

- New Orleans, 4 April 1945, sentence quoted in *ibid.*, p. 54.
- 42 Korsch, 'Human Nature: The Marxian View, by Vernon Venable', *Journal of Philosophy* (1945), pp. 712-18.
- 43 *Ibid.*, p. 717.
- 44 *Ibid.*, p. 714.
- 45 Korsch, 'The World Historians: From Turgot to Toynbee', *Partisan Review* (1942) p. 355.
- 46 See F. Deppe *et al.*, *Kritik der Mitbestimmung, passim*.
- 47 I have not been able to find the English original, so here I have used the German text from *Alternative* (April 1965).
- 48 *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- 49 *Ibid.*, p. 86.
- 50 *Ibid.*, p. 88.
- 51 R. Rosdolsky, *The Making of Marx's 'Capital'* (London, 1977).
- 52 Note to text of '10 Theses ...' *Alternative* (April 1965), p. 89.
- 53 Cf. *Interview with HK*, p. 22.
- 54 Cf. also 'Restauration oder Totalisierung?', *Politische Texte*, p. 370; 'Marx' Stellung in der Europäischen Revolution von 1848', *Die Schule* (1948), pp. 165-74 *passim*.
- 55 'Ten Theses ...', *Telas* (winter 1975/76), p. 40.
- 56 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 57 *Ibid.*, p. 40.
- 58 G. E. Rusconi, 'Introduction to *What is Socialisation?*', *New German Critique*, no. 6 (1975), p. 50.
- 59 L. Trotsky, *The Platform of the Left Opposition* (1927) (London, 1963), p. 87.
- 60 Korsch, *MG*, p. 81.
- 61 Korsch, *MP*, p. 115.
- 62 Korsch, 'Marxism and the Present Task of the Proletarian Class Struggle', *Living Marxism* (1938), p. 118.
- 63 Korsch, *KM* (G), p. 7.
- 64 *Ibid.*, p. 230.
- 65 Korsch, 'A Non-dogmatic Approach to Marxism', retranslated from the German, *Politiken* (1971), p. 10; originally in *Politics* (1946), pp. 151-4.
- 66 Lenin, 'What Is To Be Done?', *CH*, vol. 5, p. 369.

Patrick Goode, Karl Korsch:
A Study in Western Marxism (1979).

Bibliography

KORSCH'S WRITINGS

Notes:

- Other bibliographies of Korsch's writings are: (1) a typescript by Hedda Korsch, summer 1962. This has many omissions and a number of inaccuracies; (2) M. Buckmiller, *Bibliographie der Schriften Karl Korsch*, in C. Pozzoli (ed.), *Über Karl Korsch* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1973). This is comprehensive and accurate, and my bibliography is virtually identical. A difficulty in compiling bibliographies of Korsch's writings is that Korsch often (e.g., in his articles for *Living Marxism*) signed his articles 'k', 'K. Rops', 'J.h.' or wrote anonymously (e.g. for *Kommunistische Politik*).
- Korsch's manuscripts are mainly to be found in the International Institute for Social History, Amsterdam (referred to in the text as IISG); a smaller number are still in Hedda Korsch's possession. The interested reader should consult Section C of Michael Buckmiller's bibliography in C. Pozzoli (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 100-2.
- Where the same article appeared in English and other languages, I have usually given a reference to the English version only. Buckmiller's bibliography lists all versions.

Abbreviations:

Imprekorr: Internationale Presse—Korrespondenz.
Internationale: Die Internationale (Berlin), KPD theoretical journal
JH: Jenaer Hochschulzeitung
Kompol: Kommunistische Politik
LM: Living Marxism
NZ: Neue Zeitung
RF: Rote Fahne
Tat: Die Tat
Zfs: Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung

A BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- 1 *Die Anwendung der Beweislastregeln im Zivilprozess und das qualifizierte Geständnis* (Bonn, 1911). Enlarged dissertation.
- 2 *Was ist Sozialisierung?* (Hanover, 1919). Reprinted in *Schriften zur Sozialisierung*, edited and introduced by E. Gerlach (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1969).
- 3 *Quintessenz des Marxismus: Eine gemeinverständliche Darlegung* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1922).
- 4 *Arbeitsrecht für Betriebsräte* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1922). New edition with a foreword by E. Gerlach, introduction by Dieter Schneider (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1968). The second part of the book is abbreviated.
- 5 *Kernpunkte der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung: Eine quellenmässige Darstellung* (Berlin, 1922).
- 6 *Karl Marx: Randglossen zum Programm der Deutschen Arbeiterpartei*, with an introduction by Korsch (Berlin and Leipzig, 1922).
- 7 *Marxismus und Philosophie* (Leipzig, 1929) and enlarged edition, with *Der gegenwärtige Stand des Problems 'Marxismus und Philosophie': Zugleich eine Antrittskritik*. Edited and introduced by E. Gerlach (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1966). English: Translated by F. Halliday (London, 1970). French: Translated by C. Orsoni, introduction by Kostas Axelos (Paris, 1964). Italian: Translated by G. Backhaus, introduction by M. Spinella (Milan, 1966).
- 8 *Der Weg der Kommunisten: Diskussionsrede des Gen. Korsch auf der Konferenz der politischen Sekretäre und Redakteure der KPD* (16 April 1926), with appendix: 'Die Plattform der Linken'. (Berlin, 1926).
- 9 *Um die Tariffähigkeit: Eine Untersuchung über die heutigen Entwicklungstendenzen der Gewerkschaftsbewegung* (Berlin, 1928).
- 10 *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung: Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Karl Kautsky* (Leipzig, 1929). New Edition (Frankfurt-am-Main: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 1971). Italian translation with introduction by G. Rusconi (Milan, 1971).
- 11 *Karl Marx* (London and New York, 1938). Edition revised by Korsch, New York, 1947. New edition, New York, 1969. German edition, following the original German manuscript, edited by G. Langkau (HSG) (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1967). French edition (Paris, 1946). Italian: Translated by A. Illuminati, introduction by G. Bedeschi (Bari, 1969).
- 12 *Das Kapital*. 1872 edition, with an introduction by Korsch (Berlin, 1932).

B COLLECTIONS

- 1 *Karl Korsch: Schriften zur Sozialisierung*, edited and introduced by Erich Gerlach (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1969).
- 2 *Consigli di fabbrica e socializzazione* (Bari, 1970). Contains (1) above, and *Arbeitsrecht für Betriebsräte* (1968) (abbreviated version).

Bibliography

- 3 *Kommentare zur deutschen 'Revolution' und ihrer Niederlage* (s'Gravenhage. The Netherlands, 1972).
- 4 *Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung und andere Schriften*, edited by E. Gerlach (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1971).
- 5 *Revolutionärer Klassenkampf* (Berlin, 1972).
- 6 *Politische Texte*, edited and introduced by E. Gerlach and J. Seifert (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1974).
- 7 *Three Essays on Marxism* (London, 1970; New York, 1972).
- 8 *Karl Korsch o el Nacimiento de una Nueva Epoca* (Barcelona, 1973).
- 9 *Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory*, edited by D. Kellner (Austin, Texas, 1977).

C ARTICLES AND REVIEWS

1908

- 1 'Die Stellung der Arbeiterinnen im Erwerbsleben', *JH* (15 February).

1909

- 2 'Wider den Aesthetizismus in Wissenschaft und Leben in und ausserhalb der Hochschule', *JH* (20 January).
- 3 'Japanische Arbeitsverhältnisse', *ibid.*
- 4 'Einführung in die Lehren der deutschen Bodenreform', *JH* (2 February).
- 5 'Unnütze Ideale', *JH* (16 February).
- 6 'Was fordert unsere Zeit von der studierenden Frau?', *JH* (26 February).
- 7 'Monismus, Reinkevortrag, Toleranz und freie Studentenschaft', *JH* (7 May).
- 8 'Das "Verhältnis"', *ibid.*
- 9 'Soziale Studentenblätter', *JH* (26 May).
- 10 'Duellanhänger und freistudentische Ehrengerichte', *JH* (11 June).
- 11 'Allgemeine Volksschule und Mädchenschulreform', *ibid.*
- 12 'National, ein negativer und ein positiver Begriff', *JH* (10 July).
- 13 'Die "hochverräterische" Freie Studentenschaft', *ibid.*

1910

- 14 'Die Forderung eines Universitätsgesetzes im preussischen Abgeordnetenhaus', *JH* (24 June).

1911

- 15 'Die Reform des juristischen Studiums', *Akademische Rundschau*, pp. 63-9.

1912

- 16 'Rechtsformen für die Verwirklichung freistudentischer Ideen', *Akademische Rundschau*, pp. 4-10.
- 17 'Kleists Examinatorium in Frage und Antwort', *ibid.*, pp. 19-20 (review).
- 18 'Recht und Wirtschaft', nos. 1 and 2, *ibid.*, pp. 20-1 (review).
- 19 M. Rintelen, 'Schuldhaft und Einlager im Vollstreckungsverfahren des altniederländischen und sächsischen Rechtes', *Kritische Vierteljahresschrift für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft*, pp. 128-42 (review).
- 20 'Würzburger Abhandlungen zum deutschen und ausländischen Prozessrecht'.

226

Karl Korsch

196 'V. I. Lenin, *Über den historischen Materialismus*', *ibid.*, pp. 493-4; *La Critique Sociale*, p. 34 (review).

1933

- 197 'Das Kausalgesetz und seine Grenzen', *Die linke Front*, pp. 48-53 (review).
 198 'Über einige grundsätzliche Voraussetzungen für eine materialistische Diskussion der Krisentheorie', *Proletärer*, pp. 20-5.
 198 'Karl Marx', *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences* (London and New York), vol. 10, pp. 172-5; *La Critique Sociale*, pp. 94-6; *De Nieuwe Weg*, pp. 38-41.
 200 'Michael Freund, Georges Sorel. Der revolutionäre Konservatismus', *Zfs*, pp. 115-17 (review).

1934

- 201 'Ernst Wilhelm Eschmann, *Vom Sinn der Revolution*', *ibid.*, pp. 142-3 (review).
 202 'Donosco Cortes, *Der Staat Gottes: Eine katholische Geschichtsphilosophie*', *ibid.*, p. 266 (review).
 203 'F. O. H. Schulz, *Untergang des Marxismus*', *ibid.*, p. 274 (review).
 204 'Wilhelm Tempel, *Aufbau der Staatsgewalt im faschistischen Italien*', *ibid.*, pp. 302-3 (review).
 205 'T. J. Murphy, *Preparing for Power*', *ibid.*, pp. 450-1 (review).
 206 'W. Milne-Bailey, *Trade Unions and the State*', *ibid.*, pp. 452-3.
 207 'Zur Neuordnung der deutschen Arbeitsverfassung', *Räte-Korrespondenz*, pp. 1-20.

1935

- 208 'On the New Programme of the "American Workers Party"', *International Council Correspondence* (January), pp. 15-25.
 209 'Why I am a Marxist', *Modern Monthly* (April) pp. 88-95.
 210 'Remarks on the Theses Regarding the Next World Crisis, Second World War and the World Revolution', *International Council Correspondence* (May), pp. 13-22.
 211 'Marxism as a Religion', *International Council Correspondence* (June-July), pp. 17-21 (review).

1937

- 212 'Origin and Impact of Marxian Materialism', *Marxist Quarterly* (April-June). Pre-publication excerpt from *Karl Marx*.
 213 'Leading Principles of Marxism: A restatement', *Marxist Quarterly* (October-December), pp. 356-78. Pre-publication excerpt from *Karl Marx*.
 214 'The passing of Marxian Orthodoxy', *International Council Correspondence*, p. 11.

1938

- 215 'Planning New Depressions', *LM*, pp. 15-20.
 216 'Collaborations: L'oeuvre constructive de la révolution espagnole', *Zfs*, pp. 469-74.
 217 'Economics and Politics in Revolutionary Spain', *LM*, pp. 76-82.

Bibliography

227

- 218 'Marxism and the Present Task of the Proletarian Class Struggle', *ibid.*, pp. 115-19.
 219 'Lenin's Philosophy: Some Additional Remarks to J. Harper's Recent Criticism of Lenin's Book *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*', *ibid.*, pp. 138-44.
 220 'The Marxist Ideology in Russia', *Living Marxism*, pp. 44-50.

1939

- 221 'Collectivisation in Spain', *ibid.*, pp. 178-82.
 222 'Ignazio Silone, *The School for Dictators*', *ibid.*, pp. 188-90 (review).
 223 'Mathematical Constructs in Psychology and Sociology', *Journal of Unified Science*, pp. 113-21.
 224 'State and Counter-revolution', *Modern Quarterly*, pp. 60-7.

