

SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE WORLD REVOLUTION



By Jay Lovestone

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CHAPTER ONE

What's Behind Soviet Foreign Policy?

Why the problem of Soviet foreign policy has been provoking so much heart-searching and brain-racking in the labor movement is easily understandable. Here is a question which mirrors the international situation in all its phases and complications: the transitory relationship between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world, the antagonisms among the imperialist powers, the complexities of the struggle of the international working class and the oppressed peoples.

Several recent developments of paramount import have only underscored the vital significance of this problem. These are: the change of policy towards the Soviet Union by the U. S. government—the last of the major powers to drop non-recognition as a method of expressing its disapproval of the Soviet Republic—the aggravated menace of an attack against the Soviet Union thru the open intensive war preparations of Japan and the German-Polish bloc; the remarkable progress achieved by the U. S. S.R. in socialist construction; the consequently enhanced economic power and military efficacy of the Soviets leading it to play a new role in world affairs (entry into the League of Nations, Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, etc.), and the continued grave crisis in the Communist International.

It is in this concrete situation that Soviet diplomacy must be examined, that Soviet foreign policy must be treated. It is this background of events that has caused some serious-minded bourgeois students of Soviet affairs to pose, what appears to them, the following paradox: "Why is it that the Russian Bolsheviks with their concept of the present period as one of wars and revolu-

tions should, nevertheless, have such a strong desire to prolong the equilibrium of peace and to stop war?" This cultured correspondent evidently could not comprehend the marked contrast between the May Day manifesto of the Comintern and a statement by Soviet Ambassador Potemkin in Paris urging an Eastern pact for peace.

The confusion pervading the approach of some to this whole question is brought home to us in the following remarks by Prof. Edgar S. Furniss: "To conclude with a capitalist state a pact that is so much like an old-style military alliance represents a complete reversal of the original Bolshevik foreign policy as derived from the tenets of communism." (Current History, May 1935). Then, in the same vein, some self-acknowledged "pure revolutionists" (Trotskyites) mix malice with their "analysis" and condemn Soviet foreign policy as outright betrayal of the world revolution. Others, recently converted backward—from Communism to Social-Democracy—are especially bitter against the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (C.P.S.U.) every time the U.S.S.R. skillfully utilizes the conflict between imperialist powers for delaying or avoiding aggression against the Soviet Union. Of course, in repudiating such malignant distorters, we only emphasize our conviction that honest and constructive criticism of specific phases of Soviet foreign policy in the ranks of the workers is undeserving of abuse, is appropriate and welcome.

Too many look upon foreign policy as something abstract, as intergovernmental relations in a vacuum, without regard for the class basis of the states involved. Likewise, too many conceive Bolshevik

foreign policy merely as affairs arranged by Soviet diplomats, the exchange of notes, or the conclusion of diplomatic, commercial or military treaties. Such an approach is totally inadequate, is false from beginning to end. To the sole working class government, the U. S. S.R., surrounded by a world of enemies, foreign policy has always been only the strategy and tactics pursued by the proletarian dictatorship in its relations with imperialist and non-Soviet countries. Viewed in this light, Soviet foreign policy cannot be imperialist; it involves nothing but the strategy of finding the most effective steps in its inter-government relations for the purpose of securing the defense and strengthening of the Soviet Union as a proletarian state and, therefore, as the base of the international labor movement, the base of the world revolution.

Thus we must realize as axiomatic the following:

1. Due to the fact that the proletariat has not yet won power in any country but Russia, the working class government of the U.S.S.R. must reckon on living at peace and having economic and political relations with the capitalist ruling classes. The protraction of this truce until the proletariat of some other countries take power is conducive to the maintenance of power in the hands of the already victorious section of the international movement (the Russian).

2. The Soviet Union must utilize and exploit the differences among the imperialist powers in the interest of the proletarian power, especially because it is surrounded by a world of enemies.

3. The state form of the capitalist ruling class dominating any particular country does not determine its relations with the Soviet Union or the policy of the U.S.S.R. towards it. Italy, with its Fascist form of capitalist dictatorship, was among the first to establish normal relations with the Soviet Union. The British bourgeoisie, with its constitutional monarchy, was not among the first. The U. S., with its much-vaunted republican form of capitalist state power, was, until recently, vigorously opposed even to recognizing the Soviet Republic.

For that matter, nor does the form of capitalist state determine the foreign policies of any one bourgeois government

to any other. It is the economic and political interests, under given conditions, that are decisive. It is not improbable that the next war will be fought in the name of "democracy" against Fascism—or of "peace" against war. It is furthermore probable that amongst the best bombing planes on the side of capitalist democracy will be Mussolini's squadrons. In the welter of the conflict of economic and political interests the exact form of the capitalist dictatorship does not count, is immaterial. Obviously, the Soviet government, in its relations with capitalist powers, cannot fail to face reality—must not base its relations on the non-existent.

4. In formulating policies in its foreign relations the Soviet government must resort to constant adaptation—adjustment and readjustment—to the concrete conditions prevailing at any particular moment. Capitalist powers "friendly" to the Soviet Union yesterday are potentially its sworn enemies of tomorrow. And its active enemies of yesterday may become the passive and unreliable friends of today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow!

5. The economic and military strength of the Soviet Union, at any particular moment, in comparison with the economic and military strength or weakness of the capitalist powers involved, determines the character of the treaties the U.S.S.R. is able to secure with its frigid friends or its fiery foes.

Measured with these yardsticks, it is not difficult to gauge accurately the change of German bourgeois policy towards the Soviet Union, from the friendly days of Rapallo to the hostile days of Hitler; the turn in American policy from Wilson's military intervention to Roosevelt's recognition; the recent change of front by France and Czechoslovakia, from military intervention to limited mutual assistance pacts; etc.

An examination of the various periods of Soviet foreign policy confirms the soundness of our approach. In general the history of Soviet foreign policy may be thus divided:

1. First came the era of military intervention lasting approximately from 1917 to 1922. These were likewise the days of open, frontal revolutionary struggle against the capitalist regimes

of various countries (Baltic States, Bavaria, Germany, Hungary, Italy, etc.). At this time no major power accorded *de jure* or *de facto* recognition to the Soviet government. Esthonia sort of broke the ice by signing the Treaty of Tartu with the Soviet Republic.

2. The period of negotiations and recognition after the Russian proletariat, with the aid of the labor movement in Western Europe, had defeated the White Guards and their foreign allies in the armies of intervention. The years 1922-1926 witnessed the recognition of the Soviets by most of the big capitalist powers after prolonged negotiations. The Treaty of Tartu, the basis of which was laid down by Lenin, served as the model for the Bolshevik government.

3. A whole series of diplomatic difficulties and ruptures featured the U.S.S.R. foreign relations during 1927-1932. The relations with Great Britain, France, Japan, Chang-tso-Lin, Roumania, Chiang Kai-Shek were considerably strained. In the summer of 1927 the Soviet Union was perilously near war, dangerously near being attacked by Poland, Roumania, and the other lackeys of French and British imperialism. In these tense days the Soviet government resorted to foreign policy aiming to achieve peace for the proletarian state thru negotiations with the powers leading to non-aggression, non-intervention, and neu-

trality. The completion of certain defensive military preparations was the real force behind the arguments of the Soviet diplomats in these hours of strained relations.

4. Since then the U.S.S.R. has entered upon a period of heightened prestige and prowess in its foreign relations, in its role in the international arena. The successful and rapid industrialization of the country, the great headway in collectivizing agriculture, the marked economic and cultural achievements thru the Five Year Plan laid the foundation for another change of attitude on the part of the big powers towards the Soviet Union. The intense economic crisis gripping the leading capitalist countries—specifically the U. S.—drove some of them to less hostile relations with the U.S.S.R. The increased effectiveness of the Red Army cooled Japanese ardor for an attack on the Socialist republic. The rising menace of German imperialism disturbed the French and British governments sufficiently to diminish momentarily their active hostility towards the Soviets.

The political and economic agreements between the U.S.S.R. and other countries are agreements utilized by, constitute the strategy employed by the Soviet Union, as a government, for the purpose of strengthening its international position against attack by a single capitalist country or bloc of imperialist powers.

CHAPTER TWO

Soviet Diplomacy At Work

Throughout the various stages of its foreign policy the U.S.S.R. has pursued a consistent course in which we find certain "red threads", definite guiding lines. Briefly stated these are:

1. To maintain and consolidate the position and to extend the prestige and influence of the Soviet Union as the base of the international proletarian revolution. Given the beating-back of the post-war wave of proletarian revolution in Western Europe, there was but the following course open to the victorious Russian working class: The enhancement of the prestige of the U.S.S.R. in the eyes of the international working class

and of the oppressed colonial masses. This could, of course, be best achieved thru showing practical results, significant successes, socially and economically at home and thru striking fear and respect into the hearts of the imperialist enemies abroad. In this sense the Soviet Union serves as an example, as an inspiration, to the international revolution and as the citadel of proletarian power on a world scale.

2. The U.S.S.R., still being alone, must strive to secure the maximum "breathing spell" needed for continuing and strengthening the economic and political position already won by the international

proletariat in what was once the Czarist empire. Of course, if Germany had gone Soviet, if Austria and the Balkans had gone Bolshevik, this question of a breathing spell would assume a different character.

3. Soviet foreign policy is at all times cognizant of the fact that the U.S.S.R. is situated between two infernos—a Japanese imperialist inferno in the East and a monster German-Polish war machine in the West. Polish imperialism plays here a special role. It is a sworn enemy of the Soviet Union, whether it be in "alliance" with the French bourgeoisie at one time or with the German capitalist at another.

4. Because of the sharp conflicts, because of the acute antagonisms among the imperialist powers, the Soviet Union may, should and must, at one time or another come together with one or more of these countries to ward off attack by others. Thus, the Soviet Union can have, together with capitalist countries at one moment or another, common enemies but not common interests. For the Soviets such alliances are strictly military and limited to defense. They are not political understandings based on common interests.

The present relation of the Soviet Union to France, even in so far as military technique is concerned, is fundamentally identical with the relationship the Soviet Union once had, in the days of Lenin and Trotsky, with the Weimar Republic of Germany. At that time there took place an exchange of military technicians, even a close working together of both general staffs. No one then seriously questioned the great advantages reaped by the U.S.S.R. in such collaboration with the German imperialist government. Today, the situation has changed only in form. The collaboration is now taking place between the U.S.S.R. and the French Republic instead of the Weimar Republic. Today, as then, the Soviet Union does not have the same objectives as its collaborator. In the case of the military understanding with the Weimar Republic the Soviet Union sought to make impossible an invasion of its territory by blocking the road thru Germany; but in this case the German bourgeoisie had totally different aims. They sought, thru this al-

liance with the U.S.S.R., to strengthen themselves so as to win a better position for the defeated German imperialism against the victorious imperialist powers. Today, thru the alliance with France, the Soviets are seeking to paralyze German imperialist aggression against their territory; but the French bourgeoisie hopes, through the Franco-Soviet pact of mutual assistance, not only to be able to defend what they have won in the last war but also, if possible, prevent the recurrence of the German imperialist challenge.

