The Child and his Behavior. A. R. Luria

Mastery of Tools

In the upper reaches of the animal world, but below the human level, we have already noted an interesting fact: in some instances the ape would adapt to new and difficult conditions not directly, but by using external tools (sticks, boxes, etc.).^[25]

This phenomenon, which points to quite highly developed forms of behavior, is not yet discernible in the small child. The child needs to develop to the age of 1 1/2 years before he can, for the first time, use external objects as tools, and assess any given external object not merely as such, but as an object that can be used to achieve some goal. The first functional attitude to objects is the first step towards an active, rather than a merely mechanical, connection between the child and the external world.

It is not surprising that the child, having just begun to assimilate the external world, and finding it still alien and associated with various fantastic representations, should still have only a limited ability to act upon it in an organized manner, or to use individual objects of the external world as tools for his own purposes. In order to enter into such complex mutual relationships with the objects of the external world, and realize that they may be used not only for the immediate satisfaction of instincts (an apple the child may eat, or a toy that he may play with), but also as tools, for a specific purpose, the child’s development has yet to travel a very long way. For this to happen, instinctive immediate activity has to be replaced by intellectual activity, guided by complex intentions and carried out by organized acts.

Let us consider those first instances in which the child begins to use the objects of the external world as tools, thereby taking the first steps in the transition towards complex intellectual behavior.

As we know, a small child already eats from a spoon, uses a plate and wipes himself with a towel. In so doing, however, he is merely imitating adults, while his spontaneous use of objects as tools is limited, indeed practically zero. In all these instances the spoon, plate and towel are so inseparably linked to the act of eating or washing that they merge with it to form one habitual, integral situation. On the other hand we all know how difficult it is for a child aged 1 1/2 years to learn to use a spoon, or to cut something with a knife (rather than tearing it apart), etc.

If we wish to monitor the process of the mastery of tools in its pure form, and understand what precisely hampers the child’s efforts to use them, we must turn to experiments.

A number of scientists in Germany have conducted experiments with a view to elucidating the functional use of things by children as tools for a certain purpose. They were conducted by the same Kohler that discovered the use of tools among apes, and repeated with small children by K. Bühler and Peiser;^[26] experiments on older children were conducted by two German psychologists, O. Lipmann and H. Bogen, who described their findings in an interesting book.^[27]

The simplest of these experiments, involving very young children, went as follows: the child was led to a table on which there was an apple. It was impossible for the child to reach the apple, but a string ran from the end of the table to the apple. It was sufficient to pull on the string in order to reach the apple. Yet the child (Bühler studied children aged 9 months, 1 year 3 months, and 1 year 9 months) proved incapable of realizing that instead of stretching his arm to reach the apple he could pull on the string. He invariably reached for the apple, if necessary walking around the table to reach it from the other side, but it never occurred to him to use the string as an auxiliary tool to get the apple. The child completely failed to understand the objective and the means to attain it.

After lengthy experiments, Bühler did eventually manage to have the child reach straight for the string in order to pull in the apple (or cookie). However, the path the child followed in order to master such a technique for achieving his objective was a peculiar one. This child wanted the apple so badly that he made numerous random gestures with his hand, one of which happened to tug on the rope and move the apple. What appeared to be intellectual activity and organized actions on the part of the child was really nothing more than the repetition and consolidation of those random movements. The child had not yet reached the point where he could perceive the string as an object connected to the apple, and judge it to be a possible means of attaining his objective; in fact a whole year would yet have to elapse before he could grasp that connection.

Some authors designed the experiment differently; we shall describe it in order to show how the process of the first mastery of tools occurs in the child.

Toys of interest to the child were placed on the top edge of a blackboard; a chair and a long stick were not far from the wall. The child was given the task of getting a toy that was placed out of his reach; it could be done only by using the stick as a tool. These experiments involved children of different ages, at different levels of mental development. It is particularly interesting to note that the results of these experiments showed a close correlation with the child’s mental retardation. While a normally developed child of 7-8 years could solve the problem without difficulty, it proved beyond the capacity of a retarded child, who had no representation of the possibility of functionally using a stick as a tool.