1940

- 225 'The Marxist Philosophy and the Sciences, by J. B. Haldane', *LM*, pp. 59-61 (review).
 226 'Prelude to Hitler: The Internal Politics of Germany, 1918-1933', *ibid.*, pp. 7-14.
 227 'The Fascist Counter-revolution', *ibid.*, pp. 29-37.

1941

- 228 'The New German Empire', by F. Borkenau', *ibid.*, pp. 61-3 (review).
 229 'Revolution for What? A Critical Comment on Jan Valtin's *Out of the Night*', *ibid.*, pp. 21-9.
 230 'The Workers' Fight against Fascism', *ibid.*, pp. 36-49.
 231 'The Fight for Britain, the Fight for Democracy and the War aims of the Working Class', *ibid.*, pp. 78-80.
 232 'Towards Full Use of Resources', *ibid.*, pp. 60-3.
 233 'War and Revolution', *ibid.*, pp. 1-14.
 234 'Nickerson Hoffmann, *The Armed Horde: 1793-1939*', *Zfs*, pp. 358-61 (review).

1942

- 235 'The Dynamics of War and Revolution', *ibid.*, pp. 244-7 (review).
 236 'The World Historians: From Turgot to Toynbee', *Partisan Review* (May-June), pp. 354-71.
 237 'Notes on History', *New Essay* (Fall), pp. 1-9.
 238 'The Structure and Practice of Totalitarianism', *New Essays* (Fall), pp. 43-9 (review).
 239 'The Nature of Modern Warfare, by Cyril Falls', *ibid.*, p. 79 (review).
 240 'H. A. de Weerd, *Great Soldiers of the Two World Wars*', *Partisan Review* (January-February), p. 89 (review).

1943

- 241 'A Historical View of Geopolitics', *New Essays* (Spring), pp. 8-17 (review).
 242 'And Keep Your Powder Dry! An Anthropologist Looks at America, by Margaret Mead', *ibid.*, pp. 70-4 (review).

1945

- 243 'Human Nature: The Marxian View by Vernon Venable', *Journal of Philosophy*, pp. 712-18; *La Critique Sociale*, no. 19 (1947) (review).

15877

19.16

- 241 'A Non-dogmatic Approach to Marxism', *Politics*, pp. 151-4.
 242 'W. S. Halperin, *Germany Tried Democracy*', *Commentary*, pp. 196-98 (review).
 243 'Restoration or Totalization? Some Notes on Trotsky's Biography of Stalin and on the Revolutionary Problem of Our Time', *International Correspondence*, pp. 10-13 (review).
 * 244 'Independence Comes to the Philippines', *Asia* (original reference not traceable); *Alternative* (in German) (1965), pp. 85-8.

19.18

- 2411 'Marx' Stellung in der Europäischen Revolution von 1848', *Die Schule* (Hanover), pp. 165-74.
 ✓ 2412 'A Letter from Karl Korsch', *Southern Advocate for Workers' Council* (Melbourne, Australia), pp. 9-10.

19.14

- 250 'A Bakunin Sampler', *Dissent*, p. 110.

19.19

- 251 'Zehn Thesen über Marxismus heute', *Arguments* (Paris 1959) (written in 1950).

SECONDARY SOURCES

BOOKS AND ARTICLES CONSULTED

No further reference is thought necessary to the standard works of Marx, Engels and Lenin (see p. 188).

ADGB, Jahrbuch (1922).

Adler, M., *Demokratie und Rätesystem* (Vienna, 1919).Adler, M., *Marxistische Probleme* (Stuttgart, 1915).Alikasser, L., *For Marx* (London, 1969).Alkasser, L., *Lenin and Philosophy, and Other Essays* (London, 1971).Anderson, Perry, *Considerations on Western Marxism* (London, 1976).Andreas, B., and Haupt, G., 'Bibliographie der Arbeiterbewegung, heute und morgen', *International Review of Social History* (1967), pp. 1-30.Angress, W. T., *The Communist Bid for Power in Germany* (Princeton, 1963).Ayer, A. J., *Language, Truth and Logic* (London, 1946).Bahne, S., 'Zwischen "Luxemburgismus" und "Stalinismus", die Ultralinke Opposition in der KPD', *Vierteljahresschrift für Zeitgeschichte* (1961), pp. 359-83.Bahne, S., 'Sozialfaschismus in Deutschland', *International Review of Social History* (1965), pp. 211-45.Bauer, O., 'Marxismus und Ethik', *Neue Zeit* (1906), pp. 485-99.Bauer, O., *Der Weg zum Sozialismus* (Vienna, 1919).Bechtel, H., *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (München, 1956).Bendix, R., *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait* (London, 1966).

- Bericht des Gen. Zinoviev über die Tätigkeit des Exekutivkomitees der Kommunistischen Internationale, Der V Weltkongress der KI, 1924, Protokoll* (Berlin, 1924).
Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Vereinigungsparteitages der USPD (Linke) und der KPD (Spartakusbund) (Berlin, 1920).
 Bernstein, E., *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and an Affirmation* (London, 1909).
 Borkenau, F., 'Review of Karl Marx', *Sociological Review* (1939), pp. 117-19.
 Born, K. E., *Moderne Deutsche Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Cologne, 1966).
 Bottomore, T. B., *Marxism and Sociology* (London, 1975).
 Braunthal, J., *History of the International*, vol. 2 (London, 1967).
 Brinkmann, C., 'Review of Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*, *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft* (1924), pp. 717-19.
 Broué, P., *La révolution en Allemagne, 1917-1923* (Paris, 1971).
 C. B. Burdick and R. H. Lutz, *The Political Institutions of the German Revolution, 1918-1919* (New York, 1966).
 Bukharin, N., *Theory of Historical Materialism* (New York, 1925).
 Carr, E. H., *A History of Soviet Russia*, vols 1-7 (London, 1950-64).
 Carr, E. H., *Karl Marx* (London, 1934).
 Carsten, E. L., *Revolution in Central Europe, 1918-1919* (London, 1972).
 Cauté, D., *The Fellow-Travelers: A Postscript to the Enlightenment* (London, 1973).
 Cole, G. D. H., *Guild Socialism Re-stated* (London, 1926).
 Cole, G. D. H., *A History of Socialist Thought* (London, 1956).
 Cole, G. D. H., *Self-government in Industry* (London, 1917).
 Cole, G. D. H., *Syndicalism* (London, 1921).
 Cole, G. D. H., *Workers' Control in Industry* (London, 1919).
 Collotti, E., *Le Parti communiste allemand de 1918 à 1933: Une contribution bibliographique* (Milan, 1961).
 Communist International, World Congress, *Bulletin 1-32*, Fourth Conference (Moscow, 1922); Fifth Conference, *Report*.
 Communist International Executive Committee, *Bericht über die Tätigkeit der Exekutive ... vom 4 bis 5 Weltkongresses* (Hamburg, 1924).
Die Lehre der deutschen Ereignisse. Das Präsidium des EKKI zur deutschen Frage, January 1924 (Hamburg, 1924).
 Cornu, A., *Karl Marx, l'homme et l'oeuvre; de l'Hégélianisme au matérialisme historique, 1818-1845* (Paris, 1934).
 Deak, I., *Weimar Germany's Left-wing Intellectuals* (Berkeley, 1968).
 Deborin, A., 'Lukács und seine Kritik des Marxismus', *Arbeiterliteratur* (1924), pp. 615-40.
 Degras, J., *The Communist International, 1919-1943*, 3 vols (London, 1956-65).
 Deppe, F., et al., *Kritik der Mitbestimmung* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1970).
 Dersch, H., 'Neue Schriften zum sozialen Recht', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* (1924), pp. 505-16.
 Deutscher, I., *The Prophet Unarmed, 1921-1929* (London, 1970).
 Deutscher, I., *The Prophet Outcast, 1929-1940* (London, 1970).
 Diederichs, E., *Aus meinem Leben* (Leipzig, 1942).
 Diederichs, E., *Leben und Werk. Ausgewählte Briefe und Aufzeichnungen*, ed. Lulu von Strauss and T. Diederichs (Jena, 1936).
 Diederichs, E., *Selbstzeugnisse und Briefe von Zeitgenossen* (Düsseldorf, 1967).
 Drabkin, J. S., *Die Novemberrevolution in Deutschland* (East Berlin, 1968).
 Eberlein, A., *Die Presse der Arbeiterklasse und der sozialen Bewegung*, 4 vols (Berlin,

MARXISM AND THE NEW PHYSICS*

PAUL MATTICK

Although the ideological struggle between the East and the West has been carried into the natural sciences, the author contends that there is no connection between Marxism and physical theory, whether deterministic or indeterministic. Marxism, which concerns itself with social theory, deals with physical theory only in so far as it is used for specific class purposes instead of social needs. Marxism does not derive its social theory, as has been asserted either from or by analogy with, physical processes, nor does it read "social laws" of development into nature. The attempt to do so by way of "dialectical materialism" must be regarded as a Marxist aberration. The author deals with the history of this aberration and with the reasons for its persistency in Marxism-Leninism.

The conflict between the East and the West, although it involves different ideologies, has little to do with different concepts of physical reality. Ideologies differ because material and social interests differ; "physical reality," on the other hand, is quite the same for all the combatants. Nevertheless, in both camps, the ideological struggle is carried into the natural sciences—in the East, in the form of a rear-guard defense of dialectical materialism; in the West, in the assertion that dialectical materialism is "the real root of the conflict between East and West, because it is the basis of the fanatic belief of Marxists that the world is bound to fall to them spontaneously and inevitably."¹

Both sides insist, of course, that their scientific interpretations of the external world are free of all ideological encumbrances. While for the Eastern scientists and philosophers the whole of modern physics seems to verify dialectical materialism, for those of the West Marxism appears completely outdated because the idea of determinism has disappeared. The very term "materialism" is rejected as belonging to the last century. During Marx's lifetime it is pointed out, "nothing was known of today's relativistic and atomistic physics; matter was at that time what our senses conveyed it to be; physical measurement dealt with sensually perceivable properties of things,"² which is no longer true.

Marx, of course, had only the natural science of his period to rely on, but the changes in science since then do not affect his theories. Marx did not coin the term *dialectical materialism* but used the word *material* to designate the basic and primary conditions of all human existence. Hegel's dialectic merely formed the point of departure for Marx's critique of capitalist society. It was important to Marx because of "the enormous historical sense upon which it was founded," and because "it dissolves all conceptions of final, absolute truth, and of a final, absolute state of humanity corresponding to it."³

* Received, February, 1961.

¹ Max Born, *The Concept of Reality in Physics*, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Chicago, 1952, Vol. XIV, No. 4, p. 320.

² *Ibid.*, p. 319.

³ F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, New York, 1945, p. 22.

15/62 group 389 MARKISM AND THE NEW PHYSICS 351
The materialism which Marx encountered was not historical and the dialectic then in vogue was not materialistic. By pitting Feuerbach against Hegel and Hegel against Feuerbach, Marx developed his own concept of social development, for which Friedrich Engels coined the term *historical materialism*. This materialistic conception of history did not stem from the "physical determinism derived from Newtonian mechanics."⁴ On the contrary, it developed, by way of dialectics, in direct opposition to the materialism based on Newtonian mechanics. It excluded the idea of human history being determined by overriding "natural laws, whether mechanical or dialectical. Although recognizing the interrelations between men, society and nature, it was, first of all, a theory of men and society.

Unfortunately, however, the persuasive power of historical or dialectical materialism—as it came to be known—was great enough to carry away even Engels, who spoke of its universal validity. While some tolerant critics found this merely amusing,⁵ the less well-disposed used this overzealousness as an excuse to reject the whole of Marxism as just an oddity of German mysticism. But while the notion of the "universality" of the dialectic process is not defensible, neither is it essential to Marxism, which loses none of its force by omitting it. Marx, at any rate, did not concern himself with the "dialectics of nature." It is not the ideas of Marx but "Marxism," as the ideology of the rising European labor movement and of the self-declared "socialist" states of the Eastern power bloc, that nourishes Western anti-Marxism. And it is for this reason that the struggle between the "Marxist" East and the anti-Marxist West, however real, tells us nothing about the validity or invalidity of Marxism for our time.

Marxism as Ideology. The pre-capitalist world was agitated by the question of the primacy of spirit or nature. "Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belonged to the various schools of materialism."⁶ In opposing both the conditions and the religious ideologies of the feudal past, the revolutionary middle-class was materialistic. It considered nature as objectively-given reality and man as determined by natural laws. The natural sciences were to explain his life and actions and, with the function of his brain, his sensations and consciousness. Freed from religious superstitions, science devoted itself to the discovery of natural laws, and Newtonian mechanics served as the basis for a growing conviction that all natural phenomena follow definite causal rules.