5. Soviet foreign policy rests, in a measure, on a constantly changing balance of power and relations between various capitalist countries. The Soviet Government is prepared to sign non-aggression pacts, or mutual assistance pacts, with any imperialist power, let us say for ten years, although while signing it, the proletarian government knows very well that these pacts may last only ten months or ten weeks. Never do Soviet diplomats harbor any illusions as to the calendar life of such signed documents. Never does the Soviet Government, in signing such treaties, enter into an agreement in defense of one imperialist power against another. Always such non-aggression treaties are offered by the Soviet to all imperialist powers regardless of the conflicts among themselves. What the Soviet government is trying to get out of every imperialist power is the most effective pledge and guarantee against attack—no matter how little value such guarantees may have. Hence, the much-vaunted Eastern Pact of non-aggression was offered to France and Germany simultaneously. It is clear that the Eastern Pact is not an alliance with France against Germany, but a move by the U.S.S.R. to make more difficult or to prevent, either or both of these imperialist powers from attacking the U.S.S.R.

6. The strategy of Soviet foreign policy, while utilizing these divisions amongst the imperialist powers, is not based on these divisions as definite or final. At any moment any imperialist power, regardless of whatever treaty it may happen to have with the U.S.S.R. may turn against the U.S.S.R. and join hands with its own enemies against the Soviet Union—the common enemy of all

capitalist powers. Litvinov, in a recent address before the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Government, very adequately explained the why and wherefore of such divisions amongst the imperialist countries. He said in part:

"But not all capitalist states, at any or every time or always, desire war to the same extent. Any, even the most imperialist state, at any given time, may become strongly pacifist. This happens when it has either suffered a defeat in war, and, therefore requires a certain interval before it can be ready for a new war, or when it has as antagonist a far more powerful State or group of States and the general political situation is unfavorable; or it may happen when a country has become oversatiated with victories and conquests, and requires a certain period of time for the assimilation of these conquests."

Here we have the essence of the present international situation. No Communist maintains that any capitalist government will remain forever, or for any great length of time, for that matter, pacifist. Though France and England are today less bellicose than is Germany, it does not mean that they are less imperialist. It simply means that at the moment they (France and England) are not anxious for war because they have their bellies full—in more ways than one. Germany is, at the moment, more bellicose because she sees at hand an opportunity to get back some of the loot the other plunderers took from her in the last war.

7. The Soviet foreign diplomats are perfectly honest when they pledge non-interference in the internal affairs of foreign countries which have established relations with the U.S.S.R. In the present situation it is the Soviet Union, with a world of enemies against it, that has most to gain from such reciprocal pledges of non-interference in internal affairs. The Soviet Union has suffered for years thru such interference by foreign powers in its internal affairs; for example, the years of foreign military intervention in Russia after the armistice was concluded. Obviously in such agreements for mutual non-interference in the internal affairs it is the U.S.S.R. which

is the heavy gainer. Of course, the Soviet Government has nothing to do with and doesn't assume any responsibility for Communist propaganda or activities conducted by the revolutionists of the various countries with which she, as a government, has diplomatic relations.

8. Soviet Foreign policy further rests on a frank recognition of the fact that today the U.S.S.R. is economically not yet self-sufficient, not yet self-sustaining. If any country is approaching self-sufficiency the Soviet Union is, but this condition is still very far from realization. The Soviet Union still needs foreign machinery, foreign technical assistance, and certain foreign raw-materials. Satisfactory economic relations which will enable the U.S.S.R. to meet these needs and to facilitate its progress in Socialist construction are often impossible without normal diplomatic relations. Here we have the primary reason for the Soviet Government seeking complete, normal, diplomatic and economic relations with the other countries.

9. The strength of the Soviet Union in its international relations, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. in its foreign policy, is due primarily and directly proportional to its own economic and political power. Only secondarily is the prestige of the U.S.S.R. in international affairs due to the weaknesses or divisions among the imperialist countries.

It is in the consistent pursuit of the above lines of strategy that the Soviet government has, from the very first days of its existence, followed a vigorous peace policy. To achieve peace, the proletarian republic has, at times, had to make concessions and compromises. As the Soviet power became greater, the concessions and compromises became smaller. In this sense, Lenin was not a bad revolutionist because he signed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty when he did. This was the Soviet's moment of worst weakness and, therefore, the occasion for the signing of its most humiliating treaty. Trotsky was then not a better revolutionist because of his opposition to the signing of this infamous treaty. To have refused to make this terrific concession to German imperialism at the time, would have spelled suicide for the Soviet government. As it is, Trotsky's hag-

gling and bluffing at Brest Litovsk contributed substantially towards the loss of Finland to the Whites.

Certainly Stalin is not a better revolutionist than was Lenin because he does not sign such degrading treaties today. He doesn't have to do so. Today the U.S.S.R. is far more powerful. Lenin was compelled to sign treaties giving away, while Stalin is today in a position to sign treaties pledging capitalist powers not to take away.

The Soviet government earnestly desires to be at peace and to appear as the champion of peace in the eyes of the masses. This attitude is rooted in the anti-imperialist character of the proletarian dictatorship. The U.S.S.R. doesn't merely talk peace in the abstract but dramatizes its being different from other countries in practice. Hence the U.S.S.R. has, in the interest of peace, often stood for lots of provocations and insults from far weaker countries. Animated by the same genuine desire for the continuation of peace, Soviet diplomats have come forward with the most practical and straight-forward proposals for prolonging peace, for paralyzing the ventures of aggressors. Note the Soviet proposals for disarmament and its definition of an aggressor.

This realistic approach also characterizes the attitude of the U.S.S.R. towards the Versailles Treaty. The Soviet government will not join a war or enter any alliance with imperialist powers for its overthrow. Likewise, the Soviets will not go to war or sign any pacts to preserve the Versailles system. As a working class government the U.S.S.R. has its own very effective ways of getting rid of such monstrous treaties—via the revolutionary proletarian methods which sent to the scrap heap the Brest Litovsk Treaty. That is why the Soviet government can simultaneously make certain arrangements with powers adhering to and opposed to the Versailles pact. That is why in the very midst of the recent negotiations with the French Government, the Soviet Union was able to arrive at an arrangement with Germany for securing eighty million dollars credit from the latter for the purpose of improving the Russian railway system.

Today more than ever is this peace

policy of the Soviet Government conducive to the best interests of the entire international working class. Some might say: "Why are the Russians so anxious for peace? Is it not true that if war comes, then revolution will follow?" Maybe. And maybe not. Perhaps the price—thru actual devastation and destruction of human life and resources—will be so great that the proletariat will be bled white, too weak to make the revolution. Also, it would be suicidal folly to deny the possibility of blackest reaction triumphing as a result of imperialist war.

However, there are today special reasons why the Russian and the rest of the international proletariat must strive to delay or prevent an outbreak of imperialist war. These are:

1. So acute have become the antagonisms among the capitalist countries that the danger of their maturing into an open explosion among the imperialist powers themselves can only be checked by unity against a common foe. Obviously, such a common foe only the U.S.S.R. could be. Here we touch the cornerstone of Hitler's strategy. The Nazi chieftain is seeking world hegemony for German imperialism thru placing Germany at the head of a world coalition of imperialist governments against the Soviet Union. Should Hitler succeed in his strategy, the life of the Soviet Union would be at stake, the contradictions among the imperialist powers themselves momentarily softened at the expense of the proletariat in Russia and at the expense of the labor movement in all countries. Fortunately, the U.S.S.R. has so far been able, with the help of the pressure of the labor movements in the various capitalist lands, to outmaneuver Hitler.

2. Then, Socialist construction in the Soviet Union has already reached that stage in which the difficulties are well on the way of being overcome—but not yet fully overcome. This is a very delicate moment in which the achievements of years could be destroyed in a war as if overnight. At this elbow of the road, at this decisive moment in the completion of the next stage of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R., peace is essential not only in the interest of the Soviet proletariat but in behalf of the

most fundamental interests of the entire international working class. A defeat for the Soviet Union would be a defeat for the workers of all other countries as well as the Russian workers. It would prove a signal for triumphant reaction in all capitalist countries.

3. Time is on our side. In so far as the Russian workingclass is concerned, it is getting stronger economically, in a military sense, and politically with the passing of every day, while the antagonisms among the imperialists are getting sharper with the passing of every hour. Here we have increasing opportunities for the building of the revolutionary movement in every country.

Again, time is on our side in so far as the working class movements in the capitalist countries are concerned. What we must do is to win over the working class to the revolutionary principles of Communism, and to sound tactics. Simultaneously we must help the Russian workers and farmers, already victorious over their own capitalist forces, to become impregnable also against attack from the outside. Only in this way can we hasten the moment when the consolidated power of the Soviet proletariat and the sufficiently strengthened forces of the revolution in other countries can jointly make a frontal attack on international capitalism.

CHAPTER THREE

Debunking Some Critics Of The Soviets

So far we have examined the fundamental features characterizing the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. from the days when Lenin was its best head, Trotsky its most articulate mouth, thru the present day when Stalin is its firmest hand. Now, let us turn to an examination of the case made against Soviet foreign policy by its opponents. This indictment essentially runs along the following lines:

1. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is engaged in an economic drive at home to build socialism in the USSR. This policy of building "socialism in one country" is the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy and spells disinterestedness in and neglect of the world revolution.

2. In its desperate efforts to achieve this goal the USSR has been driven to resort to speed-up in production, the stimulation of competition among individuals, and the fostering of inequalities in Soviet industry. Worse than that, cry these critics, the Soviets are therefore bent on developing and intensifying commercial relations with capitalist powers. In the same breath these calumniators of the motives of Soviet foreign policy find the Soviets guilty of what appears to them an abhorrent crime—the crime of seeking to become self-sufficient. On this basis, they argue, the USSR is bound to be suffering from a weak-kneed policy in foreign affairs and from

a too great anxiety for peace even at the expense of the world revolution.

3. This foreign policy "forced on the Soviet Union by the present leadership of the CPSU, headed by Stalin", the self-confessed ultra-revolutionists maintain, means giving up the Comintern, presupposes adamant refusal to render armed aid to the proletariat and colonial masses inhabiting five-sixths of the earth. The interests of the Soviet Union are in conflict and incompatible with the interests of the international proletariat, according to these critics.

The perpetrators of such masterpieces of confusion and calumny must naturally come to but one conclusion: The USSR and its foreign policy are "past hope, past cure, past help." Hence, Fenner Brockway, the leader of the Independent Labor Party of England, sizes up Soviet foreign policy in this fashion:

"Russia does not want war. That, one understands. But international opposition to imperialism must not be sacrificed even to the interests of Russia." (New Leader, London, June 17, 1934.) Brockway, to concretize his complaint, chides the Soviet government for "acquiescence in Japanese imperialism in the East."

"The danger is that in the immediate strengthening of the tie between the Soviet government and the capitalist governments the ties of international

working class struggle and solidarity may be weakened."

"Mr. Eden was welcomed as though he were in a capitalist country rather than in a workers' state. The Workers State which has overthrown Monarchy, Capitalism and Imperialism flaunted the symbols of Monarchy, Capitalism and Imperialism on every hand. Union Jacks were displayed at every turn; Mr. Eden heard the strains of the National Anthem wherever he went. If this violation of the whole spirit of Soviet Russia really impressed Mr. Eden, it can only have been because he felt that it signified a modification of the Russian attitude." (New Leader, London, April 5, 1935.) (Emphasis ours).

