

Road to Revolution III

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Editorials (Not included in this Internet edition)

[**ROAD TO REVOLUTION III**](#) is the third major attack on revisionism by the Progressive Labor Party. This summary article attempts to draw many lessons -- positive and negative -- from the practice of the international communist movement. Particularly under attack is the current right wing leadership of the Mao Tse-tung group in China. Another important section deals with some of the errors of our party. It is our hope that we can learn from them and move the cause of the working class to socialism.

[**THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION**](#) (*GPCR*) is analyzed to see why and how it was reversed. In this important piece an effort is made to understand the class forces at play. A serious try is made to sort out -- based on evidence -- the right from the left. In addition, the left and its efforts are dealt with in an attempt to prevent repetition of its mistakes by our party and all revolutionaries.

This [**LETTER BY THE IRANIAN STUDENT ORGANIZATION**](#) indicates their revulsion at the invitation of the enemies of the Iranian people in China. The CCP is playing footsie with fascists all over the world and this letter indicates the growing disgust with Mao Tse-tung's policies.

The [**STRATEGY AND TACTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT**](#) since its inception are dealt with in this article. This herculean effort will certainly stir up thinking and controversy. The article deals at some length with how the initiators of the international movement and various followers went wrong on the "National Question." This error has invariably taken the working class right back into the arms of their oppressors.

This article on the [**SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS**](#) shows how concessions to the "better" imperialists wipe out the advances of the workers and peasants. The article also shows the inter-relationship between these concessions and nationalism. New Democracy, the current line of the CCP, is exposed as a crude application of the Seventh Congress line.

[**REPORT ON SECTARIANISM**](#) by the PLP National Committee

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ROAD TO REVOLUTION III: The Continuing Struggle Against Revisionism

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ROAD TO REVOLUTION III: The Continuing Struggle Against Revisionism

A scientific evaluation of history must have as its core the study of revolutionary movements. Our paper will therefore attempt to analyze the revolutionary sweep of world history since the Paris Commune. We want to absorb the lessons of previous experiences in order to advance beyond them. We seek to draw upon what is positive in these experiences and to learn from the negative.

Four great revolutions have marked the forward thrust of humanity: the Paris Commune, the Russian Revolution, the Chinese Revolution, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR). Each of these struggles advanced the world revolutionary movement to new heights. Each shed more light than its predecessor on the road away from bourgeois oppression. Each helped spell doom for societies dominated by a ruling class of exploiters. Workers and oppressed people have been able to advance because -- and only because -- of these revolutions.

Furthermore, these momentous revolutionary movements were not mystical events. They were all made and led by masses of people and their leaders. In each case, the process reflected the universal dominance of the antagonisms between the two principal classes. Hence, the revolutionary movement of the past hundred years has been a series of

attempts by workers to wrest control of their lives from the ruling class. Revolution determines the class that holds state power, and each of these four revolutions attempted to resolve this central question in favor of the proletariat.

The struggle for state power is inseparable from the struggle between correct and incorrect ideas about how to win, keep, and consolidate it. The ideological struggle against revisionism -- the ideas and practice of the class enemy within the communist movement -- has taken place since the beginning of the struggle for proletarian revolution. Revisionism attempts to distort the revolutionary content of Marxism-Leninism. It assumes many forms; it seeks to ride the revolutionary tide of world history by appearing in increasingly militant disguise; but its counter-revolutionary essence remains the same.

We believe that the struggle against revisionism has not nearly ended. The struggle rages in every Marxist-Leninist party and group in the world. No party has avoided it in the past. No party can avoid it now. No party will avoid it in the future. It will continue to rage until the realization of world communism. The long term error of the international communist movement has been right-opportunism.

We should not be alarmed at this prospect. Rather, we should welcome the destruction of the bourgeoisie's ideas just as we welcome the destruction of the bourgeoisie. If the military struggle for state power must be protracted, the ideological struggle to keep it will be even more so. In the course of this fight we will face many twists and turns, many ups and downs, many victories and defeats. This is not a cause for resignation, passivity, discouragement or cynicism. *The fight against revisionism is a life and death struggle. It cannot be avoided.* It has always advanced the cause of workers and oppressed people. In each period, new advances are made as revisionism is progressively unmasked. Because the political understanding of the masses increases, their fighting strength grows. They wrest power from and expose the ruling class. In the course of ideological and political struggle, they rip away the red fig-leaf from revisionist bosses. As the battle against revisionism intensifies, the people prove that they can win and hold state power. The struggle against revisionism is a protracted process. It is a good thing.

In the context of revolutionary advances and the continuing fight against revisionism, revolutionaries have made serious errors. These errors have allowed the local capitalist class and its imperialist allies to regain state power temporarily in some countries. If we understand them, we can avoid them and defeat revisionism qualitatively. We do not look to denigrate anyone, nor do we wish to minimize the great accomplishments of the revolutionary movements. Obviously, we could not carry out this task if OTHERS -- many OTHERS -- had not preceded us. We wish especially to credit the millions in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) who opened new ideological horizons for us. We are now attempting to pursue the ideas they began to put into practice. We do not approach this task with arrogance or with the absolute certainty that we are right. We do know, however, that revisionism reversed the Soviet revolution. We know that revolutionary movements in eastern Europe that followed the Soviet path have all ended badly. We know that the GPCR all along was a mass movement to defeat China's "red" bourgeoisie and re-establish proletarian dictatorship. When the GPCR broke out, the head of state, the mayor of Peking, the provincial secretaries, several top army officers, and the general secretary of the CCP were all called capitalist roaders. And now we view the spectacle of the Mao Tse-tung leadership pursuing right-wing policies (which they claimed to have rejected) with a vengeance. Current policies of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have reversed the revolutionary process in China, and have taken China back on the path of capitalism. How can such developments occur? How can they be reversed?

In the following report, we will attempt to answer these questions by analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the four great revolutions. We will also discuss four other questions: infallibility and cultism; a general estimate of the present historical epoch; the united front viewed as a left-center coalition; and the need for a broadened internationalist perspective.

This report will not try to evaluate all the questions which need to be dealt with. In the first place we can't answer them all. Secondly, many questions will be dealt with in subsequent articles in PL and Challenge-Desafio. What we will try to do is give some of our thinking on a few of the basic questions.

THE PARIS COMMUNE

The Paris Commune of 1870-71 was the first great proletarian revolution in history. Ultimately, it failed and was ruthlessly smashed by the combined efforts of the French and German bourgeoisie. However, Marx, Engels, Lenin, and others were able to draw heavily on the experience of the Commune. The Commune clarified in practice for the first time the content and forms of working class power. It taught Marx and later Lenin four profound lessons about the revolutionary process:

1. The need to smash (as opposed to taking over or "appropriating") bourgeois state power and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.
2. The need for equality -- particularly economic equality -- between revolutionary cadre and the masses of workers. In one of its first acts, the Commune abolished the gross discrepancy between the wages of working people and state functionaries.
3. Immediate recall of leadership by the masses if leaders fail to carry out the desires and aspirations of the working-class.
4. The abolition of a bourgeois-type standing army and the distribution of arms to the masses of people. The Commune correctly foresaw that a standing army could serve as a "special repressive force" only against the workers and other oppressed people and not against the bourgeoisie. The workers had made the revolution: they and only they could defend it.

In *State and Revolution*, Lenin raised and expanded these points at some length. In analyzing the Commune's weaknesses, he also showed that the class struggle would continue after socialism.

The rich experiences of the Paris Commune provided a source of inspiration to all revolutionaries. They enabled the world communist movement to take a giant stride forward.

THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

The Russian revolution was the first serious attempt by workers and peasants to seize, hold, and consolidate state power. This revolution applied the concept of proletarian dictatorship to defeat the old ruling class and drive it from power. Between 1919 and 1921, the revolutionaries made a magnificent and victorious stand against military intervention by foreign imperialist powers. In the course of this struggle, the masses showed great courage and determination to defend and build their revolution.

Prior to the revolution Lenin had written the historic *What Is To Be Done?* In this historic work, he fought the right opportunists who would have frittered the revolution away by relying on spontaneity, by engaging in reform struggles without introducing communist ideas, and by agitating for a bourgeois-democratic revolution instead of socialism. Furthermore, he developed the concept of the revolutionary party and described the type of professional revolutionary needed to enable the party to function.

The Soviet revolution did not fall out of heaven. It reflected the objective situation in Russia, and it showed that the masses, the leadership of their revolutionary party, and revolutionary violence on the part of the working class and peasantry were vital to the seizure of state power.

From its onset, the Russian revolution drew an endless series of attacks from the international bourgeoisie. The sharpest *external* form these attacks took was the fascist invasion of the Soviet Union in 1940. The Soviet struggle against the invasion was a key factor enabling other revolutions -- particularly the Chinese revolution -- to develop. Communists all over the world led the fight against fascism and Nazism. The Soviet Union was the bulwark of this fight. The armed might of the Nazis, supported by the fascist "master race" theory, seemed invincible. Yet, the Red Army, the Soviet people, and the world communist movement smashed this "master race" of fascist imperialists and its Wehrmacht.

However, this tremendous mass struggle to defeat fascism, which involved hundreds of millions who were led mainly by the communist movement, did not result in socialism. *The leadership of the international communist movement, led by the Soviet Union, did not advocate socialism -- the dictatorship of the proletariat -- as its primary goal.* So after the war western Europe, particularly France and Italy, were handed back to the bourgeoisie. This was wrong. The workers were armed. They believed in socialism. And they would have carried the class struggle through to the end. Instead communist leaders advocated the turning in of guns to the Allied military government, and winning socialism through the parliamentary process. So capitalism was put back on its feet in western Europe, and it eventually engulfed eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

In his rise to power, Hitler had received full backing from other imperialists, particularly from the "democratic" imperialists of France, Britain, and the U.S. They encouraged his scheme to transform Germany from a defeated imperialist power into a potent war machine. The arrangement was simple: the imperialists would allow Hitler to develop a powerful army if he agreed to use it as a good-squad against the Soviet Union. In this period, Hitler's principal slogan was "Drang nach Osten" (March to the East). This march to the east resulted in the destruction of the Third Reich, as the Nazis double-crossed and attacked their original backers and masses of workers and peasants drove the Wehrmacht out of every country it had occupied.

The Hitlerites were defeated by war. They were defeated in eastern Europe. Millions of other workers and oppressed people considered themselves communists. But because of serious errors (some mentioned previously) made by the international communist movement, which was led by Joseph Stalin, these advances were reversed and capitalism restored.

These developments did not happen overnight, nor did they drop like a bolt from the blue. As we attempt to sharpen the ideological struggle, we must seek out the roots of revisionism. In the case of the Soviet Union and these other countries, the roots of revisionism all converged at the point of granting concessions to the bourgeoisie, concessions that either allowed the old ruling class to reconquer power or paved the way for the emergence of a new, "red" bourgeoisie.

(Once again let us restate that the concession granted to sections of the old ruling class rested on illusions about them. The old and incorrect idea that one part of the ruling class was better than the other part predominated. This is best seen today, when various communists and radicals still claim that liberals in the U.S. bourgeoisie are better than reactionaries.) Before proceeding further with our discussion of the Soviet Union, it will be useful to make a general enumeration of the forms these concessions assume:

1. In the course of revolutionary struggle prior to the seizure of power, the revolutionary party falsely divides the bourgeoisie into a "left" and a "right" camp, calls for an alliance with the "left," and consummates this alliance by granting the "left" certain privileges such as immunity from expropriation.
2. This alliance is maintained after the revolution, and the privileges granted to the "good" wing of the bourgeoisie are extended. The rationale is that the party and the masses are too weak politically, economically,

administratively, and ideologically for the revolution to survive without the active collaboration of "friendly" bourgeois forces.

3. Many of the privileges granted to the bourgeoisie inevitably assume other than purely economic forms, although economic concessions (toleration and encouragement of "limited" capitalist enterprise, maintenance and augmentation of wage differentials between bureaucrats or technicians and ordinary workers, etc.) play a key role. Economic concessions require prior ideological concessions: if you pay an architect far more than a bricklayer, a general a lot more than a private, or pay a mayor 20 times more than a peasant, you have to come up with a theory to justify the discrepancies. One of these ideological concessions is the promotion of nationalism. ("Let's all be a little less piggy -- all of us, that is, except the bourgeoisie -- for the sake of the nation.") Nationalism is a bourgeois theory. Like the bourgeoisie, it has no progressive aspects. Lenin and Stalin were consistent in defining nationalism as a totally reactionary *ideology*. But, they often suggested that a little nationalism could be useful. This is like saying, "the lady is slightly pregnant."
4. Revolutionaries view the united front as an alliance between themselves and the "better" section of the bourgeoisie. Thus, the front unites around a bourgeois nationalist line as opposed to a revolutionary line for the dictatorship of the workers. As part of this deal, communists make the biggest concession of all by renouncing the struggle to win the masses to a socialist program.
5. One of the principal reasons offered for the above concessions is the assumption that a large section of the masses -- particularly the peasantry -- cannot be won to socialism. The argument is put forth that the socialist revolution must pass through a two-stage process, the first stage of which will be something other than socialism. The Chinese called this first stage "New Democracy." Others argued for a period of bourgeois democracy that would somehow transform itself into socialism.

The writings of Lenin, Stalin, and Mao are filled with warnings about the inevitability of a comeback attempt by the bourgeoisie after the revolution. (However, both Mao and Stalin were inconsistent on this key question. Before the current CCP leaders rewrote *On Contradiction*, Mao spoke of how the class struggle in China would lessen after socialism had triumphed. Similarly, Stalin spoke on both sides of this question. Both of these revolutionaries had a hard time grasping Lenin's point that after socialism the old rulers would try ten times harder to make a comeback.) The historical experience of revolutionary movements seems to validate these warnings without exception. The bourgeoisie's *desire* to reverse socialist revolution is constant. Its *ability* to reverse socialism depends upon the amount of leverage and maneuverability it is left with. Historical experience also seems to confirm that every time revolutionaries have made concessions to the bosses, the bosses have been able to use the concessions to regain power.

After the revolution, Russia was decimated. The Civil War and the fight against imperialist aggression had torn the country to shreds. Times were very hard. After the defeat of the interventionists, the Bolsheviks undertook the task of building the first socialist society. Before long, the leaders of the party decided that the slow pace of socialist construction would lead to ruination. They contended that the revolution would go down to defeat unless they could win the "more advanced" members of the old ruling class to cooperate in building the workers' state. The assertion was that without the expertise of some of the old bosses, the workers would be lost. Therefore, sweeping class concessions were in order. Accordingly, in the twenties, the Bolsheviks began implementing a policy known as NEP (New Economic Policy).

In a nutshell, the NEP called for the reintroduction of capitalist methods, capitalist competition, and capitalists into the government and economy. The program sought to restrict the development of capitalism. But communists were assigned to control and nurture this base of capitalism. Obviously, communists administering capitalist concessions is at least contradictory.

The Soviet party repeatedly contended that without the NEP, the economy -- and hence socialism -- were doomed. But the real failure began to materialize when communists were placed in the impossibly contradictory position of building capitalism. Profits and there fore exploitation were allowed. High living was tolerated. The equalitarianism that Lenin

had admired in the Paris Commune and that he had called an indispensable aspect of socialism in *State and Revolution* never truly came into being. A well-heeled bourgeoisie with a toehold in the state apparatus and economy could not fail to begin penetrating the party, if not bodily at first, at least ideologically. Communist cadre and leaders soon began aping the old bourgeoisie. As the economic gap increased between them and the people, the ideological gap followed suit. As this disease progressed, the CP ultimately restored full-blown capitalism to the Soviet Union. This time the bourgeoisie consisted of CP leaders and the managerial class they represented. But this new bourgeoisie could not have developed strength to take power without the concessions initially granted to the old bosses in the twenties. The seeds of capitalist restoration were already inherent in the NEP. They did not bear fruit in the Soviet Union simply because Stalin made certain errors or because Khrushchev was a usurper. Like everyone else, Stalin made certain mistakes, some of them more serious than others; and the title of usurper is almost too generous for Khrushchev. But although these may be facts, they tell only part of the story. The devil theory won't work.

The transition from socialism to capitalism was a protracted process that unfolded over many years. The working class held fundamental power during this period. As in all developments, however, quantity turns into quality. The process of capitalist restoration was completed around the time of the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956. Led by Khrushchev, this congress set forth a systematic revisionist program. It called for unity between the Soviet Union and any party or nation calling itself socialist. The CPSU held this policy valid not only for itself but also for other parties. Thus, it gave the Italian CP the green light to unite with the right-winger Saragat. According to Khrushchev and the Twentieth Congress, it was possible and even desirable to envision a peaceful transition to socialism, because a new period had dawned in which socialism and imperialism could co-exist non-antagonistically. In the course of this period, socialism would triumph not by force but by example.

Khrushchev formulated a right-wing attack on the Stalin cult for use as a battering ram in demolishing Marxism-Leninism. He capitalized on bad errors made by Stalin and other revolutionaries to obscure his own reactionary ideas. There is no question Khrushchev had a lot of revisionism going for him. Over the years the Stalin leadership committed wholesale errors:

1. Making concessions to the old Russian ruling class.
2. Introduction of material incentives instead of political-moral incentives.
3. Relying on nationalism to defeat the Nazis -- thus making the policy of the international working class subservient to the interests of the Soviet Union. So, nationalism triumphed over internationalism.
4. This policy led the Soviets into alliances with the international ruling class. This was most evident during the war against the Nazis. U.S., British, some French and other bosses were pictured as progressive forces.
5. Democratic centralism, which is the only system of revolutionary organization, was reduced to arbitrary centralism. Friends were not distinguished from enemies. Thus, many good revolutionaries were killed by the Stalin leadership because they might have had differences. Many counter-revolutionaries who should have been put down were able to slip through because of these abuses.
6. Probably the most important error Stalin and others made was not winning masses of people to Marxism-Leninism. So, an elite held power without much participation by workers and peasants. Socialism was for the party leaders. The masses were only involved in carrying out this or that policy. Because these policies seemed progressive at the time, there was little resistance to them.

When the Khrushchev gang came to power there was only a slight adjustment needed to consolidate capitalist ways of life and production which had developed over the years. Finally, he capped off his revisionist program by asserting that the Soviet Union had completed socialist construction and could now undertake the transition to communism -- and that therefore the dictatorship of the proletariat had become an obsolete concept to be superseded by the "state of the whole people." Khrushchev heralded the return of capitalism by "decreeing" the end of class struggle. The Soviet leaders then proceeded to attack all those in the international communist movement who didn't hold to these revisionist ideas, particularly the Chinese Communist Party and the Albanian Party of Labor. In the space of two generations, the

Soviet Union had turned from a socialist state that allowed "limited" capitalist enterprise into a fascist dictatorship.

ARE CAPITALISTS MORE WINNABLE TO SOCIALISM THAN PEASANTS?

As we said earlier, Soviet concessions to capitalism were predicated upon the assumption that the peasantry could not be won immediately to socialism. In the past, the international communist movement had sharply differentiated among those who could be won right off to a socialist program, those who could be won only after socialism had been established, and those who were unwinnable. In general, the peasantry was relegated to the second category. Communist theoreticians devoted many treatises to the peasants' "backward mentality." Marxist-Leninists claimed that the peasant was petty-bourgeois, either in his orientation or in his relation to the mode of production. Given this estimate, revolutionaries reasoned that the peasantry was unwinnable to socialism without initially passing through a "stage" of bourgeois democracy. According to this theory, each peasant first had to receive his own plot of land. Next, some of these plots would be turned into cooperatives. Then the cooperatives could be developed into collective farms. But even within these transitional phases, each peasant was entitled to his "own" land, cow, horse, chickens, donkey, etc. In reality, this bourgeois-democratic "revolution" consigned the vast majority of peasants to capitalist exploitation. Although Lenin and Stalin repeatedly condemned nationalism as a capitalist ideology, what other ideology could their program have produced? No matter how you sugar-coat it, capitalism is capitalism, and capitalist production relations breed a capitalist and nationalist outlook.

When peasants and oppressed people rebelled against imperialism in alliance with "anti-imperialist" local bosses, Marxist-Leninists supported this alliance. The theory was that since the fight against the imperialists took precedence over everything, local bosses in competition with the imperialists could help in building the united front. In practice, this produced two irreconcilable contradictions: in the first place, it called upon communists to win the peasantry to capitalism; secondly, it rejected nationalism as an ideology but often embraced it as a "tactic."

We believe that virtually all the world's peasants and oppressed people are proletarianized (see next PL for more data). The vast majority own neither land nor the means of production. This is certainly the case today, and we believe that it was also the case during Lenin's lifetime. As a worldwide system of exploitation, imperialism proletarianizes people, whether they work on the land or in factories. As imperialism spreads its tentacles and engenders socialist revolution, worldwide industrialization also grows at an enormously rapid rate.

This development is particularly obvious in our own country. Millions of agricultural workers in the U.S. are fighting the bosses, not for individual plots of land, but for higher wages, shorter hours, improved working conditions, etc. These are proletarian class demands. If properly led, the struggle to win them can help develop socialist consciousness. In the case of the so-called "colonial" and "semi-feudal" countries, tremendous economic growth has taken place. It is true that this growth has developed unevenly. It is also true that workers in the colonial countries are far more exploited than workers in imperialist countries. But why should communists attempt to convert these conditions into national capitalism, when this type of exploitation affords ample opportunity for winning workers and peasants -- *especially* the most oppressed -- to socialism? By drawing the conclusion that the peasants could not be won immediately to socialism, by deciding not to put forth proletarian dictatorship and a socialist program from the very start, communists found themselves making concession after concession to the bourgeoisie and thereby hastening the restoration of capitalism.

In this context, the concessions usually assumed the form of communist support for nationalism and bourgeois democracy. The theory developed to justify these activities asserts either that communists must carry forward the bourgeois-democratic revolution if the local ruling class abandons it or that they must initiate it if the rulers insist on clinging to other forms of exploitation. Needless to say, this theory "works" -- in the worst possible way: communists who begin as apologists for capitalism become capitalists themselves.

History has proved many times that once national liberation movements seize power, they remain the pawns of imperialism. Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, and other cases all demonstrate that liberation without proletarian dictatorship is a fairy tale. History has also proved the futility of attempting to sneak socialism in through the back door. The wreck of Cuba stands as a living monument to the theory of socialism by deceit. As her economy sinks yearly and it becomes increasingly dependent on the revisionist Soviet Union, the Cuban revolution must pay dearly for failing to win the masses to a socialist outlook during the war against Batista. (This includes the old CP which never advocated socialism before or after the revolution.) Withholding socialist ideas from part of the oppressed population because these ideas appear too "advanced" fatally undermines the development of socialist society.

The notion that the masses cannot understand socialism and will not fight for it is a myth that leads to elitism: "only a select few of us can understand such lofty, complex ideas." This error also compounds racism, because it vindicates the bourgeois idea that non-white people are too backward and stupid to exercise full social responsibility, and that only "we" -- the bosses -- know what's good for them. We reject the idea that socialism cannot be put forth openly and in a forthright manner. We reject the idea that it must be inched forward by stages. If communists do not wage a protracted struggle for socialist ideology before and during the revolutionary period, impossible contradictions inevitably result after the revolution. At best, the masses have not been won to socialism but to *reform* within the context of continued capitalism. No decree or sleight-of-hand can develop socialism from these conditions. Socialism does not belong to a chosen few; it belongs to the masses. They must develop socialist ideas, fight for them, and put socialism into practice. Superficially, this approach may appear more protracted than the old two-stage approach. In the final analysis, however, it may well prove to be the shorter route. In any event, we believe, it is the only route. Socialism cannot survive if it remains the property of a few political "experts." It can and must become a truly mass phenomenon. Then and only then will it be irreversible.

THE SEVENTH WORLD CONGRESS

The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International in 1935 marked another turning point for the international communist movement and the Soviet revolution. As the Congress opened, fascism was spreading throughout Europe. But neither the Congress nor the communist movement in general called for armed struggle, people's war, or revolution as the *only* method of defeating fascism decisively.

Fascism did not arise in Hungary, Italy, Germany, or Japan by fluke or default. In the first place, since these countries all had feeble economies, bourgeois democracy proved too weak a form for effective political control. The imperialist Allies had seen to this by stripping Germany of most of its wealth after World War I. But intra-imperialist competition alone -- however cut-throat it may be -- does not suffice to explain the growth of fascism. The Bolshevik revolution and the world communist movement it helped generate made fascism necessary for the bourgeoisie. Since 1917, the entire international ruling class had lived in dire fear of the spread of communism. Intervention in 1919-21 had failed to destroy the Soviet Union. Consequently, the world bourgeoisie decided to establish fascism in certain strategic countries as a more violent form of anti-communism than bourgeois democracy. The imperialists armed Germany and Japan to the teeth. They entrusted Japan with the mission of fighting communism in Asia and Germany with the mission of fighting it in Europe and destroying it in Russia. Both Japan and Germany had to play this role in order to obtain armaments and raw materials from the bourgeois-democratic imperialists.

The Seventh World Congress advanced the same strategy of concessions that we discussed earlier in this report. This strategy divided the imperialists into fascist and anti-fascist camps and proposed a united front with the same bourgeois-democrats who had helped bring fascism into being. Naturally, the social-democrats -- the most rabid anti-communists on the pseudo left -- were viewed as co-leaders of the united front.

During and after the conference, a "great debate" raged between communists and Trotskyites over the timing of the alliance with the social-democrats. The trots accused the communists of selling out because they hadn't initiated the alliance five years earlier! The Trots argued that only this timing could have stopped the spread of fascism.

In reality, both fascism and bourgeois democracy are forms of capitalist dictatorship. Both are equally counter-revolutionary, although fascism is the more consistently aggressive of the two. Neither can be smashed without proletarian revolution. If revolution was not imminent at the time of the Congress, revolutionary preparation and agitation -- not alliances with "good" bourgeois democrats -- should have been the order of the day. The parliamentary tactics adopted by the Seventh Congress served only to create the fatal illusion that fascism could be prevented without armed struggle. By systematizing unity with the "better" section of the bourgeoisie, the Congress strangled the communist movement and substituted opportunism for communist tactics. In the final analysis, a world war was necessary to defeat fascism. Although the bourgeois-democratic imperialists intervened with their armies, communist-led armed struggle by the masses was the decisive factor.

However, the communist movement failed to give this struggle revolutionary leadership. Because the Seventh Congress did not make a correct distinction between friends and enemies, it put forth the revisionist "main danger" theory. This theory became the anti-fascist line of the communist movement during World War II. The Soviets tried to forestall Hitler's invasion by making a pact with him. He double-crossed them. Then they entered into a full-blown alliance with the liberal imperialists who had initially sponsored Hitler and whom Hitler had also double-crossed. This alliance served to deepen illusions about qualitative differences among imperialists: since Hitler was the "worst," the others must be "better." Today, the Chinese Communist Party still pursues this idea. At present, the CCP version of the "main danger" theory appears to be a call for unity among all those who oppose U.S. imperialism or Soviet revisionism. Ironically, the CCP is creating an alliance with the U.S. What a contradiction to swallow. It doesn't matter that U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism are essentially the same. It doesn't matter that many of the forces opposed to them are imperialists, nationalists, revisionists, or fascists. What matters is that contradictions exist within the imperialist camp. This wrong theory explained the CCP's support for DeGaulle and its relations with Pakistan, Rumania, North Korea, Yugoslavia, Greece, etc.

The two-bit CPUSA has been pulling this bit for about thirty years. It attempts to unite everybody against the "ultra right." We have all been treated *ad nauseam* to the spectacle of CP alliances with "lesser evil" Humphrey against "main danger" Wallace (or was it Nixon?), "Lesser evil" Johnson against "main danger" Goldwater, etc. But we know from experience, as do millions, that the liberals are as bad as, or worse than, the so-called "ultra-right." (The current "Pentagon Papers" destroy the myth of the good and bad rulers.)

The line of the Seventh World Congress and the line of modern revisionism are essentially the same. They fail to grasp that although contradictions exist within the bourgeoisie, bourgeois class unity always predominates in the case of *opposition to communism*. This was a big lesson from the Paris Commune. Therefore, they fail to see that liberal bourgeois democracy feeds and develops anti-communism and fascism. Now, after decades of "lesser evil" imperialists, the CCP has taken the theory a step further by advancing the concept of "lesser evil" revisionists. The CCP has rearranged the same old hackneyed song and begun to play it on different instruments: the Soviets are the "worst;" the others are "better."

When put into practice, the "lesser evil" line has two main consequences: it either prevents revolutionary movements from seizing power or causes parties in power to restore capitalism. Today's Soviet Union furnishes a developed example of the latter consequence. Today, the only struggle conducted by the Soviet bosses is for a senior partnership in the international bourgeoisie. They are aided in this quest by the opportunism of the CCP.

The Soviet bosses must be treated like any other section of the bourgeoisie. Lenin's idea of recall by the masses might

have been feasible when the Soviet Union was still a socialist state, but the party leadership had eliminated this idea in the earliest stages of the revolution. Since the masses were too "backward" to understand socialism, they were also too "backward" to understand the "need" for reintroducing limited capitalism or for allying with the "lesser evil" section of the bourgeoisie. In a word, they couldn't be trusted.

