MIA > Archive > Rakovsky > Biography
When Rakovsky was appointed ambassador to Britain in 1923 the main objective of Soviet diplomacy was to break down the isolation of the USSR and, by means of trade and commercial relations with the capitalist countries, to begin to overcome the enormous economic difficulties resulting from the Civil War and the war of intervention.
Because of his personal qualities and international experience and reputation, Rakovsky was best suited to take on this task. The Soviet republic, in its early years, had few competent diplomats of the quality of Joffe and Rakovsky. The early Bolsheviks had very few diplomats with the culture, education and diplomatic veneer which could fit them gracefully into the salons and smoking-jackets of the still aristocratically dominated diplomatic circles of Western Europe. “Savages, like the ‘Babes of the Wood’ in a Drury Lane pantomime” was how the British representative described the Bolshevik delegates to the Genoa Conference. These “provincial conspirators” who had lived most of their lives outside the law, not to mention the salon, were received with disdain and mistrust in the negotiating rooms of Europe. “The diplomats”, wrote Rakovsky, “take three steps backward whenever we approach them.” [59] It was as an equal, however, that Christian Rakovsky confronted the leaders of bourgeois Europe. The “ambassador of the revolution”, as Trotsky called him, was already perfectly at ease in the political and cultural centres of the west. A cosmopolitan who spoke most of the languages of Western and Eastern Europe, himself of an aristocratic family, Rakovsky had a profound and sympathetic understanding of the history, culture and politics of the countries of Europe. The French statesman, de Monzie, wrote in a tribute to Rakovsky, when the latter was ambassador to France, that “the principal quality of this exceptional diplomat is his perfect ease, as if he considered himself at home eveywhere.” Although his transfer to the diplomatic service was a clear manoeuvre to get him out of the way, he carried out his tasks as Soviet representative with great skill and ingenuity.
When appointed in 1923 Rakovsky already had behind him a great deal of experience as negotiator and diplomat. Lenin had chosen him in 1918 to negotiate with the Ukrainian Rada in Kharkov and later directly with the Germans in Berlin. It was also Rakovsky who had negotiated the agreement with Lithuania.
At the beginning of February, 1922, while still head of the Ukrainian government, Rakovsky went to Berlin, where he made contact with both the Germans and French with a view to finding out their attitude towards any agreement with the Soviet Union. That same month he sent a long report to the Bolshevik leadership in Moscow, in which he proposed a Soviet strategy of economic and political alliance with Germany and Turkey, to be followed by a treaty between these three countries and France. The conflict between Germany and the allies as a result of the unfavourable conditions imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles created an opening which the Soviet Union could exploit.
At the beginning of 1922, on the initiative of Lloyd George, Britain, France and Italy had called for a conference to be held in Genoa to settle the question of German reparations and relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was invited to participate in the conference. The economic and political reforms introduced in Russia in 1921 (the NEP), entailing a revision of the Bolshevik attitude towards domestic capitalism, awakened the hope among British and French capitalists that a weakened and exhausted Bolshevik régime would have to surrender to the demands of foreign capital on the question of private ownership, investment and repayment of loans. The Allies promised Russia de jure recognition and economic assistance provided there was agreement on the questions of ownership, debts, legal reform and withdrawal of “subversive propaganda”. The invitation to the Genoa conference was an important gain for the Soviets because of the international recognition it entailed but the Bolshevik leaders differed in their estimates of the possible outcome of the conference for Russia. Radek was very optimistic and believed that the demand for recognition of tsarist debts was simply a tactical move. At the meetings between the Bolshevik leaders which took place in February 1922 in Moscow Rakovsky, supported by Kollontai and Shlyapnikov, adopted a hard line on the question of concessions, in opposition to Chicherin and Lenin. “Our whole problem,” he wrote on the eve of the conference, “is to hold out, not to count on a loan, on credits that might come after the Genoa conference. We must not forget that we are still passing through a revolutionary epoch; we must look to ourselves for remedies for our own ills; we ourselves must fight the famine and the breakdown of our transportation system; and we must make our Red Army even stronger, because this is our only support.” [60] Rakovsky did not believe that the conference would come to agreement with Soviet Russia. “They will present us with outrageous demands. We shall naturally be unable to accept these demands because in their basic conception they defy the revolutionary masses of the Soviet republic. We shall sign no commitments that would violate the basic laws of the Soviet Republic, the laws nationalizing the land and giving the state monopoly of industry and foreign trade.” [61] He saw some hope, however, in the contradictions that existed between the capitalist powers. “There is no doubt that they do not all think alike. Conditions differ: some are anxious to start trade with us immediately, others are more interested in various reparations.” [62]
The negotiations which Rakovsky had carried out in Berlin with the German leaders in February 1922 were renewed again in March, when the Soviet delegation arrived in Berlin en route to Genoa. The delegation, led by Chicherin, included Rakovsky, Joffe, Radek, Krassin and Litvinov. A draft treaty between Germany and Russia was drawn up, energetically supported by Baron von Maltzan, chief of the Eastern section of the German Foreign Office. But the treaty was not signed because of Rathenau’s hesitations, although the Soviets pressed for it.
