist; therefore the non-sense "constitutive" etc.

Kant, on the one hand, entirely clearly recognizes "objectivity" of thought ("des Denkens") ("identity of notion and the thing" (225). --and on the other hand:

... get to know
knowing things
in themselves

"..on the other side, the assertion is made again that we surely cannot know things as they are in and for themselves, and the truth does not allow cognizing reason to approach it; that truth which consists in the unity of object and the Notion, and that the object is led back by the Notion into its non-contingent essentiality; the latter enters into appearance, and for this very reason the appearance is not merely non-essential, but manifestation of Essence." (225)

"It will always remain a matter for astonishment how the Kantian philosophy knew that relation of thought to sensuous existence, where it halted, for a merely relative relation of bare ~~existence~~ appearance, and fully acknowledged and asserted a higher unity of the two in the Idea in general, and, particularly, in the idea of an intuitive understanding; but yet stopped dead at this relative relation and at the assertion that the Notion is and remains utterly separated from ~~the~~ reality;--so that it affirmed as true what it pronounced to be figments of thought that which it recognized as truth, and of which it established the definite notion," (225)

NR
Nf

In logic the Idea "becomes the creator of Nature." (226)

Logic is a "formal science" against the concrete sciences (about nature and spirit), but its subject is "truth itself"... (226)

Kant himself, asking what is truth (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 83) and giving a trivial answer ("correspondence of knowledge with its object"), defeats himself, because the "fundamental assertion of transcendental idealism"

--that "knowledge cannot apprehend the thing-in-itself" (226)

--it is clear immediately that all these are "untrue ideas" (226)

Objecting to the purely formal understanding of logic (which Kant possesses)--stating that from the point of view of ordinary (the truth is correspondence "Übereinstimmung" or "demands of knowledge with the object) for correspondence "essentially two sides", Hegel says that "truth itself" is the formal in logic and that "... This formal element must therefore be thought of as being in itself much richer in determinations and content, and as having infinitely more influence upon the concrete, than it is generally held to do..." (229)

"..even if the logical forms are to be regarded as nothing more than formal functions of thought, as to how far they correspond to the truth in themselves. A system of logic which neglects this can claim at most to have the value of a naturalistic description of empirical phenomena of thought." (230) (Here precisely lies the immortal service of Aristotle), but it is necessary to go further... (230)

<p>In such an understanding logic corresponds with the theory of knowledge. In general this is a very important question</p>	<p>Thus not only the description of the forms of thought and not only the <u>natural-historical description of the phenomena of thought</u> (how is this distinguished from the descriptions of forms??), but also its correspondence with truth, i.e.?? quintessence or, simply, the results and summation of the history of thought?? There is here in Hegel an idealistic unclarity and lack of agreement. <u>Mysticism.</u></p>
	<p>Not psychology, not phenomenology of spirit, but logic = the question of truth.</p>

Cf. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. (SL, p. 287-tr):
↓ "The notion is, on the contrary, the principle of all life..."

"Notion", developing as "an adequate notion" becomes
the Idea. (232) "Notion in its objectivity is the thing in
itself and for itself." (232) (v)

= objectivism + mysticism
and betrayal in the development

SECTION ONE: SUBJECTIVITY

The dialectic movement of "Notion"--from purely "formal" notion at the beginning--to Judgment (Urteil), then--to Syllogism (Schluss) and--finally, to transformation from subjectivity of notion to its Objectivity. (233)

First distinctive characteristic of notion--universality (allgemeinheit). NB: Notion came out of Essence, which had come out of Being.

The further development of universality, particularity (Besonderes) and individuality (Einzelnes) is abstract in the highest degree and "abstruse".

Kuno Fisher explains these "abstruse" argumentations very badly, ~~making the~~ easier examples from the Encyclopaedia, ~~adding, NB: 188, 190ff, p. 530 etc.,~~ but not showing the reader ~~how~~ to search for the key to the difficult transitions, shades, overflows, ebbs of Hegelian abstract notions.

En lisant... these parts of the work should be called: best means for getting a headache!

Voilà an abundance of "definitions & of definitions of Notions of this part of Logic!

Apparently here too the important thing for Hegel is to mark the transition. Ends a certain point of view, under certain conditions the universal is the particular, the particular is the universal. Not only (1) the connection, and an indissoluble connection of all notions and judgments, but (2) transitions of one into the other, and not only transition, but also (3) identity of opposites -- that is what is important to Hegel. But this only "pierces" through the mine of analysis of the arch-"abstruse". The history of thought from the point of view of development and application of universal notions and categories of the Logic -- voilà ce qu'il faut!

Or all this is the debt of the old, formal logic? Yes! and also the debt--the debt of mysticism=idealism

True! Citing on p. (306) the "famous" syllogism--"All men are mortal, Galus is a man, therefore he is mortal"--Hegel wittily adds: "Boredom immediately descends when such a syllogism is heard approaching"--this is due to "the otiose form"--and makes a profound remark:

"All things are a Syllogism..." NB

"All things are a Syllogism, a universal which is bound together with individuality through particularity; but of course they are not ~~two~~ wholes consisting of three propositions." (307)

Very good! The most ordinary logical "figures"--(all this in the & about the "First Figures of the Syllogism") are ~~unnecessarily~~ pedantically scribbled, sit venia verbo, the most ordinary relations of things."

The analysis of the Syllogism of Hegel's (I--P--U, "individual, particular, universal", P--I--U etc.) is reminiscent of Marx's imitation of Hegel in Chapter I.

About Kant

Incidentally:

"Kant's Antinomies of Reason are just this, that first one determination of a Notion is made the foundation of the Notion, and next, and with equal necessity, the other..." (309)

One must return to Hegel in order to analyze step by step in its current logic and theory of knowledge of Kantian etc.

The forming (of abstract) of notions and the accompanying operations already include the presentation, the conviction, the consciousness of the law of the objective world connections. To single out causality from this is nonsense. To reject the objectivity of notions, the objectivity of the universal in the particular and in the individual is impossible. Consequently, Hegel considerably more profoundly than Kant and others, in investigating the reflection of the objective world in the movement of notions, ~~at the movement~~ just as the simple value form, the individual act of exchange of a given commodity with another already includes in undeveloped form all major con- traditions of capitalism, -- as the simplest generalization, the first and simplest forming of notions (judgments, syllogisms, etc.) signifies the ever-progressing greater knowledge of the objective world connections. Here it is necessary to seek the real sense, significance and role of Hegelian Logic. This NE

NB The question of the true significance of Hegel's Logic

Two aphorisms:

The question of the criticism of contemporary Kantianism, Machism, etc:

1. Plekhanov criticizes Kantianism (and agnosticism in general) more from the vulgar-materialistic, than the dialectic materialistic, point of view, insofar he only rejects their argumentation, does not correct them (as Hegel corrected Kant), by deepening, generalizing, broadening them, showing the connection and transitions of all and every notion.

2. Marxists criticized (at the beginning of the 20th century) the Kantians and Humists more like Feuerbachians (and Buchnerians) than in a Hegelian manner. *Bilch nerach*

NB

"...An experience which rests on induction is taken as valid although admittedly the perception is not completed; but no more can be assumed than that no example can be produced contrary to this experience in so far as the latter is true in and for itself." (329)

This place is in the & "The Syllogism of Induction. The most simple truth, the most simply inductive path is always incomplete because experience is always incomplete. Ergo: the connection of induction with analogy -- with guessing (scientific foresight), relativity of every knowledge and the absolute content in every step of further knowledge.

completely grasp

Aphorism: It is impossible fully to understand Marx's Capital and especially its first chapter, if you have not studied through and understood the whole of Hegel's Logic. Consequently, none of the Marxists understood Marx for the past century!!

Transition of the conclusion of analogies (about analogies) to the conclusion of necessity--the conclusion about induction--in the conclusion about analogy--a conclusion from the universal to the particular,--the conclusion from the particular to the universal,--the analysis of the connection and transitions (a connection is transition), --that is the problem of Hegel. Hegel actually demonstrated that the logical forms and laws are not an empty shell, but a reflection of the objective world. More truly, did not demonstrate but brilliantly guessed. (*predicted the future of a genius*)

Aphorism

In the Encyclopaedia Hegel remarks that the division of Understanding and Reason, of Motions of one and another sort must be understood thus:

"our own action often stops short at the mere negative and abstract form of the notion, when we might also have proceeded to apprehend the notion in its true nature, as at once positive and concrete. It is e.g. the mere understanding, which thinks liberty to be the abstract contrary of necessity, whereas the adequate rational notion of liberty requires the element of necessity to be merged in it." (SL, p.317-tr.)(vol.VI)

Abstract and concrete notions
Freedom and necessity

Idem (p.318) as Aristotle so fully described the logical form that "no essential addition" need be made.

Ordinarily the "figures of the Syllogism" are looked upon as an empty formalism. They have however a very real significance, derived from the necessity for every function or characteristic element of the notion to become the whole itself, and to stand as mediating ground." (321)

Encyclopaedia (Vol.VI,)(SL, p.322)

"In their objective sense, the three figures of the syllogism declare that everything rational is manifested in a triple syllogism; that is to say, each one of the members takes in turn the place of the extremes, as well as of the mean which reconciles them. Such, for example, is the case with the three branches of philosophy; the Logical Idea, Nature, and Mind. As we first see them, Nature is the middle term which links the others together. Nature, the totality immediately before us, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Mind."

"But Mind is Mind only when it is mediated through nature..."
"It is Mind which cognizes the Logical Idea in Nature and which thus raises Nature to its essence."...The Logical Idea is "the absolute substance both of mind and of nature, the universal and all-pervading principle." (322)

MS
FC
228

90-2-14

NB:
Hegel "only"
worships this
"Logical
Idea", law,
universality

"Nature, the totality immediately before us, unfolds itself into the two extremes of the Logical Idea and Mind." Logic is the doctrine of knowledge. It is the theory of knowledge. Knowledge is the reflection of nature in man. But this is not a simple, not an immediate, but a total reflection, a process of a series of abstractions, formation of notions, laws, etc., which notions, laws, etc. (thought, since = "Logical Idea") it grasps conditionally, approximately the universal law of the eternally moving and developing Nature. Here actually, objectively, three members: (1) nature; (2) knowledge of man, = brain of man (as the highest product of this nature), and (3) form of reflection of nature in the knowledge of man, this form is notion, law, category, etc. Man cannot grasp = reflect = mirror the nature of everything, fully, etc., its "immediate totality", he can only eternally approach it, creating abstractions, notions, laws, a scientific picture of the world, and so forth and so on.

A pointed remark regarding analogy:
"Analogy is the instinct* of reason, creating an anticipation that this or that characteristic, which experience has discovered, has its root in the inner nature* or kind of an object, and arguing on the faith of the anticipation." (vol. VI, p.) (SL, p. 326, tr.)

And pp. 325-327: the meaningless play with empty analogies has brought about an attitude of contempt to natural philosophy. Against himself!

In ordinary logic thought is formally separated from objectivity:

"It believes thought to be a mere subjective and formal activity, and the objective fact, which confronts thought, to have a separate and permanent being. -- But his dualism is a half-truth: and there is a want of intelligence in the procedure which at once accepts, without inquiring into their origin, the categories of subjectivity and objectivity." (328) In actuality subjectivity is only a stage in the development from being and essence, -- and then this subjectivity dialectically "breaks through its own barriers and opens out into objectivity by means of the syllogism." (329)

Very profound and wise! The laws of logic are the reflection of the objective in the subjective consciousness of man.