To have completed his horrible picture of betrayal, Fenner Brockway should not have forgotten to mention that Mr. Eden also was compelled to listen to the strains of the "International" and other revolutionary songs of the Red Army and the world proletariat. Incidentally, it might be further added that while Litvinoff, under instructions of the CP SU, was toasting King George V, Pollitt, under instructions of the C.P. of G.B., was roasting the same King George and organizing demonstrations against the Silver Jubilee of this over-aged monarch.

Trotsky, chief of these prosecutors of the "guilty" leadership of the CPSU has from his false premise, logically concluded that: "The more the U.S.S.R. strengthens its international position, the deeper becomes the rift between the Soviet government and the international struggle." (New Republic, November 1, 1933.) In other words, in line with Trotsky's reasoning, the weaker the international position of the USSR, the less rift there is between the Soviet government and the international revolutionary movement. What tasks such a policy would set for the international labor movement are obvious: outright anti-Soviet operations.

It is necessary to clear the ground and take the discussion out of the atmosphere of factional pique in which the Trotskyites have placed it. Let us face conditions as they are—in their historical light, as they developed over years for the Russian and the entire international proletariat.

The world revolution which the Soviet proletariat in 1917 expected to come has not come yet. The Russian proletarian revolution is the first chapter of the international revolution but only one chapter at that. The bourgeoisie succeeded in inflicting a number of serious defeats on the international revolution and in stabilizing its rule. Who of us has forgotten the defeat of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw, the gates of Western Europe, when the Soviet proletariat made a heroic but unsuccessful attempt, thru armed aid, to extend the world revolution beyond its own borders. And let no one forget our defeats in Bavaria, Hungary, and Germany. Bolsheviks must never hesitate to admit defeats. Denying them doesn't overcome them.

By the way, Trotsky and Co. should be the last ones to organize a slander chorus against the present CPSU leadership for not rushing armed aid to the world proletariat at all times. Such armed aid can't be rendered indiscriminately, regardless of the conditions at hand, without regard to the class relations in the country to be assisted. Even in Lenin's days, in an international situation which was far more revolutionary than today, the Bolshevik Party limited its armed aid to the proletariat in revolt in the regions of the former Czarist empire. And not in every case was such aid appropriate, as could be seen from the reactions of the Polish workers to the Red drive in 1920.

When Trotsky was still at the zenith of his career in the Russian revolution he consistently and vigorously maintained—even to the point of impermissibility—the position that it was wrong to carry revolution into a country from the outside. For this reason, he opposed the Warsaw offensive in 1920; very properly he eloquently implored the Moscow proletariat not to lose its head clamoring to rush armed forces to aid the German workers in 1923. In February 1931 Trotsky went to unwarranted lengths and even opposed the Red Army helping the revolutionists in Georgia, now one of the Soviet Republics. This question of armed aid by the Russian proletariat to the workers of other countries should never be handled in a factional manner. Lenin focused the

proper light on this all-important problem when he declared:

"But we have not pledged ourselves to start a revolutionary war without taking into account how far it is possible to wage such a war at any particular moment." (Lenin: Thesis on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace.)

Evidently, Trotsky, embittered by the treatment he received at the hands of the Stalin leadership, is now seeking to perform an upside down operation. Such operations in revolutionary politics are unprincipled and ruinous. They are dictated only by factional considerations and merit only unmerciful condemnation by every class conscious worker.

The argument that the Soviet Government is betraying the world proletariat because it has relations with capitalist countries is not new. It is as old as such foreign relations are. It saw the light of day long before Stalin was primus in the CPSU leadership. Let us turn to the deliberations of the Comintern Enlarged Executive Committee sessions in February-March 1922. At this time the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist parties' delegations denounced the adoption of united front tactics by the C.I. These delegates charged that such tactics—united front actions by Communist parties with Social Democratic parties and organizations—were dictated by needs of Soviet foreign policy. Speaking for the French delegation, Monmousseau said in part:

"Why do we need a united front now? Because the revolution is surrounded by a world of enemies, is isolated and cannot continue to exist forever in such a hostile world without the help of the international proletariat . . . Since the Russian revolution cannot rely upon the hypothesis of the world revolution nor on the effective forces of the Communist International, it is constantly seeking new alignments. It is no longer banking on the international revolution but is concerned only with the preservation of the fruits of the Russian revolution. The Russians . . . are now forming alliances with capitalist states . . . and are desirous of coming to an un-

derstanding with the reformists in order to save the Soviet Union."

Most effective in their replies to the above accusation were Zinoviev and Trotsky. Zinoviev, then the head of the C.I., posed the problem in its true historical light. He said:

"If, for example, the Red Army of Soviet Russia had taken Warsaw in 1920, the tactics of the C.I. today would be quite different. This, however, did not happen. The Russian Party was forced to make greater economic concessions to the peasants and partly to the bourgeoisie. This decreased the tempo of the proletarian revolution, and vice versa; the defeats suffered by the proletariat of Western Europe during 1919 and 1921 influenced the policies of the first proletarian state and slowed down the tempo in Russia. It is a two-fold process. The difficulties of the Russian Soviet government had their effects on all other parties; the general fight for emancipation of the working class likewise influences our policies.

"This is the sense of the position taken by the Third Congress as well as in the theses on the united front in relation to Soviet Russia. This, however, by no means signifies that the Russian Party which is the leading party in the Comintern, will utilize these for its own egoistic purposes. To maintain this is to slander the Comintern. It is impossible to conceive that the interests of a proletarian power are not identical with the interests of the entire proletariat. The Russian Revolution as well as the struggles of the German, English and French workers effect the new situation; the Russian revolution more so because within the last few years the struggle of the Russian proletariat has been of greater significance than that of other countries. But one cannot maintain that the Comintern is misusing any policy in the interest of the workers government. To maintain this means to argue from the point of view of the Second and the Two-and-a-half International and is to fail to understand that the deeper historical interests of the first victorious proletarian state are identical with those of the entire working class."

And Trotsky followed in the same vein by saying:

"Comrades, the interests of the Soviet Republic can be none other than the interests of the international revolutionary movement. And if you believe that we have become so absorbed and so hypnotized by our tasks as statesmen that we are no longer capable of correctly estimating the interests of the labor movement, then it would be in place to add a paragraph in the statutes of our International according to which every Party, unfortunate enough to have seized state power, is expelled from the International." (Laughter).

The Trotsky of 1922 talked quite a different language from the Trotsky of 1933! No one should be tempted to ask why the sharp swerve by this erstwhile member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU.

History does repeat itself. But how? When the French C. P. last year dropped its anti-united front policy and made an almost 180 degree turn in the opposite direction, many of the carping critics of the USSR shrieked that this turn was made because of the needs of Soviet foreign policy. They charged that the interests of the Soviet government inspired the CP of France to come out for the united front. Of course, these same people, only a few weeks before the turn by the French CP, howled that in the interest of Soviet foreign policy the French Communists were against the united front. At this point, it is not inappropriate to underline the fact that the Soviet foreign policy toward France remained unchanged while the French CP policy changed completely. This shift by the French CP to united front tactics arose primarily because of mass pressure in its ranks for united action with the SP to stem the Fascist tide. Apparently when clique venom is substituted for a Marxian po-

litical approach such "little things" as mass pressure are easily overlooked.

It is indeed to laugh that hard-boiled centrists in the labor movement should be jumping on the Soviet government and condemning its foreign policy as responsible for recent changes for the better in Comintern policy. The depths of folly in this position are reached by Brockway. He says:

"A further development arising from Soviet Russia's foreign policy must be recognized. There is not only the tendency of the Soviet government to modify its attitude towards the capitalist-imperialist governments. There is the tendency of the parties affiliated to the Communist International to modify their policies in a parallel way. In every country the Communist Parties are moderating their policies. In Britain the Communist Party is clearly preparing the way for a changed attitude towards the Labor Party." (New Leader, November 30, 1934).

When the CPGB was steeped in ultra-leftism Brockway said its sectarian policy was dictated by the interests of Soviet foreign policy. He didn't like these leftist tactics of the CPGB. Now, the CPGB is beginning to correct its tactics. Brockway boasts of being a dyed-in-the-wool revolutionary socialist. As such, he should surely welcome the turn for the better in CP tactics, its break with ultra-leftism. However, he chirps only one way: "The Soviet's foreign policies are wrong, are nationalist. These foreign policies are the mainspring of the tactics of the various Communist parties. Hence, regardless of what the tactics of the Communist parties can be, they are wrong at their very source." We might add that the refrain a la Brockway would be: Communist policies always have been wrong, are now wrong, and always will be wrong.

Confusion worst confounded is a generous estimate of such "deep reasoning"!

CHAPTER FOUR

A Breathing Spell For The Soviets

What the opponents of Soviet foreign policy forget is that in all essential respects the present tactics pursued by the Soviet government in its relations with capitalist countries are identical with those pursued in the days of Lenin. Here are but a few incidents of Soviet diplomacy to illustrate this.

Early in 1919 Lenin accepted the invitation tendered by President Wilson and others to the Soviets to hold a conference at Prinkipo at which "the various Russian factions could iron out their differences and come to an agreement with the Allies." Because the Bolsheviks accepted, the White Russian groups refused to participate in the conference. Just about this time (February 22, 1919) the Bullitt Mission brought a definite offer from the Soviet government but it was never considered by the bourgeois governments.

So anxious for peace was Lenin that on May 7, 1920, the Soviet government even went so far as to conclude a treaty of peace with Georgia. This treaty provided in part:

"There shall henceforth not be tolerated any military operations . . . on the territory of Georgia . . . or capable of transforming the territory of Georgia into a base of operations directed against the RSFSR or against its allies, or against the public order therein established. . . .

"Russia undertakes not to permit on its territory the sojourn and activity of all groups and organizations pretending to the role of the government of Georgia or of any of its parts, as well as of all groups and organizations which have as their object the overthrow of the government of Georgia."

Given the conditions then at hand, Lenin's realism was magnificent and very soon brought great results for the Soviets.

The same line of strategy was pursued in 1920 in the treaties with Latvia and Poland providing in part as follows: Article IV, Sec. 2—(Treaty with Latvia, August 11, 1920).

The two contracting parties undertake "not to permit the formation or residence in their territory of organizations or groups of any kind claiming to represent the government of all or part of the territory of the other contracting party, or of representatives or officials of organizations or groups having as their object the overthrow of the government of the other contracting party."

Article II—(Treaty with Poland, October 11, 1920).

"Each . . . is entering not to form or lend support to organizations having as their object the promotion of armed action against the other contracting party, the abolition of its political or social regime. . . ."

Here we have the Soviet government, in Lenin's days, making pledges not to make revolutionary propaganda and not to aid proletarian revolutionists. Really, alongside of these pledges, some of the assurances made by the Soviet government nowadays appear anaemic and insignificant.