Radical middle-class materialism lost its ideological urgency with the establishment of the bourgeoisie as the ruling class. The emancipation of natural science from theology could not be extended to the emancipation of

⁴ M. Born, *The Concept of Reality in Physics*, p. 320.

⁵ B. Croce, *Lebendiges und Totes in Hegels Philosophie*, Heidelberg, 1909.

⁶ F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 31.

Materialism
Handwritten notes and scribbles at the bottom of the page.

society from religion. As Napoleon expressed it: "As far as I am concerned, religion is not the mystery of creation but the mystery of society. Religion connects the idea of equality with heaven and thus prevents the butchery of the rich by the poor. Society depends on the inequality of incomes, and the inequality of incomes, on the existence of religion." The co-existence of science and religion in the uneasy bourgeois world found ideological support in idealistic interpretations of the further results of scientific development.

The early materialists, or natural philosophers, (Francis Bacon and Thomas Hobbes) were convinced that through sense experience and through intellectual activities derived therefrom, it would be possible to gain absolutely valid knowledge of the external world. This optimism vanished with John Locke, who saw this knowledge limited by the very intervention of ideas. He thought it valid only to the extent to which ideas were actually in conformity with things. Although sensations and ideas related to the external world, this world itself could not be really known. Immanuel Kant accepted the proposition that ultimates (the thing-in-itself) are not knowable and that empirical knowledge restricts itself to the subjective forms in which man becomes aware of the objective world. It was for this reason that he saw the need for a priori concepts which brought order into experience and made it intelligible. Concepts of time, space, and causality were inventions of the human mind and, though not empirically verifiable, were nevertheless necessary to science, philosophy and effective human activity. In its essential structure, the world was, then, a product of the idea. And just as the materialist theory of knowledge became for many materialists the materialist theory of reality, so for many idealists the idealist theory of knowledge became an idealist theory of reality.

In an attempt to carry the materialist representation of the objective world into the process of knowledge itself, Ernst Mach opposed both the new idealism and the old materialism. He insisted that we cannot make up properties of nature with the help of self-evident suppositions, but that these suppositions must be taken from experience.⁹ But, since all knowledge derives from sensations and cannot go beyond sensations, it cannot make statements about objective reality; it can merely fill out the gaps in experience by the ideas that experience suggests. Although he opposed the Kantian point of view, he also rejected mechanical materialism and regarded its objective world of matter, space, time, and causality as artificial conceptions. Mach's critical empiricism supported, although unintentionally, a rising idealistic trend in the philosophy of science.

Marxist "revisionism," i.e., the successful development of labor organizations within the confines of capitalism and the hope, connected therewith, of a purely evolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, led to the loss of an earlier militant atheism and to an ambiguous acceptance of the rising idealist trend in the form of neo-Kantianism. Radical socialists began to defend

⁹Alphonse Aulard, *Histoire Politique de la Révolution Française: Origines et Développement de la Démocratie et de la République (1789-1804)*, Paris, 1901, p. 234.
¹⁰E. Mach, *The Science of Mechanics*, London, 1942, p. 234.

100
 101
 102
 103
 104
 105
 106
 107
 108
 109
 110
 111
 112
 113
 114
 115
 116
 117
 118
 119
 120
 121
 122
 123
 124
 125
 126
 127
 128
 129
 130
 131
 132
 133
 134
 135
 136
 137
 138
 139
 140
 141
 142
 143
 144
 145
 146
 147
 148
 149
 150
 151
 152
 153
 154
 155
 156
 157
 158
 159
 160
 161
 162
 163
 164
 165
 166
 167
 168
 169
 170
 171
 172
 173
 174
 175
 176
 177
 178
 179
 180
 181
 182
 183
 184
 185
 186
 187
 188
 189
 190
 191
 192
 193
 194
 195
 196
 197
 198
 199
 200

Time
 Space
 Causality

the old materialism of the revolutionary bourgeoisie against the new idealism of the established capitalist class and its adherents in the labor movement. For Russian socialists this seemed of particular importance since the Russian revolutionary movement, still on the verge of the bourgeois revolution, waged its ideological struggles to a large extent with the arguments of the Western revolutionary bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia, largely from the middle-class, formed the spearhead of the movement and was quite naturally inclined to adopt Western middle-class materialism for their own purposes, that is, for the task of opposing the religious ideology that supported Czarist feudalism.

Because, for Ernst Mach, science had its origin in the needs of life his ideas had a certain appeal to socialists. Some Russian revolutionaries, Bogdanov in particular, tried to combine them with Marxism. They gained some influence in Russia's Socialist Party and Lenin set out to destroy this influence with his book, *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*. The subjective element in Mach's theory of knowledge became, in Lenin's mind, an idealist aberration and a deliberate attempt to revive religious obscurantism. It was Mach's insistence upon the derived, abstract character of the concept of matter which disturbed Lenin particularly, because for him, as for the early materialists, knowledge was only what reflects objective truth; truth, that is, about matter. He thought that reducing objective reality to matter was necessary for the unconditional recognition of nature's material existence outside the mind.

The independent existence of the external world was not denied by Mach. He merely pointed out that our knowledge in this respect is limited because it is limited to sense experience. But Lenin found it "unconditionally true that to every scientific theory there corresponds an objective truth, something absolutely so in nature."⁹ For him dialectical materialism had already discovered what nature is and does, if not as yet completely, at any rate approximately. "From the standpoint of modern materialism, or Marxism," he wrote, "the relative limits of our approximation to the cognition of the objective absolute truth are historically conditioned; but the existence of this truth is unconditional, as well as the fact that we are continually approaching it."¹⁰

With the discovery of the substance and motion of the universe, all that was left to do was to proceed in every separate field of knowledge in accordance with the principles established for nature as a whole. One could then not fail to have scientific practice conform with objective reality, just as the latter was bound to show up in every true scientific endeavor. The difficulty with this is, of course, that it is impossible to apply the criterion of practice to a theory of the universe, not to speak of the fact that nobody knows what nature as a whole is.

It was in this way that Lenin extended historical materialism into dialectical materialism. Nature has had a history and its dialectical pattern of development has been progressive in the sense that it has developed from the inorganic

⁹ *Materialism and Empiriocriticism*, New York, 1927, p. 107.
¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 107.

Mach's
 theory

through the organic to mind and consciousness. "Matter is not a product of mind," Lenin wrote, "but mind itself is only the highest product of matter."¹¹ The world was an "eternally moving and developing material mass which reflects a progressive human consciousness."¹² Human history is a product of universal history. In a certain sense, this is true and follows from the admission of the existence of the external world independent of human existence. And it is clear that consciousness presupposes the existence of the brain.

But it is also true, as Marx pointed out, "that the question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. In practice men must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, the 'this-sidedness' of their thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question."¹³ The atomic theories of the ancient Greeks, for instance, were based not on experimental facts but were part of a speculative cosmic philosophy and were opposed and defeated by other philosophical schools on purely philosophical grounds. (This can no longer be repeated), for today's atomic theory is based on experiment and mathematical treatment, on a scientific practice in brief, able to verify the theory's validity. Not mere speculation but the work of chemists and physicists led from the atomic to the nuclear theory, to the new physics and the new philosophy associated with it. All real knowledge of the external world is the product of men's theoretical and practical activity in the actual world. But this knowledge produced by men can never be more than knowledge produced by men; it is not absolute truth. It is only truth about that part of the universe currently accessible to men, on which they can work and verify their theories. And as their knowledge accumulates with historical development, it leads to the continuous modification of knowledge by way of additional knowledge and sometimes to the discarding of theories made superfluous by theories referring to new discoveries.

The decline of the radical Western labor movement and the success of Russian bolshevism brought with it an almost complete identification of a specific Leninist version of Marxism with Marxism proper. Because the Russian Revolution was simultaneously a "bourgeois" and a "proletarian" revolution—in the sense that the preconditions for socialism were non-existent while *laissez-faire* capitalism was no longer possible—it led to a form of state capitalism which could be designated as "socialism" only because it was something other than private-property capitalism. But the functions assigned to private enterprise and competition were now the functions of the bolshevik state. By appropriating part of the social product and allocating productive resources for the construction of a larger productive apparatus and a higher productivity, the bolshevik rulers turned into controllers of labor and capital.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 109.

¹³ Marx's Theses on Feuerbach in F. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach*, p. 73.

While the capitalist's "peace of mind" and the necessary acquiescence of the workers require some form of general agreement on the indispensability of capital and private initiative, the new Russian situation needed a different ideology that could make the interests of the controllers and the controlled appear identical. Marxism could somehow satisfy this need because it was formulated during capitalism's *laissez-faire* stage. For there were no longer in Russia any capitalists in the traditional sense; and as to the government, it characterized itself as the executive of the ruling working class.

But since only the miserable are inclined to believe in an equal sharing of a miserable situation, the bolshevik "elite" soon found that income differentiations, by serving as incentives for greater individual effort, could turn into a blessing for all. In order to improve the life of all in the long run, it was necessary to improve that of some immediately. Thus a new class came into being based on control of the state apparatus and nationalized means of production. To hasten productive development, both the "positive" incentives of power and income, as well as the "negative" incentives of forced labor and terrorism were repeatedly advanced. Yet, the more the interests of the controllers and the controlled diverged, the more insistently did ideology proclaim their identity.

Under relatively stable social conditions ideological control may suffice to secure the social status quo. Under such conditions, designated as a "free" or "democratic" society, a struggle for ideas accompanies the social conflicts, and its class structure is simultaneously denied and admitted. Both the existence and non-existence of class relations, for instance, are incorporated in such concepts as "social mobility" and "equal opportunities." Socialism would eliminate these ambiguities, for if there are no classes there is no way of moving from one class to another, and if there are no privileges there are no equal opportunities to partake of. Russian society, while supporting a privileged minority, necessarily adheres to the concept of "equal opportunities," but it cannot admit the existence of class relations without destroying its socialist label.

Even if, out of fear of utopianism, Marxian socialism never became explicit, one thing was clear nevertheless: socialism implies a class-less, non-exploitative society, and not merely a modified class relationship in a modified capitalism. In Russia, ideology only can claim the absence of class relations. Yet, the ruled cannot help being aware of existing conditions and of their unrelatedness to the state-prescribed ideology. This ideology cannot serve as a substitute for, but is an aspect of, direct physical control—an instrument of police power. The enforced absence of social conflicts finds not support, but merely expression, in the apparent unanimity of ideas.

It was in the name of Marxism and socialism that the bolsheviks came into power, and in their name they destroyed all their enemies. Even their internal struggles for positions and influence within the controlling hierarchy must be expressed in Marxian terms—either as adherence to, or as an alleged deviation from, a once-established "orthodoxy." The total unrelatedness of Marxian

Handwritten notes in left margin: "The atomic theories of the ancient Greeks, for instance, were based not on experimental facts but were part of a speculative cosmic philosophy and were opposed and defeated by other philosophical schools on purely philosophical grounds. (This can no longer be repeated), for today's atomic theory is based on experiment and mathematical treatment, on a scientific practice in brief, able to verify the theory's validity. Not mere speculation but the work of chemists and physicists led from the atomic to the nuclear theory, to the new physics and the new philosophy associated with it. All real knowledge of the external world is the product of men's theoretical and practical activity in the actual world. But this knowledge produced by men can never be more than knowledge produced by men; it is not absolute truth. It is only truth about that part of the universe currently accessible to men, on which they can work and verify their theories. And as their knowledge accumulates with historical development, it leads to the continuous modification of knowledge by way of additional knowledge and sometimes to the discarding of theories made superfluous by theories referring to new discoveries."

Handwritten notes in left margin: "The decline of the radical Western labor movement and the success of Russian bolshevism brought with it an almost complete identification of a specific Leninist version of Marxism with Marxism proper. Because the Russian Revolution was simultaneously a 'bourgeois' and a 'proletarian' revolution—in the sense that the preconditions for socialism were non-existent while laissez-faire capitalism was no longer possible—it led to a form of state capitalism which could be designated as 'socialism' only because it was something other than private-property capitalism. But the functions assigned to private enterprise and competition were now the functions of the bolshevik state. By appropriating part of the social product and allocating productive resources for the construction of a larger productive apparatus and a higher productivity, the bolshevik rulers turned into controllers of labor and capital."