Vol. VI, p. (SL 330) "Realization of the Notion" is the Object. Here the transition from the subject, from the notion to the object seems "strange", but it is necessary to understand by the object not simply being but completed "intrinsicly concrete, complete, and independent existence..." (330)

9/20/21

Subjectivity (or notion) and object-~~xxxx~~ also and not also essence What nonsense about ontological proof, of god!

11/3

"We may learn... the mistake of regarding the antithesis of subjectivity and objectivity as an abstract and permanent one. The two are wholly identical..." (335)

SECTION TWO: OBJECTIVITY

(Logic)V, (347-94)

Similarly

Two-fold significance of objectivity: "xxxxxxxxxx twofold significance appears for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the independent Notion, but also is that which is 1 and for itself."

Object
1/1/1

"...the knowledge of truth is placed in the cognition of the object as object and without the addition of any subjective reflection..." (348)

Cognition
of the
object

The analysis of "Mechanism"--further--very abstrus and barely not all-round nonsense.

hardly
level

Further, idem about Chemism, stages of "Judgment", etc.

The paragraph entitled "Law" does not demonstrate what one can expect from Hegel on such an interesting question. Strange, why "law" should be attached to "Mechanism"?(364)

Concept draws near Understanding of law here approaches the concepts: "order" (Ordnung), uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessity; of objective totality; "principle of self-movement".

This
drawing
near is
very im-
portant

All this from the point of view that the mechanism is the other-being of spirit, notion, etc., individuality... Play in empty analogies, evidently!

that on

Nature-sub- (Note/p.374 we meet with the concept of "natural necessity"--"both mersion of mechanism and chemism ob'emlyutsya by natural necessity"...for notion in ex- here we see "ite (notion's) submersion in externality." (ibidem) LMS) ternality" (ha-ha!)

Freedom and necessity

"It was mentioned that the opposition between Teleology and Mechanism is, in the first instance, the more general opposition between freedom and necessity. Kant sets out the opposition in this form under the Antinomies of Reason, as the 'Third Conflict of Transcendental Ideas' (377) Briefly repeating the conclusions of Kant, thesis and antithesis, Hegel notes the emptiness of these conclusions and turns attention to the conclusion to which Kant's analysis leads:

Hegel against Kant (about freedom and necessity)

"Kant's solution of this Antinomy is the same as the general solution of the others: that reason can prove neither of these propositions, since we can have no determinant principle a priori about the possibility of things according to merely empirical laws of nature; consequently the two must not be regarded as objective propositions but as subjective maxims: on the one hand I ought always to reflect upon all natural events according to the principle of pure natural mechanism; but this does not prevent me from investigating certain forms of nature, should the occasion be given, according to another maxim, namely, that of final causes;--as though these twomaxims (which further are supposed to be required only by human reason) were not in the same opposition in which the propositions stand.-- As was ob-

from

served above, at this whole standpoint the only question which is demanded by philosophic interest is not looked into, namely which of these two principles is true in and for itself; but for this point of view, it is irrelevant whether the principles are to be considered as objective determinations of nature (that is here, as determinations existing externally) or as mere maxims of a subjective cognition.--But in fact this is a subjective, that is, a contingent cognition, which applies one or the other maxim as the occasion may suggest according as it thinks it appropriate to the given objects, but otherwise does not concern itself about the truth of these determinations themselves or ask whether both are determinations of the objects or of cognition." (378-9)

Hegel

"The End has turned out to be the complementary third* of Mechanism and Chemism; it is their truth. Since it still stands within the sphere of Objectivity or of the immediacy of the total Notion, it is still affected by externality as such; an objective world to which it relates itself still stands opposed to it. From this side mechanical causality (in which generally Chemism must be included) still appears in this End-relation (which is external) but as subordinated to it and as transcended in and for itself." (380)

"...From this results the nature of the subordination of the two previous forms of the objective process: the Other, which in them lies in the infinite progress, is the Notion which at first is posited as external to them, which is End; not only is the Notion their substance, but also externality is the moment which is essential to them and constitutes their determinateness. Thus mechanical or chemical technique spontaneously offers itself to the End-relation by reason of its character being determined externally; and this relation must now be further considered." (380)

Materialist dialectic

"The laws of the external world, of nature, the subdivision on Mechanism and Chemism (this is very important), are the bases of the totality of the activity of man.

From this side, from the side of the practical (end-positing) activity of man, the chemical (and mechanical) causality of the world (of nature) appears somewhat external, as if secondary, as if covered.

2 forms of Objectivity of the process: nature (mechanical and chemical) and End-positing activity of man. The relationship of these forms. The End of man from the beginning appears foreign ("other") in relationship to nature. The consciousness of man, of science ("notion") reflects the essence, substance of nature, but at the same time this consciousness is external in relationship to nature (not at once but simple coinciding with it).

Technique, mechanical and chemical, thus serve the aims of man, in that its character (essence) consists in its determination by external conditions (by the laws of nature)

((Technique and the objective world. Technique and End))

"..it(End)has before it an obj-ctive, Mechanical and Chemical world, to which its activity relates itself as to something already given..." "to this extent it still has a truly extra-mundane existence, namely, in so far as this objectivity stands opposed to it.."(382)

In reality the aims of man are generated by the objective world and presuppose it, find it as the given, existent. But it appears to man that his aims are taken outside of the world, independent of ("freedom") of the world. ((NB: All this in & about "Subjective End" (NB)) (381-3)

* "The End binds itself together with objectivity through a Means, and in objectivity with itself." (384) (&The Means")

3878
Further, since the End is finite it has a finite content; accordingly it is not absolute or utterly and in and for itself reasonable. The Means however is the external middle of the syllogism which is the realization of the End; in it therefore reasonableness manifests itself as such-- as preserving itself in this external Other and precisely through this externality. In so far the Means is higher than the finite Ends of external usefulness: the plough is more honourable than are immediately those enjoyments which are procured by it, and are Ends. The instrument is preserved, while the immediate enjoyments pass away and are forgotten. In his tools man possesses power over external NATURE, EVEN ALTHOUGH, ACCORDING TO HIS ENDS, he frequently is subjected to it.* Hegel and historical materialism

Vorbericht, e.1) the introduction to the book (dated: Nuremberg, 7/21/1816) (This is in & "The Realized End")

Historical materialism, as one of the applications and developments of the ideas of genius are in embryo to be found in Hegel.

"The teleological process is the translation into objectivity of the Notion which exists distinctly as Notion..". (388)

*Not only is the emphasis on this sentence VIL's, but the emphasis is not merely in italics but in small type caps.--Tr

Expedient

NB
The categories
of Logic and
the practice
of man

When Hegel tries--sometimes even straining himself and worries to death--to subsume the purposeful activity of man under the categories of logic, saying that this activity is the "conclusion" (Schluss), that the subject plays the role of some sort of "member" in the logical "figure" of the "conclusion" etc., --then this is not only a strain, not only a game. There is here a very deep content, purely materialistic. It is necessary to turn this around: the practical activity of man billions of times must bring the consciousness of man to the repetition of the various logical figures, (in order) that these could achieve the significance of an axiom. This Notabene.

NB

"The movement of the End has now achieved that the moment of externality is posited not only in the Notion, and the Notion is not only Ought and tendency, but, as concrete totality, is identical with immediate Objectivity." (394) At the end of the &"Realized End", at the end of the section (Chapter III:Teleology) --Section II "Objectivity", the transition Section III THE IDEA.

From subject-
ive notion
and subject-
ive end to
objective
truth.

Remarkable: Hegel goes through the practical, expedient activity of man to get to the "Idea" as correspondence of the notion with the object, to the Idea as truth. A close approach to this, that man by his practice demonstrated the objective correctness of his ideas, notions, knowledge, science.

SECTION THREE: THE IDEA

Beginning of Section III: "Idea"

"The Idea is the adequate Notion: objective truth", or the truth as such." 395f

In general the introduction to Section III ("The Idea") of Part II of Logic ("Subjective Logic") (Vol.V, (pp.395-400) and the corresponding && in the Encyclopaedia (&&213-215) is nearly the very best ~~amixaks~~ description of the dialectic. Here then the correspondence, so to speak, of logic and gnosiology is demonstrated in a remarkably inspired manner.

The expression "Idea" is used also in the sense of simple presentation. Kant.

Hegel against Kant: Kant has claimed the expression "Idea" again for the Notion of reason. -- Now according to Kant the Notion of reason is to be the Notion of the unconditioned, and, with respect to phenomena, to be transcendent (Begreifen), which means that it is impossible to make any adequate empirical use of it. Notions of reason are to serve for the conceptual comprehension, and Notions of understanding for the bare understanding (Verstehen) of perceptions. -- But in fact, if the latter really are Notions, then they are Notions. -- conceptual or notional comprehension takes place through them... (395)

Against transcendentalism in the sense of separation of truth (objective) from empiricism

Look below about Kant

It is likewise incorrect to consider the Idea something "non-actual" as when it is said: "This is only an idea."

très bien!

"now if thoughts are merely subjective and contingent they certainly have no further value; but in this they are not inferior to the temporal and contingent actualities, which also have no value except that which is proper to contingencies and phenomena. And if conversely the Idea is not to be rated as true because, with respect to phenomena, it is transcendent, and no object can be assigned to it, in the sensuous world, to which it conforms, this is a strange lack of understanding, -- for so the Idea is denied objective validity because it lacks that which constitutes appearance, or the untrue being of the objective world." (396)

In relation to the practical ideas Kant himself acknowledges the vulgar reference to experience against ideas; ideas he presents as the maximum to which it is necessary to strive to unite with actuality. And Hegel continues:

Hegel against the "beyond" of Kant Correspondence of notions with things, not subjectively.

"But, the result having been reached that the idea is the unity of the Notion and Objectivity, or the truth, it must not merely be considered as ~~agains~~ goal which must be approached while it still remains a kind of beyond; it must be held that whatever is actual is only in so far as it contains and expresses the Idea. The object, and the objective and subjective world, not merely ought to conform to the Idea, but are themselves the conformity of Notion and reality; that reality which does not correspond to the Notion is mere appearance,

{or that subjective, contingent, capricious entity which is not the truth." (396)

"First" it is simple truth, the Identity of the Notion and objectivity as a universal. (399) The Idea (read: knowledge of man) is the correspondence (correspondence) of the Notion and objectivity ("the universal"). This firstly.

"Secondly", it is the relation of the Subjectivity, which is for itself, of the simple Notion to the Objectivity which is distinct from it: the former is essentially the impulse to transcend this separation... 2nd. the Idea is the relation for itself of the Subjectivity (as if independent) (= of man) to the distinct (from this idea) objectivity.