For ease of comparison we shall reproduce two parallel transcripts describing how two different children, from a school for the mentally retarded, performed in the experiment. ^[28]

These two parallel transcripts very clearly typify the behavior of the two children, making it obvious that the first of them is less retarded, while the second is severely retarded. The first child immediately begins to try various combinations in order to reach the toy through the active use of external objects. He does encounter difficulties, however, as he is, after all, from a school for the mentally retarded; nonetheless, he drags a chair up to the board, talks about the possibility of reaching the toy with the help of a ladder, and eventually resorts to the stick for that purpose (admittedly after a little prompting from the experimenter).

None of this is true of the other child. From the outset, his behavior is characterized by an outright renunciation of the use of tools, and of any complex solution of the problem proposed to him. First, he continually jumps up and down in an attempt to reach the toy by hand; he then jumps onto a nearby desk, stretches as far as he can, but still fails to reach the toy; he does so despite the evident absurdity of his efforts (the desk is almost one meter away from the board). It does not occur to this child to make any active changes in the things around him, and then by means of those auxiliary changes to solve the problem. Despite the obvious promptings of the experimenter, he cannot do so; he fails to realize that an external object — the stick — can help him fulfil his purpose.

This child is clearly at a profound stage of mental retardation. His behavior has not made the transition from the primitive phase to that of cultural forms, characterized principally by active mastery of things in the external world as tools.

Mastery of tools is a sign of high psychological development; and we may safely assume that the processes leading to mastery of the tools of the external world, and to the unique elaboration of internal psychological devices, together with the ability to make functional use of one’s own behavior, are all characteristic elements of the cultural development of the child’s psyche.

The Cultural Development of Special Functions: Memory

We have seen how the small child, for whom the world of external objects was initially alien, gradually comes closer to it, and begins to master those objects and make functional use of them as tools. This is the first phase in cultural development, in which new forms of behavior and new behavioral devices come into being as an aid for both the innate and the simplest acquired movements.

In the second phase of cultural development, intermediate processes make their appearance in the child’s behavior, altering that behavior through the use of stimulus — symbols. These behavioral devices, acquired in the process of cultural experience, alter the fundamental psychological functions of the child, arm them with new weapons and develop them. The study of these devices enables us, in some instances, to resolve issues that had previously seemed enigmatic.

In numerous experiments, we have been able to monitor the development of these cultural devices linked to the memory of the child, and the manner in which that memory grows and is strengthened and re — armed until it gradually reaches the level found in adults.

For a long time, psychologists viewed the question of the paths of development of the child’s memory as extremely obscure, almost enigmatic. Does the child’s memory really develop at all? Do we adults have better memories than children? This question turns out to be not as simple as it first seems.

In fact all of us, particularly those of us who are obliged to meet people seeking personal advice, all of us — doctors, psychologists — frequently hear our patients complain about the decline of their memory. Most of them say that their memory was strong in childhood, that they were capable of memorizing whole pages of text the first time they saw them and remembering them for a long time thereafter, but that now, years later, their memory has begun to weaken, and that in adulthood it has become really poor.

Is there any substance in these complaints, that we hear from practically everybody, or are they merely the product of imagination and pathological self-doubt?

We must acknowledge that in many respects these complaints are entirely warranted. If by memory we mean that natural plasticity of the neuropsychic apparatus whereby an impression, once received, is consolidated or, as it were, imprinted in us, those people prove to be fairly close to the truth. It is safe to assume that this natural plasticity of the neuro-cerebral tissue (certain Western authors, following Rich. Semon call it the “mnema”, or the “mnemic function”) does not develop substantially during the life of the individual, and that in certain instances (nervous exhaustion, excessive fatigue, etc.), it may even regress or weaken. One has merely to monitor the natural capacity for imprinting of the healthy child, and of the nervous, exhausted adult (of whom there are many among city dwellers) to confirm that this is in fact the case. Even if we compare the average number of words mechanically memorized by children of different ages and by adults, we will find, to our surprise, no pronounced development of this function.

Below, we have quoted figures obtained by an American researcher, Ms. Norsworthy, whose study of the memorization of words by children of school age produced the following summary: ^[29]

It is evident from this table that the progression of memory in childhood and adolescence is rather slow; on the other hand, a comparison between these figures and the average memory of the adult will show that on average the adult memorizes less than an adolescent aged 13 to 14 years. It would thus appear that memory hardly develops at all; indeed by a mature age we must even acknowledge some deterioration of its capabilities.

However, we are all aware that adults often have a very good and extensive memory. As we know, a scientist can remember a vast amount of varied material in his special field; each of retains in our memory a colossal amount of terms, figures, etc. We know of adults who are able to learn a foreign language very quickly. We are often astonished by the orderly and organized nature of the memory of people we know.

