On November 11, President Ho had lodged a strong protest with the Bidault Government over France’s unilateral control of customs and foreign trade in Hai Phong.
Before the conclusion of the Modus Vivendi, on September 10, in Saigon, d’Argenlieu had instructed Morlière to try to establish French control of customs in the Hai Phong area as from October 15.
At the Fontainebleau negotiations, France had raised the customs issue several times. This issue had also been taken up by Moutet in his talks with President Ho in Paris. Customs revenue, as was known, used to make up a large percentage of the total revenue of Indochina. President Ho told Moutet that customs was not an issue that could not be solved by negotiations. The talks between the President and the representative of the French Government, Moutet, resulted in Article 6 of the Modus Vivendi:
“Viet Nam forms a customs union with the other nations in the Indochinese Federation. A coordinating committee on customs and foreign trade shall study necessary measures for putting this into effect and make preparations for the organization of customs in Indochina...”
This Article was completely distorted by the French authorities in Saigon. As Viet Nam had recognized that customs was a federal issue, they said, the coordination committee would simply define control procedures over the exchange and analysis of the customs already collected. On October 14, just one month after the signing of the Modus Vivendi the French in Saigon declared in a circular that the High Commissioner’s September 10 decision on customs would take effect on October 10. In defiance of the stipulations of the Modus Vivendi, the French unilaterally decided that we would need a permit from them for the export of coal, ores, cement, metals, wood, cereals, salt, paper, etc... This was an extremely insolent action. As President Ho had not returned, Huynh Thuc Khang, as Acting President, lodged a strong protest with the French. President Ho, at his meeting with d’Argenlieu in Cam Ranh Bay, said that the customs issue could be solved through the Coordination Committee set up under the terms of the Modus Vivendi. According to him, this committee should meet at once in Hanoi. D’Argenlieu wanted the committee to meet in Dalat so as to link this issue with the other Federal issues. In the end, however, he was obliged to accept Hanoi as the venue. But no meeting of that Committee was ever held.
Aware of the plan of the French reactionaries in Saigon to stage a fait accompli, President Ho Chi Minh sent the Bidault Government a message of protest on November 11. Morlière sent the message to Saigon where it was withheld and it was not until November 26 that it was finally transmitted to France. The delay was not unintentional: the Hai Phong incident had been provoked six days earlier.
The incident began with a minor clash.
On the morning of November 20, a Chinese barge carrying petrol with a permit from the Vietnamese Customs Office sailed into the mouth of the Cam River in Hai Phong. On arrival, it was searched and seized by the French under the pretext that the petrol was contraband. Their act was thus a violation of our sovereignty. Our police intervened. As if they had been waiting for just such an opportunity, the French opened fire. One of our policemen was killed and our men in a self defence unit nearby retaliated. The clash had begun.
At 11 o’clock, a French armoured detachment attacked the railway station area, which was a long way from the site of the morning’s incident. It met with strong resistance from our self-defence forces. Gunfire began to be heard all over the city.
This was not the first time that the French troops and our civil defence forces had clashed in Haiphong. Previously, the Franco-Vietnamese Joint Control Liaison and Control commission had been able to bring the clashes to a stop. But this time, when the Commission members tried to intervene, the Commander of the French forces in Haiphong, Colonel Debès put on a most arrogant attitude. He demanded that we release all the detained French soldiers, dismantle the police posts and the barricades erected in the streets and, even more insolently, he demanded the withdrawal of our armed forces from their positions in the Chinese residents’ quarters.
At noon, Debès sent an ultimatum under which we had to meet the above demands before 2 p.m. We agreed to release five French soldiers captured in the morning clashes and demanded the release by the French of ten persons from our side kidnapped some days earlier. Debès’s other absurd demands were rejected.
At 2 p.m. the French launched new attacks. This time the forces deployed were quite big. Covered by tanks, French troops made their way to the Municipal Theatre. Those defending the Theatre fought very valiantly, driving back wave upon wave of the attackers.
To exclude any negotiations, the French slanderously alleged that we had killed Camoin, a major and chief of the French team to the Liaison and Control Commission, who was known to be a man of sense and judgment. In Hanoi, we learned of the clashes immediately after they had taken place. Our representative in the Central Liaison and Control Commission requested that the French High Command intervene to prevent the hostilities from spreading. The French pretended surprise; we should not dramatize the incidents, they said, and hostilities could in no way be spreading. Hostilities in Haiphong, however, did spread that afternoon.
To create conditions for a settlement our Ministry of National Defence, at 3 p.m., moved reinforcements into Haiphong and gave orders that our troops should act only in self defence.
In the evening, on Morlière’s orders, Colonel Lami, who was in charge of political affairs, had a meeting with the head of our military delegation. The two sides discussed the cessation of hostilities in Haiphong and reached an agreement which consisted of the following points: immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Vietnamese and French troops to their former positions; formation of a mixed commission headed by Comrade Hoang Huu Nam and Lami to arrive in Haiphong the next morning.
Morlière approved of the agreement and kept Debès informed of it.
At 8 p.m. our comrades in Haiphong reported that our troops had ceased firing. But the French troops refused to follow suit and even used artillery, placed in Cat Bi. Gunfire was heard all through the night.
On November 21, in the morning, a mixed Franco-Vietnamese delegation travelled to Haiphong by rail. At kilometre zero outside the town, it got a signal from French soldiers to stop for the line was broken. The delegation then had to go into Haiphong by car from Thuong Ly. Haiphong was smelling of gun powder and gunfire was still continuing in many places. Indeed, after arriving at Debès’s headquarters, the delegation was able to note that the ceasefire order was not being observed. It was found imperative that the ceasefire should be at once put into effect and the troops on either side withdrawn to their previous positions.
Our representative saw the Haiphong Party Committee and learned from it that our troops and civil defence units had strictly observed the cease-fire order since the previous evening and captured French soldiers had been returned. He rang up Lami and brought this to his notice.
Gunfire in the city did not cease until 2 p.m. However, Debès still refused to pull his troops back to their old positions claiming he could not carry out the orders of his Hanoi-based superiors because they did not understand the situation. French troops were unable to leave the positions for which they had shed blood. Morlière’s representative thus failed in his efforts to persuade Debès who showed an obstinacy with regard to his superiors that is rather difficult to understand.
Pending further instructions from our government, our representative and Lami discussed the matter and agreed on the following points:
1. A strict ban on either side opening fire for any reason whatsoever.
2. Withdrawal of all French armoured vehicles to their camps.
3. Limitation of night-time movement.
4. Formation of a mixed contingent to be posted at the railway station as a guard force to ensure normal communications.
Debès not only refused to put into effect the fourth point but even demanded that the Municipal Theatre be put under French occupation and that our troops be withdrawn from the former European residential quarter. Our representative rejected this demand. Finally, the two sides could only reach an agreement on troops remaining where they were and the banning of provocative acts by either side.
At last, on the afternoon of November 21, gunfire stopped in Haiphong.
On November 22, in the afternoon the mixed delegation journeyed back to Hanoi to report on the situation. On the way, Lami told us the French wanted to have some sort of settlement.
While hostilities in Haiphong were still going on, President Ho, on November 20, received Lacharrière who had been delegated by Saigon to discuss customs issues, and suggested to him that the mixed commission on customs and foreign trade should meet immediately in Hanoi. Lacharrière relayed the President’s suggestion to Saigon.