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THE NEW AGE—

will it be

DARK OR GOLDEN?

By SCOTT NEARING

A THOUSAND YEARS AGO, in the period of the Crusades, a new historical epoch was born—the epoch of Western Civilization. It was born into a Europe that had slipped back from the heights of a complex Roman culture to the depths of poverty, ignorance, superstition and a primitive dependence upon niggard nature—conditions everywhere met with in temperate-zone village economies. The Europe spanned by Roman roads, trade, travel and administration, living under Roman law and using Latin as a universal language, had sub-divided into a myriad of self-contained, impoverished, competing units. This epoch is usually described as the Dark Ages because, during that period, man's search for truth, order, harmony and beauty was generally abandoned.

Through ten centuries thereafter, western civilization grew and matured, enslaving and exploiting, amassing wealth and struggling for power. It mined the mountains, harnessed nature, leaped the seas, conquered the air. Science, technology and social engineering developed; nature was utilized; the social environment was transformed. In those ten centuries, western man erected the structure of an industrial, urban habitat.

Life in the Middle Ages was relatively static; change has been the outstanding characteristic of the past thousand years. As the centuries succeeded one another, the tempo of change increased, until during recent times it became a revolutionary avalanche.

A New Culture Pattern Appears

As the nineteenth century drew to a close, it became increasingly evident that a transformation in the direction of the social process was taking place. Until about 1900, the culture pattern had advanced and expanded. Then for a decade it paused. After 1910 it began receding and declining.

The generation which learned to observe and share in the active life of the world around 1910 soon discovered that:

1. New social forces were gaining momentum and establishing themselves as accepted and customary aspects of the social environment. Among these forces, (a) on the disruptive side were inventions, discoveries and modifications in the sciences and arts of handling the natural and social environments; (b) on the destructive side were economic disorganization, war and revolution; (c) on the constructive side were the contributions of scientists and engineers to the techniques of utilizing nature, organizing society and day-to-day living.

2. Nineteenth-century institutional forms could not contain the new social forces. This was evident when an economy of scarcity attempted to restrict potential abundance, or the ruling oligarchy of a European nation sought to confine railroads, autos and radio pulsations within frontiers established in the days of oxcarts. Social forms that had dealt successfully with animal energy were helpless in the presence of harnessed steam and electricity.

3. Handcraft shops were replaced by factories; slavery and old forms broke up under the pressure of the new forces; serfdom yielded to the wage system. Landlords were thrust from the seats of power by businessmen. Individual enterprisers were swallowed up by corporations. Private owners were expropriated. Local governments disappeared into the maws of nations and empires. Fierce rivalries between contending nations and empires precipitated deadly wars, fought between professional military machines built up through generations by an immense expenditure of wealth and human energy. Colonial rebels demanded freedom from imperial domination.

4. New forces developed new forms. The imposing structure of modern business evolved. Sovereign nation-states appeared. Republics became the type form of nineteenth-century government. The labor movement, the movement for popular education, for suffrage, for the abolition of chattel slavery, and

other forms of free association voiced the interests and demands of freed slaves, emancipated serfs and wage workers, seeking wider opportunities for the good life. The new leisure was absorbed by professional amusements and diversions. Revolutionary forces established the soviet social pattern after 1905.

5. As the old world tottered and crumpled, human ingenuity and energy were devoted to planning for the new order and to devising methods of rescuing fragments and remnants of the old world and regrouping them into new patterns designed to set up social forms that could safeguard common interests during the storms of the Great Revolution.

Four Attitudes Toward the Revolution

CONFRONTED BY THIS stupendous and, to many, mysterious and oppressive drama of recent decades, men can take one of several attitudes.

A—The easiest, and perhaps the most common is that of Sumner Welles: "We stand confused and uncertain at the approach of a new age" (*Where Are We Heading?* N. Y., Harper, 1946, p. 1).