How does one account for this paradox? Which assertion is true, and who has the better memory, the child or the adult?

We can answer this question only by considering how memory develops, from the child to the adult, and what characterizes it during its development.

If we begin to explore the reasons for the difference between the memory of some 5-6 year-old and that of a child of school age, we will find that the use of memory takes different forms in each. While the 6 year-old memorizes immediately, naturally, imprinting the material proposed to him, the child of school age, on the other hand, has at his disposal a large number of devices which help him memorize the necessary information. He links the new material to his previous experience, resorts to an entire system of associations, including marks of various sorts, etc. Both children have generally identical memories, but they use them differently. Both have a memory, but only the older of the two knows how to use it. The development of the memory from child to adult consists precisely of this transition from natural to cultural forms of memory.

Even the primitive peoples ceased to rely on their plain natural memory function. We have already pointed out that when he needed to remember the number of head of cattle or measures of grain, primitive man, instead of using immediate memorization, devised notched sticks on which he would mark the necessary quantity, thus serving a dual purpose. ^[30] By using a primitive device he remembered the necessary information more reliably than by natural means, and at the same time he lifted a superfluous load from his natural memory.

We can say that the child follows a similar path, the only difference being that primitive man invented his own memorization systems, whereas the developing child more often than not is supplied with ready systems that help him memorize; he merely assimilates them, and learns how to use and master them, thereby transforming his natural processes.

We have confirmed, under experimental conditions, that this transition to cultural forms of memory is based on the use of various devices capable of greatly and rapidly enhancing the power of memory.

We read out ten figures, one after the other, to a boy aged 6-7, seated before us. When we asked the boy, after the experiment, about the figures he had remembered, it turned out that he had memorized only two or three of them, or at most four.

When he was convinced that memorizing ten figures was extremely difficult, we altered the experiment. We gave him some object, such as a piece of paper or string, or some wood shavings, etc., and told him that the object in question would help him memorize the figures we were to read out. We set him the task of using the object as a means towards a certain end, as a means of memorizing figures.

Thereafter, the sequence of events usually went as follows: at first the child could not understand precisely how he could functionally use a piece of paper for memorization. It did not occur to him that the piece of paper, on the one hand, and the proposed figures, on the other, could have anything in common. The functional use of things – the notion that one thing could be used artificially for some process or other, to serve a purpose – was often too much for him to comprehend. Admittedly, he knew how to use a spoon when eating, or a towel to wipe himself dry, but these are all familiar processes, of which the object in question is itself an integral part. The child still lacked the ability to invent the use of auxiliary tools in those cases where some new, extraneous object was being used to assist some process or other, while the functional use of psychological auxiliaries posed even greater problems for him.

For this reason, the child of this age, more often than not, simply gives up, saying that the piece of paper does not help him remernber numbers. We are still faced with the task of ensuring that the child masters the material put before him as an aid to memorization, and discovers the functional use of some symbol for purposes of memorization.

We usually succeed, though the time taken varies according to the individual child. After a number of attempts, the child “guesses” that certain symbols may be put on the piece of paper; he becomes excited, picks it up after each new figure has been announced and begins to make marks on it. His method usually involves making a series of tears along the sheet, or actually tearing off bits of paper, so that the total number of tears or bits equals the number he has to remember. As a result, the child eventually has before him a distinctive system of recording, not unlike the “notched stick” system of numerical markings. Figure 19 shows some typical notched sticks, of the kind used by primitive peoples (in this case the Buryats). Here (Figure 27) we have reproduced a “notched stick” record invented during our experiment by a 6 year-old boy. We can see how similar they are by virtue of their formal-psychological role, and how the child, under experimental conditions, invented a system of recording which had been practised among the primitive peoples.

In the case of the child, of course, this system depends on a considerable number of factors – primarily the nature of the material put before him.

If we give the child a piece of paper or a piece of wood, we will see a kind of record similar to those in the “notched stick” system; if we offer him a piece of string, the result will be reminiscent of the knot-based system of writing; lastly, if we give the child various individual objects (grains, shotgun pellets, feathers, nails) we will usually see markings consisting of piles of these objects, etc.

In all of these instances, the child performs external manipulations in order to master the internal process of memory, which is exactly what characterizes a primary cultural device used to aid the natural psychic functions.