Today, the Soviet bosses have less reason than ever to trust the masses, because the masses now need to "recall" all of them by means of violent revolution. Overthrowing the Soviet leadership is a necessary and desirable goal. Revolutions are bound to erupt in all the former socialist countries. Recent events in Poland, where workers stormed the CP headquarters singing the *Internationale*, sent shivers down the Soviet bosses' spines and proved that revisionism leads to capitalism, oppression, and revolutionary struggle.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION

The Soviet revolution provided an impetus and helped create favorable conditions for the Chinese revolution. Once proletarian dictatorship had been established in Russia, one-sixth of the world's land surface, the international relationship of forces changed irrevocably in the direction of revolution. Millions of communists and their supporters were actively engaged in political struggle from one end of the earth to another.

A vibrant communist movement had begun to develop in China. Despite certain key mistakes in the initial period (e.g. reliance on the Chiang Kai-shek nationalists), the party and the revolutionary masses had grown in numbers and strength. By the late 1940s, they had won control of the Chinese mainland and established the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Chinese revolution proved conclusively that a non-industrial country could move directly to socialism. Heretofore, many Marxist-Leninists had thought that socialist revolution was feasible only in countries with an industrial development at least on a par with Russia before 1917. The theory was that high industrialization -- and hence a large urban working class -- was a necessary objective condition for socialist revolution. Although China had some industry and therefore also a small working class, the number of city-dwelling workers was small before and during the revolution. But Mao Tse-tung and others understood that the peasantry could be a revolutionary force and unite with workers in the cities to seize power.

The period that elapsed between the founding of the CCP and the seizure of power took nearly thirty years. Therefore, Mao correctly pointed to the need for an outlook of protracted struggle. Here, as in the case of the Russian revolution, organized armed struggle led by a communist party was one of the main aspects of the struggle. And Mao always insisted that revolutionaries must never surrender their weapons to local nationalists.

This titanic battle helped clarify and enrich many other important revolutionary concepts, such as party building, cadre training and development, inner-party struggle, etc. The success of the Chinese revolution threw imperialism -- especially U.S. imperialism -- into a panic. By 1949, another huge section of the world had gone over to the revolutionary camp. Asia had taken its first qualitative step away from colonialism and imperialism. Mao's statement that the "east wind prevails over the west wind" summarizes this historic development.

However, the Chinese revolutionaries never broke with the old policy of concessions to the so-called "progressive" bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they implemented it with a vengeance, so their revolution stood on wobbly legs from the outset. In the Soviet Union, this policy did not begin to develop fully until after the revolution. In China, on the other hand, it reached maturity well before the seizure of power. In the course of the anti-Japanese war, the CCP made alliances with large sections of the "national" bourgeoisie. As usual, these alliances required serious ideological and

economic concessions. One of the most important -- in fact, the concession without which the nationalists would never have consented to the alliance -- was the CPC's willingness to curtail its open advocacy of proletarian dictatorship and socialism.

After wresting power from the "right-wing" nationalists, Mao called for a period of "New Democracy," a supposed joint dictatorship of four revolutionary classes, including the "progressive national bourgeoisie." We do not believe that a state commonly ruled by several classes ever existed in China or any other country, or that it will ever exist anywhere, for that matter. *In the modern epoch, either the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, and no one else, is capable of wielding state power.* We believe that, regardless of terminology, and despite serious weaknesses, what actually existed in China during the "New Democratic" period was essentially proletarian dictatorship. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) was led by communists, and the party was the only effectively functioning political instrument in China. In essence, the "theory" of New Democracy served merely as a tactic to justify the serious concessions made by the party to the bourgeoisie. Mao believed in the necessity of these concessions. With a few twists, New Democracy was nothing more or less than the Chinese version of the NEP. New Democracy enabled the bourgeoisie to acquire footing and maneuverability in the party, the state apparatus, and the economy. Small wonder, then, that educational institutions never changed their class character or that after nearly twenty years of proletarian dictatorship, Chinese culture was primarily bourgeois.

Additionally, copying the Soviet model of socialist construction, and granting significant concessions to the bourgeoisie, the CCP managed to subvert socialism in China much more rapidly than it had been subverted in the Soviet Union. By the time the GPCR had broken out, even the moderate wing of the mass movement in China (those who supported Mao) understood that the basic task of the Cultural Revolution was to seize power from the "red" bourgeoisie.

The influence of China's "red" bourgeoisie manifested itself clearly in the field of foreign policy. After the Twentieth Party Congress, the CCP issued a text called *The Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. This piece basically supported the revisionist Soviet line. Shortly thereafter, the CCP issued another text called *More on the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat*. This piece heralded the beginning of the apparent break with Soviet revisionism. Before the break, however, the Chinese signed the "81 Party Statement," a jumble of pacifism. They also signed the "12 Party Statement." Although couched in Marxist rhetoric, the "12 Party Statement" approved by parties holding state power in twelve socialist countries, was in reality an abject apology for Soviet revisionism. China's signature, coupled with the internal developments later brought to light by the GPCR, indicated the extent to which revisionism had progressed within the CCP.

THE GREAT PROLETARIAN CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Like the Paris Commune, the Soviet revolution, and the first Chinese revolution, the principal question raised by the GPCR was the class nature of state power. By the early sixties, the ferocity of class struggle in China had begun to intensify dramatically. The concessions granted to the bourgeoisie by the policy of New Democracy had enabled a new ruling class to emerge and gain ascendancy. It differed in form from the old ruling class, but its capitalist essence remained identical.

The heart of this new ruling class was the party itself. In the space of a few short years, the CCP had turned into its opposite. Virtually all of its leading cadre had become a "red" bourgeoisie. The GPCR therefore constituted an effort on the part of the masses to win power back from these revisionists.

The GPCR erupted within the framework of a worldwide anti-revisionist struggle apparently led by the CCP. In the

late fifties, the CCP launched a significant attack against Soviet revisionism and Yugoslav opportunism. But this attack was not comprehensive. It took aim at several branches of revisionism without digging deep enough to ferret out its roots. According to the formulations advanced by the CCP between 1955-66, the Soviet Union had become revisionist because it had repudiated armed struggle and was now calling for peaceful coexistence with imperialism. This criticism was correct -- *but only as far as it went*. During this entire period, the CCP never critically examined socialist construction in the Soviet Union or China, never repudiated the theory of concessions to the bourgeoisie, and never conducted an all-out ideological struggle against nationalism and the 7th World Congress.

Given the nature of the CCP, a thorough evaluation of these questions was inconceivable. Why should China's "red" bourgeoisie have put into question the very principles that had helped foster its development as a class? China's red bourgeoisie didn't fundamentally oppose revisionism; it attacked the Soviets because the Chinese masses were too advanced politically to swallow the obviously right-wing line of the CPSU. A more militant left cover was necessary in order to restore capitalism in China. The only hitch came when the Chinese masses began to take seriously the idea of overthrowing the bourgeoisie and reconquering state power.

The GPCR helped inject a number of vital ideas into the world revolutionary movement:

1. The absolute primacy of political incentives over material incentives. From the earliest days of the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet leaders were convinced that the masses could be won to socialism only if they were impelled by the promise of special material rewards. The Soviet leaders reasoned that a worker would be willing to increase his production if he received additional pay for producing over the norm. Correspondingly, it was felt that peasants would also produce more if they owned a part of the land they worked. The same system had developed in China. In the course of the GPCR, the left mass movement tried to smash it.
2. The primacy of politics over technique. The GPCR demonstrated that the prime requisite for socialism was not a bevy of "experts" or technocrats but rather the masses' understanding and implementation of socialist ideas.
3. Intensified struggle against revisionism. One of the slogans advanced by the left during the GPCR was "no aid from revisionists." China's own experience had shown that Soviet "aid" would lead to its opposite by creating illusions about revisionism and diluting the class struggle. The left also stated its opposition to negotiations with revisionists and imperialists.
4. Intensified struggle against imperialism and its nationalist stooges. The left and the masses led a series of attacks on imperialist diplomats residing in China. Chinese workers laid siege to the British "crown colony" of Hong Kong. These developments helped strengthen all revolutionary movements in Asia and many in the West. The revisionists and imperialists were always babbling that Peking was "isolated from the community of nations." The left said that isolation from imperialists like DeGaulle or stooges like Sihanouk *was just fine* because it was a necessary condition for *unity with revolutionary forces, workers and oppressed people around the world*.
5. The revolutionary doctrine that the masses are more important than weapons and can defeat any imperialist war, including nuclear war. The U.S. imperialists and Soviet revisionists increased their war provocations against China during the GPCR. The GPCR was not intimidated. It took the line: "China will never launch a nuclear war or any war of aggression. Despite the apparent superiority of your weapons, the Chinese people and the workers and oppressed people of the world are invincible. Imperialism and revisionism will be crushed. Start your war -- we will finish it."

The Chinese masses took many of these ideas in dead earnest and attempted to act upon them. A large organized movement developed against Soviet aid to Vietnam. Shipment after shipment of Soviet arms was derailed by left forces in the GPCR. The purpose of these actions was to show revolutionary solidarity with the people of Vietnam by opposing the machinations of the revisionists. The Soviet bosses went wild, because these actions made it more and more difficult for them to use "aid" to sell out the struggle in Vietnam. Only the direct, violent intervention of the Mao

Tse-Tung controlled People's Liberation Army was able to put a stop to this movement.

Underlying the GPCR was the premise that the class struggle grows sharper after the seizure of power. the capitalist class becomes increasingly desperate in its efforts to restore exploitation, and at the same time, a new capitalist class strives mightily to emerge and gain hegemony. The GPCR was a struggle for state power. It proved that workers and revolutionaries must fight back to win power away from the "red" bourgeoisie and keep the red flag of revolution in the vanguard of the mass movement.

Various forces allied with Mao Tse-tung have portrayed the GPCR as "personally led and initiated" by Mao. This is a myth. The GPCR really began in the late fifties, when masses of people rebelled against the new "red" bourgeoisie and attempted to implement a program for drastic change in Chinese society. The commune movement of the fifties was one of the first expressions of this struggle. Although the commune movement was identified with Mao, it was crushed while he dominated the Chinese political scene.

Two distinct elements participated in the GPCR: a left, represented by certain forces in the party, by the Red Guard movement, and by revolutionary workers' councils; and a right, represented by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. The initial actions of the GPCR had nothing to do with Mao. One of the first struggles launched by the pre-Red Guard movement was a rebellion against revisionism at Peking University. This movement and the workers' movement rapidly grew into huge mass phenomena. Mao and the forces allied with him used them in a struggle against the more exposed rightists like Liu and P'eng Ch'en.

The only differences between Mao and Liu centered around the question of whether or not China would continue its development along the Soviet line. Some of Liu's friends who were Marshals in the PLA wanted to build the Chinese army with Russian weapons, thereby making China economically and militarily dependent on the Soviet Union. Mao and his allies wanted the Chinese economy to develop independently of the Soviet Union. They wanted to produce their own brand of national revisionism. Led by Mao, they used the revolutionary mass movement as a battering ram to drive the very exposed right-wingers like Liu out of the party. *But the masses wanted to drive out the entire party leadership. This was the necessary condition for seizing back state power and the means of production.* Mao uttered left formulations and issued left directives to ingratiate himself with the masses and win their confidence. But every time the masses went "too far" in carrying out his instructions, he immediately called upon the PLA to beat them into submission.

Basically, Liu and his associates were used as scapegoats. Mao and the forces close to him used them to obscure their errors. Many of the errors pinned on the "black gang" were errors made by Mao Tse-tung. During the thirties Mao had said not to advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat; Mao advocated concessions to landlords and other businessmen in order to win them to the anti- Japanese struggle; Mao called for. alliances with every kind of nationalist fink. This policy culminated at the Bandung conference, where even Adam Clayton Powell was hailed by the CCP as an anti-U.S.-imperialist force. And the CCP's current policy is even outdoing the corrupt policy of Bandung.

The left of the GPCR wanted to model socialism in China after the principles of the Paris Commune. By establishing himself as the "symbol" of these principles, Mao was able to deceive much of the left. His own apparatus and many honest forces in the mass movement worked swiftly to elevate him to the status of demi-god. He was soon identified with the moon, the sun, and the stars; he became the "red sun in our hearts" and it was discovered that he had never said or done anything wrong. He got away with this by giving lip service to the revolutionary aspirations of the masses.

Mao helped put his man Lin Piao in charge of the armed forces. In this way, he succeeded in creating the impression that the GPCR was being carried out within the PLA. Millions of Red Books were distributed to PLA soldiers. Since

the Red Book is basically an anthology of Mao's old ideas, many of which lead straight to revisionism, Mao and Lin were able to prevent the power-holders from being thrown out of the army by the GPCR. According to opportunists, the PLA had already become "a great school of Mao Tse-Tung Thought"; therefore any disruptions in it would be harmful to China's stability and would render China vulnerable to external attacks from the imperialists and revisionists.

After Mao's rapid ascension to divinity, his authority was enormous. How can one question someone who controls the army? The political self-reliance of the masses could not possibly have developed in these circumstances. Bit by bit, Mao methodically whittled away the reforms initiated by the GPCR and dismantled the organizations that had led the fight to win them. He dispersed the Red Guards and other leftists. He removed those leaders of the GPCR who opposed him or who "mistakenly" persisted in "ultra-leftist" thinking. He distorted the great slogan "serve the people" until it became indistinguishable from the slogan "serve Mao."

In order to carry out this slogan, Mao's forces established new "three-in-one" committees, consisting of PLA members, old party cadre, and hand-picked forces from the mass movement. This even included genuine leftists to serve as a fig leaf. But they were without power. Power rested mainly in the PLA. In reality, these committees were the most streamlined form yet developed for exercising "red" bourgeois political power "out of the barrel of a gun." In the initial phase of the GPCR, when the masses said they wanted to drag out all the power holders, they meant concretely that 90 percent of the senior party cadre should "stand aside." Mao claimed, however, that only 5 percent of the cadre were hopeless right-wingers. He said that since 95 percent were good, they could be rehabilitated and re integrated into the party. This fable completely contradicted the aims of the GPCR. In addition, Mao called for a *non-violent* revolution, although he accurately described the GPCR as a class struggle for state power. But Marxist-Leninists, including the left of the GPCR, know that there is no such thing as a non-violent revolution. The class struggle for state power has never been peaceful; it was not peaceful during the GPCR and it will never be peaceful.

The turning point in the GPCR came once the PLA had been granted immunity from the revolutionary struggle. Backed by the prestige of Mao's vast authority and the power of the PLA, the opportunists were able to impose the old revisionist methods in China. This development is most readily discernible when viewed from the outside. A clearly revisionist foreign policy began to emerge toward the end of the GPCR. Since then, it has rapidly progressed further rightward. In 1967, masses of workers and students threw snowballs at the French ambassador in Peking. In 1968, hundreds of thousands demonstrated in Peking to support the French worker-student rebellion. But by 1970, the leaders of the Chinese party and state were holding "cordial talks" with Pompidou's emissaries, and Chairman Mao "personally led and initiated" the sending of a heart struck letter of condolence to Mme. DeGaulle. This love-letter was the symbol of New Democracy on a world wide scale. According to the CCP, DeGaulle had been independent of U.S. imperialism. Therefore his memory should be revered. His role in suppressing the same worker-student rebellion that the Chinese masses had rallied to defend was conveniently overlooked. The Chinese leadership has now entered into negotiations with the Soviets, whom the GPCR characterized as "worse than Hitler." The CCP gave Yahya Khan \$20,000,000 worth of aid for the Pakistani bosses a few short weeks before the devastating cyclone in East Pakistan. These bosses knew the cyclone was coming but did nothing to help or warn the Pakistani masses. Coincidentally, East Pakistan has long been a center of opposition to the Pakistani ruling class. Two years ago, the Pakistani army met rebelling workers on the steps of the palace in the capital with Chinese tanks and guns. The CCP had given arms to the Pakistani rulers because of their feud with the Indian bourgeoisie. The Indian bourgeoisie was allied with U.S. imperialism and Soviet revisionism. The Pakistani bourgeoisie was in competition with it. Therefore, the Pakistanis were "better," and the Indians were the "bigger enemy." In fact, however, as is always the case when this revisionist line is applied, the main enemy of the opportunists in Peking proved to be the masses themselves.

Because the CCP never really broke with the old policies that eventually led to revisionism, some of the ideas it now advances to explain developments in the Soviet Union and China are inadequate. According to the CCP, the revisionist were able to "usurp" power in Russia because Stalin failed to distinguish correctly between friends and enemies and

therefore could not understand the difference between antagonistic and non-antagonistic contradictions. Of course, this point has some validity. But, as we stated earlier, the Chinese never made a thorough analysis of the development of errors in the general line of the international communist movement. The CCP does a relatively good job of summarizing the manifestations of the revisionist line of the Soviet Union, and of pointing to the consequences of this line. It fares less well in explaining how and why this line was adopted.

A similar situation prevails with respect to China itself. The CCP says that the "black gang" of capitalist roaders (i.e. the right led by Liu) have been rotten for decades, and that a "handful" of them usurped power before the GPCR. Mao's only self-criticism is that, some years ago, he allowed himself to be outmaneuvered by them and kicked upstairs. Although Mao's critique of Liu contains many correct points, it fails to explain how Liu managed to become top dog in the state. In essence this critique is unprincipled and opportunist, because Mao nowhere explains why he and Liu held many of the same political positions during the thirties and forties. We believe there is overwhelming evidence to prove that Liu & Co. were right-wingers. But this fact by itself cannot explain the growth of revisionism in China. Because the CCP never correctly analyzed its own development or the development of revisionism in the Soviet Union, it has not solved this problem.

Therefore, it is no surprise that the GPCR has been crushed and the changes fought for in China have been reversed. It is no surprise that the momentary left direction of China's foreign policy has turned into its opposite, and that Chinese foreign policy is now to the right of the right-wing Bandung Conference program of the fifties. Additionally the CCP never mounted an anti-revisionist attack on the Cubans, the North Koreans, or the North Vietnamese. (In the recent period, this troika has served as a figleaf for revisionism.) They have used engagement in and support of armed struggle as a cover for their own right opportunism and nationalism. But their opportunism becomes increasingly apparent nonetheless. Cuba hailed Allende's election in Chile and now advocates the peaceful road to socialism. The North Vietnamese revisionists recently announced their public advocacy of capitalist production relations. Le Duan, who seems to be the big boss in North Vietnam, issued sweeping orders to enlarge material incentives, grant private ownership, and allow increased profits. Typically, the CCP does not issue the slightest criticism of these developments. Why should it? Le Duan, Castro, and Kim Il Sung are faithfully carrying out Chairman Mao's thesis of New Democracy.

Consequently, it is a very logical development that the Mao Tse-tung leadership moves for accommodation with U.S. imperialism. Ping-pong diplomacy is a consistent development of right-wing policies. How ironic that the CCP feverishly tries to get into the U.S.-Soviet imperialist's UN, after giving the ex-Indonesian leader, Sukarno, roses for leaving it. During the GPCR the CCP attacked the UN. They carefully explained the class role it played in the world. And they were emphatic that they had no intention of trying to get into this nest of vipers dominated by U.S. and Soviet bosses. Finally the trickle of attempts of the right-led leadership to reestablish relations with capitalist powers has now become a torrent. This includes virtually all the large capitalist powers who were accurately described as monsters of all kinds, every right-wing nationalist hack and every revisionist leadership in the world. Obviously, the CCP has changed its policy of reliance on the masses to reliance on the world's bourgeoisie. The rationale is to prevent an attack on China, but this policy has never worked on its own terms. It has subverted, confused and held back revolutionaries.

We would be guilty of the same error committed by the CCP in analyzing the roots of revisionism, however, if we ascribed the defeat of the GPCR and the present right drift of Chinese policy to Mao's errors alone. *The key error in the GPCR was made by the left, when it failed to separate itself ideologically and organizationally from Mao.* It tolerated and in some cases encouraged the anti-Marxist Mao cult. The principal task in China remains the overthrow of the "red" bourgeoisie. If the left is to give leadership in accomplishing this task, it must regroup and irrevocably split from Mao & Co. This is the only course that can lead to the realization of the excellent slogans advanced by the GPCR: serve the people; no "aid" from revisionists; no negotiations with revisionists and imperialists; support only the broad revolutionary masses; bombard the headquarters; drag out the power-holders; draw a clear line between us and

the enemy; and no unity of action with revisionists.

We are convinced that the defeat of the GPCR is temporary. This profound revolution enriched Marxism-Leninism and enabled the international communist movement to advance. We would never have been able to discuss many of the ideas in this report without the forward thrust of left forces during the GPCR. True, Mao and his group were able to turn the left's own weaknesses against itself, but in order to do so, he had to popularize left ideas and slogans to millions. We believe in these ideas and slogans. They light the way forward for our party, and we must strive to carry them out.

INFALLIBILITY AND THE CULT OF THE INDIVIDUAL

We have already attempted to show how this bourgeois concept helped reverse the GPCR. The myth of leaders' infallibility has been a millstone around the neck of the communist movement for decades. Whenever the movement dilutes itself by making concessions to bourgeois forces, it leaves itself open to the Pandora's box of bourgeois ideas.

Cultism and the doctrine of infallibility did not originate with the struggle for proletarian dictatorship. They are as old as the hills. The Greeks had an oracle at Delphi. The pre-feudal Orient produced Buddha. Christianity gave us God the Father, Jesus the Son, and Casper the Holy Ghost., along with the Pope and the mumbo-jumbo surrounding all of them. Infallibility and cultism have appeared down through the ages and have affected every aspect of social life. The Nazi Hitler claimed infallibility, as did the bourgeois democrat Roosevelt and the communist Stalin.

This reactionary doctrine thwarts the political development of the masses. Since someone "up there" does our thinking for us, why should we bother to do it ourselves? It takes political power out of the hands of the masses. It encourages bourgeois individualism, by urging the masses to seek individual self-improvement through emulation of the "infallible one."

Khrushchev attacked the Stalin cult from the right, in order to discredit Marxism-Leninism and secure political power for the new Soviet bourgeoisie. We attack the cult from the left, in order to serve the masses and win socialism. We believe in a revolutionary working-class party directly tied to the masses and controlled by them. We believe in democratic-centralism. We believe in *leadership that sets proletarian dictatorship and socialism as its goal*. We believe in criticism and self-criticism by all party members and leaders. We view infallibility and cultism as class questions.

Today the U.S. ruling class consciously uses cultism to impede the growth of the left. The bosses are only too happy to use their media to build up a left leader. They would like to turn his head, transform him into a "celebrity," and thereby separate him from the masses. Since they like to take as few chances as possible, they also glorify scores of their own heroes and urge us to emulate them. By using cultism, extreme egoism, and individualism, the bosses try to determine the identity of the people's leaders and the content of their leadership. Leadership by publicity is the current vogue. The bosses choose certain "leaders" and slate them for instant stardom. Suddenly, everyone is reading their books or watching their interviews on the tube. Then, when the bosses decide they need a fresh image, they shunt these gurus into oblivion by shutting them off the tube and publishing someone else's books.

In the final analysis, we must decide once and for all who is the prime motive force in history: individuals or the masses.

PERIOD OF WARS AND REVOLUTIONS

Many people will react to the ideas in this report by saying that PL is arrogant and cruel: "They sit on their asses and say it was wrong to make this concession or that one. Do they want people to fight and starve endlessly?" The masses -- not we -- have already answered this question. If everything had been hunky-dory in China, why did the GPCR erupt? How come the workers in Poland rebelled against their revisionist bosses? How come the people of Vietnam rebelled and built their revolutionary movement after the 1946 negotiations with the French? How come they rebelled again and built an even stronger movement after the Geneva accords? Both China and the Soviet Union signed the 1954 Geneva agreement to break up Vietnam. They relied on imperialist promises of free election guaranteed by the UN. But the South Vietnamese people never went along with this sellout. Before the ink had dried on the Geneva agreement, they were organizing and fighting. Ho Chi Minh didn't organize them. He and the other Vietnamese leaders latched onto their movement only after it had become the fact of life. These revisionists made sure the Vietnamese revolution would remain well within the bounds of nationalism and bourgeois democracy.

The people never accept betrayal. They always see through it and fight back. Even on its own terms humanism fails, because every time "humanitarian" arguments are induced to bring about negotiations, the people have to pay a stiffer price after the inevitable sellout. They are left with the same rotten, murderous exploitation that they attempted to smash in the first place. They often have to rebuild their movement from scratch. Their fight for socialism becomes longer and harder than it would have been without the betrayal. But no deal, no concession can stop this fight. Nothing can.

Every time revolutionaries foist a nationalist hack like Sihanouk on the backs of the people, the people must pay a high price to get rid of him. How many Indonesians did Sukarno's line enable the bosses to slaughter? Yet the Chinese hailed Sukarno. They praised him to the skies. When he pulled out of the U.N., they congratulated him for his courage and principles. Yet today they are dying to get into the U.N. themselves. Every time they buy the vote of another nationalist or fascist, *Peking Review* hails the event as a momentous victory. Ironically, the Chinese have restored or are attempting to restore ties to many of the capitalist powers with whom Sukarno severed relations.

There is no correct way to unite with nationalists or imperialists. Where did such unity ever advance the cause of revolution? During the GPCR, the masses rejected this old, wrong, despicable policy. They will do so again.

In this period, the mounting contradictions faced by U.S. imperialism are embodied in its economic, political, and military weaknesses. Contradictions in revisionist countries are helping to intensify class antagonisms. These contradictions are clearly manifested by sharpening class struggle in Poland and Yugoslavia. Revolutionary ideology will strengthen its foothold among the masses, and the revolutionary process will spread internationally. Imperialism and revisionism cannot stop this process. For this reason, we say that the present period is one of wars and revolutions.

We hope and work for more revolutions. We welcome mass armed struggle. Conditions for sharper, more serious struggle are constantly maturing in the U.S. We believe that nuclear blackmail as it was used by the Soviets during the Sinn-Soviet border clashes won't work. It may have scared Chou En-lai & Co. to back down. But it will not intimidate the masses. The left in China and the rest of the world will not be bamboozled by any kind of blackmail. The GPCR and the initial stages of people's war in Vietnam have shown that in the period that has seen great increases in the sophistication of imperialist weaponry and in imperialist ferocity, revolutionary struggle has taken giant strides forward.

UNITED FRONT AT ALL TIMES

As we have repeatedly pointed out, we reject the concept of a united front with bosses. We reject the concept of a united front with revisionists. We reject the concept of a united front with Trotskyists and the herd of various fakes on

the left. We believe in a united front that advances the struggle, not one that leads the masses into the arms of the enemy. We can't and won't run after every leader or group that may appear left but is really right in essence.

We believe in a united front from below that takes the form of a left-center coalition. Many people in our country are ready to grasp socialist ideas *now*. The contradictions between them and their leaders are increasing daily. In addition, there are many millions of good people who have no basic organizational or political allegiance to the bourgeoisie. In some cases, the party can help organize groups and work with them around questions of *immediate interest*. This would be an alliance between center forces and ourselves. In other cases, we can attempt to ally with groups that already exist. Finally, we may also ally with formations within national or state organizations that separate themselves from the policies of their liberal-imperialist or revisionist "leaders." The united front necessarily assumes the organizational form of an alliance between ourselves and other groups. Within this alliance, we must implement the policy of "*struggle with -- struggle against*."

We also work within reactionary groups if they have a hold on significant numbers of people. We set no particular restrictions on this type of work. But this is not united front work. Generally speaking, the purpose of our presence in such groups is to win their membership to socialism and our party, not to build the groups. We can't develop the united front or the party by wagging our tail after right-wingers.

The political basis of the united front is our mass line on whatever issue workers and others deem important at any given moment. At present, the fight against racist unemployment constitutes the principal aspect of our mass line. Our participation in this fight enables us to make a united front with many different forces. Without a mass line, the united front is meaningless. Unlike the Trots and other nuts on the "left," we know that the masses are always embroiled in struggle. Every struggle carries with it a mass line. We attempt to raise the level of political consciousness both within and outside the mass movement. The process of politicization can be accomplished only if we involve ourselves in work on immediate issues. We should never separate ourselves from the people by abstaining from the class struggle. A party that doesn't fight dries up and dies. A party that doesn't bring communist ideas into the movement isn't a communist party: at best, it is a reform group.

We can best support the people's struggles by fighting for socialism and by defeating revisionism. This approach is as applicable to wars of liberation as it is to the fight at home for more jobs. The best support we can give our comrades in Vietnam is to struggle for the U.S. to get out now, to organize for the defeat of imperialism at home and in Vietnam, and to reject revisionism in the U.S., Vietnam, and everywhere else.

The united front is a critical form for winning people to socialist consciousness. Ultimately, no struggle can succeed unless its goal is proletarian dictatorship -- and the only way to win proletarian dictatorship is to defeat imperialism and revisionism.

Basically, this means that there are many questions around which the mass struggle is raging. These include: unemployment, wages, prices, taxes, more schools, improved medical care, racism, war, and living conditions. There are plenty of principled questions which we can unite and fight on with millions. Within these struggles we can link the fight for reforms to the need for socialism. Most people in our country are not yet for socialism. However, many more people than we ever dreamed of are open to struggle for working class ideas -- ideas for workers' power. In doing this we can avoid the old error of creating illusions that capitalism can reform itself; and we can avoid the old Trotskyite error of separating ourselves from the struggle of all people. We are a working-class party. No struggle is meaningless to us. No struggle is something that belongs to other people whom we are just helping out. We need to fight on all questions of principle. Socialism is not just something we need -- it is necessary for the survival of our class.