Genoa became what the London Times called “a stage for the Bolsheviks”. Rakovsky was in charge of public relations for the Soviet side. The negotiations proceeded in secret. But, at first in the hall at the hotel and later, because of the large crowds, in the auditorium at the University of Genoa, Rakovsky organized daily conferences. These weren’t just press conferences but large public forums which attracted an increasingly large number of persons, including the many journalists covering the conference. These daily forums, which were reported extensively in the Western press, provided Rakovsky with a rare opportunity to present the Bolshevik case to world public opinion. In impeccable French he not only explained the viewpoint of the Soviet Union but expounded also on the lessons of European history, especially the French revolution, and international political relations.
The Genoa Conference broke up, on the second day, into four commissions. Rakovsky was the Soviet delegate responsible for the finance commission which dealt with the key question of economic aid, loans and debts. But it is for his role as mediator between the Soviet and the German delegations that Rakovsky is most remembered. As the secret negotiations between the Soviets and the Allies continued in the Villa Albertis, the German delegation, which was excluded from these deliberations, feared a deal between the Allies and the Russians concerning German reparations. On the third day Rakovsky and Joffe met with von Maltzan in a Genoese café and talked again about the treaty that had been left unsigned in Berlin.The next day, Easter Sunday, at one o’clock in the morning Rakovsky telephoned von Maltzan. He gave the Germans to understand that the negotiations with the British and the French in the Villa Albertis were proceeding favourably but held out the final offer of a separate treaty with Gennany. In this way, and before it could become clear that the Genoa talks had broken down, by playing on German fears of an Allied-Soviet understanding, Rakovsky and the Soviets drew the Germans to the signing table. That same night the famous party took place at the Soviet headquarters in Rapallo which led to the signing of the Rapallo Treaty, one of the greatest diplomatic coups of all time and an event which robbed the capitalist powers of one of their most effective weapons against the new Soviet régime, pressure by isolation. In his brochure England and Russia Rakovsky later described how they had “almost danced a quadrille” at Genoa with Lloyd George and the Germans.
The capitalist world which Rakovsky entered in 1923 as ambassador of revolution was a hostile and also a dangerous one. In Britain the Conservative government carried on a relentless campaign against the Bolsheviks and maintained the constant threat of intervention. In March 1923 the failure of the workers’ uprising in Germany was a blow to the hopes of the Bolsheviks for the spread of the revolution in Europe and gave further encouragement to interventionist currents in the West. In Britain the Soviet representative in 1923 had been Krassin. Both Trotsky and Chicherin, however, wett not satisfied with Krassin’s role, and at the end of March 1923 the Soviets proposed that his place should be taken by V.V. Vorovsky. Vorovsky had a background similar in many respects to that of Rakovsky and Joffe. He spoke many languages, was a brilliant publicist and orator, and was a long-standing friend of Rakovsky, with whom in Sweden in 1918 he had produced Voice of the Russian Revolution. In 1923 he was Soviet representative in Italy. At the Lausanne conference, which he attended with Rakovsky that same year, Vorovsky was assassinated. Krassin’s job then went to Rakovsky.