The kernel of this policy is to be found in the instructions prepared by Lenin and Trotsky for the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference in 1922. Rakovsky, until recently an 18-karat Trotskyite, was chairman of this delegation. In its behalf, Chicherin declared at Genoa:

"The Russian delegation recognizes that, in the present historical period, which permits a parallel co-existence of the old social order and the new one being born, economic collaboration between the powers representing the two systems of property is urgently necessary for general economic reconstruction. . . . The Russian delegation has come here not to make propaganda for its theoretical views but to set up practical relations with the governments."

Here we have an offer by the Bolsheviks to provide the bourgeoisie with a program for "capitalist construction"!

But it is interesting to note that while the Soviet government was making such

offers to the capitalist governments at Genoa, the representatives of the Comintern (Zetkin, Radek, Bukharin) were almost simultaneously negotiating in Berlin with the spokesmen of the Second and Two-and-a-half Internationals for a working class united front against capitalist reaction and its instruments of suppression—the various bourgeois governments.

The Soviet government has rigidly adhered to its "repeated declarations regarding the non-responsibility of the government for acts of the Communist International." The vilest enemies of the U.S.S.R. have always deliberately sought to blur or deny this distinction of organisms and separation of responsibilities. It is precisely on the basis of this distinction that on June 4, 1923, in Trotsky's sunshine days, the Soviet government, pursuing its peace policy, signed a treaty with England providing:

"Not to support with funds or in any other form, persons, or bodies, or agencies, or institutions whose aim is to spread discontent, or to foment rebellion in any part of the British Empire, and to impress upon its officers and officials the full and continuous observance of these conditions."

Indeed, a more sweeping pledge could not have been exacted. But the Soviets literally gave up nothing and gained tremendously thru the re-establishment of trade and diplomatic relations with Great Britain. The Comintern continued its activities with industry and intelligence.

Even some keen bourgeois students of international affairs could see what the Soviets were driving at in these agreements—in these forerunners of present-day U.S.S.R. treaties with foreign powers. Said Professor Malhorne W. Graham, Jr. in his study of "The Soviet Security System," (pp. 12-13) published in September 1929:

"In both these sets of agreements, as well as in the now historic Anglo-Russian Trading Agreement, there were elaborated, in varying degrees, the provisions which Russia thought essential to her military security against a renewal of aggressions from certain quarters. By differently pledging various nations, previously

in open or passive hostility to the Soviet regime to a predetermined line of conduct which would prevent military aggression, Soviet Russia succeeded in breaking the iron circle of her foes and in progressively isolating the powers or groups engaged in definite hostilities with her.

"A broad analysis of all the foregoing agreements reveals the fact that the Soviet government began to elaborate its security policy by building, on the stipulations of conventional neutrality, the broad outlines of a non-aggression system. In addition to converting the conception of neutral obligation from a passive one such as marked nineteenth century neutrality to one of an active and positive character, the Soviet government insisted on giving and receiving specific guarantees of non-aggression and non-interference."

The Soviet government was only about two months old when it first conceived the idea of being in alliance with some capitalist countries for a certain length of time. If ever there was the slightest grain of truth in the nonsensical charge that the C.I. was a section of the Foreign Office of the Soviet government, that was so in the early days of the Soviets. To illustrate both phases, let me cite the Decree of the Soviet government, December 13, 1917, declaring that it is necessary

"to come forth with all aid, including financial aid, to the assistance of the left, internationalist wing of the workers' movement of all countries, entirely regardless of whether these countries are at war with Russia, or in alliance, or whether they retain their neutrality. With these aims the Soviet Peoples' Commissars ordain the assigning of two million rubles for the needs of the revolutionary internationalist movement, at the disposition of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs."

This was some time before the foundation of the Communist International. This was at a time when the international proletarian revolutionary forces had not yet suffered certain defeats. Yet Lenin, author of this decree, saw possible values for the proletariat in

such simultaneous alliances with bourgeois powers. This, of course, didn't mean in the least an abatement of revolutionary work. Today, with the Comintern being an entity distinct from the Soviet government, this is even more true.

It was Lenin and not Stalin who first conceived the possible necessity of the proletarian government getting into an alliance with imperialist governments in order to save itself from attack by another imperialist government. Thus Lenin said in February 1918.

"But what if the representative of the exploited class, of those who suffer, after that class has overthrown the exploiters and has published and annulled all secret and grasping agreements is the object of a treacherous attack by the German imperialists? Is he to be condemned for dealing with the Anglo-French robbers, for accepting their arms and potatoes in exchange for the timber and so on? And how timely is the following advice culled from Lenin's letter to the American Workers on August 20, 1918:

"He is no socialist who does not realize that, in the interest of the victory over the bourgeoisie, in the interest of transferring power to the workers, in the interest of the international proletarian revolution which is commencing, one must not and should not stop short at any sacrifices, even the sacrifice of territory or the sacrifice of severe defeats at the hands of imperialism. . . .

"They (hypocritical slanderers of workers' government) act as if they do not understand the difference between a pact of the 'socialists' with the bourgeoisie (native or foreign) against the workers, against the toilers—and an agreement which the workers, who have overcome their bourgeoisie, enter into with the bourgeoisie of a definite color against the bourgeoisie of another national color, in order to protect the proletariat and to take advantage of the antagonisms existing among the various groups of the bourgeoisie.

"There are agreements and agreements; there are *fagots et fagots*, as the French say. . . ."

Today's great prowess of the U.S.S.R.

in international affairs is a monument to this dynamic realism of Lenin's approach which has essentially characterized Soviet foreign policy thruout the years. To day the Soviet government no longer finds it necessary even to think of territorial concessions. When Stalin recently threatened to hit on the snout any power threatening Soviet territory, he wasn't bluffing. The Red Army today can well defend the Socialist fatherland.

Less and less does the Soviet Union have to beg the favors or fear the hate of the capitalist countries. This steadily improved international position of the Soviet Republic is rooted in its tremendously strengthened economic position and in the resulting enhanced popularity of the Socialist Republic among the proletarian and oppressed masses the world over. The big gains in socialist construction have simultaneously proved a great stimulus to the international labor movement as well as a boon to the masses in the U.S.S.R.

All of the enormous changes in Soviet economy have been in but one direction—the building up of socialized heavy industry and the development of a collectivized rural economy. Thru the smashing of Russia's most dangerous capitalist forces, the kulaks in the agrarian areas, the Soviets have extended the socialist revolution to the countryside and have driven the final nail into the coffin of the capitalist forces within its own boundaries. And just as a victory for the working class of any one country is a victory for the workers of all countries, so a defeat of the capitalist elements in any one country at the hands of the proletariat is a defeat for capitalism in all countries, a setback for capitalism as a world economic system.

Only those who are hopeless calumniators or blind to facts can maintain that recent Soviet economic progress has been at the expense of socialist principles. The development of a great supply of new basic capital has taken place under great difficulties without any substantial aid from the outside and free from the evils attendant to this process under capitalism. The radical changes in the social composition, in the class makeup of the Soviet population, and in the class relations in the U.S.S.R., with-

in recent years, have been entirely in the direction of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. completing its victory. The extraordinary progress registered during this period in the life and culture of the Soviet people has flown directly from this socialist offensive in the urban and

rural areas. The marked strengthening of the hand of the working class inside of the U.S.S.R. has obviously served to fortify the position of the Soviet government outside, in the international arena, in its relations with the capitalist countries.

CHAPTER FIVE

Soviet Economy And Foreign Policy

The general line of economic policy pursued by the C.P.S.U. is not new. It is a policy long ago sketched for the Bolshevik party by its leader, Lenin. Stalin is neither to be condemned nor commended for it. At best, his contribution is a firm adherence to this line coupled with a vigorous hand in its execution. In corroboration of our viewpoint, we cite from an address by Lenin to the Academy of Science on April 6, 1918 entitled "Outline of Scientific and Technical Work":

"The Academy of Science, which has commenced on the systematic study and investigation of the natural productive forces of Russia, must immediately be instructed by the Supreme Council of National Economy to set up a number of committees, composed of specialists, for the purpose of drawing up a plan for the speediest possible reorganization of industry and the economic revival of Russia. . . .

"A most rational plan from the standpoint of the latest and the largest industries and particular trusts, for the amalgamation and concentration of production in a few very large enterprises.

"A plan that will guarantee to the widest possible extent the Russian Soviet Republic in its present state (without Ukraine and without the territory occupied by the Germans), the ability independently to supply itself with all the most important items of raw materials and industry.

"To devote particular attention to the electrification of industry and transport and the application of electricity in agriculture. . . .

"Water power and wind motive

power should be utilized in general and also in agriculture."

To Lenin even the military occupation of one of the most naturally endowed sections of the Soviet Republic was not a drawback for initiating the economic reconstruction along socialist lines. Those who see "capitalist restoration" in this economic progress, those who see in this "capitalist restoration" the *raison d'être* for "capitalist aims" in the foreign policies of the U.S.S.R., apparently can't distinguish a swan from a crow. The bourgeois ideologists, however, know better and sense the social implications. For instance, Nicholas Murray Butler, President, Columbia University, has thus sized up the recent trend in the U.S.S.R.

"Whether we like it or not, the fact is that 140 millions of people are experimenting with an alternative mode of economic, political and social control. The application of this new series of principles is so thorough, so logical, so persistent that it does not hesitate to tear up by the roots those things which the Western world regards as fundamental.

"And what are our institutions doing to meet the challenge?"

No one claims that we now have communism in the U.S.S.R. In fact, tho doing well on the road to socialism, we are still quite some distance from a socialist society in the U.S.S.R.—despite exaggerated claims made by Stalin in the heat of factional controversy. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, leading the Soviet government, has very properly sought to utilize all the technical progress achieved by capitalism and the best technical talent of the bourgeois countries. These efforts have been made possible and facilitated by diplomatic re-

lations between the U.S.S.R. and the other countries. These efforts and relations have served to enhance and not to undermine the socialist character of the socio-economic setup inside the U.S.S.R. and the weight of the Socialist Republic outside its borders.

A prominent German manufacturer who, in the days when Trotsky was Commissar of Foreign Concessions, ran a concession in the U.S.S.R., bears witness as follows:

"We are traitors to our class. We are helping Communist Russia in capitalistic technique. We are serving a Frankenstein monster which some day will devour our class thruout the world."

And Professor Sombart, the well-known anti-Marxist, discussing "The Future Economic Development of Western Europe" before the Social Science Association in Zurich, was compelled to go even further. He said: "The domination of capitalism is nearing its end. A new economic system is arising." On what basis do these capitalists and their economists arrive at their conclusion? Let us hear from Professor Calvin B. Hoover, who has spent some years studying the U.S.S.R., as a critic. Examining "The Soviet Challenge to Capitalism", Professor Hoover pointed out even as far back as 1930 that:

"At the present time Soviet industry has reached an entirely new stage in its development. For the first time, a considerable part of production is being carried on with mechanical equipment which has been provided by a socialist economy. It is now being demonstrated that such a socialist economy can not only operate industrial equipment inherited from capitalism, but can also carry on the necessary social saving and construction required to replace and augment that equipment." (Harper's Magazine, October, 1930).