BROADEN OUR INTERNATIONALIST OUTLOOK

In the past, we have been too reticent in seeking out and working with other forces in the international movement. We have been slow in raising support for the class struggles conducted by workers in other countries. However, we know that class struggle is sharpening everywhere. We know that each struggle abroad is interrelated to struggle in the U.S. We also know that communism can't advance with a bad line.

We have no reason to bemoan our fate or to pity ourselves for being the only ones with these "way-out" ideas. The ideas we hold did not fall from heaven, nor do they belong to use exclusively. We know that millions in China hold them. Many other groups and individuals around the world either share some of these ideas already or are open to them. In the final analysis, *everyone* is open to them. We have no lock on the objective situation. Everyone else is as "smart" as we are. Millions will draw the same conclusions we have drawn, enrich them, and advance them. The ideas in this report by no means constitute the final word on the subject.

In our paper, magazine, pamphlets, and organizational work, we must strive to make internationalism more than a nice word on a hunk of paper. International Solidarity Day (ISD) was significant step in this direction. Curiously enough, our enemies at home went ape after ISD. All the little cockers starting hustling their groups together and issuing one manifesto after another. All these groups push the line of nationalism in opposition to internationalism. The banding together of our enemies reflects the bosses' panicked efforts to preserve nationalism in the face of growing proletarian-internationalist mass consciousness. We know that the police are pushing these people along every step of the way. Keep up the good work, fellows. All your puny actions prove that we are pursuing the right course.

OUR ERRORS

Over the years we have been guilty of many of the same errors made by the CCP. In our earlier period we supported many nationalists at home and abroad. We were unable to make the correct link-up between nationalism -- the "militant" variety -- and capitalism. We believed that "revolutionary" nationalism as espoused by a Malcolm X, Robert Williams or a Sukarno or Boumediene type would be a transition belt from capitalism to socialism. Sometimes we arrived at these erroneous conclusions ourselves, or we were guilty of following the CCP policies unquestioningly.

In doing this we deluded ourselves into taking incorrect class positions. This cop-out from the ideological struggle often led us into making racist errors. It was our belief that most black and minority workers couldn't be won to socialist ideas. Hence, we didn't engage in sharp ideological struggle. Many black and minority people who were won to the party drifted away as they recognized that the party had two standards for black and white. White members had to believe in socialism; minority members could believe in anything they wanted. Naturally, they reasoned if the party had a nationalist outlook why did you need a party in the first place. After all, many non-communists in the mass movement advocated many national reforms.

The other side of the coin was reached when we rejected nationalism as a bourgeois outlook. Then many of our members developed a racist pattern. Many considered everyone an enemy who had a nationalist outlook. In every section of the people there is acceptance of many ruling class ideas. If they all were our enemies we would all disappear. To the extent nationalism is a mass phenomenon it is a response to racism. We have found that it isn't that difficult to win many people away from a nationalist outlook. Not to do so would result in the vilest racism. Additionally, if we accept the point that many, if not most, white workers are racists whom we should have nothing to do with, we would lose by default. This inverse racism would be an acceptance of the status-quo.

Another serious error we made was to take a superficial view of the CCP's fight against Soviet revisionism. We didn't

seriously question the limited nature of the struggle against revisionism. We were satisfied by the superficiality of the struggle as opposed to the need for ferreting out the roots of revisionism. We were too content to hear the Chinese berate Khrushchev instead of analyzing, ourselves, the fundamental reasons for Soviet opportunism. (Perhaps we haven't come up with all the answers or even the right ones; but we have tried to go beyond the simple shibboleths dished out by various forces in the movement.)

So when the GPCR was launched we didn't question it sufficiently. While we questioned the adulation of Mao, and the fact that workers were not immediately in the leadership of the GPCR, and that many of the errors attributed to Liu were errors made by Mao, we were satisfied that Mao and Co. were going in the right direction. We weren't able to see the trends in the mass movement, or that Mao and others were really right-wingers wrapping themselves in a red flag. We didn't recognize the above-mentioned errors to be of sufficient principle, as to throw into question the entire Mao leadership. In other words, we couldn't see how the Mao Tse-tung leadership was taking away the initiative of the left in order to put over a right line.

We were fooled for awhile into believing that basic differences existed between the Mao and Liu factions. In essence, differences which did exist were tactical, not strategic. They are like differences which exist in the ruling class in our country between liberals and conservatives. We are against picking sides at home because we know that every faction in the ruling class is for capitalism. We didn't know enough to take a similar position in regard to the CCP. We weren't sharp enough in drawing the proper lessons from Mao's one-sided support of the Hanoi and National Liberation Front leaders. The right-wingers in Hanoi and in the NLF held many, many positions which were contrary to the CCP. For example, the Vietnamese supported Soviet revisionists. They took Soviet "aid;" they supported most of the counterrevolutionary actions of this group -- like the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Hanoi opportunists never fought revisionism. They always sought to unify Peking and Moscow. Obviously, they knew more than we did. We had illusions about the Mao leadership. Ho Chi Minh must have understood that the differences between China and the Soviet Union-- as well as differences between Mao and Liu -- were secondary.

Another area in which we erred for some time was our method of relying on the masses. From our inception we rejected the idea of withholding our socialist ideas from workers. And to some extent we put it into practice. But this practice was limited. In the past two years we have begun to reach out to workers and all people opposed to the ruling class in a much larger way with communist ideas. The response has been excellent. More workers have come into or drawn closer to the Party. While we have improved in putting forward our ideas in a much more vigorous and consistent way we have not yet achieved what is possible.

Still too little time is spent in winning workers to communism, either through mass agitation or mass struggle. And only by overcoming our weaknesses in building united fronts and base-building can we correct this shortcoming. Either we rely and have confidence in workers or we perish. Either we become communists where we work, live or go to school or we will be reduced to perpetual outsiders.

Thus, the main way revisionism appears in our party is to the degree we do not implement our line on basebuilding. It is to the degree our sectarianism separates us from the workers. The kernel of our line is reliance on the workers. But how can we rely on them if we have little or no base among them? While we have made important strides these past two years, many people are still lagging by the wayside.

During the last two years we made an important breakthrough in the battle against revisionism. We brought socialist ideas to masses of workers, and we involved ourselves with thousands. We smashed the revisionist concept that socialism wasn't the order of the day, and that raising socialist ideas would separate us from the workers. To the degree we have done this we have drawn closer -- much closer. Workers, by the thousands, are interested in our party and socialism. However, most workers are not ready to launch a socialist revolution now. They are ready to fight like

hell on many immediate grievances. To abstain from these fights would be to reduce socialism to an abstraction. There would be no way to win people to the need for socialist revolution, and to show how the fight for reforms by itself can never solve workers' problems.

All struggles would be separated into two. There would be those "unimportant" struggles for jobs, wages, against war and racism, etc., that workers are involved in daily; and those actions for socialism our party is involved in. In other words, to abstain from workers' struggles would be tantamount to saying that the party doesn't care about conditions. As a matter of fact the party would preserve and update the Trotskyite notion of the "worse the better." In other words, why should we fight for reforms, because if we succeed we will only be creating illusions about the system. Instead we should relate the fight for reforms to the fight for socialism, and in these fights unmercifully expose all the fakes in the mass movement who would deliver the movement to the bosses.

If we are sectarian or without ties to people we can spout our line all we want. We will get no place. We will dry up and disappear. Too many people still have a "me-too" outlook -- that is, a capitalist outlook. They hide their anti-working class feelings or their fear of the workers behind "correct" slogans. A holier-than-thou attitude sometimes prevails. Secondary matters become primary in the absence of a base. Many people still view Marxism-Leninism as their property. They are unwilling to bring it to workers, learn from them and enrich Marxism-Leninism. We cannot tolerate isolated members. We cannot tolerate members who hang onto their base like money. The purpose of a political base is to bring more workers into leadership in the fight against the bosses. Most of our subjective weaknesses like fear and individualism can be corrected within the framework of base-building. New people won to the party should be developed so they can build a base. The party can grow in a climate which is more than favorable. In most cases when we rely on the masses or our base to give leadership the class struggle progresses. Most of our subjective weaknesses like fear and individualism can be corrected within the framework of base-building.

Our party wants to be involved and leading events. But *we want to involve millions in the Marxist-Leninist process*. Only the workers have the power and understanding to win and secure state power. History has taught us the bitter lesson that a party can grow, can lead struggles, and even hold power temporarily. But it will lose out if millions upon millions of workers aren't imbued with socialist consciousness, and take part in the political planning and direction of the party. This concept is not antagonistic to leadership, to a party, or to winning power. The more people who are involved in leadership and party building the better. We reject socialism by deceit, by inches, by an elite, etc. We reject reliance on the ruling class -- any section of it. We rely only on workers all over the world. The working class is one international class with the need to crush each section of the international bourgeoisie until the entire ruling class is finished. This is not a bookkeeper's approach. It is an approach which demands the unity of all workers at the highest level. It calls upon all workers to be won to Marxism-Leninism.

SUMMARY

Undoubtedly, our ideas will be attacked as heresy. We will be called everything from Trotskyists to who-knows-what. However, we have the ability to act on our mass line. We aren't going to contemplate our navels. Carrying out our line in practice is the decisive way to prove its validity. Every time we move our asses one tiny bit to bring our line to workers, they receive it enthusiastically. Our confidence in our ideas and our ability to make progress are closely tied to continued basebuilding for the party in the working class. Our party won't grow if it doesn't initiate struggles, if it doesn't stand in the forefront of all struggles, and if it doesn't build united fronts with those who are prepared to join with us on specific issues or sets of issues.

If we don't serve the people, we are useless or harmful to them.

Therefore, in the coming period, we must carry out the following tasks:

1. Root out all ideas that lead to alliances with the ruling class. Reject alliances that lead to ideological concessions now and economic concessions later. They can only turn us into a revisionist organization.
2. Steel ourselves and our friends to recognize and avoid nationalist traps. This can best be accomplished by fighting racism.
3. Make sure that the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism are *always* put forward in all party agitation.
4. Wipe out all vestiges of cultism. They have held us back in the past. Intensify the struggle against individualism in ourselves. As a start, the National Committee has approved the idea of suppressing the glorification of individual images that may arise in the party. Every member of the party must be able to present the party line. We do not believe in relying on the verbal or political dexterity of a few "experts."
5. Intensify our mass work. Struggle on issues. Build the united front as a left-center coalition. Win people to the Party. Build the unemployment movement.
6. Improve and expand our international work. Build international unity.

We have every reason to believe that by discussing, applying, and enriching this line, our party will deepen its ties to workers in this country and internationally. We have a world to learn -- and a world to win.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution & the Reversal of Worker's Power in China

(Originally published in *PL Magazine*, 'Special Issue' Vol 8, No. 3, November 1971, pp. 25-49. Second article in the original *PL Magazine* publication)

The accepted view among Marxist-Leninists is that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (GPCR) was a struggle of the masses, led by Chairman Mao, to defeat the bourgeois rightists within the Party and thereby prevent their influence from growing to the point where they could reverse the proletarian dictatorship. The "16-point" *Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Concerning the GPCR* (Aug. 8, 1966) defines the struggle in this way:

Although the bourgeoisie has been overthrown, it is still trying to use the old ideas, culture, customs and habits of the exploiting classes to corrupt the masses, capture their minds and endeavor to stage a come-back. The proletariat must do just the opposite: it must meet head-on every challenge of the bourgeoisie, in the ideological field and use the new ideas, culture, customs and habits of the proletariat to change the mental outlook of the whole of society. At present, our objective is to struggle against and such those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road, to criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois academic "authorities" and the ideology of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes and to transform education, literature and art and all other parts of the superstructure that do not correspond to the socialist economic base, so as to facilitate the consolidation and development of the socialist system.

The basic assumption is that the GPCR takes place under conditions of proletarian dictatorship, i.e. that the working class holds state power and has successfully carried through the socialist transformation of the material base. A *Red Flag* editorial of Feb., 1967 made the goals more concrete and defined the enemy:

Proletarian revolutionaries are united to seize power from the handful of persons within the party who are in authority and taking the capitalist road....Adequate attention must be paid to the role of revolutionary cadres in the struggle to seize power....The can become the backbone of the struggle to seize power and can become leaders in this struggle....A clear distinction must be drawn between those in authority who belong to the proletariat and those who belong to the bourgeoisie....

The overwhelming majority of the ordinary cadres in the Party and government organizations, enterprises and undertakings are good and want to make revolution.

The official documents of the GPCR state that 95% of the cadre are revolutionary, that only a "small handful of capitalist-roaders" have "wormed their way" into the party and that even leading cadres who have made serious mistakes can be re-educated by the masses and allowed to remain in their posts. Thus the GPCR is seen as a struggle between the Left, led by the proletarian headquarters of Mao, Lin Piao, Chou En-lai et. al. and the Right, led by the "black gang": Liu Shao Ch'i, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, P'eng Chen and Tao Chu. Victory went to the Left, preserving and consolidating socialism in China.

But this picture is confused by a third force on the scene. Mao and official CCP statements refer often to "extreme-leftists" who attack *all* the leading cadre, engage in "bitter armed struggle", deny the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is a supporter of the Left, despise Chou En-lai and the other bureaucrats of the State Council and launch indiscriminate attacks against China's nationalist allies. What do we know about this "extreme-left" and what was its program?

Many of the large mass organizations of students and workers formed to overthrow the "capitalist-roaders" espoused "extreme-Leftist" views. In Hunan province, the "Sheng-Wu-Lien", a coalition of 20 Red Guard and rebel-worker groups, claimed 2 to 3 million followers. In Kwangsi, the "April 22 Rebel Grand Army" was one of the two largest mass organizations and came repeatedly into conflict with the PLA and the Central Authorities. In Peking, "extreme-Leftists" were strong in the Red Guard Congresses of Tsinghua and other universities. In Canton, the "Red Flag" was an "extreme-Leftist" group which was for a time the largest organization in the city and the major antagonist of the Military Region Command which ruled the city. Another important "extreme-Leftist" group was the "Red Guard Army", known in Canton as the "August 1 Combat Corps", which was made up of de-mobilized veterans of the PLA and several times resisted orders to disband. Similar organizations existed in urban areas. The consensus of Red Guard sources and western scholars who have studied the question is that somewhere between *30-40 million* people followed these organizations.

Moreover, these local organizations, based in factories, schools, cities and regions began to develop an extensive network of connections. Red Guards traveled frequently to congresses where experiences and ideas were exchanged; liaison stations were established in many cities by important local groups, e.g., the Ching kangshang Rebel Red Guard group of Peking University had representatives in Canton, Wuhan and Shanghai. These congresses and stations were the beginning of a movement toward political and ideological unification of the "extreme-Left" which proceeded rapidly until smashed by the government and the Army between Sept. 1967 and July 1968.

These facts make it clear that we are dealing here with a political movement quite different from the isolated sectarian groups whom Lenin had attacked as "ultra-left" after World War I. This is a mass movement which frequently put forward positions in contradiction to Mao/Lin/Chou and came into sharp conflict with the PLA under their leadership.

An article in a Shanghai periodical in late July, 1967 characterized the politics of the "extreme-Left" in this way:

Recently, a sort of so-called 'new trend of thought' prevails in society. Its principal content is to distort the major contradiction of socialist society into one between the so-called 'power-holders', i.e., the 'privileged persons' who hold 'property and power' and the masses of the people. It demands an incessant 'redistribution' of the social property and political power under the proletarian dictatorship. The new trend of thought has equated the current GPCR with a conflict for wealth and power 'within a reactionary ruling class'. It has equated the headquarters of Mao/Lin with that of Liu/Teng/Tao. It has branded all leading cadres as privileged persons and thrust them all into the position of objects of revolution. (CNS, No. 188)

The "extreme-Left" held that China was already in the hands of a *bourgeois ruling class* at the time the GPCR began, that the vast majority (90%) of the leading cadres were part of that oppressor class, that the PLA was its tool to smash the real Left and maintain power, that the new "red" bourgeoisie had emerged during the 17 years from 1949-66 from the ranks of the revolutionaries themselves and, therefore, that the GPCR was not, as Mao said, a struggle to consolidate proletarian rule, but *the first revolution in history to attempt to take power back from the revisionists*. This basis analysis led the "extreme-Left" groups to carry out the following political campaigns.

- 1) They demanded the ouster of Chou En-lai as the chief representative of China's "red" capitalists, along with the high-ranking economic and administrative ministers he was sheltering.
- 2) They demanded that the GPCR be carried into the Army Officer Corps, which they saw a part of the new ruling class. They engaged in arms seizures from the PLA, raiding depots and arms trains, on the principle that a revolution to overthrow the bourgeoisie had to be an armed struggle of the masses.
- 3) They looked to the Paris Commune as the model of the institutions of the proletarian state and fought to establish the commune-type of state throughout China (abolition of the standing army, worker's wages for officials, election and right of recall of all officials).
- 4) They opposed China's foreign policies of alliance with secondary imperialists (France, etc.) and bourgeois nationalist regimes (Indonesia, Pakistan, etc.). To carry this through they seized foreign ships in the harbors, burned the British consulate in Aug. 1967, launched a liberation struggle in Hong Kong, seized Soviet arms going to Vietnam over China's railroad lines and opposed China's nuclear development program.
- 5) They began to discuss and implement the formation of a new Marxist-Leninist Communist party, given their assumption that the CCP had become the party of the bourgeois apparatus which was restoring capitalism under the ideological cover of Marxism-Leninism.

The "extreme-Left" presented a view of what was going on in the GPCR which was contradictory to the official views of the CCP under Mao. ("95% of the cadres are good" vs. "90% of the political cadres must step aside".) If their analysis of the political situation in China was correct, if China was at that time ruled by a "red" bourgeoisie, then the "extreme-Left" is, in fact, the *Left* and Mao and his allies are the principal section of the "red bourgeoisie". The attack on Liu Shao-ch'i and a tiny minority of high officials was therefore a struggle *within* this bourgeois class between those who wanted to develop China through dependence on the Soviet Union and those who wanted an independent path. Mao and Lin Piao attempted to mobilize the masses to their side by appropriating many of the ideas and slogans of the Left and presenting them in watered-down versions. We are not arguing that this was, in every case, a *conscious* process of deception; but that the ideology of new-democracy/Mao Tse-tung Thought *objectively* led the proletarian and peasant masses into an alliance with a part of the bourgeoisie (the 95% of "good cadres") allowing this part to consolidate its power at the expense of the masses and sacrificing only an especially discredited group of officials as scape-goats.

It is necessary, therefore, to make an objective historical analysis of the developments of socialism in China, in order to determine whether the position of the "extreme-Left" in the GPCR was correct.

Throughout the period of revolutionary struggle in the countryside, (1927-1949) the line of the CCP contained two contradictory aspects: on the one hand there was a "poor-peasant" *class struggle* line directed against both the landlords and the capitalist rich-peasants and calling for collective forms of landholding; on the other hand, there was "rich-peasant" new-democratic *class collaborationist* line directed solely against the most important landlords and the Japanese imperialists and advocating partial reliance on local capitalists. These two lines were in constant struggle, giving CCP policy and practice a vacillating and inconsistent character. The class-struggle aspect was primary during the period of civil war against the Kuomintang (1946-1949) and led to victory and proletarian dictatorship. But the new-democratic line became primary right after the seizure of power.

This new-democratic political line anticipated a transition period during which capitalism was to be allowed to develop further, although under close regulation, so as to create the material and ideological conditions for making the

transition to socialism gradually and without further armed struggle. The CCP had promised the people immediate benefits from the elimination of the landlords and the imperialists and the opening up of new opportunities for individual and collective enrichment. On the eve of victory, Mao defined the party's task:

If we know nothing about production and do not master it quickly, if we cannot restore and develop production as speedily as possible and achieve solid successes so that the livelihood of the workers, first of all, and that of the people in general is improved, we shall be unable to sustain our political power, we shall be unable to stand on our feet, we shall fail...

In this period, all capitalist elements in the cities and countryside which are not harmful but beneficial to the national economy should be allowed to exist and expand...But the existence and expansion of capitalism in China will be restricted from several directions...Restriction versus opposition to restriction will be the main form of class struggle in the new-democratic state. (Report to 2nd Plenum of 7th Central Committee CC.)

"RED" CARPET FOR SUDANESE BUTCHER

On August 6, Major-General Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri (P.S.C.), President of the Revolution Command Council, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Sudan, and the Sudanese Friendship Delegation led by him arrived in Peking by special plane on a state visit at the invitation of the Chinese Government. Several hundred thousand revolutionary people lined the main thoroughfare of the capital to extend a grand and warm welcome to the distinguished Sudanese guests from the Arab anti-imperialist front.

A grand ceremony was held at the airport where the national flags of China and the Sudan were fluttering. The band played the nation anthems of the Sudan and China. Accompanied by Premier Chou En-lai and Chief of the General Staff Huang Yung-sheng and others, President Nimeri and the other distinguished guests reviewed a guard of honour made up of men of the three services of the P.L.A., militiamen and Red Guards, and walked round to meet the newcomers.

Peking Review, August 14, 1971

CAIRO, July 22 -- The Sudanese leader who was deposed in a coup d'état Monday reclaimed power today after neighboring Libya ordered a plane carrying two his rivals down and then took them into custody. According to broadcasts from the Sudan, Maj. Gen. Gafaar al-Nimery was restored to the

premiership by loyal officers and troops who staged a countercoup. The general went on the radio tonight and called on the Sudanese people to seize all Communists and turn them over to the police or the army.

New York Times

There was only one way to bring about an immediate restoration and growth of the national economy: rely on the former ruling class which had learned the methods and skills required to keep the economy functioning. This meant, in particular, enlisting into the service of the new state the large body of technicians, managers, engineers, government administrators and intellectuals who had served the old regime. According to An Tzu-Wen (*NCNA*, Sept. 30, 1952), the cadre force had quadrupled between '49-'52, from 720,000 to 2,750,000. The bulk of these were the so-called "retained cadres", capitalist managers and ex-Kuomintang civil servants. Some were peasants and workers who had distinguished themselves in various political campaigns, especially the land reform; but the CCP was mistrustful of the many rural activists who had tendencies during land reform to commit "Leftist" errors, meaning that they had carried expropriation into the ranks of the rich peasants, whom Mao wished to preserve as a source of increased production. Another group consisted of recent graduates of colleges and special cadre training schools.

The ideological commitment of the bulk of cadres was thus not to socialism, as a system of social relations among men, but to national economic development, which they would see, as a result of class background and education, to conceive in capitalist terms. The CCP tried to counter this situation by intensive political education of the new cadres and mass campaigns in which the workers were encouraged to criticize all elements of personal corruption, bureaucratic style of work, etc. that they found in the cadres. But these steps could not in any short period alter the basic ideological orientation of the bulk of the new cadres.

Moreover, many of the cadres were taken into the party, in order to subject them to its discipline and facilitate their ideological re-molding. Party membership rose from 3,000,000 in mid-1948 to 5,800,000 in mid-1951. (Official CCP figures in Schurmann, p. 129.) It was inevitable, given the new-democratic line, that the CCP would attract many whose primary commitment was not to socialism but to the protection and advancement of the interests of the bourgeoisie. The repeated anti-Rightist struggles of the next decade (1954-55, 1957, 1959) testify to the existence of this element within the Party.

The "retained" cadres, as well as the newly trained college graduates, were paid the wages which they were accustomed to receiving. Given their primarily bourgeois orientation, only material reward commensurate with the privileged position of managers and administrators within capitalist society would induce them to serve the new state power. This created a contradiction with the system under which the Communist cadres had lived before liberation, the so-called "supply-system". All cadres, whatever their responsibilities and positions, from the rank-and-file on up to top leadership were provided with the basic necessities of life in kind, plus a little pocket money for incidentals. This created an egalitarian and democratic style of work. It was a concrete application of communist principle of distribution: "From each according to his ability, to each according to his need." Those who were committed to serving the people by destroying the system of exploitation and creating a new system of socialism should be willing to do the work they were capable of without special material reward. This corresponded to the lesson Marx, Engels and Lenin had drawn from the experience of the Paris Commune, that fundamental principle of proletarian dictatorship must be that work *for the state be performed at average workers' wages*.

After Liberation, the supply-system for Communist cadres contradicted the wage system under which new cadres were paid, a wage system which necessarily contained large differentials between high and low levels, it being a basic idea of bourgeois society that the mental work of administration and management is superior to manual work and

ought to be rewarded correspondingly. The CCP leadership then made the choice to eliminate the supply-system and bring all the cadre, both Party and non-Party, both pre-Liberation and post-Liberation, under a unified wage-grade system. This was completed by a State Council Order of Aug. 31, 1955:

for the purpose of putting into effect the principle of to 'each according to his work' and 'equal pay for equal work', the supply system now applicable to a section of government employees is to be changed into a wage system of pay and allowance for governmental employees and facilitate the building of socialism. (*NCNA*, Sept. 14, 1955. Transl. in *SCMP*, 1134, 1. 12.)

At the same time, the cadre wage system was consolidated into a 30-grade scale with the following monthly wages: (from Barnett, p. 191)

REPRESENTATIVE POSITION	GRADE	WAGE (in yuan/month)
Premier, Head of State, etc	1	600
Deputy Premier, CC member, etc	2-5	400-500
Central Minister	6	400
Bureau Chief (Central)	9-12	200-250
Division Chief (Central)	13-15	150-200
County-level Magistrate	13-15	130-160
Section Chief (Central)	16-17	100-135
County-level section member	18-23	50-90
Clerical Staff	24-27	30-45
General Service personnel	28-30	23-29

For purposes of comparison, here are some representative wage figures for workers and managers: (from Chao Kuo-chun, Vol. 2, p. 73-74 -- figures for 1956)

Plant director--263, Chief Engineer 223, Chief Designer--135, Engineer--118-191, Technician--103-166, Chief Accountant--74-126, Bookkeeper--45-78, File Clerk--41-66, Worker in heavy industry--69-106, Worker in light industry--56, Worker in construction--31-51, misc. worker--23-34. At the same time peasant incomes ran about 8-15.

It is clear from these highly-differentiated wage scales that the principle of the Paris Commune was not being applied. The payments were thought to reflect correctly the principle of distribution under the first stage of socialism--'to each according to his work'. The official editorials explaining the change presented the following view:

The supply system was a system of treatment of government employees adopted at a time of the revolutionary war when the financial and economic situation was rather acute. It was built on the premise that the revolutionary workers possessed a high

degree of political consciousness. Its special features were: On the basis of the minimum subsistence requirements of revolutionary workers, the state was to supply them with a definite quantity of the essential articles of livelihood...There was thus little difference between the treatment accorded to cadres at higher levels and the general rank-and-file government workers, insofar as their personal requirements were concerned. It may be described as a measure in keeping with the military communist way of life.

If the supply system has played an important role in ensuring the final victory of the revolution, why should it be replaced now in its entirety by the wage system?...this is because the supply system is contradictory to the principles of 'to each according to his work' and 'equal pay for equal work'. (Tu Shao-po & Wang I-cheng in Shih Shih Shou Ts'e, Sept. 25, 1955. Transl. in *ECMM*, no. 19, p. 27)

...He who performs better labor and does better work gets a better pay, and equal work will earn equal pay. In this way, one can be caused to interest himself, from the standpoint of material interests, in the results of his labor and to link up his personal interests with the overall interest of the state...(Renmin Ribao, Sept. 14, 1955. Transl. in *SCMP*, no. 1134, p. 13)

The CCP leadership thus saw the supply-system not as a desirable application of the communist principle of distribution but as an expedient adaptation to the conditions of extreme material deprivation which prevailed before Liberation. The coming of socialism, with greater abundance of products, would eliminate the necessity for this kind of egalitarian sharing of difficulties. In this view, Socialism, the first stage in the development of the new society, is separated from communism by a long period of development of the productive forces. Only when there is general abundance, the ability to satisfy the material needs of all the people, could the transition to communism begin. During the first stage, material incentive still played a powerful role, along with other aspects of bourgeois thinking, and had to be harnessed to the needs of socialist development. The supply-system was therefore "utopian" and a violation of the stage-by-stage development toward communism.

The opposing argument was put forward by Left forces during the Great Leap (1958) and again during the GPCR. It acknowledged that distribution according to need for the whole population and for all products could only be introduced gradually but saw the *ideological consciousness of the masses*, not the level of development of the material forces of production, as the main limitation on the rapidity of transition to communism. To the extent that people were won to the idea of "serve the people", as against bourgeois individualism, communism could be introduced in part, even if at a lower level of *shared* subsistence than would be possible with the further development of the economy. In particular, the Party members, as the ideological *vanguard* of the working class, and especially the Party *leaders* should be willing to apply communist distribution to themselves even if the masses as a whole continued to cling, in part, to material incentive.

It was, in fact, the bourgeois road that prevailed. Rather than winning the bourgeois intellectuals to communism, the Party was won to material incentive. This was a consequence of the new-democratic line. Having taken power without a mass force of workers and peasants won ideologically to communism and having committed itself to satisfying the immediate material aspirations of the masses, the party had to rely on the bourgeois technicians to manage affairs of state and economy. If the masses had been won to a greater degree to socialism, a totally different course would have been possible--the creation of new organs of power and administration putting management directly into the hands of the people, under the leadership of the party. This might have meant, temporarily, more "disorder" and stagnation of production as the people learned to fashion and run these new socialist forms, but it would have avoided reliance on

bourgeois forces and ideas and eventual reversal of the revolution. Moreover, the new-democratic line welcomed into the Party, during the anti-Japanese War, many forces whose primary commitment was to nationalism and bourgeois land reform. These forces within the Party were strong enough to bring about the elimination of the supply-system and the merging of Party cadres into the privileged stratum of officials. The new wage-grade system provided a framework of material privilege within which a new bourgeoisie could slowly form and become conscious of its class interest in opposition to further development toward communism.

THE QUESTION OF A STANDING ARMY

In summarizing the lessons of the Paris Commune, Marx had pointed also to its abolition of the standing army and replacement by the *arming of the workers*, the proletarian militia. In the third of his *Letters From Afar* (March 11, 1917) Lenin had explained:

We need a state, but not the kind other bourgeoisie needs, with organs of government in the shape of a police force, an army and a bureaucracy (officialdom) separate from and opposed to the people. All bourgeois revolutions merely perfected *this* state machine, merely transferred it from the hands of one party to those of another.

The proletariat on the other hand....must "smash", to use Marx's expression, this "ready-made" state machine and substitute a new one for it by *merging* the police force, the army and the bureaucracy with *the entire armed people*...the proletariat must organize and arm *all* the poor, exploited sections of the population in order that they *themselves* should take the organs of state power directly into their own hands, in order that *they themselves should constitute* these organs of state power. (Coll. Works, Vol. 23, pp. 325-326)

The Chinese revolution was made by the armed masses of workers and peasants. After victory was achieved, the decision was made to *disarm* the masses and concentrate weapons in the hands of a standing army which lived in barracks separate from the masses. At the same time there began an intensive program of modernization, both technical and administrative, of the PLA which put increased emphasis on knowledge of military science, on sophisticated weaponry and on professionalism. All of these developments led, in the early 1950s, to significant moves away from the democratic-egalitarian traditions of the PLA. They culminated in the State Council order of Feb. 1955 setting up a system of ranks within the PLA and eliminating the supply-system for military personnel. This was followed in October by the conferring of the title of Marshal on the ten top leaders of the PLA, the wearing of shoulder badges and insignia showing rank, and the creation and award of several types of military decorations. A *Renmin Ribao* editorial of Sept. 28, 1955 gave arguments for the new rank system:

Why must the PLA adopt the system of military ranks at present? This is because with the application of the Military Service Law (conscription), the modern equipment of the armed forces requires that the training and activities of the servicemen should follow strict systems and regulations. The ranking and interrelation of the officers should be clearly defined, and the organization and discipline of the armed forces should be consolidated...all officers must wear shoulder badges and insignias of their ranks so that there will be clear distinction between officers and other ranks, between the various branches of the armed forces....Only in this way would the units of the armed forces be able to carry out successfully their task of defending the country in a changing situation and under the

new conditions of complex equipment, speed of movement and joint action of the different branches.

After the adoption of the military ranks, there will be clear distinction between the officer and the men...Will this affect the close unity of the officers and the men and of the officers of the upper and lower ranks? The answer is no...there is no clash of class interests between the officers and men...their interests being the same. The officer and the men would struggle together to defend the country, protect the interest of the people, and safeguard the cause of Socialism. There fore the holding of military ranks...implies that the officers are entrusted with an even greater responsibility and should be even more concerned with the men and take better care of them...The military ranking system will also ensure the equality of officers as required by national defense. The modern revolutionary fighting forces require of the officers not only their loyalty to the country and the people but also accomplishment in the knowledge of military science as well as proficiency in modern military techniques....The conferment of titles is determined on the basis of responsibility, political qualities, abilities, terms of service and contribution to the revolution (Trans. in *SCMP*, no. 1147, pp. 3-5)

The new system of ranks also included a wage scale for payment of men and officers, extending the principle "to each according to his work" to the people's army. Our best information on these wages comes from Edgar Snow who visited an army camp in his trip of 1961-62 and was given the following pay figures (*The Other Side of the River*, p. 289. These figures are in \$U.S./month. Snow calculated the monetary exchange himself.)

Private -- 2.50	Lt. Colonel -- 51-60
Corporal -- 4	Colonel -- 62-64
2nd Lt. -- 20	Senior Colonel -- 74-84
1st. Lt. -- 24	Lt. General -- 144-160
Captain -- 29-33	General -- 192-236
Major -- 39-44	Marshal -- 360-400

Why was the principle of the proletarian militia not carried through? In the first place, it requires a high level of ideological commitment of the masses to the long-term goal of the party--communism. Only if that ideological understanding exists will the Party feel that it can rely on the masses to defeat the class enemy during the sharp class struggle which continues under proletarian dictatorship. If, as in the case of the CCP, the Party has won the support of the masses by leading a national liberation struggle with an alliance with the national bourgeoisie, then the concentration of armed force in a standing army directly under the control of the Party (all officers are Party members) is seen as a guarantee against the situation where the Party loses, temporarily or permanently, the support of the masses.

In the second place, the CCP never broke away from the bourgeois concepts of war and did not carry through the

revolutionary idea of people's war. While on a number of occasions Mao put forward the idea that men are primary over weapons in warfare, he did not mean by this to deny the role of modern weaponry but only to attempt to control its use by political criteria. In practice, the CCP invested heavily in modern weapons, going all the way to atomic weapons in the 1960s. The logic of positional war with modern weapons corresponds to the kind of professionalism which came to dominate the officer corps of the PLA.

This does not mean that a proletarian militia is totally unable to use weapons beyond small arms. But it would adopt them only to the extent that its organization remained socialist and not elitist. The militia would train in the factories and neighborhoods. Those with technical knowledge would act as teachers but without becoming administratively separate from the masses, nor would this knowledge be kept as a monopoly of the few; rather all the people would attempt to master the more advanced weapons. Military work would be an aspect of political work and leadership would not become professional, separate, institutionalized. Such a people's militia, moreover, would have a powerful weapon only rarely used in the past, the appeal to proletarian class interests of the soldiers of the imperialists. A people's war is as much agitational as military in the narrow sense. And even if defeated temporarily by an army equipped with superior fire-power, the militia would have maintained the ideological consciousness of the masses and prepared them to continue to struggle against all their class enemies, while the standing army under socialism in China became one of the most important breeding-grounds for the new bourgeoisie and eventually became a tool of that class.

Arming of the people requires that the Party be willing to share power with the masses, that the dictatorship of the proletariat be seen as a system of *worker's rule with party leadership*, a version of Left-center coalition under new conditions, rather than as a system in which the party monopolizes all positions of power because it is not willing to trust in the masses and their desire to fight for and defend socialism. This in turn requires that the party win power, leading masses of people who are *consciously fighting for socialism*, not just more material goods or land or peace. And it is precisely this element that the Bolshevik and Chinese revolutions lacked. And the reason that they maintained a standing army under Party control.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ECONOMY

So far we have seen some of the effects of the exercise of state power of the bourgeois aspect that advocated reliance on the capitalist class as a progressive force in the first-stage of the revolution. But this line, insofar as it was Marxist-Leninist, also had a proletarian aspect, the intention of moving to socialism in a second-stage and the mobilization of the masses of workers and peasants to destroy the power of their class enemies. In 1953, the CCP proclaimed the General Line of the construction of Socialism, sketching out the Party's plan to gradually expropriate all private capital and lead the peasants through a number of stages to collective production. Serious disagreements developed within the CCP around the question of how rapidly and comprehensively to move toward socialism. Liu and others had foreseen a much longer period of new-democracy and ascribed a much greater progressiveness to capitalism. They exerted their influence throughout the fifties to slow down and distort the elimination of the bourgeoisie. The Left in the party, made up primarily of worker and peasant cadres taken in during the sharp class struggles of 1947-52, fought constantly to move to higher stages of socialism.

If the Soviet Union wouldn't do (point the way), then he would place his hopes on the American people. The United States alone had a population of more than 200 million. Industrial production was already higher than in any other country and education was universal. He would be happy to see a party emerge there to lead a revolution, although he was not expecting that in the near future.

In the meantime, he said, the foreign ministry was studying the matter of admitting Americans from the left, middle and right to visit China. Should rightists like Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, be permitted to come? He should be welcomed because, Mao explained, at present the problems between China and the U.S.A. would have to be solved with Nixon. Mao would be happy to talk with him, either as a tourist or as President.

I, unfortunately, could not represent the United States, he said; I was not a monopoly capitalist. Could I settle the Taiwan question? Why continue such a stalemate? Chiang Kai-shek had not died yet. But what had Taiwan to do with Nixon? That question was created by Truman and Acheson.

--Edgar Snow in *Life*

According to Mao, U.S. bosses are doing fine (high production) and workers poorly (no revolutions on the horizon). U.S. workers and PLP will shoot his theories to hell.

Mao and his close supporters, applying the new-democratic line, swung back-and-forth periodically between these two groups and, most importantly, refused to break decisively with the Right. This created a complex pattern of economic struggle with distinct stages: 1) a sharp advance by the Left with which Mao associates himself, 2) an attempt by the leadership to restrain the advances and prevent it from passing beyond the new-democratic framework to a decisive break with bourgeois ideas, and 3) counter-attack and victory by the Right putting an end to the advance and often retreating to an earlier position. This pattern characterizes all the major episodes; Land reform (1947-1950), Collectivization (1955-56), Communization (1958-59), and the GPCR (1966-68).

The first step was Land Reform, initiated as early as 1947 in the old Liberated areas and completed in 1950-51 in the Southern areas. The property of landlords was taken over and distributed to the peasants. In the early stages, Leftist cadres and poor peasants had tended to carry the struggle past the landlords to the rich peasants who owned sufficient amounts of land to require the employment of hired labor. These rich peasants were rural capitalists and often had industrial or commercial interests in addition to land. The CCP leadership quickly put a stop to these "excesses" and Mao summarized the new line in June, 1950,

Carry forward the work of agrarian reform step by step and in an orderly manner.
The war has been fundamentally ended on the mainland; the situation is entirely different from that between 1946 and 1948, when the PLA was locked in a life and

death struggle with the KMT reactionaries and the issue had not yet been decided. Now the government is able to help the poor peasants solve their difficulties by means of loans to balance up the disadvantage of having less land. Therefore, there should be a change in our policy towards the rich peasants, a change from the policy of requisitioning the surplus land and property of the rich peasants to one of preserving a rich peasant economy, in order to help the early restoration of production in the rural areas. This change is also favorable for isolating the landlords and protecting the middle peasants and small "renters out" of land. (Report at CC meeting, June 6, 1950. Transl. in *CB*, supplement no. 1, p. 3)

The same new-democratic line, with its prime emphasis on *quantity of production*, which required the use of bourgeois "experts" in the factories and state organs, required that the rural capitalists be allowed to flourish, at least for a time. The CCP was well aware, from observing the history of the Soviet countryside in the twenties, that the small-producer economy created by land reform was subject to internal instability; control of draft animals and implements by the richer peasants would progressively lead to impoverishment of the "new-middle" peasants and their return to the status of wage-earners, i.e., that a petty-property commodity-producing economy generated capitalism rapidly and inexorably. It attempted to counter this development by encouraging, both ideologically and financially, the formation of mutual-aid teams, arrangements in which peasants would use their privately-owned implements to help each other by planning collectively the application of those resources. By late 1952, 40% of rural households were members of such teams, which generally included 7-10 families. In addition, genuine co-operatives, in which land and larger tools were pooled and used collectively, although payment was still made for the property contribution of each family as well as its labor contribution, were formed in many of the areas where land reform had taken place earliest.

But the policy of preserving the rich peasants left them free to use their political influence and economic power to enter the mutual-aid teams and co-ops, turning them into instruments of their individual enrichment, or to destroy them from without. Mao reported in 1955 that there had been "large scale dissolution of co-ops in 1953" as rich peasants convinced the other peasants that the road of individual enterprise was superior to the socialist road of the co-ops. Rich peasants entered the mutual-aid teams in order to share in the government loans and technical assistance which the teams qualified for. They then usually managed to get the lion's share of the benefits for themselves. Thus by 1954-55, the class struggle in China had reached a fateful turning point. If no further mass movement toward socialism could be made, then the countryside would revert to capitalism and the proletarian dictatorship would certainly be undermined.

But a profound ideological process had been percolating among the peasants in the preceding years. They had begun to grasp Marxism-Leninism under the leadership of the Leftist rural cadres. These cadres had not shared in the privileges of the senior cadres in the cities and lived among and at roughly the level of the peasants. The peasants initiated in 1955-56 a mass movement to form co-operatives. Leadership was taken by the poor peasants and the new "lower-middle peasants", former poor peasants who had received insufficient land and implements from the agrarian reform to be able to survive without continuing, often in disguised and illegal forms, to hire themselves out to the rich capitalist peasants, or go deeper into debt to them. By May, 1956, 91.2% of rural families were members of agricultural producers' co-operatives (APCs). By the end of 1956, 88% were in *advanced APCs*, in which payment to the individual family was based only on labor contributed, while property contributed was not compensated beyond the initial payment for its value. This was a tremendous victory for the Chinese proletariat and demonstrated concretely that *peasants could be won ideologically to fight for socialism*.

While the move along the "socialist road" was the primary aspect of this rural struggle, the Right forces in the CCP were strong enough to enforce certain limitations on the movement, to concede certain positions to the bourgeoisie.

The rich peasants were not compelled to enter the APCs, but had to be convinced that it was in their interest to do so. So, many remained separate, often with the best land and implements and continued to act as a source of temptation to the upper-middle peasants who had often reluctantly agreed to enter the APCs. Moreover, the prices set for subsidiary crops on the free markets were highly favorable and tempted the peasant to divert his labor and fertilizer from the collective endeavor to his private plot.

The principle of income distribution within the advanced APC was payment according to labor performed. Material incentive, transferred now from the level of the individual family to that of the small group, was still the cardinal point. Co-ops with different ratios of labor power to mouths-to-feed or different qualities of land received therefore very different per-capita incomes. The party fought vigorously against the tendency of the poorer peasants to demand more egalitarian distribution in favor of labor-poor families. A complex system of calculating work-points according to the job performed, the quality of the work, etc., was introduced, the equivalent of the piece-rate system then being introduced in industry. This kind of system, beginning from a situation where the APCs are unequally endowed with labor power and land, would lead to progressively widening disparities in living standards between poor and rich APCs. A kind of "collective" exploitation of poorer co-ops by the richer could eventually result. It was this tendency which led, as we shall see, to the mass movement among the poor and lower-middle peasants to form the people's communes in 1958.

[PHOTO, FOUR YOUNG RED GUARDS
HOLDING THE LITTLE RED BOOK SINGING
IN FRONT OF LARGE PICTURE OF MAO]

Picture, from Life magazine, shows cult of Mao is alive and well. Mao reveals how cult, like all individualism, is tool of the bourgeois class in maintaining power.

At the time of our 1965 colloquy, Mao continued, a great deal of power-over propaganda work within the provincial and local party committees, and especially within the Peking Party Committee--had been out of his control. That was why he had then stated that there was need for more personality cult, in order to stimulate the masses to dismantle the anti-Mao party bureaucracy. Of course the personality cult had been overdone. Today, things were different...In the past few years there had been need for some personality cult. Now there was no such need and there should be a cooling down.

Developments in industry had been very similar. In 1949-50 the state had seized the property of those capitalists who were intimately involved with the imperialists and politically supported the Kuomintang. This had brought a large part of Chinese industry into the hands of the state. In 1955-56 the government moved to convert all remaining bourgeois industrial property into jointly owned state-private enterprise. The state had complete control over the use of the property and ownership of its output while the former capitalist owners were compensated for their property in government bonds paying a fixed rate of interest. Many of the capitalists, in addition to these fixed-income payments, stayed on as plant directors and staff at the high money salaries prevailing in these positions and, through the combination of these sources of income, were able to continue living in a way that was far above that of the average worker and a constant source of corruption of the government cadres.

The system of management used in both state and joint enterprises was known as "one-man management" and had been quite consciously borrowed from contemporary Soviet practice. Its essence was the absolute authority of the manager over day-to-day operations, hiring and firing, use of available resources. This system was modified in 1956

to give a much greater advisory and supervisory role to the Party committee in the factory, made up of the most politically advanced workers, but the managers retained great power.

In June, 1956, the great variety of wage payment schemes which the CCP had inherited from pre-Liberation factories were unified and rationalized in a systematic wage reform. This set up a basic wage scale with eight grades, with the wage in the highest (most skilled) grade being approximately three times the lowest. Roughly 80% of wages was to be base pay, calculated by hours worked according to skill grade, with the remaining 20% being used to spur extra output through piecework or bonus remuneration. Material incentives were the basic technique driving production, as is shown in an important article commenting on wage reform,

This revision will effectively eradicate equalitarianism and the state of unreasonableness and confusion obtaining in the current wage system and serve as a powerful material factor setting into motion the extensive masses of workers and office employees to strive for fulfillment of the First Five Year Plan ahead of schedule. (Chin Lin, in *Lao-tung* (Labor), no. 3, March 6, 1956. Transl. in *ECMM*, no. 35, pp. 32-35)

A *Renmin Ribao* editorial of June, 1956, emphasized that piece rates are the most effective way of tying income directly to the individual quantity and quality of work performed and advocated their extensive development in the wake of the wage reform. By 1957, about 42% of all workers in state-operated factories and mines were covered by some sort of piece-rate system. Beginning in 1954, workers were given special monetary rewards for invention and innovation. Workers were given special bonuses of up to 15% of the standard monthly wage for achieving cost reductions or over fulfilling output quotas. In addition, the State Council, in 1955, set down regulations establishing monetary rewards for scientific contributions aimed at "inspiring the positive and creative talents of scientific research workers....for serving the construction of the country." Monetary rewards to scientists represented multiples of the average worker's yearly income, ranging from 2,000 yuan to 10,000 yuan.

It is fair to say, therefore, that material incentive was the primary idea affecting the ideology of the Chinese working-class through 1957. This kind of reliance on bourgeois thought and habits could only weaken the working class ideologically and prevent it from developing the communist consciousness necessary to enable it to prevent restoration of the state power of the bourgeoisie. The Party led mass campaigns for ideological re-molding of the thought of workers and cadres. But these were vitiated by the inconsistency of the party line and *could not change the strong bourgeois ideas constantly being generated by the material conditions under which people worked*. Moreover, Mao's reluctance to deal self-critically with the theory of new-democracy which allowed and encouraged the Party's Rightists to devise these schemes, prevented him from breaking the unity of the Party. He compromised repeatedly with Liu and the other Rightists on the most fundamental questions.

The Rightist trend of 1956 also extended to the ideological sphere. Initial Chinese reaction to Khrushchev's speech to the 20th CPSU Party Congress was quite favorable. At the first session of the 8th National Congress of the CCP (Sept., 1956) Liu gave a political report, as Head of State of the People's Republic, which included the following points,

....The fact that our bourgeoisie has heralded its acceptance of socialist transformation with a fanfare of gongs and drums is something of a miracle. What this miracle shows is precisely the great strength of the correct leadership of the proletariat and the absolute need for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

....During the past few years, the national bourgeoisie has taken part in the

rehabilitation of the national economy...In the course of socialist transformation, the alliance of the working class with the national bourgeoisie has played a positive role in educating and remolding the bourgeois elements. In the future, we can continue our work of uniting, educating and remolding them so that they may place their knowledge in the service of socialist construction. Thus, it can be readily seen that it is wrong to consider this alliance as a useless burden.

In another speech to the Congress, reported years later in a Red Guard tabloid, Liu is reported to have said, "The question of who will win in the struggle between capitalism and socialism in our country has now been decided" and he criticized "some members of our Party who hold that everything should absolutely be 'of one color' "--(i.e., the Left).

THE GREAT LEAP FORWARD AND THE RURAL PEOPLE'S COMMUNES (RPCs)

The Great Leap period of 1958-59 is very complex because all the conflicting class forces in society and within the Party participated and put forward very different ideas and goals for the movement. For the Left, it was an attack on all the aspects of "bourgeois right" that had been primary up to that time in Chinese institutions; it put into question and often eliminated material incentives, piece-rates, managerial authority, high pay differentials, etc. It challenged the existence of the standing army and the wage system for cadres. For the Left, the large-scale RPCs, amalgamating the former APCs into units often containing 5,000 to 6,000 households and changing the existing system of income distribution, were the organizational means for beginning the transition to communism. The system of free supply of grain was introduced into the RPCs along with communal mess halls, nurseries, laundries, etc., so that the principle of distribution "to each according to his needs" was no longer a distant goal separated from the present by a long process of economic development, but a living reality. The commune eliminated the private plots of land and raised the socialization of property to a new level. The income earned by any individual household was determined not, as previously, by its own individual performance or that of the small work team of which it was a part, but as a share, based on a political calculation of needs, of the total output of the commune. Working for the commune, rather than for oneself, became, at least in part, a living principle.

It is useful here to quote extensively from some of the Left writings of the period, to show the kind of thinking which lay behind the mass movement of the summer and fall of 1958.

An article which stimulated a lengthy discussion was "Break Away From the Ideas of Bourgeois Rights", by Chang Ch'un-ch'iao (whom we will meet again as a participant in the Shanghai Cultural Revolution in 1967),

To support the PLA, thousands of militiamen followed the Army in their march to the South. They led the same life of military communism as the Army. They did not aim at becoming officials or getting rich. No idea of wages, let alone "piece-wages" entered their minds....After the nation-wide liberation, this life of military communism marked by "supply-system" was still very popular.... Comrades who were inured to the life of supply system did not covet the wage system....but shortly afterwards this system of life was subjected to the impact of the bourgeois idea of right. The idea of bourgeois right has its kernel in hierarchy. In the view of persons imbued with the idea of bourgeois right, the supply system was undesirable....There was nothing strange in such arguments brought forth by the bourgeoisie. But soon a number of party cadres were subjected to the impact of this idea. Among them were

heard more criticism of the drawbacks of supply system while more talks were heard about the merits of the wage system...In a word, the communist supply system which ensured victory of the Chinese revolution, was condemned by some people as a serious offense which must be punished.

The main argument against the supply system is that it cannot stimulate production enthusiasm. Its theoretical basis is the "principle of material interests" stressed by economists. It is said that as survivals of the old division of labor still exist under the socialist system, i.e., some distinctions still exist between mental labor and physical labor, between workers and peasants. and between skilled and unskilled labor, the principle of "developing production through the material interests of workers" is represented as a wonderful principle.

...The arguments seem to be very convincing but reduced to the popular language it is the same as the old saying: "money talks". If high wages are used to "stimulate", then socialism and communism can be bought like a piece of candy.

What do we have to say about such a theory? It is precisely the workers, who, according to the above-mentioned economists, are the most concerned with the wage levels, who express fundamentally contrary views. Shanghai's workers....pointed out that advocates of this theory want to "let money instead of politics assume command." These words hit the bull's eye. Of course, we do not deny....that the inequality in "bourgeois right" cannot be done away with at once....*but did Marx tell us that bourgeois right and bourgeois hierarchy of inequality must not be destroyed but should be systematized and developed?* Did he not say that the principle of "material interests" should only be partially stressed and that communist education should be intensified politically, ideologically and morally in order to break down the bourgeois right?...

....As a result of the attack on the supply system, the living standard which did not show much difference in the past has changed among out party cadre and some who were not inured to hardship have rapidly learned manners of gentlemen, high-class Chinese and old Mr. Chan (a snobby character in Lu Hsun's *Story of Ah Q*). some cadres feel displeased when they are not addressed as "heads". This indeed stimulates something. but it does not stimulate production enthusiasm but enthusiasm in fighting for fame and wealth....It stimulates estrangement from the masses. Some elements soon degenerate into bourgeois rightists....Some cadres expect extra pay when they work for only one extra hour. (Transl. in CB, no. 537, pp. 3-5)

Another article of the same period, "Let us Begin Our Discussion with the Supply System", by Hu Sheng, put forward the idea that, while it was not possible to introduce communist distribution "according to needs" generally and completely until the productive forces of society had developed further, it was necessary to fight for communist "aspects",

Does the enforcement of the supply system mean realization of communism? It is not yet the case. Many people's communes in the countryside now provide free meals; some even provide "three things" (meaning food, clothing, free housing),

"five things" and even "seven things". It is not proper to represent this as communism.

But it should be said that it contains the communist factors. At a time when products are not so abundant, the communist "to each according to his needs" principle cannot be fully realized. By communist factors are meant a comparative uniformity for all and the "break-up" of the "to each according to his work" framework. Under the supply system, one will not set a big store by pay....(Transl. in *CB*, no 537, 33-36)

Under the free grain supply system described in these articles food was provided free of charge in communal mess halls. Often additional necessities of life were provided free by the commune. This meant that the poorer co-ops, who previously had difficulty in providing these necessities, were merged into the larger commune and benefited from the higher productivity of the more advanced co-ops. Conversely, it meant that the peasants in the more advanced co-ops, which often meant the ones which had incorporated a larger number of former rich peasants, had to be willing to share the fruits of their own labor with the less fortunate, i.e. to put the needs of the commune as a whole above their own small group material interest. This transformation was no automatic administrative matter; it was the result of a sharp class struggle led in the countryside by party cadres in which poor and lower-middle class peasants struggled for the formation of communes while rich and upper-middle peasants resisted them and tried to undermine the free supply aspects. The communization movement itself had been preceded in the fall of 1957 by a sharp anti-Rightist struggle within the Party in which some of the most prominent figures in economic affairs (such as Ch'en Yun) were demoted because of their opposition to the Great Leap.

"The question about Nixon has been partly answered for us by Chairman Mao in my earlier report. He told me that Nixon, who represented the monopoly capitalists, should be welcomed simply because at present the problems between China and the U.S. would have to be solved with him. In the dialectical pattern of his thought Mao has often said that good can come out of bad and that bad people can be made good--by experience and right teaching. Yes, he said to me, he preferred men like Nixon to social democrats and revisionists, those who professed to be one thing but in power behaved quite otherwise.

Nixon might be deceitful, he went on, but perhaps a little bit less so than some others. Nixon resorted to tough tactics but he also used some soft tactics. Yes, Nixon could just get on a plane and come. It would not matter whether the talks would be successful. If he were willing to come, the chairman would be willing to talk to him and it would be all right. It would be all right, whether or not they quarreled, or whether Nixon came as a tourist or as President. He believed they would not quarrel. But of course he would offer criticism of Nixon. The hosts would also make self-criticism and talk about their own mistakes and shortcomings--for instance, their production level was lower than that of the United States."

Mao's phony "dialectics" is high-falutin' cover for sellout of world's workers and peasants. Genuine dialectical thought is based on distinguishing classes and being able to tell friends from enemies.

A second aspect of the Left view of the Great Leap was the change in the mode of economic planning and organization. Rather than professional managers dominating the factories, with an adversary Party committee, the Left advocated that the Party committee itself combine political direction with day-to-day management, i.e. putting politics

in command. This new management system was introduced in a number of factories and generally accompanied the partial elimination of piece rates, narrowing of the pay differentials among the workers and an increase in the amount of political discussion and struggle within the enterprises. Control over the planning process was taken away from the central Ministries and given over to Provincial and county Party committees who were to involve the workers and peasants themselves much more closely in the process of drawing-up, reconciling and executing the plans. Overall coordination was to be maintained not by centralized bureaucratic determination of the details of output quotas and resource use (combing with much reliance on the price-market mechanism) but by de-centralized response by the masses and basic-level cadres to the general line put forward by the Party leadership. This kind of de-centralization was very different from that carried out in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, where more power to lower-level units meant more power to managers and technicians, not workers.

But there was a contradiction between the Left view of the RPCs as a new form of organization (with a new ideology) opening up the transition to communism, and the view of the Party leadership, which saw the Great Leap primarily as a *production drive* and the RPCs as a tool which could mobilize labor on a large scale and in a more specialized fashion to complete the industrialization of the country and catch up to the capitalist nations. The communes had been preceded by predictions of enormous increases in production, capital investment, and per/acre yields, both in agriculture and industry, for the years 1957-62. It was anticipated that Chinese steel production would "catch up to Britain in 15 years". As part of this plan, the CCP advocated the policy of "walking on two legs", supplementing the large-scale modern factories in the cities with a network of smaller-scale regional and local industries making use of the traditional skills of the workers and peasants and relying on locally-available resources. The communist aspects of the RPCs, especially rejection of material incentives and growth of free supply, were always evaluated by the CCP leadership *in relation to their effect on production*. This cautiousness can be seen in the official editorials which followed the Aug. 20, 1958 Communique of the CC giving approval to the communization movement:

....The establishment of people's communes is shaping up as a new irresistible tide of the mass movement on a nation-wide scale....The existing people's communes have shown ever greater superiority over the farm co-operatives in spurring the initiative of the masses in production, raising the rate of utilization of labor power and labor productivity, enlarging productive capital construction, accelerating the cultural and technical revolutions and in promoting public welfare.

....The Chinese peasants, having defeated capitalism economically, politically and ideologically and having overcome right conservatism in agricultural production, have carried out agricultural capital construction on an unprecedented scale, adopted advanced technical measures in farming and thereby are doubling farm yields or increasing them by several, a dozen or scores of times. At the same time, small and medium industrial enterprise are being rapidly developed in the countryside to promote the integration of industry and agriculture and to raise the standard of living of the rural population.

Of course, when the people's communes re established it is not immediately necessary to transform collective ownership into ownership by the whole people and it is even less appropriate to starting to advance from socialism, i.e., the primary phase of communism, to its higher phase. ("Greet the Upsurge in Forming People's Communes", *Red Flag*, no. 7, Sept. 1, 1958. Transl. in *CB* no 517, pp. 1-4)

CCP editorials and resolutions repeatedly stress that the free supply system should not be taken so far that "production enthusiasm" is affected. As time passed, it became clear that the new forms of social organization and the new

communist ideas were leading to sharper class struggle in the countryside and that this struggle was likely to interfere with achievement of the ever more-grandiose production and productivity targets emanating from Peking. When the CC met for its 6th Plenary Session in Dec. 1958, it issued a set of "Resolutions on Questions Concerning People's Communes" which carried the retreat from Leftist views several steps further:

True, the free supply system adopted by the people's communes has in it the embryo of the communist principle of distribution according to needs; the policy of running industry and agriculture simultaneously and combining them carried out by the people's communes has opened up a way to reduce the differences between town and countryside and between worker and peasant; when the RPCs pass over from socialist collective ownership to socialist ownership by the whole people, these communist factors will grow further. All this must be acknowledged....

Nevertheless, every Marxist must soberly realize that the transition from socialism to communism is quite a long and complicated process of development and that throughout this entire process society is still socialist in nature. Socialist society and communist society are two different stages marked by different degrees of economic development.

....The communist system of distribution is more reasonable, but it can be put into practice only when there is a great abundance of social products. In the absence of this condition, any negation of the principle of "to each according to his work" will tend to dampen the labor enthusiasm of the people and is therefore disadvantageous to the development of production, to the increase of social products and hence to speeding the realization of communism. For this reason, in the income of commune members, that portion of the wage paid according to the work done must occupy an important place over a long period and will, during a certain period, take first place. In order to encourage the labor enthusiasm of commune members and also facilitate satisfaction of their complex daily needs, the communes must strive to increase the wages of their members gradually and, for a number of years to come, *must increase them at a faster rate than that portion of income that comes under the heading of free supply....*(Transl. in *CB*, no. 542, pp. 7-23) (our emphasis-PLP).

The italicized words represent a major turning point in the development of the communes. Many of the more advanced had carried through the practice of giving half of income as free supply; and they had the perspective of gradually increasing that percentage as social productivity increased. But this resolution implied that this per cent was for it to *decrease*. As a result, free supply, in the bulk of the communes, fell to around 30% in the first months of 1959.

Another paragraph of the resolution altered previously held views on the degree of socialization of property:

....Some people think that the switch over to communes will call for a redistribution of existing personal consumer items. This is a misconception. IT should be publicized among the masses that the means of livelihood owned by members, (including houses, clothing, bedding and furniture) and their deposits in banks and credit cooperatives will remain their own property after they join the commune and will always belong to them....Members can retain individual trees around their houses and small farm tools, small instruments, small domestic animals and poultry;

they can also continue to engage in some small domestic side occupations on condition that these do not hamper their taking part in collective labor. (*Ibid.*)

These may seem like very small concessions to private property, but they were the opening wedge in a retrogressive movement which was to lead, within a year, to the restoration of the private plots and the revival of private sideline occupations.

We have seen that the party leadership justified the new principles of organization as beneficial to achieving great production advances. During 1958 Mao made a trip to Moscow to negotiate the largest Sino-Soviet trade agreement ever, as part of a plan to exchange the increased agricultural surplus for heavy capital goods. Thus, the leadership in no way accepted another cardinal tenet of the Left: that a socialist state should strive for self-sufficiency and avoid becoming dependent on others, especially those whose ideological position has already been put into question. When the great production advances failed to materialize, the CCP (just like the Russians and western commentators) blamed the excessive "Leftism" of the communes and took steps to retreat from those measures. In fact, the production difficulties of 1959-1961 resulted from a combination of severe natural calamities, unrealistic output targets, and especially the incorrect over-emphasis on heavy industry which the CCP had taken over uncritically from the Soviet experience. The Party Right was able to use the production crisis to completely overwhelm the Left and begin to undo the accomplishments of the Great Leap. In 1961-62, as we shall describe in the next section, the retreat turned into a rout as the new ruling bourgeois forces took China rapidly along the capitalist road.

Before moving on, it is important to consider the following question: Was the People's Republic of China a proletarian dictatorship during the period 1949-1959? We have seen that it set up a number of arrangements which violated the teachings of Marx and Lenin on the condition of workers' rule (standing army, cadre income, etc.). Moreover, its foreign policy during those years was in no essential way different from the type of policy which our party criticizes today. China was the prime mover in the Bandung conference of non-aligned nations, strove at all times to establish diplomatic relations with bourgeois nationalist leaders, upheld unity with the revisionists by signing the Moscow declaration of 1957 and the 81 party statement of 1960, both of which acknowledged the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, and, in general, put forward new-democracy as the universal strategy for revolution in the contemporary world. Throughout this period, bourgeois authorities dominated culture and education; and the former capitalist class continued to enjoy material privileges through its interest-income and high salaries.

But this is only one aspect. The other is the destruction of the landlord class, the expropriation of the property of the bourgeoisie (who, even if they retained some strong positions from which it engineer a comeback, had certainly become, for a time, subordinate to the workers and peasants), and the destruction of petty bourgeois property and ideas among a peasantry which had launched the commune movement. *The most important lesson of these years is that the poor and middle peasants can grasp Marxism-Leninism and fight for socialism and communism.* Our party's line on the peasants is not an abstract prediction but is based on the accomplishments of the Chinese peasants and the ideological consciousness they reached. A great Left force of workers and peasants had been created which was to reappear strongly during the GPCR in an attempt to resume the progress toward communism which had prevailed until 1959.

In the Leninist view, state power is an instrument of the class which holds it, used to transform the economic, political and ideological conditions of the society. The question of who holds state power cannot be answered by examining only forms (the Soviet Union, after all, has a Communist Party and state ownership of property) nor by taking ideological pronouncements at face value (the Soviet revisionists still occasionally proclaim their devotion to proletarian dictatorship) but only by determining *which class is transforming society in the direction of its interests.* There are only two forms of state power possible in the modern world: proletarian dictatorship or bourgeois dictatorship. All theories of third forms: new-democracy, joint dictatorship of revolutionary classes, democratic

dictatorship of proletariat and peasantry, etc., are incorrect and correspond to no objective reality. In China between 1949 and 1959, the primary aspect of social change was in the direction of communism, despite the errors of line and policy which were to have such a devastating effect. No bourgeois dictatorship would have created the people's communes or free supply or thoroughly liquidated the landlord class or removed the capitalists from much of their power. In 1949 a workers' state came into existence in China and from its positive accomplishments we can learn much about what socialism is and will be.

THE RESTORATION OF BOURGEOIS RULE

The communes of 1958 has totally abolished private plots of land. It is important, therefore, to look at the available information for the period 1960-66 to see what changes had intervened. In 1964, a delegation of agriculturists and economists from Pakistan toured a sample of communes. Their observations were collected and used as the basis for the book: S. J. Burki, *A Study of Chinese Communes, 1965*. They found that in 1964 the 10 communes they surveyed, which included a large variety in terms of region and size, averaged 7.55% of the total land in private plots. For four communes which made more detailed information available, the following had been the change over time:

<i>YEAR</i>	<i>Per Cent of land under Private Ownership</i>
1958	--
1959	1.39
1960	2.79
1961	4.34
1962	6.40
1963	7.61
1964	8.64

The private plots, however, played a larger part in the peasant's lives than these figures indicate because of the higher value of the crops grown on them. The top 10 communes showed the following income figures:

COMMUNE	Private Plot Income as % of Total Family Income
1	20.8
2	30.2
3	18.4
4	22.9
5	17.1
6	16.9

7	20.6
8	19.4
9	13.5
10	8.8
Average	19.3

Even this data under-estimates the revival of private agriculture and its role in rural livelihood. More detailed information comes from the Lien-chiang documents, a series of directives and reports concerning communes in Lien-chiang country in Fukien province on the east China coast. They cover the years 1962-63 and were seized during a Nationalist Chinese raid on the coast. (They are translated and annotated in Chen, C. S. (ed.), *Rural People's Communes in Lien-chiang*). We quote from the editor's summary of the statistics provided by the documents:

The area of private plots, by law, could not exceed five to seven per cent of a team's crop area. (A team, at that time, contained, on the average, 24 households and a brigade, 171 households.) Nevertheless, in the Hu-li brigade the private plots amounted to 9.5 per cent of its crop land. The situation varied from team to team in the brigade. At one extreme, the private plots in one team amounted to 11 per cent of its crop land and at the other, 7.6 per cent. In the Shan-K'ang brigade, the private plots in the individual teams ranged from 12.1 per cent to 15 per cent of the crop area, the average being 13.1 per cent. For the two brigades, the private plots averaged 11.3 per cent of their crop land, which was substantially higher than the limit set by the law.

Besides the private plots, team members might also hold reclaimed land and land for growing animal feed. In addition, some land collectively owned by the team was farmed out to the members for cultivation.

The reclaimed land in the county amounted to 40,000 mou, or 19.6 per cent of the crop area.

Farmed-out land was 4,178 mou, or 2.05 per cent of the country's crop area. Private plots (11.3 per cent), reclaimed land (19.6 per cent) and farmed-out land (2.05 per cent) together constituted the "Small Freedom" land, which amounted to more than 30 per cent of the crop area. In some teams the production was more than 50 per cent. Households were permitted to engage in such subsidiary domestic enterprises as embroidery, sewing, knitting and bee-keeping. The products, except for the kinds and quantities subject to state purchase, could be disposed of in the free market. A surprisingly large variety of private activities, which would be thought impossible under a socialist system, was pursued by members of the commune system. Many commune members engaged in peddling. Selling what was produced by oneself was permitted, but re-selling what one purchased from others (er pan shang) was generally viewed with approval. Some members did odd jobs ("rat work") outside their own commune units. Half the 106 member labor force of the Lien-teng brigade in the Ao-chiang commune worked outside: 31 in stonemasonry and earth-work, three in carpentry, 44 in peddling and 27 in miscellaneous jobs. The profits from

peddling totalled 8,200 Yuan, averaging 196 Yuan per peddler (four of the peddlers made profits of more than 1,000 Yuan each). Members who worked outside the team would have to surrender their earnings to the team. Failing to do so, they would be given no ration and would have to buy food at high prices and be subjected to certain fines. Lending money at high interest was fairly prevalent. It was reported that in three communes....384 households engaged in lending at high interest, involving a total of 72,440 Yuan in principal. The rate of interest ranged from 1 to 1.5 per cent.

He calculates a breakdown of the peasants income sources:

Source of Income	Value (Yuan)
<i>Collective:</i>	
Rations	19.87
Retained fruits	4.50
Work-points	41.68
Income from collective system	66.25
<i>Private:</i>	
Private plots	7.14
Reclaimed land	14.28
sub.dom. enterprise	(unknown)
misc. private income	(unknown)
Total Private Income	21.42
Total income per person/year	87.67

From this table it can be seen that private sources contributed about a quarter of total income, and this does not take into account the miscellaneous and illegal sources, which in some cases could be quite large. Moreover, the high prices paid for subsidiary products, such as livestock and vegetables, grown privately, presented the peasant with the constant temptation to divert his effort from the collective to the private sector. Many cases are reported of peasants attending to their private plots by day and making up by working the collective land at night.

Even more significant for ideological and political trends is the organization of the collective sector itself. A large-scale *desocialization* of the communes took place over the period 1959-62. By this is meant that property and control over its use were transferred downward from higher-level units to lower-level, from the commune to the brigade to the team, in order to bring about a closer relation between individual output and reward and restore the primary role of material incentive. The communes went through three distinct stages, depending on which level of organization was the "accounting unit". (An accounting unit, roughly defined, "carries on independent accounting, is responsible for its

own profits and losses, organizes production, and distributes income."--Lien Chiang, Document VII.) From Aug. 1958 to March 1959, the commune itself, with an average of 5,000 households, was the accounting unit. In March 1959, the CC decided to shift the accounting unit from commune to brigade. Then in Nov. 1969, it issued a directive establishing the team as the accounting unit. (In the meantime, the number of communes had been tripled and their average size reduced to 1622 households. A team had an average membership of 24 households in 1963.) This new arrangement was formalized in one of the most important documents of recent Chinese history, *The Revised Draft Regulations Governing Rural People's Communes*, promulgated in Sept. 1962.

The basic principles of ownership and income distribution are set forth in these regulations:

Article 21

Land within the scope of the production team is all owned by the production team. None of the land owned by the commune, including the members' private plots, private hills and housing may be rented out or bought or sold.

Labor power within the scope of the production team is all to be controlled by the production team. Transfer of labor power for use by the commune or the production brigade must be discussed with the mass of members. It may not be requisitioned without their agreement.

Large domestic animals and agricultural implements owned collectively by the production team may not be requisitioned by the commune or the brigade. Any agricultural implements, small scale agricultural machines and large domestic animals formerly owned by the communes or brigade which may be suitably owned by and utilized by the production team should revert to production team ownership....

Article 22

The production team has autonomy with regard to production operations and management and distribution of income....

Article 31

For convenience in organizing production, the production team may be divided into permanent or temporary work groups, each to be assigned a section of land to work on a short-term, seasonal or year-round basis.

Groups and individuals who are active in labor, responsible in management, noteworthy in achievements, or who overfulfill their obligations must be given suitable rewards. Those groups and individuals who are not active in labor, are irresponsible in management, and who do not fulfill their obligations must be given a suitable reduced payment for labor or other punishment.

Article 32

The production team should give reasonable payment for the labor of its members, it should avoid egalitarianism among the members in calculating payment for labor.

....Payment for labor requiring technical skills in agriculture or herding should be higher than that for common labor.

The over-all effect of these regulations was to bring back the situation where the peasant's view was limited to producing for the immediate small group of which he was a part. The beginnings of any aspects of communist distribution and communist morality (working for the sake of a larger and larger collective) were reversed completely. Along with this the experiments in free supply of grain on a commune-wide scale were wound up and income differentials between teams reappeared with full force.

These organizational changes were accompanied by an ideological campaign to justify the reversal of the original commune spirit. Private sideline occupations were said to be not only compatible with the collective economy but a necessary stimulus to it. Piece-rates, similar to those prevalent in industry, were encouraged as the best way to tie reward to effort. And the motif, "this is the period of socialism; communism must wait until the full development of productive forces", was dominant once again. The argument was made that private plots and team-ownership did not represent movements toward capitalism for the following reasons: 1) The private plots are owned by the brigades and only assigned to members for use. They cannot be transferred or sold; 2) Collective labor takes up the majority of member's time. 3) Only the collective economy can provide the tools and raw materials necessary for sidelines production; and 4) The markets for private output are controlled by the state. It was also pointed out that individual production is not the same as capitalist production, since the latter required free purchase of means of production and existence of an expropriated proletariat. (Hsiao Liang, "Is Development of Family Side Occupations Likely to Aid Capitalist Spontaneity", transl. in *CB*, no. 677, pp. 14-17.)

But this is a typical revisionist argument. Nobody claimed that private plots, contracting of land by peddling, withholding effort from the collective, material incentive systems and all the other bourgeois tendencies characteristic of this period were already full-blown capitalism. The Left ideologists of the Great Leap had simply pointed out that the entire period of Socialism was a *class struggle between capitalism* and communism, that during this period a fierce and continuous struggle would take place between those who wanted to freeze the revolution at some particular stage and then reverse it. Those who advocate the compatibility of private and collective tendencies, rather than their fundamental contradiction, will end up *objectively* building bourgeois consciousness among the masses and creating the *conditions*, ideologically, for the restoration of capitalism. Any time the revolution ceases moving forward toward communism as its clear goal, it will immediately begin to turn around towards capitalism. *There is no middle position.* Because of their concern for quantitative levels of production (implicitly defining socialism as material improvement) the CCP leadership created organization and ideology in the countryside and weakened proletarian consciousness and weakened proletarian consciousness. A clear example of this position is provided by the following article.

As we know, the system of distribution of "to each according to his work" enforced in rural people's communes at the present stage represents a sort of material incentive and material guarantee in-so-far as the laborers are concerned. It plays an important part in stimulating the labor enthusiasm of commune members. But does this mean that material incentive is the only way to heightening one's production enthusiasm? No. It must be realized that only with politics assuming command is it possible for material incentive to play its part correctly.

....the party's policy is, on the one, hand, to make it clear to the masses that their

most fundamental interest lie in speeding up socialist construction and, on the other hand, to take the greatest care of the immediate living conditions and material benefits of the masses. In handling the relations between the state, the collective and the individual in people's communes, over-emphasis on the collective and long-range interests is unfavorable to the raising of the production enthusiasm of the masses....if the principle of "to each according to his work" is not adhered to, those commune members who have strong labor-power and do more work will feel they are put at a disadvantage. If one simply looks at the superiority of collective labor and collective economy and loses sight of the small freedom permitted within the big collective and the necessity of meeting the diversified needs of members at the same time as increasing social wealth, one is disregarding the present level of production and consciousness of the masses...thus, it is not proper to set political command against material incentive. Political command and material incentive are united; they may not be cut apart; nor one stressed to the neglect of the other. (Chao Hsu-kuang, from *Kung-ren Ribao*, Dec. 1, 1961. Transl. in *CB*, no. 677, pp. 23-25.)

In articles like this and many others of the period the bourgeois principle of material incentive and the proletarian principle of politics taking command are not seen as waging a life and death struggle. Rather, in line with the new-democratic idea of utilizing the bourgeoisie *constructing socialism*, they are seen as each playing a useful role; *their relation is primarily one of unity and only secondarily one of struggle*. This reversal of the unity-contradiction relations is the essence of revisionism, seen from the standpoint of dialectics.

Nor was the revival of revisionist ideas and policies limited to the rural areas. Major changes took place in industrial management, economic planning and wage payments. The system that began during the Great Leap of transferring managerial control to the Party Committee at the factory level was ended and the managers returned with even greater power than before 1957. The manager is responsible for meeting certain financial targets set by the State Plan. The main ones are profit targets and cost reduction targets. In meeting these he has a great deal of discretion in determining what the enterprise shall produce, in placing orders with other factories or retail agencies and in using advertising to solicit orders for his goods. Contracts between enterprises are widely used and are legally binding. There is a good deal of evidence that the State has surrendered allocational controls over many goods, allowing them to be exchanged through the market. Before 1957, all profits above the set targets were taken by the state, with a portion returned to the enterprise for bonuses. In that year, however, and continuing to the present, a profit-sharing scheme was worked out. Under this, the enterprise was allowed to retain a fixed percentage of all profits above the target. This can be used for bonuses to staff and workers as well as for expansion of the scale of the enterprise.

Closely connected with these changes in management and planning are the return to piece-rates and material incentives in the factories. In early 1961, enterprises were urged to cut down on employment, keeping only the best of their workers. Those retained would share more greatly in the excess profits of the enterprise. Piece-rates were advocated even more strenuously than before the Great Leap. A new device used was team piece-rates, which set groups of workers against one another in production competition.

These new policies were summarized in the so-called "*70 Articles on Industrial Policy*" reputedly authored by Liu Shao-ch'i and Po I-po in Dec. 1961. Here are excerpts from these:

Article 2. The task and target in industry from now on is "the market comes first."

Article 9. All industrial units which show a deficit in "economic accounting", with the exception of those designated, are henceforth to cease operating.

Article 21. The currently enforced eight hours of study and eight hours of meeting each week should be reduced as much as possible in order to avoid interfering with the rest time of the employees and workers.

Article 22. Henceforth no industrial unit is to summon its employees and workers again to engage in "bitter battles".

Article 25. Factories may calculate piece-work wages when feasible.

Article 26. When it is not feasible to calculate piece work, they may implement a collective piece-work system.

Article 52. Carry out the system of the factory manager bearing responsibility under the leadership of the party committee.

Article 65. Unions having 50 or more members are permitted to have a chairman who is half-removed from production. Those with 200 or more members may have a union chairman who is entirely removed from production. Those with over 500 men may have two men who are removed from production.

Special attention should be given to Article 9, which stipulates the domination of profits over production. (During this period Chinese economists began to write about "market socialism"; the content of their theories was in essence the same as that coming forth from Liberman in the Soviet Union, and revisionists like Sik and Brus in Eastern Europe.) The essential effect of a genuinely planned economy is that the production pattern which results, being determined by a social calculation of the people's needs, would differ from the pattern determined by a monetary calculation of costs and profits. This article enforces a market-determined pattern by eliminating enterprises which don't meet the monetary test.

Articles 21 and 22 register the leadership's opposition to the participation of the workers in struggles against managers and technicians and their concern that excessive political study and debate would reduce labor productivity.

What sort of man will the President see in Chou En-lai? Chou is clearly one of the world's ablest negotiators. Handsome and exuding charisma, he is now, in his 73rd year, tireless. In August 1967, Chou negotiated his way out of his most perilous moment in the Cultural Revolution. Though idolized by youth, he was, for more than two days and nights, surrounded in his offices in the Great Hall by a half a million ultra-leftist Red Guards. Their leaders--some later arrested as counter-revolutionaries--were seeking to seize the files of the Central Committee--and Chou himself. Mao and Lin Piao were both absent. By talking to small groups, day and night, Chou gradually persuaded the masses--so Chou called them in talking to me-- to disperse. It was only following that incident that Lin Piao brought thousands of troops into the capital, and the disarming and breakup of the Red Guards began in earnest--with heavy casualties.

--Edgar Snow in *Life*

Chou tells it like it was: how Left Red Guards almost had his head. Use of Mao cult, backed up by armed forces, played on Left's weaknesses.

Another major bourgeois trend during 1960-66 was the system of temporary and contract labor which came into use. Under this, the number of workers permanently assigned to enterprises was reduced while the number who were temporarily employed when work was available and then let go was increased. In this way, enterprise managers had more flexible control over costs of production and could shift social insurance and public welfare costs on to the communes and the State.

It was the Right forces within the party which seized control after the Great Leap. Many of the young cadre who had led and supported the Great Leap were purged or demoted. The party, under the leadership of the Right, became the representative of the bourgeois forces which had been slowly developing and consolidating; the senior cadres, the officer corps, the professional managers and technicians; all those whom the concessions of new-democracy had put into privileged economic positions. Even the old capitalist remnants got a new lease on life when the Party, in 1962, decided to extend their fixed-interest payments for at least five more years.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is itself a form of continuous and sharp class struggle. New bourgeois forces are constantly emerging from the ranks of the people. If bourgeois ideology is not decisively combated, it is possible *at any stage* in the transition to communism for the movement to be reversed and the bourgeoisie to come back to power. This does not mean that the full economic and political structure of capitalism can quickly be restored; that requires a transition period during which the new bourgeois ruling class undermines and dismantles the socialist aspects of the economic base. What it does mean is that the power of the state is now being used to move the ideological consciousness of the people *away from communism and toward capitalism*. That kind of use of state power is the essential definition of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie and that is what came to prevail in China in the period 196-1966.

THE ANTI-SOVIET REVISIONIST CAMPAIGN 1959-1966

One factor would seem to contradict the characterization of China, 1960-66, as a bourgeois dictatorship; the split in the international communist movement and the sharp anti-revisionist struggle waged by the CCP. Why would the new "red" bourgeoisie feel it necessary to defend the ideology of Marxism-Leninism against the changes the Russians were advocating. Two fundamental points can be made about this struggle.

1) At no time did the CCP question any of the tenets of Marxism-Leninism as it had always interpreted it, especially its compromises with nationalism and united-fronts against Soviet denials of its basic concepts: proletarian dictatorship vs. "state of the whole people" and armed struggle vs. peaceful transition. Major Chinese documents, such as the *Proposal on the General Line*, 1963, and Lin Piao's *Long Live the Victory of People's War*, 1965, reaffirmed the nationalism-based strategy that had brought the Chinese revolution to power. The practice of Chinese foreign policy did not alter significantly during the period of the anti-Soviet polemics; in fact, the Chinese re-doubled their efforts to put themselves at the head of an anti-U.S. imperialism coalition of nations. Chou En-Lai made an extensive tour through Africa in 1964, lauding such bourgeois regimes as that of Toure in Guinea and Nkrumah in Ghana. He especially went out of his way to make overtures to the Algerians and Egyptians. 1961-1965 saw the development of close relations between China and Indonesia. Liu Shao-ch'i visited Indonesia in 1963 and stated, "The Republic of Indonesia has become an important force opposing imperialism and colonialism and safeguarding the peace and security of Southeast Asia and Asia as a whole." (*Peking Review*, April 19, 1963). The Chinese line in

Indonesia was to lead the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) to the disaster of 1965 in which it was virtually destroyed.

Moreover, throughout the period of bitter back and forth polemics, the Chinese continued to maintain *effective unity of action* with the Soviet Union in delivering arms to Vietnam over the Chinese railroads. At no time did the Chinese engage in public polemics against the Soviet aid.

2) The immediate cause of the split was Russian refusal to provide the Chinese with atomic weapons or even the technical assistance and materials necessary to produce them. One of the purposes of Mao's Moscow trip in 1958 was to persuade Khrushchev to make this available. The polemics heated up considerably shortly after his failure. The Chinese have given this explanation themselves?

In 1958 the leadership of the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control. These unreasonable demands were rightly and firmly rejected by the Chinese government. Not long afterwards, in June 1959, the Soviet government unilaterally tore up the agreement between China and the Soviet Union in October, 1957, and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning its manufacture. (*The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves*. Peking, 1963, p. 26).

This was followed by Soviet refusal to support China in the Formosa straits, the proposed summit meeting of Khrushchev and Eisenhower and Soviet support for India in her border dispute with China. What the Chinese objected to most strongly was Russian rapprochement with the U.S. and desertion of support of Chinese foreign policy goals.

What then is the real meaning of the dispute? The Russian bourgeoisie had seized power some years earlier and was already well along the way to restoring capitalism. Given the degree to which the Russian workers and peasants had lost confidence in Marxism-Leninism and given the long period during which nationalist ideas had been emphasized (from before WWII), the new Russian bourgeoisie could proceed to the renunciation of Marxism-Leninism without fear of popular reaction and begin to create a revisionist ideology more in correspondence to the new material conditions of bourgeois rule.

[PHOTOGRAPH OF RALLY OUTSIDE SOVIET EMBASSY IN PEKING]

caption: **During height of GPCR, thousands of Chinese workers gathered to demonstrate outside Soviet embassy in Peking, showing their hatred of revisionist bosses.**

The newly consolidated Chinese "red" bourgeoisie, however, was coming to state power at a time when hundreds of millions of Workers and Peasants still looked upon Marxism-Leninism as a correct guide to social practice. But analysis of the objective historical process has shown us that Marxism-Leninism in the particular version that characterized the line of the CCP and the ideas of Mao Tse-tung, *contained a number of incorrect ideas which led inexorably to bourgeois restoration*. No doubt the Chinese leaders consciously believed that they were defending genuinely revolutionary ideas against Soviet revisionism. The anti-Soviet polemics were necessary in order to defend that body of ideas which corresponded to the class interests of the bourgeois class. Had the Chinese leaders gone along with Khrushchevite ideology they would have been exposed before the masses and would have lost the "Left"

cover under which capitalist counter-revolution is most likely to succeed.

Moreover, the ideological imperative corresponded to the desire of the new Chinese bourgeois forces to free themselves from excessive economic and military dependence on the Soviet Union and create the material and scientific infrastructure for the development of their own atomic arsenal. The attempts by Soviet leaders to moderate the inter-imperialist rivalry with the U.S. opened up the possibility that the Chinese bourgeoisie could displace the USSR as the leader of a world wide united front of "oppressed nations" against U.S. imperialism (now joined by Soviet social-imperialism).

Nothing in these external struggles contradicts the view, derived from internal evidence, that the bourgeoisie had regained power in China in the early 1960s.

MORE ON THE GPCR

We began this report by summarizing the class forces in the cultural revolution. We then presented evidence to confirm the position of the so-called "extreme left" that most senior cadres and army officers had become a new bourgeoisie which was carrying out capitalist restoration. We can now look at some of the details of this great revolution in the light of that Left outlook.

The new element created by the GPCR was the existence of a great many *mass organizations* of students and workers. These tended to divide along political lines. Left groups, such as "Sheng-wu-Lien" in Hunan and "May 16 Corps" in Peking, took the leading role in the early days of the GPCR in attacking the high-level power-holders in the municipalities and provinces. These cadres, in turn, organized and supported mass organizations to defend their positions: these mass organizations waged protracted and then violent struggle with one another.

The mass organizations which favored "seizure of power" overthrew the existing senior cadre in many important provinces and municipalities in Dec. 1966 and Jan. 1967. In Peking, Shanghai and Taiyuan, the people moved in to set up organs of power modeled on the Paris Commune. The implication of the commune arrangement was that all the existing cadre should be removed and replaced by new leaders elected by the membership of the mass organizations. The students and workers who put forward this demand were quite sure that they had the support of Chairman Mao in proclaiming the commune-type state as their goal. On Feb. 5, 1967 the Shanghai commune was proclaimed and all the leading cadre of the Shanghai municipal Council were put on notice that they would be evaluated by the people. A new organ of power, the provisional committee for the Shanghai People's Commune, was established, with members drawn from a number of mass organizations which had participated in the power-structure. The most important leader of the commune was Chang Ch'un ch'iao, who had been a prominent Leftist during the Great Leap. Chang left for Peking on February 12 to consult with Mao.