The furore over the Curzon ultimatum had barely died down when the news of Rakovsky’s appointment was announced. This immediately aroused great indignation and protest in Britain, both in parliament and in the press. On 6 August 1923 The Times reported a speech to the Ukrainian Central Committee on 15 July of that same year (“Mr Rakovsky’s speech. Explanations demanded from Moscow”)in which he had said: “The force of the national movement developing in its colonies has reduced Great Britain to the status of Austria-Hungary: the dissolution and dismemberment of the British empire is only a matter of time.” He was also alleged to have called on the Communist International to “revolutionize the British Isles”. The campaign against Rakovsky, mounted by the Conservatives in Parliament and by the press, led to the Foreign Office on 2 August suspending his visa. It was not until the end of September 1923 that Rakovsky was able to arrive in Britain, three months late.
One of the main aims of Soviet foreign policy was to lengthen the “breathing space”, to gain time to build the Soviet economy and strengthen the Soviet state. As Trotsky said to the Moscow Soviet in May 1923, the month of the Curzon ultimatum: “We desire peace above all things, naturally not at the price of capitulation, not at the price of converting the Soviet Union into a vassal state of foreign capitalists.” [63] Concretely, the Soviet Union wanted de jure recognition as a foundation for firmer trade and economic relations. This recognition was panted by Germany in the Rapallo treaty, but was opposed by both Britain and France.
Shortly after Rakovsky’s arrival in Britain the Conservative government of Baldwin failed to win a majority against its Labour and Liberal opponents, and the Labour Party under Ramsay MacDonald formed the first minority Labour Government. The Labour Party was committed to de jure recognition, though not unconditionally. During the period between the election and the appointment of MacDonald as Prime Minister, important negotiations took place between MacDonald and Rakovsky. The new Labour prime minister wanted guarantees from the Soviets concerning economic concessions, credits, debts, and so on, but Rakovsky insisted on unconditional recognition. On 1 February 1924 the new British government gave full recognition to the USSR and proposed a conference to draw up a treaty which would settle all the outstanding questions between the two countries, particularly concerning credits, debts and trading relations. The Soviet government agreed, and Rakovsky was named as chief negotiator for the USSR.
The Anglo-Soviet conference opened on 4 April 1924, with speeches from Rakovsky and MacDonald. British capitalists, who in general opposed de jure recognition, now placed stiff demands on the Soviet republic. Since the main requirement of the Soviets was a British loan, British creditors placed the following conditions on any loan to the communist government: restoration by Russia of private property rights for foreigners; recognition by Russia of private and public debts; drastic changes in the judicial procedure within Russia; a guarantee against the confiscation of private property; restoration of the right of private trade between foreigners and Russia; and the abandonment by the communist government of propaganda against foreign governments. Rakovsky rejected those demands. The Bankers’ Memorandum, as it was known, was published in The Times on 14 April 1924. In an article published in The Manchester Guardian on 26 April, Rakovsky replied to the bankers’ demands: “The Memorandum demands the reestablishment of private property. The memorandum demands the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. The memorandum demands a change of our code. Our answer to such an attempt is a categorical ‘never’.” He declared that “nationalization as a result of revolution is legal, and we must refuse to pay its consequences.” On the question of debts, however, he did not adopt a dogmatic position, saying it depended on the type and size of loan the British were willing to make. Nationalization would remain but concessions could be made to former owners for purposes of investment in production in Russia. The conference lasted until August, when two treaties were signed on 8 August 1924. The treaty of commerce and navigation provided for the restoration of normal trade relations. The Soviet Union would get the benefits of the export credit system and diplomatic immunity for her trade representatives in Britain. The general treaty provided for a British loan to the Soviet government after claims of British subjects against Russia were settled. This was what Rakovsky wanted, that the claims of private citizens should be settled outside the confines of the conference. Practically all the capitalist owners presented their claims to Rakovsky in London. One Englishwoman wished to call on the Soviet envoy to collect rent for the three years he had lived in her house in Kharkov while prime minister of the Ukraine.