"...In this relation the Idea is the process in which it sunders itself into individuality and its inorganic nature, and again brings the latter back under the power of the subject, returning to the first simple universality. The self-identity of the Idea is one with the process; and the thought which frees actuality from the show of purposeless changeability and transfigures it into the Idea must not imagine this truth of actuality is a dead repose, or bare picture, spent and without impulse or motion, or as a genius number, or abstract thought. In the Idea the Notion reaches freedom, and because of this the Idea contains even the harshes opposition; its repose consists in the security and certainty with which it eternally creates and eternally overcomes it, coinciding with itself." (399-400)

Subjectivity is the striving to abolish this separation (of the Idea from the object) Knowledge is a process of submersion in inorganic nature (mind) for the sake of subordination to it of the power of the subject and generalization (knowledge of the universal in phenomena)... The correspondence of thought with the object is a process. Thought (=man) must not present to itself truth in the form of a dead repose, in the form of a simple picture (image) of a male (spent); without impulse or motion, like a genius, a number, abstract thought.

The Idea has in itself the strongest contradiction, repose (for the thought of man) consist in firmness and conviction from which he eternally creates (this contradiction of thought with the object) and eternally transcends it...

NB
NB

NB

Knowledge is eternal, infinite approachment of thought to the object. The reflection of nature in the thought of man must be understood not in a "dead", not in "an abstract" manner, not without motion, not without contradictions, but in eternal process of movement, emergence of contradictions and their solution.

"...the Idea is...the Idea of the True and of the Good

as Cognition and Volition*...the process of this finite cognition and (NB)action (NB)makes the universality (which at first is abstract) into a totality, whence it becomes perfect objectivity. (400)

The Idea is cognition and striving (wish) (to man)... The process (transient, finite, limited) of cognition and of action makes abstract notions into completed objectivity

1549

Also in the Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI. Encyclopaedia, &213.
(SL, p. 352-3, tr)

"..The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notion...And yet, again, everything actual, in so far as it is true, is the Idea...Every individual being is some one aspect of the Idea: for which therefore, yet other actualities are needed, which in their turn appear to have a self-subsistence of their own. It is only in them altogether and in their relation that the notion is realised. The individual by itself does not correspond to its notion. It is this limitation of its existence which constitutes the finitude and the ruin of the individual." (SL, 352-3)

Separate being (subject, phenomenon, etc.) is (only) one aspect of the idea (of truth). Still other sides of actuality are needed for truth, which also will merely appear independent and separate (especially existing for themselves.) Only in their totality (zusammen) and in their relation (Beziehung) does truth realize itself.

The totality of all sides of a phenomenon, of actuality and their (mutual) relationship--that is how truth is formed. Relations (= transitions & contradictions) of notions = the main content of logic, in addition to which these notions (and their relations, transitions, contradictions) are shown as reflection of the objective world. The dialectic of things creates the dialectic of ideas, and not the reverse.

Hegel as a genius guessed the dialectic of things (phenomena, world, nature) in the dialectic of notions.

This aphorism should be expressed in a more popular way, without the word, dialectic: thus: Hegel with the guess of a genius in the change, interdependence of all notions, in the identity of their contradictions, in the transitions of one notion into another, in eternal change, movement of notions saw precisely such a relation of things, of nature.

Precisely guessed, no more

of what does dialectic consist?

interdependence of notions
" of all "
without exception
transitions of notions from one into the other
"of all " without exception
relativity of the contradiction between notions...
identity of contradiction between notions.

= NB
Every notion is in a certain relation, in a certain connection with all the others.

(&213) (SL, 353)
"Truth is at first taken to mean that I know something is. This is truth, however, only in reference to consciousness;

it is formal truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion.*...

"A bad man is an untrue man, a man who does not behave as his notion or his vocation requires. Nothing however can subsist if it be wholly devoid of identity between the notion and reality. Even bad and untrue things have being, in so far as their reality still, somehow, conforms to their notion...

"...everything deserving the name of philosophy has constantly been based on the consciousness of an absolute unity where the understanding sees and accepts only separation....(354)

"The stages hitherto considered, viz., those of Being and Essence, as well as those of Motion and of Objectivity, are not when so distinguished, something permanent, resting upon themselves. They have proved to be dialectical; and their only truth is that they are dynamic elements of the idea." (SL, p. 355)

The distinction of Being from Essence, notion from Objectivity are relative

Vol. VI 222

Moments of knowledge (= "the Idea") of nature by man-- that is what the categories of Logic are

Vol. VI, p. (355) (& 214):

"The Idea may be described in many ways. It may be called reason (and this is the proper philosophical signification of reason); subject-object; the unity of the ideal and the real, of the finite and the infinite, of soul and body; the possibility which has its actuality in its own self; that of which the nature can be thought only as existent, &c. All these descriptions apply, because the Idea contains all the relations of understanding, but contains them in their infinite self-return and self-identity.

(the idea of truth is all-sided)

"It is easy work for the understanding to show that everything said of the Idea is self-contradictory* But that can quite as well be retaliated, or rather in the Idea the retaliation is actually made. And this work, which is the work of reason, is certainly not so easy as that of the understanding. Understanding may demonstrate that the Idea is self-contradictory: because the subjective is subjective only and is always confronted by the objective, --because being is different from notion and therefore cannot be picked out of it, --because the finite is finite only, the exact antithesis of the infinite, and therefore not identical with it; and so on with every term of the description. The reverse of all this however is the doctrine of Logic. Logic shows that the subjective which is to be subjective only, the finite which would be finite only, the infinite which would be infinite only, and so on, have no truth, but contradict themselves, and pass over into their opposites. Hence this transition, and the unity in which the extremes are merged and become factors, each with a merely reflected existence, reveals itself as their truth.

NB: Abstraction and the "concrete unity" of opposites. Superb example: the most simple and the most clear. The dialectic of notions and its materialistic roots. Dialectic is not in the mind of man, but in the "Idea", i.e. in the objective activity.

"The understanding, which addresses itself to deal with the Idea, commits a double misunderstanding. It takes first the extremes of the Idea (be they expressed as they will, so long as they are in their unity), not as they are understood when stamped with this concrete unity, but as if they remained abstractions outside of it. It no less mistakes the relation between them, even when it has been expressly stated. Thus, for example, it overlooks even the nature of the copula in the judgment, which affirms that the individual, or subject, is after all not individual, but universal. But, in the second place, the understanding believes its 'reflection',--that the self-identical Idea contains its own negative, or contains contradiction,--to be an external reflection which does not lie within the Idea itself. But the reflection is really no peculiar cleverness of the understanding. The Idea itself is the dialectic which for ever divides and distinguishes the self-identical from the objective, the finite from the infinite, soul from body. Only on these terms is it an eternal creation, eternal vitality, and eternal spirit." (356)
VI. 4214 (356)

NB
indiv-
idual--
to the
univer-
"Etern-
al life"
=dial-
ectic

"The Idea is essentially a process, because its identity is the absolute and free identity of the notion, only in so far as it is absolute negativity and for that reason dialectical." (357)
Therefore, the expression, "unity" of thought and being, finite and infinite etc. is false, because it reflects a "quiescent" identity. It is not true that the finite simply neutralizes the infinite and vice versa. In actually we have a p r o c e s s.

Idea is
a pro-
cess
this NB

If (kol) to calculate...every second on the earth 10 men die and a greater number are born. "Motion" and "moment": seize it. Every moment a given...Seize this moment. Idea in simple mechanical movement (contra Chernov)

"The idea as a process runs through three stages in its development. The first form of the idea is Life...The second form is...the idea in the form of Knowledge, which appears under the double aspect of the Theoretical and Practical* idea. The process of knowledge eventuates in the restoration of the unity enriched by difference. This gives the third form of the idea, the Absolute Idea..." (358)

Truth is a process. From the subjective idea man goes to objective truth through "practice" (and technique)

* The Idea is "truth" (pp. 352-6) & 213). The Idea, i.e. truth as a process--since truth is a process--goes through three stages in its development: 1) life; 2) process of knowledge, including practice of man and technique (cf. above),--3) the stage of absolute idea (i.e. complete truth). Life gives birth to brain. Nature is reflected in the brain of man. Verifying and applying those reflections in his practice and in technique, man comes to objective truth.

Logic, Vol.V.
Section III. Chapter I. Life.

Life seems to have no place in "logic as it is commonly imagined" (401). But if truth is the subject of logic, and "truth as such essentially is in Cognition", then it is necessary to treat ~~with~~ cognition--it is necessary to speak of life already in connection with cognition.

Sometimes in a so-called "pure logic" is already included "applied" (angewandte) logic, but then...

Every science is an applied logic "for then every science must be absorbed in logic, since each is an applied logic in so far as it consists in apprehending its object in forms of thought and of the Notion." (401)

The thought to include l i f e in logic is understandable --and inspired--from the standpoint of the process of reflection ~~and~~ in consciousness (at the beginning individual) of man of the objective world and the verification of this consciousness (reflection) by practice --see:

"the original Judgment of Life consists in this, that it separates itself as individual subject from the objective..." (404) Life = individual subject separates himself from the object

Encyclopaedia & 216: the single members of the body are what they are only in relation. A hand, cut off from the body, is a hand in name only. (Aristotle)

Encyclopaedia & 219: "...The inorganic nature which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is virtually the same as what life is actually." (p. 361) Turned around = pure materialism. Splendid profound, true!! And also NB: demonstrates the extreme correctness and pointedness of the terms "in itself" and "for itself"!!!

If we are to examine the relation of subject to object in ~~the~~ logic, then it is necessary to take into account also the general references of being of the concrete subject (= life of man) in the objective surrounding.

- Subdivisions: 1) life, as the "living individual" (&A)
2) "Life process"
3) "Process of the Kind" (Gattung), reproduction of man and transition to cognition.

- (1) "Subjective completeness" and "indifference" "objectivity"
(2) unity of subject and object.

"...This objectivity of the Living Entity is Organism: the objectivity is the Means and instrument of the End..." (406)

Hegel and a game in "organic notions"

Further "podvedeniye" under logical categories "sensitivity" (Sensibilität), "irritability" (Irritabilität)--and this is the particular in distinction from the universal!!--and "reproduction" is empty game. Forgotten is the nodal line, transition into other platitudes of natural phenomena. Etc. Pain is "actual existence" of contradiction in the living individual

Hegel and a game in "organism"

Or also: reproduction of man "as their (that of two individuals of opposite sex) realized identity is the negative unity of the Kind which intro-reflects itself out of the division." (414)

The ludicrous is Hegel

Logic, Vol.V. Section III. Idea. (pp.395-496)

Subjective consciousness and its submersion into objectivity

"...Its (the notion's) reality in general is the form of its existence, and what matters is the determination of this form; upon this depends the distinction of that which the Notion is in itself or as subjective, and of what it is as submerged into Objectivity, and next in the Idea of Life." (416)

Mysticism

"...Spirit not only is infinitely richer than Nature, but the absolute unity of opposites in the Notion constitutes its essence..." ?Mysticism!

Hegel against Kant:

With Kant the "Ego" appears "as the transcendental subject of thoughts"; "At the same time this Ego, according to Kant's own expression, is awkward in this respect, that we must always make use of it in order to make any judgment about it..." (417)

i.e. that the "Ego" in Kant is an empty form (self-sucked out) without concrete

(analysis of the process of cognition)

(p.418)

"In his (= Kant's) criticism of these determinations (that is: of abstract, one-sided determinations of the previous--pre-Kantian--metaphysics about the "soul") he simply followed Hume's sceptical manner: he holds fast to that which appears as Ego in self-consciousness, from which however (he insists) everything empirical must be omitted, since the aim is to know its essence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now nothing remains but the phenomenon of the 'I think' which accompanies every idea; and nobody has the slightest notion of this 'I Think.'" (418) # # #

NB: Kant and Hume--sceptics

NB

Evidently Hegel here sees scepticism in the fact that Hume and Kant do not see in "phenomena" the appearing thing-itself, separate phenomena from objective truth doubt the objectivity of cognition, the separate (weglassen) from Ding an sich...And Hegel continues:

See what does Hegel see in scepticism

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###... "It must certainly be admitted that it is impossible to have the slightest notion of Ego or anything else (the Notion included), if no Notion is formed and a halt is made at the simple, fixed general idea and name." (419)

It is impossible to understand outside of the process of Understanding (of cognition, of concrete study, etc.)