The child does not, however, always find it so easy to get results. We witnessed a number of cases in which the child, having invented a technique for tearing off bits of paper equal to the number in question, would then gather them all into a single pile and find himself in great difficulty when required to reproduce, one after the other, the figures that had been read out. In these cases, a second invention was needed in order to make the task feasible: the child had to think of laying out the bits of paper he had torn off in separate piles, and then counting them off in order. If he did this, the problem was solved properly.

In all of these experiments, one important point should be noted: in the transition from the system of immediate memorization to that of “recording” by means of certain marks, the “output” of memory rose sharply: a certain .fiction of its development occurred. A child who could remember three to four numbers using his natural technique of immediate imprinting was of course able to memorize a virtually endless quantity of numbers once he had transferred to the method of “recording”. This was because his memory, having been supplanted by new devices invented he himself had invented, began to work in a new mode yielding quantitatively maximum results. In order to memorize, he would tear off bits of paper and arrange them in piles, or use matches, feathers, etc., setting aside each time the appropriate number of these objects.

In the experiments we have just described, the child himself invented a system of specific markings with which, by switching from the natural to the cultural mechanism, he managed to increase the power of his memory many times over. However, this system is obviously very primitive, cumbersome and awkward. The further development of the child’s memory centers less on its natural improvement than on the alteration of those devices, on the replacement of primitive devices by other better ones, elaborated in the process of historical evolution.

Let us now return to the question of how the child memorizes the series of numbers read out to him, using as our experimental subject not a 6 year-old, but a child in the first year of school. Such a child is already familiar with the system of numerical notation, and the system for symbolic representation; he knows a system which has taken centuries to elaborate and which has been transmitted to him in his school exercises. Yet when we give him the same task of memorizing a series of numbers, and we propose the same material (paper, string, grains, gunshot pellets, feathers, etc.) as aids to memorization, we find him behaving quite differently. A child of school age usually will not revert to the primitive devices of the preschool child, and usually displays no tendency to make tears along the sheet of paper, or to tear off bits of paper and lay them out. He immediately takes the piece of paper and tears out a picture of the number. These children show a strong tendency to depict the numbers in order to memorize them: in fact they even try to form the symbol for the number out of a piece of string, despite! the difficulty involved. The new cultural devices acquired in school apparently displace the old primitive devices to such an extent that even materials that suggest a quantitative rather than a symbolic recording do not lead to a resurgence of the old forms of “notched stick” recording. Even with grains or gunshot pellets, the child forms the shape of the number; in other words, in order to form the Figure 1, the child does not simply lay out a single gunshot pellet, but instead goes to the trouble of arranging several of them in the shape of the Figure 1.

There is an example of such a record in which the child has used a piece of string, wood shavings or whatever he can, but to produce symbols, depicting numerals.

If we increase the pace at which the numbers are read out, the child invents a new simplified system of markings, without departing from the system of inventing symbols, for the numerals or their components. The effect – a massive increase in the quantity memorized – remains the same.

These examples make it clear that the child, while developing, does not merely exercise his memory, but re-arms himself, shifting to new memory systems and devices; and while the child’s natural “mnemic function” remains on average the same throughout this period, the devices for the use of memory increase greatly, ultimately producing maximum effect.

Strictly speaking, we and children memorize in quite different ways. We all have a large body of material consisting of traces of our past experience, which we actively use in each act of memorization. In order to memorize something new, we connect it in our Minds to something old that we know and remember well. It is said that we use the mechanism of association, linking the new associatively with the old; though it would be more accurate to say that we actively create a structure, a picture that includes not only new elements but also old and familiar ones; by memorizing that mentally contrived picture, we at the same time memorize the new object or word we need to retain in our memory.

Each of us carries about within us an entire complex mechanism assisting the memory. If a man has memorized something particularly well, it usually means that he is able to make an organized and proper use of his psychological inventory, that he knows how to create auxiliary structures and use them as aids to memorization.

In our experiments, we became convinced that the development of these psychological auxiliaries, mastery of one associations and images, and the ability to use them functionally for purposes of memorization account for the bulk of the development of memory in the child.