In the meantime, throughout 1924, Rakovsky had also been negotiating with the French the terms of recognition. In June 1924 the Radical-led Herriot government came into office in Paris, having defeated the Conservative Poincaré at the polls. Herriot had supported de jure recognition since 1922 and was supported in this by Senator de Monzie. Rakovsky met with Herriot in London in June 1924, where the latter demanded some guarantees for French bond-holders. The treaties being negotiated with Britain were of great concern to the French capitalists, to the extent that the French government of Poincaré actively intervened in the negotiations between Rakovsky and MacDonald. “As far as debts are concerned”, Poincaré had written to the British ambassador in Paris, “there is a material and moral solidarity among all foreign creditors.” [64] “France”, said Rakovsky, “tried to participate in the Anglo-Soviet pourparlers with the purpose of changing London into a second Genoa.” [65] The election of Herriot changed the situation, although Herriot, like MacDonald, was no friend of Soviet communism and wanted, basically, to do a deal with the Soviets which would best serve the interests of French capital. Rakovsky pressed for immediate recognition which, however, was not forthcoming. In October 1924 de Monzie came to Dover to discuss with Rakovsky the text and terms of French recognition. These negotiations, in which de Monzie conceded to Rakovsky all the essential points, led to the French announcement of de jure recognition on 28 October, the eve of victory of the Conservatives in the British elections and a few days after the publication of the Zinoviev letter. Krassin was nominated Soviet ambassador to France.
Rakovsky, in 1925, was becoming dissatisfied with his exile in London. Since the return of the Conservative government, and the disdain with which he was received by Chamberlain, who refused to continue the negotiations with him, Rakovsky looked to France for a new diplomatic opening for the Soviet Union. It was not until November 1925, that Rakovsky became ambassador to the country to which he had always felt the closest in Europe and to which he had many deep cultural, political and personal ties. With Rakovsky’s appointment France now became the centre of Soviet diplomatic activities.
Before leaving Britain, in June 1925 he published in Communist International a rather long study on the state of the British economy and class relations. Entitled The Decline of the World’s Shop, the article gives a detailed description of the successive economic crises which had paralysed different branches of the British economy, particularly mining and textiles. This was a structural or chronic crisis, said Rakovsky, not a passing phase. This was why the ruling class resorted to a policy of reaction which would eventually include the breaking of ties with the Soviet state in order to cut off its own working class from communist influence in the struggles that lay ahead. The General Strike which broke out some months later and the breaking off of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union completely confirmed Rakovsky’s analysis.
The French Foreign Minister, Briand, regarded Locarno as a defeat for France with regard to her aspirations for German territory. British domination of the League of Nations and the weakness of the French Treasury encouraged some political leaders in France to seek a rapprochement with Russia, especially over the issue of debt settlements. Accordingly, shortly after Rakovsky’s arrival in Paris a Franco-Soviet conference was called on 25 February 1926.
In France the same problems over claims and the recognition of tsarist debts beset the negotiations on trading relations which Rakovsky now conducted as ambassador. And again the French creditors, in the form of the National Association of Russian Bondholders, among others, called for the restoration of private property as a precondition for a French loan. The conference lasted until 26 July 1926, but did not achieve results. The French government changed three times during the negotiations. Under the Briand-Caillaux government, which took office on 15 June 1926, Rakovsky worked out a draft treaty agreement with de Monzie which was, however, defeated by the opposition of Poincaré. In July 1926 Rakovsky returned to Moscow to attend the plenary meeting of the Central Committee, the one at which Dzerzhinsky died. When he arrived at the airport he was handed a telegram from de Monzie which informed Rakovsky that he, de Monzie, was now Minister of Finance in a new government headed by Herriot and that Rakovsky should return to have the draft agreement ratified. Rakovsky rushed back to Paris but on the day of his arrival, 2 August, the two-day Herriot government was again out of office. Poincaré again became premier and the anti-Soviet elements in French political life now continued to hold the dominant hand. The prospects of a Franco-Soviet agreement receded as France more firmly integrated itself into the anti-Bolshevik alliance of Locarno.
The Soviet government was very pleased with the two treaties which Rakovsky had negotiated. Chicherin said that the two treaties “recognized the October revolution as the basis of the Soviet state” and that they gave the Soviet Union an “advantage that outweighs the sacrifices that we shall have to make as a result of our partial recognition of old debts”. [66] When he returned to Moscow after the treaty signing Rakovsky was received with full honours. On 20 August 1924 Izvestia published on its front page an article entitled Rakovsky the Diplomat by B. Pelouso praising the oppositionist for his diplomatic ability and his successes both at Genoa and in London.
The Anglo-Soviet treaties were strongly opposed in London by the Association of British Creditors, by the Federation of British Industries and by their political spokesmen in the Conservative and Liberal parties. They prepared to bring down the Labour government, and the pretext was found when the latter dropped a court case against the Communist Workers’ Weekly for allegedly having called on the British troops to mutiny. On 8 October 1924 the parliamentary opposition united to bring down the first Labour government and elections were set for 29 October.