In order to understand, it is necessary empirically to begin understanding, study, from empiricism to elevate oneself to the universal. In order to learn to swim, one must get into the water.

Kant limits himself to "phenomena" The old metaphysics, striving to know truth, divided subjects according to the sign of truth, according to substance and phenomena. The Criticisms of Kant renounced the investigation of truth... "But to stand fast at appearance and the data given to mere sensuous representation in everyday consciousness is tantamount to a resignation of the Notion and of philosophy." (421)

AA: THE IDEA OF THE TRUE

"At first the subjective Idea is impulse... the impulse has the determinateness of cancelling its own subjectivity, of making concrete its reality (which was abstract at first), and of filling it, for content, with the world which is presupposed by its subjectivity... Cognition is the Idea as End or as subjective, and so the negation of the world which is presupposed as being in itself is first negation..." (425-6)

i.e. the first stage, moment, beginning, approach of knowledge is its finitude (Endlichkeit) and subjectivity, negation of world-in-itself--the goal of knowledge is at first subjective...

Hegel against Kant:

Kant raised one aspect into the absolute "Strangely enough this side of finitude has latterly (evidently Kant) been seized upon and has been taken to be the absolute relation of Cognition--as though the finite as such was to be the absolute! At this point of view the Object is assigned the property of being an unknown Thing-in-itself behind all knowledge, which property, together with truth, is considered an absolute Beyond for Cognition. The determinations of thought in general, the categories and the determinations of reflection as well as the formal Notion and its moments, are here given the position not that they are finite determinations in and for themselves, but that they are so in the sense that they are subjective as against that empty Thinghood-in-itself: the error of taking this relation of the untruth of Cognition as valid has become the universal opinion of modern times." (426)

With Kant: the thing in itself is the absolute "Beyond" Subjectivism of Kant

xx Shouldn't "behind" be "Beyond"? - tz.

Finite, transitory, relative, conditional character of man's knowledge (his categories, causality, etc. etc.) Kant took for subjectivism, and not for the dialectic of the Idea (= of nature itself), tearing knowledge from the object.

... "But Cognition must by its own process resolve its finitude and therefore its contradiction." (428-7)

But the course of knowledge leads him to objective truth

"It is one-sided to imagine analysis in such a manner as though nothing were in the object except what has been put into it; and it is equally simply taken out of it? The former idea is of course the thesis of subjective idealism, which in analysis takes the activity of Cognition only as a one-sided positing; beyond which the Thing-in-itself remains hidden; the latter idea belongs to so-called realism, which takes the subjective Notion as an empty identity that absorbs the thought-determinations from without." (429)

Hegel against subjective idealism and "realism"

Objectivity of logic

... "But the two moments cannot be separated; in its abstract form, into which analysis elaborates it, the logical is certainly present only in Cognition; while conversely it is not only something posited but also something which is in itself." (429)

The logical notions are subjective so long as they remain "abstract", in its abstract form, and at the same time express also the thing-in-itself. Nature and concreteness and abstractness, and phenomenon and essence and moment and relation. Man's understanding is subjective in its abstractness, otrvanost but object as a whole, in the process, in the result, in the tendency, in the source.

Very good & 225. Encyclopaedia where "knowledge" ("theoretic") and "ill", "practical activity" are described as two sides, two methods, two means of abolishing "one-sidedness" and subjectivity and objectivity.

And further: (430-1) very important about the transition of the categories one into another (and against Kant, p. 431)

Logic, Vol. V, p. (end) (431, -tr)

"...Kant...takes up the determinate connections (the relations and the synthetic principles themselves) from formal logic as given". They ought to have been deduced by the exposition of the transition of this simple unity of self-consciousness into these its determinations and distinctions; but Kant spared himself the trouble of demonstrating this veritably synthetic progress--the self-producing Notion." (330-1)

Kant did not demonstrate the transition of the categories one into the other.

(434) Returning once again to higher mathematics (revealing, incidentally, acquaintance with the manner in which Gauss achieved equation $X^m - 1 = 0$), Hegel once again concerns himself with differential and integral calculus, says that

"whence to this day mathematics has failed in justifying those operations, which are based upon this transition, through themselves, that is, in a mathematical manner: for the transition is not of a mathematic nature. Leibniz" is given the credit of having transformed the arithmetic of the infinitesimal differences into a calculus; but (as was shown in the same place) he made the transition in the most inadequate manner, a manner both thoroughly notionless and unmathematical." (434)

"Analytic" Cognition is the first premise of the whole syllogism,--the immediate relation of the Notion to the Object. Consequently identity is the determination which it recognizes as its own: it is only the apprehension of what is. Synthetic Cognition endeavours to form a Notion of what is, that is, to seize the multiplicity of determinations in their unity. Hence it is the second premise of the syllogism in which terms various as such are related. Its goal is therefore necessity in general." (435)

Regarding the manner in which some sciences (for example, physics) take for "explanation" various "forces, etc. and tighten (strain), spur on the facts, etc. Hegel makes the following wise remark:

"It is now seen that the so-called explanation ~~on the~~ proof of the concrete element which is brought into Propositions is partly a tautology and partly a confusion of the true relation; further it is seen that this confusion served to disguise the trick of Cognition, which took up empirical data one-sidedly (the only manner in which it could reach its simple definitions and formulae), and eludes empirical refutation by examining experience and allowing it validity not in its concrete totality but as example, and only in that direction which is serviceable for the hypotheses and the theory. Concrete experience being thus ~~xxx~~ subordinated to the presupposed determinations the foundation of the theory is obscured, and is exhibited only from that side which is in conformity with ~~xxx~~ the theory..." (456-7)

Remarkably true and profound (cf. the political economy of the bourgeoisie)

Against subjectivism and one-sidedness

Example: nonsensical razhnicaniya with banalities, etc.

fn

overturned

i.e. Kant did not understand the universal law of the dialectic of the finite. Kant and Jacobi overthrew the old metaphysics (for example, Wolff). Kant showed that the "strict demonstrations" led to antinomies. "But he did not reflect upon the nature; yet the two stand and fall together." (458)

Synthetic Cognition is not yet complete because "the Notion does not become unity with itself in its object or its reality...Hence in this Cognition the Idea does not yet reach truth because of the inadequacy of the object to the subjective Notion.--But the sphere of Necessity is the highest point of Being and of Reflection; in and for itself it passes over into its manifestation, which is the Notion as Notion." (459)

"...The Idea, in so far as the Notion is now for itself the Notion determinate in and for itself, is the Practical Idea or Action" (460) And the following is entitled "The Idea of Good".

Theoretic cognition must give the object in its necessity, in its all-sided relations, in its contradictory movement an-und für-sich. But man's understanding "definitively" embraces this objective truth of cognition, laps it in, masters it only when understanding becomes "being for itself" in the sense of practice. I.e. the practice of man and humanity is the verification, criterion of objectivity of cognition. Is that the thought of Hegel? One must return here.

Hegel about practice and the objectivity of cognition

Why is the transition from practice, action only to "good", das Gute? This is narrow, one-sided: And the useful? Undoubtedly the useful also enters. Or is it that according to Hegel this too is "the good"?

All this is in the chapter "The Idea of Cognition" (Chapter II)--in the transition to "The Absolute Idea" (Chapter III)--i.e., undoubtedly practice in stands higher as a link in the analysis of the process of cognition and precisely as a transition to the objective ("absolute", according to Hegel) truth. Marx, consequently, clings to Hegel, introducing the criteria of practice into the theory of knowledge: cf. Theses on Feuerbach.

Practice in the theory of Cognition (460)

"As subjective the Notion has again the presupposition of an otherness which is in itself; it is the impulse to realize itself, or the end which tries to give itself objectivity in the objective world, and to execute itself, through itself. In the Theoretical Idea the subjective Notion stands opposed, as the universal which is indeterminate in and for itself, to the objective world, from which it draws determinate content and fulfillment. But in the Practical Idea it stands opposed as actual to the actual. But the self-certainty, which the subject has in the fact of its determinateness in and for itself, is a certainty of its own actuality and of the non-actuality of the world..." (460)

Alias:
Man's cognition not only reflects the objective world, but creates it.

Understanding (= man), as subjectivity, again presupposes Otherness in-itself (nature independent of man). This understanding (= man) is the impulse to realize itself, give itself through itself objectivity in the objective world and to actualize (execute) himself.

In the theoretical idea (in the sphere of theory) subjective understanding (cognition?), as a universal and devoid in itself of determinateness, is counterposed to the objective world out of which it scoops out determinate content and filling.

In the practical idea (in the sphere of practice) this understanding, as an actual (existing?) is counterposed to the actual.

Confidence in self, which the subject here suddenly instead of "understanding" has in its Being in itself and for itself, as a determinate subject, is confidence in its own actuality and in the non-actuality of the world.

"This determinateness, which is contained in the Notion, and is equal to it, and includes within itself the demand of the individual external actuality, is the Good. It appears with the dignity of absoluteness, because it is the totality of the Notion within itself--the objective in the form simultaneously of free unity and subjectivity. This Idea is higher than the Idea of Cognition which has already been considered, for it has not only the dignity of the universal but also of the simply actual." (460)

... "Consequently the activity of the end is not directed against itself, for the purpose of absorbing and assimilating a given determination; it aims rather at positing its own determination, and, by transcending the determinations of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality." (461)

... "The realized Good is good by virtue of what it is already in the Subjective End, in its Idea; realization gives it an external existence..." (462)

i.e. that the world does not satisfy man and man by his action decides change it.

The essence:

"The good" is "the demand, or... external actuality", i.e. under "the good" is understood the practice of man = need (1) and external actuality (2).

Practice is higher than (theoretical) cognition, for it has not only the dignity of the universal, but also immediate actuality.

"the activity of the end is not directed against itself...."

it aims rather at ~~existing~~ transcending the determinations (sides, traits, phenomena) of the external world, at giving itself reality in the form of external actuality..."

"An objective world is presupposed to the Good, a world which constitutes the subjectivity and finitude of the Good and, as being other, pursues its own course: and in it even the realization of the Good is exposed to obstacles, which may sometimes be insuperable." (462)

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"The objective World" "goes its own way", and the practice of man, having before him this objective world, meets "difficulties in realization" of goals, even comes up against the "insuperable".

... "Thus the Good remains an Ought*; it is in and for itself, but Being, as last and abstract immediacy, remains determined against it as a Not-being too." * * (462)

The Good, welfare, blazive strivings remain subjective "Oughts"...