None of these experts has been able to comprehend or even recognize the significance of the fact that while capitalism is worst off in agriculture (where it is most pristine), Socialist Russia is able to make giant headway here. This phenomenon has inestimable import for the economics and politics of the whole world. But some of the hyper-critical

in the ranks of labor, calling themselves such 16-cylinder revolutionary names as "International Bolshevick-Leninists Left Communists" (affiliated with the French, Spanish, Belgian, etc. sections of the Second International), jump on the C.P.S.U. for precisely this achievement. They howl: "The U.S.S.R. is engaged in dangerous maneuvers in its foreign policies in order to get the means whereby it can hasten its becoming self-sufficient and then draw itself still further away from the world proletariat." This is a masterpiece of confusion. If alongside of the U.S.S.R. there were Soviets, let us say in Germany, Japan, Poland, Roumania, etc. adjoining it, such efforts at self-sufficiency would not be necessary for the U.S.S.R. either from the viewpoint of soundness of its economy or military defense. No international division of labor can take place without more proletarian revolutions. National division of labor is, therefore, forced upon the U.S.S.R. The C.P.S.U. very correctly and very effectively has, even in the face of this great obstacle, been stimulating proletarian revolutions elsewhere by demonstrating in life the superiority of the socialist organization of economy over the capitalist mode of production and exchange.

Ruthlessly pursuing the logic of their own fallacious major premise, these "super-revolutionists", declare that the "degeneration of Soviet foreign policy naturally flows from the Thermidorian degeneration of the C.P.S.U. desperately trying to build socialism in the U.S.S.R." Being in their hearts and minds against building socialism in this one, specific, particular country, called the U.S.S.R. and occupying one-sixth of the earth, the Trotskyites deny that socialism is actually being built there and rave against certain features of present-day economic relations in the Soviet Union. To these opponents of the U.S.S.R. there is an organic connection between what they call "the traitorous foreign policies of the Soviet government" and such "bourgeois" features of present day Soviet economy as competition, inequalities in pay, efficiency in production, and Bolsheviks learning how to trade, export, and strike good bargains in the world market. The former grows out of the latter, they contend.

Such criticism is not new. It was levelled against Lenin by some highly self-esteemed pure "revolutionists" when the Soviet government was but a few months old. Lenin's answer given then will serve as our reply today:

"Socialism not only does not extinguish competition but on the contrary creates for the first time the possibility of applying it on a real wide, on a really mass scale, of really drawing the vast majority of toilers into work in which they can develop their abilities, which can reveal talent among the people that has never been tapped and that capitalism trampled on, crushed and strangled in thousands and millions...

"Only now has the possibility for wide and really mass display of enterprise, competition and bold initiative been created . . . Now for the first time after centuries of working for others, of involuntary labor for exploiters, it has become possible to work for oneself. . .

"Now that a socialist government is in power, it is our task to organize competition." (Our emphasis).

The genius of Lenin here is evident. He did not play with empty words. He was quick to recognize the new class content, the substance, of competition under a proletarian dictatorship. This policy laid down by Lenin was reaffirmed by the Ninth Congress of the C.P.S.U. held in 1920 as follows:

"Every social order (slave-holding, feudal, capitalist) had its own methods and practises of compulsory labor and labor-training in the interests of the exploiting upper classes. The Soviet order is squarely faced with the task of developing its own methods of action for the purpose of increasing the intensity and expediency of labor on the basis of a socialized economy to the interests of the entire nation.

"In addition to the agitational-ideological influence on the laboring masses and repressions as far as ingrained parasites, shirkers and disorganizers are concerned, competition is a powerful force making for increased productivity of labor. In capitalist society competition bore the character of rivalry and led to the ex-

ploitation of man by man. In a society where the means of production are nationalized, competition in labor must necessarily, without infringing on solidarity, increase the sum total of the products of labor. Competition between factories, districts, shops, departments and individual workers must be made the subject of careful organization and attentive study on the part of the trade unions and economic organs." (Our emphasis).

Too many comrades look upon the revolution as a simple one-act process. They forget the various stages of development. They are not aware of the new types of work revolutionists must undertake after the proletariat has taken power. This failure to distinguish between the "destructive" and "constructive" phases of the whole revolutionary process has led many workers to the falsest conclusions. Lenin very aptly pointed out this whole situation in his masterly address, "The Great Initiative," delivered in the very first weeks of the Russian Revolution. He said:

"In order to win, in order to establish and consolidate socialism, the proletariat must solve a two-fold or rather a biune problem. In the first place, to carry with it the whole mass of toilers and of the exploited by its self-sacrificing heroism in a revolutionary struggle against capital, to carry the mass with it, to organize it, to lead it in order to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to put down completely all resistance on its part; secondly, to lead the entire mass of the toilers and exploited and also all the petty bourgeois strata along the path of a new economic construction, the path of the establishment of a new social contract, a new labor discipline, a new organization of labor, combining the latest achievements in science and capitalist technique with a mass association of class-conscious workers who are creating large-scale industry, socialist industry.

"This second task is more difficult than the first, for it can never be realized by the heroism of a single outburst of enthusiasm, but requires a most protracted, a most stubborn, most strenuous heroism in the day-to-day work among the masses."

Lenin concretized and generalized his above ideas in this fashion:

"It is necessary that a comparison of the business results of the management of individual communes becomes a subject of general interest and study, that outstanding communes be immediately rewarded by introducing a shorter working day for a certain period, wage increases, furnishing more cultural and esthetic values and advantages etc.

"Communism begins where the rank and file workers overcoming arduous toil display a self-sacrificing concern for increasing labor productivity."

Lenin constantly harped on the importance of increasing labor productivity in the Soviet republics. In his speech on the "Great Initiative" he stressed:

"Labor productivity is, in the final analysis, the prime and most important factor in the triumph of the new social order. Capitalism has created a degree of labor productivity unknown to serfdom. Capitalism can be finally overthrown and will be finally overthrown by the fact that socialism will create a new and much higher productivity of labor. This is a very difficult matter and it will take a long time; still, it had been started, and that is the main thing. . . ."

"Communism means a higher labor productivity, as compared with that of capitalism, on the part of voluntary, conscious, united workers employing progressive technique."

Far be it from us to deny, especially in the present world-situation where the U.S.S.R., is a Soviet island in a turbulent capitalist sea, the connections between the social and economic policies of the C.P.S.U. in the Soviet Union and the foreign policies of the U.S.S.R. We have cited the above not to refute but to confirm the relationship. Yes, the U.S.S.R. is at present anxious for peace, pursuing vigorously a peaceful course in its foreign policy. Yes, in no small measure is the Soviet Union resorting to such foreign policies because of its great devotion to socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. In leading the C.P.S.U. along this line Stalin is, in general, adhering to a fundamental course laid down by Lenin, conforming with and not break-

ing from the traditional policy of the Bolshevik Party. The emphasis Lenin placed on the importance of the Soviet government being able to secure peace for some time to come and thus to be able to march on the road of socialist development is beyond exaggeration. As far back as 1918 Lenin, therefore, stressed that "The entire possibility of a socialist development depends on the question whether in the course of a certain period of transition we can succeed in protecting our internal economic independence by means of paying a certain tribute to foreign capital."

Fortunately, this period "of paying a certain tribute to foreign capital" is practically gone by now. In none of its foreign policies since the death of Lenin has the Soviet government gone back on a single prerequisite laid down by the founder of the Bolshevik Party. None of the Czarist debts have been honored or paid. They had either been killed outright or buried in the frigid vaults of eternal negotiations and sterile "study". At no time has the Soviet government made even the slightest move in the direction of giving up its export monopoly. Never has the Soviet Union made any promise or attempt to make any internal changes to suit foreign (external) powers. The private ownership of land, banks, factories and natural resources in the U.S.S.R. is as dead as a dodo.

And precisely, because in recent years, the U.S.S.R. has been able to strengthen tremendously the socialist character of its economy, has the Soviet government during these very same years, been able to improve its international position, to wipe out the likelihood of having to pay "a certain tribute to foreign capital." Vice versa, because and as a result of its strengthened world position, the U.S.S.R. has been able to breathe easier and move faster in its campaigns of socialist construction—in its efforts to make the proletarian government not only impregnable against attack by lingering capitalist elements inside the Soviet Republic but also invincible against the threatening capitalist powers outside of the Soviet Union. The two processes are distinct but organically inseparable phases of one aim: the strengthening of the U.S.S.R. as a socialist republic and, therefore, as the base of the internation-

al revolutionary movement against capitalism and its reactionary domestic policies and imperialist foreign policies.

Progress towards the achievement of this aim is to be hailed and not denounced and howled at.

The opponents of Soviet foreign policy ought to once in a while, try to visualize a different line for the U.S.S.R. in its relations with the capitalist governments. Concretely, would they advocate the Soviets declaring war now, pursuing a less vigorous peaceful course, disdaining to utilize the divisions among

the imperialist powers? Truly, many of these opponents of the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. would shudder at the very consequences of whatever alternative course they might propose. Perhaps that explains why these people don't come forward with their own program to replace the present course of Soviet foreign policy. Very likely that's the reason for most of them not daring to come forward with even piecemeal suggestions in a positive sense. They dread the full logic of their own poor thoughts on this question!

CHAPTER SIX

C. I. Strategy And Soviet Foreign Policy

Far be it from us to maintain that the problem of correlating the tactics of the C.P.S.U. with those of the other sections of the C.I. is simple. Far be it from us to deny that the very existence of the Soviet government, surrounded by a world of hostile governments, is not a new fact that we must face in the consideration and adoption of our most decisive strategy. Take the question of the Communist position towards imperialist war and its relation to Soviet foreign policy. All Communist Parties must resolutely oppose imperialist war and reject national or republican defense, even tho the war be with a country governed by a Fascist or a monarchist state. Were, let us say, the French or Czech Communist Parties to make the slightest concession to their bourgeoisie on the ground that Germany has a Fascist regime, they would be guilty of the same crime and meet the same fate that the German Social Democracy met when it listened to the plea of the Kaiser and his generals to save German culture from Czarism, or that the French Socialist Party met when it plunged into a war "for the defense of democracy."

But it is not enough to repeat the old slogans. Especially for the proletariat of certain capitalist countries has the problem of national defense assumed a new form, tho not a new substance.

There are two reasons for this being so. These are: (1) The emergence of German Fascism leading German imperialism headlong towards a war of aggression—very probably at first against the U.S.S.R. This gives such bourgeoisie as the French and the Czech (whose governments now have military alliances with the U.S.S.R.) demagogic slogans with which to arouse and mislead their working classes in the event of their having a war with Germany. Secondly, the very existence of the Soviet government which, in the interest of peace and the international working class, has entered into military alliances with some capitalist countries.

In a general theoretical sense this problem of Soviet-capitalist alliances is not new. Lenin raised this question in 1917-1918. He dealt with the permissibility and correctness in principle of the Soviet Union entering into such alliances. At the Fourth World Congress of the C.I., at the close of 1922, Bukharin attempted to examine the tactical implications of such Soviet alliances for the proletariat of those countries in a military bloc with the Soviet government. Bukharin, then, very wrongly said: "In this form of national defense—involving a bourgeois state in military alliance (with the U.S.S.R.—J.L.) it is the duty of the comrades in such a country to

help this bloc be victorious." No one even discussed Comrade Bucharin's dangerously erroneous remarks. The problem had not yet reached a practical stage.

