D’Argenlieu returned to France in mid-February. Among the French ruling circles, there had been changes that ran counter to his wishes. General De Gaulle, his master who had appointed him High Commissioner in Indochina, had resigned, Felix Gouin, a Socialist Party member, was nominated Prime Minister of the provisional government. The Ministry of the Colonies, formerly held by one of De Gaulle’s close associates had become the “Ministry of Overseas France” and was held by Marius Moutet, also a Socialist. The Gouin government, with a majority of members belonging to the Socialist Party, had agreed to the plan of negotiation with the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam, proposed by Leclerc. D’Argenlieu was most active in seeking support from rightwing elements in the new administration in France. He clamoured everywhere that the Viet Minh was an “anti-French party”, which could not be trusted, that “Ho Chi Minh and the other Viet Minh leaders” were all “Communist rebels”. Early in April, he came back to Saigon.
After the Preliminary Agreement of March 6 became public, D’Argenlieu made a speech over Saigon radio. The High Commissioner praised the morale of French troops during the days after the Japanese coup. He blamed the Japanese for having aroused “evil desires among the natives”, meaning the Indochinese people’s aspirations for independence. He expressed thanks for the British army who had helped France to return to Nam Bo. D’Argenlieu referred to the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam as “the Hanoi authorities” or “the Hanoi government”. He was compelled to mention what had been stipulated in the Agreement: “The Democratic Republic of Viet Nam has its own government, its own parliament, its own finances and its own army”. But he added: “I should like to tell you that Cambodia also has its own government, its own army, its own finances and is going to have its own parliament”. He praised what the French had done in Nam Bo, i.e. the establishment of a consultative council. Finally, he expressed the hope that “Indochinese in all walks of life” would “proliferate and prosper”.
That colonialist-minded speech was immediately attacked by our press in vigorous fashion.
On March 9, 1946, the Minister of Overseas France, Moutet, submitted the Vietnam — French Preliminary Agreement to the Council of Ministers in Paris. The Agreement was approved by the French Government. But only a few days later, on March 14, Moutet himself stated that Cochinchina would have a free constitution and would “enjoy a separate regime like the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam”. This showed that we should not expect much from the so-called Socialists in power in the French government.
With regard to the Agreement that the French government had just approved, the French in Indochina were most inconsistent in their words and deeds.
On March 13, Leclerc issued an appeal to French troops and citizens urging them to have a friendly attitude towards Vietnamese. Sainteny wrote in the newspaper L’Entente published in Hanoi: “It is not with vain regret for an out-dated past that one can build up a fine and full future”. But at the same time, in Nam Bo, the French scattered leaflets from the air calling on the Vietnamese army to surrender their arms. On March 9, French troops were mustered in Ca Mau, Rach Gia... They launched surprise attacks against many positions held by our troops. Our armed forces resolutely fought back in self-defence. The guns were still booming in Nam Bo. In the North, the newly-landed French troops made movement without asking for our leave.
By mid-March, leaders of the Viet Nam Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party agreed to issue a Joint order on the integration of administrations and armies. The parties were to cooperate in a friendly way, refrain from attacking or arresting each other’s members, refrain from intimidating the population, carry out propaganda freely in a lawful manner, and strictly abide by the Government’s order.
Just one day after the order was published in the press, on March 16, the Nationalists had a group of their henchmen march in the streets shouting slogans against the signing of the Preliminary Agreement. When they arrived at Hang Dau square, our police forced them to disperse. Three of our policemen were injured when doing their duty. The Nationalists continued to stage kidnappings in the cities.
The situation developed according to the forecast of the Party Bureau in its directive “Make peace in order to advance:” A new stage in the struggle, most complex and no less fierce, had started.