Two worlds: the subjective and the objective

Although the Idea of the perfected Good is an absolute postulate, it is no more than a postulate, -- that is, the absolute infected with the determinateness of subjectivity in the pure spaces of transparent thought, the other a realm of objectivity in the element of an externally manifold actuality* which is an unexplored realm of darkness. The complete development of the unresolved contradiction, of that absolute end which the barrier of this actuality insuperably opposes, has been considered more closely in the Phenomenology of Spirit. (pp. 610 sqq) (462)

Scorning at "pure spaces of transparent thought" in the realm of subjectivity to which is counterposed "darkness" "of the objective" "diverse" actuality.

... (463) "in the latter (= of the theoretic idea in distinction from the practical idea)...Cognition knows itself only as apprehension, as the self-identity of the Notion, which for itself is indeterminate: fulfilment, that is, objectivity determined in and for itself, is given to it, and that which truly is is the actuality that is present independently of subjective positing. The Practical Idea on the other hand counts this actuality (which at the same time opposes it as an insuperable barrier) as that which in and for itself is null, which is to receive its true determination and sole value through the ends of the Good. Will itself consequently bars the way to its own goal in so far as it separates itself from Cognition and external actuality does not, for it, obtain the form of that which truly is; consequently the Idea of the Good can find its complement only in the Idea of the True." (463)

Cognition... finds itself before its own existence, as independent from subjective opinions (Setzen), real actuality. (This is pure materialism!) The Will of man, his practice itself hinders the attainment of its goal... by this, that it separates itself from cognition and does not accept external actuality for true-being (for objective truth). It is necessary. The joining of cognition and practice ✓

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And immediately following this:

|| ... "But it takes this transition through itself (the transition of the idea of truth to the idea of good, of theory into practice and vice versa)*. In the syllogism of action one premiss is the immediate relation of the good end to actuality*, of which it makes itself master, directing it (in the second premiss) as external means against external actuality." (463)

"Conclusion of action" For Hegel action, practice is the logical "conclusion" of the figure of logic. And this is true! Of course, not in the sense that the figure of logic has by its Otherness the practice of man (= absolute idealism) but vice versa: the practice of man repeats itself billions of times, ~~is~~ corroborates itself in consciousness of man by the figures of logic. The figures have the solidity of a prejudice, an axiomatic character precisely (and only) because of this billion-times repetition.

- 1st postulate: good end (subjective ~~idea~~) versus external actuality
- 2nd postulate: external means (weapon), (Objective)
- 3rd postulate: namely the conclusion: the correspondence of subject and object, the verification of subjective ideas, the criteria of objective truth.

"..the realization of the Good in the teeth of an opposing and other actuality is the mediation which is essential for the immediate relation and actualization of the Good." (464)

"If now in spite of this the end of the Good should not be realized, then this is a relapse of the Notion to the standpoint which the Notion has before its activity--the standpoint of that actuality which was determined as null and yet was presupposed as real. This relapse becomes a progress to bad infinity; it has its only ground in the fact (1) that in the transcendence of this abstract reality the transcendence is equally immediately forgotten, or (2) that it is forgotten that this reality has already been presupposed as non-objective actuality which is null in and for itself." (464)

NS: The non-accomplishment of goals (of man's activity) has its reason (Grund) the fact that reality is taken for a non-existing (nichtig), that objective actuality is not recognized (for its reality).

"By the activity of the objective Notion its external actuality is altered, and its determination is accordingly transcended; and by this very process it loses merely apparent reality, external determinability, and nullity, and it is thus posited as being in and for itself." (465)

NS: The activity of man, composing for itself an objective picture of the world change s the external activity, transcends its determinateness (= changes these or other of its aspects, qualities) and thus takes away from it the traits of appearance, externality and nullity, gives it being in-itself and for-itself (= objective truth).

+ ... "Presupposition in general is here transcended,--that is, the determination of the Good as an end which is merely subjective and restricted in its content, the necessity of realizing it by subjective activity, and this activity itself. In the result mediation transcends itself; the result is an immediacy which is not the reconstitution of the presupposition but rather the fact of its transcendedness. The Idea of the Notion which is determined in and for itself is thus posited no longer merely in the active subject, but equally as an immediate actuality; and the latter conversely is posited as it is in Cognition, as objectivity which is veritable." (465)

The result of action is verification of subjective cognition and criteria by truly-existent objectivity.

"... "In this result then Cognition is reconstructed and united with the Practical Idea; the actuality which is found as given is at the same time determined as the realized absolute end,-- not however (as in inquiring Cognition) merely as objective world without the subjectivity of the Notion, but as objective world whose inner ground and actual persistence is the Notion. This is the Absolute Idea." (465) (End of Chapter II. Transition to Chapter III: "The Absolute Idea")

Chapter III: "The Absolute Idea" (466)

"The Absolute Idea has now turned out to be the identity of the Theoretical and the Practical Idea; each of these by itself is one-sided..."

The unity of theoretic ideas (cognition) and practice --this, ~~is~~ and this unity precisely in theory of knowledge for the result is the "Absolute Idea" (and Idea = "objective truth") (Vol.V, (395).

What remains now is to examine not the content, but ... "the universal element of its form--that is, the method." (467)

"In inquiring cognition the method is likewise in the position of a tool*, of a means which stands on the subjective side, whereby the method relates itself to the object....But in true cognition the method is not merely a quantity of certain determinations: it is the fact that the Notion is determined in and for itself, and is the mean only because it equally has the significance of objective..." (469) (the mean in the logic figure of Syllogism)

"...The absolute method (i.e. the method of cognition of objective truth)...does not hold the position of external reflection; it draws the determinate element directly from its object itself, since it is the object's immanent principle and soul.--It was this that Plato* demanded of cognition, that it should consider things in and for themselves*, and that while partly considering their universality, it should also hold fast to them,

not catching at externals, examples, and comparisons, but contemplating the things alone and bringing before consciousness what is immanent in them..."(472)

This method of "absolute cognition" is analytical... "But equally the method is synthetic"...(478)E

One of the determinations of the dialectic | "This equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment," |
by which the original universal determines itself out of itself to be its own Other, may rightly be called the dialectic moment.. (478) (cf. next page)

"This equally synthetic and analytic moment of the Judgment by which (moment) the original universal (universal cognition) determines itself out of itself, to be its own Other, may rightly be called the dialectic moment."

A determination The definitions is not among the clear ones!!!

- 1) The determination of the Notion out of itself (the thing itself should be examined in its relations and in its development).
 - 2) The contradictory in the thing itself (das Andere seiner), the contradictory forces and tendencies in every appearance.
 - 3) The ^{unity} joining of analysis and synthesis.
- Such apparently are the elements of the dialectic.

We can, if you please, present them in a more detailed way, thus:

Elements of the dialectic

- 1) The objectivity of the observation (not examples, not digressions, but the thing in itself).
- 2) The whole totality of the manifold relations of this thing to the others.
- 3) The development of this thing (respective appearance), its own movement, its own life.
- 4) The internally contradictory tendencies (and sides) of this thing.
- 5) The thing (the appearance, etc) as sum and unity of opposites.
- 6) The struggle respective the unfolding of these opposites, the contradictions of the impulses, etc.
- 7) The ^{unity} joining of analysis and synthesis, --disintegration of the particular parts and the totality, the summarization of these parts together.
- 8) The relation of each thing (appearance, etc.) is not only manifold but general, universal. Each thing (appearance, process, etc.) is connected with every other.
- 9) Not only unity of opposites but transitions of e v e r y determination, quality, characteristic, side, feature into e v e r y other (into its opposite?)/

- 10) Infinite process of unfolding of n e w sides, relations, etc.
 - 11) Infinite process of the deepening of man's cognition of things, appearances, processes, etc. from appearance to essence, and from the less profound to the more profound essence.
 - 12) From coexistence to causality and from the one form of connection and of mutual dependence to another, deeper and more universal.
 - 13) The repetition at a higher stage of certain features, characteristics, etc. of the lower, and
 - 14) The apparent return to the old (negation of the negation)
 - 15) The struggle of the content with the form and the reverse. The shedding of form, the transformation of content.
 - 16) The transition of quantity into quality and vice versa.
- ((15 and 16 are examples of 9))

Briefly the dialectic can be defined as the doctrine of the unity of opposites. Thereby is the kernel of the dialectic grasped but that demands explanation and development.

(Continuation. Cf. previous page)

Plato and dialectic

... "Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences which have been most misjudged in modern metaphysics and the popular philosophy of ancients and moderns alike..." (473) Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that Plato was initiator of dialectic, the third philosophy that belongs to science (as Thales was of natural philosophy--Socrates of moral philosophy) but although those who talk especially loud about this, think very little of it... (474)

Objectivity of dialectic

... "Dialectic has often been considered an art, as though it rested upon a subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the Notion."... The great merit of Kant lay in the fact that he again introduced the dialectic, recognized it as a necessity to "reason" (478), but the result (of this application of the dialectic) must be inverse (to Kantianism). Cf. below.

Further there follows an interesting, clear, important sketch of the dialectic:

... "Dialectic generally appears as contingent; but, further, it usually has this form, that opposite determinations are demonstrated in the same object (such as the world, motion, or point, and so on): for example (in the above order), finitude in space and time, presence at a given point, absolute negation of space, --and also, with equal necessity, infinity in space and time, non-presence at a given point, and a relation to space and, consequently, spatiality. The Elder Eleatic school applied its dialectic chiefly against motion, Plato frequently against contemporary ideas and concepts (especially those of the Sophists).

but also against pure categories and reflection-determined actions; the developed later scepticism extended it not only to the immediate so-called data of consciousness and maxims of ordinary life, but also to all the concepts of science. The conclusion which is drawn from such a dialectic is contradiction in general and the nullity of the assertions made. But it may be drawn in a twofold manner, --in the objective sense, the self-contradictory object being held to cancel itself and to be null (--the Eleatic conclusion, by which, for example, the world, motion, and the point were deprived of truth), and in the subjective sense, cognition being held to be defective. The latter conclusion is sometimes understood to mean that it is only this dialectic that effects the trick of an illusive show. This is the ordinary view of the so-called sound common sense, which holds fast to the evidence of the senses and to customary ideas and expressions." (473-4)

Role of scepticism in the history of dialectic
Dialectic is understood as a kunshtiuk

For example, ~~καταξ~~ Diogenes the Cynic's exposition of motion by walking is a "vulgar refutation" (474), says Hegel.

Kantianism
= (also)
scepticism

"Or again the result reached--that of subjective nullity--may relate not to the dialectic itself, but rather to the cognition against which it is directed, or, as in the case of scepticism and likewise of the Kantian philosophy, to cognition in general." (474)

"The fundamental prejudice here is that the dialectic has only a negative result..."

Incidentally the merit of Kant lies in his having turned attention to the dialectic and to a consideration "of the determinations of thought in and for themselves." (475)

This is true!
the image and thought,
the development of both, are aliud

"The object in its existence without thought and Notion is an image or a name; it is what it is in the determinations of thought and Notion..." (475)

The object show itself to be dialectic.

"...It must not therefore be considered the fault of an object, or of cognition, if they prove their dialectic nature through their quality or through an external connexion..."

Notions are not stationary but a transition in themselves, by their nature

"Thus all opposites which are taken as fixed like (for example) finite and infinite or individual and universal, are contradictory not in virtue of some external connexion but rather of their transitions in and for themselves, as the consideration of their nature showed..." (475)

The first universal notion (and any universal first met

"Now this is the standpoint which was referred to above, in which any first term considered in and for itself shows itself to be its own Other..."