De jure recognition and the normalization of trade and commercial relations would only further strengthen the communist power, and this British capitalist interests were determined to prevent by any means. No British money must go to build up Soviet Russia, was the main slogan of the opposition. The means chosen to defeat the Labour government, and the Anglo-Soviet treaties, was the very effective though somewhat shabby forgery, the Zinoviev letter. A few days before the elections the British press published a letter which they claimed had been written by the Comintern leader, Zinoviev, to leaders of the British Communist Party calling for an armed insurrection in Britain. The influence of this infamous piece of forgery (as it was subsequently proven to be) on the elections was shattering. The Conservatives won the election, gaining 400 seats, the Labour and Liberal parties between them getting less than 200. The Zinoviev letter was, of course, only one of many such attempts to undermine the Bolshevik government. It was the most famous and most effective, for it decisively influenced the outcome of the elections, the fate of the newly negotiated treaties, and the course of Anglo-Soviet relations for many years to come.
Although the Zinoviev letter has been the subject of much speculation even to the present day, especially among commentators who still wish to see in it the hand of communist intrigue [67], very little of substance has been added to the position taken by Rakovsky when he heard of the letter and realized its impact on the aims of Soviet policy in Britain. In a note to MacDonald on 25 October 1924 Rakovsky rejected the Zinoviev letter as a forgery “intended to arouse British public opinion against the Soviet Union and to frustrate the efforts being made by both countries to establish durable and friendly relations”. [68] He pointed out that “not only the contents, but also the heading and signature of the document prove that it is the work of malicious individuals who are inadequately familiar with the constitution of the Communist International. In circulars of the Communist International it is never described as ‘the third Communist International’ for the simple reason that there has never been a first or a second Communist International. The signature is a similarly clumsy forgery. M. Zinoviev is made to sign himself as the ‘President of the Praesidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International’, whereas he is and always signs himself as ‘President of the Executive Committee’.” [69] Rakovsky pointed out that the British government admitted having never seen the original of the letter and he called for an independent investigation. In a letter to the new Conservative government on 28 November 1924 Rakovsky maintained that the forgery had originated in counterrevolutionary émigré circles in the West. He later told Louis Fischer that an official of international repute in the Quai d’Orsay had informed him that the Zinoviev letter was a Polish forgery, produced in collusion with Russian émigrés and placed at the disposal of the British, who used it to bring down the Labour government and block the Anglo-Soviet treaties. One of the first acts of the new Conservative government was to nullify the treaties. De jure recognition remained, as well as the trade agreements of 1921.
Rakovsky was also becoming more and more of an embarrassment to the French government. In February 1927, he again took up in public the issue of an agreement and pressed for the resumption of negotiations. In March he made proposals to de Monzie which went a long way towards satisfying French claims; it was now clear that only political motivations and the anti-Soviet hostility of the Poincaré government blocked the signing of an agreement. But the working class and a considerable number of small bondholders among the French petty bourgeoisie wanted an agreement. In April 1927 Rakovsky made public his proposals in the Paris Oeuvre, employing the tested Bolshevik tactic of talking to the masses over the heads of the negotiators. Just as he had in Britain, Rakovsky now succeeded in injecting the issue of the agreement into French internal politics. His ability to do this, to make the demands and interests of Soviet foreign policy a factor in the political life of the country, which the bourgeois governments were forced to take into account, was one of the qualities which made him, in the words of E.H. Carr, “the greatest Soviet diplomat of the twenties”. The question of the agreement with the Soviet Union now threatened to become an issue in the forthcoming French elections which the left and the radicals could use against the Poincaré government. So the French decided to get rid of Rakovsky.