B—In sharp contrast with such perplexity and bewilderment is the approach suggested by Julian Huxley: "The revolution must be consciously accepted and entered upon" (*Harper's Magazine*, Sept. 1942, p. 238). Mr. Huxley continues: "The revolution itself is inescapable . . . The United States is the only great power which has not generally recognized its existence as an inescapable fact . . . The most important single thing for the Americans to do now is to recognize that they, like the rest of the world, are living in a revolution and that, in some form or other, it will achieve itself inevitably, whether they like it or not" (*ibid.*, p. 240). Welles is baffled; Huxley recognizes the changing social pattern and proposes to adapt himself to it.

C—A third attitude toward the Great Revolution is one of pity—self-pity and pity for the multitude of men, women and children who have lost jobs, homes, possessions, health, happiness and life itself in the social overturn of the last half-century. No sensitive human being can escape this feeling of pity, particularly for the young folk, who were in no position to anticipate the catastrophe and had no hand in bringing it about. Sympathy and fellow-feeling do credit to the humanity of those who feel

such sentiments. They are of little social value, however, unless they lead the sympathizers to adopt and follow through some line of action.

D—Determination to act is the fourth attitude toward the Great Revolution. Granted that the social upheaval is the outcome of deep-lying causes, human beings who built the present-day social environment through centuries of painstaking effort cannot placidly accept its disintegration. If the life-standards to which they have grown accustomed are to survive and persist, if the race is to avoid heavy material and human losses, men must make the same kind of supreme effort in the face of this upset as they would make in the wake of flood, wind or fire. They must, as Julian Huxley says, look facts in the face, anticipate necessary adjustments and ease the social transition, avoiding unnecessary displacement, suffering and loss. We propose first to look the situation in the face. Then we shall attempt to formulate an action-pattern.

The Old Age and the New

WESTERN MAN is entering a new age which will differ in many essentials from that through which he has recently passed. What will be some of its characteristics?

Sociologically, as well as ideologically, the new world will differ from the old. The old world was divided along lines of occupation, language, race, class, nationality. The divisions were emphasized because the ruling minorities could maintain their profit-and-power-seeking authority only so long as they could keep the majority divided. The new age will minimize differences as the only workable way to coordinate and unify the large numbers of individuals and sub-groups that will constitute the world community.

Competing nations and empires accepted the struggle for survival as the first principle of their being. A coordinated community, reacting against the twentieth-century losses that arose out of the re-division of the world, *will rank cooperation first among the social virtues.*

Cooperating social units must bear a planned relation to each other. Competition pre-supposes over-all planlessness. Cooperation pre-supposes a plan. The greater the number of units in a cooperating group and the wider the variations in their character and function, the greater will be the necessity for planned relations between them.

Social planning begins with a statement of social objectives, lays down a program for their realization, anticipates social frictions and tensions, adopts the devices necessary to offset them, safeguards social equilibrium and formulates the measures required for social improvement.

Social planning provides the pattern within which natural and social sciences are employed, not for the profit of privileged minorities, but in the interest of the majority who make up the world community. Rule-of-thumb and the hit-and-miss of competitive struggle are replaced by plans drawn up, checked and adopted for the operation of the social order in the same way that a train schedule is drawn up, checked and employed in the operation of a rail terminal. Granted that trains will often be late and subject to unforeseen or unforeseeable circumstances which will throw them off schedule, it is nonetheless evident that a planless rail terminal would be a hurly-burly of confusion and wreckage. The planning device that keeps order in a multiplicity of relations between trains can be even more effective in the far greater complexities of present-day, planet-wide social relationships.

Competitive struggle, especially when coupled with private property holdings, results in a maximum of economic and social inequality. Inequality is justified on the plea that it provides incentive, but a little reflection will show that inequality, especially when it is made hereditary, destroys incentive by permitting the descendants of the holders of wealth and power to live without labor on the work performed by others. Furthermore, economic and social inequality passed down from parent to offspring is one of the most effective means of dividing a community into rival cliques, classes and castes and thus laying the groundwork for social antagonism and conflict.

