M. Philips Price

Politics

England’s Role at the Washington Conference

(22 November 1921)


From International Press Correspondence, Vol. I No. 11, 22 November 1921, pp. 85–86.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive.
Public Domain: Marxists Internet Archive (2019). You may freely copy, distribute, display and perform this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit “Marxists Internet Archive” as your source.


It is always necessary in trying to estimate the relations between the ruling classes of the British Empire and the American Republic to take into consideration the question of Ireland. Now the general trend of the Irish crisis in the last few days has been favourable to those elements in England, who are anxious to bring about an Anglo-American Entente, even at the cost of sacrificing some of their former privileges in Ireland. It is not a mere accident that the American-friendly Lord Northcliffe and his newspaper trust have been uttering of late warnings to the so-called “Die-hards”, that is the irreconcilable extreme right wing of the English Conservative party, who have been trying to break up the peace negotiations between Lloyd George and Sinn Fein and recommence the Irish war. For the far-seeing elements of the British bourgeoisie see that a recommencement of the war with Ireland would give such encouragement to the anti-English and Irish elements in America that the possibility of a real Anglo-American Entente would almost certainly be wrecked. And this Entente is realised to be essential, in order to save the finances of England from collapse and in order to find an insurance against an armed conflict with America, which would inevitably mean the break-up of the British Empire.

Thus it is not surprising that at the Conference of the British Conservative, or as it calls itself, the Unionist Party at Liverpool last week a big conflict took place between those elements who realised the danger of failure in the settlement of the Irish question to England’s world position and those elements who were unable to look beyond the immediate interests of the near future. But the overwhelming victory for the former point of view at the Conference was a proof how great has been the change of opinion even in the most reactionary circles of the British ruling class. In this connection it is not improbable that the big engineering and shipbuilding interests of Belfast, who up to now have always been the chief support of the extreme Ulster and anti-Irish movement, because their interests were bound up with their commercial connection with the British Empire, where their chief markets are, have realised now that the warding off of a conflict with America is more important than the maintenance of a phrase about Anglo-Irish unity. Thus Lloyd George seems to have the way clear for forcing Sinn Fein to accept his terms, which are the recognition of the “independence” of Ireland on condition that it remains a “dominion” of the British Empire. This of course does not necessarily mean that there will be peace with Ireland, for it remains to be seen, if Sinn Fein will accept these conditions but one thing is certain, namely that by the acceptance of the principle of Lloyd George’s terms to Sinn Fein the latter will be put in a difficult position. For it is by no means certain on how much American support Sinn Fein could now reckon, if it refused the terms and if the Irish war began again. The Northcliffe press has already been publishing letters from American journalists, which indicate that this support will no longer be forthcoming, if Sinn Fein refuses. The present situation may therefore well cause a crisis within the ranks of Sinn Fein itself, thanks to the astute manoeuvring of the dominant class in England.

Both the French and German bourgeois press have been in the last week emphasizing the possibilities of a failure to reach an agreement at Washington between England and America. On the other hand as far as England is concerned the utterances of the press and of leading statesmen all seem to point to the fact that the rulers of the British Empire are, in a healthy sense of self-preservation making great efforts to reach an agreement. The idea moreover is very popular among the writers and literary men of the petty-bourgeoisie, who have sent such men as H.G. Wells, as correspondents for prominent newspapers at Washington. Moreover the leaders of finance in England are not a little attracted at the prospects of being able to save, owing to an agreement on naval armaments, the sum of about 100 million sterling, which may just make the difference in the balancing of the British Budget next year. The proposals of Mr. Hughes refer of course mainly to future construction of battleships but these are extensive enough to effect a very considerable relief for the overburdened budgets of the victorious capitalist lands. Thus the proposals, if accepted, will mean the abstention from building in the next ten years some 20 of the greatest and latest type of battleship, which will mean an economy of some 200 million sterling. Also it will mean abstention from building a number of smaller ships, the cost of which will come in the next ten years to 100 million sterling, thus making a total saving of some 300 million sterling. Now taking into consideration the trade crisis in England, the indebtedness of England to America for the amount of some one milliard sterling and the impossibility for England to compete with America in ship-building, if the latter seriously decides to outbuild England, there is every reason to believe that the pro-American standpoint will prevail with the English delegates at Washington. England’s friendliness is, and has always been in the history of Anglo-American relations, a friendliness born of fear.

At the same time there are serious difficulties which may at any time wreck an Anglo-American naval understanding. Hughes proposals allow England a margin of superiority of four big battleships over America and 12 over Japan, 36 fight cruisers over America and 44 over Japan. On the other hand America intends to continue her programme for destroyers and submarines, on the grounds that the American coast is of such a nature that it can only effectively be defended by these arms of defence. Now the submarine is just the one thing to which England’s overseas trade is most susceptible in war time. It is no surprise that the English naval delegates at Washington have raised objections to this aspect of Mr Hughes proposals. They are not without some support among the British bourgeoisie, for the Daily Telegraph attacks the Hughes proposals fiercely from this point of view and declares that England wishes to show her true pacific nature by agreeing to total disarming even of the submarines and destroyers!!!

The real object of the American proposal on naval armaments is of course political. America is determined to break up the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, to bring the British Empire under its financial and diplomatic protection, in order effectively to isolate Japan in the Far East. The struggles which will take place between now and Christmas at Washington, will in all probability be concerned with this question. The opinion of the British bourgeoisie is on this question divided. Lloyd George with his genius for compromise has for some time past been advocating the transformation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance into an Anglo-American-Japanese Entente for the Pacific and the Far East. He seems to have the support of some financial interests in the London City, who are interested in railway and bank concessions in the South of China and who have been working for some time past for the partition of China between England, America and Japan. It is very doubtful if this will satisfy America, which is clearly aiming at using its dominating financial position in the world to play the leading role in the Pacific and Far East. This is understood by such men as Lord Northcliffe, who in his recent despatches from Manchuria and China to the Times, discreetly hints at the need of abandoning the Anglo-Japanese Alliance altogether, as the first step towards securing an agreement between the three chief capitalist powers in the Far East. The whole policy of Northcliffe is the policy of a powerful group of statesmen in England, including Winston Churchill, Geddes, McKenna and of financiers of the London City, who are interested in securing a postponement of the payment of the English war debt to America. These people would gladly sacrifice the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to secure an Entente with America, even if that Entente meant, as it certainly would mean, the subordination of the British Empire to American financial Imperialism.

It is thus clear that there are considerable dangers in these new developments in the relations between the victorious capitalist powers for the proletariat of the world and particularly for the workers and peasants of Russia and China. The Times’ correspondent at Washington has already hinted in some of his despatches at the possibility of an American proposal for the international control of China in all matters concerning concessions and finance and of the open door in Eastern Siberia, “as soon as an orderly government is established there.” There can be not the slightest doubt that the danger which would arise to Soviet Russia and to the democratic government of South China from such a “peaceful penetration” of the Far East cannot be underestimated. The question, which the near future will decide at Washington, is whether this tendency to the creation of an international financial consortium for the joint exploitation of China and Siberia, to which leading men among the British bourgeoisie are giving their support, is likely to bring practical results, or whether the old rivalries within the capitalist Powers will result in new conflicts and give Russia and China a breathing space.


Last updated on 10 January 2019