It is sad but true, that to-date the official Communist Parties and the Comintern as a whole have not faced this fundamental question seriously, have given little thought to it. In fact, the very regime and system of party life, the very lack of collective leadership in the C.I. and the very method of mechanically transferring tactics have made it very difficult for the world Communist movement to understand and solve this basic problem. Hence, the recent dangerous manifestations of social chauvinism in the ranks of the French and Czech Communist Parties.

At best, confusion has gripped the sections of the C.I. in so far as this problem is concerned. Thus, following the impermissible Stalin declaration, the Paris organization of the French Communist Party held a membership meeting and adopted a resolution to "greet their great comrade Stalin whose wise words on the necessity of security and peace have been approved by the French people." After this excursion into the realm of the hero cult which is now a curse in the C.I., the resolution very properly declares: "The Communists have no confidence whatsoever in the peace policy of the bourgeoisie. In view of the fact that the army is being used against the working class in France and to oppress the colonial people, and in view of the possibility that it might be used against the Soviet Union, the Communist Party will continue to FIGHT AGAINST THE TWO YEAR PERIOD OF MILITARY SERVICE AND WILL REFUSE TO VOTE WAR CREDITS."

While it was entirely correct for the C.P. of France to counteract the efforts of the French anti-Soviet forces to sabotage and prevent this pact and to bring on instead a rapprochement with Hitler Germany at the expense of the U.S.S.R., while it was absolutely right for the French Communists to bring pressure to bear on the French government to sign the Eastern Pact, it was entirely wrong for the French C.P. to stop at this. The adoption of this pact by the French government could in no wise be a signal

for the French proletariat putting faith in it. In no way does this mean that the French government, because it adopted such a pact, is no longer imperialist, does not seek to achieve any imperialist aims thru it. It was furthermore the duty of the French C.P. to point out the very limited value of this pact in the hands of the French bourgeoisie, which at most is only an unreliable ally of the U.S.S.R. The job of the French C.P. was and remains to advocate the development of the proletarian revolution in France, the establishment of a French proletarian dictatorship as the only genuine and trustworthy ally of the U.S.S.R. waging a revolutionary war.

Painfully indicative of the costly chaos pervading the C.I. today, in regard to the most vital questions, is the fact that shortly after this meeting, Thorez, the theoretical leader of the French C.P., broke out with a declaration that should France be lined up on the side of the U.S.S.R. in a war, then such a war would no longer be imperialist for the French capitalist class. Here Thorez maintains that the French bourgeoisie of today is able to wage a revolutionary war, a non-imperialist war. In Czecho-Slovakia, the serious menace facing the Communist movement is reflected in a speech by a C.P. deputy in which he said in part: "In the event that the Czecho-Slovakian army will fight consistently against German imperialism, the Czecho-Slovakian Communists will support this struggle and come out in favor of the army. We are for preserving the independence of the Czecho-Slovak nation which can be guaranteed by means of a strong army cleansed of Fascist elements and in which the workers enjoy all political liberties. We demand that the members of the army be granted the right of suffrage again. . . . We will support the Socialist parties in the government in all the measures which are designed to combat Fascism and to produce concrete benefits to the workers."

Of course, it is the worst of idiocies for Communists to speak of cleaning out the Fascist officers as a condition for the revolutionary proletarians supporting capitalist armies which happen to be lined up on the same military front—but for opposite reasons—with the U.S.S.R. From this point of view, it would be in-

conceivable and impermissible for the U.S.S.R. to have a military alliance with Italy, all of whose officers and generals are Fascists. Worse than that. Comrades who argue this way forget the organic connection today between Fascism and imperialist war. The bourgeoisie is for a Fascist state as an instrument enabling it to wage war more effectively. Vice versa, imperialist war breeds Fascism. The very declaration of war would be an occasion for the French capitalists to force a Fascist state on the country. Indeed, one of the most potent arguments used by the French Fascists for their form of state is that Fascism is necessary in order to enable France to wage her "war of defense" against Hitler Germany.

For Communists not to fight imperialist war to the finish or to make the slightest compromise with their own bourgeoisie (which may momentarily be in alliance with the U.S.S.R.) is to give way to Fascism, to strengthen the stranglehold of the capitalist class in the country in question. This means weakening the revolutionary movement in one or more capitalist countries—which means weakening the most reliable and effective ally of the U.S.S.R. Such policies smell of social-chauvinism regardless of the good intentions that may be involved. Such tactics hurt the peace policies of the U.S.S.R. and are not conducive to the best interests of the foreign or domestic policy of the victorious proletariat in the U.S.S.R. or the proletariat still struggling for victory in the other countries.

The swamp of opportunism and social-chauvinism into which the leaderships of some of the C.I. sections have fallen is most forcefully portrayed in the C.P. U.S.A. Clarence Hathaway, editor of the Daily Worker, is guilty of the crassest and most vulgar expression of such deviations from the revolutionary position towards war. Approving the position of Thorez, he says: "French imperialism, willy-nilly, is carrying on an historically progressive war which is objectively for the defense of the Soviet Union and against a Fascist force that it today the main instigator of a new world war. . . . At the outset of the war, and in so far as France really fights alongside of the Soviet Union, we are

not going to call for the defeat of the country that is helping us."

This was precisely the line of "reasoning" taken by the social-chauvinist leaders in 1914. To Scheidemann, the Kaiser was, "willy-nilly," "carrying on an historically progressive war" against Czarism and for culture. To Johaux, Henderson, and Gompers there were also special reasons for not calling "for the defeat of the country" that is helping them "make the world safe for democracy." To Hathaway, imperialist France, fighting to hold the loot it seized in the last war, is capable of "carrying on an historically progressive war." He sees common aims binding the Soviet Union waging a revolutionary war of defense and imperialist France which, regardless of momentary military exigencies, is inherently anti-Soviet. Hathaway even speaks of the country (as a homogeneous entity) and not the government—a clear indication of his dropping the class viewpoint. When Hathaway and Stalin say "we are not going to call for the defeat of the country that is helping us" they mean of course that they are not going to call for the defeat of the government that is guarding our exploiters, persecuting our class, and that will be utilizing the very pretense of war to wipe out all workers' rights to organize and strike—in short, to introduce Fascism in order to save capitalism and insure its victory in the imperialist war.

This never was Lenin's point of view. Before the Soviet Union was established he mercilessly flayed all elements in the labor movement which made the slightest retreat from or compromise with the idea of fighting for the defeat of the home government in imperialist war. After the establishment of the Soviet Union Lenin, in the decree of the Soviet Government issued on December 13, 1917, emphasized that revolutionary propaganda and activity must be continued (and aided by the Russian C.P.) in those countries having an alliance with the Soviets as well as in the neutral or hostile countries. Certainly such revolutionary propaganda and activities do not help the government win the war—unless the government is a revolutionary proletarian government. Perhaps Hathaway and his partners in blunderland will tell us next that the U. S. government of

today would become such a revolutionary proletarian government if it were to enter into a military alliance with the U.S.S.R. in the event of a war with Japan. To us this would not occasion any surprise in view of the fact that not so long ago the Central Committee of the C.P.U.S.A. called upon the Hoover government to expel the Japanese ambassador in Washington because he was a representative of imperialism and preparing war against the U.S.S.R. Of course, this really meant putting faith in the Wall Street government as an anti-imperialist agency and pledging support to it in the event that Japan would go to war over this breaking of diplomatic relations by the U. S.

What is to be done? Basically the Communist slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war remains unchanged. It does assume a new concrete form. In every country we work for the overthrow of our own bourgeois government and for supplanting it with a proletarian dictatorship. After establishing Soviet power we do not pull out of the war, we do not make peace with the capitalist governments warring against the Soviet Union, but continue the war on the side of the U.S.S.R. helping it attain its revolutionary objectives, as one proletarian revolutionary government allied with another.

The proper course of the Communist International for its sections in the face of the developing war situation and in the event of a new war was outlined by the National Bureau of the Communist Party (Opposition) as follows:

"The basic Communist slogan of transforming the imperialist war into a civil war remains unchanged but assumes a new, concrete form for Communist parties in countries having an alliance with the Soviet Union. These Communist Parties steadfastly continue to aim at the revolutionary overthrow of their own bourgeois state by the proletariat. They must declare war on their own bourgeoisie and organize the revolutionary struggle against them not only before such a war breaks out but also incessantly from the very first day of such a war. Once the bourgeoisie is thus overthrown in a particular country, the job of the

proletariat taking power is not to stop the war immediately but rather to organize revolutionary warfare, to throw their full forces and resources on the side of the U.S.S.R. in a revolutionary war. . .

"Under no circumstances can a military alliance between a capitalist country and the Soviet Union mean that the Communist Party in the bourgeois country is to conclude peace with the capitalist class when the war breaks out. Just the opposite must be the strategy pursued by the Communist Party in question. In order to defend the Soviet Union and to help it achieve its revolutionary objectives in the war, the Communist Party must lead the workers in its country towards the overthrow of its own bourgeoisie. At best, the bourgeoisie, momentarily lined up on the side of the Soviet Union in a war, are unreliable allies of the proletarian dictatorship and would seek the first opportunity for turning on it. . . . In any war in which the Soviet Union is involved, the highest interests of the entire international proletariat are expressed in the complete victory of the U.S.S.R. waging a revolutionary war. The progress of the world revolution in other countries is organically bound up with such a victory by the Soviet proletariat. The best way to hasten and insure such a victory is the seizure of power by the workers of other countries and then allying themselves with the U.S.S.R. in a revolutionary war. This strategy holds just as much for the Communist Parties operating in imperialist countries which have military agreements with the U.S.S.R. The task of such Communist Parties is also to transform the imperialist war into a revolutionary war. This task can be achieved only thru the establishment of a proletarian dictatorship, thru the destruction of bourgeois rule. Talk of peace with the bourgeoisie or voting for war credits is out of the question, is utterly impermissible for Communists in such countries as well as for the Communists of other lands. Such a policy would be open social-chauvinism no matter under what banner it would be conducted." (From the Draft Thesis Proposed by the National Bureau to the Fifth National Convention of the C.P.O.)

CHAPTER SEVEN

Soviet Foreign Policy And The Comintern

To the splenetic and rash in the labor movement there appears to be the following arrangement between the U.S.S.R. and the imperialist powers: In return for capitalist trade, concessions and recognition, the CPSU, leading the Soviet government, is to de-revolutionize and finally to give up the Comintern.

There isn't the slightest foundation in fact for this conclusion. Until a few months ago, the entire line of the Comintern was atrociously ultra-leftist; there was pursued a strategic course based on a totally false estimate of conditions, based on an exaggeration of the degree of development of the class struggle and the objective possibilities for revolutionary conflicts in Western Europe and the United States. We were in the "third period," in the period of revolutionary upsurge and wars and revolutions on all sides! The Comintern strategy was adjusted to this fantastic conception. Nor was this merely a paper evaluation. The various sections of the C.I., vigorously pushed and aided by the ECCI, dominated by the CPSU, unfortunately set to work on this basis in their respective countries. Yet, it was precisely in this period that the capitalist powers accorded more and more recognition to the USSR.