"...but the Other is essentially not only the empty neg- This is or Nothing which is commonly taken as the result of the very import- dialectic: it is the Other of the first, the negative and in the of the immediate; it is thus determined as mediated understanding of --and altogether contains the determination of the Dialectic First. The first is thus essentially contained and preserved in the Other. To hold fast the positive in its negative, and the content of the presupposition in the result, is the most important part of rational cognition; also only the simplest reflection is needed to furnish conviction of the absolute truth and necessity of this requirement, while with regard to the examples of proofs, the whole of Logic consists of these." (476)

Not a bare negation, not a random (случайное) negation, not a sceptical negation, vacillation, doubt which is characteristic and existent in dialectic, --which, undoubtedly, contains in itself the element of negation and as the most important element at that, --not, but negation as a moment of connection, as a moment of development, with retention of the positive, i.e., without any vacillation, without any eclecticism.

In general dialectic consists in the negation of the first proposition, in its relay by the second (in the transition of the first into the second, in the indication of the connection of the first with the second, etc.). The second must consequently be the predicate of the first--

for example: "The finite is infinite", "One is many," "the individual is the universal." (476)

"...the first or immediate term is the Notion in itself, and therefore is the negative only in itself; the dialectic moment with it therefore consists in this, that the distinction which it implicitly contains is posited in it. The second term on the other hand is itself the determinate entity, distinction or relation; hence with it the dialectic moment consists in the positing of the unity which is contained in it..." (477)

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(2m In relation to the simple and original "first" positive assertions, propositions, etc. the "dialectic moment", i.e. scientific examination demands indications, distinctions, connections, transitions. Without this, first positive assertion is incomplete, lifeless, dead. In relation to the "nd", negative proposition, "the dialectic moment" demands indications of unity, i.e. of connection negative with positive, finding this positive in the negative. From affirmation to negation--from negation to "unity" with the affirmative, --without this the dialectic would become a bare negation, a game, or scepticism).

"If then the negative, the determinate, the relation or judgment, and all determinations which fall under this second moment, do not of themselves appear as contradictory and dialectical, this is a mere fault of thought which does not confront its thoughts one

with another. For the materials--opposite determinations in one relation--are posited already and are at hand for thought. But formal thought makes identity its law, and allows the contradictory content which lies before it to drop into the sphere of sensuous representation, into space and time, where the contradictory terms are held apart in spatial and temporal juxtaposition and thus come before consciousness without being in contact." (477)

"Come before consciousness without being in contact" (object)--that is the essence of anti-dialectic. Here it is only as if Hegel sucked out the sensitive ears of idealism, transferring time and space (in connection with images) to something lower against thought. Incidentally, in a certain sense presentation is, of course, lower. Essentially it is that thinking must grasp all "representation" in its movement, but for this thinking must be dialectical. Is representation more refer to reality than thinking? Yes and no. Representation cannot grasp the movement as a whole for example, does not grasp the movement with the speed of 300,000 km. a second, and thinking grasps and must grasp it. Thinking, taken from representation, also reflects reality; time is a form of being of objective reality. Here, in the notion of time (and not in relation of representation to thinking) is the idealism of Hegel.

"...In this connexion this thought makes it its fixed principle that contradiction is unthinkable; but in truth the thinking of contradiction is the essential moment of the Notion. In point of fact formal thought does think contradiction, but immediately disregards it, and with the empty assertion of that principle passes over to abstract negation." (477)
(that contradiction is unthinkable).

Salt of the dialectic
Criterion of truth (unity of notion and reality)

"The negativity which has just been considered is the turning point of the movement of the Notion. It is the simple point of negative self-relation, the innermost source of all activity, of ~~negative~~ living and spiritual self-movement, the dialectic soul which all truth has in it and through which it alone is truth; for the transcendence of the opposition between the Notion and Reality, and that unity which is the truth, rest upon this subjectivity alone.--The second negative, the negation of the negative, which we have reached, is this transcendence of the contradiction, but is no more the activity of an external reflection than the contradiction is: it is the innermost and most objective moment of Life and Spirit, by virtue of which a subject is personal and free." (477-8)

Here what is important is: 1) the characteristic of the dialectic: self-movement, source of activity, movement of life and spirit; correspondence of notions of the subject (man) with reality; 2) objectivism to the highest degree ("most objective moment").

1567 Hegel--"if in general you wish to count"--but it can be ac-

cented as the fourth, considering two negations: "simple" (or "formal") and "absolute" (478ff)

The distinction is not clear to me; is not the absolute equivalent to the more concrete?

WE:

"It is the wholly superficial and external side of the manner of cognition that apprehends this as a unity, and the form of the dialectic method as a whole as a triplicity..." (478-9)
its external, superficial side

it

---but says that ~~xxxxxxx~~ is the "infinite merit of Kant's philosophy", that ~~is designated~~, although (it is without notion) has been

Hegel sharply castigates formalism, tediousness, emptiness of the ~~form~~ in dialectic

"Formalists have seized even upon triplicity, and have held fast to its skeleton; and this form has been rendered tedious and of ill-repute by the shallow misuse and the barrenness of modern so-called philosophic construction, which consists simply in attaching the formal framework without concept and immanent determination to all sorts of matter and employing it for external arrangement. But its inner value cannot be diminished by this vapid misuse, and it must still be deemed a great matter that the outward form of rational procedure has been discovered, albeit not understood." (479)

The result of the negation of the negation, this third is not... "a quiescent third term, but as this unity (of opposites)*, is self-mediating movement and activity..." (479)

The result of this dialectic transformation into a "third", into a synthesis, there is a new reference, assertion, etc., which again becomes the source of a further analysis. But in it, this "third" stage, the "c o n t e n t" of cognition ("the content of cognition as such enters within the sphere of our contemplation") was already included--and the method is extended into a system. (480)

The beginning of all considerations, of the whole analysis, --this first reference seems now already indeterminate, "incomplete", is the need to demonstrate, "draw^aown" (ableiten), results in that

"this may seem equivalent to the demand for an infinite backward progress in proof and derivation" (481)--but on the other hand, a new beginning drives forward:..

"...cognition rolls forward from content to content. This progress determines itself; first, in this manner, that it begins from simple determinatenesses and that each subsequent one is richer and more concrete". For the result contains its own beginning, and the development of the beginning has made it the richer by a new determinateness. The universal is the foundation; the progress therefore must not be taken as a flow

from Other to Other. In the absolute method the Notion preserves* itself in its otherness, and the universal in its particularization, in the Judgment and in reality; it raises to each next stage of determination the whole mass of its antecedent content, and by its dialectical progress not only loses nothing and leaves nothing behind, but carries with it all that it has acquired, enriching and concentrating itself upon itself." (482-3)

(This citation not at all badly leads to its own kind of result as to what is dialectic.)

extension "contained in it" But broadening also demands deepening ("entrance within") and greater extension is also higher intensity." (485)

This NB: Richest of all is the most concrete & most subjective

"The richest consequently is also the most concrete and subjective term, and that which carries itself back into the simplest depth is also the most powerful and comprehensive." (493)

"In this manner it comes about that each step in the progress of further determination in advancing from the indeterminate beginning is also a rearward approach to it, so that two processes which may at first appear to be different (the regressive confirmation of the beginning and its progressive further determination) coincide and are the same." (483)

This indeterminate beginning should not be deprecated:

NB: Mag81 against Kant

"...it need not be objected that it (the beginning) should be allowed to count merely as provisional and hypothetical. Any objections which might be advanced--about the limits of human cognition, or the need of a critical investigation of the instrument of cognition before the problem is attacked--are themselves suppositions which, as concrete determinations, imply the need of their mediation and proof. Formally then they are no better than that beginning against which they protest, and ~~are~~ rather require a derivation by reason of their more concrete content; so that it is sheer presumption to demand that they should have preferential consideration. Their content is untrue, for they make incontrovertible and absolute what is known to be finite and untrue (namely, a restricted cognition which is determined as form and instrument as against its content); and this untrue cognition is itself form and regressive confirmation.--The method of truth too knows the beginning to be incomplete because it is beginning, but also knows this incomplete term in general as necessary, but ~~is only self-coincidence~~ truth is only self-coincidence, through the negativity of immediacy."

Against Kant (true)

Science is a circle of circles

"...By reason of the nature of the method which has been demonstrated the science is seen to be a circle which returns upon itself, for mediation bends back its end into its beginning or simple ground. Further, this circle is a circle of circles...The various sciences...are fragments of this chain..." (484)

NB:
connection of
the dialectic
method with
"fulfilled Being"
with being full
of content and
concreteness

"The method is the pure Notion which is related only to itself; it is therefore the simple self-relation which is Being. But now it is also Being fulfilled", the self-comprehending Notion, Being as the concrete and also the roughly intensive totality." (105)

★

... "2. This Idea ((the idea of absolute cognition)) is logical, it is enveloped in pure thought, and is the science only of the divine Notion. The systematic development is itself a realization, but is maintained within the same sphere. In so far the pure Idea of Cognition is enclosed in subjectivity, and therefore is an impulse to transcend the latter; and, as last result, pure truth becomes the beginning of another sphere and science. This transition need here only be intimated.

Transition
from Idea
to Nature...

"For the Idea posits itself as the absolute unity of the pure Notion and its Reality, and thus gathers itself into the immediacy of Being; and in doing so, as totality in this form it is Nature." (485)

This phrase ~~is~~ on the last (485-6) page of the Logic is exceedingly remarkable. The transition of the logical idea to Nature. Stretching a hand to materialism. Engels was right, the system of Hegel is turned-around materialism. This is not the last phrase of the Logic, but further till the end of the page is unimportant.

End of "Logic", 12/17/1914. Several Reviews

NB:
In the small
Logic (Encyclop-
&244, addition,
(p. 379), the last
phrase of the
book is: "but
this Idea which
has Being is
Nature."

in
It is remarkable: the whole chapter on "The Absolute Idea" there is almost not a single word on God (scarcely a "godly" "notion" ~~even~~ slips out even accidentally) and, moreover--this NB--this chapter almost does not contain idealism specifically, but its main object is the dialectic method, ^{the} sum and summation, the last word and gist of the Logic of Hegel is the dialectic method--that is extremely remarkable. And another thing: in this most idealistic work of Hegel, there is ~~not~~, most materialism. "Contradictory" but a fact!

NB

Additional Quotations from the Encyclopaedia

Vol. VI. (p. 364-8)

Encyclopaedia-#227-- magnificent on the analytic method--"to resolve" "the given concrete" appearance--to give its particular sides the form of abstract universality, and "to bring into relief" --"the Genus, or Force and Law" (p. 3685L)--and about its application:

NB:
"Genus or Force and Law" (Genus = Law!)

This matter depends not at all "solely on our choice" / to apply the analytic or the synthetic (as it is ordinarily stated)--this depends rather "on the form of the objects of our investigation".

Locke and the empiricists have the standpoint of the analytical method. And it is often said that "Cognition... can never do more..." (365)

Very true!
Cf. the remark of Marx in Capital, I, 5

"It is, however, at once apparent that this turns things upside down and that cognition, if its purpose be to take things as they are", thereby falls into contradiction with itself." For example, the chemist "tortures" a piece of flesh and then discovers nitrogen, carbon, etc. "but these abstract matters have ceased to be flesh."