Social planning, aimed at equality of opportunity, will reduce the probability of conflict and thus prove a stabilizing social force. If greater incentive is desirable, it could be put on a far more permanent basis by equalizing opportunity than by permitting the development of hereditary inequality. The possibility of inequality among those who are relatively equal does, it is true, furnish a temporary incentive to effort but, no sooner has inequality institutionalized itself, than it has the opposite effect, since property is in the nature of an hereditary monopoly and the propertyless are excluded from the monopoly enjoyed by the propertied. Where opportunity is equalized and preserved over

a considerable period of time, the members of successive generations all have a like chance to prove their capacities. Equality of opportunity, rather than property ownership, besides offering a formula for social stability, is the most reliable of incentives.

Social planners have for a long time advocated restrictions on the concentration of wealth and population in urban centers which shut people away from sunshine, fresh air and contact with other aspects of nature. Competitive industrialization has piled up industries and populations in human ant-heaps which provide higher rents and land values for property owners, more customers for merchants and a surplus of handy and often cheap labor for industries. Social planners begin with the proposition that a particular area of land can support a certain number of healthy, happy human beings. Such a criterion of maximum health and happiness provides, for industry and population alike, a limitation in terms of human well-being.

Competitive social forces have made the age-old urban centers too big. The new age, using electric energy and the newly developed agencies of transport and communication, will decentralize cities to a degree determined by considerations of human welfare.

"Freedom" Meant License and Irresponsibility

Finally, in this listing of the sociological characteristics of the new age is the provision of (a) economic, (b) political and (c) social freedom. Nineteenth-century civilization succeeded in making freedom synonymous with *license* and *irresponsibility*. There is some reason behind a property system that allows the landless to acquire enough land to yield them a living in exchange for their labor. But a system that joins farm to farm and city lot to city lot, until an individual (or, worse still, a corporation) has secured a monopoly control over land areas larger than the owner can himself use productively, and extensive enough to permit one human being to live on the labor performed by others, is establishing a foundation for hereditary inequality and social conflict. Freedom, expressed in these terms, provides for license, rather than liberty. Yet, in the name of "free enterprise," such property concentrations were established throughout the nineteenth-century capitalist world.

Similarly, the old social order in the western world interpreted freedom as irresponsibility. The monopolists of property were for the most part soulless, un-moral corporations, to which social

responsibility and moral values were meaningless phrases. Holders of corporate securities, permitted to hide behind corporate anonymity, were thus freed from social responsibility and were permitted to live off unearned income without the need of rendering any social service. Indeed, in many instances, the recipients of unearned income, through their conspicuous indulgence in waste and dissipation, set a pernicious example to their fellows.

Opponents of the new social order usually center their attacks upon its alleged failure to provide freedom. They are in the same position as monopolists who advocate "free enterprise." Of course, the new age will prevent an individual from holding land that he cannot use. Of course, it will deny him the chance to exploit his fellows. Of course, it will forbid the payment of unearned income. Of course, it will outlaw anonymity and insist upon social responsibility. It will go far beyond that, however, by demanding that, until social survival be assured and a reasonable measure of social security guaranteed, the individual must expect that social duties will be at a premium and freedoms at a discount. Even with survival assured and security guaranteed, the freedom of the individual will be subordinated to the major considerations above listed among the ideological and sociological characteristics of the New Age.

Economic Characteristics of the New Age

WE MUST NOW TURN to a third category and list some of the economic aspects of the new world. Of these the first is, of course, *social ownership of the means of production*.

The key economic institution of the capitalist world is undoubtedly the private ownership of productive tools. Private ownership is not merely the instrument through which wealth and power are concentrated in the hands of a minority. It likewise provides the basis for exploitation and makes the property-holder top dog in the political state and master of the agencies that shape and direct public opinion and determine control. Social ownership of productive tools is therefore a point at which the new order deviates fundamentally from the old.