The foreign policies of the various bourgeois powers are in no way determined by the tactical course of the Communist International. It isn't at all true that the less vigorous, the less revolutionary the C.I., the more concessions and the better the terms the imperialist powers accord the USSR. In fact, the first capitalist recognition of the Soviet government came in the crimson days, the first years, of the C.I. Furthermore, it was precisely in these days that the Soviet government had to pay the highest price in its foreign relations.

Countries having far more fear of revolution than the U.S. recognized the Soviet government long before Uncle Sam did. And the Soviet Republics made far greater concessions than today to bourgeois countries when their regimes were far less stable, far more in danger

of being overthrown by their proletariat than at present. Witness the treaties with Esthonia (1920), Poland and Latvia (1921), and the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany in April 1922. These were the days of Lenin and Trotsky and not the days and nights of Stalin.

Of course, the factionally-perverted might say that the CPSU, dominating the C. I., deliberately forced an ultra-left, sectarian line on the Comintern in order to hide, with a revolutionary cover, as it were, the very aim of giving up the Communist International. The crass hypocrisy of these distorters is revealed by the fact that it was precisely they who conceived and initiated the ultra-left course. At the peak of this ultra-revolutionism in August 1929, Rakovsky and Trotsky emphasized to the CPSU that "there had been a softening of opinion between us (Stalin and Trotsky) thru circumstances." A little later, in his letter to his so-called Leninbund of Germany, Trotsky boasted that: "To be a sectarian today is an honor for every real revolutionary." And Trotsky's most persistent parrot in the U.S. not so long ago uttered the following words of truth, tho not of wisdom: "Stalin had to borrow copiously from the ideological arsenal of the Left Opposition." (P. 60—Ten Years of the Left Opposition).

More than that. If these critics honestly attribute to the Soviet government and its leadership such nefarious motives and dastardly plans of betrayal, then, they should logically condemn the USSR as the most dangerous type of anti-proletarian state which is not only against its own working class at home but also camouflages itself in order to undermine and poison the working class movements thruout the world. Trotskyist logic should then impel these latter day saints of "pure revolution" to call upon the entire international proletariat to wage a holy war against this ogre known as the CPSU, this unholy monster called the Soviet government. The Trotsky program for civil war in the USSR is in line with this logic. And a blood brother of the Trotsky family, like the

United Workers Party, is consistent enough to declare: "Russia will enter the next world war, as it now prepares for it, as an imperialistic force lined up with other imperialistic forces and it is not possible for the working class to have any other position towards Russia than towards any other country. The answer of the revolutionary movement to war is revolution; so, too, must be the answer of the Russian workers to a war in which Russia participates . . ." (Council Correspondence, July 1935, p. 13)

Too many speak too often of the world revolution as if it were some Messianic conception. The social revolution isn't something that will happen all at once, that must come on a certain date, but is something that is happening, is developing. As Lenin saw it, "the social revolution cannot ensue save in the form of an epoch. . . ." Historically speaking we are in that epoch now. That doesn't mean, however, that every moment of that epoch is equally appropriate for "civil warfare on the part of the proletariat." Altogether too often do many talk too loosely of the world revolution. They seem to think that all that is needed for the world revolution to happen (in one act, perhaps) is for the USSR "not to hold back" the working classes of other countries. This is plain poppycock. The slowness of international revolutionary development is not due to the "bad intentions" of the Soviet leaders as reflected in Soviet foreign policy. Rather, this slowed-down development is due to a whole series of factors; to wit, treacherous role of Social-Democracy, consequent immediate post-war defeats of Bolsheviks, C.I. mistakes in tactics, economic possibilities for and political ability of bourgeoisie to recover and hit back, etc.

The fundamental problem involved here is that of the relationship between the interests, aims and tactics of a Communist Party already in power and those of the C.P.s still struggling to win a majority of the workers for taking power. Both types of Communist Parties have identical interests. Both types of Communist Parties seek the destruction of all capitalist forces and the state powers which protect and seek to perpetuate the bourgeoisie as ruling classes. In this light, the revolutionary class

struggle is thoroly international. We must, however, distinguish between the various stages of the class struggle in the different countries. This means that we must differentiate between and must allow for differences in the tactics employed by the C.P.s in the sundry countries for the achievement of the common identical objectives.

This process of differentiation is rooted not only in the uneven development of capitalism itself, not only in the distinct class relations prevailing in different countries, but also in the degree of strength developed by the various Communist Parties. Thus the victorious CPSU faces today two problems—viz, the wiping out of the remaining capitalist elements within the Soviet borders and the aiding and abetting of the destruction of all capitalist forces outside Soviet territory. In the first case, it is the Soviet power against the remnants of one capitalist class; in the second instance, the CPSU tackles a job in which, controlling an armed Soviet power, it is facing many or all capitalist classes and the countries which they dominate. As a section of the world party of Communism, the CPSU thus faces the problem of Red "Intervention." Any other Communist Party in power would face the same and other problems. For us Communists it is categoric that every CP in power, that every proletarian state not only has the right to such "intervention" but is dutybound to exercise this right. In fact, the Red Army today in the USSR—tomorrow in another country—is so trained and organized as to be able to fulfill this duty at the proper moment. The only problem involved here is a political and technical one, the propriety of the moment, the ripeness of the occasion for such Red "intervention."

Would any of the opponents of Soviet foreign policy really propose that the USSR and the CPSU, which leads it, should today exercise this right, should declare that now is the proper moment for fulfilling this duty, let us say, in Germany or England? Obviously this would mean pitting the USSR not against one capitalist power but against the whole capitalist world today—when the proletariat of the different bourgeois countries is still not only far from being able

to do its share in the way of rendering armed aid to the Soviet government, but is even still largely nationalistic in a bourgeois sense. Clearly, this would be suicidal and impractical. It would mean certain disaster for the USSR and its victorious working class. Just now, Hitler would welcome such an attempt by the Soviet government. That's precisely what Nazi Germany is seeking. Indeed, Hitler's powerful propaganda machine is trying desperately to sell the capitalist world the idea that the USSR is about to launch such a war against all capitalist countries. Fortunately, Soviet foreign policy has been able, so far, to thwart the Nazi bandits in their manoeuvres against the USSR, in the moves to put Germany at the head of the armies of the big powers on march against the USSR.

We must, therefore, recognize that the USSR is compelled to find some *modus vivendi* with the imperialist and capitalist powers. This *modus vivendi* is expressed in certain compromises by the Soviet government, by the Russian proletariat already in power, in certain economic relations, pacts, treaties and diplomacy resorted to by the USSR. The same would hold for the CP in the U. S. if it were today a party in power and in the international position in which the USSR now finds itself.

But because the state politics of the USSR (laid down by the CPSU) necessarily must be different and cannot be identical with the politics of the various other sections of the C.I., one should not conclude that there is a fundamental, necessary or unavoidable conflict between the interests of the CPSU as the leading party of the C.I., as the sole victorious party, and the other sections of the C.I. We cannot stress too strongly that the methods and tactics of the various individual sections of the C.I. and of the Comintern as a whole towards bourgeois governments must today be totally different from the methods and tactics laid down for the Soviet government by the CPSU.

When we grant this necessary difference of tactics in the pursuit of common

aims, in defense of common interests, it doesn't, for even a fraction of a second, mean that the CPSU cannot make mistakes in the tactics it works out for the Soviet government, that the Soviet state cannot make mistakes in its diplomatic relations, in its foreign policy. Nor does it mean that when such mistakes are made by the CPSU and the Soviet government which it controls, we should close our eyes to them and not criticize them. The very opposite is the case. Only the most unequivocal but constructive criticism can hasten the overcoming and prevent the recurrence of such mistakes.

For instance, Stalin's joining Laval in the communique accompanying the necessary and correct signing of the Franco-Soviet pact was the gravest of errors. Being the symbol and decisive and almost sole leader of the C.I. today, Stalin made a fatal mistake in joining Laval in a declaration that he "understands and approves fully the national defense of France in keeping her armed forces at a level required for security." The French C.P. immediately took this not merely as a diplomatic declaration but as a line of policy for the C.I.

Likewise, we must condemn Radek's recent declaration in the Japanese press assuring the world that the Soviet Union will not resort to armed force in the inner Chinese complications and that the freedom of the Chinese people is the concern of the Chinese nation itself. In the face of reality and for strategic reasons, it is not wrong in principle to say that the USSR is not contemplating armed intervention in China, but the form of Radek's declaration is impermissible.

Besides this, it is also possible for individuals who symbolize and speak solely in the capacity of Soviet diplomats to make mistakes. In this light, Litvinov's declaration in the League of Nations, hailing Germany's victory in the Saar plebiscite, was not sound from the point of view of the best interests of Soviet foreign policy. To say the least, it was uncalled for and clumsy.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Soviet Foreign Policy And World Revolution

The Trotskyite theory that there is a fundamental cleavage between the interests of "Russian state policy" and the interests of the international proletariat is false from top to bottom. Ludwig Lore, in the New York Evening Post, lodges this accusation rather crudely as follows: "Protection and safety for the Soviet is everything; the movement is nothing. . . ."

Let us see how much water and what sort of water this theory holds. In a long range sense, the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. is an essential and effective weapon not merely of the Russian workers but of all workers against world imperialism. When the Soviet Union is strengthened, then, the efforts of the workers in other countries to establish proletarian dictatorships are strengthened. When the Soviet government throws its weight in the international arena for peace—even for the shortest time—it helps the proletariat in the other countries to delay, check or paralyze the war moves by their own bourgeoisie.

Experience itself is the decisive test here. Mounting prestige, rising influence, of the U.S.S.R., inspires the workers of other countries in their daily struggles. For instance, the strength of the U.S.S.R. enabled it to form military alliances with the French and Czecho-Slovakian governments. The effect of this Soviet alliance upon the proletarian masses of these countries was evidenced in the last elections held there. The primary reason for the gain in Communist votes in these elections was the increased sympathy for and enhanced prestige of the U.S.S.R. as a force for world peace, as the force for preventing war. Were it not for this stimulus given to the workers in France and Czecho-Slovakia by Soviet foreign policy, there is every reason to believe that the Communist strength in these elections would have been either stagnant or receding.

Besides this, many sections of the bourgeoisie, even in countries compelled to form temporary military alliances with the U.S.S.R., dread the Red Army. They realize that the Red Army is not an instrument of imperialism, and would engage only in a war whose interests are totally different from those animating the capitalist ruling classes. Furthermore, many capitalists are scared, because they fear that such alliances might have a revolutionary effect on their own armies. (For instance, during the debate in France over the pact with the U.S.S.R., Deputy Charles Relasteyrie condemned the Soviet alliance and complained that "encouragement is being given to revolutionary propaganda by the entente with the Soviet.")

In this light only must we face the problem of the defense of the Soviet Union. Obviously, the C.P.S.U. defends the Soviet Union with different tactics than those employed by the Communist parties which have not yet won power. There is no such question as to "which comes first," the defense of the Soviet Union or the revolutionary struggles inside any particular country. The two are distinct but inseparable phases of one organic task: the defeat of the international bourgeoisie. A successful defense of the Soviet Union by the C.P.S.U. helps the revolutionary labor movement in the capitalist countries, that is, a rising revolutionary proletarian movement is the best defense of the U.S.S.R. by the non-Russian workers.