In order to explore this under experimental conditions, we were of course obliged to study objectively those memorization devices used internally by man, which meant that we had to “bring them to the surface.” Our experiment went as follows: a number of ordinary pictorial lotto cards were laid out in front of the student, each bearing pictures of animals, things, etc. We gave the child a series of words, asking him to memorize each of them, in turn, by choosing whichever card he thought was most helpful for purposes of memorization. The cards thus selected were set aside; at the end of the experiment the child, by looking at the card he had chosen, was required to reproduce the word we had given him to remember. Of course, the cards we provided did not exactly match the words involved, but they could be linked with them, by capable subjects. For example, having read out the word “dog”, we did not include a picture of a dog among the cards provided, but merely a picture of a house, a cabin, wolf, etc. In the more complex experiments no suggestive picture was provided at all; instead, the test subject was required to link the given word, actively and artificially to any of the pictures. Consequently, the problem was to prompt the test subject to Make functional use of the pictures for purposes of memorization.

Our experiments showed that children are not all equally capable of successfully using the tool that had been suggested to them. When we provided small children aged 4-5 with cards, asking them to use those cards in order to memorize words by establishing the most primitive links, the result was often failure. The child would refuse to use the cards for memorization. It did not occur to him that the cards could have any secondary significance in the memorization of words, or that they could be used or connected to words, or that a drawing of a collar could help them remember a dog.

Children of that age (not counting, of course, gifted children who are advanced for their age) prove unable to master the functional use of secondary symbols; as they are not yet familiar with the cultural use of memory, they rely on simple immediate imprinting.

Let us now take one step further. We may either try to induce that child to use picture cards for memorization (which certainly can be done), or we may take a child of 6-7 years. He will already be able, though by no Means all of the time, to use accessory cards to memorize words. Only when the relationship between the picture on the card and the word in question is fairly straightfor ward will the child prove able to memorize it with the help of the picture. The simplest instances of such mediate memorization are those in which the picture is already linked to the word in the child’s previous experience. For example, the child can easily memorize “tea” if the picture shows a cup, or “milk” if it shows a cow. The process becomes somewhat more complex when it involves connection through analogy (word, “bird”; picture, “airplane”), or function (word, “knife”; picture “watermelon”, which is cut by a knife), but any connection more complicated than this is already beyond the child’s grasp. If the picture is not linked by immediate proximity in his past experience, or if he is required to make an effort to connect the two images, the child is quite unable to use the picture as an auxiliary for memorization.

This is not what we find in a schoolboy aged 11 to 12, particularly if he is well developed. He clearly uses a different mechanism. A child at this level of development is already able not only to reproduce, for purposes of memorization, familiar situations from his previous experience, but also to actively connect the word proposed and the picture to form a new situation, which helps him imprint the new word on his memory. A picture chosen by such an older child for memorization may have nothing at all to do with the word proposed, but, when actively connected with the word to form a new situation, it may help him memorize it firmly. Here are a few examples of such connections, that we found in a 10-year-old boy:

1. The given word is “theater”. The child chooses a picture of a crayfish on the seashore; after the experiment, by looking at the picture he correctly reproduces the word “theater”. In response to a question, he explained: “The crayfish sits on the seashore and looks at the pebbles under the water: they are beautiful, so it’s like a theater to him.”

2. The given word is “spade”. The child chooses a picture of some chickens digging in a pile; after the experiment the child reproduced the word correctly. Explanation: “Chicks dig in the earth with their beaks, like spades...”

3. The given word is “want”. The child chooses a picture of an airplane; he reproduces the word correctly. Explanation: “I want to fly in an airplane.”

Here we have quoted three types of connection forming a single structure, that help the child memorize more words than he could ever have memorized without the aid of these auxiliaries. As we can see, all three examples establish complex links between different forms.

The detailed consideration of those links falls outside the scope of this study; in the small child they are often extremely primitive, whereas in the adult they can be highly complex and imaginative. The difference between the memory of the child and the adult lies not only in the habitual natural “strengthening” of memory, but in the “cultural” acquisition of ever larger quantities of new devices, and in the ability to memorize by means of conventional symbols that help the child, by mediate paths, to augment his memory many times. By suggesting to the child that he make the transition to the device of pictures as a means of memorizing, we achieve a certain “fiction of memory development": the child who has memorized 4-5 words begins, at that same session, to memorize 20 to 30 words using other devices. In adults we can achieve an even greater “enhancement” of memory. The difference between the memory of the adult and the child is therefore the difference between the “cultural devices” being used.

Children of different ages were given the task of first memorizing ten words directly, and then memorizing the same number of words using auxiliary pictures.