Social, or collective, ownership is the antithesis of private or individual ownership. The nature of the collective owner may vary all the way from a consumer or producer cooperative, through different types of voluntary associations such as athletic and musical clubs, mutual-benefit societies and trade unions, to the municipality, the county, the state, the nation and a world

authority. Thus, the consumer cooperative might own or have a use-interest in its merchandise mart, the producer cooperative in its farm, creamery or rug factory, the athletic association in its gymnasium and sport field, the musical circle in its concert hall, the trade union in its headquarters, the municipality in its houses, bakeries and buses, the state in its highways and universities, the nation in its railroads, post offices and steel mills, a world authority in its planet-wide network of ship and air ways and radio communications.

The essential quality of social ownership is that nowhere does it allow for the "mine for me" conception that private property sets up and everywhere it involves a *use-right*, valid so long as the social group continues to function as a contributing segment of an interdependent economic whole.

At every stage through the hierarchy of collectivities that own property, the same rule prevails—ownership only to a point that does not jeopardize the next higher or more inclusive social unit. For example, at the point where collective ownership by the municipality trespasses upon the interests and prerogatives of the state, the interest of the lesser group yields control to the greater and more inclusive. Finally, the most extensive of all collectivities, a world government, will draw its authority directly from its citizens—the members of the human race.

Individual property is a source of private wealth and of arbitrary power in the hands of the property-owners; social property will be a source of group service and social income.

For a long time to come, commodities in a collective community will be rationed in the sense that the places in public schools are rationed—one to a pupil. The rich and powerful cannot get more school places by using their money. Nor are the children of the poor and weak deprived of their places in public schools because of the disadvantageous economic and social position of their parents. Places in public school, like the chance to drive on public highways, are rationed in accordance with need—one to a customer. They are not "owned" individually. The pupil in school and the driver on the highway have a *use-right* in the place that each occupies.

"But," you may retort, "what good would be three places in school for one child?" I answer, "No more good than three houses for one family or a thirty-room residence for three or four persons."

The only property relation that makes any sense is based upon

use and need. The gardener should have as many acres as he can use. The family should have as many cubic feet of living space as health, convenience and the development of personality require. The school child and the driver of a vehicle should have their chance respectively to learn and to drive.

So long as a commodity is scarce, the amount going to any individual or group will be limited in terms of use, need and average share. People now use schools and highways on that basis; the same principle should be extended to include food, housing, clothing, health services and the other necessities, decencies and conveniences.

By the same logic, the supply of goods and services moving toward individuals should be regulated and reduced to a routine in the same sense that the course of study in schools, the provision of school buildings and equipment, the building and maintenance of highways and the handling of street traffic are regulated and regimented. School children must be in their places at a specified hour; the school buildings are cleaned and heated; certain school-work is planned for pupils of each age group. Drivers of vehicles on the highways of the United States must pass on the right. When they encounter a red light, they must stop. Their speed of movement is limited by considerations of public safety. The result of such a set-up—whether an educational system or a traffic code—rigorously enforced against all comers, is that each child gets his chance at learning and each street user acquires a pattern of traffic habits under which he gets his chance to use the highways. It is no more necessary for a school child to worry about his primary educational opportunity or for an experienced street user to think about the traffic code than it is for an adult to wonder how he will use his feet in walking or his vocal organs in talking.

Economic function in the new world will be on just such an habitual basis. The head of a household will no more ask whether food and shelter will be available on the morrow than he will ask whether schools will be open and heated, streets paved or water running in the city mains. In an emergency such questions will arise but in the realm of food and shelter the course of social routine will be as invariable as it is now in the realm of schools, highways and water supply.

Consequently, economic factors will be demoted from the top-ranking position which they hold in an acquisitive society to the status of a community routine. There will, as a matter of course,

be food, shelter, first aid, streets, schools, parks and play spaces for those who need them. Humans will then be free to devote their vocational energies to necessary productive routine and their avocational energies to that wide range of pursuits in which healthy and active human beings engage, and to concentrate their creative faculties on the unfoldment of those philosophies, sciences and arts the development of which is the most exalted achievement of human genius.