There can be many definitions for the objects have many sides:

"The richer the object to be defined is, that is, the more numerous are the aspects which it offers to our notice, the more various are the definitions we may frame of it." (366-7) (#229)--for example, definitions of life, the state, etc.

Spinoza and Schelling give a mass of "speculatives" (evidently Hegel uses this word in good sense) in their definitions, but "in the form of simple assertions". (Philosophy But must demonstrate everything and derive), and not limit itself by definitions.

The division (Einteilung) must be "nature, and not merely artificial, i.e. arbitrary" (367)

(369)--against "construction" and "play" in construction when it is a question of notion, "Idea", "the unity of the notion and objectivity."

In the little Encyclopaedia #233, section b entitled "The Will" (that which in the Larger Logic is "The Idea of the Good").

Activity is a "contradiction"--the End is actual and not-actual, possible and not....etc.

WIn point of form however this contradiction vanishes when the action supersedes the subjectivity of the purpose, and along with it the objectivity, with the contrast which makes both finite; abolishing subjectivity as a whole and not merely the one-sidedness of this form of it." (372)

The point of view of Kant and Fichte (especially in moral philosophy) is the point of view of the End, of the subjective ought (without a connection with the objective)...(372)

In speaking about the Absolute Idea, Hegel makes fun of (&237, Vol.VI, p.(374-5) "the declamations" about it as if it revealed everything, and remarks that

très bien!

A beautiful comparison! In place of vulgarity (vulgar) religion, it is necessary to take all abstract truths

"the absolute idea" is the universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which the particular content is a stranger, but as the absolute form, into which all the categories, the whole fullness of the content it has given being to, have retired. The absolute idea may in this respect be compared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child, but for whom it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime. Even if the child understands the truths of religion, he cannot but imagine them to be something outside of which lies the whole of life and the whole of the world." (375)

suppl/bn

III ... "The interest lies in the whole movement." (&237, p.375)

"...the content is the living development of the idea"....
"Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image of the absolute, but at first in a limited mode..."

&238, note:

"Philosophical method is analytical as well as synthetical, not indeed in the sense of a bare juxtaposition or mere alternating employment of these two methods of finite cognition, but rather in such a way that it holds them merged in itself. In every one of its movements therefore it displays an attitude at once analytical and synthetical. Philosophical thought proceeds analytically, in so far as it only accepts its object, the Idea, and while allowing it its own way, is only, as it were, an on-looker at its movement and development. To this extent philosophising is wholly passive. Philosophic thought however is equally synthetic, and evinces itself to be the action of the notion itself. To that end, however, there is required an effort to keep back the incessant impertinence of our own fancies and private opinions." (377)

(&243, p.378.. "It thus appears that the method is not an extraneous form, but the soul and nerve of the content..."

(End of Encyclopaedia: cf. above, the remarks at the side of the end of the Logic.)

PLAN OF THE DIALECTIC (LOGIC) OF HEGEL

Table of Contents of the Small Logic (Encyclopaedia)

- I. Doctrine of Being. A) Quality. a) Being
b) Determinate Being
c) Being-for-self
B) Quantity. a) Pure Quantity
b) Quantum (How much)
c) Degree
C) Measure.
- II. Doctrine of Essence. A) Essence as Ground of Existence.
a) Identity--Difference--Ground;
b) Existence;
c) The Thing.
B) Appearance.
a) The World of Appearance;
b) Content and Form;
c) Relation.
C) Actuality.
a) Relationship of Substantiality;
b) " of Causality;
c) Reciprocity.
- III. Doctrine of Notion. A) The Subjective Notion.
a) The Notion as Notion;
b) The Judgement;
c) The Syllogism.
B) The Object.
a) Mechanism;
b) Chemism;
c) Teleology.
C) The Idea.
a) Life;
b) Cognition;
c) The Absolute Idea.

The Notion (knowledge) in Being (in immediate phenomena) reveals the essence (law of cause, identity, difference, etc.)--such actually is the universal course of all of man's knowledge (of all of science) in general. Such is the course also of natural science and political economy and of history. The dialectic of Hegel is to such an extent the generalization of the history of thought. Extremely productive seems to be the task to follow this through more concretely, in greater detail on the history of individual sciences. In the logic ~~of~~ history of thought must, in general and as a whole, correspond with the laws of thought.

Abstract
"Being" only
as a moment
in the process

What hits one's eyes is that sometimes Hegel goes from the abstract to the concrete (Sein (abstract)--Dasein (concrete)--Fürsichsein), --sometimes the reverse (subjective notion--object--truth (absolute idea)). Is this not the inconsistency of the idealist (that which Marx called the "mysticism of the Idea" in Hegel)? Or are there more profound reasons? (For example, Being=Nothing--the idea of becoming, development). At first impressions flash, then something comes out, --then notions of quality (determinations of things or appearances) and quantity develop. After that the study and thinking through direct thought and to know cognition of identity--difference--ground--essence versus appearance, --causality, etc. All these moments (steps, stages, processes) of cognition are directed from subject to object, verifying themselves in practice and arriving through this verification at truth ("Absolute Idea").

#Quality and sensation (Empfindung) are one and the same, says Feuerbach. The very first and the most famous is sensation and in it quality is inevitable...

If Marx did not leave a "Logic" (with a capital letter) he left the logic of Capital, and this should be doubly utilized on the given question. In Capital there is applied to one science, the logic, dialectic and theory of knowledge of materialism (3 words are not necessary: they are one and the same), taking all of value in Hegel and moving this value forward.

Commodity--money--capital

- production of absolute surplus value
- production of relative surplus value

The history of capitalism and the analysis of the notions summing it up.

The beginning--most simple, ordinary, evident en masse, immediate "being": an individual commodity ("being" in political economy). Its analysis, as a social relation. The analysis is a dual one, deductive and inductive, --logical and historical (forms of value). Verification of facts respective the practice is here in every step of the analysis

- Cf. with question about essence versus appearance
- price and value
 - demand and supply versus "value" (= "crystallized labor")
 - wages and price of labor power.

Raymond

1575
(Form of pages is same as appears in Philosophic Notebooks,
with VIL's remarks at a side)

ROUGH TRANSLATION OF LENIN'S

OUTLINE OF HEGEL'S LECTURES ON THE HISTORY
OF PHILOSOPHY, Works, Vols. XIII, XIV, & XV
(Translator is using translation by E. S. Haldane, London, 1892)

Introduction

pp. 24-25: "If the Truth is abstract it must be untrue. Healthy
human reason goes out towards what is concrete;...
Philosophy is what is most antagonistic to abstrac-
tion, and it leads back to the concrete."

p. 27: the comparison of the history of philosophy with a circle
--"which, as periphery, has very many circles..."
: A very profoundly-true-comparison!! Every shade
: of thought = a circle
: in a big circle (spiral)
: of the development of human
: thought in general

"...I maintain that the sequence in the systems of Philosophy
in History is similar to the sequence in the logical deduction
of the Notion-determinations in the Idea. I maintain that if
the fundamental conception of the systems appearing in the
history of Philosophy be entirely divested*of what-regards
their outward form, their relation to the particular and the
like, the various stages in the determination of the Idea
are found in their logical Notion. (30)

NB

"Conversely in the logical progression taken for itself,
there is, so far as its principal elements are concerned,
the progression of historical manifestations; but it is
necessary to have these pure Notions in order to know what
the historical form contains." (30)

p. 42.--derision over the pursuit--as fashion, by those who
are ready "to proclaim every twaddle (?)**a philosophy."

pp. 42-43--it is important, as strict historicity in the
history of philosophy, not to attribute to the ancients
such a "development" of their ideas as is understandable to us,
but in reality the ancients still lacked.

Thales, for example, did not yet understand ~~the~~ ^{have determination of thought} (as principle),
the notion of ~~thought~~ ^{causes}...***

"There are whole nations which have not this
conception at all; ~~for~~ indeed it involves a
great step forward in development..." (44)

*VIL's emphasis, Tr.

**It is not clear whose emphasis and question mark this is.

The translation of the phrase reads instead "Every popular cry"

***The paragraph which VIL is paraphrasing reads: "But Anaximander
first made use of and Thales then did not possess this deter-
mination of thought at all; he recognized as commencement
in time, but not the fundamental principle." -Tr.

Overly lengthy, empty, boring is the relationship of philosophy to religion; in general, the introduction is nearly 200 pages--impossible!!

Vol. XIII/ Vol. I of the His. of Phil.

The Ionic Philosophy

"Anixamander (610-547 BC) supposes man to develop from a fish, which abandoned water for the land (p.187)

~~Pythagorean~~ Pythagorean Philosophy

"...hence the determinations are dry, destitute of process or dialectic, and stationary." (212) Negat-
ive def-
inition
of dial-
ectic

The question concerns Pythagorean general ideas;--"number" and its significance, etc. Ergo: this is said regarding the primitive ideas of the Pythagoreans, of their primitive philosophy,/"determination" of substance, things, the world: are "dry, destitute of process (of movement), nondialectical".

Following through the predominantly dialectic in the history of philosophy, Hegel cites the argumentation of the Pythagoreans: "...one, posited as even, makes odd (2+1 = 3)*; as odd it makes even (3+1 = 4)*; This is what it could not do unless it partook of both natures, for which reason they also called the one, even-odd." (214)

"Harmo-ny of the world") Musical harmony and philosophy of Pythagoras:

Relation of subjective to the objective. { "...The subjective, and, in the case of hearing, simple feeling which, however, exists inherently in relation, Pythagoras has justified has justified to the understanding, and he attained his object by means of fixed determinations." (226)

p.229; movement of heavenly lights--their harmony--
p.250; the harmony of the singing, unheard by us, of the heavenly spheres (according to the Pythagoreans. Aristotle about the sky, II; K3 (and 9):
..."Fire was by the Pythagoreans placed in the middle, but the Earth was made a star that moved around this central body in a circle." But this with them did not result in the sun.. "They thus rely not on sensuous appearance, but on reasons," ... "these ten spheres make, like all that is in motion, a tone; but each makes a different one, according to the difference in its size and velocity. This is determined by means of the different distances,

*Parenthesis are Lenin's--Tr.

**Zk A direct translation from the Russian seems to differ from this last sentence, and would have read thus: "it (one) has the characteristic to make even, and hence must itself be even. Hence one in itself contains different determinations."

Page

p.239 --Pythagoreans accept ether ("...A ray penetrates from the sun though the thick and cold ether and gives life to everything" etc.)

Thus there exists thousands of years of guessing regarding ether, remaining till now a guess. But now there are already a thousand more underminings, leading to the solution of the question of a scientific definition of ether.

THE ELEATIC SCHOOL

In dealing with the Eleatic school, Hegel speaks about dialectic:

What is... "We here find (in the Eleatic school)* the Beginning of dialectic, i.e., simply the pure movement of thought (a) in Notions; likewise we see the opposition of thought to outward appearance or sensuous Being, or of that which is implicit to the being-for-another of this implicitness, and in the objective existence we see the contradiction (b) which it has in itself, or dialectic proper."..(p.240)

Hegel about dialectic

indications
Two signs
Two characteristic traits (determinations)
Here in essence are two ~~signs~~ (Bestimmungen, keine Definitionen) of dialectic:

- a) "pure movement of thought in Notions"
- b) "in the objective existence (to explain)* (to disclose)* we see the contradiction, which it (this existence)* has in itself, or dialectic proper."*

In other words, this "fragment" of Hegel's should be ~~xxx~~ understood thus:

Dialectic in general is "pure movement of thought in Notions" (i.e. speaking without the mysticism of idealism: human Notions are not stationary, but eternally move, go over from one to another, pour out one into another, without this, they do not reflect living life. The analysis of Notions, their study, "masterfully to work with them" (Engel demands always the study of movement of Notions, their connection, their reciprocal transitions).