Handwritten notes in right margin: "27", "37", "May 21", "1948"

Handwritten note in right margin: "22"

socialism to Russian conditions makes impossible any questioning or serious discussion of Marxian theory. Lenin's dogmatized "Marxism" must be accepted as an article of faith. Only in this way can it be fitted into Russian conditions. And it is not only Lenin's use of middle-class materialism in defense of "Marxism" which indicates the half-bourgeois, half-proletarian character of bolshevism and of the Russian Revolution itself. There is also the bolshevik state-capitalist concept of "socialism," the authoritarian attitude toward organization and spontaneity, the outdated and unrealizable principle of national self-determination and, finally, Lenin's conviction that only the middle-class intelligentsia is able to develop a revolutionary consciousness and is thus destined to lead the masses. The combination of bourgeois materialism and revolutionary Marxism which characterized early bolshevik philosophy reappears with victorious bolshevism as a combination of neo-capitalist practice and socialist ideology.¹⁴

Science and Society. "In social production," Marx wrote, summing up his materialism, "men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society—the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness."¹⁵

Marx did not concern himself with the dialectic of any other absolute law of nature because for him "nature fixed in isolation from men—is nothing for men."¹⁶ He dealt with society as an "aggregate of the relations in which the producers live with regard to nature and to themselves."¹⁷ Although nature exists independently of men, it exists actually for men only in so far as it can be sensed and comprehended. The laboring process in its various forms, including scientific labor, is the interaction and metabolism between men and nature; it dominates, exploits, and alters nature, including the nature of man and society. "Laws of nature" relate not to "ultimate reality" but are descriptions of the behavior and regularities of nature as perceived by men. Perceptions change with the change of knowledge and with social development which affects the state of knowledge. Concepts of physical reality relate then not only

¹⁴ A more extensive criticism of Lenin's scientific and philosophical ideas is to be found in *Marxism and Philosophy*, by Karl Korsch, Leipzig, 1930, and *Lenin as Philosopher*, by Anton Pannekoek, New York, 1948.

¹⁵ *Critique of Political Economy*, Chicago, 1904, p. 11.

¹⁶ *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*, Moscow, p. 169.

¹⁷ *Capital*, Chicago, Vol. I, p. 952.

68861

to nature and men but also indirectly to the structure of society and to social change and are therefore historical.

Although specific social relationships, bound to specific forms of social production, may find ideological reflection in science and affect its activities in some measure; science, like the production process itself, is the result of all previous social development and in this respect is independent of any particular social structure. Concepts of physical reality may be shared by structurally different societies. And just as different technologies may evolve within a particular social structure as, for instance, the current so-called Second Industrial Revolution, so one concept of physical reality may be replaced by another without affecting existing social relationships. Yet, these new concepts are still historical in comparison with earlier concepts of physical reality associated with previous and different modes of production and previous and different social relationships.

Science in the modern sense developed simultaneously with modern industry and capitalism. The rapidity of scientific development parallels the relentless revolutionizing of the production process by way of competitive capital accumulation. There is an obvious connection between science, its technological application and the prevailing social relationships. Although modern science is not only quantitatively but also qualitatively different from the rudimentary science of the past, it is a continuation of it nonetheless. Likewise, the science and technology of the hypothetical socialist future—no matter how altered—can only be based on all previous scientific and social development. There is no "bourgeois science" to be replaced by "proletarian science." What a Marxist critique of science is directed against is the class-determined ideological interpretation and class-determined practical utilization of science wherever and whenever it violates the needs and well-being of humanity.

Although science strives toward some hypothetical ideal objectivity, the application of science is guided by other considerations. Like the utilization of other productive and human resources, it is subordinated to the requirements of class relations which turn the social production process into capital formation. The utilization of science for prevailing profit and power principles may not affect internal scientific objectivity, but it affects the direction of scientific development. Because there is no "end" to science and because its fields of exploration are unlimited, science can choose to concentrate upon one or another. The emphasis upon a specific field and a particular direction depends upon the needs, structure, and superstructure of a particular society. There was, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, an obvious connection between the concentration on astronomy and the development of world trade. There is an obvious connection between the present emphasis on atomic physics and the current imperialist military struggles.

In Marxist values, man is the measure of all things and science should be science for men. As socialism implies the further growth of the social forces of production, it also implies that of science. It intends to add to the principle of scientific objectivity that of social responsibility. And just as it rejects

15882

fetishistic capital accumulation, so it rejects "science for the sake of science." This fetishistic attitude towards science, supposedly based on an innate human need to search for ultimate reality, is actually only another expression of the lack of sociality in class society and the fierce competition among scientists themselves. The irresponsible, irrational, and self-defeating disregard for humanity on the part of many scientists today, who defend their work in the name of science even though it has often no other but destructive purposes, is possible only in a society that is able to subordinate science to the specific needs of a ruling class. The humanization of science presupposes, however, the humanization of society. Science and its development is thus a social problem.

Materialism and Determinism. Marxism, not being a theory of physical materialism and not bound to Newtonian determinism, is not affected by the new physics and microphysics. To be sure, Marx had no way of rejecting and no desire to reject the physics of the nineteenth century. What distinguished his historical materialism from middle-class materialism was his rejection of the latter's direct confrontation of individual man and external reality and its inability to see society and social labor as an indivisible aspect of the whole of reality. What united Marxism with middle-class materialism was the conviction that there is an external world independent of men and that science contributes to the knowledge of this objective reality.

While Marxists accept the positivist emphasis on experience, they reject the notion that sensations are the sole source of experience—a notion which led some people into the self-contradictory sterility of solipsism and others to idealism and the indirect justification of religious beliefs. Although sense perceptions are individuals' perceptions, men extended the range and amplified the powers of their senses in quality as well as quantity. Moreover the "knowledge of an orderly external world on which we can act rationally is derived almost entirely from society. The scraps disclosed in sense perceptions by themselves would make no pattern but fit into the pattern whose outlines society has taught us. Indeed what we perceive with our sense organs is conditioned very largely by our education—by what our elders and fellows have taught us to notice."¹⁰

The concept of matter now implies something different from what it did a hundred years ago. While for Lenin, and middle-class materialism before him, matter, composed of atoms, was the very stuff of nature, and for Mach atoms were a mental artifice not susceptible to sense-experience, matter is now regarded as something "in-between" because "matter as given by our senses appears as a secondary phenomenon, created by the interaction of our sense organs with processes whose nature can be discovered only indirectly, through theoretical interpretations of experimentally observed relationships; in other words, through a mental effort."¹¹

¹⁰ V. G. Childe, *Society and Knowledge*, New York, 1956, p. 97.
¹¹ M. Born, *The Concept of Reality in Physics*, p. 319.

15884

truly
 the
 Marx
 Lenin

Positivist

By
 the
 fact

1

Radio
 activity
 matter
 particles
 can
 disappear
 MARXISM AND THE NEW PHYSICS
 condense
 into
 matter
 create
 particles

Matter was once conceived as consisting of indivisible atoms. This concept lost its validity by newly discovered properties of matter such as radio-activity. It was found that material particles are capable of disappearing while giving rise to radiation, while radiation is capable of condensing into matter and of creating particles." Einstein formulated the transformation of mass into energy and now the term, matter, when it is used, includes all the physical phenomena of which men are aware. Experimental methods were devised which recorded the effects of atoms and of the elemental particles of which they are composed. These elemental particles may be considered the ultimate units of matter—"precisely those units into which matter decomposes under the impact of external forces. This state of affairs can be summed up thus: All elemental particles are made of the same stuff—namely, energy. Matter exists because energy assumes the form of the elemental particles."¹²

These discoveries do not deny the objective existence of physical reality, nor its manifestation in things considered to constitute matter. Whatever science may reveal as properties of nature, and whether or not matter is considered "real" or "unreal," as a "primary" or as "secondary" phenomena, it exists in its own right and without it no immaterialist would be there to deny its existence. The material world is the world of men, quite independent of the fact—scientifically or philosophically speaking—that the old concept of matter is insufficient to account for physical reality.

The equivalence of mass and energy, of light and matter, extended the wave-corpusele duality—at first discovered for light—to all matter. Like light, material particles can be pictured as either corpuscles or waves, and both pictures are necessary to explain their properties. According to Max Planck's quantum theory radiation is not continuous but, like matter, can be dealt with only in individual units. Emission and absorption of these units involves the principle of probability. The application of quantum mechanics to the problems of atomic structure by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg led to the principle of uncertainty, or indeterminism, and to the concept of complementarity. According to the latter the description of micro-objects, such as electrons, requires both wave and corpusele models; although mutually exclusive, they also complement one another. The uncertainty principle relates to the impossibility of ascertaining with accuracy both the position and the momentum of a particle simultaneously.

Because in their totality the elementary processes constitute physical reality, the indeterminist, statistical, probabilistic character of quantum physics led to a denial of causality. Not all scientists, however, are willing to recognize acausality as a fundamental aspect of nature. For Einstein, quantum theory in all its implications seemed only a temporary makeshift—an expression of our ignorance. Max Planck held that the quantum hypothesis will eventually find its exact expression in certain equations which will be a more exact formula of

¹² L. d. Broglie, *Physics and Microphysics*, New York, 1960, p. 68.
¹³ W. Heisenberg, From Plato to Max Planck. *Atlantic Monthly*, Boston, November, 1959, p. 113.

Matter
 does
 not
 have
 a
 definite
 position
 or
 momentum
 at
 the
 same
 time

Q

the law of causality. And Heisenberg speculates whether acausality is only a consequence of the separation of observer and observed and is not applicable to the universe as a whole.

However this may be, the problem can only be resolved, if at all, by further scientific work. While some scientists hold that behind the statistical laws of quantum physics there are hidden, but discernable, parameters obeying the laws of classical physics, others think that causality in macroscopic phenomena is itself based on probability laws. While for some, causality once ruled absolutely, now chance rules absolutely for others. Marxism, which does not think in absolutes, accepts the state of physics for what it is, convinced that like any other state previously it, too, is transitory and is not the final end of physical knowledge.

Newtonian mechanics worked well on the macroscopic and human scale of phenomena. The knowledge gained about objective reality through our sense organs and scientific instruments did not perceptibly affect external reality itself. In microphysics, however, the interaction between the observed and the observer affects the observed phenomenon. Sense impressions and instruments imply the transfer of energy (photons) which forms an integral part of the behavior of the atomic objects under observation. This inescapable situation, deplored by some as the definite borderline to all understanding of objective reality, induced others to state: "that science stands between man and nature," and though events in the world of nature do not depend on our observations of them, nevertheless, "in science we are not dealing with nature itself but with the science of nature—that is, with nature which has been thought through and described by man."²²

While this aspect of quantum physics is used, more often than not, as an argument against philosophical materialism and as evidence in favor of idealism, in a way, and differently expressed, it rather suits Marxism quite well. What stands between men and nature also connects men and nature. Marxism, for which knowledge of objective reality implies the indivisible interrelationship between man, society and nature, does not bother with an "objective reality" apart from that recognizable by men. If there should be no way towards "absolute" objectivity, that degree of objectivity attainable is the objective reality for men. The recognition that nature and the nature revealed through science may not be the same merely compels us to the largest possible degree of objectivity, quite apart from the question as to whether or not it will lead to an understanding of "ultimate reality."

Microphysics is one of many human endeavors and though it led to new concepts of physical reality, it did not alter the human situation in the macroscopic world. The duality "between statistical and dynamic laws is ultimately associated with the duality between macrocosm and microcosm, and this we must regard as a fact: substantiated by experiment. Whether satisfactory or not, facts cannot be created by theories, and there is no alternative but to

²² W. Heisenberg, *From Plato to Planck*, p. 112.

concede their appointed places to dynamical as well as to statistical laws in the whole system of physical theories."²³ Space, time, causality, derived from experience, remain dependable guides to most human activities, quite independently of the over-riding or under-lying relativistic and atomistic theories of reality. It is quite certain that classical mechanics will "remain the instrument best fitted to solve certain questions, questions which for us are of the highest importance, since they relate to our scale of magnitude."²⁴

Nothing is altered in this situation if the deterministic interpretation of classical mechanics is also regarded a fallacy. For causality and determinism do not refer to nature in its totality but to our interrelationship with nature through which we discover rules and regularities that allow us to expect—and thus to predict—natural events with a degree of probability close to certainty. Although the early ideal of absolutely certain knowledge of the external world vanished in the very quest for scientific objectivity, "natural laws" which allow for predictability retain their "absolute" validity on the human scale of experience. And while the understanding of atomic processes implies probability and statistics, the utilization of this knowledge leads to predictable activities as if based on cause-and-effect relationships. Likewise, "the notions of classical physics provide an *a priori* foundation for the investigations of quantum physics, since we can carry out experiments in the atomic field only with the aid of concepts from classical physics."²⁵

Because indeterminism rules in quantum physics, and determination is out of the question "even in the simplest classical science, that of mechanics," Max Born finds it "simply fantastic to apply the idea of determinism to historical events."²⁶ However, historical materialism, in so far as it claims predictive powers, does not claim that these powers are derived from, or are analogous to, natural processes but that they are based on "social laws" of development fortified by the evidence of history. To reject "social determinism" it is necessary to demonstrate its impossibility in society and history, not by analogy with physical processes. By doing the latter, Born does exactly—only the other way around—what pseudo-Marxists were doing when they read "social laws" of development into nature. If one analogy is bad, so is the other.

Society does not develop and function by chance but through human responses to definite necessities. Man must eat in order to live, and if he must work in order to eat, the work itself leads to a regulated behavior on his own part and in connection with his obeying of, and his struggle against, natural phenomena and their regularities. When men work in groups and societies, new necessities and new regulations arise out of the social labor process. With the increase of productivity there develops social class relations and social

²³ M. Planck, *A Survey of Physical Theory*, New York, 1960, p. 64.

²⁴ E. Borel, *Space & Time*, New York, 1960, p. 182.

²⁵ See: M. Born, *Voraussagbarkeit in der klassischen Mechanik*. Physikalische Blätter, 1959, Heft 8.

²⁶ W. Heisenberg, *From Plato to Max Planck*, p. 112.

²⁷ *The Concept of Reality in Physics*, p. 320.

regulations based on them. With the further growth of the productive powers of society the determination of human behavior by external necessity diminishes while the determination by social arrangements increases. Determination is largely a social product; it is the social development itself which leads—with the recognition of the material and social requirements of production and reproduction—to predictability.

Because of the socially-produced character of social determination, Marx is neither a determinist nor an indeterminist in the usual sense of these terms. In his opinion history is the product of human action, even while men are the products of history. Historical conditions determine the way man makes subsequent history, but these historical conditions are themselves the result of human actions . . . The basic point of departure is never history, but man, his situation, and his responses.²³

In known history stages of human and social existence are recognizable through changing tools, forms of production, and social relationships that alter the productivity of labor. Where social production stagnates, society stagnates; where the productivity of labor develops slowly, social change is also tardy. But all previous development is the result of progress made in the sphere of production and it is only reasonable to expect that the future will also depend on it.

This indicates little with regard to the actual transformation from capitalism to socialism anticipated by Marx. It merely predicts that socialism is the next step in the development of the social forces of production, which includes science and social consciousness. Every class structure, according to Marx, both fosters and retards the general development of social production. It fosters it in contrast to previously-existing social relations of production; it retards it by attempting to make existing social relations permanent. Definite social class relations are bound to definite levels of the expanding social forces of production—all the actual over-lapping of old and new forms of social relations and modes of production notwithstanding. In our time, it is the capital-labor relationship, the basis of all social antagonisms, which fetters further social development. But such development requires the abolition of social antagonisms. And since only those able to base their expectations on a class-less society are likely to strive towards its realization, Marx saw in the working class and its needs a force of human emancipation.

Although Marx was convinced of capitalism's inevitable end, he did not commit himself as to the time of its departure. This depended on the actual class struggle and was certain only on the assumption of a continuation of the previous course of social development. Future events can only be based on present knowledge and predictions are possible only on the assumption that the known pattern of past development will also hold for the future. It may not; yet, all knowledge justifies some expectations and allows for actions which themselves will decide whether the expectations were justified or not. When

edw. ²³ A. G. Meyer, *Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice*, Cambridge, 1954, p. 10.

Marx spoke of the end of capitalism, he also thought of the elements of a new society already present and unfolding in the "womb of the old." Capitalism had no future because its transformation was already an observable phenomenon. As it developed, it enlarged all its contradictions so that its expansion was at the same time its decay when regarded from a revolutionary instead of from a conservative point of view.

The Ideological War. While there is no connection between Marxism and physical determinism or indeterminism, there is also no real connection between the cold war and the different concepts of physical reality in the East and the West. Indeed, what possible connection could there be between the indeterminacy of nuclear physics and all the social problems that beset the world and give rise to its political movements? These social struggles were disturbing the world before the rise of the new physics and they cannot be abated by either science or philosophy. Political relations between East and West will not improve simply because physicists abstain from ideological interpretations of their work. This work, and its practical application, is the same in the East and the West. Where there is disagreement, it does not matter, i.e., in speculations as to what the physical knowledge of the future may reveal. Some Eastern scientists do not bother to embroider their work with philosophical interpretations; others try to fit it into the scheme of dialectical materialism so as not to violate the state-prescribed ideology in which they may also actually believe, just as Western scientists accept almost generally the ruling ideologies of their own society.

At any rate, reality is always stronger than ideology, as is demonstrated by the recurrent need to incorporate the new findings of science and the advancements of technology into the prevailing ideologies. There was a time when Russian dialectical materialists denounced Einstein's relativity theory as bourgeois obscurantism, only, and rather quickly, to come to celebrate it as still another manifestation of dialectical materialism. Space-time, wave-mechanics, the structure of matter, in short, the whole of modern physics has been turned into so many revelations of the dialectics of nature and of its material substance. The principle of "complementarity," i.e., the abandonment of a conceptually unitary picture of atomic phenomena, has been interpreted as yet another example of dialectical development by way of contradiction and reconciliation, that is, as a struggle between thesis and anti-thesis, bringing forth the synthesis.

As yet, however, the "synthesis" is only philosophically anticipated by dialectical materialists to satisfy the Leninist criterion of absolute objective truth. Some Eastern physicists (not all) simply claim that the phenomena observed in microphysics with regard to both wave and particle are completely objective, whereas for some Western scientists (not all) they are in part subjective, because of the disturbing and altering interplay between observer and observed, and because wave has the character of a probability wave and is not regarded as an objective entity. Of course, the Russian physicists admit

that the sheer objectivity of micro-objects is only partly recognizable but they believe that, in principle, it will be possible to establish their full objectivity by finding ways and means to discount the influence of the observer and his instruments upon the observed micro-objects. The application of atomic energy appears to them as proof of the objective character of atomic phenomena.

For Western physicists, all that matters presently is quantum theory in its present state and the problems to which it gives rise. This, of course, is also true for Russian scientists. And it can at once be admitted that their search for absolute objectivity, whether realizable or not, seems a better working-hypothesis than the subjectivistic resignation to an assumed absolute limit to the understanding of objective reality on the part of some Western physicists. However, atomic energy has been applied on both sides of the "barricades"; the pragmatic truth of atomic theory has been revealed quite aside from dialectical materialism and bourgeois idealism.

Because Lenin insisted on the objectivity and universal validity of causality and because Leninism is the ruling ideology, it cannot very well be denied by Russian physicists. There is also no real need to do so, for according to dialectical materialism causality does not exclude but implies chance. The indeterminacy in quantum physics, though recognized, is explained as due to experimental techniques and not to a fundamental law of nature. The differences between the Eastern and Western physicists may then be summed up as differences relating not to their work but to additional expectations on the part of Eastern physicists that their work will come to verify the assumptions of dialectical materialism.

These assumptions, however, relate not to the victory of socialism over capitalism, but merely to the reestablishment of causality for the whole of nature and to the reacceptance of the concept of matter, in its present sense, as the sole basis of all existing phenomena including the human mind. Of course, in a certain sense, such expectations may be regarded as an expression of a general optimism associated with the rise, success and expected triumph of bolshevism and its ideological concomitant, Leninism. Still, it is difficult to see how dialectical materialism in physics could determine the political decisions of people: one way or another or could be regarded an instrument of class struggle.

Ideologies are weapons, but in the age of the atom bomb they are no longer decisive or even very important weapons. As little as the Western nations trust in the "rationality" and the "naturalness" of their socio-economic relations, just as little do the Eastern "Marxists" put their trust in the dialectical course of history—not to speak of that in nature—as the means to final victory. Both sides rely, first of all, on their material might. It can only be to the good, of course, when material might finds ideological support, for which reason successful ideologists in both camps find themselves in comfortable income brackets. But their professional rating of the meaning and power of ideologies is only an over-rating of their own importance.

ON TEACHING MARXIST EPISTEMOLOGY*

BARROWS DUNHAM**

Materialism is the view that existence does not necessarily involve perceiving or being perceived, knowing or being known. Dialectics is the view that the universe is a system of entities in process of change, the dynamic arising from the impact of the parts on one another. The epistemology of Dialectical Materialism (Marxism) is therefore the view that truth (i.e. the correspondence of a sentence with fact) can be determined by the following rule: "Examine any alleged state of affairs as related to and distinguished from a total environment, and you will know whether or not the sentence alleging that state of affairs is true."

No special pedagogy is required for Marxist epistemology: the only rule is the usual rule of honesty and candor which bids us teach every subject as that subject actually is.

The theory of knowledge aims at producing a rule, and thereupon a method, by which we can distinguish true sentences from false ones. The theory arises because we are aware of mistakes, and is important because mistakes may be disasters. Marxist epistemology has the further interest that Marxism now defines the daily mode of life of about one billion people upon earth.

I judge that in this paper I am to answer two questions: what would one be teaching if one taught the Marxist theory of knowledge, and how would one proceed if one were to teach that theory truly? Since we are all philosophers and therefore sensitive to language, it will be well to observe a certain ambiguity in the verb "teach." There is a sense of it which suggests no more than acquainting other people with information and with techniques: this is the sense in which you would teach Physics. There is another sense, however, which suggests advocacy—as when you say that your mother taught you to be good.

All advocacy relates to choice and has its impact directly upon human decision. The acquainting of people with information and techniques, though possibly related to choice, leaves the chooser rather more free to ponder the truth of the information and the validity of the techniques. It is a calm tenor of conduct, admirable in itself and much to the taste of philosophers. It may, however, effect a separation of theory from practice; and, in any event, it is not strikingly present among people who are transforming an old society into a new. "Philosophers," said Marx in the most famous of his Theses on Feuerbach, "philosophers have interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it."¹

This sentence, which declares the union of theory with practice, of knowledge with achievement, of science with ethics, is the pulse of all Marxism. Knowledge is not knowledge only: it is also an object of concern. We need to

* Received, August, 1961.

** A paper delivered before the Western Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy, St. Louis, Missouri, May 4, 1961.

¹ Thesis No. 11. Italics Marx's.

of Tula 6 (Fall 1970)
& 11 (Spring 1972)
+ 12 (Fall 1974) Antonio
C. 620

KORSCH IN SPAIN

by

Paul Piccone

Karl Korsch o el Nacimiento de una Nueva Epoca. Editorial Anagrama:
Barcelona, 1973. 144 pages.

That a scholarly anthology dealing with the work of Karl Korsch could be published in Spain under present conditions of dictatorship is a politically significant event foreshadowing future explosive developments in the Iberian peninsula. In fact, it should be immediately pointed out that there is no chance whatsoever for a work of this type to come out in Russia,¹ and even in the English-speaking world nothing comparable is available,² notwithstanding a certain revival of interest in Hegelian Marxism in the wake of the politicization resulting from Vietnam and the rise of the New Left in the 1960s. It indicates the existence in Spain of an ongoing process of theoretical preparation for the time when Franco passes away, taking with him the remnants of an era long since gone in the rest of Europe. This may prevent the kind of chaos brought about in a totally unprepared Portugal by the military coup.

While there is no doubt that Spain and Portugal are on the threshold of "the birth of a new epoch," it is altogether unclear what the character of this new epoch will be. As postulated by most Marxist theories, outright fascism and Stalinism have turned

out to be historically transitional phenomena. For most of the West after World War II, the transition culminated with the internalization and institutionalization of repressive mechanisms in advanced capitalism, and in the East, into a much cruder and less efficient bureaucratic collectivism. Yet, the real question in the Iberian peninsula today is whether to become economically and politically integrated with the rest of Western Europe, or develop a new type of social organization along the lines roughly prefigured by council communists in the 1930s or the Socialisme ou Barbarie group in the 1940s and 1950s. Notwithstanding the Portuguese military's flirtation with the Communist Party, today there is very little chance in Spain and Portugal for the development of an Eastern European variety of bureaucratic collectivism. The Portuguese Communist Party's frightening ideological backwardness even vis-a-vis other Western European Communist Parties, and the total bankruptcy of the Russian statist model--periodically impressed on world consciousness through the smashing of revolutionary developments such as in 1956 Hungary and 1968 Czechoslovakia--makes this model altogether unsuitable as a real alternative to the obsolescent fascist state. ³

It is precisely this state of affairs that makes this book all the more ⁴²⁹ relevant since it presents a Marxist vision irreducible to any of the institutionalized travesties in power in allegedly "socialist" societies. Korsch, in fact, was one of the first and few to seriously challenge the Bolshevik model from a rigorous Marxist perspective while seeking a radical alternative to both the social-democratic as well as the Stalinist or bureaucratic

collectivist model. His Anti-Kautsky and the (1930) Introduction to Marxism and Philosophy remain two of the most systematic and thoroughgoing critiques of Kautsky (social democracy) and Lenin (Bolshevism). What was original in Korsch's critiques, which distinguished them from all others and remains the kernel of his theoretical heritage, was that he did so with the very same arguments and by showing both of them as representing opposite sides of a fundamentally similar bourgeois consciousness. By presenting the materialist conception of history as an objective science above class interests and divisions, Kautsky had not only distorted the revolutionary meaning of the dialectic and de-politicized Marxism, but also turned it into a theoretical chain "of the proletarian struggle to the ideas and objectives of the bourgeois class." ⁴ For Korsch theory avoids becoming ideology only to the extent that it mediates human activity and political struggles. Once it is severed from the historical subjects who are to concretely objectify it as praxis, and it is presented as an objective and contemplative reflection of being, it automatically turns precisely into the kind of ideological mystification that its neutrality and objectivity sought to avoid. The same thing happens with the Lenin presented by Stalin and his followers who "universally transfer the dialectic into Object, Nature and History and who present knowledge merely as a passive mirror and reflection of this objective Being in the subjective Consciousness. In so doing they destroy both the dialectical interrelation of being and consciousness and, as a necessary consequence, the dialectical interrelation of theory and practice." This results in the "complete abandonment of Marx's dialectical

Review of Korsch's
Philosophy
1930

materialism and a retreat to a totally abstract opposition of pure theory, which discovers truths, to pure practice, which applies these laboriously discovered truths to reality. (5)

With Lukacs, Korsch also identified objectivism, in the guise of commodity fetishism, as the "specific problem of our age, the age of modern capitalism. (6) Unlike Lukacs, (7) however, he did not pose the problem in terms of a tendential subject-object identity which, within the universalized fragmentation of bourgeois society, could be realized only by a party whose primacy and substitutional character was a necessary consequence of the whole-part dialectic.

By regarding as theory that knowledge which concretely mediates activity, rather than as an attribute of a future, all-encompassing collective consciousness imparting the status of historical validity to all of those previous consciously undertaken steps toward the final reconciliation (as in Lukacs), Korsch sought to place Marxism on a rigorous subjective basis by tying it to the class struggle that it was to mediate while at the same time expose all objectivistic versions as theoretical capitulations to bourgeois consciousness. In this respect, Eduardo Subirato, the editor of the anthology, is on the right track in introducing this re-examination of the Korschian project as "the poetry of the revolution of the future which will recognize no other time and space than the subjective, and no imperative other than the oceanic passion of man to become the master of history" (p. 9). In an historical juncture full of possibilities such as the present Spanish context, it is crucial to demystify "the cursed history of the labor movement from Kronstadt to the 1937 Revolution." To the extent that "Korsch's

NOT ONLY "objis"
study

future, p 84

the
wave

?

work appears negatively as the liquidation of the previous false consciousness of the European labor movement," the critical reception of his work will constitute an unavoidable starting point for "the reflection on the historical alternatives on radical emancipation" (p. 12).

With the exception of an article by Vacca and two texts by Korsch himself, all of the rest of the contributions to the anthology come from two issues of Politikon⁸ and rate among the best on the subject. Particularly relevant are the essays by Mattick, Negt, and Rusconi. Given the fact that Mattick was one of Korsch's closest collaborators during the years in exile, it is understandable why he is the author of the opening essay, which tries to provide an overall account of Korsch's work. After retracing the path of Korsch's break with "orthodox" Marxism and with Leninism, Mattick locates the tragedy of a thinker and militant who strongly believed that revolutionary "Marxism can exist only if united with the revolutionary movement of the working people" (p. 15), while forced to operate for the rest of his life outside of such a movement.

Mattick can write with first-hand knowledge on this theme, since Korsch's predicament is also his own. Yet, a rather different starting point and a subsequent different conception of Marxism prevents Mattick from fully understanding the logic of the development of Korsch's thought--which both explains why one remained a Marxist and the other one did not, and why Mattick does not discuss the later Korsch. In terms of the very logic of the Korschian discourse, council communism as Korsch formulated it, necessarily deteriorated to the level of an ideology after the 1926 break with

the Communist Party, and only the hope of eventually reconciling the theory of Linkscommunismus with the practice of the working class made the theoretical efforts of the council communists at all legitimate in Korsch's own vision. The persistence in analyzing the Stalinist phenomenon as a variant of state-capitalism and equivalent to fascism⁹ prevented the grounding of Marxism in the Comintern-instrumentalized "world labor movement" and necessitated either a new theoretical grounding of Marxism, or its abandonment. Of course, Korsch and the council communists regarded the Bolshevik phenomenon as transitory as social democracy, and to be swept aside by the working class after the newly developed state-capitalism would confront labor as a unit, thus triggering class consciousness and the final confrontation.¹⁰ Only after WWII did Korsch gradually come to relegate Marxism as the thought form of a bygone age when "the transition" began to appear much more permanent than expected. What is significant, however, and has been missed by most critics, is that Korsch rejected Marxism by remaining firm on the most fundamental tenet of his whole outlook, i.e., the analysis of knowledge as concrete mediation. His very analysis of the developments of Marx's own theory postulated a unity of forms of being and forms of thought which remained his theoretical trademark. As he put it in the very last page of his Karl Marx, reiterating a major thesis of Marxism and Philosophy: "A genetic presentation would show with what precision and at the same time with what weight every new phase of the real history of society, every new experience of the proletarian struggle, is reflected in each new turn of the theoretical development of Marx's doctrine... To be

W 23
instrumental to the historical movement of our time is the great purpose of Marx. ⁽¹¹⁾ In other words, genuine theory is such only in its instrumentality to the class struggle. It is precisely this argument which in the Zurich theses (1950) led Korsch to altogether reject Marxism: "it is now altogether meaningless to ask to what an extent the doctrine of Marx and Engels is in the present epoch theoretically relevant and practically applicable... The first step to be taken, in order to put together a revolutionary theory and practice, consists in breaking with Marxism." ⁽¹²⁾ *Prky! But he changed after*

ohh!
Whereas Korsch remained faithful to the logic of his theoretical perspective, Mattick, who had never shared its fundamental assumptions and had never been an Hegelian Marxist, did not find it at all difficult to remain unmoved with an analysis whose foundation has long since been washed away by the erosion of new historical events. It may very well be true that, as he put it, "all of the capitalist contradictions remain intact and require an alternative completely different from the one offered by capitalism" (p. 43). Yet, his ouvrieriste perspective ends up missing all of the significant mediations, thus leaving his account as a mere act of faith in a Rip van Winkle proletariat to be awakened into action by the eventual reassertion of the unsolvable capitalist crisis in the wake of the exhaustion of the Keynesian solution: "If revolutionary consciousness depends on misery, there can be little doubt that the suffering awaiting the world's population will go beyond anything thus far experienced and that it will eventually engulf even the privileged minority of workers in the industrially advanced countries who still think of themselves as immune from the conse-

Mattick 334
CP 105

quences of their own activities. ⁽¹³⁾ Thus, from the very first introductory essay to Council Correspondence in 1934 ⁽¹⁴⁾ to his Marx and Keynes, Mattick remains immersed in the classical Marxist perspective of the Communist Manifesto where ^memiseration and class polarization function as the fundamental determinants of the proletarian revolution: "The ruling class is the decision-making class; the other class, regardless of its inner differentiations, is at the mercy of these decisions, which are made with a view to the special needs of capital and determine the general conditions of society. ⁽¹⁵⁾ Of course, Mattick is well aware of the major social developments resulting from the shift from competitive, entrepreneurial capitalism to the monopoly stage, but he does not think that they make much of a difference and, far from stabilizing the old contradictions, they intensify them: accordingly, today "the capitalist world is far more unstable, disorganized, and disintegrated than it was, say, fifty years ago. ⁽¹⁶⁾ The current mix of free and controlled market relations, instead of making for greater order, exclude both the automatic and 'controlled' integration of both the national and the world economy. ⁽¹⁶⁾ There is no alienation, no culture, no administration of everyday life in this account: the economic dimension is the only one that matters.

Korsch had also shared this perspective whereby "Marx's materialist social science is not sociology, but economics, ⁽¹⁷⁾ and with Mattick had accepted a variant of the old theory of the capitalist collapse. As Rusconi has pointed out, from the very beginning of the council period, "the scientific necessity of socialism results from the impossibility of reconciling a capitalist

economy and a socialist policy."¹⁸ Thus, the "Pratiker Sozialismus" that he put forth in an article by the same title¹⁹ was conceived as a concrete alternative both to socialism as a pure science which saw capitalism as naturally giving way to socialism (contrasted in Second International thinkers such as the Austro-Marxists --particularly Hilferding--to Marxism as an ethical ideal)²⁰ and that reformism which sought to carry out a socialist policy within a market economy. Unlike earlier versions of the theory of the crash such as Luxemburg's which saw it as a result of the exhaustion of areas in which capitalism could expand, or Bernstein's which saw it as a result of the natural development of capitalism,²¹ *Wolff: added!!!* Korsch saw it as a result of the impossibility of instituting a social policy within a capitalist economy.²² Thus, rather than stressing objective factors such as economic laws, Korsch focused on the will and conscious human activity as bringing about that socialization which capitalism could not otherwise institute on a long-term basis. Fascism, Stalinism, or state capitalism in general, were seen as transitory capitalist solutions which could, at best, only postpone the socialist outcome. Unlike Mattick, however, Korsch posed this whole problematic within an Hegelian framework which eventually ^{???} forced him to abandon Marxism altogether.

As early as 1919, Korsch had posed the problem of revolution not in economic terms but, along with other council theoreticians such as Gramsci,²³ in terms of a culturally and spiritually "new humanity."²⁴ Within such a perspective, what justifies and at the same time necessitates revolution is not just misery or exploitation, or even insurmountable economic contradictions, but

the fact that Geist manifests itself as teleological human activity (praxis) and capitalism both requires the fulfillment of this spirituality because of its needs for functioning subjectivity to guarantee accumulation, while unable to accept the society of subjects that it prefigures because of its class character and the principle of domination whose retention is the primary goal of the bourgeois state. Although, as has been pointed out, ²⁵ Korsch's whole problematic of socialization during the council period up to the writing of Marxism and Philosophy, was posed within a Kantian framework, it does not take much imagination to see how it could readily lean in an Hegelian Marxist direction. And such a development explains his posing of the question of epistemology in the way that he did.

✓ Within Hegelian Marxism, ✓ knowledge tends toward collective self-consciousness in the classless society in the form of a subject object identity where all concrete social individuals who are such precisely because they are all subjects who produce and, consequently, share common interests, collectively determine the dynamics of a social whole in which, for the first time, freedom can be automatically translated into necessity. In a class society, however, knowledge becomes specified as class-consciousness and comes to express particular class interests in universal disguises. The historical validity of the proletarian perspective is solely a result of its objective goal of genuine universality through the abolition of classes altogether and, consequently, the realization of a society of subjects. Within specific contexts of transition, this problematic takes on the guises of how the transition is to

be carried out (organization) and of what mediations (consciousness) to develop in a situation of rapidly declining bourgeois domination. Strangely enough, however, as Ceppa has pointed out, in Korsch--either during the council period or in American exile--there is no theory of ideology or of organization, which is a result of his particular understanding of the dialectic. Whereas other council communists--turned-Hegelian-Marxists such as Lukacs and Gramsci developed highly sophisticated theories of alienation and of ideology, Korsch articulated neither one. His short-circuiting of the dialectic between appearance and reality led him to analyze ideologies as immediate expressions of given socio-historical situations and to collapse the problem of organization into the always already given class struggle automatically generated by the capitalist organization of labor. According to Ceppa, "the confusion between the abstract-real level of the logical-cognitive moment and the empirical level of genetic determinations--i.e., the lack of a distinction between the synthetic-dialectical moment of exposition (Darstellungsweise) and the analytic moment of empirical research (Forschungsweise)--brings about in Korsch the collapsing of the dialectical problematic of historical 'constitution' into the positivist problematic of 'empirical' specification, with the result of reaching--through Kurt Lewin--a kind of paradoxical alliance between Hegel and Wittgenstein." (27)

Although from as early as 1924 Korsch unqualifiedly defended the dialectic from people such as Thalheimer who "hold that the question of 'scientific' method has been resolved once and for all through the empirical method of the natural sciences and the

corresponding historical-positive method of the social sciences,"
by pointing out how this method is "the specifically bourgeois method
of scientific research,"²⁸ *not included in G.L.D.* his own elaboration did not succeed in
working out a radical alternative. His claim that "only an idealist
dialectician could attempt to free the totality of the forms of
thought (determinations, categories)--which we partly apply
consciously in praxis, in science and in philosophy, but which also
penetrate our spirit in an unconscious and instinctive way--from
the object of intuition, imagination and desire in which they are
usually embroiled, in order to consider them as if they were a
particular object in itself"²⁹ *over*-historicized the dialectic. It
allowed no free play whatsoever between forms of thought and forms
of being. In the dialectic between universal and particular,
the former can only manifest itself through the latter without,
however, being thereby reduced to it. The defense of the autonomy
of theory, ^(or) of the irreducibility of the universal to the parti-
cular which became the leitmotif of Adorno's crusade against *Neofascist*
identity theory, ³⁰ is the very precondition for the kind of his-
torical specification of theory which Korsch sought to carry *???*
out. Historical specification is possible only within a
constituted ^a-historical framework which, however, does not
obtain in any transcendental dimension, but lives and breathes
with the subjects who continually re-constitute it precisely
in order to concretely specify their praxis. This Gramscian
"absolute historicism"³¹ neither shuns practice, thus becoming,
as in Adorno, a monumental justification for its own political
impotence,³² nor does it collapse into an equally impotent

pragmatism as in Korsch, but attempts to locate objective historical possibilities³³ and thus intervene in the historical process.