Where Will the New World Take Shape?

THUS FAR we have commented on the ideological, sociological and economic characteristics of the new age, answering the question, "What kind of age will it be?" We now turn to the question, "Where?"—to the geography of the new age.

In our discussion of the impact of the Great Revolution upon highly industrialized regions of the West, upon the semi-industrialized regions of East Europe and elsewhere and upon the colonies, we discovered that, while the industrialized regions are now *caught in a death-trap of their own building*, the other two groups seem to be working out an alternative to the social pattern now crushing the life out of the industrialized West. This new pattern has had its fullest expression in the Soviet Union. Its characteristics are widely understood, however, and it is making its appearance in many other parts of the planet.

Two broad principles govern the geographical spread of the new social order. The first is the principle of the unequal rate of social development. The second is the movement of social forces along the lines of least resistance.

• No two communities ever occupy exactly the same level of social development at the same time. Variations in natural resources, in social tradition and in the human beings who compose the communities account for these variations in the culture level.

Words obscure these differences. We speak of the capitalist empires of 1910, for example. There were a dozen such. They varied in size, wealth, degree of integration, in their economic and political organizations, their policies and procedures. Although they had certain institutions in common—private ownership of productive tools, the wage system, class divisions, the armed state, colonies, spheres of economic and political influence—these institutions and practices varied from empire to empire.

Similar variations will be found among the nations and peoples that will take part in building the new world. Starting from different cultural backgrounds and at different dates, both assisted and obstructed in their forward movement by the complex of domestic and foreign, forward-looking and backward-looking forces, each community will move on its own culture level toward objectives that will vary from one community to another.

It goes without saying that similar differences in the culture level exist within nations, states, cities and neighborhoods. Culture-level variations are one of the universal factors with which social science deals.

2. The second principle governing the geographical spread of the new age is the movement of social forces along lines of least resistance. Resistance to social change is offered by (a) lack of resources and capital, (b) the opposition of domestic vested interest, (c) foreign opponents, (d) a deadlock of rival class forces, (e) incompetent or corrupt leadership, (f) popular indifference or apathy concerning social policy.

The expansion of capitalism offers a good example of this principle. Capitalism had its rise in the trading centers of Europe. Science and technology got under way in the cities of Italy, Spain, France, the Low Countries, Germany and Britain. (Edward P. Chesney's *The New Era* and Lewis Mumford's *Technics and Civilization* picture the process) By 1750 capitalist development had centered in western Europe and Britain. The French Revolution of 1789 broke the hold of the feudal interests on West Europe and disrupted their control over Central Europe. The citadel of the passing feudal order was Russia, Prussia and Austria, which formed the nucleus of the Holy Alliance. Judged in terms of resources, capitalism should have moved from West Europe into Middle and East Europe. The territories were contiguous and coal, iron, timber, rich agricultural land and manpower existed in abundance. Nevertheless the new capitalist order moved westward across the Atlantic into North America and later into Japan and Australasia, before it penetrated eastern Europe. It was not until the last years of the nineteenth century, more than a century after its penetration of North America, that capitalism gained a foothold in Russia.

The Americas offered little resistance to the advent of capitalism—though there was more resistance in Spanish America than in English America, just as there had been more resistance

to its advent in Spain than in England. In Russia and Austria, the resistance was sturdily maintained for generations after the historical forces seemed ripe for the rise of capitalism in those areas.

Similar forces are at work today. The first break in the resistance of capitalism to the new social order occurred in East Europe, where the grip of the peasant culture was broken by the mechanized military power of the industrial culture. Armed intervention by the industrialized powers succeeded in crushing the structure of the new order throughout Europe, except in the Soviet Union. In Asia, however, geographically far removed from the centers of western industry and alienated by imperial exploitation and oppression, the forces of the new order steadily gathered strength. In China they were able to maintain themselves continuously from the outbreak of the revolution of 1911. After the 1926 split in the People's Party, the Chinese soviet, or communist, forces organized a government which drew its support from an important segment of the Chinese people.

