The deep changes in Vietnamese society, together with the heroic resistance of our people in Nam Bo, had gradually brought about changes in the minds of the more far-sighted officers among the French military commanders. They felt that De Gaulle’s statement of March 24, 1945 lagged ten years behind the actual situation here.
According to French documents, after occupying a number of provinces in Nam Bo, the French staff in Saigon worked out a military plan for a return to North Viet Nam. In its outline, the plan provided for the use of Massu’s armoured units and Valluy’s light infantry for a landing on Haiphong under artillery cover; the use of paratroops for the occupation of crucial positions in Hanoi with a view to neutralizing our central government, freeing the five thousand French troops detained in the citadel, rearming them quickly and using them to assist the paratroops in taking control of Hanoi pending the arrival of the armoured units; then, they would proceed to occupy all strategic positions...
But the French Command expressed reserve about that plan, which seemed to be highly adventurist. The strength of the French expeditionary force in Nam Bo had reached 35,000 men. Yet the realities of the war had shown that even if the French generals had an army several times as strong, they would not be able to bring the situation in Nam Bo back to the days before French overthrow.
Under such conditions, they would have to face the strength of a whole nation if they widened the war to the whole of Viet Nam. The French generals were also well aware that in the North they would be opposed by resistance forces that were many times as strong as those in the South. To restore colonial rule here, Leclerc estimated he would need an expeditionary force of 350,000 men, all white. That was what France, exhausted after the Second World War, could not afford. And even if he could have such a large army, Leclerc still realized that this “restoration” work would need much time and would meet with great difficulties and obstacles.
On the other hand, in the North, there were still 180,000 Chiang troops doing the task of disarming the Japanese. If they sent their troops to the North, the French were likely to clash with Chiang’s army. It would be very dangerous.
The more clear-minded of the French generals realized that an adequate solution for the Indochinese problem should be a political one: negotiations with Chungking for a withdrawal of the Chiang army and its replacement by the French; parley with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam to avoid a long war with little chance of a way out.
The French government quickly sought negotiations with Chungking. It was a hard job, but they did not meet only with difficulties.
In the past, China had also been victim of French imperialism. At present, China had nominally become one of the five big powers in the world. But in reality, the Chiang Kai-shek administration was still dependent on the United States in various respects. The French and the Americans disliked each other. But the Americans, British and French shared a common concern over the powerful development of the Soviet Union after the Second World War. This “peril” was due — many Western strategists bitterly complained — to the victory of the Allied forces over fascism in the Second World War. The Americans were trying to gather the forces of the European capitalist states to cope with the so-called “Russian peril”. Thus, they could not remain indifferent to French interests.
Late in August 1945, when he visited the United States, De Gaulle had suggested to Truman that he should help the French in the Indochinese question.
On the other hand, the internal situation in China was troubling Chiang. After the Japanese capitulation and facing the surging revolutionary movement, the Koumintang militarists were forced to sign the “October 10 Agreement” with the Chinese Communist Party. Both sides agreed to avoid a civil war, to open a political consultative conference on the basis of unity, solidarity, democracy and peace. But hardly had the ink dried when Chiang Kai-shek launched a massive attack against the revolutionary base areas, deploying as many as 1,800,000 troops. By such a treacherous action they hoped to smash the Red Army within a short time. But they were faced with fierce resistance on all fronts. The fighting spread over eleven provinces. Within one month, 110,000 Chiang troops were put out of action. The revolutionary fire was ablaze over the whole Chinese mainland. Chiang was forced to resort to delaying tactics with a view to making further preparations for war. He signed a cease-fire agreement on January 10, 1946 and started the Political Consultative Conference.
So, Chiang Kai-shek was meeting with many difficulties. Under those circumstances, he would probably have to withdraw a large part of his army in northern Indochina so as to consolidate his rear bases.
Early in January 1946, Leclerc sent a negotiator to Chungking. He was General Salan, who had been appointed Commander of the French forces in northern Indochina in replacement of Alessandri. Salan obtained some initial results: Chungking allowed the French troops detained in China to return to Lai Chau.
Toward mid-January, at a United Nations session, the French Government’s delegate Moutet met Chiang’s representative and suggested concrete negotiating terms. Chiang Kai-shek expressed approval when he got the report. Paris sent at once a new ambassador, Merrier, to Chungking. Merrier was instructed by the French Government to conclude an agreement within the shortest possible time. But Chungking wanted to let the negotiations drag on with a view to gaining more advantages in the final bargain.
The negotiations with Chiang were unanimously approved by all the colonialists. But many of them openly opposed any negotiations with us. De Gaulle still wanted to maintain the French empire nearly as it had been. He would not listen to the advice of the so-called “liberals”. D’Argenlieu, the High Commissioner, was a very conservative colonialist naval officer, loyal to De Gaulle’s ideas and policies. He wanted to preserve all the French prerogatives and privileges. The French colonialists with interests in Indochina, especially the former administrators, were angry to hear about negotiating with the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. For them, the only question was how to restore the old colonial regime as it had existed before March 9, 1945. They regarded negotiations with us as a shameful surrender.
On January 20, 1946, there was a change in the political situation in France. De Gaulle resigned. Felix Gouin, a member of the Socialist Party, took office. Leclerc’s plan for negotiations with the Vietnamese Government was considered appropriate by Paris. D’Argenlieu deemed it necessary to return to France to defend his position. On February 13, he left Saigon. While in temporary command in place of d’Argenlieu, Leclerc, instructed the French delegation in Chungking to try to reach an early agreement with Chiang; on the other hand, he urged Sainteny to step up the negotiations with our Government.
The negotiating position of the French Government as put forward by the French mission in Hanoi this time was somewhat different from the previous one. However, the French did not accept as yet our basic claims: independence and territorial integrity. Uncle Ho’s consistent, calm but very firm attitude made a strong impression on the French negotiators.
In Chungking, the bargain between the French and Chiang was finally struck. The French agreed to return to Chiang the concessions in Shanghai, Tientsin, Hankow, Canton, the leased land of Kwanchowwan, and to sell him the Yunnan railway. In disregard of our sovereignty, they agreed with Chiang that Haiphong would become a free port, and Chinese goods could be carried in transit through northern Viet Nam duty-free. In exchange, Chiang Kai-shek agreed to let French troops replace his own in northern Indochina, and the operation was to be completed between March 1 and March 15 — by March 31, 1946 at the latest.
That was the content of the Sino-French Agreement signed on February 28, 1946. After the signing, Salan hurriedly returned to Hanoi and prepared for the comeback of the French to North Viet Nam. Crepin remained in Chungking to discuss the procedure for the troop replacement.
On March 1, Leclerc got news from Chungking that everything had been settled.
The Fench fleet had been waiting to sail for several days.
According to French documents available to us later, Leclerc immediately put his paratroops on the alert and ordered his fleet to weigh anchor.