Identity theory is the cancer that consumes Korsch's dialectic: the lack of any theoretical preventive medicine such as a critical perspective on science, leads him to a strange and eventually embarrassing interpretation which resulted in the wholesale dumping of the Marxist perspective. As early as 1920 he had put forth a very pragmatic account of science. He wrote: "science anticipates the social reality which is about to assert itself, and precisely through this intellectual anticipation of the future, it poses one of the conditions for the creative overcoming from the old to the new forms of individual and social being."³⁴ Exactly the same argument applies to the materialist dialectic which he sees as "an immanent and real component of revolutionary proletarian praxis."³⁵ Marxism and the dialectic are not ground in praxis but, like science, in determinate historical conditions. When the mediation fails to mediate, Korsch has to give it up. His inability or unwillingness to recognize any theoretical autonomy to the dialectic has the dialectical consequence of preventing Korsch from actually determining historical specificity, and his Marxism thereby takes a metaphysical turn.

Notwithstanding the fact that Mattick remained an orthodox Marxist and Korsch did not, both shared an interpretation of Marxist theory which, as Oskar Negt put it in what is probably the best essay in the anthology being reviewed, ended up being "a monumental transcendental philosophy whose fundamental categories do not change" (p. 103). The absence of a theory of science and of the problematic of constitution (which, in many respects, amounts to the same thing)

eventually led Korsch to present historical materialism as "an empirical and scientific method with which to penetrate the 'eidola' standing in the way of unbiased research, and to determine 'with the precision of natural science' the real subject matter hidden behind the interminable confusion of 'ideological' disguises."³⁶ Its claims, therefore, could be empirically verified as in any other science. It is no wonder that Korsch in his later years earned himself a reputation as a positivist.

Unlike Gramsci who unambiguously located all science and knowledge at the level of the superstructure,³⁷ or the old Lukacs who in an equally unambiguous way fixed science in the dubious Stalinist "infrastructure,"³⁸ Korsch never resolved the problem of science other than, as already indicated, by postulating a unity of theory and practice, and his work contains no critique of science.

It is precisely this postulation of the tendential unity of theory and practice which had given rise in Marxism and Philosophy to the periodization of Marxism and provided Korsch with a key to interpreting the misadventures of Marxism from 1848 to the 1920s. According to such a periodization, Marxism reached a high theoretical level in the works of Marx and Engels while it was the intellectual production of a very restricted number of intellectuals politically engaged in the revolutionary wave which ended in 1850. After that, the separation between Marx's and Engels' rapidly developing theory and the swelling of the workers' movement resulted in a broadening of the base but with a lower theoretical level--German social

democracy.³⁹ Only in the third stage, through the political maturation of the working class and the development of revolutionary situations was it possible for Marxist theory to become once again concrete mediation. Whereas during the pre-1926 period Korsch stressed the primacy of theory over political practice (Leninism) which explains the degeneration of the Second International in terms of lack of correct political theory, after his break with the party, presumably through the influence of the council communists with whom he worked closely, theoretical shortcomings came to be explained in terms of the immaturity of objective conditions. As Ceppa has put it, after his break with the party, "the polemics against Kautsky and against Lenin are never 'genuine' polemics, but rather the rigorous demonstration of the historical necessity of their ideological limitations."⁴⁰ And even when Korsch began to question some of Marx's views, these shortcomings were explained as "unavoidable under the circumstances out of which Marx's materialist social research arose."⁴¹ In a nutshell, as already indicated, Korsch had no meaningful theory of ideology.⁴² This led him to draw too close a relationship between reified forms of thought and reified forms of being, so that, as Negt points out, "in spite of his intention, elements of the theory of reflection" reappeared in his analysis (p. 99). "Precision," "verification," "laws," etc., became part of his vocabulary, while his outlook did not really undergo much of a change.

The eventual rejection of Marxism came about when it became clear to him that the class struggle could no longer be adequately mediated by a Marxism too inextricably rooted in a 19th century

social context. Mattick, who had never been an Hegelian and, therefore, did not have Korsch's theoretical commitment to the unity of social being and social thought, had no problem in remaining a Marxist. The explanation of Korsch's political tragedy, however, is not to be sought, as has become customary,⁴³ under the unconscious influence of official party interpretations, in his "isolation from the workers' movement," but in his inadequate critique of objectivism which, as Negt has put it, led him to insist on "the restoration of the practico-revolutionary content of the authentic philosophy of Marxism through the program of applying historical materialism to its own history" (p. 95).

The failure of vindicating the autonomy of theory takes its toll.

Thus, in spite of himself, Korsch ends up uncritically carrying out a mechanical transposition of theoretical mediations onto the level of metaphysics which, in restoring the original character of Marxist theory, also remained an expression of its original context, thus trapping Korsch within a perspective which, under the new conditions of advanced capitalism, had very little chance of being politically viable.

Following Krahl, who against Habermas' trivialization of praxis into instrumental and symbolic interaction, vindicated the phenomenological problematic of constitution,⁴⁴ Negt shows how Korsch fell victim to objectivism by restricting himself within the dimension of the "already constituted," thus losing the critical thrust of Marx and Engels--and even of Kant's philosophy (pp. 100-101). This is why economics becomes the only viable Marxist sociology and "his theory breaks up in two parts which in Korsch's

work co-existed with unequal importance." Thus, "on the one hand elements of contemplative materialism come to the fore in relation to the particular empirical sciences, while on the other, and in contraposition to it, Marxist theory is converted in the theory of class struggle" (p. 101).⁴⁶ The reification of historical materialism into a formal method de-historicizes its structure and forces the content to be dealt with as preconstituted and as already given. This is why Korsch "obstructs the road that could have led him to a lively development of Marxist theory" (p. 103), and, notwithstanding the fact that he has been classified as a "fanatic of historical specification," Negt concludes that in Korsch there is not even one "specific and material analysis carried out under the sign of his theoretical vindication" (p. 104).

These theoretical shortcomings translate into major political problems when in the 1930s Korsch sought to provide an analysis of new socio-economic developments and devise a political strategy adequate to them. Thus, the realization of the bourgeois character of both social-democracy and Bolshevism, combined with the attempted thematization of the capitalist overcoming of its laissez-faire or competitive phase⁴⁶ led him and other council communists to formulate the thesis of state capitalism and to eventually foresee the imminent fascistization of the world.⁴⁷ But these changes in socio-economic content do not find a corresponding change in the theoretical form meant to mediate these very changes in a revolutionary direction. Far from re-examining the base-superstructure distinction along lines such as, e.g., critical theory, where the shift from entrepreneurial to monopoly capitalism finds its theoretical

expression in the collapse of base and superstructure and the subsequent thematization of the integrational function of the culture industry⁴⁸ or of the internalization of capitalist mechanisms within the very structure of personality,⁴⁹ Korsch remains firm within the reified version of a Marxism rooted in entrepreneurial capitalism. As a result, his penetrating insights into social developments in the 1930s lead him to predict the political re-composition of the working class and the coming of the final revolutionary confrontations.⁵⁰ When subsequent developments falsified such a prediction, Korsch still refused to undertake a theoretical reconstitution of Marxism and chose to abandon it altogether.

The Korschian lesson, therefore, is primarily negative and, presumably, its function within the present Spanish context is essentially to prevent a repetition of the errors of the past. Marxism must be grounded in praxis, but at the same time it must not be identified as a mere pragmatic mediation nor reduced to an expression of socio-historical conditions. After the 1930s and the advent of fascism, Stalinism or, more generally, the more recent forms of totally administered society, the working class has been systematically prevented from fulfilling the role assigned to it by Hegelian Marxists. The politicization of economics and its instrumentalization to guarantee the class compromise character of the whole post-WWII period makes the Hegelian Marxist project of radicalizing Marxism and wresting it away from the bureaucratized travesties of the Second and Third Internationals unable any longer to pretend to ground itself in the proletariat as its collective subject. It is not a matter of

whether, but of how to retreat to the bourgeois individual. In this respect, the fate of Korsch, Lukacs, Gramsci and the Frankfurt School is indicative of the various options. With the exception of Lukacs, who opted very early for the bureaucratic solution rather than the return to the bourgeois individual, and Gramsci, who did not live to confront the consequences of the failures of his brand of Marxism, Korsch and Adorno provide typical cases. Neither of the two succeeded in providing satisfactory solutions to the main problem. Korsch's retreat went through American empirical science whose character completely baffled him,⁵¹ while Adorno went back to the pre-WWI model--precisely the one that Lukacs had managed to reject by moving first to Hegelianism and then to Marxism in the immediate pre-1920 period. None of these alternatives are satisfactory.

If a retreat has to be made, however, then it may well be to what in 1937 Marcuse derisively called the last bourgeois perspective⁵² at a time in which he still hung onto the belief in the possibility of a radical transformation before the coming of the WWII holocaust. The return to the phenomenological problematic is the only salvation for Hegelian Marxism. Within it the communist ideal of a society of free subjects does not take on the character of an unattainable Kantian ideal as in Adorno, but can be grounded, through absolute historicism, in a long-range political project. In a context within which wage-labor is systematically prevented from ever becoming praxis and thus making it impossible for the "class in itself" to become the "class for itself," praxis itself becomes anarchist and, more than ever,

transcends these class lines which have long since ceased to make much of a difference in terms of revolutionary consciousness. What this means in terms of the practical problem of societies such as Spain in the process of undergoing a major transition, is that the old third-internationalist Marxist rhetoric can only be an obstacle to political and social emancipation: meaningful solutions will have to be sought elsewhere. As in the case of the council phenomenon which is the real historical experience giving rise to the Hegelian Marxism of the 1920s, the new theoretical perspective will have to come from the new experiences of the transition period by settling the account with the theoretical debris of the past, thus preventing "the tradition of all the dead generations" from weighing "like a nightmare on the brain of the living."⁵³ *KB*

Precisely because of their therapeutic theoretical function, books such as Karl Korsch o el Nacimiento de una Nueva Epoca are a welcome sight--especially given their place of publication. Of course, the choice of the essays could have been better: Buckmiller's polemic against Negt adds very little to the understanding of either Korsch or the present theoretical and revolutionary tasks, while Rusconi's attempted comparison of Korsch, Gramsci and Bordiga does not go much beyond showing that differences of perspectives within the Linkscommunismus opposition, which "prevented that extraordinary personalities [such as Korsch and Bordiga] could come together in an effective common action" (p. 80). Presumably written much earlier while he was still under the neo-Bordigean group rotating around Quaderni Piacentini and

Rivista Storica del Socialismo, Rusconi fails to investigate the full wealth of the left opposition--something that remains yet to be done⁽⁵⁴⁾ Yet, the choice of Korsch's "Crisis of Marxism" (1931),⁵⁵ and "The Young Marx as an Activist Philosopher" (1934) shows excellent judgment, which the editor will hopefully exercise again in other similarly useful anthologies.

NOTES

1. Of course, one of the reasons why such an anthology could be published in Spain but not in Russia may be the violent anti-Bolshevik character of most of the essays--and Korsch's work as well. Yet, if one recalls that in Spain the most powerful radical force in the 1930s was not Bolshevism but a variety of anarcho-communism very close to Korsch's vision, the publication of the anthology appears all the more politically explosive. The publisher may have printed it as a result of lingering pre-Franco political sympathies, while the censors may have approved it because of its general anti-Bolshevik thrust.