In particular, dialectic is the study of the opposition of thing in itself (Ansich), of essence, substratum, substance, --from phenomenon "being-for-another". (Here we also see transition, overflow from one into another; essence appears. The appearance is essential.) The thought of man deepens infinitely from phenomenon to essence, from essence of the first, so to speak, order, to essence of the second order, etc. without end.

Dialectic proper is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects** : not only passing phenomena, mobile, fluid, separated only by limited borders, but also the essence of things."

1578

*Parantheses & emphasis are Lenin's. **phrase could also be translate as "very objective existence"

179-5-

(Tr. here skips one par. from Sextus, criticized by VIL, in order to continue uninterrupted with dialectic)

Xenophanes (Eleet) says:

Gods in the image of man (p.248) "Did beasts and lions only have hands, Works of art thereby to bring forth, as do men, They would in creating divine forms, give to them What in image and size belongs to themselves."

"What specially characterizes Zeno is the dialectic... being the originator of the true objective*dialectic." (261,264)

p.264 about the refutation of philosophic systems:

"Falsity must be demonstrated through another, and as untrue because the opposite is true, but in itself..."

Dialectic

"Dialectic is either (a) external dialectic, in which this movement is different from the comprehension of the movement, or (b) not a movement of our intelligence only, but what proceeds from the nature of the thing itself, i.e. from the pure Notion of the content. The former is a manner of regarding objects in such a way that reasons are revealed and new light thrown, by means of which all that was supposed to be firmly fixed, is made to totter; there may be reasons which are altogether external too, and we shall speak further of this dialectic when dealing with the Sophists. The other dialectic, however, is the immanent contemplation of the object; it is taken for itself, without previous hypothesis, idea or obligation, not under any outward conditions, laws or causes; we have to put ourselves right into the thing, to consider the object in itself, and to take it in the determinations which it has.

Objective dialectic

in regarding it thus, it shows from itself (sic!)**that it contains opposed determinations, and thus breaks up; this dialectic we more especially find in the ancients. The subjective dialectic, which reasons from external grounds, is moderate, for it grants that: 'On the right there is what is not right, and in the false the true.' True dialectic leaves nothing whatever to its object, as if the latter were deficient on one side only; for it disintegrates itself in the entirety of its nature." (pp.264-5)

With "the principle of development" in the XX century yes and also at the end of the XIXth century) "all agree".--Yes, but this superficial, not-thought-out accidental, philistine, "agreement" is the kind of agreement which stifles and vulgarizes truth.--If everything develops that means that everything transits from one into another since development known beforehand is not simple, general and eternal growth, increase (respective***decrease) etc.--Since it is so, then firstly, it is necessary more precisely to understand evolution, as the rise and disappearance of all, mutually transitions (perekhody).--And finally, if everything develops, then this relates to the most general Notions and categories of thinking. If not, this means, thinking is not connected with being. If yes, it means there is a dialectic of Notion and dialectic of knowledge which has objective significance. †

About dialectic and its objective significance

*Emphasis, VIL's. **Paranetical remark VIL's. ***The word appears in English in VIL's text.

I principle of development...

Besides the general principle of development, it is necessary to join, tie up, put alongside with the general principle of unity of the world, of nature, movement, matter, etc.

II principle of unity

NB

NB
This one can and one must wrap up: the question is not: is there movement, but: how to express it in the logic of Notion

... "Zeno's treatment of motion was above all objectively dialectical." (p.266)

... "movement itself (is) the dialectic of all that is." Zenon did not mean to deny motion, as "sensuously certain", the question concerned only "(the movement) of truth" (about true motion). And on the following page told of an anecdote of Diogenes (cynic from Sinope) refuted motion by walking. Hegel writes:

(Tr. skips here - she did not find anecdote, evidently quoted by VIL directly from Zenon, since VIL begins arguing with Hegel as to the source of the continuation of the anecdotes.
Ch.2 of Vol.I--Sophists-- is listed by Hegel VIL as Vol.II; evidently from original German. In any case skip everything to Socrates, that is from now I ~~must~~ translate only extracts, beginning with Russian p.258, towards end of philosophy of Socrates, where VIL writes:)

Intelligent idealism is nearer to intelligent materialism than is stupid materialism.
Dialectic idealism instead of intelligent; metaphysical, undeveloped, dead, vulgar, stationary instead of stupid.

See Socrates
94

NB

Work out: Plekhanov wrote on philosophy (dialectic), probably near 1,000 pages (Beltoy + against Bogdanov + against Kantians + basic questions, etc.etc.) There is nil in them about the larger Logic, it, its thoughts (i.e. dialectic proper, as a philosophic science)!!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO

1580

What follows is not a new... (195)
the dep. of the mon...
we remarks of Sh
our Cubes
on the section

-7-

universal
The significance of the general is contradictory: it is dead, it is unclear, not full, etc. etc., but it is only a step to the knowledge of the concrete, because we never know the concrete fully. The infinite sum of general notions, laws, etc. gives the concrete in its fullness.

NB
the
dial-
ectic
of
know-
ledge
NB

Ne

The movement of knowledge to the object always can go only dialectically: to go away in order the truer to ~~oppose~~ reculer pour mieux sauter (savoir?). Lines similar and dissimilar: circles relating one to another. Knottenpunkte --the practice of man and of human history.
(Criteria (practice =) of coincidence of one of the infinite sides of the real)

NB

These Knottenpunkte represent out of themselves the unities of contradictions when being and not being, as disappearing moments, coincide for a moment, in the given moment of movement (= of technique, of history, etc.)

Ar

Hegel smears in great detail the "nature philosophy" of Plato, the arch nonsensical mysticism of ideas, like the "existence of sensuous things the essence of a three-cornered hat" etc. mystical nonsense. This is extremely characteristic! The mystic-ideal-ist-spiritualist Hegel (as all state, pope-like-idealistic philosophy of our time) exalts and shuyet the mystic-idealism in the history of philosophy, ignoring and treat carelessly materialism. Cf. Hegel about Democritus--nil!! About Plato a mystical crass thin gruel.

Idealism
and
mysticism
of
Hegel
(and of
Plato)

Speaking of Plato's Republic and of the contemporary view that it is a chimera, Hegel repeats his favorite:
"..what is real, is rational. The point to know, however, is what exactly is real; what in common life all is real, but there is a difference between the phenomenal world and reality." (II, p.95)

The
really
ration-
al

PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE

Hegel has made a complete hash of the Platonic ideas of Aristotle

The Idealism of Aristotle Hegel sees in his idea of God. ((Of course this is idealism, but it is more objective and more remote, more universal than the idealism of Plato and therefore more often in nature (philosophy =materialism))

Aristotle's critique of "the ideas" of Plato is a critique of idealism as idealism in general: ~~because~~ because from there where notions, abstractions are taken, thither goes also "the law" and "necessity", etc. The idealist Hegel cowardly went around the fact that Aristotle's foundations (his criticism of the Ideas of Plato) undermined the basis of idealism.

NB

When one idealist criticizes the foundations of another idealist, materialism is always the victor. Cf. Aristotle versus Plato etc. Hegel versus Kant etc.

Aristotle so miserably brings out God against the materialist Leucippus and idealist Plato. Here Aristotle is an eclectic. And Hegel covers up the weakness for the sake of mysticism.

Not only is the transition from matter to consciousness dialectic, but so it is from feeling to thought, etc.

NB

Hegel the adherent of dialectic was incapable of understanding dialectically the transition from matter to movement, from matter to consciousness—especially the second. Marx corrected the mistake (or weakness?) of the mystic.

How is the dialectic method distinguished from the nondialectical? By a leap. By contradiction. By the break in gradualness. By unity (identity) of being and non-being.

only about Aristotle's Metaphysics!! Everything that he says against the idealism of Plato in essence is hidden!! Especially hidden is the question of existence outside of man and humanity!!!—the question about materialism!

It is sickening to read Hegel exalt Aristotle for "true speculative notions" (about the "soul" and much else), smearing up the clearly idealistic (= mystic) nonsense.

Hidden are all the points of vacillation of Aristotle between idealism and materialism!!!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EPICURUS

Speaking of Epicurus(342-271 BC), Hegel immediately (before the analysis of his views) puts himself in a militant position against materialism and declares:

"..it is yet self-evident that if existence for sensation is to be regarded as the truth, the necessity for the Notion is altogether abrogated and in the absence of speculative interest things cease to form a united whole, all things being in point of view of the ordinary human understanding."!!* (p.277)

Sland-
ders
against
mater-
ialism.
Why??

Slandering on materialism!! "necessity for the Notion" is not "abrogated" by an iota by the ~~analysis~~ study of the source of knowledge and Notion! Inconsistency with "ordinary understanding" is the putrid whim of the idealist.

NB

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SKEPTICS

Speaking of ~~the~~ scepticism Hegel points to its seeming "invincibility" (Unbezwinglichkeit):

"If anyone actually desires to be a Sceptic, he cannot be convinced, or be brought to a positive philosophy any more than he who is paralyzed in all his limbs can be made to stand. Scepticism is in fact such a paralysis

Blen-
dit!!

(Relation of philosophy to scepticism:)

"Philosophy is dialectic, this dialectic is alteration. **The Idea as abstract Idea, is the quiescent and inert; it only is in truth in as far as it grasps itself as living. This occurs because it is implicitly dialectic, in order to abrogate that inert quiescence, and to change itself. But if the philosophic Idea is thus implicitly dialectic, it is not so in a contingent manner. Scepticism, on the contrary, exercises its dialectic contingently, for just as the material comes up before it, it shows in the same that implicitly it is negative." (p.331)

NB
the dial-
ectic of
scepticism
is "accidental"

"These sceptical tropes, in fact concern***that which is called dogmatic philosophy (by its nature it must revolve in these forms)*** --not in the sense of its having a positive content, but as asserting something determining as the absolute." (-.363)

Against the absolute of Hegel! Here is where there is the embryo of dialectical materialism.

*Exclamation points are VIL's. **Tr. did not find this first sentence in English. ***The emphasis is VIL's and that is not the translation of the word; the Russian word means not concern simply but "to be caught in".****The paranthetical explanation is VIL's.

The neo-Platonians, listed as Section III in Vol. II of English is by Lenin listed as Vol. III. But only one page of that and the notebooks end abruptly. No explanation is given by editor.

(The following excerpts are from the Notebooks around Hegel's History of Philosophy)

In dealing with the Eleatic school, Hegel speaks about dialectic (after quoting Hegel)
Two indications
Two characteristic traits
Here in essence are two determinations (Bestimmungen, keine Definitionen) of dialectic:
a) "pure movement of thought in Notions"
b) "in the objective existence (to explain) (to disclose) we see the contradiction which it (this existence) has in itself or dialectic proper."

In other words this "fragment" of Hegel's should be understood thus:

Dialectic in general is "pure movement of thought in Notions" (i.e., speaking without/mysticism of idealism: