

THE SITUATION AND OUR TASKS 1983



Speech on the occasion of the
62nd Anniversary of the Founding
of the Communist Party of Turkey

R. YÜRÜKOĞLU

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Workers of the world unite!

The Situation and our Tasks 1983

R. YÜRÜKOĞLU

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Introduction

The situation and our tasks 1983

Comrades,

I would like to start my speech * by reading to you one of the many messages we have received, that is the message from the Aegean Regional Committee.

“Our honourable struggle is the herald of communism”

“Our party is now 62 years old. This long history has taught much to communists and is continuing to do so. We have seen again and again the damages inflicted by the opportunists on our working class and people. In these 62 years, no deeply rooted heritage was left to the communists. However, today, under conditions of a fascist dictatorship, a fresh page is being opened in the history of our party, and this is being done in a manner which befits communism.

“Our greetings on the 62nd anniversary to the communists who are writing a new page in the history of our party, waging a struggle against the fascist junta in the prisons, in the torture-chambers and in the factories, who are fighting and resisting with great honour.

* This speech was delivered at a meeting held to commemorate the 62nd anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Turkey on 10th September 1921.

“Long live the Communist Party of Turkey!

“Long live the *Worker's Voice!*

“Long live Communism!

“We will make our contribution to the world revolution by making revolution in Turkey!

*The Aegean Regional Committee
of the TKP”*

* * *

Comrades, I would like to touch upon three topics. The international situation and the situation in Turkey; united action and the united front — questions which of late have been an important topic in the revolutionary movement; and thirdly, a theme to be taken up here again for perhaps the second or third time, one which under difficult circumstances is extremely important for all organisations; democratic centralism and questions of organisation.

You may remember that the following were the opening sentences in *Turkey — Weak Link of Imperialism*:

“Underlying the strategy and tactics of the world communist parties is the Leninist idea that the world revolutionary process is universal. Thus, when evaluating the objective and subjective conditions for revolution in a given country, we should consider that country within the context of the world as a whole.

“Turkey must also be considered within the world context, as part of a whole. We cannot understand Turkey's place or role in the world, the situation our country is in, if, like a worm in an apple, we look only at events taking place within her boundaries. For this reason, it is necessary to look first at the kind of world in which Turkey is situated”.

This is a correct attitude and one which in the last few years

has spread in the revolutionary movement in Turkey in general. Most people start their speeches by presenting an overall picture of international questions, therein never failing to mention the Middle East and Palestine, and only then pass on to a consideration of the situation in Turkey. However, this approach is still not correct. Many things happen in the world, what matters is to be able to distinguish the determining tendencies.

In Turkey, there have been widescale bankruptcies. Kastelli absconded and then returned; Özal resigned; the condition of the textile industry is clear to everyone. Again, many movements had difficulties interpreting these events. What they say fails to correspond with either their previously held ideas or present experience. It is a question of being able to correctly pinpoint the general tendencies. In order for correct politics and tactics to be determined, the analysis must be scientifically based. In this respect, they fail to correctly situate events in Turkey within a general framework and to correctly evaluate Turkey's position in the world.

In the capitalist world economic system certain structural changes have now become *firmly established*.

In the first pamphlet edition of "*Weak Link*" in 1977, as well as in its later editions in book form, this subject was treated with similar sentences. Here I will quote from the pamphlet:

"In our day... profound *structural changes* are taking place in the world capitalist economic system.

"For example, we observe new developments in the structure of production (particularly in industry), in the structure of international trade and its geographical distribution, in the norms of international trade, and in the regional movement of capital and labour-power.

"... *the international division of labour within the world capitalist economic system is gradually changing. Consequently, so too are changing the positions held by various countries in this system of division of labour.*"

The five years that have passed since show that the great majority of these structural changes have become firmly established tendencies. (Other changes have turned out to be not "structural" but transitory and superficial developments.)

Without understanding the changes that have taken place in the capitalist economic system, we will not be able to understand the present economic problems faced by Turkey, the relationship between imperialism and Turkey, or *why* and *in what way*, revolution and socialism will be able to solve the problems in Turkey.

I. The world and Turkey

Let us first, before making any evaluation, consider the situation of the imperialist and the exploited countries. Then, considering the relations between these two sections, let us look at the new developments in the world capitalist economic system, and finally, let us try to understand the situation in Turkey by considering it within the context of these new developments.

1.1. The present situation in the world capitalist economic system

1.1.1. The imperialist countries

All the imperialist countries are presently experiencing a serious crisis. The USA's hegemony in the capitalist world is continuously weakening. This is reflected particularly in the fact that Europe and Japan are gaining an increasingly greater share in world production and trade, thus reducing the USA's share. This is also reflected in the fact that the dollar is falling behind such currencies as the Yen and the Mark. Most recently, it is reflected in the conflict over the Siberian pipeline.

In connection with the above, as well as some other factors,

geo-political relations are changing on a world scale. Europe and Japan have become involved in Latin America, which for a long historical period had had the status of the United States of America's backyard. On the other hand, Europe has lost its hegemony over South-East Asia. Africa and the Middle East are no longer under the hegemony of a particular imperialist country but have turned into an arena of conflicting influences.

The imperialist countries which are continuing their "divide-and-rule" policies towards the developing nations are, on the other hand, themselves divided. Their divisions are not only economic but also such as concern their political strength.

Unable for some time now to extract themselves from economic upheavals, the imperialist countries have found a true "scapegoat" in OPEC. Every kind of disorder and derangement in the Western economies is put down to OPEC's control over the price of petrol. But this contradicts the facts. Inflation in the Western world had started to rise sharply already in 1970. Between 1966 and 1970 unemployment in the USA had risen by 44%. These are things that happened before the famous petrol crisis of 1973.

Unemployment in the imperialist countries has risen since the end of the 1960s in a continually upward trend and has now assumed a structural character. And no one expects it to fall. Today there are about 15 million unemployed in the imperialist countries.

In many branches, production in the imperialist countries is declining, that is, the amount of commodities produced is decreasing. In many sectors, there exists excess capacity. Further, compulsory short working hours have been introduced in many branches of production. And everywhere there are widespread, massive redundancies. All of us read about these developments every day in the papers.

The massive redundancies are due in particular to two developments:

Firstly, *automation* is increasing rapidly.

Secondly, the *process of production is being rationalised* — a very important characteristic common to all imperialist

countries.

The rationalisation of the process of production has gained great significance in the last few years. The most important reason for this lies in the fact that, as a result of the advances made in electronic engineering, electro-mechanics has been overtaken by electronics, opening up a great variety of new opportunities.

Further, in the most important imperialist countries, namely the USA, England, France, Germany and Japan (and this is a very important point) the ratio between national investment and the Gross National Product has remained stagnant since the 1970s, and from time to time it has even fallen. This means that in the most important imperialist countries the imperialist monopolies are no longer investing in their own country, or they are investing at a continually decreasing rate.

It is necessary to make a further addition here. An increasingly greater share of the internal investment that they do carry out is used for purposes of rationalisation. This means that, not only are investments stagnating or receding, but an ever greater part of any investment that is made is used to rationalise existing enterprises. All of these developments result in unemployment.

In contradistinction, the foreign investments of imperialist countries have been systematically increasing. Further, the share of investment in underdeveloped countries is increasing in relation to the total amount of foreign investments. This is a point that must be added since our analysis in "*Weak Link*".

I would like to say one thing further on the question of investment, and that in regard to a very significant development. I said that foreign investment has increased and that the share of underdeveloped countries in it has also increased. But there is also an increase in the investments which are being made with a view to *changing the location of industry*. I shall return to this topic below.

Unemployment, decrease in the volume of production, compulsory short working hours, massive redundancies — all these describe the situation of the imperialist *countries*, not that

of the imperialist monopolies. The profits of the imperialist monopolies are growing rapidly, their foreign investments, production capacity and employment of labour-power is increasing. In particular, their investments in underdeveloped countries are increasing. What Lenin said in his book *Imperialism* can be seen in its most blatant form. Capital has only one instinct: profit. It knows no "god", no "bible", no "fatherland", and is driven by nothing other than its instinct for profit. Wherever there is a more profitable opportunity, there it goes to achieve record profits, washing its hands of anything else.

These developments have brought about the following results: in every imperialist country *the state is in a financial crisis*. This may lead to some confusion. Sometimes, comrades think that this is only an imperialist trick. You read in the papers that this or that monopoly has achieved record profits and at the same time that there is unemployment, a recession, etc. It doesn't seem to fit. Nonetheless, this is what really happens. The monopolies are experiencing a profitable period, but the state and society in the imperialist countries are experiencing a crisis. This is very interesting. It is not clear when this financial crisis of the state in the imperialist countries will come to an end because these tendencies do not appear to be transitory.

What is the cause of the financial crisis of the imperialist states in a period which has proven so profitable for imperialist capital?

a) High unemployment and short working days diminish the state's tax income and lead to an increase in state expenditure.

b) Faced with the threat of a shift in the location of industrial production mentioned above, new forms of taxation cannot be introduced for fear that they might encourage companies to leave the country.

c) In order to encourage investment at home so as to prevent social upheavals and crises, the imperialist states are not only abstaining from the introduction of new company taxes, but striving desperately to provide them with ever greater incentives.

Of course, we know who controls the state, but there is something new here. In all respects, the state is granting the monopolies fresh opportunities, including unilateral assistance, interest-free credits, tax allowances and so on. In the same way, in all these countries, it is doing its utmost to reduce *real wages*.

All this, bit by bit, worsens the state's financial crisis. And as a result, state spending on social services, retirement pensions and health insurance has been reduced in these countries.

If we refrain from identifying the state too closely with capital, this state of affairs will start to make sense.

What has been said in this section in relation to the imperialist countries may be summarized as follows: the economic problems experienced in the imperialist countries are the consequence of the actions (whether conscious or unconscious is of no significance, driven by the profit instinct) of their own imperialist monopolies.

1.1.2. The underdeveloped countries*

I have said that there are 15 million unemployed in the imperialist countries. But in the underdeveloped countries, the extent of unemployment and of hidden unemployment exceeds hundreds of millions. As capitalism dissolves the traditional structure of agriculture, this number is increased even further. The unemployed move to the periphery of the large cities and increasingly it becomes the case that the greater part of the urban population inhabits the city's shanty towns.

What are the economic consequences of such massive unemployment? These unemployed people are looking for work under any conditions and for any wages. They are prepared to work under the worst conditions with their needs held at the lowest physical limit.

This means that, when talking about the underdeveloped countries, we must emphasize that they provide an inexhaustible

* Where not otherwise specified, the term "underdeveloped countries" is meant to include also "medium-developed countries".

ground for the *lowest possible wages* and *unlimited exploitation*.

This gigantic industrial reserve army (to use Marx's term) nourishes the growing industrialisation in some underdeveloped countries, particularly in the medium-developed countries. However, extensive industrialisation is by no means common to all of those countries and secondly, even in those countries where industrialisation is most extensive, it in no way effects the rate of unemployment.

In the underdeveloped countries, effective demand is low, the home market is narrow. This too is an important characteristic. Consequently, industries emerging in the underdeveloped countries develop *with an orientation towards export*. All the existing developing industries which have reached a certain level are oriented towards export, regardless of whether they are the result of an imperialist monopoly shifting the location of its industrial production, closing its factory in Germany and re-opening it in Nigeria, or of local capital in Nigeria gradually accumulating and opening up its own factories; whatever form it takes.

All underdeveloped countries face the following *dilemma*: an industry which has started to develop has either to sell its products abroad or collapse. Because the home market is small and demand low, a factory producing more than a certain capacity will not be able to sell its products in that market. Thus, it must either sell abroad or shut down.

For this reason, the market for industrialisation in the underdeveloped countries is the foreign market. And this, as we know, is one of the most important elements in the underdeveloped countries' dependency on imperialism.

Again, as we know, the underdeveloped countries are not one uniform whole but include a great variety. However, even when considering those which boast rapid industrialisation (namely the countries at the threshold stage), their situation does not appear to be much different from that of the others.

For one thing, rapid industrialisation in the countries at the threshold stage is greatly dependent on the foreign monopolies for capital, technology and know-how, as well as for access to the

export market. Industry exists in the form of small islands. And they are such small islands that not even mutually supporting industries have been established. For example, the textile, clothing and synthetic materials industries. The number of underdeveloped countries where all three industries exist is small. Turkey is one of them.

Aside from the fact that these three mutually supporting industries are not often seen together in one place, even when industrialisation is of a kind where industrial complexes are founded, it still does not exist within a framework of general economic development such as would free the economy from its external dependency. Therefore, in every respect a many-sided dependency on imperialism continues to be the case even where industrialisation develops most rapidly.

Countries at the threshold are still the most fortunate among the underdeveloped countries. There is a certain degree of industrialisation and a lively economy. However, in the great majority of cases, not even such partial industrialisation exists. Instead, we see the following phenomenon: two or three highly specialised industries whose links with the country as a whole are very limited and whose production is wholly oriented towards export.

There is a development which is spreading rapidly throughout the world: imperialist monopolies closing down their factories in their own countries to reopen them again in some underdeveloped country. In the underdeveloped countries other than those at the threshold, this is the main type of industrialisation, industrialisation which is divorced from the home economy. For example, the Wrangler company is producing blue jeans in the far east, in Asia. The material is imported from elsewhere. What it uses in the country of production is probably no more than its electricity and water. And it extensively employs young women workers of that country. (In such factories the working period of the employees rarely exceeds 3 or 4 years. The workers are made to work under conditions of such severe exploitation that they are soon discarded and new workers employed in their stead.) This means

that, in the developing countries other than those at the threshold, almost the entire production input comes from elsewhere. These materials are assembled there, put in boxes and taken away again. These factories even have a special name, they are called "*factories of the world market*".

These units of production are in reality the result of a choice made by imperialist monopolies and in reality function with the aim of exploiting the extremely cheap labour force in that country.

Aside from this, in all the underdeveloped and medium-developed countries there is industrialisation oriented towards export. But so far, this industrialisation has not solved any problems at all. And no such solution can be expected for some time to come. On the contrary, existing problems are aggravated even further. The distribution of wealth becomes even more unequal, social expectations are raised but cannot be fulfilled.

Consequently, these countries and particularly the threshold stage, medium-developed countries where development is most rapid, become focal points of the entire array of difficulties, contradictions and crises. This brings us to a point on which we all agree: these countries become the weak links of the world imperialist system. For this reason, we call the countries at the threshold the foremost *weak links* of imperialism.

In the countries at the threshold which experience such rapid development, the necessity to use naked force, open dictatorship, against the people, and its actual employment have become structural and are a permanent characteristic in those countries. This is what we see in Chile, in Argentina, Brazil, Turkey, Thailand, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and others. Again, this is connected with a point brought forward in *Weak Link*, namely that "in such countries a Western-style moderate, bourgeois democracy has no chance of survival".

The reason for the present economic crisis of the underdeveloped and medium-developed countries is again the movement of imperialist capital.

1.1.3. The structural changes that have taken place in the world capitalist economy

Even when presenting only a very general picture of the world capitalist economy, it is not sufficient to simply consider the imperialist countries on the one hand and the underdeveloped countries on the other and leave it at that. An evaluation of the world capitalist economy must consider 1) the relations that are established between them, 2) their relations with the world socialist system, 3) the results of the scientific and technological revolution.

It must be considered within the framework of relations with the world socialist system because both are parts of a single world market. Consideration of the scientific and technological revolution is helpful in determining the potential of newly emerging processes and their degree of permanence. What we are considering is the world *capitalist* economy and the results of the other factors have already been realised in the relation between them.

The world capitalist economy (as we have defined it in *Weak Link*) is not the simple sum total of autonomous national capitalist economies which have limited foreign trade relations and whose development is determined by their own particular laws of movement. Each one of these economies is part of a single whole, *organic elements of the world capitalist economic system*.

It is for this reason that when we speak of relations between particular economies or of the relation between imperialist and underdeveloped countries, we are speaking of interaction within the general world capitalist economy. As organic parts of the whole, all units influence one another. The general result of these mutual influences determines the form of the world capitalist economy. Once this form is determined, the position of particular countries will henceforward be given in relation to it.

As we said at the beginning, tendencies that had been operating for some time in the world capitalist economic system have now become *firmly established* trends. A structural change has occurred.

What are the *indications of the structural change* which has taken place in the world capitalist economic system?

Firstly, we may look at *international trade*. More than 15% of all services and commodities produced in the world capitalist economy enters into international trade, with this percentage steadily increasing during the past fifteen years. This indicates the degree of interrelatedness in the world capitalist economic system, and the fact that this interrelatedness is growing steadily.

70% of the total exports of all the capitalist countries goes to the imperialist countries while 20% goes to the underdeveloped countries. That means that the foreign trade of the imperialist countries takes place mainly among themselves. The foreign trade of the underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, takes place, not among themselves, but again with the imperialist countries. This is an indication of the underdeveloped countries' dependency on imperialism.

The great majority of exports from the underdeveloped to the imperialist countries still consists of raw materials, while their imports consist of manufactured goods. However, there has been a *slow* but very *definite* change in the past few years. The export of manufactured goods from the underdeveloped countries is becoming an ever greater share of the total world export of manufactured goods.

This indicates that a change has taken place, not only in world trade, but in the functioning of the world capitalist economic system. Previously, raw materials would be exported, natural resources would be exploited, and manufactured goods would be imported. But now, the underdeveloped countries also export manufactured goods to the imperialist countries. This is something new.

There is yet another novelty in international trade. An increasingly greater part of international trade takes on the form of a flow of commodities between a monopoly's different units in various countries, or between a monopoly and infant companies in different countries linked with it by subcontracts. This too has given rise to some very interesting results from the point of view of the capitalist economy.

We are faced with production and trade which are increasingly taking place on a world scale and gradually turning into a division of labour planned by individual monopolies on a world scale. This is not simple commodity exchange. Nor is it something done by this or that country. It is the planning of production from beginning to end by the computers of a single monopoly with 85 factories in 85 countries, conveying its commodities to the consumer. Of course, the export of capital already implied this phenomenon. But it has reached such dimensions for the first time. An ever increasing part of international trade is taking place as the result of planning on a world scale by individual monopolies.

The second indication is *foreign investment*. This too, is a significant indicator which points to certain changes in the functioning of the system. Investment by the monopolies of the imperialist countries is still realised largely among themselves. However, investment by the monopolies of the imperialist countries in the underdeveloped and especially the medium-developed countries is growing in proportion.

Nevertheless, the most fundamental indicator showing that a change has occurred in the division of labour is what we have called the *shift in the location of production*.

Today, we may speak of a shift in the location of production on a world scale. The imperialist monopolies are locking up their factories in their traditional regions of production — namely in the imperialist countries — and reopening them in the underdeveloped countries where they can find unlimited exploitation, where the labour force can be replenished whenever they wish, where the trade unions and the working class have only limited strength for organised resistance, countries which offer great advantages in every respect. This applies particularly to steel production, ship-building, the textile and clothing industry, manufacture of office supplies, electronic parts, transistors, radio, TV, record players and tape recorders, toys, calculators, sporting equipment, etc. For example, it used to be the case that whenever the toy industry was mentioned, Japan would spring to mind, now toys come from Malaysia, Hong Kong, etc.

The shift in the location of production is being effected in various forms. The most widespread is that of an imperialist monopoly shutting down its factory in one place and reopening it somewhere else. The second form, and one which applies more closely to Turkey, is that in which local capital develops in certain branches and seizes them from the advanced capitalist countries.

All of these new phenomena have meaning only if they are considered as the *changing and developing of the functioning of the world capitalist economic system* as a whole. Only if we evaluate them as structural changes in economic functions will we have identified them correctly. This is the first time since the emergence of capitalism in the world that industrial production is being carried out, not only in the developed capitalist countries, but also in the backward countries. This is rooted in necessity and is not a passing phenomenon. Due to technological development, the production of a commodity can be broken down into so many detail parts that each unit is produced wherever the most favourable conditions for its production exist. Capitalism means deathly competition and, under the conditions of such competition, production can no longer be carried out in any other way.

Small or large, all companies that have a significant capacity must, if they want to survive, organise their production more and more on an international level. While such a massive army of unemployed exists in one part of the world, an army which is prepared to accept work under any conditions in order not to starve, while possibilities exist to pay extremely low wages and for the most intense exploitation, while, on the other hand, technological development has made it possible for the production process to be broken down into small parts, enabling production to be carried out wherever conditions are most favourable (consequently, even the most unskilled worker can produce commodities at a world standard), and thirdly, when transport and communication techniques have advanced so greatly, any other form is inconceivable. Under such conditions, no one who fails to shift to international production can survive.

There is one result of this development which concerns us closely: today we may truly speak of a *world working class*. Of course, one could speak of a world working class at the time capitalism began to grow into imperialism. However, it is only today that, for the first time, we can speak of a world working class that is truly part of one whole.

This development places great, historical responsibility on the shoulders of the working class, particularly in the imperialist countries. I do not want to go into this here, it was partially dealt with in the *Cancun* article. At this point, the working class of the West is confronted once again with a situation where it has to show that it is a class worthy of the name.

This development confirms one of our ideas, namely that, at the present level of development of the forces of production, national borders play an increasingly *reactionary* rôle. The process of production needs to be organised on a *world scale*. It is interesting to see that, despite the various difficulties created by countries and states, things are still moving in this direction.

The organisation of production on a world scale is gradually being realized in spite of the imperialist states. True, one of the first things we learnt is that the state is the weapon of the ruling class. And in state-monopoly capitalism, the state, not to speak of the government, is the mere "executive committee" of a tiny minority, it is the agent of capital. But there are some other factors which separate the state from capital. For one thing, the state has certain responsibilities towards the people living within its boundaries. It has the duty of preventing social upheavals. It realizes what must be done within those boundaries. If we consider the relations between imperialist countries, when it is a question of talking in general terms, they all see what has to be done. But, as you will remember from the *Cancun* article, when it comes to deciding as to who will do it, everyone points to the others. The capitalist system is going through such a curious development that we may speak of a *contradiction between imperialist capital and the imperialist state*.

Now we can ask, does this new development, this export oriented industrialisation in the underdeveloped countries, cont-

tribute anything to alleviate the conditions in those countries? Does it reduce unemployment, solve the socio-economic problems, overcome their underdevelopment?

No, it provides none of these. On the contrary, it increases their dependence on imperialism. And in such a way that, to the extent that industrialisation progresses and deepens, the development of those countries continues to the same extent in the form of "*chronic underdevelopment*". However much they progress, they can do nothing but reproduce their own underdevelopment.

Under the "old" division of labour in the world capitalist economic system the exploited countries were the depots of agricultural and raw materials. Now, the same relation is reproducing itself on the industrial level. Industries such as textiles, ship-building, steel, etc., have shifted to the underdeveloped and medium-developed countries. To what end? These branches may have spearheaded development in the West when it was still in the stage of industrialisation. This is no longer the case. Today, just as yesterday, all the technological, scientific and industrial branches that truly determine capitalism's development on a world scale are still firmly under the control of imperialism.

Let us emphasize this general result:

The many-faceted economic crisis which the imperialist *countries* (not capital itself) as well as the underdeveloped exploited countries are experiencing today is the result of the movement of international capital driven only by its instinct for profit.

1.2. Turkey

The present situation in which Turkey finds itself can only be set within its correct framework if considered in the light of what has been said so far; only in this way can it assume a meaning beyond the "plot mentality" of opportunism.

Following the rapid economic development of the past few

years, Turkey's economy is plagued by a number of very serious and great imbalances. For various historical reasons, direct foreign capital investment in Turkey is limited. For this reason, Turkey's industrial development, unlike some examples we witness today, was not oriented towards export from the very beginning. However, in time, industrialisation developed rapidly. The development of some branches of industry rapidly outstripped that of the economy in general, and within a short period of time transcended the limits of the home market's effective demand (eg., the textile industry). Other industrial sectors (eg., the automotive industry) were from the very beginning oriented towards both export and the home market.

The textile industry was not born as an export industry but today it is an industry oriented towards export. Its rapid development brought new technology and new investment and it employs roughly two million people. Turkey's market cannot absorb the output of this industry.

In the automotive industry, on the other hand, the share of foreign capital is larger, as this industry was from the start oriented towards export as well as the home market. Turkey is basically an extremely nationalistic country. This fact must surely have had an effect on the present level of foreign capital. However, in the final analysis, our judgement must be that the economically developed branches of industry have outstripped the home market's consumption capacity. They have reached the point where they can live only through export.

The rapid spread of monopolies and the seizure of the economy by finance-capital have led to the need to expand abroad, in terms of both the export of capital as well as that of manufactured goods. However, still, we see that this expansion has not been effected to the required extent. We know of the initiatives in the export of capital: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Nigeria, Libya, etc. However, it has been unable to reach a meaningful level. The "explosion" expected in the export of commodities has not occurred so far. The most recent example of this is seen in the Common Market's attitude towards cotton and textile imports.

The situation of Turkey's textile industry is in many respects a laboratory. What does the crisis in the textile industry indicate?

1. It is an example of the fact that the "protectionism" and "tariff walls" rising in the Western imperialist countries as a result of their own recessions are transferred to the economies of the under- and medium-developed countries in the form of a crisis.

2. It is an example of the great obstacles that countries approaching the imperialist stage will be confronted with. The actual market for the products of a country which has reached this level is the market of the developed capitalist countries; but once these goods start to represent a serious threat, the philosophy of "free trade", hitherto referred to at every opportunity, is suddenly dropped and protectionism is introduced. In that case, what remains are those countries which are even less developed than those we are concerned with here. But then again, other factors start to come into play. Cheap labour, which is the one factor that makes these goods attractive on the imperialist market, is no longer cheap on the markets of the under-developed countries.

3. In all those countries which try to become imperialist themselves, some industrial sectors will have developed much more rapidly than and out of proportion to the other industrial sectors, as well as the country as a whole, becoming the spearheads of that country's economy. During this rapid development extensive investment will have been made in these sectors, and modern technology in tune with world standards will have been imported. So that, when the opportunities for the sale of these goods abroad diminish, the capacity of the country's market will be too small to absorb the products of the advanced industrial sectors. Is the textile industry then now being punished for the general backwardness of the country, for its own disproportionate development, or for its dependence on the imperialist countries? Probably all three at once. These three factors working together have pushed the country's most rapidly developing, most modern and strongest export industry into a very serious crisis.

Therefore, the *dilemma* referred to above exists in Turkey in

its most intensive form: on the one hand, there are the products of the developing industries, and on the other, a home market which cannot absorb this output and a foreign market which, due to its own problems, is unwilling to do so.

Confronted with this dilemma, there have recently been a number of different propositions. Some say that since we are unable to sell abroad, let us raise the purchasing power of the home market. But to do so would increase inflation, raise the very low wage level which has been the most important advantage on the foreign market, and result in an overall price rise. Further, no matter how much the home market expands, it would still be unable to secure the survival of industries such as the textile industry which, from the point of view of their size, their technology and level of production, have reached world standards. The local monopoly bourgeoisie sees all of this very clearly. Unless it succeeds in expanding abroad, its developing industries will collapse.

At this point, let us speculate and imagine what would happen if they collapsed. That kind of collapse would not be a noiseless affair. It would happen amongst great social upheavals and the working class would be presented with many opportunities. But what would happen if these opportunities for revolution are not taken advantage of as they should be? I suppose that only one thing could happen, namely that those industries that had collapsed would re-emerge, but this time as a direct extension of an imperialist monopoly and with a changed capital constitution.

Of late, the following debate is being waged. One section says that a tight monetary policy should be continued, and the economy should concentrate on exports. The other section says that this policy should be abandoned and instead the effective demand of the home market should be increased. This debate is taking place within the bourgeoisie (I refer to the bourgeoisie without here making a distinction between monopoly and non-monopoly). This debate will drag on. The second path suggested, that of expanding the home market within a short period of time, is a cul-de-sac. And the first path, as we have

already seen, is full of various obstacles. That means, whichever one of these propositions is tried, it will not lead to success, and as soon as its failure becomes evident, the other view will begin to dominate. Therefore, this debate will go on, swinging like a pendulum first in this and then in the other direction, with first one and then the other view coming to dominate.

However, the objective-structural need of Turkey's *capitalist* economy is the export of both *goods* and *capital* and local finance-capital is very conscious of this need.

I would now like to read you a few sentences from an article published in the August 1982 issue of *Kitle* (Mass) which is entitled "Friedman's politics have gone bankrupt quickly in Turkey":

"We said it many years ago and have repeated it at every opportunity since the 24th January decisions(!). We have said that the economic crisis will deepen further and become chronic so long as Turkey's economy (which was initially also the case with industry) does not free itself of a structure which is dependent on the West, based on assembly, and backward — and for this reason *oriented towards the internal market*. This is not a belief we hold but a fact of political-economic science. Of course, like all facts it is stubborn. And it stubbornly resists all those who do not want to accept it as such.

(...)

"For what reason and by whom has Özal been expelled? Answer: Because it was understood that, with Özal's policies, exports could not be raised sufficiently; by those *monopolists whose interests are tied up more strongly with the internal market*." (Our emphasis)

Industry "oriented towards the internal market" and "monopolists whose interests are tied up with the internal market"(!). Where have they been? Really, where there is no

scientific basis which correctly reflects life, the phrase "political-economic science" is not enough to save the analysis. An article spread over two full pages, but nowhere are we told who those "monopolies oriented towards the internal market" are. Perhaps they are clandestine ones! This is not an analysis, and no politics could be pursued based on it.

All this apart, local finance-capital knows very well what it needs. But the fact that monopoly, which has developed quite out of proportion with the overall economic make-up of the country, recognises this need does not suffice to satisfy it. Not sufficing, the economic crisis again deepened during the summer months (1982 — trans.). The automotive industry, the durable consumer goods industry, and also the textile and clothing industries are all in the oxygen tent.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has drawn attention to the fact that the rate of inflation in Turkey has risen sharply in the recent period. Even if we assume that the rate of inflation stated by the IMF is an underestimation, it does show the trend. The rate of increase of retail goods prices rose from 27.4% at the end of 1981 to 30% by the middle of 1982. According to the IMF, this was primarily due to the "extremely rapid expansion of the money supply". Thus, the IMF proposes that tight monetary policies should definitely be continued in Turkey and applied more consistently. This proposition was made at a time when the junta was about to call the people to vote and when the economic crisis had become very pressing.

So much so that something of the order of 150 companies have applied to the government for financial aid. We know what has happened to *Güney Sanayii* (*Southern Industries*). The banks are having a very difficult time as the bank debts that industry has been unable to clear are becoming an increasingly greater share of the banks' total debts outstanding. With the drop in foreign market sales and the inability to find sufficient new markets abroad, industry's ever-deepening crisis is also hitting the banks.

It was one of those curious accidents of life to see the junta squeezed in between the need to bring out the popular vote and the short-term but compulsory demands of the economy on the

one hand, and the demands of local and imperialist capital centres on the other. On the one hand, the 24th January decisions were shelved together with their appliers, and on the other hand the guarantees required were given to imperialism! The junta informed the IMF through Kafaoglu that the tight monetary policy would be maintained. But, clearly, this did not satisfy the IMF. The latest IMF Report says: "Economic performance since the beginning of this year has been more complex than in 1981".

As has now become evident, *fascism, too, has been unable to solve Turkey's problems*. That the crisis is permanent has been proven once more. As already pointed out at the Second Conference of the Leninists of the TKP, although the fascist coup of 12th September succeeded in suppressing the revolutionary situation, there continues to be a situation which can only be solved by revolution.

In the section where we discussed the changes that have taken place in the world capitalist economic system, the matter was dealt with by means of a number of generalisations. But when we look at Turkey, we see that general trends are not acted out smoothly in particular countries. These trends emerge very slowly amidst a plethora of various struggles, crises and zig-zag courses.

It is not only Turkey which is in this situation. Other examples are Argentina, particularly *Mexico*, South Korea, the Philippines and Bolivia.

Let us not forget one thing among all that has been said. Despite all the difficulties, industrialisation oriented towards export will most definitely continue in Turkey. In any case, Turkey as a medium-level developed country does possess a comparatively widespread industrial complex. Yes, it will continue. Until such time as a power emerges which is strong enough to halt it! Herein lies our chance. We live and have taken on a duty in one of history's more enjoyable periods. We are working in a period which is full of opportunities.

It will continue, but such industrialisation will not solve a single one of our country's problems. It will be incapable of breaking the chain of underdevelopment. So long as there is no

rescue from its dependence on imperialism, the path to true progress in Turkey will be barred and Turkey will continue to be a weak link of imperialism. The liberation of the people of our country demands a revolution with an anti-imperialist, anti-monopoly content, using proletarian methods, carried out under the hegemony of the working class, an anti-fascist, anti-chauvinist revolution — an advanced democratic people's revolution that will grow into socialism. For this the revolutionary unity of the people must be achieved.

II. Unity of the revolutionary forces — the question of a united front

Unity of the revolutionary forces — the question of a united front is a current question for the revolutionary movement of Turkey. It is a revolutionary movement divided in the extreme and faced with the necessity of creating a serious centre of attraction against the fascist junta. It must overthrow the junta and then prevent the social movement being usurped by the social-democratic jellyfish. That is why the question of the unity of the revolutionary forces has come onto the agenda almost of itself.

I will not discuss every aspect of this question. I will also not touch upon the level at which the concept of the united front has remained despite the results which have emerged from world revolutionary experience. I will only consider the question to the extent that the present situation demands.

Since the 12th September, all (the revolutionary — trans.) movements have, to one extent or another, matured and adopted a more favourable behaviour towards one another. Perhaps this will change when everyone is once again cowboy in his own street. But that is a matter for tomorrow. Today a favourable wind is blowing. And there is a front movement. We too have taken our place in this front and are carrying out our tasks.

What I am going to say may appear to be undiplomatic and

ill-timed. However, our primary task is to tell our comrades and the working class the truth. Thus, although it may at times seem ill-timed, I must still say it. Anything else would be only short-term interests, with the idea that if it doesn't work out, it can't be helped.

The tendency towards social-democratising the world communist movement is advancing. The communist movement of Turkey has had a fair share in it, too. But it is not only we or the mensheviks who are concerned, traces of this social-democratisation can be found in all the revolutionary movements of Turkey. Even the most "leftist" exhibit traces of an opportunist understanding in regard to the question of a united front. Examples of such an attitude towards the front question are views such as, "communists don't chase after the leadership", or "those who work hardest in the front will be the vanguard". The idea of hegemony does not exist. There is no place for the communist party in the front. If we look around us, it is obvious that such views are not only defended by the mensheviks.

For this reason, we shall dwell here on those aspects in regard to which mistakes are being made. This in no way means to play down the importance of the unity of the revolutionary forces or the question of a united front. If new views were to emerge tomorrow, we would then concentrate on those.

2.1. The unity of the working class

Let us first start with the question of the unity of the working class which some refer to as "the working class front".

What is a working-class party? This question has emerged due to the fact that, particularly in Europe, significant sections of the working class are gathered in the social-democratic parties. Those who call these parties working-class parties, do so on the basis of one consideration alone: membership. They have organised the majority of the working class, therefore they are working class parties. But is that the case? May we call a party a

working-class party because it has organised a significant section of the working class? Consider what Lenin said:

“First of all, I should like to mention a slight inaccuracy on the part of Comrade McLaine, which cannot be agreed to. He called the Labour Party the political organisation of the trade union movement... It is erroneous, and is partly the cause of the opposition... coming from the British revolutionary workers. Indeed, the concepts ‘political department of the trade unions’ or ‘political expression’ of the trade union movement, are erroneous. Of course, most of the Labour Party’s members are working-men. However, whether or not a party is really a political party of the workers does not depend *solely* upon a membership of workers but also upon the men that lead it, and *the content of its actions and its political tactics. Only this latter determines whether we really have before us a political party of the proletariat.* Regarded from this, the only correct, point of view, the Labour Party is a thoroughly bourgeois party, because, although made up of workers, it is led by reactionaries, and the worst kind of reactionaries at that, who act quite in the spirit of the bourgeoisie. It is an organisation of the bourgeoisie, which exists to systematically dupe the workers with the aid of the British Noskes and Scheidemanns.” (Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.31, pp.257-258) (Our emphasis)

The ideology of social-democratic parties is bourgeois ideology. The ideology of the working class is Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. The politics of the former are not revolutionary but reformist. Their programme is bourgeois reformism. In consequence, they are *bourgeois parties of the working class*.

In our case, however, the Republican People’s Party (RPP) has to be evaluated somewhat differently. The RPP differs from

the classical social-democratic parties. Social-democratic parties were born in the working-class movement. Not the RPP. In the one-party period, it was a party in which all the bourgeois sections were represented. Later, differences started to emerge very slowly in accordance with capitalist development in society, and, as a result, a number of different parties emerged from within the RPP. They will continue to emerge in the future. It is a bourgeois party.

And then there are the socialist parties. For example, there is the Workers Party of Turkey (WPT). Its ideology is that of petty-bourgeois socialism. Its political tactics are opportunist, pacifist. We do not call it a working-class party in the true sense. "These are the *real bourgeois agents within the working-class movement*, the lieutenants of the capitalist class, the real channels of reformism and chauvinism." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.5, p. 12)

The only genuine working class political party is the communist party. No other party is the genuine party of the working class. "The communist party is the highest political organisation of the working-class, its general staff, its vanguard detachment". The party is the vehicle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. We shall prove that in Turkey, this party can only be the Communist Party of Turkey.

What is meant by the *unity* of the working class?

a) The unity of the working class should not be understood as a numerical unity. There are two million workers. This implies that all of those two million should adopt the same viewpoint. Under conditions of capitalism, it is impossible to establish the numerical unity of the working class.

b) Neither is the unity of the working class to be understood as cooperation among the communist, socialist and social-democratic parties. To make the unity of the working-class conditional on cooperation among the communist, socialist and social-democratic parties has only one meaning: the integration of the working-class and of the communist party into the bourgeois order.

What we mean by the unity of the working class is the strengthening of its party which is working on the basis of

Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. Some may find this too sectarian, but this is what we understand by the unity of the working class. The genuine unity of the working-class is only realised in the working class' organising within and around its own party, the communist party.

When we look at historical experience, for example, in Eastern Europe, we see that after the Second World War, the communist parties united with some of the local socialist and social-democratic parties, adopting such titles as Socialist Unity Party and Workers' Party. This was the case in the GDR, in Poland and in Hungary. This may give rise to some questions, it may be said that this shows that these parties can unite. However, one should not forget the historical conditions when attempting to understand these experiences. Let us immediately say that we would always be in favour of such a unity, because this unity is based on Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism. It is not a case of both sides making a step forward to meet somewhere in the middle, or one where the communist party has accepted the platform of the other parties. It is the others which have accepted its position. When this is the case, there is nothing on which we differ.

I said historical conditions so that you would not think it could be done easily. That development emerged under very particular conditions. After the Red Army had broken the back of fascism, there was no force for some time that could have stood up against the progressive movement in Eastern Europe, the Red Army's physical presence in those countries... What could a social-democratic party have done? In spite of this, differences emerged in those parties. The left wing remained. The right wing escaped to the West. Today, it is precisely those fugitives who are at the head of Radio Free Europe, etc. Today, it is those social-democratic parties of the Eastern European countries which make up almost half of the Socialist International. It is the same who are at the head of intelligence services and the Eastern European Departments of Western universities.

Situations may arise in which unity between the communist

party and workers' parties which are in essence bourgeois parties of the working class, may be of use in the revolutionary struggle. If this should be the case, great efforts would be exerted in this direction. However, for one thing, this unity would not be the genuine political unity of the working class. Secondly, and this is an unchangeable condition, this unity between the communist party and the others would be realised to the degree that the communist party is strong and would be based on a more correct revolutionary line. Everything depends on the strength of the communist party.

2.2. Two articles by Lenin and a summary of our understanding of the united front

First let us read two articles written by Lenin. They do not directly deal with the question of a united front, but the logic of this matter can be seen clearly in both articles.

The first article is entitled "We have paid too much" and was written in 1922. The second article is the "Letter to the workers and peasants apropos of the victory against Kolchak". Both articles are extremely useful in understanding the logic of the matter of the united front. They display a different attitude under different circumstances but the same understanding underlies both attitudes. Let us read:

"Imagine that a Communist has to enter premises in which agents of the bourgeoisie are carrying on their propaganda at a fairly large meeting of workers. Imagine also that the bourgeoisie demands from us a high price for admission to these premises. If the price has not been agreed to beforehand we must bargain, of course, in order not to impose too heavy a burden upon our Party funds. If we pay too much for admission to these premises we shall undoubtedly commit an error. But it is better to pay a high price — at all events until we have learned to bargain properly

— than to reject an opportunity of speaking to workers who hitherto have been in the exclusive 'possession', so to speak, of the reformists, i.e., of the most loyal friends of the bourgeoisie.

"This analogy came to my mind when in today's *Pravda* I read a telegram from Berlin stating the terms on which agreement has been reached between the representatives of the three Internationals.

"In my opinion our representatives were wrong in agreeing to the following two conditions: first, that the Soviet Government should not apply the death penalty in the case of the forty-seven Socialist-Revolutionaries; second, that the Soviet Government should permit representatives of the three Internationals to be present at the trial.

"These two conditions are nothing more nor less than a political concession on the part of the revolutionary proletariat to the reactionary bourgeoisie. If anyone has any doubt about the correctness of this definition, then, to reveal the political naiveté of such a person, it is sufficient to ask him the following questions. Would the British or any other contemporary government permit representatives of the three Internationals to attend the trial of Irish workers charged with rebellion? Or the trial of the workers implicated in the recent rebellion in South Africa? Would the British or any other government, in such, or similar circumstances, agree to promise that it would not impose the death penalty on its political opponents? A little reflection over these questions will be sufficient to enable one to understand the following simple truth. All over the world a struggle is going on between the reactionary bourgeoisie and the revolutionary proletariat. In the present case the Communist International, which represents one side in this struggle, makes a political concession to the other side, i.e., the reactionary

bourgeoisie; for everybody in the world knows (except those who want to conceal the obvious truth) that the Socialist-Revolutionaries have shot at Communists and have organised revolts against them, and that they have done this actually, and sometimes officially, in a united front with the whole of the international reactionary bourgeoisie.

"The question is — what concession has the international bourgeoisie made to us in return? There can only be one reply to this question, and it is that no concession has been made to us whatever.

"Only arguments which becloud this simple and clear truth of the class struggle, only arguments which throw dust in the eyes of the masses of working people, can obscure this obvious fact. Under the agreement signed in Berlin by the representatives of the Third International we have made two political concessions to the international bourgeoisie. We have obtained no concession in return.

"The representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals acted as blackmailers to extort a political concession from the proletariat for the benefit of the bourgeoisie, while emphatically refusing, or at any rate making no attempt, to induce the international bourgeoisie to make some political concession to the revolutionary proletariat. Of course, this incontrovertible political fact was obscured by shrewd bourgeois diplomats (the bourgeoisie has been training members of its class to become good diplomats for many centuries); but the attempt to obscure the fact does not change it in the least. Whether the various representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals are in direct or indirect collusion with the bourgeoisie is a matter of tenth-rate importance in the present case. We do not accuse them of being in direct collusion. The question of whether there has been direct

collusion or fairly intricate, indirect connection has nothing to do with the case. The only point that has anything to do with it is that as a result of the pressure of the representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, the Communist International has made a political concession to the international bourgeoisie and has obtained no concession in return.

“What conclusion should be drawn from this?

“First, that Comrades Radek, Bukharin and the others who represented the Communist International acted wrongly.

“Further. Does it follow from this that we must tear up the agreement that they signed? No. I think it would be wrong to draw such a conclusion. We ought not to tear up the agreement. All we have to do is to realise that on this occasion the bourgeois diplomats proved to be more skilful than ours, and that next time, if the price of admission is not fixed beforehand, we must bargain and manoeuvre more skilfully. We must make it a rule not to make political concessions to the international bourgeoisie (no matter how skilfully these concessions may be concealed by intermediaries, no matter of what sort) unless we receive in return more or less equivalent concessions from the international bourgeoisie to Soviet Russia, or to the other contingents of the international proletariat which is fighting capitalism.

“Perhaps the Italian Communists and a section of the French Communists and Syndicalists, who were opposed to united front tactics, will infer from the above argument that united front tactics are wrong. But such an inference will obviously be wrong. If the communist representatives have paid too much for admission to premises in which they have some, even if small, opportunity of addressing workers up to now in the exclusive ‘possession’ of

reformists, such a mistake must be rectified next time. But it would be an incomparably greater mistake to reject all terms, or all payment for admission to these fairly well-guarded and barred premises. The mistake that Comrades Radek, Bukharin and the others made is not a grave one, especially as our only risk is that the enemies of Soviet Russia may be encouraged by the result of the Berlin Conference to make two or three perhaps successful attempts on the lives of certain persons; for they know beforehand that they can shoot at Communists in the expectation that conferences like the Berlin Conference will hinder the Communists from shooting at them.

“At all events, we have made some breach in the premises that were closed to us. At all events, Comrade Radek has succeeded in exposing, at least to a section of the workers, the fact that the Second International refused to include among the slogans of the demonstration a demand to annul the Treaty of Versailles. The great mistake the Italian Communists and a section of the French Communists and Syndicalists make is in being content with the knowledge they already possess. They are content with knowing well enough that the representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals, and also Paul Levi, Serrati and others, are very shrewd agents of the bourgeoisie and vehicles of their influence. But people, workers, who really know this, and who really understand its significance, are undoubtedly in the minority in Italy, Britain, the USA and France. Communists must not stew in their own juice, but must learn to penetrate into prohibited premises where the representatives of the bourgeoisie are influencing the workers; and in this they must not shrink from making certain sacrifices and not be afraid of making mistakes, which, at first, are inevitable in every new and difficult undertaking.

The Communists who refuse to understand this and who do not want to learn how to do it cannot hope to win over the majority of the workers; at all events, they are hindering and retarding the work of winning this majority. For Communists, and all genuine adherents of the workers' revolution, this is absolutely unpardonable.

“Once again, the bourgeoisie, in the persons of their diplomats, have outwitted the representatives of the Communist International. Such is the lesson of the Berlin Conference. We shall not forget this lesson. We shall draw all the necessary conclusions from it. The representatives of the Second and Two-and-a-Half Internationals need a united front, for they hope to weaken us by inducing us to make exorbitant concessions; they hope to penetrate into our communist premises without any payment; they hope to utilise united front tactics for the purpose of convincing the workers that reformist tactics are correct and that revolutionary tactics are wrong. We need a united front because we hope to convince the workers of the opposite. We shall put the blame for the mistakes on our communist representatives who committed them, and on those parties which commit them, while we shall try to learn from these mistakes and to prevent a repetition of them in the future. But under no circumstances shall we thrust the blame for the mistakes of our Communists upon the proletarian masses, who all over the world are facing the onslaught of advancing capital. We adopted united front tactics in order to help these masses to fight capitalism, to help them understand the ‘cunning mechanism’ of the two fronts in international economics and in international politics; and we shall pursue these tactics to the end.” (Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.33, pp.330-334)

In the second article, "Letter to the workers and peasants apropos of the victory over Kolchak", it is really the fourth lesson which is of interest to us, but let us read the entire text:

"Comrades, Red troops have liberated the entire Urals area from Kolchak and have begun the liberation of Siberia. The workers and peasants of the Urals and Siberia are enthusiastically welcoming Soviet power, for it is sweeping away with an iron broom all the landowner and capitalist scum who ground down the people with exactions, humiliations, floggings, and the restoration of tsarist oppression.

"Although we all rejoice at the liberation of the Urals and the entry of the Red troops into Siberia we must not allow ourselves to be lulled into a sense of security. The enemy is still far from being destroyed. He has not even been definitely broken.

"Every effort must be made to drive Kolchak and the Japanese and other foreign bandits out of Siberia, and an even greater effort is needed to destroy the enemy, to prevent him from starting his banditry again and again.

"How is that to be achieved?

"The harrowing experience of the Urals and Siberia, as well as the experience of all countries which have been through the torments of the four years of imperialist war, must not be without its lessons for us.

"Here are the five chief lessons which all workers and peasants, all working people, must draw from this experience...

"First lesson. In order to defend the power of the workers and peasants from the bandits, that is, from the landowners and capitalists, we need a powerful Red Army...

"Consequently, everyone who seriously wishes

to rid himself of the rule of Kolchak must devote all his energies, means and ability without reservation to the task of building up and strengthening the Red Army...

"Second lesson. The Red Army cannot be strong without large state stocks of grain, for without them it is impossible to move an army freely or to train it properly. Without them we cannot maintain the workers who are producing for the army.

(...)

"Third lesson. If Kolchak and Denikin are to be completely destroyed the strictest revolutionary order must be maintained, the laws and instructions of the Soviet government must be faithfully observed, and care must be taken that they are obeyed by all.

(...)

"Fourth lesson. It is criminal to forget not only that the Kolchak movement began with trifles but also that the Mensheviks 'Social Democrats' and SRs 'Socialist Revolutionaries' assisted its birth and directly supported it. It is time we learned to judge political parties not by their words, but by their deeds.

"The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries call themselves socialists, but they are actually *abettors of the counter-revolutionaries*, abettors of the landowners and capitalists. This was proved in practice not only by isolated facts, but by two big periods in the history of the Russian revolution: 1. the Kerensky period, and 2. the Kolchak period. Both times the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, while professing to be 'socialists' and 'democrats', actually played the role of *abettors of the whiteguards*. Are we then going to be so foolish as to believe them now they are suggesting we let them 'try again', and call our permission a 'united socialist (or

democratic) front?" Since the Kolchak experience, can there still be peasants other than few isolated individuals, who do not realise that a 'united front' with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries means union with the abettors of Kolchak?

"It may be objected that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have realised their mistake and renounced all alliance with the bourgeoisie. But this is not true. In the first place, the Right Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries have not renounced such an alliance, and there is *no* definite line of demarcation from these 'Rights'. There is no such line through the fault of the 'Left' Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries; for although they verbally 'condemn' their 'Rights', even the best of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in spite of all they say, are actually *powerless* compared with them. Secondly, what even the best of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries advocate are actually *Kolchak* ideas which assist the bourgeoisie and Kolchak and Denikin and help to mask their filthy and bloody capitalist deeds. ...

"In our own country we see that Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich or any other general readily hands out such 'democratic' promises. Can we trust a man who on the strength of verbal promises helps a known bandit? The Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, all without exception, help known bandits, the world imperialists, using pseudo-democratic slogans to paint *their* state power, *their* campaign against Russia, *their* rule and *their* policy in bright colours. All the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries offer us an 'alliance' on condition that we make concessions to the capitalists and their leaders, Kolchak and Denikin; as, for example, that we 'renounce terror' (when we are faced with the terror of the multi-millionaires of the whole Entente,

of the whole alliance of the richest countries, that are engineering plots in Russia), or that we open the way for freedom to trade in grain and so on. What these 'conditions' of the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries boil down to is this: we, the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, are wavering towards the capitalists, and we want a 'united front' with the Bolsheviks, against whom the capitalists taking advantage of every concession are fighting! No, my Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary gentlemen, look no more in Russia for people capable of believing you. In Russia class-conscious workers and peasants now realise that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries are abettors of the whiteguards — some deliberate and malicious, others unwitting and because of their persistence in their old mistakes, but abettors of the whiteguards nevertheless.

"Fifth lesson. If Kolchak and his rule are to be destroyed and not allowed to recur, all peasants must unhesitatingly make their choice in favour of the workers' state.

"Either the dictatorship (i.e. the iron rule) of the landowners and capitalists, or the dictatorship of the working class.

"There is no middle course. ... There is no middle course anywhere in the world, nor can there be. Either the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie ... or the dictatorship of the proletariat. He who has not learned this from the whole history of the nineteenth century is a hopeless idiot. ..." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.29, pp.552-559)

The two articles by Lenin we have just read exhibit the logic of the united front question extremely well. What we must do is to follow this logic: *A front which will support the hegemony of the working-class!* For, so long as the hegemony of the proletariat is

not realised, society will not advance towards its liberation! This is our understanding of the united front!

2.3. The united front and the hegemony of the proletariat

If we look at its root, hegemony is a Greek word. In antiquity, confederations of city-states were formed in which one city-state was called the *hegemon*. That city-state whose authority was not effectively challenged by the other city-states would become the hegemon.

If we generalise the above, the word hegemony in class politics means that one class has made the other classes accept its predominance, its leadership, with varying degrees of opposition, but without their posing any effective challenge to it. *Hegemony, in the social sense means to have won the acceptance of the active majority of the people.*

In its philosophical sense, hegemony means the *organisation of force*. And politically it means the organisation of force by winning the acceptance of the active majority of the people.

From the point of view of the proletariat, the need for hegemony arises out of the existence of other oppressed classes outside itself, from the need to march together with them against the common enemy.

2.3.1. The problem of securing hegemony and advancing the revolution

How is the hegemony of the working class secured in the revolution, in the revolutionary movement? In the end, everything depends on this question.

The opportunist front programme says the following: "Those who struggle most effectively for the common front programme will become the vanguard". It is incorrect to say that those who struggle most effectively for the common aims of the

front, on the basis of common principles, will become the vanguard. Why should this be so? Let us suppose that there is the RPP on the one side and the Communist Party on the other and that they have agreed on a particular question. If it is a matter of who fights best for the common aims, you may have exerted super-human efforts, but the other is already a powerful force. If its members were to spare only two hours each every day, it would still achieve a great deal. Thus there must be some other means of securing the hegemony, some other logic. Do they really think that you just sit down at a table, sign some joint documents and then you become the vanguard by fighting best for them? This can only be meant to deceive us. Such things are designed to deceive the communists. Designed to tag us on to the tail of the bourgeoisie. It cannot be like this, there must be some other logic. And there is another. We must read *Two Tactics* carefully. We keep reading it, but we must read it a gain with this in mind.

Hegemony is first and foremost a political concept. It is a question of strength, but a political concept. In essence it means that the masses will follow you, take the path you prescribe. Consequently, *its essence is ideological*. Given this, in order for the working class to secure hegemony through the communist party, that is, for the masses to follow it, it must be able to show to the masses the *inconsistency* of the forces with which it is cooperating, or not cooperating, of the forces which exist in that particular arena. It is not a matter of working better for the same thing but of making oneself *distinct*. Not a matter of abolishing the colour differentiations within the front but, just the opposite, of ensuring that your colour is distinct from the rest. On every question.

Now I will pass on to the question of advancing the revolution. Showing the working masses the impotence of your allies means directing them towards the real class struggle; in other words securing hegemony means at the same time advancing the revolution. They are two sides of the same coin.

Let us take an example: the demand to regulate working hours. Suppose that in some country people work twelve hours a

day. The communist party argues for an 8-hour working day. Depending on the concrete situation, the social-democratic party may also immediately adopt this demand. But generally, and judging from historical experience, it is the case that it will only adopt this just demand once the workers themselves have begun to adopt it. If we then, once it has adopted this demand, act according to the opportunist understanding of a front and say that "all we have to do now is to work harder than them for this common aim", we will be lost. We would simply melt away within this massive force. Instead, we will say "seven hours". This time, they will find it more difficult to adopt the demand for a seven-hour working day. But our ally is also a pragmatist. When it sees that the slogan has taken hold and demonstrations and strikes are being held, it will most probably also adopt the seven-hour demand.

Again there is no stopping here. (Of course, I am only using this example to give the logic of the matter. Otherwise, the example is not a very fortunate one.)

If you succeed in advancing your allies step by step (or persuade the masses to adopt the aims without moving your allies), are you not deepening the revolution at the same time? If you had stopped at the beginning, eight hours would have been one of your revolutionary demands. Later, in the confusion and undecidedness of the forward advance, you would expose the impotence of those who claim to represent the people, and at each turn would further enlighten the working people. This is where Lenin's great genius lies. Lenin describes this attitude as follows:

"To *advance* the revolution, to take it beyond the limits to which the monarchist bourgeoisie advances it, it is necessary actively to produce, emphasise, and bring into the forefront slogans that will *preclude* the 'inconsistency' of bourgeois democracy." (Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.9, p.45)

This means that the key to securing hegemony is first and

foremost the politics and attitude that are adopted. There are various parties and political movements and all of them are fighting for hegemony. This is what it means to be a political movement. At every step we must come out with slogans that will expose the impotence of the "saviours".

But we must correctly understand the sense in which Lenin adopted this attitude. Otherwise we might start to believe that hegemony can be secured solely by continually proposing more advanced aims than the other political movements. If that is the case, however, let us remember that there are a great many petty-bourgeois groups divorced from production, both in terms of their origins and attitudes, for whom it is a favourite past-time to propose the "most advanced" slogans.

You probably know the story of the Laz. He went to court and said "This man stole my chicken". The accused turns to the prosecutor and says "Sir, I don't know this person". "You don't know me?" "I don't know you." "You don't know me?" "No, I don't know you". "Then I don't know you either!"

It is something like that. Someone says two hours. I say one hour. He says 45 minutes. What would be the more advanced aim? Not to work at all! This is not what we understand by a more advanced slogan. The most advanced slogan is that slogan which is *most suited to the situation, the most correct*.

On the level of the masses, our main and most important weapon is our science. Our duty is to see, by means of this science, what is right and impart it to the masses on the basis of *their own experience*.

However, this alone is not enough either. An understanding that goes no further than this would resemble Gandhi's pacifist movement. Victory cannot be achieved solely by saying what is right. For there are also forces working against the truth. There are always enough arguments to support speculation.

Moreover, experience throughout the world points to one indisputable fact: movements not defending correct ideas could still become the hegemon. It is not essential to defend the truth to become the hegemon. One also sees those who defend false ideas becoming the hegemon and, unfortunately, all over the world it

is those who defend false ideas who are in the position of hegemony. (Why should we want such an hegemony? Hegemony divorced from correct views is only good for using up energy. Hegemony and correct views are actually two separate elements but *for communists they are united in one*. Only if they are so united do they have meaning for communists. And in the hands of communists, correct views are the most important, *most fundamental* weapon in the struggle for hegemony.)

On the level of classes the matter is less confused. The hegemony of the proletariat means that the working class has made others accept and adopt its will. But this is an abstract statement. How does it take place in life? First and foremost, it takes place through the medium of the working class party and the auxiliary organisations grouped around it. Does hegemony hang in the air until the communist party comes to appropriate it? To say that politics know no vacuum means to say that hegemony knows no vacuum. Excepting temporary situations, this means that, until such time as the real claimant appears, hegemony will belong to someone else. To whom? To the one who holds the most correct views? No, to the strongest.

We must fight with every means, with every weapon. The difference between us and other movements is that we conduct this struggle defending what is right, to make the truth dominant, knowing that it will open the minds of men to the extent which we are able to do so.

Imagine that there is some omnipotent force that tells us "children, the rules of this game are as follows: no one is to touch the other, everyone is to listen to each other, events will show who is right, and his word will thenceforth carry three times as much weight". If such an omnipotent force existed, politics would have a very different look. But it doesn't!

When we see the dictatorship of the proletariat, the hegemony of the proletariat on paper, in the books, we accept it without question. But when we look at how it is practised in life, particularly the dictatorship of the proletariat, we will also see its ugly side. Lives are lost and both the just and the unjust go. When we see all these, many an intellectual, to use Lenin's

expression, will find his stomach turning and vomit. Many stomachs will turn when we reach this point. (Already now, some find it hard to cope). Let us not deceive ourselves with any illusions. We do not make the rules of the game, they were made thousands of years ago, in accordance with the reality of class society. However, we will only be able to remove this filth by wading through it.

Those who disregard ideology and seek only to organise force are mere bullies with whom we are not concerned at all. (There are quite a few comrades among us whose ideological knowledge is insufficient but, taken as a whole, in no other movement is ideological understanding as deeply rooted as in ours). But this is not the end of the matter. In his discussion with the opportunists, Lenin said: "It is not that you are strong when you have won the sympathy of the people, but if you are strong you will win the sympathy of the people" We do not interpret this statement mechanically to say that Lenin believes in achieving sympathy through strength while the opportunists believe in strength through sympathy.

Today, just as yesterday and the day before, hegemony is a question of force, but today this fact is camouflaged. When things become heated this camouflage will become a luxury. And when you take it away, a sword will be revealed.

There is always hegemony. The manner in which it is established, the way it is applied, and its aims differ according to circumstances. The more heated the class struggle becomes, the more openly will force come to the fore in the establishment of hegemony and the aims for which it is used. The greater the heat, the more clearly will hegemony appear as the organisation of force.

The organisation of force may take various forms in its practical realisation. For example, the communist party, even if it does not become conciliatory towards the other parties of the working people, may still win over their base. For instance, the peasant party may put forward a slogan which fails to get adopted, it may organise a meeting but no one attends. When the communist party says, occupy the land, the peasants occupy the

land. This would mean that the working class has established its hegemony. This is the shortest route. Most of the time it is not like that. However, in whatever manner it may be achieved, hegemony emerges in the fight between different organisations which represent various classes and strata in the political arena. From the point of view of the militants this means only one thing: particularly in a country like ours, the fight for hegemony will be a violent one. There is no other way.

In summary then, *hegemony means the organisation of force. From the point of view of the working class, hegemony means winning the active majority of the people for the aims of the working class and its party, the communist party. This is achieved by advancing with the most correct ideas, fighting with every kind of weapon, and preserving one's distinct character and independence from all other organisations.*

No movement which opposes the use of force for this or that theoretical excuse is fit to lead the working-class. Revolution itself is force. And it can be achieved only by those who are not afraid of this.

2.3.2. Three questions

What happens if you are not able to establish hegemony (that is, if you are also unable to advance the revolution)? You will face the reformism of social-democracy, the inconsistent politics of opportunism compromising with capitalism, with your hands tied behind your back. You will be unable to effect the course of events. You will become a tailist. Life continually confronts man with dilemmas. This too, is a dilemma. Either you establish hegemony and march in the forefront, or you walk in the rear guard. Either you advance the revolution, or you dissolve within bourgeois democracy. There is no other possibility. Putting it even more concisely, there is either hegemony or tailism. How could it be otherwise, if you are not in front you are in the rear. In the social struggle, there will definitely be a hegemon.

Naturally, the "tailism" referred to above is different from

the *consciously followed* tailism of opportunist parties and trends. Here tailism appears not as a conscious choice, not as political tactics being applied, but as the *objective* result of social developments.

In fact, the truth is always simple. One must be able to ask the right questions. When you ask a question, its answer will present itself. In political life, mastery means being able to ask the right questions. Now let us see Lenin's reasoning:

"The question now arises: in which outcome of the two possible will Social-Democracy find its hands actually tied in the struggle against the inconsistent and self-seeking bourgeoisie, find itself actually 'dissolved', or almost so, in bourgeois democracy?"

"It is sufficient to put this question clearly to have a reply without a moment's difficulty.

"If the bourgeoisie succeeds in frustrating the Russian revolution by coming to terms with tsarism, Social-Democracy will find its hands actually tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; Social-Democracy will find itself 'dissolved' in bourgeois democracy in the sense that the proletariat will not succeed in placing its clear imprint on the revolution, will not succeed in settling accounts with tsarism in the proletarian or, as Marx once said, 'in the plebeian manner' .

(...)

"Only in the event of a complete victory of the democratic revolution will the proletariat have its hands free in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeoisie; only in that event will it not become 'dissolved' in bourgeois democracy, but will leave its proletarian, or rather proletarian-peasant, imprint on the whole revolution.

"In a word, to avoid finding itself with its hands tied in the struggle against the inconsistent bourgeois democracy the proletariat must be class-conscious

and strong enough to rouse the peasantry to revolutionary consciousness, guide its assault, and thereby independently pursue the line of consistent proletarian democracy.”(Lenin “Two Tactics”, *Collected Works*, vol.9, pp.58-60)

In order for this to take place, leadership of the revolutionary movement, HEGEMONY, must be secured by the working class through its own party, the COMMUNIST PARTY. Everything turns on the strength of the working class party and its correct politics.

The *second question*: as the main aim is to secure hegemony, can we enter into a front where we will clearly be a minority? Such a question reflects a cliquist, narrow group understanding. It is wrong to pose the problem in this manner. We do not want hegemony just to be able to call it “our” hegemony. We want it because it is the only tool that can take society forwards. But situations may arise in which you will enter into a front fully conscious that you may be weak. Lenin said that the interests of social development rank above the interests of the party, even above those of the entire class. One may join a front even if one is weak. Whether or not one is able to turn weakness into strength is determined by both the objective situation and one’s subjective capability.

The *third question*: another fundamental question. Given a united front against imperialism, the monopolies and fascism, one in which the broadest possible popular unity has been achieved, and including the working class first and foremost, how can the working class become the hegemon while at the same time preventing the disintegration of the front? This question reflects the view that a united front and hegemony are mutually exclusive. This too is very wrong. Firstly, it must be said that hegemony is not something that emerges because we want it. Even if one were to assume that we do not want hegemony, the problem would remain.

Let us see what Lenin said in this respect:

“Our Party, like any other political party, is striving after political domination *for itself*. Our aim is the dictatorship of the revolutionary proletariat.”
(Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.25, p.310)

Suppose the working class says it does not want hegemony? In its place another will come to the head. Then one must ask, how can hegemony be made compatible with the front? No political unity is devoid of hegemony. Hegemony and the notion of a united front or unity do not contradict one another. On the contrary, for the working class to be strong, strong enough to lead the forces which can become its allies, is the principal condition for the success of a united front. Without a force that can truly secure its hegemony, there can be no lasting front or unity. A united front may be set up and social development may be such that the working class party also joins it. However, as long as it is unable to turn its weakness into strength, the front will not be of much use.

2.4. The concrete situation among the revolutionary forces of Turkey: The United Resistance Front against Fascism (URFAF)

Before speaking of the concrete situation in regard to the front-unity of the revolutionary forces of Turkey, it is necessary to touch upon one point. Looking at the revolutionary movement in Turkey, we do not see any organisation which has established its hegemony in the class struggle. One may perhaps speak of three or four alternative centres of hegemony. There are various reasons for and various consequences of the fact that, since the 1960's, there has been no genuine hegemon in the revolutionary movement on the *political level*. Let us consider this fact only in so far as it played a role in aggravating the disunity and fragmentation of the revolutionary movement.

Apart from the game of "cooperation" which the NDD (National Democratic Revolution) people played once or twice with the junta members during the 1960's, and apart from the fruitless to-ing and fro-ing of the "officials" of TİP-TSİP-TKP (Workers' Party of Turkey, Socialist Workers' Party of Turkey, Communist Party of Turkey — trans.) in recent years, for the first time in Turkey a serious attempt to create a united front has emerged recently. On the initiative of *Dev-Yol* (Revolutionary Path) and the PKK (Kurdish Workers' Party) the United Resistance Front against Fascism (URFAF) has been founded.

In last year's (anniversary — trans.) speech I had said that:

"... we refuse to consider unity of action, to unite with organisations and cadres (whether they retain or relinquish their names) long since bankrupt, for whom it could only be in the nature of a blood transfusion. Today the *most dangerous* demagogues for the revolutionary movement are those fast-talking '*unity peddlars*' who are aiming at anything but genuine unity. Without pushing these peddlars and upstarts aside with the back of its hand, the working class movement cannot advance beyond its present situation." (R. Yürükoğlu, *The Struggle for the Future*, p.30)

After having carefully examined the behaviour Dev-Yol and PKK in particular and satisfied itself that none of the attitudes described above was present, our responsible bodies resolved unanimously to join the URFAF. Although there are many points in the front programme on which we differ, we did not make them points of "controversy". What is necessary today is the creation of a serious centre of attraction against the junta; we believe that wrong views will be cleared up in time as the united movement develops further. In England there are five people who think that our attitude towards the other revolutionary forces is not "friendly"(!) enough and that we attribute no importance to the question of the united front; however, these

were the same five people who opposed our joining a front in France in which both Dev-Yol and PKK were represented, particularly the latter. Aside from these five, the decision had the full support of all the party organisations. Today we are working actively within the URFAF and fulfilling the tasks which fall to us.

The URFAF is today taking its first steps, it is not yet standing firmly on its feet. And it is only natural that there should be a number of difficulties hampering its development.

For one, the process by which the leading cadres of the forces participating in the front get to know and understand each other has only just begun. There are objective reasons for this, for example, large distances, etc. Such factors have had a delaying effect on the development of mutual confidence.

Another difficulty is the difference of attitude displayed towards the front as such and towards the other front members by the various regional branches of the front member organisations, differences which have not as yet been eradicated.

Thirdly, there are still attitudes which confuse the idea of hegemony with that of imposition. These attitudes surfaced among front members, and particularly among those whose representative strength is small, in the form of "statements" and "announcements" which confuse the front with their own party programmes.

Such problems do exist. But to some extent they are unavoidable. Our past does not include such experiences. Still, the success of the URFAF should not be underestimated. It has already accomplished important tasks. It has become an important centre of attraction.

The most important task facing the member organisations of the front today is to persuade organisations still outside the front and which have a certain representative force, to join the united front. We too, just as other organisations, must perform the task before us in this respect. First and foremost, we must exert efforts to secure the participation of such organisations as TKSP (Socialist Party of Turkish Kurdistan), Kurtuluş (Liberation) and Partizan (Partisan).

I would like to end this section by answering the question as to what our attitude to the URFAF has been and what it will be in the future.

The moment the decision to join the URFAF was taken, the following directive of the Bureau of the TKP Coordinating Committee was sent out to all party organisations: we are to work harmoniously, abstain from sharp and dominating attitudes, from opportunist behaviour under the name of "hegemony", and not pursue short-term gains. We will inspire trust in the friends with whom we have engaged in common struggle. We are a movement that stands by its word, a serious movement which favours unity. (This is very important, it is sometimes difficult to get three people in the revolutionary movement of Turkey to sit down together); we are absolutely a uniting movement. We are a movement with which it is easy to get along. In ideological matters, however, we are always difficult to get along with.

This has been our attitude to the URFAF from the very beginning and this it will remain.

In its present state and with the *steps it will take*, the URFAF has a good chance of success. Whether this possibility becomes fact depends on itself. Naturally, much water has yet to flow under the bridges before there is any genuine victory.

III. Party life

3.1. Our organisations

I will touch only very briefly on the developments of the year that has passed since the last 10th September meeting. In regard to our organisations in Turkey, I will give only limited information taking into account the circumstances there, and I am certain that this will meet with your understanding. There are, however, some things which I am able to state with absolute *certainty*.

Apart from one region where we have had some difficulties in establishing relations, there is constant organisational contact with all the regions. District committees are operational in all regions. And all are carrying out good work. The phenomenon of abandoning politics or the party is weak enough so as not to disturb the structure of our organisations in Turkey. *İşçinin Sesi (The Worker's Voice)* is still today the only revolutionary organ being distributed regularly and widely inside Turkey.

As for our organisations in Europe, our movement there has had very important successes this year. The most encouraging development has been that in Germany. Germany has started to become a *bridgehead* in the true sense. The organisation there is developing into one which in respect to all *criteria* is developing into the kind of organisation we are used to. The next Summer Campaign will most likely prove that by next year, Germany will

take over the actual leadership of our movement in Europe. We shall all do whatever we can in order for it to do so. It is rapidly developing in regard to its discipline, self-sacrifice, level of consciousness and political ability. That almost 40% of this year's Summer Campaign total was contributed by our organisations in Germany is a practical indication of this development.

The organisation in France has made lively progress in its organisational life on the initiative of our worker comrades; it is a development that is being watched with close interest by the Bureau (of the Coordinating Committee — trans.) and is moving towards lasting results.

Our organisation in Austria is a firm communist kernel, rapidly spreading its influence in the area. Together we shall soon see encouraging developments there.

In the past year new party organisations were formed in Norway, Sweden and various parts of Germany. Already today, our comrades in Norway stand out with their systematic work.

Despite having had to face a whole variety of pressures and attacks, our organisation in England has completed the year in a manner befitting its past. With professionalism and persistence, it continues to bear a great weight on its shoulders.

If we look at the whole, our party organisations in Europe have completed this year more mature, more firmly embracing their party and having *grown* in size. Our membership has increased even during this reactionary period.

All those who have left their party, be it in Europe or in Turkey, for one excuse or another, all of them, have been either students or intellectuals, and I mean absolutely *all*. This has been a welcome development both in the sense that it rid the party of shaky elements, and that it increased the weight of the workers in the composition of the party's membership. The workers are the guarantors and the true owners of both the revolution and the party.

3.2. The Party must embrace the masses; the Soviet experience

We are living through a difficult period. Despite this, and with the help of various factors, our membership has increased, we have grown. Actually, the process by which the masses come to adopt the views of the party is a line full of zig-zags. It is really determined by the particular period which is being experienced. Under favourable conditions and unless they make serious mistakes, movements grow rapidly. Under unfavourable conditions and no matter how faultless they may be, organisations inevitably shrink. During the past two years we have been an exception to the rule. Perhaps this will continue to be so in the coming year, the year after, and always the fact that a very significant part of our working class is living and struggling beyond the reach of the conditions of fascism has played an important role in this. However, when we look at the world, we see that exceptions do not invalidate the rule and that the development of a thousand and one political movements really depends on the general political conditions prevailing in the country. If your actions are suited to the conditions you will shrink less in the period of contraction; if your actions are suited to the conditions, you will grow even more during the period of expansion.

Secondly (I am saying this in order that we may correctly assess what we must expect of ourselves), a party that never makes concessions from its militant ideology, never lowers its standards of party membership, will always be smaller than reformist and opportunist parties, up until the point when it at last reaches out for the revolution. We see that in some particular instances, we are bigger than many an opportunist movement. But that is nothing. A movement that defends a truly militant ideology and does not aim to be big for the sake of bigness, will expand suddenly and embrace millions when the country moves towards revolution. If a movement can hold out until that moment arrives, if it does not abandon its stubbornly held ideology, its organisational and political positions, it will have

proven that it measures up to the tasks it has assumed, and will fulfil them. If, however, it fails the test of the years up until that moment, then history will in any case pass its own judgement, deeming that organisation unworthy of leading the world's most advanced class.

This is our situation at the present, and we, just as all the other revolutionary movements, are living through a difficult period. Our aim is to say what is right and to build on all sides smoothly functioning organisational mechanisms. We are well aware of the fact that a party's ability to embrace the masses is not a matter of 1000 people yesterday 2000 now, and then on a given date coming to power. Rather, this is a development full of leaps, one which really depends on the prevailing conditions. We also know that a sound mechanism, a sound organisation, if it defends the correct ideas is able to take advantage of opportunities, and apply its politics correctly, will, when the situation changes, very quickly come to embrace millions, while its small underground cells will each become genuine popular platforms. This part happens only at the very end; actually it is not all that difficult. Lenin, too, said the same. The really difficult part is to be a cadre that can take the boat up to that point. Lenin once said:

"In the spring of 1905 our Party was a league of underground circles; in the autumn it became the party of the *millions* of the proletariat." (V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol.15, p.154, Moscow 1917)

This is what we are trying to say.

Now let us look at the Soviet experience. Until the 1905 revolution, the Bolsheviks' influence in the workers' movement was limited, it was a small party that consisted largely of underground reading groups and was being organised from the top downwards.

The revolutionary upsurge of 1905 brought about changes in the party structure and its organisational work. Lenin worked out these changes in his article "The reorganisation of the

party". Some of these changes were: taking advantage of all legal opportunities, forming legal and semi-legal structures, building a network of auxiliary organisations but preserving the secrecy of the party's illegal mechanism, taking a great number of new members, and *wherever possible, forming leading party organs by means of election.*

In the light of these proposals, the party changed its form of work. *For the first time, democratic centralism (but still not completely) began to be applied in the party as a whole.*

The party grew during the process of revolution with the participation of the most advanced workers. Towards the end of 1905, the St. Petersburg organisation had nearly 3000 members, the Moscow organisation 2500, the Ivanova-Vosnesensk organisation nearly 900, the Baku and Harkof organisations 1000 each.

After the defeat of 1905, *trade union membership, which had been approximately 245,000 in 1907, dropped to 13,000 by the end of 1909.*

Following the defeat of the revolution and the victory of counter-revolution, the mass struggle subsided and the working class movement began to retreat. The number of strikes fell drastically. While in 1907 the number of workers on strike had been approximately 740,000, this number had fallen to 46,500 by 1910. Similarly, the previously sharp struggles in the rural areas came to an end. Time was needed to overcome the exhaustion which had accumulated through the years.

The government of the Black Hundreds directed its fiercest attack against the Bolshevik Party. Mass arrests started, some Central Committee members were imprisoned. The workers' press was silenced. It was only in 1909 that *Social-Democrat*, the party central organ, was able to resume publication. Not even a single local party committee escaped without losses from police repression. During those years, the St. Petersburg Committee was arrested more than 10 times. Many prominent party leaders found themselves either in prison or in exile. *Petty-bourgeois intellectuals rapidly deserted the party.* There was a significant decrease in membership: the St. Petersburg organisation, which

had had 8000 members in 1907, was left with only 3000 in 1908; membership dropped from 1070 to 250 in Yekaterinburg, from 2000 to 600 in Ivanova-Voznesensk. Contact among the party organisations weakened.

In the summer of 1910, strikes were organised in Moscow. These strikes gave a new impetus to the movement and towards the end of the year important political demonstrations took place in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities. This development continued also during 1911.

At the Sixth All-Russia Conference which met in Prague from 5-17th January 1912, delegates representing 21 party organisations participated.

300,000 workers participated in the protest strikes of 1912, 400,000 in the May Day strikes. Lenin compared the strike movement which exploded in 1912 to that of 1905 in regard to its great size.

The favourable conditions that were developing also rapidly affected the Bolshevik Party in a positive way. *Pravda* became a newspaper greatly respected among the workers. It was flooded with letters from all parts of Russia. While *Pravda's* circulation rose to 40,000, *Luch*, the paper of the liquidationists, sold only 16,000 copies. 80% of all groups making donations to the workers press, were sending donations to *Pravda*. In 1914, *Pravda* had subscribers in 924 residential centres.

The workers movement continued to swell.

Despite heavy police repression, there was a great increase in the number of strikes. While in 1914, about 70 strikes were organised involving 35,000 workers, in 1915, about 1000 strikes, involving 500,000 workers took place. And in 1916, there were 1,500 strikes involving 1 million workers.

The Seventh All-Russia Conference where Lenin read out his *April Theses*, was held in Petrograd from 24-29th April 1917. 151 delegates from 78 party organisations representing 80,000 party members participated in the conference. Still, under Russian conditions, these cannot be considered great numbers.

The Sixth Congress of the RSDLP was convened under semi-illegal conditions in Petrograd from 26 July-3 August 1917.

The membership of some Bolshevik organisations
during the 1905 Revolution and in the following years:

	1905*	1907	1908**
St. Petersburg	2500	8000	3000
Ivanova-Voznesensk	900	2000	600
Baku and Harkov	1000	—	—
Yekaterinburg	—	1070	250

* towards the end of 1905, that is under conditions when it started to grow rapidly

** 1908 — by now the reactionary period has staled

In the *three months* that had passed since the April Conference, the party had grown to *three times its previous size*. At the April Conference, 78 party organisations representing 80,000 members had participated. At the Sixth Congress, 162 party organisations representing 240,000 members participated. The Third City Conference which was convened in Petrograd during the same period represented 50,000 members. The Moscow organisation had, 70,000 members.

Everywhere, workers security units were being set up with great speed. In October, they embraced 200,000 advanced workers ready to lay down their lives for the revolution and capable of pulling the labouring masses behind them.

At the First All-Russia Congress of Soviets which took place at the beginning of the revolutionary tide, on 3 June 1917, only 105 of the 1000 congress delegates had been Bolsheviks. The vast majority of delegates consisted of SR's and Mensheviks.

On the evening of 25th October, the Second Congress of Soviets was opened. It represented 400 Soviets throughout the country. Out of the 650 delegates, about 400 were Bolsheviks. Most of the remaining delegates were from the left-wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. The right wing SR's and Mensheviks, who until then had been dominant in the Soviets, constituted a small group of only 70-80 people.

**The balance of organisational forces
at the 5th Congress of the RSDLP**

(30th April — 19th May 1907)

Bolsheviks	46,000
Mensheviks	38,000
Bundists	25,000
Polish Social-Democrats.....	25,000
Let. Social Democrats	13,000
TOTAL	147,000

**Membership of the Bolsheviks during the months
preceding the 1917 October Revolution**

April 1917 Conference: 78 organisations representing 80,000 members
July-August 6th Congress: 162 organisations representing 240,000 members

The following shows the increase in the number of those who supported the Bolsheviks:

March 1917 (as Tsarism was being overthrown) 1 million.

June 1917 (after the armed demonstrations) 5 million.

November 1917 (elections to the Constituent Assembly) 9 million.

January 1918 (3rd Congress of Soviets) 13 million. (Albert R. Williams, *Through the Russian Revolution*, Progress Publishers, Moscow.)

The Bolsheviks' experience shows very well that the party's development will follow a leap-frog course depending on both the prevailing conditions and on the ability to act in accordance with those conditions. These in turn are connected with a necessity which Lenin emphasised many times. During difficult periods — and these are either periods of a forward thrust or periods of retreat — the only vehicle that can take the party forward is discipline and centralism.

3.3. Discipline and democratic-centralism

What is that iron discipline which the Bolsheviks continually spoke of, how was that centralism achieved, how was it developed, what does it mean? In order to answer these, I would like to read two quotations from Lenin:

“Victory over capitalism calls for proper relations between the leading (Communist) party, the revolutionary class (proletariat) and the masses, i.e., the entire body of the toilers and the exploited. Only the Communist Party, if it is really the vanguard of the revolutionary class, if it really comprises all the finest representatives of that class, if it consists of fully conscious and staunch Communists who have been educated and steeled by the experience of a persistent revolutionary struggle, and if it has succeeded in linking itself inseparably with the whole life of its class and, through it, with the whole mass of the exploited, and in completely *winning the confidence of this class and this mass* — only such a party is capable of leading the proletariat in a final, most ruthless and decisive struggle against all the forces of capitalism. On the other hand, it is only under the leadership of such a party that the proletariat is capable of displaying the full might of its revolutionary onslaught, and of overcoming the inevitable apathy and occasional resistance of that small minority, the labour aristocracy, who have been corrupted by capitalism, the old trade union and co-operative leaders, etc. — only then will it be capable of displaying its full might, which, because of the very economic structure of capitalist society, is infinitely greater than its proportion of the population.” (Lenin, “Theses on the Fundamental Tasks of the Comintern”, *Collected Works*, vol.31, pp.187-188) (Our emphasis)

Let us first establish this as an absolute principle, an absolute rule, and then let us read the second quotation. During difficult periods, reactionary periods or periods of attack, *absolute centralism and iron discipline* are the necessary conditions for victory. The petty-bourgeois will not like this statement, discipline is what he fears most. And just because this is the case, this principle is a vital one. In difficult periods it is anathema to petty-bourgeois sentiments and ideas.

Now let us read the second quotation:

"I repeat: the experience of the victorious dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia has clearly shown even to those who are incapable of thinking or have had no occasion to give thought to the matter that absolute centralism and rigorous discipline of the proletariat are an essential condition of victory over the bourgeoisie.

"This is often dwelt on. However, not nearly enough thought is given to what it means, and under what conditions it is possible. Would it not be better if the salutations addressed to the Soviets and the Bolsheviks were *more frequently* accompanied by a *profound analysis* of the reasons *why* the Bolsheviks have been able to build up the discipline needed by the revolutionary proletariat?

"As a current of political thought and as a political party, Bolshevism has existed since 1903. Only the history of Bolshevism during the *entire* period of its existence can satisfactorily explain why it has been able to build up and maintain, under most difficult conditions, the iron discipline needed for the victory of the proletariat.

"The first questions to arise are: how is the discipline of the proletariat's revolutionary party maintained? How is it tested? How is it reinforced? First, by the class-consciousness of the proletarian vanguard and by its devotion to the revolution, by its

tenacity, self-sacrifice and heroism. Second, by its ability to link up, maintain the closest contact, and — if you wish — merge, in certain measure, with the broadest masses of the working people — primarily with the proletariat, *but also with the non-proletarian masses of working people*. Third, by the correctness of the political leadership exercised by this vanguard, by the correctness of its political strategy and tactics, provided the broad masses have seen, *from their own experience*, that they are correct. Without these conditions, discipline in a revolutionary party really capable of being the party of the advanced class, whose mission it is to overthrow the bourgeoisie and transform the whole of society, cannot be achieved. Without these conditions, all attempts to establish discipline inevitably fall flat and end up in phrasemongering and clowning. On the other hand, these conditions cannot emerge at once. They are created only by prolonged effort and hard-won experience. Their creation is facilitated by a correct revolutionary theory, which, in its turn, is not a dogma, but assumes final shape only in close connection with the practical activity of a truly mass and truly revolutionary movement.

“The fact that, in 1917-20, Bolshevism was able, under unprecedentedly difficult conditions, to build up and successfully maintain the strictest centralisation and iron discipline was due simply to a number of historical peculiarities of Russia.

“On the other hand, Bolshevism arose in 1903 on a very firm foundation of Marxist theory. The correctness of this revolutionary theory, and of it alone, has been proved, not only by world experience throughout the nineteenth century, but especially by the experience of the seekings and vacillations, the errors and disappointments of revolutionary thought in Russia. For about half a century — approximately

from the forties to the nineties of the last century — progressive thought in Russia, oppressed by a most brutal and reactionary tsarism, sought eagerly for a correct revolutionary theory, and followed with the utmost diligence and thoroughness each and every 'last word' in this sphere in Europe and America. Russia achieved Marxism — the only correct revolutionary theory — through the *agony* she experienced in the course of half a century of unparalleled torment and sacrifice, of unparalleled revolutionary heroism, incredible energy, devoted searching, study, practical trial, disappointment, verification, and comparison with European experience. Thanks to the political emigration caused by tsarism, revolutionary Russia, in the second half of the nineteenth century, acquired a wealth of international links and excellent information on the forms and theories of the world revolutionary movement, such as no other country possessed.

"On the other hand, Bolshevism, which had arisen on this granite foundation of theory, went through fifteen years of practical history (1903-17) unequalled anywhere in the world in its wealth of experience. During those fifteen years, no other country knew anything even approximating to that revolutionary experience, that rapid and varied succession of different forms of the movement — legal and illegal, peaceful and stormy, underground and open, local circles and mass movements, and parliamentary and terrorist forms. In no other country has there been concentrated, in so brief a period, such a wealth of forms, shades, and methods of struggle of *all* classes of modern society, a struggle which, owing to the backwardness of the country and the severity of the tsarist yoke, matured with exceptional rapidity, and assimilated most eagerly and successfully the appropriate 'last word' of

American and European political experience.” (Lenin, “Left-wing Communism — An Infantile Disorder”, *Collected Works*, vol.31, pp.24-26)

There can be no better explanation as to how Bolshevik discipline and centralism was achieved, how it was protected and how it was developed further. Briefly summarising the conclusions to be drawn from the two quotations:

1. Absolute centralism and iron discipline are necessary conditions for victory.

2. The Bolsheviks achieved and strengthened this discipline

a) by the class-consciousness of the vanguard, its devotion to the revolution, self-sacrifice and heroism,

b) their ability to merge with the masses,

c) the correctness of their political strategy and tactics and the recognition of this correctness by the masses through their *own experience*.

3. These conditions do not emerge all at once. They are brought about only after long years of effort and gaining experience. A correct revolutionary theory is also of assistance.

4. How did the Bolsheviks succeed in achieving this discipline?

a) The Bolshevik Party rested on the firm foundation of Marxism. The rich experience of Russia played a great role. European exile brought back new currents of thought, new developments.

b) Cadres matured in the fifteen year long struggle.

This is how Bolshevism emerged with a discipline that has become legendary throughout the world.

What, then, is democratic centralism and discipline in our Party like?

3.4. Democratic centralism and discipline in the TKP—*Işçinin Sesi*

The communist party is a monolithic organisation bound to one

discipline. This is also the primary understanding on which our rules are based. But it is not something which we will be able to establish easily. This is determined by the lack of sufficient knowledge and experience and by the particularities of the concrete development which we are experiencing.

We emerged in a struggle against the mensheviks. It was only natural that, within the logic of this struggle, emphasis should have been put on the aspect of discussion. We are not people writing letters to history. On the condition of not defending wrong views, it was necessary to talk about whatever were the questions at the time. This situation had the inevitable consequence that the other aspect of the party mechanism, centralism and discipline, somewhat slipped into second place in the consciousness of members.

Further, we did not enter this struggle having previously worked many years as a clique inside the TKP, nor having placed our comrades, who had matured through years of the class training of *İşçinin Sesi*, in various regions of Turkey. We did not start with the aim of forming a separate party. Having recourse to our rights as provided in the rules, we voiced our ideological-political views. As a result of this, we were suddenly faced with expulsions carried out in violation of the rules, with the obligation of defending the party in both words and actions. A struggle cannot be waged without organisation, there can be no communist without organisation. It was necessary to wage an organised struggle against opportunism in the party. However, there were not enough people who had adopted the views of *İşçinin Sesi* to set up an organisation. On the other hand, there was a revolutionary situation in the country. Consequently, rapid organisation was necessitated by both the inner party situation as well as conditions within the country itself.

In the meantime, the Leninist views defended by *İşçinin Sesi* began to be echoed throughout the entire revolutionary movement. Revolutionaries defending *İşçinin Sesi* started to emerge everywhere. Among them were also some who criticised *İşçinin Sesi* from the top of a café table one day, only to join it the next. This meant that, if we were to organise, it would have to be

with that section which had only newly begun to defend *İşçinin Sesi*. As Leninism has taught us, the revolutionary situation requires that doors be opened more widely than under normal circumstances. However, our situation was also different from normal party organisation. In the normal model, there will be a firm kernel of cadres who have tested one another thoroughly during long years of struggle, while the doors will be opened up wide for rank-and-file membership. We had no such kernel of any meaningful proportions either. Leading positions were filled on the basis of a very cautious selection, but this also included some who had only recently joined us. That is, the basic criterion of that selection was provided by what was available at the time.

The party leadership was fully aware of the dangers involved in organising the party in accordance with such a particular course of development, of the possibilities, of what was intended and what was necessary. Conditions within both the country and the party advised us to adopt an approach of Lenin: As one of our comrades said at the First Conference, if you want to form an army of 6000 people, you will take on 12,000; 6000 you will drop along the way and form the army with the remainder. It was clear that, with the onset of the reactionary period, there would be drop-outs among some comrades who had not passed sufficient tests and even among some who had entered the leadership. However, we were far more fortunate than in Lenin's example. Under those conditions we did not lose half of our party comrades but only 1/25. The rest are continuing in their path, continuing in the process of becoming bolsheviks.

In the light of what I have said here, you might be helped in reaching positive conclusions if you re-read pages 62-63, 79-80, 86 and 195-222 of the *Minutes of the First Conference* (in Turkish-trans.)

Today, the situation in Turkey makes it necessary, and the *general* level of maturity of our party organisations makes it possible, for us to up take up the question of discipline and centralism.

Is there any place for various wings in a communist party? A wing represents not only a difference of views, but the

organisation of such views according to their own discipline. Is there room for factions, cliques and groups that have their own internal discipline alongside the party's uniform and indivisible discipline? Noone is likely to say that there is. However, there are some questions which have arisen from our experiences.

There must certainly be a structure which allows for different views and ideas, which accords the opportunity for different views. It is one thing to provide a structure which allows different views to emerge, and another thing for different views to organise themselves in the form of factions, cliques and groups. It is one thing to create a structure which allows the emergence of different views and another to accept that groups which hold different views should band together. If there are different views they will be expressed and discussed. Whichever view becomes the dominant view, that one will be followed. The criterion here is that the minority submits to the majority. There can be no other criterion.

We said the same during our struggle against the mensheviks: "You must convene a congress. Until such time, we have the right to defend our views *within the framework of the party rules*, and at the congress. If the majority at the congress takes up a position against these views, then we will sit down and think again." Anything else is anarchism, something resembling the fear of the petty-bourgeoisie who is as scared of discipline as of a madman's straightjacket. It is one thing for a structure to allow for the expression of differences of opinion, another to allow petty lords and chiefs to exist within the party.

I realise that there are difficulties here. We are the people of an underdeveloped country, we live among great difficulties, there is a lack of tolerance. Even those who believe themselves to be the most tolerant persons are so only because their roles are different. Let him exchange this role for another, let him take responsibility for these tasks, perhaps then he will find himself to be much less tolerant. In general, we have little tolerance and our youth serves to aggravate this.

Life advances through the resolution of contradictions. It would be preferable if contradictions could be solved through

comradely debate. One view may emerge and then another, they will be discussed in the relevant party organs and, if need be, an inner-party debate may be called in accordance with Article 15 of the party rules (and this may be carried out in different ways: the issue under discussion could be made an obligatory matter on the agenda of all party cells, circulars of the inner-party debate could be published, or the debate could be published in the central organ); the majority opinion will become dominant and the troupe will march on. If there are *still* some who oppose the troupe's way, they will have to go in another direction.

Are we against all kinds of faction? One has to be very careful here. Sometimes there are circumstances where the possibility of defending different views is not permitted. If such a possibility is not granted, people will form their own discipline, that is, they form a faction. Because they have not been granted a platform, they can claim that their behaviour is justified up to that point. But if that is done in the defence of wrong views, they will again be doomed. It is another matter when someone defends the correct views against wrong, and if they are forced to form a faction because they have not been granted the possibility of (properly) expressing these views.

When we say that we are against all factions, let us not stumble into demagoguery. We are not against factions that defend correct views, we are against factions that defend wrong views. There is a very sharp and thin line between the two. Everyone is free to consider it as he likes. No one will form a faction saying that they are defending wrong views. Everyone is free to do as he pleases. And the common will of the party is free to decide as it pleases.

Our circumstances have been unlike either case. We did not start as a faction. Everyone knows very well how we behaved when *İşçinin Sesi* appeared for the first time and when it appeared for the second time. We did not enter into contact with any comrades in Turkey. At no point did we violate general party discipline. We made use of our rights within the framework of party discipline. That is something else. Because we were given no other alternative, and only at the very end, did we engage in a

factional struggle.

If you are really denied the possibility of defending your views, if the party rules are brought to bear when you defend your views in your organ, only then will the possibilities have been curtailed. But, besides the organs, there are also the crowded meetings which we are able to organise under conditions provided in Europe. If a difference of opinion voiced at such meetings is termed a violation of discipline, if a platform is not granted (this only applies when a platform for the expression of differing views is refused organisationally, if it is a truly structural prohibition, not when those who say that there is no platform are simply lacking in civil courage), only then, and again on the condition of defending correct ideas, does it become morally and practically legitimate to violate party discipline.

Ideological debate, replying to incorrect views, theoretically demolishing them, are not included in the concept of "prohibiting free speech". Those who have reached the level of consciousness involved in party membership will certainly engage in struggle against every manner of wrong view. The tone of the struggle will tend to rise or fall according to the seriousness of the mistake and depending on the attitude of those who defend it.

Of course, there will be a lively debate. Of course, party members will move to achieve unity. That is something else.

Comrades who are working to fulfil their daily tasks may disagree on this or that subject which does not directly concern their daily work. It is of no significance: They still work together. But, whenever moves are made, *outside the party rules*, against the party rules and programme or against the current political line as drawn up by the CC, the whole organisation will oppose it as one. In any case, this is what we are discussing; no-one is looking for an identical twin-brother. It is a question of deciding under what conditions there are to be differences, under what conditions there is to be a split, and under what conditions there is to be unity.

There is no place for factions in the communist party. The party is a monolithic party. This is implied in being communist.

The opposite would be contrary to the very nature of the party. And it is one of the points which separate communists from social-democrats, Trotskyists and student revolutionaries. However, the real problem lies not here, but with what follows.

If there is no criterion everyone will pull things in the direction that suits him. Due to the very nature of the structure, the leadership will tend to be restrictive, the rank-and-file intellectuals to favour expansion. The rank-and-file worker members will not pull in the latter direction either. This is why there is need for a sound criterion.

This sound criterion is the *party rules*. The question of whether or not the party rules are being applied both to the letter and the spirit is a very sound criterion indeed.

Let us all repeat here once again something we said last year: "The failure of any person or organisation to adhere to the rules (statutes) he or it has drawn up himself is the greatest political immorality. Moreover, any organisation which does not object to this can be nothing else than a collection of precisely the sick minds we mentioned above". (*The Struggle for the Future*, p.22)

Our party rules do provide the possibility for the emergence of different views. And do so even under the present conditions when centralism is *definitely* the dominant aspect. In many of its aspects, these party rules are more democratic than those of the Euro-communist parties which insist that they are the most democratic of all. Our party rules of tomorrow, when conditions have changed, will be very different. But the rights provided by party rules drawn up for a period when the operation of inner-party democracy will be extremely limited, are there for everyone to see.

Well then, do these party rules only exist on paper? Is it the case that they only exist on paper and that differences of opinion are being penalised?

What is the criterion of allowing a platform for the expression of different views? Are we allowed to express our views in our own organs? May we appeal to a higher organ, if in our opinion correct views do not develop in our own organs? Are party rules invoked against us during this process? Is the matter

taken up and discussed at more general meetings, depending on the (legal or semi-legal) conditions under which the party is working? Are different views granted the possibility of expression? If none of these are the case, then one may indeed say that possibilities are not granted.

It is not right to hide a difference of opinion only because it will be a minority opinion in the meeting, cell or group in question. It may or may not remain in the minority. No one is talking about the right for different views to automatically become the majority view. Any comrade who holds a different view must bring it forward. Among them there may be some correct views which fall by the wayside and there may be some which are taken up and applied. Such is the life of any organisation. But you must express your views. If someone both hides his views and then stands up to say that moral pressure is being applied, he will only have engaged in the petty games of the petty bourgeoisie.

Today, discipline and centralism in the party must be strengthened, this is demanded by both the party rules, and by any consideration of the conditions under which they operate, by the very fact that we are a communist party. Discipline and centralism are matters which a reactionary period places at the very top of the agenda, from the point of view of both the organisation and the cadres.

The TKP is an illegal party. In comparison with a legal party, discipline will *always* be stricter in an illegal party. For the life of an illegal party is similar to a continuous military situation.

Apart from this, there are also periods which demand that the discipline of an illegal party be emphasised still further. These are extraordinary periods such as a revolutionary situation or a reactionary period.

Extraordinary periods differ from relatively peaceful periods. In such periods the party will come under heavy fire and tackle great problems. Discipline and centralism are the keypoints in coming through such periods successfully, and liberalism the main enemy.

On the other hand, there is an *objective drive* towards the loosening of discipline during extraordinary periods. In difficult periods discipline weakens. All the liberal illnesses become aggravated. Crimson-red turnips display their true whiteness. This is an objective development, a social phenomenon. Only consciousness and belief help to overcome it.

During extraordinary periods, the *criterion of being communist* lies in applying the party's organisational and tactical decisions to the letter.

Up to this point, there is no problem. Those who do and those who do not submit to party discipline will be separated out.

The aspect of this period which we must really fear and against which we must be consciously vigilant, is the tendency, when applying the party's tactical and political line, its organisational decisions, to modify them in a manner that suits oneself. To apply them but to modify them in the process. It is even worse in day-to-day work to modify the party's tactics and politics while supposedly applying them. Ridding the party of those who break party discipline cleanses the party, and has a positive effect on organisational life in general. But the modification of party decisions in the application means to *weaken our own structure*. This is the point where liberal trends insinuate themselves.

The minority submits to the majority, the lower organs submit to the higher organs. In this period even more so. Consciously, and voluntarily.

It will be of benefit to consider once again at this point an understanding taken up in our *party rules*:

"Our party is a party that works illegally. Under conditions of illegality, the democratic aspect recedes while the centralist aspect comes to the fore. Furthermore, during *critical periods*, centralism will be even more prominent in the functioning of the party. Moving towards the moment of revolution, the period immediately following the revolution, and the counter-revolutionary period are such critical

periods. With the 12th September fascist coup, our country entered such a period. The attempts of the political police to crush our party apparatus will become ever more ferocious. This attack is not only directed against the party rank-and-file in the form of arrests and murders, but also against the leadership cadres who secure the continuity of the movement, it is a conscious and more devious attempt.

“These conditions demand that the centralist aspect come to the fore. The possibilities of achieving genuinely democratic procedures such as convening congresses of party organisations at all levels, and of broad debates are limited. For this reason, the TKP Rules reserve truly democratic procedures for the General Congress, the Central Committee and its organs, limiting it in a graduated form for all lower organs. It revoked democratic procedures for all organisations beneath the provincial committee level for which it is obligatory to hold their congresses under all circumstances. This is the situation in our party today. All party members must pay much greater attention to uniformity in action and behaviour. Centralism is fundamental. This procedure operates on the basis of, and means that the lower organisations of members have delegated their various democratic rights to the Central Committee, the district and provincial committees, trusting completely in the moral authority of the party. This delegation of rights is *temporary, conscious and voluntary*. This is yet another difference that separates Leninists from opportunists who are anti-democratic under all conditions irrespective of whether the circumstances necessitate it or not; they are bureaucratic centralists and present this as democratic centralism. The Leninists are not afraid to say that this is a centralist procedure forced on us by circumstances, to say that it rests on the temporary

approval of the members.

“The Communist Party of Turkey which shall work in this manner in the present period, shall give the greatest importance to strengthening the party leadership’s authority and moral influence.” (*TKP Rules*, pp.19-20, in Turkish)

The section of the party rules which I have just read out is in complete accordance with the quotation I cited from Lenin. They are truly Leninist views. But are we equally successful in applying them? Not yet. Of course, we cannot. For, as I have quoted from Lenin, there must also be other conditions present for their successful application. An infra-structure must develop. Without it, we will not be able to establish that Bolshevik iron discipline even with the best of intentions. If that is the case, what meaning would our party rules have? They mean that *we must exert a concerted effort*, as Lenin phrased it, to establish a Bolshevik iron discipline. We are not saying that the conditions are not ripe, so we won’t try. We are making a concerted effort to bring about such conditions, a concerted and collective effort. In the meantime we are beset with many problems. But they are neither the first nor will they be the last. We will experience many more.

“We shall strengthen discipline in a joint effort. We shall not permit any wavering or any waverers to disrupt our organisation ideologically, politically or organisationally. Again Lenin’s views remind us that during difficult periods the party organisation is adjusted according to only one consideration: *to get rid of all wavering*. This applies to us as individual communists in respect to purging ourselves of all waverings, to the movement in respect to purging it of all unstable views and elements. Such is the aim of this period. This is what Leninism taught us.” (R. Yürükoğlu, *İşçinin Sesi*, No.200 “Dönemler ve Kadrolar”).

Lenin once said that politics is directed towards the state and concerns classes; when politics is directed towards personalities it will start to become ugly. We have seen much of "politics" that is directed towards personalities, that busies itself with personalities, uses them; and we have all worked together to resist such endeavours. We shall not allow it to distort our nature in the future. To busy oneself with personalities, to use them, is a chronic disease of the petty-bourgeoisie, one that will take it to its grave. We will not allow it to infect our organisation. On the level of individuals, all kinds of people join all kinds of organisations. I am not saying that with the recent departures our organisation has been completely cleansed. Some come and others go. It is like standing at a cross-roads. What I am saying is that, as an organisation and in terms of collective behaviour, we have so far resisted trends that concern themselves with personalities, and we will go on resisting them. "What does it matter what he says? He's nothing". People who talk like that are usually guilty of the most ugly activities themselves. Has anyone ever heard *Işçinin Sesi* bring forward criticism regarding personalities or character, or criticism related to anyone's private life? Politics is a good thing, it is sacred, but only when it is directed towards the state and classes. When it is directed towards personalities it becomes something base.