2. Even the republication of all the issues of Council Correspondence, Living Marxism, and New Essays by Greenwood Publishing Co. (Westport, Conn., 1971), has remained practically unnoticed although there are many points of contact between the Marxism of the New Left and Council Communism. Cf. Stanley Aronowitz, "Left-Wing Communism: The Answer to Lenin," in Dick Howard and Karl Klare, eds., The Hidden Dimension: European Marxism since Lenin (New York, 1971).

3. Thus, if worse comes to worst, Spain and Portugal will precipitate disastrous civil war before accepting bureaucratic collectivism. This time the Warsaw Pact troops will be too far away to readily "legitimate" any Kadar or Husak type of regimes in Spain or Portugal.

4. Karl Korsch, Die materialistische Geschichtsauffassung und andere Schriften, hrsg. Erich Garlach (Frankfurt, 1971), p. 130.

5. Karl Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, trans. Fred Halliday (London, 1970), p. 117. Cf. also Karl Korsch, "The Passing of Marxian Orthodoxy: Bernstein-Kautsky-Luxemburg-Lenin," in International Council Correspondence, vol. III, nos. 11-12 (December, 1937), pp. 7-11. Korsch's evaluation of Lenin, of course, was mediated by Stalinism. In the mid-1930s, he must have become aware of the Philosophical Notebooks, or what had been published of them in 1932, since in his review of Pannekoek's Lenin als Philosoph,

he cites them. Yet, his viewpoint closely associating forms of being and forms of thought led him to interpret this return to Hegel as an intellectual fulfillment of the bourgeois character of the Russian Revolution: "Thus the whole circle not only of bourgeois materialistic thought but of all bourgeois philosophical thought from Holbach to Hegel was actually repeated by the Russian dominated phase of the Marxist movement, which passed from the adoption of 18th century and Feuerbachian materialism by Plekhanov and Lenin in the pre-war period to Lenin's appreciation of the 'intelligent idealism' of Hegel and other bourgeois philosophers of the 19th century as against the 'unintelligent materialism' of the earlier 18th century philosophers." Cf. Karl Korsch (under the pseudonym I.h.), "Lenin's Philosophy," in Living Marxism, vol. IV, no. 5 (November, 1938), p. 141. Apparently, both with the passage of time as well as his better acquaintance with Lenin's texts, Korsch's evaluation of Lenin improved considerably. Thus, in 1946 when he published four documents in his "A Non-Dogmatic Approach to Marxism," in Politics (May, 1946), he included passages of a very early (1894) polemic of Lenin against objectivism which vindicated the view of Marxism as grounded on a particular class viewpoint--precisely what Korsch himself had never tired of arguing, for instance, against Ruda and the Russian Marxists. See Karl Korsch, "Why I am a Marxist," in Modern Quarterly, vol. IX, no. 2 (April, 1935), pp. 88-95. LADIC

6. Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London, 1971), p. 84.

7. For an excellent account of convergences and divergences of Korsch and Lukacs during the 1920s, see Paul Breines, "Praxis and its Theorists: The Impact of Lukacs and Korsch in the 1920s," in Telos 11 (Spring, 1972), pp. 67-104.

8. No. 39, January-February 1972, and no. 40, March-April 1972. Vacca's piece is a summary of his book Lukacs o Korsch? (Bari, 1969). Cf. Paul Breines' review of Vacca's book in Telos 6 (Fall, 1970).

9. Cf. Karl Korsch, "The Marxist Ideology in Russia," in Living Marxism, vol. IV, no. 2 (March, 1938), pp. 44-50. See also "The Struggle against Fascism begins with the Struggle against Bolshevism," Living Marxism, vol. IV, no. 8 (September, 1939), p. 255, where it is argued that "Fascism is merely a copy of Bolshevism." Mattick, of course, still holds onto notions such as "state capitalism" and "state socialism." See Paul Mattick, Marx and Keynes (Boston, 1969), ch. XX, pp. 278-291; and his "Der Leninismus und die Arbeiterbewegung des Westens," in Lenin: Revolution und Politik (Frankfurt, 1970), pp. 7-46. For a devastating critique of these notions, see Antonio Carlo, "The Socio-Economic Nature of the USSR," Telos 21 (Fall, 1974), pp. 2-86. LADIC

10. Interestingly enough, a very similar position was taken by Castoriadis and at least some of the members of the Socialisme ou Barbarie group immediately after World War II. Castoriadis

argued that the development of the bureaucracy in Russia finally unified the class enemy and would have had to trigger a complementary unification of the working class, thus setting the stage for the final confrontation. Cf. Cornelius Castoriadis, "Phenomenologie de la Conscience Proletarienne," in La Societe Bureaucratique, vol. 1 (Paris, 1973), pp. 115-129. ~~The two groups developed autonomously and it was not until the 1950s that they came into contact with each other, when Castoriadis sent some issues of Socialisme ou Barbarie to Pannekoek.~~ In the ensuing correspondence (which eventually turned sour for not-altogether clear reasons) focusing on whether Russia was state-capitalist or bureaucratic-collectivist, the similarity in outlook is striking. Cf. "Reponse au Camarade Pannekoek," and "Postface a la Reponse au Camarade Pannekoek," in Cornelius Castoriadis, L'Experience du Mouvement Ouvrier, vol. 1 (Paris, 1974), pp. 249-277, which reprints both of Pannekoek's letters. Apparently, the council communists had reached most of the conclusions that Socialisme ou Barbarie came to almost 20 years earlier. Even Korsch's eventual rejection of Marxism in the 1940s anticipated by at least two decades a similar outcome in the mid-1960s with people such as Castoriadis and Lefort, and for almost exactly the same reasons and with the very same arguments.

11. Karl Korsch, Karl Marx (New York, 1963), p. 235.

12. Karl Korsch, "Dix Theses sur le Marxisme aujourd'hui," in the appendix to the French translation of Marxisme et Philosophie (Paris, 1964), pp. 185-187.

13. Mattick, Marx and Keynes, op.cit., p. 336. Cf. the very same passage in his Critique of Marcuse (New York, 1972), p. 105.

14. "What Is Communism?" in Council Correspondence, no. 1 (October, 1934).

15. Mattick, Marx and Keynes, op.cit., p. 339; Critique of Marcuse, op.cit., p. 96.

16. Critique of Marcuse, p. 84.

17. Korsch, Karl Marx, op.cit., p. 234.

18. Gian Enrico Rusconi, "La Problematica dei Consigli in Karl Korsch," in Annali Feltrinelli, vol. 15 (Milan, 1974), p. 1205.

19. Karl Korsch, "Pratiker Sozialismus," in Die Tat, vol. 11, no. 10 (1920).

20. Throughout his life Korsch attacked such a view. Cf. Karl Korsch, "Why I am a Marxist," op.cit.

21. For an excellent analysis of these problems, see Lucio Colletti, "The Theory of the Crash," Telos 13 (Fall, 1972), pp. 34-46.

22. It is interesting that, almost half a century later, the same argument reappears in a well-known essay by Wolfgang Müller and Christel Neusüss, "Die Sozialstaatsillusion und die Widerspruch von Lohnarbeit und Kapital," in Probleme des Klassenkampfes, Sonderheft 1 (June, 1971), pp. 71-98 (English translation will be forthcoming in Telos 25, Fall 1975); to point out the limitations of state intervention, and, therefore, vindicate the old theory of the crash. For a critical evaluation, see Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Tom McCarthy (Boston, 1975), pp. 50-60.

23. Cf. Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (London, 1971), p. 242.

24. See Karl Korsch, "Die Politik im neueren Deutschland," Der Geist der neuen Volksgemeinschaft (Berlin, 1919), pp. 63-71. Korsch writes: "Socialization of the economy and socialization of education are only two faces of the same process of transition from a private to a communal socialist economy. This transition is not important only and primarily for questions of production and consumption of material goods, but it is a cultural and spiritual question of immense import."

25. Cf. Rusconi, "La Problematica dei Consigli in Karl Korsch," op.cit., p. 1202; and Michael Buckmiller, "Observaciones sobre la Critica de Korsch de Oskar Negt," in the anthology being reviewed, p. 117.

26. Leonardo Ceppa, "La Concezione del Marxismo in Karl Korsch," Annali Feltrinelli, vol. XV (Milan, 1974), p. 1250.

27. Ibid., p. 1247.

28. Karl Korsch, "Ueber materialistische Dialektik," originally published in Die Internationale, vol. VII, nos. 10-11 (June 2, 1924), pp. 376-379, and subsequently reprinted in all German editions of Marxismus und Philosophie. For reasons neither clear nor justifiable this important essay has been omitted from the English translation of Marxism and Philosophy.

29. Ibid.

30. Interestingly enough, when Adorno wanted to exemplify identity theory in Marxist theory, he specifically mentioned Korsch and... Diamati! Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik (Frankfurt am Main, 1966), p. 144.

31. Cf. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, op.cit., p. 465.

32. Cf. Theodor W. Adorno, "Marginalien zu Theorie und Praxis," in Stichworte: Kritische Modelle 2 (Frankfurt am Main, 1970), pp. 169-191.

33. In many respects, this is precisely what Lukacs also attempted to do. For reasons which I have elaborated elsewhere, however, Lukacs ended up recuperating the whole Leninist problematic within the Hegelian Marxist model, whereas Gramsci was able to avoid such an outcome. Cf. my "Dialectic and Materialism in Lukacs," Telos 11 (Spring, 1972), pp. 105-133; and "Introduction" to Antonio Gramsci, History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci (St. Louis, 1975).

34. Karl Korsch, "Grundsätzliches über Sozialisierung," in Schriften zur Sozialisierung (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p. 73.

35. Korsch, "Ueber materialistische Dialektik," op.cit., p. 379.

36. Korsch, Karl Marx, op.cit., pp. 230-231.

37. Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, op.cit., p. 468.

38. Cf. "Preface to the New Edition (1967)," in History and Class Consciousness, op.cit. x

39. Korsch, Marxism and Philosophy, op.cit., pp. 56-58.

40. Leonardo Ceppa, "La Concezione del Marxismo in Karl Korsch," op.cit., p. 1250.

41. Korsch, Karl Marx, op.cit., p. 231.

42. Among Korsch's many unfinished manuscripts there is one which, according to the editor of the 1967 German edition of Karl Marx, he wanted to expand into a full volume dealing with the doctrine of ideology and of the State. Apparently, nothing came of it and the few remarks that remain indicate a mere historicist critique of the metaphysical conception of immutable truths. In the last two paragraphs, Korsch restates his thesis concerning the identity of forms of being and forms of thought which throughout his life prevented him from dealing with ideologies other than as immediate extensions of social being: "...forms of consciousness cannot change before a change in the bourgeois mode of production," in Karl Korsch, Karl Marx, ed. Götz Langkau (Frankfurt and Vienna, 1967), appendix V.

43. See, for example, Ceppa, op.cit., p. 1259.

44. Hans-Jürgen Krahl, Konstitution und Klassenkampf (Frankfurt, 1971).

45. Rusconi comes to very similar conclusions concerning Korsch's earlier works: "the active theoretical thrust...breaks down on the one hand in the empirical scientification of the dialectical method, while on the other, in its militant function." Cf. Gian Enrico Rusconi, "Dialektik in pragmatischer Anwendung," in Claudio Pozzoli, ed., Ueber Karl Korsch, vol. 1 (Frankfurt, 1973).

46. Cf. "Capitalism and Planning," in Council Correspondence, no. 4 (January, 1935), pp. 5-15.

47. Karl Korsch, "The Fascist Counter Revolution," in Living Marxism, vol. 5, no. 2 (Fall, 1940), pp. 29-41; and "The Workers' Fight against Fascism," vol. 5, no. 3 (Winter, 1941), pp. 36-49.

48. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of the Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York, 1972), chapter on "The Culture Industry: Enlightenment as Mass Deception," pp. 120-167. cf

49. Cf. Studien über Autorität und Familie (Paris, 1936).

50. Cf. Ceppa, op.cit., p. 1254.

51. For Korsch's own evaluation of the differences between America and European science, see his letter to Paul Partos of July 30, 1939, in Alternative, no. 41 (April, 1965), pp. 76-77.

52. Herbert Marcuse, Negations, trans. Jeremy Shapiro (Boston, 1968), p. 154.

53. Karl Marx, "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Selected Works, vol. 1 (Moscow, 1962), p. 247.

54. For a good step in that direction, see Die Linke gegen die Partei herrschaft, hrsg. Fritz Kool (Olten, 1970).

55. This piece has been recently translated into English and published with an Introduction by David Bathrick, in New German Critique 3 (Fall, 1974), pp. 3-11.