When he returned on Feb. 24th, he reported to a mass rally that Chairman Mao opposed the name Shanghai People's Commune and preferred that it be called Shanghai Revolutionary Committee, on the model of the new organ of power which had been created in Heilkungkiang Province (Manchuria) in January. These are the reasons Chang gave:

On the 12th, Chairman Mao called us to Peking, and received us on the same day....

Chairman Mao said: "The present revolution is a revolution under proletarian dictatorship, one that has been organized and started by ourselves."....As we understand it Mao showed clearly here that for the past 17 years our country was under proletarian dictatorship and that is was Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, not

the Liu-Teng line, that was in the ruling position. Why, then, did we need to carry out a revolution under proletarian dictatorship? Chairman Mao explained: "It is because some of the organs of proletarian dictatorship have been usurped.

....he noted that the slogan "Thoroughly Improve Proletarian Dictatorship" is a reactionary one....Speaking correctly, the proletarian dictatorship could only be improved partially.

Can we do without revolutionary leading cadres? No! A combat team cannot do without a responsible man. In seizing power now, we must also have cadres, that is, we must also have new as well as old cadres. Why do we need old cadres who have assumed leadership work before? The reason is very simple. For instance, some workers perform very well. They dare to break through and rebel; they are able and have made significant contributions to the cultural revolution. But if we turn over to them a city such as Shanghai or a province such as Kiangsu, then they would find it very difficult to manage it because of lack of experience. They may be more adept in the management of one workshop.

Chairman Mao says, "A university student cannot become a university president for he has not graduated yet and is not familiar with the whole university." As I see it, he is not even qualified to become a department head because he has no teaching experience and no experience of leading the work of the whole department. So we should ask a professor or assistant professor to lead the department.

Young comrades present at the forum, don't be discouraged. Chairman Mao also says that young people have made numerous contributions to this great cultural revolution, but they cannot be once be expected to take over the duties of the secretaries of the Provincial Party Committee or the Municipal Party Committee. I myself think so too. The "three-way-combination" provides very good training for the young people. If young people in their twenties follow the old revolutionary cadres and learn from them for seven, eight, or ten years, then they are still young when they become secretaries....

There are more than 600 cadres holding the rank of heads of the departments (bureaus) and more than 6,000 with the rank of section head in Shanghai. How can we fail to find candidates for the "three-way-combination" from among these?....And the great majority of these comrades are good.

The idea of "doubting all and overthrowing all" is a reactionary one. This is not an idea of us rebels, but it has an influence on us. When we are infuriated to see that many people are so stubborn, we can easily be taken in by the propaganda of others.

....Recently the State Council told us that the rebel headquarters of an organ of the municipal part committee issued an order to the State Council demanding the abolition of all posts of "chiefs". Many things said in it were wrong. For instance, it was stated that "for a long time the department heads control the section heads and the section heads control the section personnel". I think that the same will be true in the future also. "The chiefs have always ridden on the backs of the Party and the

people." Comrade Lin Piao is Minister of National Defense, and does he ride on the backs of the Party and the people? If is reactionary to say that he does.

Chairman Mao explicitly stated: "We shall not be able to survive for a few days if we do away with even deputy section heads."

Chairman Mao said:"names should not be changed too frequently, because the form is only of secondary importance while the content is primary."

"The main thing is: which class is in power? For instance, the Soviet Union has changed, yet its name remains the same....

....Now the various provinces and municipalities are learning from Shanghai and calling themselves people's communes. What should the State Council be called? Should the national title be changed? If the state is changed into the Chinese People's Commune, then the chairman of the state would be called commune chairman or director. After the title is changed, there would still be the question of recognition by foreign countries. I think the Soviet Union would not "recognize it because to do so would be disadvantageous to herself."

"Let the Shanghai People's Commune be changed to Shanghai Municipal Revolutionary Committee....Would you not feel isolated because yours is the only commune in the whole country? The Jen-min Jih-pao could not publish the news, for if it published it, all would follow suit, and the series of problems mentioned above would arise." (Transl. in *SCMP*, no. 4147, March 27, 1968, pp. 1-19).

Clearly, the Shanghai Committee didn't just have its name changed. The "three-way-alliance" which Chang brought from Mao as the organizing principle of the new Revolutionary Committee--an alliance of army cadre, leading cadre who were "making revolution" (i.e. were willing to denounce Liu), and hand-picked representatives of some of the mass organizations--was incompatible with the view of the Leftists among the students and workers. The Shanghai Commune itself, with Chang and Yao Wen-yuan in the leadership, had already excluded the "Red Revolutionaries", the most Left student group. On Jan. 27, the latter had tried to question several members of the Shanghai Writers Union who had been drafting diatribes against them. They were prevented from doing to by a detachment of troops of the Shanghai garrison, sent on Chang's orders. When they appealed to the Central CR Group in Peking (of which Chang and Yao were members) they were condemned as "ultra-leftists". This clash between the Left and the PLA was only a small foretaste of things to come.

An important editorial in Red Flag in February clarified the line of the CC further:

Leniency should be adopted in making decisions about cadres who have made even very serious mistakes, after they are criticized and struggled against....

Cadres who have committed mistakes should be given the opportunity to examine, criticize, and correct them. So long as they make a self-criticism, correct their mistakes and come over to the side of Chairman Mao's revolutionary line, they can still be given appropriate leading posts. Many of them can even be drawn into the provisional organs of power....("Cadres Must be Treated Correctly", Transl. in *On*

the Revolutionary Three-in-One Combination, FLP, Peking, 1968, p. 36).

A State Council directive of Jan. 23, 1967 ordered the PLA to intervene actively in the provinces to bring about the formation of Revolutionary Committees. The typical series of events that followed was: 1) revolutionary mass organizations would overthrow the leading cadres as supporters of the Liu line; 2) the PLA would prevent these cadres from offering any kind of armed resistance (through mass organizations that they controlled); 3) some of the leading cadres, often from the second-line of leadership, would denounce their former superiors, make phony self-criticisms and organize mass groups to support themselves; 4) these Right mass organizations would come into sharp and protracted struggle with the Left which wanted to overthrow all the bourgeois cadres, not just a handful; 5) when this struggle passed over, as it generally did, to armed struggle, the PLA would intervene, on orders from the CC and CR Group, to "overcome the contradictions among the people" and bring everybody, including the new group of "Maoist" cadres, into a "three-way-alliance". If the Left persisted in refusing to work with the "red" bourgeoisie, then it was attacked and disarmed by the PLA.

In the cavernous Peking Gymnasium, a former diplomat named Yao Teng-shan last month was unceremoniously dragged before a gallery of 4,000 approving spectators, then forced to bow down in humble obeisance while his hands and arms were twisted behind his back. The leader of a Red Guard unit during the frenetic Cultural Revolution, which all but paralyzed China between 1966 and 1969, Yao was accused of mounting a raid on the Chinese foreign ministry, burning down the British chancellery, and plotting a personal assault on Premier Chou En Lai. Yao's reported sentence: ten years in prison.

When Yao's trial got under way, the Chinese made a special offer to see that the foreign diplomatic community in Peking was fully aware of the proceedings. Chou himself has pointedly mentioned the case in recent conversations with foreign visitors. The motive is obvious: China's current leaders are sparing of no effort to disassociate themselves from the ideological frenzy that threatened China with total chaos and mystified the watching world for much of the 1960s. Though its press and radio will still crackle with anti-U.S. and anti-Soviet vitriol, Peking is in the midst of a prodigious effort to demonstrate that China is once again in the hands of responsible moderates.

-- *Time Magazine*

Since the end of the GPCR in late 1968, Chinese bosses have been frantically crushing the leadership and dispersing the rank-and-file of the great Leftist movement which almost threw them on the garbage heap. They fear the high level of socialist consciousness reached by masses of Chinese workers and peasants, who will someday rise up to take power back for the working class.

Some examples of the end-result of the process:

In Heliungkiang, the co-chairmen of the Rev. Comm. were P'an Fu-sheng, first secretary of the former Provincial Party Committee, and Want Chia-tao, commander of the Military Region; in Shangtung, the chairman was Wang

Hsiao-yu, ex-deputy mayor of the province's largest city. In Tsinghai the chairman was Liu Hsien ch'uan, commander and party secretary of the Military District. In Szechuan, the chairman was Chang Kuo-hua, First Commissar of Chengtu Military Region and the commander of the Tibet operations of the PLA. In Kansu, Hu Chi-tung, secretary of the former Provincial Party Committee, became a deputy-chairman.

It was this overall movement that the Left later came to call the "February Adverse Current of Capitalist Restoration" or the "Evil Wind of March". The sharpest struggle was in the city of Canton. There the Leftist organizations were so strong that the CC had to place the province under direct military rule. Huang Yung-sheng (presently Minister of Defense) was sent to Canton to take command. The Leftist Red Flag faction attacked the military command several times during the following months, seizing arms, records, etc. and agitating for the removal of Huang. The armed struggle in Canton continued into mid-1968 before the resistance of the Left had finally been suppressed.

Between February and August 1967 the Left forces became more and more conscious and began to focus on the persons and institutions they held responsible for the failure of the leading cadre to "step aside". They directed their fire at Chou En-lai and the Vice-Premiers he was sheltering. Chen I and his Foreign Ministry and the PLA. Red Guards in Peking held several mass rallies denouncing Li Hisen-nien and Nieh Jung-chen, both high-ranking PLA generals who had turned to economic affairs. (The latter was in charge of the nuclear development program.) On each occasion Chou personally intervened to rescue his fellow bureaucrats. In July, 1967, Lin Chieh, editor of *Red Flag* (he was purged in August) published an editorial calling for the "dragging out of a small handful of capitalist-roaders in the Army". Even though this formulation was compromising (a "small handful") it was still too much for Mao and Lin Piao who insisted that the members of the CR Group who had connections with the radicals he purged. Chiang Chi'ing (Madam Mao), who had brought these men onto the Group in the first place, was prevailed upon to denounce her proteges in a speech to a meeting of representatives from Anhwei on Sept. 5,

....Comrades, I am not in favor of armed struggle and you must not think that I like it, because I'm for 'peaceful struggle, not armed struggle'....Armed struggle always hurts some people and damages state property.

At present, let us take Peking as an example. There is a bad thing, and I call it a bad thing because it is a counter-revolutionary organization, called the "May 16" corps. Numerically it is not a large organization, and superficially the majority of its members are young people, who are actually hoodwinked. The minority consists bourgeois elements....who make use of the ideological instability of the young people....The "May 16" assumes an "ultra-Leftist" appearance; it centers its opposition on the Premier (Chou).

Now we come to the second question: the army. Sometimes earlier, there was this wrong slogan: Seize a 'small handful in the Army'. As a result, 'a small handful in the Army' was seized everywhere and even the weapons of our regular troops were seized.

Comrades, come to think of it: if our field Army were thrown into confusion and if trouble occurred, could we tolerate such a situation?....The slogan is wrong. Because the Party, the government and the Army are all under the leadership of the Party. We can only talk about dragging out the handful of Party capitalist roaders in authority and nothing else....Even if some comrades in our Army committed serious errors, they need not be dealt with in this way.

I have talked with the young fighters of Peking about this question. Last year you went out to kindle the fire of the revolution and exchange revolutionary experience. But by going out again now, you will only do a disservice. You said that you were unable to drag out the small handful in the Army and that you needed our help in doing this. In some places, this has been done. This is a wrong assessment of the situation, and the result of the fact that you have fallen into a trap set by others.

We must not paint a dark picture of the PLA, for they are our boys and we must protect their honor. (Here she reads out the CC's Sept. 5 Order Forbidding Seizure of Arms...from the PLA, which instructed the Army to respond with force to attempted seizures.) Do you know what has happened? Military materials allotted for the support of Vietnam have been seized, and the ammunition. Those were ammunitions for striking the American imperialists!

....Some people also seized foreign ships. In Peking a strange thing has happened: some people went to the foreign embassies to make troubles and the office of the British Charge d'Affaires was burned down. We, of course, are determined to hit the American imperialists and reactionaries. But we must not make trouble at foreign embassies, and we must not go aboard foreign ships. It would be childish for good people to do so; and when bad people do so, they want to ruin the reputation of the country.

During August a sharp struggle took place around the Foreign Ministry. Struggle sessions had been taking place against Chen I since June and had forced Chinese foreign policy slightly Leftward. Statements appeared focusing on armed revolutionary struggle against Ne Win in Burma and Sihanouk in Cambodia. In August Leftists, led by Yao Teng-shan, last Chinese representative in Indonesia, seized the Foreign Ministry. The British mission was sacked and burned, rebellion in Hong Kong was encouraged, foreign ships were boarded and cargo seized and editorials began to oppose the Vietnamese negotiations. But this period ended rapidly when Mao personally intervened to "save" Chen I and began to repair the damage the Left had caused to China's "diplomatic position".

After September the formation of revolutionary committees continued in more provinces. But the Left had also grown stronger in several provinces and continued to resist the continuation of bourgeois rule under this new guise. In Hunan, "Sheng-wu-lien" held out until April before being crushed and disbanded by the PLA. The most protracted struggle took place, however, in Kwangsi, the province bordering on North Vietnam. Here, the Kwangsi "April 22 Rebel Grand Army" had been engaged in seizing arms bound for Vietnam and in preventing the formation of a stable revolutionary committee. A leaflet of June 1968 reveals how the cadres on the preparatory group for the revolutionary committees armed the members of conservative organizations to attack "April 22". As a result of the battle, says the leaflet:

....more than 2,000 buildings were reduced to rubble in Wuchow, more than 4,000 inhabitants rendered homeless, hundreds of rebel fighters and revolutionary masses arrested, creating a serious situation in which die-hard conservatives and capitalist-roaders tried to reverse previous correct decisions on them. (Transl. in *SCMP*, no. 4213, p. 4).

Leaders of "April 22" and its rivals, along with Army leaders, were called to Peking in July for a meeting to settle the conflict. There, April 22, like the Leftists of Peking, Shanghai and Hunan, found out too late which side Chairman Mao was really on. At the meeting, "April 22" was condemned, the Army was ordered to protect the railway lines to

Vietnam (many of which had been closed for months by Leftist railway workers) and the composition of the preparatory group was approved. (The CC Notices on the Kwangsi situation are translated in *URS*, Vol. 53, Nos. 1 and 2; the minutes of the above meeting in *URS*, Vol. 53, No. 9).

By autumn of 1968 the Left had been defeated everywhere and the new power structure was consolidated. A portion of the cadres had been purged, although many were and will be re-educated and rehabilitated, but the great bulk of the cadres who had carried through the bourgeois policies of 1960-66 remained in power. The role of the military officers had increased, as can be seen in the composition of the new 9th CC, announced at the 9th CC Party Congress in April 1969. Of the 279 members, 123 are military cadres, 76 are leading political cadres and 80 are former members of mass organizations loyal to the Right. The continuity of political leadership is shown by the fact that eight of all 11 members of the Standing Committee of the Politbureau of the 8th Central Committee (elected in 1956) are full members of the new 9th CC. Twenty-three members of the new CC had been criticized and repudiated in mass struggles during the GPCR. The Cultural Revolution, as an attempt by the proletariat to take power back from the bourgeois revisionists, has failed and the Right is in firm control of the CCP.

Why did it fail? The basic reason is insufficient mass support and an important factor in that was misconception about the role of Mao Tse-tung. Repeatedly, the Left forces, or at least some part of them, continued to hope that Mao would come over to their side and agree to lead a new Marxist-Leninist party to attack the entire bourgeois class. Because they waited upon his moves and looked to his initiative, the Left constantly found itself unorganized and insufficiently prepared for the sharp attacks made upon it by the Army, with Mao's approval. Behind the weakness lies the long history of the personal cult of Mao, which culminated in the quasi-religious glorification of him during the GPCR. This played and especially bit part within the Army, where Lin Piao had been leading a "learn from Chairman Mao" campaign since 1962-63. Their reluctance to admit (or even conceive) that Chairman Mao might be wrong in his evaluation of the situation must have led many Leftists to accept, partially, a Centrist stance. This failure to break with Maoism, ideologically and organizationally, led to their defeat. Moreover, the bourgeoisie had used the period 1960-66 to conduct an intense ideological campaign against Leftist thought which must have weakened the ideological consciousness of the masses to the point where only a minority, though a very large one, was willing to follow the Left into battle.

Since the end of 1968, the Leftist students and workers have been sent away from the centers of power as part of the "hsia-fang" movement of sending young people to live and work among the peasants in remote and difficult regions. In itself, there is nothing wrong with students going to learn from peasants; but, at this particular time and in this political context, the main aspect of "hsia-fang" is to fragment the Left and remove it from contact with the urban proletariat.

None of the Leftward ideological or economic trends of the GPCR can last. Material incentives are reappearing as the emphasis shifts overwhelmingly in publications and propaganda as the emphasis shifts to technical innovations (see any recent Peking Review). The Draft Regulations for Rural People's Communes of 1961-62 have never been changed; in fact, the CC, throughout the GPCR, emphasized that they would be around for at least 30 years. With the Right in firm political control, these trends will continue.

TRANSLATION SERIES

CB -- Current Background, U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong

ECMM -- Extracts From China Mainland Magazines, Hong Kong

SCMP -- Survey of China Mainland Press, Hong Kong

CNS -- China News Summary, Taiwan

URS -- Union Research Service, Union Research Institute, Hong Kong

CHINESE PRESS

Red Flag (Hung ch'i or Honqui) -- bi-weekly theoretical magazine of the CCP

Renmin Ribao (or Jen-min Jih-pao) -- People's Daily, daily organ of the CC of the CCP

New China News Agency (NCNA) English-language news service of the Chinese government

OTHER SOURCES OF STATISTICAL DATA

Barnett, A.C., Cadres, Bureaucracy and Political Power in Communist China

Schurmann, H.F., Ideology and Organization in Communist China

Chao Kuo-chun, Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China, Vol. 2

Iran Students Assail China Invitation to Hated Fascist

(Originally published in *PL Magazine*, 'Special Issue' Vol 8, No. 3, November 1971, pp. 49. Third article in the original *PL Magazine* publication)

(Note: The following are excerpts from an *Open Letter from the World Confederation of Iranian Students to the People's Republic of China.*)

The World Confederation Of Iranian Students (WCIS) has learned with utmost amazement and regret that Ashraf Pahlavi has been invited for a 10-day visit to the People's Republic of China.

...Such an invitation...is in no way justifiable for the movement of the youth and progressive and anti-imperialist forces of Iran.

Your government has invited Ashraf, who, next to her brother, is the most hated and the most reactionary element of the Pahlavi court. She is the element who has been directly involved in, and played a determining role in, the Black Coup of 1953, and being an agent of the CIA, has rendered the greatest service to the American and British imperialists and Iranian reaction. She, along with per dictator-butcher brother, has had a decisive role in betraying the interests of our people and in carrying out the killings of our revolutionaries and freedom lovers.

...**Even more important, this invitation** is taking place at a time when:

The anti-imperialist and anti-dictatorial movement of our people is in the midst of a new upsurge;

this movement is strongly under the savage attack of the fascist regime of the Shah of Iran;

The best revolutionary fighters of our country, group after group, are being tried in closed military "courts" and executed or being murdered in torture chambers;

The anti-imperialist movement of our youth and people, more than at any other time, is in need of support and solidarity of...the revolutionary and anti-imperialist forces of the world....

The WCIS in the name of the democratic and anti-imperialist movement of Iranian students and in the name of the anti-imperialist students and youth of Iran, and taking into account the above facts, objects to the act of the government of the People's Republic of China inviting such a hated element like Ashraf, and considers this act, not in the interests of our people but in the interest of profiting that puppet regime-which right now; with the help of imperialists and reactionary forces of the world, is preparing to celebrate the 2500th year of the "kingdom" of Iran in order to cover and mask its great economic difficulties and dead-ends, in order to deceive Iranian and world public opinion. For this, and in order to show that Iran is a "stable and independent island," it has started an unprecedented fascist campaign of terror and attack against our people and our revolutionary elements.

Our people, who have always rightly desired the recognition of the People's Republic of China on a world scale and have been true and ardent supporters of friendship between the Iranian and Chinese peoples, as before, with untiring and determined spirit, will continue its struggle against imperialism and its functionaries in Iran, against the fascist dictatorship of the Shah, in order to build the real cornerstone of this friendship.

Victory to the common struggle of the peoples of the world against imperialism and its running dogs!

Long live the militant unity of the peoples of Iran and China!

-- Secretariat of the World Confederation of Iranian Students

Strengths and Weaknesses in the Line of...

The International Communist Movement

(Originally published in *PL Magazine*, 'Special Issue' Vol 8, No. 3, November 1971, pp. 50-71. Fourth article in the original *PL Magazine* publication)

Millions of working people in every corner of the world know that they can solve the fundamental problems of their class only by making proletarian revolution and winning the fight for socialism.

The history of this century can be summed up as the story of how working people came to embrace the goals of revolution, socialism, and communism and how they struggled to rid themselves of capitalist society by replacing it with socialist society.

Revolution and socialism would not be mass ideas today without the international communist movement of the past 100 years, which led hundreds of millions of workers and oppressed people in titanic class battles against capitalist exploitation.

The revolutionary movement has passed through successive stages of growth and deepened understanding in the five generations since the Paris Commune marked the first attempt by workers to seize and hold state power. As we have pointed out in the article *Road to Revolution III*, each of these stages--the Commune, the Russian revolution of 1917, the Chinese revolution, and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution--has enabled millions to absorb fresh lessons' about class struggle and to advance the revolutionary process.

These lessons are embodied in the science of Marxism-Leninism. As the historical leaders of the international communist movement, Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, Mao, and others attempted to discover the laws of class struggle and apply them to the revolutionary practice of the movement. The discoveries they succeeded in making were not the result of individual "genius" but rather the product of the collective experiences shared by masses locked in life and death struggle against the capitalist class.

Revolutionaries today refer to themselves as Marxist-Leninists because these discoveries point the way ahead for the communist movement everywhere. Marx and Engels discovered historical materialism (the science of history and society), dialectical materialism, the economic laws of capitalism's development, and, most importantly, the need for violent working-class led revolution that would smash the state apparatus of the old bourgeoisie and replace it with a workers' dictatorship. Lenin and his comrades in the Bolshevik party rescued Marxism from the opportunism of the social democrats. They brought to light Marx's teachings about the Paris Commune and taught the working people how to seize political power. Their great discoveries were the theory and development of a revolutionary democratic-centralist party, the primacy of politics over economics (in his struggle against the "Economists," Lenin outlined the key task of winning masses to revolutionary political consciousness--he defeated the revisionist idea that the fight for reform demands would "spontaneously" bring about revolution), the nature of imperialism, and the nature and function of the state under capitalism and socialism. Under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, the communist movement developed the theory of protracted people's war and discovered the revolutionary potential of hundreds of millions of peasants.

Without these discoveries, the revolutionary movement could not advance today. They embody the living kernel of Marxism-Leninism and the hope of workers and oppressed people everywhere. However, revolutionary theory is not a

catechism--a set of ideas and principles that work mechanically, as if by "magic." Workers and revolutionaries must constantly evaluate their experiences in struggle and re-evaluate their ideas about these experiences. If working class revolution, proletarian dictatorship, and socialism 'correctly remain the goals of the revolutionary movement, there is no universally valid formula served up on a platter for achieving these goals .

The proof is in the pudding. On the one hand, the general trend of modern history is the revolutionary thrust of millions grasping and fighting for communist ideas. As an historical phenomenon, this process is irreversible. On the other hand, however, the working class has suffered many temporary defeats on the road to revolution and socialism. In every country where workers seized power and began to build socialist society, the bourgeoisie has reconquered state power, re-asserted its class dictatorship, and restored or begun to restore capitalism. The old communist movement, led by Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao, is dead as a revolutionary force. A new communist movement can and must develop to absorb the lessons of past defeats and carry forward the struggle to destroy capitalism.

The defeats suffered by the communist movement over the last 100 years did not simply "happen." In every case, they occurred as the direct result of weaknesses within the movement. Since the Bolshevik revolution, the communist movement in all countries has applied the same strategy to make , consolidate revolution. When the Chinese Communist party seized power in 1949, it did so with essentially the same line that had been put into practice by Lenin's party in 1917. The temporary reversal of workers' power and socialism in the Soviet Union, the transformation of once-mighty communist parties elsewhere into revisionist agents of the international bourgeoisie, and the emergence of China's "red bourgeoisie" as a ruling class after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution make it critical at this time for revolutionaries to analyze the strategy of the old communist movement, identify its errors, and use this knowledge to turn defeat into victory. The purpose of this article is to study the communist movement's traditional view of how to make revolution.

BOLSHEVIK RECIPE FOR SEIZING POWER

The Bolshevik strategy, which was virtually copied by the entire movement until the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, includes four main points:

- (1) The key point is to organize a democratic centralist party made up of active militants. Lenin wrote, "The party, so to speak; embodies in itself the vanguard of the proletariat." This set the Bolsheviks apart from all other socialist groups, all of whom opposed Lenin's party concept.
- (2) Through taking part in all sorts of progressive struggles the party wins the support of the masses of workers; professionals, intellectuals and so forth. This set the Bolsheviks apart from the syndicalists, the other major left-wing tendency of the early part of the century. The syndicalists believed only in trade union action.
- (3) Through alliances with existing organizations or by a program proposing to parcel out the big landlords' land to the rest of the peasantry the party wins the support of the peasants. This complete]y reversed the traditional Marxist attitude towards the peasants, which was that they could play no revolutionary role.

The lower middle class, the small manufacturer , the shopkeeper, the artisan, the peasant, all these fight against the bourgeoisie to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. They are therefore not revolutionary but conservative. Nay more, they are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history. If by chance they are revolutionary, they are so only in view of their

impending transfer into the proletariat, they thus defend not their present, but their future interests, they desert their own standpoint to place themselves at that of the proletariat.

-- *The Communist*

Manifesto

(4) By advocating equality and the right to independent statehood for all colonized nations the party wins the support of the bourgeoisie of colonized nations. This introduced an idea no Marxist before Lenin had built on, though Marx had anticipated the idea. During Lenin's time all other groups of the socialist movement held that colonial freedom could come about only as the result of a successful revolution in the colonizing country.

.Having achieved this great united front the party is in a position to take power, through required military action whose character depends on local conditions .

In other words the socialist revolution means the party taking power .

POLITICAL STRUGGLE AND ECONOMIC DETERMINISM

In order to understand this strategy we must discuss what Marxists think is the reason events happen as they do.

A certain set of material conditions lies at the base of every historical development and determines its limits at any given period. These material conditions are a given society's forces of production and their relation to each other, which, taken together, Marxism-Leninism terms the mode of production. The development of the economic base is, in the long run, the cause of historical development.

The question is not what this or that proletarian, or even the proletariat as a whole, considers as its aim at any given moment. The question is what the proletariat is, and what, in accordance with this being, it will be historically obliged to do. Its aim and action in history is patently, irrevocably preordained by its situation in life, as well as by the whole organization of contemporary bourgeois society. (Karl Marx in *The Holy Family* .)

The longer the time period we consider or the more important the historical event, the more forcefully does this point assert itself.

Marx and Engels held, and Marxism holds, that the "development of the economic base" proceeds through class struggle. But clearly it is possible to read the above quote from Marx and proceed to . a very mechanical view that people always act in any given situation according to their economic interests. In fact the tendency within the Marxist movement has always been to think this way. The right wing within the Marxist movement has always interpreted events almost as if they were preordained by history; the right has always given primacy to economics. The left wing has always opposed this and based itself on politics, on conscious mass action rather than historical "inevitability." The struggle between the deterministic and the political tendencies has been a constant and basic controversy within the movement: History demonstrates that the movement has been successful in making revolution only where the political approach was in charge.

The theory that class struggle determines how the economic base develops involves two related groups of ideas.

(1) Historical development depends upon the ideas that the various classes hold. People act according to what they think is right. On the one hand these ideas ultimately derive from the economic base. On the other hand ideology has a relative independence of development. Economic conditions ultimately determine the way in which existing ideas change and develop further, but they do so indirectly, through politics, law, literature and the other elements of the superstructure. The economic base is reflected indirectly and in a distorted form, and only analysis of the superstructure reveals its relation to the base. In other words, there is interaction on the basis of economic necessities, which are decisive in the long run.

There is never complete correlation between base and superstructure. Nor can every element in the ideological superstructure be traced back totally to economic conditions. The parallel between economic and ideological development emerges only when dealing with longer time periods.

Engels criticized himself and Marx for a certain omission in their work:

Marx and I are ourselves partly to blame for the fact that younger writers sometimes lay more stress on the economic side than is due to it. We had to emphasize this main principle in opposition to our adversaries, who denied it, and we had not always the time, the place or the opportunity to allow the other elements involved in the interaction to come into their rights. But when it was a case of presenting a section of history that is or a practical application, the thing was different and there no error was possible. (*Correspondence*, page 475)

Marx and Engels held that the final cause of any particular event was the interaction between base and superstructure. As their contemporary, the Russian philosopher Lavrov, put it:

Once these political forms, abstract ideas and concrete ideals, created by the economic forces, have arisen, once they have become elements of a culture, they often become independent social forces, and forgetting or denying their origin, take up the struggle for mastery against just those economic forces to which they owed their origin. Thereby they have evoked new forms of economic needs, new economic forces on the stage of history.

(2) Until political struggle decides who wins there are only conflicting tendencies existing. But nothing in the world happens merely because some group of people wants it to happen. People who think that all you have to do is have clear ideas are called "voluntarists," and they tend to get themselves killed without any useful results, as the Guevara's example points out.

All groups and classes have to contend with other groups and classes. Under capitalism, there are always two completely opposing interests. What benefits one hurts the other. If each interest is conscious of itself, has developed its view logically and is passionate about the justness of its cause, who will win? Whichever is actually stronger and fights better will win. One side may be potentially stronger; however, it is not potential strength but actual strength that wins. There is nothing inherent in any situation that determines what will happen. We can estimate in advance what might happen given the relative balance of forces. But the struggle itself is the only thing that determines what does happen.

Marxism does not hold that economic law rules political struggle. It is the other way around; class struggle determines the operation of economic laws. Marx writes, for example, of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. From this the

determinists conclude that capitalism is inevitably doomed. But the rate of profit will not tend to fall if the workers allow the capitalists to increase their exploitation.

For example, the Bell Telephone Company is now attempting to maximize its profits by automating thousands of workers out of jobs. In July 1971, 500,000 Bell workers went on strike. Far from cutting Bell's profits, the strike actually enabled the bosses to increase them, because the workers were misled by sellout union officials who had organized them into several different unions and led only one union out at a time. As a result, the linesmen's and installers' union was on strike while the operators' and business representatives' union was not. With the exception of certain situations where there was heightened class consciousness, the workers who were not "officially" on strike crossed the picket lines set up by the strikers and went to work. The union sellouts had cooked up a deal with management to institutionalize scabbing: "if the bosses don't bother our picket lines, we'll allow supervisors and non-striking unions through the lines." Because of this sellout and because they were not organized to defeat it, the phone workers' strike had little or no effect on the bosses. On the contrary: it enabled the bosses to operate the phone company at reduced costs, since they weren't paying 500,000 salaries for the duration of the strike. In addition, the bosses could use this opportunity to plan the installation of more automated equipment that would pave the way for further mass layoffs.

By itself, the phone company's desire for more profits did not determine the results of the strike. If all Bell workers had united to maintain mass picketing 2-4 hours a day, if they had shut down the entire industry by taking steps necessary to prevent anybody from getting through the lines, the results of the strike would have been far different, and the Bell bosses would not be able to gloat over the fat figures that appear in their profit column. The success or failure of any strike--or any other form of class struggle against capitalism--is fundamentally a political question, not a numbers game. Capitalism is doomed only if the working people decide to kill it and then organize to do so.

The victory of the Russian revolution was the historical proof of the correctness of the political as against the deterministic tendency in Marxism. (Interestingly, the Russian determinists condemned the revolution as "anti-Marxist.") One cannot explain the Russian revolution at all without first granting the truth that class struggle develops the economic base. Trying to explain why the Russian revolution continued to develop despite the apparently overwhelming forces arrayed against it the Bolshevik historian Pokrovsky wrote:

'Objective causes' are now (the late 1920s) against us, and on this fact were founded the predictions both of our 'friends,' who are gradually losing hope that we shall 'reform,' and 'come to our senses,' and of our enemies, who are also gradually losing hope that we shall fail. The objective logic of the old 'economic materialism' is against us--and we go forward. ..This means that there is something in the very 'nature' of the proletariat of our country which gives it the possibility to conquer even when 'objective causes' are not for it, but against it.

The Bolshevik revolution was successful contrary to the beliefs held by all revolutionary socialists at the time, contrary even to many beliefs held by the Bolsheviks themselves. These beliefs were highly deterministic. In relation to the movement as a whole the Russian Bolsheviks were the most political and the least deterministic. But the strategy of revolutionary nationalism they elaborated following their victory, which the 'new communist movement' adopted, is also basically deterministic. This strategy had two drawbacks. First, only one party in the whole history of the communist movement was able to conquer state power by following it. This was the Chinese party, and their triumph came only after they made a major change in strategy replacing the main deterministic feature with a highly political one.

The second drawback is that in neither Russia nor China could the working people follow a political course that

subordinated political consciousness to economic development and continue to hold power .

History shows that it is possible for communists to win state power even though they follow a strategy that contains fundamental errors that will lead to the eventual loss of power if they are not reversed. But when parties do win power by following a wrong course they are not able to use that power over any long period of time to produce socialism. The proletarian dictatorship is not able to maintain itself and the Leninist party, is transformed into an exploiting class. This is the result of the deterministic errors that characterize revolutionary nationalist strategy.

Fighting for socialism during the period after the working class seizes control of the state means

fighting for a type of economic and government structure and carrying out political struggles that advance an equalitarian, collectivist, anti-individualist way of life. The production of ever-increasing masses of people who struggle for this type of world is the main thing that socialist society must accomplish. The production of goods is secondary to this, must serve this, and must not obstruct this.

In the Soviet Union socialism came to be identified with higher living standards. The "battle for production" was the battle for socialism, and anything went so long as it increased production. When a new exploitative system was fully developed it was easy for it to achieve legitimacy as an administrative reform designed to improve production. Socialism was overthrown in the name of socialism.

PHASES OF COMMUNIST STRATEGY

Communist strategy went through four major phases. (1) The first phase was marked by the Bolshevik triumph in Russia. But that triumph was not considered a victory for socialism by the Bolsheviks or by anyone else. At that time all revolutionaries confidently expected socialist revolution to triumph in western Europe, especially in Germany. They believed that only this triumph would create the conditions for transforming the Russian revolution into a socialist revolution. The task of the newly-founded Communist International (Comintern) was to help this European socialist revolution break out. This period ran from the outbreak of the First World War to 1921 and encompassed the Bolshevik triumph in 1917, the triumph and then failure of the Hungarian revolution in 1919, the Red Army's march on Warsaw in 1920, which was defeated, and the German revolutions of 1919 and 1921, which were both crushed. A frustrated attempted coup in Germany in 1923 and the Bulgarian communists' failure to act to prevent the overthrow of a comparatively liberal bourgeois regime also in 1923 (though they were the country's major political party) were icing on the cake. By 1924 the Comintern could not avoid changing its line, adopting what we now know as typical communist strategy. Until 1923 the Comintern's approach was still fundamentally the approach of the left-wing of the old social-democratic movement.

(2) With the failures of the first period came a re-evaluation of the Russian experience,. What had earlier been thought of as an event that would trigger the socialist revolution was now seen as the socialist revolution itself. Accordingly the Russian experience was generalized to apply to all countries. As the revolutionary movement had just met a series of defeats in Europe and was on the defensive, European politics declined in importance in the Comintern 's view, replaced by Asia and the Middle East (especially China) where the Communist movement was successfully growing. As a result the peasant question and the alliance with the national bourgeoisie became the most important and characteristic features of communist strategy.

(3) With the Great Depression of the 1930s European and American political events eclipsed Asian developments in the Comintern's estimate. But now the approach used was fat different than that of the first period. Instead the approach which had proved so successful in building up the movement in Asia was adapted to Europe. We know it as

the 7th Comintern Congress line, or the Dimitroff line.

(4) The fourth and final phase was the result of the Soviet victory in World War II. The Soviet army installed local communist parties in coalition governments with bourgeois parties. But the Soviets disarmed the bourgeoisies throughout Eastern Europe and armed the Communists, creating conditions for the Communist parties to seize complete power, which the Czech communists did in 1948. In Yugoslavia and Albania, where the Communist parties controlled their own mass armies, they installed themselves in power right after the Russians crushed the German war machine. But everything done in Eastern Europe in this period was really the culmination of the preceding period. The partisan movements were built on the principles of the 7th Congress line, and the policies of the Communist-led governments emphasized economics and "material conditions" to the exclusion of revolutionary politics, in fact substituting economics for politics.

PEASANTS: FEUDAL OR CAPITALIST EXPLOITATION?

Because of the importance which Bolshevik policy toward the peasants came to have, it is important to review the development of this policy.

Marx and Engels, as we have seen, considered the peasants a reactionary survival of feudalism. They held that large-scale farming was a necessary feature of socialism, whereas the peasants demanded the division of the land into small-holdings.

In the 1850s a populist movement developed in Russia which held that the feudal common lands farmed by the peasants but not owned by them provided the basis for a future socialist society. This point became the focal point of controversy within the Russian socialist movement for the rest of the century.

In the 1880s a group of young Marxists split off from the populists. They held that capitalism would be necessary before socialism could be reached in Russia, and therefore rejected the populists' vision of the peasant commune serving as the foundation of socialism. Plekhanov, the leader of the group, demonstrated that the commune could develop only into bourgeois forms .

Marx and Engels tended to support the populist view in the 1870s and 1880s but added the important qualification that a proletarian revolution had to take place in Western Europe first so that material means would be available for a technological r-evolution to raise productivity in Russian farming. On that basis socialism could be developed. By 1893 Engels backed away from the populist position altogether. As far as he was concerned, capitalism was inevitable for Russia.

Lenin entered the scene in the 1890s as a supporter of Plekhanov's views. The main theme of his early writings was that contrary to populist theories, capitalism was developing in Russia and that was good for the socialist revolution.

The common view of the Russian Marxists was that the peasants, no matter what their country, were at best a conservative force. Plekhanov wrote in 1892, "Apart from the bourgeoisie and the proletariat we perceive no social forces in our country in which opposition or revolutionary groups could find support." Plekhanov foresaw a two-stage revolution, whose first stage established capitalism, and whose second stage overthrew it.

The first program of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party was drawn up in 1903. Although the party split between Lenin's followers and Plekhanov's on the issue of the party concept, on economic matters there was no split.

All agreed that the proper program for the peasantry was to promote the development of capitalism in the countryside, get rid of feudal leftovers, and hasten class division.

The industrial workers touched off the 1905 Russian Revolution at the beginning of January. By February there were full scale peasant revolts in the Ukraine, in the Baltic provinces and in the Caucasus, and the revolts lasted until the summer of 1906. No faction of the Social-Democratic party sent organizers to the rebellious peasants. Lenin felt that "the peasants...desire, dream of and truly need (not the abolition of capitalism...but) to emerge from the mire of semi-serfdom..." This was not something the Social-Democrats could properly help the peasants do. (As Engels had written, "We can win ...the mass of small peasants only if we make them promises which we notoriously cannot keep.") Instead the Social Democrats threw all their meager forces into the urban industrial areas because--as Lenin wrote-- "the Social-Democratic influence is as yet very very insignificant" within the proletariat.

Lenin concluded from the 1905 revolution that all the revolutionary measures taken by the peasants should be supported. He also proposed that the immediate goal of the revolution be a "democratic dictatorship of workers and peasants."

All these principles of Marxism have been proved and explained in minute detail in general and with regard to Russia in particular. And from these principles it follows that the idea of seeking salvation for the working class in anything save the further development of capitalism is reactionary. In countries like Russia the working class suffers not so much from capitalism as from the insufficient development of capitalism. The working class is therefore most certainly interested in the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism. The removal of all remnants of the old order which hamper the broad, free and rapid development of capitalism is of absolute advantage to the working class. The bourgeois revolution is precisely an upheaval that most resolutely sweeps away survivals of the past, survivals of the serf-owning system. .. and most fully guarantees the broadest, freest, and most rapid development of capitalism.

...The transformation of the economic and political system in Russia along bourgeois-democratic lines is inevitable and inescapable.

'The revolution's decisive victory over czarism' means the establishment of the revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry ...

...We must not be afraid of...Social Democracy's complete victory in a democratic revolution. ..for such a victory will enable us to rouse Europe; after throwing off the yoke of the bourgeoisie, the socialist proletariat of Europe will in its turn help us to accomplish the socialist revolution. ..in Europe the conditions for socialism have reached. ..maturity. ..(We) set the revolutionary proletariat of Russia an active task: winning the battle for democracy and using this victory to bring the revolution into Europe. ..

The time will come when the struggle against the Russian autocracy will end, and the period of democratic revolution will have passed in Russia; it will then be ridiculous even to speak of 'singleness of will ' of the proletariat and the peasantry, about a democratic dictatorship, etc. When that time comes we will deal directly with the question of the socialist dictatorship of the proletariat...

The "democratic dictatorship" is thus in theory a temporary, defensive, transitional period designed to defeat the "desperate counter-revolutionary struggle" in a country not yet ready for socialism. When the struggle against the autocracy is finished the need for the "democratic dictatorship", is over and the time for building socialism is at hand. The country is not ready for socialism now because the Marxist-Leninists have little influence over the masses. But despite this a revolution is imminent, and "since we are out to fight, we must desire victory." This is the thrust of Lenin's strategy.

Despite the fact that all social-democrats considered that large scale farming was a necessary part of socialism and that Lenin repeatedly argued that dividing up the land was only "the most consistent clearing of the way for capitalism" and the "strivings of the most radical of the bourgeoisie," the Bolshevik revolution based itself precisely on this division.

At first this presented no problem, as the Bolsheviks held that their seizure of power did not mean that the introduction of socialism was an immediate task (see the Eighth of the April Theses, which Lenin wrote in April 1917 and which outlined the Bolsheviks' revolutionary strategy).

But by August 1917 Lenin's view had radically changed. He was now convinced that the time was ripe for the Bolsheviks to take power and felt that the revolution would be transformed into a socialist revolution at once. He was therefore able to take over, completely the agrarian program of the populists he had fought for so long, a program whose great merit was that the bulk of the peasants supported it. This program called for nationalizing the land and dividing it up among the peasants for their perpetual use. Since the land was mortgaged, it could be nationalized only if the resistance of capital was broken. In December 1917 Lenin called on the Peasant Soviets to recognize that the land distribution was possible only on the basis of the workers' socialist revolution of November and to support the November revolt as a socialist revolution. (The Peasant Soviets were controlled by the populists.)

In February 1918 the Bolsheviks and the left wing populists with whom they shared government power issued jointly the socialist land law. This law made the point that the purpose of a socialist land program was "to create conditions favorable to the development of the productive forces.... by increasing the productivity of the soil, by improving agricultural technique..." The last of five points explaining the purpose of the program was "to develop the collective system of agriculture as being more economic in respect of labor and of products, at the expense of individual holdings, in order to bring about the transition to a socialist economy."

Lenin later conceded that equal distribution of the land was irrelevant to the socialist revolution, but was necessary to win the peasants. "We Bolsheviks shall help the peasantry to outlive petty bourgeois slogans, to make the transition as rapidly and easily as possible to socialist slogans."

The land reform benefited the more prosperous peasants more than the poor peasants. Eighty-six per cent of the land was distributed to the peasants, 11 per cent became state farms and 3 per cent went to collectives (in all, these last two categories amounted to only a few hundred farms on the worst land.) By the end of the reform the typical unit of Soviet agriculture was a small farm of up to four desyatins worked by a peasant and his family, who usually owned one horse. In general, the rich peasants-known as the kulaks-controlled the countryside, including the Soviets and the state farms and collectives.

The Bolsheviks were confronted with the problem of feeding the cities. This was the impetus for the changes in farm policy. They had hoped to buy grain from the peasants but discovered the peasants wouldn't sell.

We came to the conclusion that the measure on which we had staked so many hopes, namely exchange of goods, was not likely to prove particularly useful. Many cases occurred in which the peasants, seeing that we had no goods, declared: 'We will not give grain without goods.' But when we brought the goods we did not get the grain. .. (Speech by the Peoples Commissar for Supply to the 5th All-Russian Congress of Soviets, July 1918).

Through the first six months of the revolution the Bolsheviks made no move to organize the poor peasants against the petty bourgeois kulaks. This was the result of the extreme Bolshevik weakness in the countryside, for at no point had they ever devoted any resources to peasant organizing. But as the kulaks resisted giving up the grain it was now necessary to attack them and get the grain. On June 11, 1918 the Committees of Poor Peasants were established and made responsible to the Commissariat of Supply. The committees were to confiscate grain from the kulaks and help the poor peasants organize themselves against the kulaks. According to Lenin, the organization of the poor peasant committees was the step by which "we passed the boundary which separates the bourgeois from the socialist revolution." At the same time the first efforts were made to begin large-scale agriculture. But all these policies failed to increase food production.

Many of the poor peasants who had benefited from the land reform now opposed any further revolutionary measures. They had become typical middle peasants. The poor peasant committees therefore tended to turn their fire on both the kulak and the middle peasant, with the result that even less was sown. Politically the poor peasant committees stood in opposition to the peasant soviets. When the central leaders saw that production was being hampered by the activities of the poor peasant committees they disbanded them, merging them into the peasant soviets at the end of 1918.

The new approach was to conciliate the middle peasant. This policy emerged in March 1919. He could be won to communist society "only...when we ease and improve the economic conditions of life".

The Bolsheviks were in a bind. Without agricultural produce not only could they not feed the cities, they also could not develop any light industry to manufacture commodities for the peasants.

Along with the policy of conciliating the middle peasant came the policy of relying on the old exploiters as managers and technicians of the larger farms. "No, if you yourselves do not know how to organize agriculture in the new way, we must take the old specialists into our service; without this we shall never escape from beggary ", said Lenin.

When the Soviet government was attacked at the Second Comintern Congress by a German delegate for giving in to petty bourgeois ways of thought in defending the middle peasants, Lenin replied that if the Soviets acted otherwise "the small peasant will not notice the difference between the former government and the dictatorship of the Soviets" and that "if the proletarian power does not act in this way it will not be able to maintain itself. ',

A year earlier Lenin had pointed out:

If we could tomorrow give 100,000 first-class tractors, supply them with benzene, supply them with mechanics (you know well that for the present this is a fantasy), the middle peasant would say: 'I am for the commune (i.e., for communism).' But in order to do this it is first necessary to conquer the international bourgeoisie, to compel it to give us these tractors.

As we know, relying on the middle peasants did not turn the trick, and in 1921 a new policy of relying on the kulaks

was applied. This was accompanied by a general reversion to capitalist practices. The whole plan is known as the NEP (New Economic Policy) which lasted until the late 1920s. By this time the Soviet government was able to get certain imperialists to "give tractors" even without conquering them. Krupp, Ford, General Electric all played a role in helping make the Soviets dependent on the international bourgeoisie.

The result of all this was that never were the Bolsheviks able to introduce the Paris Commune type state they desired to introduce. How could they when the peasants were not committed to socialism?

The Bolsheviks were the victims of their own policies. Having abandoned the countryside (where 80 per cent of the population lived) before the seizure of power they were in no position to influence the peasants. Nor did they have any framework of peasant cadres to work with. After 1917 they were forced to reap what they had previously sown.

The reason for this abandonment of the countryside was a mechanical, deterministic one. As Lenin put it, the peasants neither need nor desire the abolition of capitalism. Capitalism is to the peasant what socialism is to the proletariat. This is all wrong.

First, why is the proletariat the "only consistently revolutionary class?" According to Marx it is because, whether or not he realizes it, "his social problems cannot be solved short of socialism. Does not history prove that this is also true for the peasant? The experience of every single land reform without exception proves that the peasant cannot overcome his social problems short of the collectivization of the land, which is to say socialism. Cannot the world's peasants today assimilate this knowledge?

Second, Lenin maintained that the proletariat could play a key revolutionary role because of the organizational skills it had acquired as a result of its collective experience in factories and with mass production. But the history of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions proves that the peasants are also perfectly capable of carrying out complex organizational tasks.

Third, in what way is the mentality of the average worker so different from that of the average poor peasant? If the worker owns his own home (as most in America do), if he is covered by union welfare plans and seniority protection, does he not feel a stake in the system? If he works in a place where there is a high proportion of petty supervisors to regular workers, as in the telephone company where there is a supervisor for every five workers, may he not tend to hope that he might become a supervisor too? Is there not a similarity between this and the desire to become a landowner? Yet all revolutionaries feel that the proletariat can be won away from class collaboration because in the long run and in general it cannot work. Why shy away from this same approach in the countryside?

Some argue that there is a qualitative difference between the proletarians and the poor peasants. Let us examine this briefly. A proletarian sells his labor power in exchange for enough commodities to keep alive, in working condition and to raise a family of future proletarians. He does not own what he produces. Capitalism produces two things, commodities and proletarians.

To attempt to prove a qualitative class difference between peasants and proletarians by characterizing the agrarian economies of most of the world as "semi-feudal"--which the proponents of "revolutionary nationalism" do--is to confuse the form with the content of production relations. Capitalism is the dominant mode of production in all but the most remote corners of the world. It did not develop indigenously in many countries, but was imposed by imperialism. When the imperialists came they found various pre-capitalist systems already established. The imperialists incorporated many of the forms of these earlier systems into their new capitalist system. In other words, the essence is capitalist but the appearance may sometimes be feudal.

What are the fundamental criteria for the existence of capitalist production? How do we recognize it? Capitalism is a system of commodity production, production for the market mediated by a system of monetary exchange, and it is a system in which the actual producers do not own the means of production necessary to turn out a usable product. These means of production are owned by a class of capitalists who buy the labor-power of the producers, paying them only a certain portion of the total value they produce. The most developed and typical form in which producers are paid is by a money wage. But there are other forms characteristic of less well developed capitalist systems, especially agrarian economies, and this has led to these economies being characterized as "semi-feudal."

An example of what we mean is found in India, one of the most important agrarian capitalist nations (which, incidentally, is the scene of a vigorous struggle led by a Marxist-Leninist party along the lines of Lenin's and Mao's strategic approach). The agricultural population in India can best be divided in the following way (aside from big landlords):

- (1) Rich peasants--owning or renting over 30 hectares and hiring numerous workers, either by the day or seasonally. Usually they pay their workers in money, but sometimes they pay in kind. They make up perhaps 10 percent of the rural population.
- (2) Middle peasants--relatively self-sufficient in tools and labor power, but usually renting the land and paying money rent. They make up about 20 per cent of the rural population.
- (3) Poor peasants or semi-proletarians--most commonly sharecroppers or tenants of a related type. They do not have enough land to be self-sufficient and they own either no tools or pitifully meager implements. The capitalist farmer provides them with additional land and the necessary tools. He pays the tenants with a share of their output, which naturally varies according to the output. This is a piece-work wage paid in kind rather than in money. It may look like semi-feudal tenancy, but the sharecropper, owning little (if anything) more than his labor-power, is in essence a worker. He moves easily between sharecropping and working for day wages, often doing both within a single season. There are many forms of this type of relationship in India, their appearance complicated by their tie-in to the caste system (which is a precapitalist ideological system justifying relations of dependence). But all of these forms are merely transitional forms of capitalist relations. About 10 per cent of the rural population is contained in this category.
- (4) Agricultural proletariat-working for wages on larger farms or plantations (tea, jute, cotton, etc.). They are typical workers, completely separated from all means of production. They make up 30 per cent of the rural population.

This is the process of the disintegration of the peasantry (about which Lenin wrote, but much further developed than what Lenin knew). Originally a more homogeneous peasantry existed (but never a completely equal, petty-bourgeois-utopian peasantry). It was split along two lines. The bulk became increasingly proletarianized. Capitalist penetration has gone so far in India that today 70 per cent of the rural population is proletarian. The middle peasants, who are both theoretically and practically the core of Lenin's strategy, are a transitional group rapidly being broken up.

What is true for India is true for the rest of the world. A separate article is being prepared for the next issue of *PL Magazine* documenting this at great length. Here we may summarize the conclusion that the bulk of the world's peasantry has already been proletarianized. There is no necessary qualitative difference between urban and rural workers, neither "objectively" nor "subjectively."

As we have shown, it has traditionally been assumed that a certain relatively high level of productivity was" required to effect the transition to socialism. But we have also shown that this is a mechanical viewpoint founded on the idea that the peasants can only be bought off. High productivity is what one is reduced to if the necessary political work

has not been done. Even so, there is not the slightest evidence from anywhere in the world that buying off works. The evidence is that if you don't succeed at the political struggle the socialist revolution fails and dies.

IMPERIALISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

The Bolsheviks could not help but be concerned with the problem of oppressed nations, since the Russian empire was known as the "prison house of nations."

Lenin drew his most direct inspiration from Marx and Engels' 1869 position on the Irish struggle. Marx and Engels held that if Ireland became independent the power of the English aristocracy in England would be broken, and the power of the English bourgeoisie would be shaken. Most important, if the English workers supported Irish independence then there would be unity of the working class within England. This unity would crush the power of the bourgeoisie. Therefore for the English workers "the national emancipation of Ireland is no question of abstract justice or human sympathy but the first condition of their own emancipation". Lenin said this was the attitude proletarians of "oppressing nations" should take toward all national movements.

Lenin felt that just as the proletariat of Russia was not strong enough to prevail over capitalism without being able to rely on the peasantry, so the world proletariat could win power only in alliance with the world peasantry.

It is becoming quite clear that the socialist revolution which is impending for the whole world will not be merely the victory of the proletariat of each country over its own bourgeoisie. That would be possible if revolution came easily and swiftly. We know that the imperialists will not allow this, that all countries are armed against their domestic Bolshevism and that their one thought is how to defeat Bolshevism at home.

Union of the proletarians and working masses generally of all nations and countries for a joint revolutionary struggle to overthrow the landowners and the bourgeoisie. For this alone will guarantee victory over capitalism.

In this way Lenin merged the peasant with the national and colonial questions. His idea was twofold. On the one hand, destroy the various imperialist, multinational empires through secession, and on the other hand, unite the working classes of the separate nations organizationally. Just as the middle peasants are the core of the "democratic dictatorship", strategy, the national bourgeoisie is the core of the national liberation strategy. Lenin's writings (and Stalin's) on the national question are often contradictory tactical polemics intended partly to justify and mainly to work out the problems and contradictions inherent in this strategy.

Lenin's main theoretical opponent on the national question was Rosa Luxemburg, a leader of the German revolutionaries.

Luxemburg held, in her book "The Accumulation of Capital," that imperialism would collapse everywhere in the world once it fell anywhere, because of its international nature. Therefore simultaneous socialist revolution in the advanced capitalist countries was the only possible strategy. According to her, national liberation was an impossible illusion, which only masked imperialist intrigues. The peasantry had no important revolutionary role to play. In common with Lenin and Stalin she pointed out that nationalism tended to make the workers follow the leadership of their national bourgeoisie, losing sight of general class interests they shared with workers of other nationalities.

At the beginning of 1914 Lenin wrote "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" to counter Luxemburg's views. National antagonisms in Russia were becoming acute under the impact of the Balkan crisis that preceded World War I.

Lenin argued that:

1. a genuine national liberation struggle is possible under imperialism. It will lead to state independence. This might not be complete independence (since economic independence may not be won) but it is a step forward because state independence sets the stage for the development of capitalism.

2. The working class supports the bourgeoisie only in order to secure national peace (which the bourgeoisie cannot bring about completely and which can be achieved only with complete democracy), in order to secure equal rights and to create the best conditions for the class struggle. .That is why the proletariat confines itself, so to speak, to the negative demand for recognition of the right of self-determination, without giving guarantees to any nation. .." (Lenin, *Collected Works* Vol. I, p. 647)

3. The most dangerous nationalism is the oppressor's nationalism. Not to oppose it is to assist it. "Inasmuch as the bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation fights the oppressor, we are always...in favor. ...The bourgeois nationalism of every oppressed nation has a general democratic content which is directed against oppression and it is. this content we support unconditionally. (Ibid., p. 649)

4. National oppression causes the workers of the oppressing nation to become racist and chauvinistic, creating enormous obstacles to their own freedom. To combat all nationalism the equality of the various nations must be upheld. This means "educating the masses in the spirit of...rejecting the...privileges of any nation. Propaganda for the equal right of all nations to their national state "is (at present) our principal task in the national question, for only in this way can we defend...the alliance of all proletarians. ...This is the only propaganda to ensure the greatest chances of national peace in Russia, should she remain a multi-national state, and the most peaceful (and for the proletarian class struggle, harmless) division into separate national states, should the question of such a division arise." (Ibid. p. 650)

None of this convinced Luxemburg, who restated her case in 1916 while in prison, in her "Junius Brochure." She wrote again that national liberation had lost its significance, because imperialism could not be destroyed piecemeal, but was about to be destroyed by the socialist world revolution.

"Only from Europe, only from the oldest capitalist countries, can the signal for the world-liberating social revolution come. ...Only the English, French, Belgian, German, Russian, Italian workers jointly can lead the army of the exploited and enslaved of the-five continents. Only they will be able, when the time will have come, to redress the wrong perpetrated by capitalism through its century-old crimes against all primitive peoples and its work of destruction all around the earth." (*Junius Brochure*, p.91)

Luxemburg's view has nothing in common with what the Progressive Labor Party is now advocating. Luxemburg argues the peasantry and the agrarian nations have no role to play. But in fact imperialism is being destroyed piece-by-piece presently by these same peasants. Lenin argued they were an indispensable reserve for the proletariat. We maintain the facts prove they are a main force of the socialist revolution.