Two days after the signing of the Preliminary Agreement President Ho met with district chiefs and company commanders of the Hanoi self-defence corps at the city hall. He said, “The signing of this ceasefire agreement does not mean an end to the war, nor is our moderate and mild attitude towards French troops one of limpness or passivity. On the contrary, more than ever, we should strengthen our forces and heighten the morale of the whole people so as to cope with all eventualities. The spirit of resistance should be maintained and careful preparations be permanently in force without a second or a minute’s relaxation”. He talked to the comrades there for one and a half hours.
In a letter to the Nam Bo people and fighters dated March 11, Uncle Ho wrote:
“During this ceasefire period, especially when troops from both sides have to remain at their present positions, it is more than ever necessary to make preparations, strengthen your forces and observe discipline. And later, when peace is achieved your mettle will be a valuable force to guarantee the complete independence of our country for the future.”
On March 13, President Ho sent a letter to our compatriots and to the government and peoples in the world denouncing the French for their acts contrary to the spirit of the Agreement. He called on our people to keep calm and be ready to act on order. He called on the peoples and governments in the world, especially the French people, to support our just cause and to demand that the French government carry out the Agreement. On the same day, President Ho sent a message reminding the French side of the need to open formal negotiations, as it had been agreed that such negotiations were to start at once.
Meetings and demonstrations surged up everywhere. In Hanoi, a hundred thousand people gathered on the grounds of the University students’ hostels demanding that the French stop all acts contrary to the Agreement and open formal negotiations in Paris at once. The masses shouted slogans: “Support President Ho”, “We’re ready to obey the Government’s orders” and “Nam Bo is part of Viet Nam.”
In spite of the reactionaries’ acts of sabotage, we persisted in carrying out the policy of uniting various parties. A large gathering was held jointly by the Viet Minh, the Revolutionary Alliance and the Nationalist Party at the Municipal Theatre on March 17. Comrade Dong, on behalf of the Viet Minh, explained the necessity of rallying round the Coalition Government for the Resistance and expressed the Viet Minh’s desire to achieve unity. Uncle Ho arrived in the middle of the meeting. A thunder of applause burst out in the auditorium and all the people present stood up. The military band played the tune “Long live Ho Chi Minh.”
The reactionary elements of the Nationalist Party in the Coalition Government advocated seeking support from Chiang and the Americans. On March 12, Nguyen Tuong Tam, arriving at the Foreign Ministry to assume office, declared: “China and the United States have the duty to maintain peace in the Far East.” He constantly spoke of the necessity to keep in touch with the Americans, to win the aid of the Americans and Chiang in every field. Nguyen Tuong Tam proposed that a goodwill mission be sent immediately to Chungking to strengthen Sino-Vietnamese friendship. It was certainly an idea of his masters. Vinh Thuy, who was then at the head of the Foreign Affairs Commission, the task of which was to advise the Government on diplomatic affairs, approved Tam’s proposal. He expressed his wish to go to Chungking. The Chiang leaders in Hanoi also suggested that we should let Vinh Thuy go. We learned later that Marshall was present at Chungking at that time. It was possible that the US imperialists had seen in Vinh Thuy a card they might use later on. The sending of a mission to Chungking would also help lessen the contradictions between us and Chiang. Our Government agreed. It was a severe test for Vinh Thuy. He had said some fine words in August of the previous year: “I’d rather be a citizen of a free nation than king of an enslaved country.” Some time later, he was again to be confronted with a choice: whether to march on with the people or relapse into a traitor’s life. Before French troops arrived in Hanoi, Vinh Thuy had left the capital for China on board an American aeroplane. The short journey made by the last king of the Nguyen dynasty on the side of the people had ended. Not long after the outbreak of the national resistance war, Uncle Ho sent an emissary to Hong Kong to see Vinh Thuy and ask him to return home and join the resistance but he refused. In early December 1948, Vinh Thuy chartered a Catalina sea plane and flew to Ha Long Bay to meet Bolaert who had replaced D’Argenlieu as the French High Commissioner in Indochina. Thus Vinh Thuy’s bargaining with his old master to resume the life of an enslaved puppet started.