When we make this point we do not in the faintest way desire to minimize the counter-effect, the negating influence, the weakening of the international labor movement thru the false tactics pursued by the Communist International in the various countries. Incidentally, in speaking of factors responsible for the present plight of the international labor movement outside of the U.S.S.R., one must not forget the disastrous consequences flowing from the principles as

well as tactics of Social Democracy the world over. In the capitalist world, Social Democracy is far more influential and generally far stronger numerically than the Communist movement. The Labor and Socialist International has contributed more than its share to the weakening of the world working class movement, to the defeat of the proletariat in Germany, Austria, Spain, and elsewhere.

Again, we cannot stress too much one very serious mistake that all Communist parties must avoid in the present situation. This is the following: The successes and achievements of the U.S.S.R., whether on the economic field or in international politics, can under no circumstances replace the revolutionary struggle in the other countries. A correct foreign policy pursued by the Soviet government, led by the C.P.S.U., can never be a substitute for correct tactics by the Comintern or any of its sections in capitalist countries. It is entirely possible that, at a particular moment, the Comintern as a whole may have false tactics, while the tactics laid down by the C.P.S.U. for the Soviet government in its relations with capitalist powers may be sound.

It can also happen that the mechanical, artificial transference of these sound tactics from the U.S.S.R. would in itself doom them when applied in other countries—would in itself be the source of fatal harm to the C.P.'s resorting to such a strategic course. In fact, the recent history of the Comintern abounds with costly errors emanating from this source. Right in the Soviet Union does not necessarily mean correct in the other sections of the Comintern; vice versa, wrong tactics in the other sections of the Comintern, do not necessarily mean wrong policies by the C.P.S.U. Nor must anyone attempt to hide or minimize the falsity of the line of the Communist International at a particular moment behind the soundness and achievements of Soviet foreign policy.

The question of constructing socialism in the Soviet Union is much more than an ordinary tactical problem confronting the proletarian republic. In its many ramifications it is a vital problem faced

by the entire international working class and the many millions of oppressed colonial peoples. The Russian workers have seized political power. They now rule one sixth of the earth. What should they do with their power within the Soviet Union? This is no abstract question flourishing in a vacuum. To play with state power is to play with fire. Clearly, the question cannot be treated abstractly. What should the Russian workers do in the Soviet Union but build socialism? For what other purpose shall the Russian proletariat use—inside the U.S.S.R.—the state power they now wield except for constructing socialism? None of the critics of the C.P.S.U. has to date offered an alternative to the Russian proletariat.

What do we mean by the question: can the proletariat build socialism in the Soviet Union? The construction of socialism in the Soviet Union means the overcoming of all capitalist elements in the U.S.S.R., by the Soviet workers themselves, with their own forces, without armed proletarian aid from the outside. Hence, we pose the question: is the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. capable of uprooting completely its own bourgeoisie? For years, the C.P.S.U. has answered this question with an emphatic yes. If the C.P.S.U. were not correct in concluding that the Soviet proletariat was capable of overcoming fully all capitalist elements within its country, that is of building a socialist society, then, it would really have no reason for maintaining power. We should then stop fooling the workers in the U.S.S.R. and everywhere else and give up power to another class.

But living facts speak much louder than sterile, false theories. Despite tremendous difficulties, technical backwardness, the slowing down of the proletarian revolution in Western Europe and America, bitter imperialist opposition, the Soviet proletariat has remained in power, has consolidated its position and has splendidly utilized its power for achieving remarkable progress in socialist construction. Witness the world-astounding achievements of the First and Second Five Year Plans in all walks of life.

This policy has been persistently pur-

sued by the Bolsheviks from the very moment of their assumption of power; it was a policy which Lenin defended vigorously against Trotsky years before the October revolution. In 1915, in an article in the *Social Democrat*, then the central organ of the Bolsheviks, Lenin stated:

"Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. From this it follows that the victory of Socialism at first in a few, or even in a single country taken separately, is possible. The victorious proletariat of this country, (where the proletarian dictatorship is in force.—J.L.), having expropriated the capitalists and organized Socialist production in its own country would rise against the rest of the capitalist world, attract to its side the oppressed classes of other countries, raise revolt against the capitalists of those countries and, if necessary, take up arms against the exploiting classes in those states." (Our emphasis).

And in 1919, in his article "Economics and Politics in the Epoch of the Proletarian Dictatorship," Lenin further emphasized:

"From the point of view of fundamental economic problems, the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country, the victory of Communism over capitalism is assured. It is precisely for this reason that the bourgeoisie of the whole world is furious and raves against Bolshevism and is organizing military crusades, conspiracies, etc., against the Bolsheviks: it is because they perfectly well understand that our success in the work of reconstructing social economy is assured, unless they crush us by military force and to crush us in this manner they will fail to do."

No one should speak of the revolutionary class struggle, its problems, difficulties and perspectives in the abstract—divorced from reality. When we now speak of constructing socialism we have in mind not any one country in the abstract, let us say Monaco or Luxemburg, but concretely the U.S.S.R., abounding in natural resources, covering one sixth of the earth, rich in certain revolutionary traditions, having certain historical features, having a proletariat

playing a certain dynamic and decisive role in relation to other classes, etc. In this sense, we can only repeat that constructing socialism in the Soviet Union involves the ability of the Soviet proletariat to defeat decisively its own (national) bourgeoisie. This job the Russian proletariat can do with difficulties, with mistakes, but even without the armed help of the Western European and American proletariat.

Naturally no one claims that the Soviet proletariat alone, regardless of the strength it has attained to-date, can now destroy the entire international bourgeoisie without the armed assistance of the international working class. Therefore, the final, complete and unbreakable victory of socialism on a world scale involves the victory of the Soviet proletariat and the rest of the international working class in a combat with world imperialism. Surely many of the critics of Soviet foreign policy would hesitate advocating that the U.S.S.R. should today, without the armed aid of the Western European and American working class, launch a frontal attack on the entire world bourgeoisie.

When the Russian proletariat snapped the chains of Czarism and broke the chains of capitalism it was not a victory only for the Russian workers. The Russian October is, so far, the mightiest, world-shaking, victory won by the entire international working class and all the world's colonial masses. The U.S.S.R. as the land of proletarian dictatorship, is, therefore, the base, the center, the inspiration of the international revolutionary movement. Its gigantic successes not only do not come at the expense of the world proletarian revolution but are milestones on the path of and powerful stimuli to this revolution.

The situation in which the Comintern finds itself today illustrates this very clearly. Were it not for the great victories scored by the Soviet proletariat in socialist construction, surely the false, sectarian, adventurist—and now the confused and opportunist—policies of the Comintern in the capitalist and colonial countries would by this time have reduced the C.I. to a mere memory. Here

again the Soviet Union has been a lifesaver for the revolutionary international proletariat.

It is unchallengeable that the interests of the Russian and the rest of the international proletariat are inseparable and harmonious. They supplement and complete each other. There is no such thing as Soviet nationalism. This is a pure fabrication of enemies of the international Communist movement, of the Soviet Union, of the entire world labor movement. The world proletariat has, so far, not had as powerful a stimulus, as powerful an impetus to its victory, as its successes and achievements in Russia. On the other hand, if the proletariat in the capitalist countries hadn't supported the Soviet Union, intervention would have come extensively and rapidly enough and the Soviet Republic, under attack by the imperialist powers, would have been overthrown.

If failure or disaster were ever to befall the Soviet Union, it would spell the darkest defeat for the workers and oppressed colonial peoples for many years. Again, should the international sympathy and support for the U.S.S.R. grow, then, the growth of socialist construction in the Soviet Union, the socialist victory, would be speeded up tremendously. If the Soviet Union moves forward swiftly in its drive for Socialist construction, these socialist victories achieved go a long way toward strengthening the proletarian positions of battle against international capitalism as such.

It is amusing to find that most of the critics of the U.S.S.R. base themselves on the assumption that the Soviet government is not revolutionary enough towards capitalist governments. It is precisely these people who have, for years prior to the present juncture of international relations, condemned the Bolsheviks as too revolutionary. It is the same people who now demand that the C.P.S.U. should have the Red Army march thru Germany to avenge the wrongs and injuries inflicted on the German proletariat by Hitler. There is little room for doubt that if the Red Army had marched, as some of these people now say they wanted it to march, most of these critics would today be helping their bourgeois governments against so-

called red imperialism, against the attempts of the Russians to force a "dictatorship" on the rest of the world. Surely, these critics will grant us that sending the Red Army into Germany would immediately mean a closed front of German, British, Italian, Japanese and American imperialism and all their lackeys against the U.S.S.R.

By the way, we wonder how some of these Social Democratic opponents of Soviet foreign policy would have liked it if the Red Army were to have marched on Berlin in 1929 when Zoergiebel shot down thirty workers participating in a May Day demonstration prohibited by the Prussian "Socialist" government. No one need have even the slightest doubt that if this had occurred the Social Democrats, the world over, would have risen to the defense of German Social Democracy against Bolshevik "dictatorship"!

It is just these people, who have yelled for years that the Soviet Union should not interfere in the affairs of other countries, that are now criticizing Soviet foreign policy and accusing the U.S.S.R. of betraying the interests of the international working class because the Soviet government does not break diplomatic relations with Germany and does go out of its way to prevent an imperialist war which would, in every likelihood, bring about a concerted drive of the big capitalist powers against the Soviet Republic.

To conclude, the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is primarily a weapon of the Russian section of the international proletariat in the world struggle against imperialism. It is a weapon different from the weapons used by the workers of other countries because the Russian proletariat has already attained a higher degree of class consciousness, has already won power. In the use of this weapon the Communist Party of the Soviet Union must take into consideration the actual class relationships prevailing inside the leading imperialist countries, the differences amongst the imperialist powers, the strength of the international labor movement and the economic and military forces at its own command. This is the only sound, practical revolutionary approach. Abstractions without foundation in fact, shibbo-

leths as a substitute for reality, must be discarded.

Trotsky once struck the proper keynote in this field when he said: "It would be childish to argue from the standpoint of abstract revolutionary ethics. The point is not to die with honor but to achieve ultimate victory. The Russian

revolution wants to survive, must survive, and must by every means at its disposal avoid fighting an uneven battle and gain time, in the hope that the Western revolutionary movement will come to its aid."

This has been and should remain the foundation of Soviet foreign policy.

August, 1935.



A Footnote to the Reader

This pamphlet has, we are sure, contributed something to your education in living Marxism. To continue further this education we urge you to read Betram D. Wolfe's booklet "Things We Want To Know," in which a series of questions on Communist theory and tactics, asked by an upper-bracket intellectual, is answered. "Things We Want To Know" is 15 cents.

For other theoretical articles on the American and international labor movement read the "Road To Communism" a quarterly magazine, priced at 25 cents. And to follow labor week by week in articles by Jay Lovestone, Bert Wolfe, Will Herberg, Charles Zimmerman, Geo. F. Miles, and many others, read the weekly

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