Our results may be summarized as follow:

Let us ponder the implications of this table. The youngest preschool child, as our experiments showed, can memorize extremely little – on average only 2.12 of very 15 words given to him. However, even the cards we give him as an aid hardly enhance his memorization at all. The memory of the preschool child obviously works mechanically, never going beyond simple natural imprinting (as the enormous development of the graphic eidetic memory in small children clearly demonstrates). Understandably, the child’s mechanical memory cannot grasp a significant number of the words proposed to him; it is also understandable that, being incapable of using accessory symbols, he continues, even in the experiment with cards, to rely on immediate mechanical memorization. The cards are often more of a hindrance than a help to him in memorizing; and when he is provided with extraneous auxiliary cards, unrelated to the. stimuli, we often find a decline in the number of words memorized. The situation is better in the older preschool age group, where the use of auxiliary symbols leads to an 81% increase in the number of words memorized; the transition to mediate memorization yields an even bigger improvement in memory in the first group of school children, where the use of external symbols produces a twofold average increase in the amount memorized. Thereafter the use of auxiliary devices continues to apply, accompanied by a significant enhancement of memory not using external auxiliary means.^[31]

If we present the numbers in the table in the form of a graph, we have the picture in Figure 28. The first part shows a sharp rise in the upper line, denoting memory relying on external auxiliary means; in the second half (older school children and adults), the upper line begins to level off, while the lower line, representing the number of words retained without the aid of external auxiliary means, rises more sharply. The result is what we might call a “parallelogram of memory”, that can be deciphered by the different mechanisms of memorization of the lower and upper age groups. ^le the small child was quite unable to use external auxiliary devices, in the first school-age group such a use of external accessory symbols reaches its highest point. The second school-age group is notable for something else: the use of external symbols now also begins to alter the internal processes; whereas at the lowest ages, memorization without external means was mechanical, the school child now already begins to use certain internal devices: he no longer memorizes mechanically, but associatively and logically. In actual fact, his “natural” memory begins to lose its natural character and becomes a “cultural memory”; and in this cultural transformation of primitive processes we are inclined to see an explanation for the considerable level of development found in “natural” memorization in childhood.

The following experiment, which the reader may wish to undergo, convincingly demonstrates how certain devices that may be used can increase the output of one’s memory. Memorize some system of 100 words, for example 50 Russian writers in chronological order, and 50 names of towns or stations situated along some river or railroad. This will certainly require some effort, but we are all aware that it is really not so very difficult to memorize a series of elements arranged in a system (the parts of a machine, the organs of the body, etc.). With that memorized stock you should be able without undue difficulty to memorize any 100 words proposed to you, and repeat them in the order in which they were read out to you. You can perform this apparently amazing task simply, though imperceptibly to a casual observer. All you need to do is connect each new word you hear with the respective link in a prepared series, as we did in experiments with the pictures. Having at one’s disposal this series of internal auxiliary symbols, it is possible to increase the “output” of one’s natural memory between five and ten times, and create what we may very appropriately call a “fiction of the development of memory”.

This is how culture works, by nurturing in us more and more new devices, converting natural into “cultural” memory; and school works the same way, by grafting on a series of subtle and complex auxiliary devices and opening up a number of new possibilities for a natural function of man.

We have deliberately explored in some detail the function of memory, since it provides us with an opportunity to illustrate, by means of a concrete example, the relationship between the natural innate forms of mental activity and the cultural form acquired in the process of social experience. Here we have seen how development proves to be more than mere maturation: it means cultural metamorphoses and cultural re-armament. If we now wished to consider the mernory of the civilized adult, we would have to take it as created not by nature, but by culture. After all, it would be quite wrong to limit it to those laws, pertaining to the strengthening and reproduction of experience, that are inherent in the natural mnemic functions.

If psychology wishes to study the laws governing the memory of contemporary civilized man it must, on the one hand, include the devices he uses for this purpose, and the external symbols generated by cultural development and the conditions of the social environment – his note book, his ability to make notes and copies, and the whole more or less rationally organized system of external symbols that serve as aids to memory. On the other hand, it must take into account the radical changes wrought in the internal psychological mechanisms by a cultural existence and by the use of certain devices.

Strictly speaking, when we study the memory of civilized man we are in fact studying not an isolated “mnemic function% but the entire strategy and technique of civilized man, designed to consolidate his experience, which developed throughout the process of his cultural maturation.

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