As World War II drew to a close with the defeat of the Axis, the military forces of communist China must have ranked fourth or fifth among those of the chief world powers. At the same time, communist China had moved its center into Manchuria and North China, where it was ranged along the southern frontier of the Soviet Union, thus reducing for the latter the danger of encirclement.

Meanwhile southern Asia was hacking furiously at the chains which bound it to the European empires. The massive anti-British movement in India stubbornly demanded independence; Burmese independence forces echoed the same demand; Indo-Chinese and Indonesians organized their republics and undertook to drive the French and Dutch out of their respective countries. In all these Asiatic movements, Communists played a part, in some places quite minor but in others major. In all these areas, imperialism was repudiated, independence was demanded and moves were made to nationalize or socialize major units of the economy.

The Center of Revolution Shifts to the East

After World War I, the center of revolution was in Europe; after World War II it was in Asia. By 1919 the eastern half of Europe was busy building a new social order; in 1945 the peoples of more than half of Asia were similarly occupied.

Between 1939 and 1945, Germany, France, Britain and the

United States, by rubble-izing the capital plant of Middle and West Europe, made a contribution of first-rate importance toward the new world order. At the beginning of World War II, the capital plant of Middle and West Europe (including that of the British Isles) was probably the most effective in the world, judged on the basis of technology. Its effectiveness was, it is true, lessened by the split-up of ownership and political control among half a dozen nations and empires but it was, nevertheless, a formidable base for the production of both civilian and military goods. Five years of shelling, bombing and burning reduced this area to such a level of economic impotence that it could not even feed its own population or provide it with shelter and clothing. Credit for the destruction of the capital plant of Central and West Europe must go almost entirely to the capitalist nations and empires. Soviet-armed forces operated almost entirely in eastern Europe, where they seem to have spared capital equipment wherever possible.

Long before the Potsdam Conference of 1945, through its decision to de-industrialize the Axis powers by blowing up their shipyards and moving out their machine tools and railroad equipment, finally marked Middle European capitalism for extermination, war destruction had all but wiped out its foundations. Capital plants, accumulated through generations, were crippled or destroyed in months, days, hours. And this destruction extended from the Ukraine to Land's End.

EVEN IF European capitalists had possessed the surplus capital with which to rebuild their plant after 1945, they still faced four immediate obstacles. (1) Many of the industrialists and financiers, having supported the Axis regimes, were collaborationists and traitors, scheduled for trial by their home governments and by the victorious Allied powers. (2) The probabilities of both international and civil war made the risks involved in rebuilding exceedingly high. (3) As the sphere of eastern influence was extended, the policy of nationalization was being more and more widely adopted. (4) If private enterprise had had the resources necessary to rebuild capital plant, the advance of socialization would probably have expropriated it before the private interests had gotten their money back.

However, these considerations were largely academic. European capitalists did not have the economic means to undertake

reconstruction. Furthermore, after Potsdam, reconstruction in the Axis countries was politically impossible.

Rehabilitation of the capital plant of Europe will be a social enterprise, undertaken chiefly by national governments, with lesser political sub-divisions, such as municipalities, playing a minor part. Consumer and producer cooperatives will also be an active force in socialist construction.

Certainly, for the present at least, the Soviet Union will continue to be the geographical center of the new economy, which will spread through Far Asia, East Europe, Near Asia and Middle Europe, perhaps in that order. Meanwhile, Britain, Scandinavia and possibly France and Italy will experiment with some phase of democratic socialism.

