In April when General Juin, Commander-in-Chief of the French Army, called at Calcutta on his way to Chungking, d’Argenlieu had sent him a letter through a messenger demanding the recall of Leclerc on the ground that the latter had refused to execute orders from his superiors. As a result of this, Juin decided to appoint Leclerc Inspector General of the French troops in North Africa. Thus the Admiral had his hands free, having succeeded in getting rid of his main adversary in Indochina.
Though the French reactionaries in Saigon had done all they could to delay the journey of the delegation, the two aircraft with Uncle Ho and the delegates aboard were heading for the French capital. The French High Commissioner had to act quickly by the only policy left to him — that of the fait accompli. Without waiting for any answer from the French Government, he rushed ahead with his comedy of “Autonomous Cochinchina”, hastily scenarioed by Cédile.
On June 1, just a day after Uncle Ho’s departure, the formation of the so-called “provisional government of the Republic of Cochinchina”, headed by Doctor Thing, was announced in Saigon. As an aid to confusion, an agreement was signed between the representatives of France and the Republic of Cochinchina which repeated almost word for word, Article I of the March 6 Preliminary Agreement: “The French government recognizes the Republic of Cochinchina as a free State having its own government, parliament, army and finances and forming part of the Indochinese Federation and French Union”. There was an annex to the agreement. What clearly revealed the puppet character of the “provisional government of the Republic of Cochinchina” was the fact that it was to have a French adviser, in the person of Cédile, who was publicly declared to be responsible for the internal and external security of the “Republic”.
The Standing Bureau was well aware that the French reactionaries in Indochina were cynically intensifying their sabotage hoping to create difficulties to these negotiations held at a time when the political situation in France was far from stable. The struggle in the time ahead would certainly be very complicated. We had to remain highly vigilant.
We knew that D’Argenlieu would not stop there.
On the morning of June 26, while working in the Bac Bo Palace, I was informed that General Valluy had come and asked to see me.
On entering Valluy gave a salute, then said at once: “I come as a soldier executing an order from my superiors. I have a note to transmit to the Vietnamese government”.
I had more than once discussed military questions with Valluy. Though outwardly pleasant, open-hearted and courteous he was a cunning and perfidious man. At the banquet given on the occasion of Uncle Ho’s departure, he had brought his daughter who had just come from France. Presenting her to us and joking about his age, he said, “Let the young people sit together”.
This time his manner was different from usual. I had the impression that this was a new provocation. “Give me the note, please,” I said.
He handed me the note and stood waiting. It was a brief communication, addressed to the acting President of the government of the DRVN: “As he has already informed President Ho Chi Minh when he was in Hanoi, the French High Commissioner in Indochina, Admiral D’Argenlieu, has given orders to the French army to occupy the Moi highlands (Tay Nguyen, Ed).”
It seemed to me that Valluy observed me attentively while I was reading the note. This was a new move from the crafty unfrocked priest. I said to Valluy, “If you have come here only to discharge the mission given you by your superiors, your task is fu1filled.”
He left.
On the evening of the same day we learned that at 4 a.m. the French had launched a surprise attack on Tu Bong near Deo Ca. Their aircraft flew very low to strafe our positions. At 10 a.m. they landed in Dai Lanh but, meeting strong opposition on our part, they had to withdraw.
On June 22, they attacked our positions at Cung Son. Repulsed by our forces, they once more pulled out.
On June 23, the French launched a sudden attack at Pleimedden on the road between Pleiku and the Cambodian border.
Hostilities became widespread throughout the Tay Nguyen Highlands.
D’Argenlieu’s scheme was obvious: his seizure of the Tay Nguyen Highlands would be the preliminary to the formation of a “Republic of Tay Ky”. Our armed forces there received the order to hit back resolutely at any aggressive French action. The acting President sent a note to the French, refuting their allegations and strongly protesting against their illegal action. It read: “President Ho Chi Minh was never informed by the French that they would occupy the Tay Nguyen region and he never in any way agreed on such an occupation”.
Meanwhile, on June 25, an incident took place in Hanoi: The French occupied the former Governor General’s palace. Even before the withdrawal of the Chiang Kai-shek troops we had more than once held discussions with the French on taking over this sector. Valluy had agreed to wait for the decision of the official negotiations in Paris. Now no sooner had Lu Han left the place than the French troops had occupied it. We protested against this. Valluy tried to deny responsibility by claiming that this was a detachment entrusted with keeping watch over the building.
The French encroachment on the former palace of the Governor General aroused strong indignation among the people.
“We cannot let the French reactionaries and colonialists go on doing as they please. We must prevent them.” On June 27 various parties and political organizations called on the people to hold a general strike in Hanoi, Haiphong and every town with French presence. The government let the people show their condemnation of the illegal actions of French troops but orders were given to public services, water stations and electric plants to continue working.
Protest demonstrations took place at the same time wherever there were French troops. The resolute attitude of our government and people caused anxiety to the French forces. Valluy had to declare that his troops had only entered the former Governor General’s palace to take it over on the withdrawal of the Chiang troops; the palace, he agreed, would be guarded jointly by the Vietnamese and French troops pending the decision of the Paris negotiators.