Rakovsky’s role in foreign negotiations was also a factor in the inner-party struggle in the Soviet Union, where he was one of the recognized leaders of the trotskyist opposition. Until 1926 the opposition had favoured conciliation in negotiations with the French, since Russia would be negotiating from a position of strength as regards the world situation – the British General Strike, the developing Chinese revolution, and the French inflationary and governmental crisis. At that time, however, Stalin was advocating a hard line and opposing a settlement. In 1927, however, when Rakovsky again took up the issue with the Poincaré government, the world situation had changed. The defeat of the General Strike and the rupture with Britain, but above all the defeat of the Chinese revolution, meant that the Soviet Union was now bargaining from weakness and couldn’t afford to make any new concessions. But Stalin, true to form as the man who, in Trotsky’s words, customarily sang wedding songs at funerals and dirges at weddings, now advocated a conciliatory line. In the Central Committee Stalin tried to play off Rakovsky against Trotsky. Trotsky wrote to Rakovsky and asked him to keep in mind that his role in Paris had become an issue in the inner-party struggle. [70] Caught between the French desire to get rid of him and Stalin’s desire to use him against Trotsky and the opposition to which he was deeply devoted, Rakovsky was in a delicate and difficult position. It was in this situation that the French government found its equivalent to the British Zinoviev letter, which they proceeded to use to their own ends.
In August 1927 Rakovsky had signed a Declaration of the Opposition which, among other things, called on the workers and soldiers in the capitalist countries to rise up and defend the Soviet Union in the case of war. The declaration was also signed by Kamenev, who was at the time Soviet ambassador in Rome. That the Soviet ambassador in France should sign a declaration calling on French soldiers to mutiny immediately provoked a storm of protest. Big capitalist interests in France, especially oil interests (Royal Dutch Shell and others), were violently opposed to a deal with the Soviet Union. Shell feared the creation of a French oil monopoly operating with oil provided by the Soviet Union. Shell also controlled one of the French papers. A vicious press campaign was carried out against Rakovsky during August and September 1927. On 16 September Litvinov, Assistant Commissar of Foreign Affairs, made a statement to the press condemning the French campaign. “Only the most naive people”, he said, “or international political deceivers, can say that the anti-Soviet campaign in France is directed against our present plenipotentiary representative there, comrade Rakovsky, personally, for having signed the well-known Declaration of the Opposition. Clearly the incident serves only as a pretext. Reactionary French circles have another aim in the campaign they have started, namely, to end Soviet-French relations and negotiations concerning debts.” [71] On 7 October 1927, the French government declared Rakovsky persona non grata and demanded his recall.
Trotsky, according to Deutscher, maintained that Stalin played a disloyal game over Rakovsky’s recall and that the Soviet Foreign Office should have told Briand bluntly not to meddle in the internal affairs of the Bolshevik Party. [72] Rakovsky, however, wanted to return to Russia. When he was officially asked to assume the leadership of the Soviet delegation to the Geneva Preliminary Disarmament Commission (a job which Litvinov later took on), Rakovsky refused because he wanted to participate more actively in the opposition struggle in the Soviet Union. [73] Trotsky too was glad to have his old friend and collaborator back. Stalin had managed to have Rakovsky out of the country from 1923 to 1927, four years that were crucial for the Soviet Union and for the opposition struggle.
With his removal from France, diplomatic relations between the two countries ceased for all practical purposes. According to Fischer, “if the personality of Rakovsky in truth prevented a debt agreement between France and the Soviet Union, his removal should have facilitated a settlement. As a matter of fact, however, the debt and pact negotiations ended with Rakovsky’s departure and were not resumed. Rakovsky had been successful in keeping them to the fore and in the public eye. His successor was given no such opportunity. Rakovsky, the French said, had been a full bright light. His successor must be a veilleuse de nuit, a dimmed night light.” [74]
Part 5. Opposition and Exile: The Final Years
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59. C. Rakovsky, Angliya i Rossiya (Moscow 1924), p. 27.
60. C. Rakovsky, Nakanune Genui (Moscow 1922). Extracts are translated in Euden and Fisher, op. cit., pp. 128–31.
61. ibid.
62. ibid.
63. Pravda, no. 105, 13 May 1923, p. 3.
64. Izvestia, no. 189, 21 August 1924, p. 3. Quoted in Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., p. 261.
65. See, for example, as late as October 1967, the article in Soviet Studies, XIX, which attempts to prove that the letter was a Communist forgery, and part of a plot to undermine the British Labour Party.
66. Rakovsky’s note is in Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., p. 471.
67. ibid., p. 472.
68. Quoted in Louis Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, vol.II, p. 571.
69. ibid.
70. See Deutscher, op. cit., p. 363.
71. Statement in Eudin and Fisher, op. cit., p. 381.
72. Deutscher, op. cit., p. 362.
73. According to Fischer, op. cit., p. 708.
74. ibid., p. 715.
Last updated on 4 February 2015