We have shortcomings and difficulties in regard to absolute centralism and iron discipline, which are necessary preconditions for victory in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, as we have in all aspects of party work. This, as I mentioned at the beginning, has been determined by our lack of sufficient knowledge and experience, as well as by the particularities of our concrete development. I have mentioned some of these shortcomings, but here some others might be added:

a) Although we are an organisation that has the most advanced revolutionary theory of the left of Turkey, the ideological level of the membership is still low. It has not reached the level that Lenin spoke of. Theoretical understanding has been less of an "understanding" and more of a ready-made mould.

b) What we inherited in terms of party understanding and party work has been meager. So much so that irregular unit meetings are not such a rare phenomenon. And the number of comrades who arrive late for meetings is also not very small. But these are not even the ABC of party training. Starting meetings on time, not arriving late for meetings, to perform all tasks in the best possible way. All these are not even the ABC of party discipline. But, as I said, our heritage has been meager. According to a communist understanding, his cell meeting must go on even if both his hands are bleeding. When cell meetings are not held regularly, there is nothing left of party life. There can be no party in which cell meetings are irregular, because the party functions through the medium of cells. And arriving late for meetings is a question of communist discipline. It is at the same time a question of communist ethics. In these respects, we still have a long way to go.

c) We do not have that generation in the 30-50 year-old range which is the most valuable cadre of a communist party. We did not inherit one. Actually, nobody did. Everyone is very young, everyone is very inexperienced. And as an inevitable side effect of great youth, everyone thinks that what he knows is absolutely right. This is the situation. However, a proper mixture of generations is much more important than we can imagine. There are many articles written by Lenin about this subject. How should the cells be set up? You should always put a quiet person next to an enthusiastic one, a mature person next to a young one. The saying goes: "if only the young ones knew and if only the old ones could". These two must be brought together. And that will only happen with time.

d) Our level of cohesion with the working class is low. This has been partially caused by the circumstances which are not favourable for work among the masses, but the shortcomings mentioned above have also had their share in it. Nonetheless, I am able to say that matters are improving. The fact that the level of participation in this year's Summer Campaign was three times that of the previous year, is a modest confirmation of this improvement.

e) (What was already said in last year's speech): *the shortage of highly developed cadres*. It is we who develop the organisation's theoretical views. It is we who publish, post and sell *Işçinin Sesi*. It is we who fold papers 24 hours a day, we who keep the accounts of the Summer Campaign, we who build roofs and repair windows. It is we who lead our organisations, we who participate in the choir and in folk-dancing. And, besides doing all this, work in factories to make a living. Enter a second job because of the Summer Campaign. Take a worker's child to the hospital, solve his dispute with the landlord, fulfil all the requests of our comrades in Turkey with superhuman effort. It is we who conduct education, we who give seminars, who learn and teach. We who both establish and enable the organisation to live.

The tasks that must be fulfilled go far beyond the limits of our division of labour and turn it upside down.

But look at our past. We have always been a movement that accomplishes one thing after another, a movement that works hard and makes others work hard, a movement in which "fiery" revolutionaries who try to get out of work really feel as if they are in Mamak prison. Sometimes someone appears who doesn't want to do very much but relying on one thing or another, perhaps on our friendship, wants to remain on the sidelines. We meet all kinds. But in the end our organisation slaps back. This organisation has no room for those who do not work. This is an organisation of people who work. This is a working organisation. It accomplishes one thing after other. This is an important characteristic of our organisation and one which is shared by all its members.

Of course, due to the contradiction mentioned above, some things do not progress as one wishes. They do not progress as quickly as we wish. But we know that they are also always *finished*. This organisation carries out whatever it has promised. Moreover, during this process, cadres develop everywhere, alleviating the organisation's burden. We must see all of this. In which direction are matters moving? In all matters, one must be able to discern those trends which determine the final outcome. This is also the case in regard to party life.

We do not succeed in completing all our tasks as quickly as we would wish, but let me say this with absolute certainty: speaking with comrades who have joined us recently, I can see the same commitment in them; whatever work it does, this movement does it in the best possible way. It may not be able to do everything, and it might be late in completing it, but what it does, it does in the best possible way. Some accuse us of being arrogant. Not at all. We have said that we will overthrow the bourgeoisie. And behind the bourgeoisie there stands imperialism. We say that we will overthrow them. Any movement which does not do its best, will achieve nothing. Whatever we do, we will do the best we can and if we don't, it will not be acceptable. All our comrades are developing with this consciousness. In every area. If they call this arrogance, let them. This is not arrogance. If you want to defeat the bourgeoisie you must do your best. This is the criterion we have set for ourselves.

f) We may not be able to completely solve the contradiction I mentioned above with the means at our disposal today, but there may be ways of easing it. And that is the leading cadres modernising their forms of leadership and work at every level. Here we again return to what we said last year: *amateurish, artisan working methods are widespread*. They still persist.

I will read you a quotation from Lenin. He wrote the following for comrades working in state (administration). It applies also to the party:

“Our communists still do not have a sufficient understanding of their real duties of administration: they should not strive to do ‘everything themselves’, running themselves down and failing to cope with everything, undertaking twenty jobs and finishing none. They should check up on the work of scores and hundreds of assistants, arrange to have their work checked up from below, i.e., by the real masses.” (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol.32, p.363)

This is the real problem. Comrades of the leadership on all

levels should not wear themselves out by trying to do everything themselves, trying to do twenty jobs and failing to cope with anything. Leadership is an art. It is not taught in any school; it must be learned in long years of difficult experience. It is very easy to be a "chief" who throws blind-folded people into the fire for the sake of aims and in the service of what only he knows. To be an organiser who cannot even organise (!) a brief destructive activity. This is not communist leadership. From this point of view as well, time may be working a little against us, but time is definitely on our side. We have set ourselves the right goals. We know very well what is necessary. We know where we want to go. And we have the determination to do so.

Leadership is truly an art. It is learned by doing it, from experience, by living through different situations, by maturing, but there is also a *scientific* aspect to it. Furthermore, this latter is an aspect which is continually expanding. A science of administration has been developed in regard to the forms and methods of administration. It emerged primarily to meet the needs of the large monopolies. Very interesting and very valuable research is being carried out. For example, a great deal of useless material has been written on the question "how to become a leader", but there are also many things which we would do well to learn. If you consider the monopolies: to carry out production they do need truly great leaders. It is not easy. It is even less easy for a small minority to dominate the world. And they do it. Very slowly the common characteristics of centuries of experience are brought together in the form of a science which emerges as the science of administration. We must learn from it as well. You will not be able to find a single piece of paper on the desk of the director of a monopoly. A huge desk standing there completely empty. Does this man not work at all? It is not that he does not work, there is a reason for this. He organises work. I know from my own experience that whenever papers pile up and files accumulate on my desk, I know that I am behind in my work. Whenever it is the case that whoever comes and whoever goes leaves something on my desk, this shows that the work has gotten on top of me. Whenever the papers and files on my desk

start to clear up, it means that I am on top of my work. This is obvious and it applies to everyone. Whenever a comrade arrives with thousands of papers so that when he enters, I first see the papers and only later recognise the man, I say to myself "this comrade is in a mess"

Further, there is another problem which has gained even greater significance in this period, namely the ability to *correctly place the relation between the general and the particular within the framework of party life* — something which, due to our lack of experience we are not able to do sufficiently.

We are experiencing a difficult and troubled period, one which spreads discouragement. We must not lose sight of the forest for the trees. We come across this very often, everyone of us will have come across it. Some shortcoming in a comrade, some fault in an organisation or even a few paragraphs or a few sentences in an article published in the paper, start to preoccupy the mind of some comrades. There you have a problem! If only we evaluated these things in the light of the general. What in general are the weaknesses and strengths of this comrade? That comrade is unable to perform well a particular aspect of some task, he prints a leaflet and prints it wrongly. All right, but what in general is the place that this organisation occupies, are its activities in general positive or are they negative? Or what does this article in the paper explain in general. Sometimes, even the manner of speech employed by some party leader becomes a problem. Should it? It should not. We should look at what he does. Some may speak coldly, some warmly, some may speak well, others poorly. But that is how things are. The relation between the general and the particular should be evaluated correctly and the particular should only be paid the attention it deserves in accordance with the place it occupies in the general. To do otherwise may only be preparing excuses for one's departure. There is a fault here, all right there is a fault. Yes, this is a shortcoming. Now what are we going to do? We will overcome it together. Or shall we go? Where will we go? It is an important problem in this period.

There are the difficulties we have mentioned. But we have

also great advantages. What are they? We have three mentioned by Lenin:

1. We have a cadre that has proved and is proving itself with its commitment to the revolution, its self-sacrifice and heroism. The time may come where all this may be written openly. Then everyone will see more clearly who showed what heroism.

2. With every unexpected turn taken by life, the correctness of our political tactics are verified. Where have we said something wrong? Which event has disproved what we have said? Or where, at which turning point, have the views of *Işçinin Sesi* not been verified?

3. Our movement rests on the firm foundation of Marxism. At the same time, for ten years we have been living through experiences in Turkey the like of which are being experienced by only a few countries in the world. Different periods come and go. The lessons each one of those periods leaves in consciousness are accumulating. And the past ten years have been confirmation for everyone that there is no other key than that of Marxism. Furthermore, there is a large section of workers from Turkey living in Europe. After the 12th September, many of our comrades emigrated to Europe. All of these, together with the new developments in the workers' movement in Europe, make us very fortunate; this is shown by the results we have achieved.

This means that all the preconditions Lenin deemed necessary for the development of iron discipline and absolute centralism are present in our movement, and these will multiply in time. But we know that this takes time. It is a matter of time, and of it being made proper use of. We too make proper use of the time we have and state exactly where we want to go. No matter what anyone says, we are heading in this direction. Time is on our side. We too will build what the Bolsheviks built

3.5. Two important tasks

Everything I have said up to this point shows that there are many tasks awaiting us. However, two of these tasks must be given

special emphasis.

3.5.1. Work among the masses

Despite the fact that this is an unfortunate period we must develop our ability to *merge with the masses*. We must consider a variety of different ways; if one approach doesn't work, try another, if that doesn't work, one must try yet another.

To the extent of our ability, our work among the masses is becoming more successful. And in general, we are progressing in this area as well. I would like to take up one point which is necessary today. As you know, today a great number of revolutionaries are leaving all the movements and organisations, either "criticising mistakes" or having "found the correct path". A large unorganised mass of revolutionaries has appeared. On the other hand, there is a dissatisfied section among the rank-and-file of nearly every organisation. When we talk about work among the masses, do not fix your eyes on these two groups. For one thing, they would not be in their present position if in general they were not ailing elements infected the most severely with the weaknesses of this period. Secondly, the kind of organisation we want cannot be built with elements that keep wandering from one place to another. Thirdly, to concentrate attention on these would cause us to forget the genuine masses.

Many examples of the above are to be found, particularly in Germany. Everyone is going to someone else's office to drink tea and to "try to win over their rank-and-file". For the members of our party, this attitude is strictly *forbidden*. Those who come to us because they believe our ideology, will come in any case. Like moths that circle around a light, these groups will in reality go wherever they see the strength of an organisation. We must look towards the factories, the work places, workers' homes, towards ordinary, healthy minded people. Our mass work is conducted in the factories, at the factory gates, at the change of shift. Draw up your lists, find the factories in your area, think about how to

approach them. Who has gone this week to visit which worker's home, who has got to know how many new workers? This is mass work.

The second path we must follow during this period is to deepen the theoretical understanding of our cadres.

3.5.2. The communist party and scientific theory

The communist party must be a party which develops and continually reproduces the most scientific theory.

In no other party or movement does ideological understanding determine the choice of cadres and leaders as much as it does in the Leninist wing of the TKP. However, there may still be a number of misunderstandings as to the relation between scientific theory and the CP. It will be useful to touch briefly upon some of them.

For example, this relation may be understood as follows: to form a "science council", a cadre of experts alongside the Central Committee. The cadre of experts is to determine in each matter what is scientifically necessary. And this is then supposed to mean that "our party is directed by science". This is a primitive understanding, pregnant with disasters. A privileged cadre of experts, isolated from the members and organs of the party, a party which applies their recipes. Such an elitist understanding is definitely out of the question.

Science in the party must be developed by continually taking from the different scientific fields. The party leadership must play a constant role in this. What is shown by science, must be passed down the line by the leadership in the form of a *general understanding*, of an *approach* towards problems, not in the form of various *items*. For science to be dominant within the party does not mean a group of experts and intellectuals presenting recipes. It means that the party, as a collective and with the leadership playing the main role, produces theory and spreads it to the rank-and-file as a form of *understanding*. The domination of science and ideological understanding in the party should be

understood as a search, as investigation, thought, and *understanding being passed down to the cadres.*

* * *

I would like to conclude my speech by addressing our comrades in prison. If you look at the facts, the assault has not let up. There is no end to those who are arrested, those who fall into their hands. But the places vacated are filled again. The party structural diagram has not been emptied. *No sacrifice is in vain.*

I can say with ease that our comrades are passing this test with flying colours. I am going to read you a letter by a comrade who has recently come out of prison:

“If they had wanted to, they could have immediately taken me into the army after I left prison, but they didn’t. After some time elapsed they again took me to the station. Having kept me there until morning they released me again. The day I spent at the station there were four political detainees there. With one of them I had the chance to exchange a few words. As far as I remember his name was... He said that he is from *Işçinin Sesi!*

“My family is continually pressurising me to do my military service. But I am always putting it off. I am actually not in favour of going. Suppose I go to the military. Apart from being subjected to repression, I would be absent for years. The appeal court will most probably confirm the sentence. This would mean that I would have to live separated from my party for fifty months. Anyone who has been separated from his party knows what this means.

“Still, the decision lies with my party.

“The prison: the morale of our comrades in prison is extremely high. As always, even under prison conditions and facing a fascist administration, our comrades continue in their Bolshevik attitudes. They are waging an ideological struggle against *Halkın Kurtuluşu (People’s Liberation)* and *Halkın*

Yolu (People's Path) which try to isolate us Leninists, as well as against all species of opportunism, spreading the ideology of *İşçinin Sesi* throughout the whole of the prison. Communication is kept up and organisational work carried out among its own cadres within the framework of Leninist discipline and Leninist ideology. Without ever making concessions from our Leninist principles, the signature of *İşçinin Sesi* is put to actions carried out on the scale of the whole prison. Everyone is reading in the appropriate manner, the publications that arrive from the outside, and is organising their distribution.

"The attitude of the police varies according to individuals and according to the organisations that they belong to. Some are taken to interrogation the moment they are arrested. Others are kept waiting for more than 10 days. Anyone from *İşçinin Sesi*, is immediately taken for interrogation. Comrades, I am very inexperienced in writing reports. I am prepared to accept your criticisms in this respect. Because I have only had primary school education, my handwriting is poor."

They really are passing with flying colours. Let me say something here. According to latest reports, rumours are spreading to the effect that one comrade from our leadership has gone mad. This rumour does not originate from his lawyers, and its source is not clear, but it is spreading. This comrade has been subjected to unimaginable tortures. The news we receive from prisons in different regions indicate that he is being taken from prison to prison. And, wherever he goes, he is tortured. But I definitely do not believe in this rumour. The comrade that I have known will instead make all of the dogs go mad and come.

What we said at the beginning still stands. Those who try to ridicule this truth will have to account for their sins.

Comrades in prison, you are the honour of our party!

Comrades, this is all I have to say. This year must be a year of great progress for our organisational structure and the development of our institutions. Let us unite to prepare for the new tasks.

Long live the Communist Party of Turkey!

Long live communism!