Such a development would leave the western hemisphere as the sole remaining center of free-enterprise capitalism. Should South America develop a national-socialist bloc grouped about Argentina, the possibilities of free-enterprise economy in that region would be virtually ended. Such a trend would isolate United States and Canadian private economy in a world economy consisting chiefly of public-economy units.

When Will the Big Change Take Place?

THERE REMAINS THE QUESTION of timing. How long will it be before the old economy, probably centered in North America, is effectively liquidated and the work of building up the new economy can go forward, largely freed from the threat of counter-revolution? Only a prophet would attempt to answer that question in terms of years or decades. Three propositions can be safely advanced, however. (1) The old social order is weaker than it looks. (2) It is weaker than it was after World War I. (3) The technical agencies for change are becoming continually more effective.

1.—Before World War I, capitalist imperialism seemed massive enough and solid enough to live forever. Four years of war ended in a wave of revolutions that swept Central and East Europe and extended to Asia and North Africa. Half of Europe went bolshevik. Another segment went socialist. Asia, Africa and Latin America began shaking themselves free from the imperialist yoke.

Lloyd George was very close to the truth when he wrote, in 1919: "The whole of Europe is filled with the spirit of revolution. There is a deep sense, not only of discontent, but of anger

and revolt among the workmen against pre-war conditions. The whole existing order, in its political, social and economic aspects, is questioned by the masses of the population from one end of Europe to the other" (*Memorandum of March 25, Cmd. 1922, p. 1614*).

Capitalist imperialism did not even look strong when the Spanish Civil War began in 1936. Certainly, it was well armed, but those arms, as already noted, were destined to be the means of destroying its own capital-plant foundation in Central and West Europe. Furthermore, capitalism was still wallowing in a quagmire of depression that had already extended over a decade, threatening to engulf the entire western economy unless a "limited war" came to its assistance.

2.—After World War II, capitalist imperialism was reduced to one economic bastion—the United States, plus Canada. There alone was to be found any considerable amount of exportable capital. Even this bastion was economically gutted, saddled with debt, undermined by a bitter capital-labor war, honeycombed with race hatred, loaded with a heavy burden of militarism, bloated with pride, surfeited with pleasure-seeking, drowned in escapism and psychologically frustrated to the point of despair. Whatever its people said, they smelled the stench of decay, sensed the oncoming paralysis of death and knew that they and their way of life had come to the end of their tether.

3.—The third item related to timing is dependence upon the speed-up in technological change. There is no way to state in simple, summary fashion the change that has come over technology. From muscles to wind and water as a source of energy was a very long step; it probably covered millions of years. From wind and water to steam was a far shorter step, which may have taken 10,000 years. From steam to electricity, there were about 200 years; from electricity to radio and radar, fifty—from radio and radar to atomic fission, twenty. Thus, at ever shortening intervals, man's control of nature's energies has been stepped up to higher and ever higher levels. The end is not yet—far from it. Scientists assure us that we are only at the beginning of a series of steps that might be taken within a single generation and which will enable men to domesticate the heretofore hidden forces of nature as completely as they have already domesticated many sorts of plants and animals.

Scientific achievements have expressed themselves in industrialization, mass production, transport, communication and

in ever rising levels of destructive efficiency. Black powder yielded to dynamite, dynamite to gun cotton, gun cotton to TNT. The ratio of destructiveness rose rapidly between the two world wars. World War II used TNT to rubble-ize middle and western Europe. In 1945 came an atom bomb which vaporized an entire city. Since 1945 scientists have been engaged in a feverish competitive search for explosives, poisons, death rays.

If World War III is fought, its destructiveness will exceed that of World War II by a greater ratio even than the destructiveness of World War II exceeded that of World War I. If World War III is fought wholly or partly in North America—and there seems every likelihood that it will be—the liquidation of the final stronghold of the old social order might be a relatively brief episode.

It is not necessary to speculate, however. Time has leaped from its old oxcart pace to ride the air, the lightning and the ether waves. The old age rushes to its doom. The same speedy forces are rushing the new order to its destined position of world domination.

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