Late in August, the Western press reported that President Ho had sent a note to the French Government. Then Moutet and Varenne were said to have stated: “The Fontainebleau Conference may be resumed.”
But even the beginning of September saw no resumption of the conference because a great disparity remained between the viewpoints of the two sides. This fact was confirmed by the French Government’s note sent a few days later in reply to that of President Ho: “The difference between the viewpoints of the two sides on fundamental problems is too great to make a resumption of the conference practicable, for such a resumption would not have any success.”
Now came a point about which we had been very anxious: if no agreement could be reached by the two sides, the French reactionaries, undoubtedly aware of the trend of developments in Indochina, might try to obstruct the return of Uncle Ho and our delegation to Viet Nam. However we believed that Uncle Ho would be able to find a solution.
The following days saw a swift succession of news. The French press reported on September 10 that President Ho and our delegation were preparing to leave for home on September 14. On September 12 and 13, it was reported that the Vietnamese and French delegations were working out a summary agreement. But the following day, on September 14, all the French news agencies carried the information that our 15-man delegation had left for Toulon port on September 13 in order to take the ship back to Viet Nam. At the same time, there was a report that President Ho was to leave Paris on September 14 and was to return to Viet Nam aboard a French warship. Thus the reported summary agreement that we had supposed to be a conciliatory action by our delegation before leaving, would not be concluded.
On September 15, according to the latest news given by the French agencies, an Agreement between Viet Nam and France had been signed on Saturday night, September 14, and on Monday morning, September 16, President Ho would leave Paris. Though the content of the Agreement hadn’t been made public, we felt somewhat relieved.
A few days later, Franc-Tireur published an account of the signing of the September 14 Modus Vivendi. It said roughly:
The meeting between President Ho and Mr. Moutet on the night of September 14 took place in a tense atmosphere. The main difficulties were all derived from the problem of Southern Viet Nam. Every time, President Ho Chi Minh suggested the participation of both sides, Viet Nam and France, in the settlement of the southern Viet Nam problem, the French government’s representative replied: “This would be a violation of French sovereignty. It is unacceptable.” Moutet showed himself inflexible. He said: “Will your Excellency, please, sign the Agreement, to avoid a breakdown?” In reply to Mr. Moutet, President Ho Chi Minh reiterated his determination to set out for Viet Nam at 8 a.m. on Monday, then rose to leave. President Ho and the Minister parted coldly at 11 p.m.
The situation became very strained. Those who accompanied President Ho were of the opinion that the Agreement would not be signed.
On his return from Mr. Moutet’s, President Ho went into his room and pondered over the matter. At half past midnight, when all his assistants had gone to bed, he met again with Mr. Moutet. He once more raised the problem of southern Viet Nam. In his persuasive voice, he discussed things with Mr. Moutet and put several questions to him:
“Why does the French government refuse the cooperation of Vietnamese government representatives in bringing about an armistice in southern Viet Nam?”
As a result, the presence of a Vietnamese representative by the side of d’Argenlieu was agreed upon in principle. Then President Ho asked:
“If so, why can’t we agree with each other that such a representative would have the duty to participate in the implementation of the Modus Vivendi?”
This point, too, was approved.
“But will this representative have the right to go to southern Viet Nam?”
Mr. Moutet kept silent. However, Moutet had agreed that Vietnamese would have the right to freedom of movement in southern Viet Nam and that the Vietnamese army could stay on there.
Yet, the question of the movement of the Vietnamese representative by the side of Admiral d’Argenlieu was left pending. However, at long last, the two sides agreed to sign the Modus Vivendi.
We read this article on the news bulletin of a French agency and we were not sure of its authenticity. Two days later, the Modus vivendi was made public. What Franc-Tireur had published was not inconsistent with its content. But the developments which had lead to the conclusion of the Agreement were not clearly known until the return of Uncle Ho and the delegation. The negotiations between our side and France had gone through excruciating movement. And, like the conclusion of the Preliminary Agreement half a year earlier, it was Uncle Ho who made the decision at the eleventh hour.
The struggle for freedom and democracy in France was encountering untold difficulties. The reactionaries’ counter-attacks became more frantic at every success of the democratic forces. The monopolies had never eased their grip on the State apparatus. Even after De Gaulle’s resignation, they maintained their firm control over the key posts of the French government. With Bidault’s coming into power, they were able to further consolidate their rule. As regards the problem of French overseas territories, none of the successive governments had ever suggested any amendment in the French policy going beyond de Gaulle’s statement in Brazzaville on March 24. It was noteworthy that the Inter-Ministerial Council on Indochina had always been in the hands of those who backed De Gaulle’s policy towards colonies, with men such as Bidault, Michelet and then Varenne. This was the mainstay of d’Argenlieu after de Gaulle’s withdrawal from the government.
This fact had been the stumbling block in the earlier negotiations between our side and France at Dalat and the cause leading to the impasse of the Fontainebleau conference. It was under such circumstances that Uncle Ho signed the September 14 Modus Vivendi. The document as its name indicated, had only a provisional character and did not contain decisions on questions of principle. These, by mutual agreement, were to be further discussed in early 1947 between the two Governments. It was noteworthy that President Ho had succeeded in his demand for a provision to be inserted in the document that “France undertakes to put into effect democratic freedoms in southern Viet Nam and to cease all acts of force.”