Luxemburg's argument errs even on its own terms. She states that revolutionaries must never ally with the national

bourgeoisie because the latter will always sellout the struggle for "independence." Nothing could be further from the truth. From the point of view of workers, peasants, and other oppressed people, there is no way to "sell out" a struggle for "national liberation"--because this struggle itself is a sellout in its very conception. The history of the past 50 years shows that national liberation movements are the political embodiment of the fight waged by local "national bourgeoisies" to accumulate large amounts of capital and establish themselves either as important junior partners of imperialism or as the rulers of an independent capitalist economy in their own right. The capitalist mode of production does not develop evenly. Even among bosses, there is a sharp relative division between "haves" and "have-nots." The "have-nots" are constantly in competition with each other and the imperialists as they strive to become bigger exploiters. As we will show in future articles, the examples of India, Egypt, Indonesia, Ghana, Algeria, Chile, and many other countries show that "national liberation" struggles all represent attempts by local capitalist classes to use "their" workers and peasants as a battering ram to win the maximum amount of profits that international imperialism will allow. This view advanced by Luxemburg was the precursor of Trotsky's position that only communists could guarantee the success of a national liberation struggle--in other words, that only communists were a sure bet to clinch maximum profits for local bosses by helping them win the workers and peasants to a program for more capitalism.

Lenin's retort that communists should support national liberation struggles led by the local "oppressed" bourgeoisie amounts in essence to the same thing. As we have shown above, he held the view that the free, "democratic" development of capitalism in countries where such struggles took place represented the essential first stage on the road to socialism. Nowhere in the world, however, has a fight for more or "better" capitalism led either directly or indirectly to socialism. What difference does it make to workers and peasants that their oppressors call themselves capitalists or "communists" if a national "liberation" movement can achieve liberation only for local bosses?

THE EXPECTATION OF EUROPEAN REVOLUTION

The writings of both Lenin and Stalin are filled with warnings about the unalterably reactionary character of nationalism as an ideology. On occasion, they even go so far as to state that the national bourgeoisie of an "oppressed nation" is, after all, an exploiting class and must eventually be overthrown by its "own" revolutionary proletariat. But the experience of the Bolshevik party, both in Russia and internationally, indicates that on balance, Lenin and Stalin consistently supported national bourgeoisies in their struggle to develop "democratic" capitalism.. Regardless of pure textual analysis, this is the inescapable conclusion that must be drawn from a study of the Bolshevik revolution, the NEP, the Seventh World Congress, and the Soviet conduct of the anti-fascist war. In April 1920 Lenin wrote of the Bolshevik revolution having international significance in the broad sense that it influenced politics in all other countries. He maintained that its significance in the narrow sense--meaning by that the aspects of the Russian experience that were directly reproducible in other countries--was limited to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the party organization. Lenin failed to understand fully the broad significance of the Russian revolution. He considered Soviet Russia extremely backward as a socialist state: "It would be a mistake to lose sight of the fact that after the victory of the proletarian revolution in at least one of the advanced countries things will in all probability take a sharp turn--Russia will soon after cease to be the model country and once again become a backward country (in the "soviet" and the socialist sense)". (Lenin, "Left Wing Communism", in *Selected Works*, Vol. III, p. 375).

Just two years earlier he had denied the possibility of Russia being any kind of socialist state on its own, let alone a model--albeit a poor model. Since he did not correctly forecast how the world revolution would develop he was unable to appreciate now important the communist consciousness of the rural working people would be. He failed to recognize who was truly advanced and who was truly backward, though he wrote many' articles about the "advanced East" and the "backward West." And so the ultimate result was that the communist movement substituted radical nationalist consciousness for communist consciousness in the case of the urban working class as well.

All the Bolshevik leaders were sure that the European socialist revolution was about to break out. To hasten it was the

point of all their work in the first period of Soviet "power. They were ready for any sacrifice to help the international revolution. During the debate over whether to conclude peace with the Germans, Zinoviev held that the peace negotiations held back the German revolution and should be ruptured. Lenin replied that if Zinoviev were right in his estimate of the German situation then "we ought to sacrifice ourselves, since the German revolution will be far more powerful than ours."

Revolutionary propaganda was immediately begun among the prisoners of war, and by April 1918 there were revolutionary groups of Germans, Magyars, Austrians and Yugoslavs, training organizers who were sent to work behind the enemy lines or to work at home. This work was the real foundation of the Third International. Béla Kun, the Hungarian revolutionary, told a mass meeting of war prisoners:

Sweep from tile path all obstacles to the liberation of the enslaved, turn into ashes all castles, all palaces into which your wealth flows and from which your poverty and hunger are spread allover the country. ..Turn your weapons against your officers and generals and against the palaces. Let everyone of you be a teacher of revolution in his regiment.

Millions were allocated for revolutionary work in Europe. Joffe, the Soviet representative in Germany, spent hundreds of thousands of marks buying guns for the social democrats and millions of marks for propaganda. In October 1918 Lenin wrote Joffe in Berlin: "We must publish 100 times more. There is money. Hire translators."

At the end of October it seemed the revolution had arrived. Pro-Bolshevik mass demonstrations took place in Berlin, Paris, throughout Italy, in Scotland. In November soldiers , and workers' councils were being set up in many German cities. On November 9 the Kaiser abdicated and on the 10th the Berlin workers and soldiers council appointed a "Council of Peoples' Representatives," composed of three right wing and three left wing social-democrats. The next morning there were mass rallies in Moscow, Lenin spoke and when he appeared:

Tens of thousands of workers burst into wild cheering. Never have I (Karl Radek) seen anything like it again. Until late in the evening workers and Red Army soldiers were filing past. The world revolution had come. The mass of the people heard its iron tramp. Our isolation was over .

Two days later the Soviet Government annulled the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty.

All policies in this period were considered to be short range policies, because communist leaders believed that all noxious concessions to the bourgeoisie would soon be swept away by the revolution, as the Brest-Litovsk treaty had been.

In December 1918 the revolutionary left group within the left wing social-democratic party decided to split off to form the German Communist Party. Lenin greeted this with an article declaring that as a result of the Germans' action "a really proletarian, really international, really revolutionary Third International, a Communist International, became a fact." The new party tried to seize power in February. The attempt was easily suppressed by the rightwing social-democratic government. The two outstanding leaders of the party, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, were shot and the party declared illegal.

On March 2, 1919 more than 50 delegates from embryonic communist groups in 19 countries gathered in Moscow and founded the Communist International. Revolution was feared by all the heads of bourgeois states, as the

revolutionary propaganda of the communists reached to more and more soldiers and workers. In the first few months of 1919 there were serious mutinies in the French fleet and in French army units stationed at Black Sea ports, whom the imperialists had sent to fight the Soviet government on the side of the Whites. The troops had to be withdrawn. Central European troops commanded by the British mutinied. British troops mutinied. The British Prime Minister declared that if he had to send more troops to Russia they would mutiny and England would go communist. American , troops refused to fight. A strike wave swept over Britain, France, Holland, Switzerland, Italy. On March 21, 1919 a Soviet republic was established in Hungary. Early in April another Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Munich, capital of Bavaria. Lenin was moved to declare that "next July we shall greet the victory of the international Soviet republic." Soviet "foreign policy" was based on "keeping aloof from all participation in any kind of combination of imperialist' governments," in the words of Chicherin, the Foreign Minister. It consisted of mutual aid to workers, revolutionary movements, and revolutionary governments. No more was necessary.

In its first year the Comintern was concerned with firmly establishing itself. It was to be the rallying point for all the sincerely internationalist and leftwing forces in the old socialist movement. It tried to attract all who supported soviet power , accepting even pacifists and syndicalists.

By the fall the political situation had changed. Unable to mobilize the Prussian workers, the Bavarian Soviet republic fell on May 1. An attempted communist rising in Vienna was crushed in the middle of June. In August the Hungarian Soviet republic fell as a result of intervention by Rumanian troops backed by the Western bourgeoisie. In Russia the Whites reached the peak of their success, controlling vast parts of Siberia, central Russia, the Ukraine and even marching on Petrograd.

In this position of relative weakness Karl Radek, Comintern secretary, declared, "If our capitalist partners abstain from counter-revolutionary activities in Russia, the Soviet government will abstain from carrying on revolutionary activities in capitalist countries."

As far as the Bolsheviks were concerned the revolution in Europe was still imminent. Lenin justified signing a peace treaty in January 1920 with the Estonian government on the grounds that the workers were about to overthrow the government and a new Soviet government would conclude a new peace treaty. That seemed a reasonable prediction, since the Red Army was then crushing every one of the counter-revolutionary white armies in a victory that surpassed all expectations.

On April 28, 1920 Pilsudski, the former right wing socialist who was then ruler of Poland, proclaimed a general offensive into the Ukraine. He was backed by France and Britain. By May 6, Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, fell to the Polish army. The budding rapprochement with the imperialists, with its peaceful coexistence foreign policy, died at once. It was at this moment that the Second Comintern Congress met. The Comintern was now a going concern. Its prestige and effectiveness were never higher than at this time. Anew revolutionary period was beginning.

Lenin wrote one of his most influential pamphlets, *Left Wing Communism, An Infantile Disorder*, for this congress. Lenin's estimate of the times involved two points. First Lenin believed that revolution in Europe was only a short time off--a matter of weeks or at most a few months. Second he believed that the tactics followed by the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 would work in the other European countries. He and the other Bolsheviks interpreted European events according to the Russian pattern. For example, when discussing the Estonian peace treaty mentioned above Lenin made the point that Estonia was passing through its "Kerensky period." Or, when, in September 1920, "councils of action" were established in Britain to organize opposition to military intervention in Russia, Lenin regarded them as soviets with another name, concluded Britain had entered its February period of dual power, that the British Mensheviks were clearing the fields for the British Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks accepted this parallelism, and other leading communists from other countries felt the same way.

The leader of the Italian party commented: "What am I compared with comrade Lenin? He is the leader of the Russian revolution. I represent a tiny communist socialist party."

Quite naturally, the very failures of the European revolutionaries to bring about the revolution they all agreed was imminent invested the successful Bolshevik leaders with greater and greater authority. The second Comintern congress set out to perfect the organizational form and lay down the basic policy for communist action on all major questions. The result, not the conscious intention but the result, was to ensure Russian leadership, for only the Russians had succeeded. A British delegate commented that the Bolshevik leaders "are quite prepared to admit that revolutions are not metaphysical in their origin; are the outcome of 'historical development; and that the social revolution must develop in each country along different lines; but they always return to the point that their tactics are the model on which all socialist method must be based."

The theme of Lenin's pamphlet is that Russian experience is the example the other revolutionary movements should follow. He made a series of recommendations as to what ought to be done to cause the gathering revolutionary storm to break through. Given what we know about his outlook at this time, these proposals were all short-term tactical expedients designed (or the brief period between the time he wrote and the time the storm would break.)

Lenin felt that the main danger to the revolution, which came from the opportunist right, and was represented by the social-democratic leadership, had been overcome. He was therefore concerned to defeat the left danger which tended, he thought, to isolate the movement from the masses. This was expressed in the refusal of the left German and English movement to take part in elections and in trade unions. Important parts of the American, French and Italian movements also had this policy. Lenin had tolerated their policy the year before, regarding it as a secondary question (support of soviet power was the primary question then). Now Lenin regarded these as primary questions.

Lenin also pointed out the need for the communists to maneuver as much as necessary to achieve temporary tactical advantages, to enter into alliances even with bourgeois parties in order to expose them and split the workers from them.

In his remarks to the Congress Lenin developed the point that imperialism would inevitably fall when the workers' movement for a socialist Europe linked up with the liberation struggles of the Asian peoples.

He said that the central point of world politics was the struggle of the world bourgeoisie against the Soviet movement and the Soviet Russian Republic. One cannot now confine himself to proclaiming the need for closer union of the working people of various nations; now the policy must be unity of the liberation movements with Soviet Russia.

The CI should enter into temporary alliance with the bourgeois-democratic movements, but only on condition that communist parties are permitted to be formed in the national areas. The job of these local CPs is to fight the bourgeois-democratic movements within their own nations. "Only" those bourgeois-democratic movements which allow the communist party to organize and educate the masses have a revolutionary and anti-imperialist content." They should be called "nationalist-revolutionary."

The foundation of the Soviet movement must and can be laid in the developing countries, but in this case, the main mass organization will be peasant soviets as there is practically no proletariat. The important question is, can the peasant soviets lead the backward nations to develop without going through a capitalist phase?

If the victorious proletariat conducts systematic propaganda among them, while the

Soviet governments come to their assistance with all the means at their command-in that event it would be wrong to assume that the capitalist stage of development is inevitable for the backward nationalities.

The result of the Congress was to organize the Comintern as a single international party with national branches subordinate to the central leadership in Moscow. A document--the "21 Points"--defining the conditions of membership in the Comintern--was issued. Their import was to bar all centrists--those desiring to compromise with the old right wing socialist movement--from membership. It was the submission of this document to the various socialist parties that gave rise to the unified communist movement.

When the congress opened in the last half of July, the Polish war had taken a dramatic turn. The Red Army had driven the Poles out of the Ukraine and was marching on Warsaw without opposition. Warsaw's fall, and the outbreak of the Polish revolution, seemed all but certain.

Zinoviev described the scene:

In the congress "hall hung a great map on which was marked every day the movement of our armies. And the delegates every morning stood with breath less interest before this map. It was a sort of symbol: the best representatives of the international proletariat with breathless interest, with palpitating heart, followed every advance of our armies, and all perfectly realized that, if the military aim set by our army was achieved it would mean an immense acceleration of the international proletarian revolution.

One must realize that the Bolshevik leaders did not regard the Red Army as a Russian army, but as an international army. It did not serve national interests but class interests. At the beginning only workers and poor peasants were eligible to join it. Soviet troops had helped Red forces in Finland in 1917 -18; they had helped to establish Soviet republics in Estonia and Latvia at the end of 1918; they would do the same in Georgia in 1921. In every case there were local communists in the lead. The march on Warsaw was different in that there were no local communists leading a political struggle. But Lenin, who convinced the others of the need to wage the revolutionary war, was certain that the Polish revolution was about to begin. Therefore the Polish workers would rise up and crush the bourgeoisie. Neither he nor anyone else thought the Red Army would defeat the Polish army.

The underground Polish communists were unable to organize a rising. The Red Army marched through eastern Poland, an area whose urban population was mainly Jewish, the Poles being mainly landowners and officials. Most of the communists were Jews. A heritage of centuries of carefully inculcated anti Semitism was a powerful weapon against the revolution. The Red Army was itself too weak and ill equipped, to defeat the Poles, who were being rushed French, British and even American munitions and officers. The failure of the Polish revolutionary war was not defeat so much for the Red Army as for the estimate that world revolution was imminent. In 1921 after yet another German uprising had failed, Lenin said that now the Comintern should spend its time studying and preparing. But this was not what it had been set up to do.

When the period of "imminent revolution" passed the Comintern became more and more downgraded and the status of the Soviet state rose correspondingly. From 1921 onward the communist parties concerned themselves not so much with organizing revolution as with "preparing" to organize for revolution, by defending democracy and the interests of a successful revolution--the Soviet state. This turned the communist parties into radical reform parties shorn of revolutionary perspectives. It produced impossible contradictions, because the tactical line of Left Wing Communism was not changed. The situation could be resolved only by holding absolute faith in the Soviet leadership, and that is

the way the movement did resolve it. But blind faith in leaders is hardly the same as! raising the revolutionary political consciousness .of the masses.

"SOCIALIST" DIPLOMACY

According to Lenin the Soviet state must unite with the liberation movements of the world, even though they are not socialist, implying that the diplomacy of socialist countries is a form of revolutionary struggle waged by the communist movement, and that a proletariat that has state power can use diplomacy to overthrow imperialism. Without entering into a discussion of whether diplomacy can be used in this way (and our judgement is that it cannot, that diplomacy with imperialists is by its nature anti-revolutionary) we must note that the diplomacy of the socialist states has always been intentionally anti -revolutionary. This was excused by the curious idea that there is a difference between "party" and "state" relations.

Socialist foreign policy was always based on the national interests of each state. It is a fine point to consider whether the socialist states were base areas for world communist revolution, or whether the world communist movement served as auxiliary to the "national interests" of the socialist states.

The communist movement never discussed, much less determined, the foreign policy of the socialist states, since this was always considered a prerogative of each socialist state. When a bloc of socialist states emerged from the Second World War they coordinated their foreign policies, but the rest of the world movement was not consulted. Today of course, we know that the "consultation" was very one-sided. But wasn't that inevitable?

A few years ago the Chinese attempted to resolve this problem (without, however, facing the basic question--the content of foreign policy) by advising fraternal parties to regard only party statements as authoritative. Government declarations could even be ignored; they were "only" diplomacy. We defy anyone to try to develop his politics along that path. When Chairman Mao welcomes the military dictator of Pakistan, for example, is that the "authoritative" Chairman Mao of the Communist party, or merely his first cousin once removed, Chairman Mao of the government? "But necessary compromises between the socialist countries and the imperialist countries do not require the oppressed peoples and nations to follow suit and compromise with imperialism and its lackeys." So wrote the Chinese in the 1963 "proposal concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement." What "necessary compromises", do they mean? Why is it proper for the communist movements in power to negotiate and compromise with the imperialists and their lackeys, but improper for the much weaker communists who are not in power?

Is power a hindrance to carrying out revolutionary struggle? In fact, that argument has been made: "We can't do this, we can't say that, because we hold power and it would be improper. We have relations with these people. It might be said we were pressuring them. But you can do it, you can say it."

This opportunism follows from divorcing state from party relations. Making revolution is what the party does; building socialism is what the state does. Therefore peaceful coexistence is the appropriate foreign policy:

"Lenin's principle of peaceful coexistence is very clear...Peaceful coexistence designates a relationship between countries with different social systems. ...It should never be extended to apply to the relations between oppressed and oppressor nations. ...The reason is that...it is absolutely impermissible and impossible for countries practicing peaceful coexistence to touch even a hair of each other's social system. ...The application of the policy of peaceful coexistence by the socialist countries is advantageous for achieving a peaceful international environment for socialist construction, for exposing the imperialist policies of aggression and war and for isolating the imperialist forces of aggression and war." This is the line of the Chinese Communist Party today.

Another problem with Lenin's strategy is that it presupposes an impotent, deaf-dumb-blind and stupid national bourgeoisie (and a perpetually sleeping imperialism.) If we accept the historical lesson that no ruling class gives up power willingly, it is hard to see why any bourgeois-democratic nationalist movement would ever ally with a local communist party which was doing its job of organizing the working people to fight for socialism. In Turkey, for example, the CP was outlawed, all communists were imprisoned or executed, and the Ataturk government had excellent relations with Moscow, whose advice it sought on how to outmaneuver the British. As a consequence the Turkish communists had the brain-wracking problem of supporting their own "objectively progressive" executioners. How would you organize behind that line? Why would anyone join? --after all you can commit suicide without going to meetings or paying dues. Nobody ever solved this problem except the Chinese, who only did it verbally. They cut the Gordian knot by negotiating an uneasy military truce with the "objectively progressive" Chiang and calling that a united front.

The united front policy of the Communist Party, headed by its brilliant leader Comrade Mao Tse-tung, was a policy of both unity and struggle, a policy of retaining independence and initiative in the united front, a policy of giving free reins to the masses and arming the masses without any restriction ...Only then could the revolutionary bases be developed in a spirit of independence and initiative, the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression sustained, Chiang Kai-shek's bureaucratic-capitalist group isolated and his successive counter-revolutionary offensives repulsed. This was a struggle...to avoid repeating the mistakes of 1927. (Chen Po-ta, *Stalin and the Chinese Revolution*, p.50)

THE EXAMPLE OF INDONESIA

The 5th congress repudiated the views of the first period and concluded that revolution in the west would be preceded by revolution in the east, and that the proletariat was not the bearer of the right to self-determination. A new era had dawned. But the CI warned that while it was good to support the national bourgeoisie struggling for power against imperialism, it was dangerous to support the victorious bourgeoisie in building capitalism. This declaration dodges the problem. What about a national regime enacting a protectionist tariff to foster national industry? This act is anti-imperialist and builds capitalism. What are communists to say and do about that?

Lenin had condemned Pan-Islamism at the 1920 Second Comintern Congress. But the leader of the Indonesian CP, Tan Malaka, felt Pan-Islamism was a useful force during the national-democratic phase of the revolution. He argued before the Fourth Congress, at the end of 1922, that the more the CP collaborated with the Pan-Islamists, the closer it would get to the peasants and workers.

All through 1922 the Indonesian CP had used religious phraseology to great effect. When a railroad strike took place the CP said, "God is mighty, but He has ordered it so that on earth the railroad workers are mightiest! The railroad workers are the executive committee of God in the world." Malaka concluded that militant Islamism was the embodiment of the struggle for national emancipation and therefore anti-imperialist and progressive. Nothing is as convincing as success, so Lenin's condemnation of Pan-Islamism was changed. Pan-Islamism was now to be considered relatively progressive in certain circumstances.

The Indonesian CP was very successful in 1922 in establishing a base for itself among the Moslem masses through collaborating with the Pan-Islamists. The Pan-Islamist leadership dumped the communists in February 1923. This forced the CP (against its desires) to form its own movement aimed at both the Dutch imperialists and the national bourgeoisie.

In 1925 the impact of the Northern Expedition in China (which consolidated Sun Yat-sen's revolution) and events in the Moslem world moved the Indonesian Pan-Islamists apparently leftward. Nationalist unrest grew, especially among intellectuals, and with it, terrorism. Assassinating colonial police was a favorite tactic. Naturally this provoked increasing Dutch repression.

In these circumstances the CI advised the Indonesian CP to make an alliance again with the nationalist bourgeoisie and also to form a mass revolutionary party. But the communist leaders active within Indonesia (Malaka lived abroad), disgusted with the Pan-Islamists, themselves decided at the end of 1925 that the time was ripe to unleash an armed uprising. They planned one for the next year. Throughout 1926 preparations for armed rebellion and negotiations for bourgeois united fronting proceeded simultaneously.

Sometime in 1926 Malaka and the CI learned of the decision to start an armed uprising. They opposed it, calling it putschist, lacking in popular support and therefore not revolutionary. They insisted on concentrating on the united front with the national bourgeoisie. Finally, in August 1926, after long negotiations, the united front was concluded, with the CP and the Pan-Islamists forming the United National Liberation Committee. At the same time a flood of peasants was joining the CP-controlled mass revolutionary party, strengthening their resolve to unleash armed rebellion.

On November 12, 1926 armed revolutionary bands opened fire on police and government troops throughout Java. Faced with this fact the CI tried to rally international support for the rebels. They were careful to point out that the slogans of the rebellion were purely national-democratic and not at all of a socialist nature. The Dutch crushed the rebellion and it took the communists 25 years and one more massacre--led by Sukarno--to rebuild a party.

The article of faith of the rebuilt party was that armed rebellion was impossible in Indonesia because of the country's geography! Party chief Aidit wrote a pamphlet, published in many languages, explaining this theory. The rebuilt party followed essentially the same line as the 1920s party. The Chinese Communist Party frequently held it up as an especially successful example of how to go about making the revolution, suggesting that other parties study the Indonesian experience, especially its united front work. In 1965, the Indonesian CP was once again wiped out. A survivor from the leadership analyzed events this way:

Let me refer to our experience of cooperating with the national bourgeoisie in the past. In the past the party's line deviated from Marxism-Leninism. It pursued the parliamentary road. It didn't formulate in a concrete manner that armed struggle was the road to victory.

As a result of this wrong political line we put prominence in building a united front with the national bourgeoisie. Since the road followed was the parliamentary road, this cooperation was given a higher place than the interests of the proletariat. The interests of the proletariat were subordinated to the united front with the national bourgeoisie. In building the party we relied on cooperation with the national bourgeoisie. The party had a large membership but a low quality.

In our old documents we said we must place class interests below national interests. This was a great mistake. We didn't understand the nature of contradictions. We saw the main contradiction as between the people and imperialism, while in fact imperialism acted through the reactionary forces at home who are in general

representatives of the national bourgeoisie. We tried to classify the national bourgeoisie into 'left, , , , middle of the road, , , and "die-hard." There is always such a classification. But when it came to class interests, the interests between the three sections are the same. More important, power is in the hands of the national bourgeoisie, in the die-hard group, especially the military forces. Our main mistake was class collaboration. Seemingly it was collaboration with the Left, like Sukarno. But we tolerated the growth of the die-hards because when it came to fight, the left petty bourgeoisie had no courage to resist the die-hards and the middle-of-the-roads.

Where did we learn about subordinating class to national interests? From Mao Tse-tung who used it in a vastly different situation, a situation of Japanese aggression. But in Indonesia there was no direct aggression. Imperialism exerted its power through the national bourgeoisie. So what we did was not in accord with the teaching of Mao Tse-tung, but a deviation from it. Also we ignored Mao's teaching that we must have a people's army led by the party to win power. Mao says we need a party, armed struggle and a united front that serves the armed struggle. In the past, by not having our own army and not formulating concretely the armed struggle, we placed the united front above everything else.

Despite what the Indonesian comrade says, the Indonesian party's strategy and tactics were not in contradiction to Mao Tse-tung's teachings. During the Cultural Revolution Mao repeatedly said that he--not Liu Shao-chi--had always set the line for foreign policy. The Indonesian party had a permanent delegation in Peking and a large and constant stream of visits and consultations with the Chinese leaders. Finally, the Chinese advised foreign parties to study and learn from the Indonesian experience, which they held up throughout the early 1960s as a model of how to build the party, how to organize the united front, how to do underground work. The Indonesian experience is New Democracy at work.

NEW DEMOCRACY

"New Democratic strategy" is a variant of Lenin's scheme. But there is a difference between Mao's ideas and Lenin's and Stalin's. Lenin and Stalin were ambiguous and contradictory on the question of national liberation. As we have seen, they changed their minds and embraced opposite positions a number of times.

Mao has always been consistent and clear. He accepted Stalin's 1918 conclusion that the Russian Revolution ushered in a new era of proletarian revolution. Rather than draw the conclusion that this means socialist political consciousness can and must now play the leading role in historical development and therefore working people should now be convinced to fight against their bourgeoisie for socialism, Mao merely applies Stalin's conclusion to the "productive forces" theory. "No matter what classes, parties or individuals in an oppressed nation join the revolution, and no matter whether they themselves are conscious of the point or understand it, so long as they oppose imperialism, their 'evolution becomes part of the proletarian-socialist world revolution and they become its allies.'"(New Democracy, Selected Works, Vol. II, p.347.)

That's why "Although such a revolution (any revolution in a colony or semi-colony directed against imperialism) is still fundamentally bourgeois democratic in its social character. . and although its objective mission is to clear the path for the development of capitalism...this revolution actually serves the purpose of clearing a still wider path for the development of socialism." (p. 344) For these reasons Mao has always been an unwavering supporter of nationalist revolutions:

The various types of contradictions in the contemporary world are concentrated in the vast areas of Asia, Africa and Latin America. These are the most vulnerable areas under imperialist rule and the storm centers of world revolution dealing direct blows at imperialism.

The national democratic revolutionary movement in these areas and the international socialist revolutionary movement are the two great historical currents of our time.

The national democratic revolution in these areas is an important component of the contemporary proletarian world revolution.

The anti-imperialist revolutionary struggles of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America are pounding and undermining the foundations of the rule of imperialism and colonialism, old and new, and are now a mighty force in defense of world peace.

In a sense, therefore, the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas, who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population.

Therefore, the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the people in Asia, Africa and Latin America is definitely not merely a matter of regional significance but one of overall importance for the whole cause of proletarian world revolution. ...

In these areas, extremely broad sections of the population refuse to be slaves of imperialism. They include not only the workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie, but also the patriotic national bourgeoisie and even certain kings, princes, and aristocrats, who are patriotic. (*A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement*, March 30, 1963.)

But in order that the nationalist rebellion should develop properly, Mao added the idea of a communist-led peasant army, protracted communist-led people's war for New Democracy, and a communist-led agrarian revolution to Lenin's conception of the party, the united front and the democratic dictatorship growing into socialism in stages.

Nevertheless, in spite of the betrayal of the bourgeoisie our Party under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, following the revolutionary line indicated by Comrade Stalin, independently opened up a broad road for the agrarian revolution, and thereby advanced the revolution onto a new stage. Led by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, the revolution retreated from the city to the countryside, and by combining this correct retreat with a correct offensive, the retreat became a new offensive. (Chen, op. cit. , p. 45)

"What areas then should be the key points of attack in the armed struggles at different times? In offensives will there be defensive actions or retreats? How should the offensive and defensive or retreat be interlinked? How should a defensive or retreat be changed into an offensive? Everyone knows that these questions constitute the major portion of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's long struggle against opportunism.

(Ibid., p. 26).

The Chinese party did not wait until after it had won power to organize the poor peasants. Instead they organized the poor peasants and promoted class struggle in the countryside as the path to power. This was a big change, not only from accepted communist policy generally, but from their own immediately preceding policy. Chou En-lai recounted this history this way:

The war (World War II) made Chiang strong. There was both American and Soviet support for Chiang. Outer Mongolia detached itself from China. The Northeast and Northwest of China became Soviet spheres of influence. The Soviet ambassador even accompanied Chiang to Canton after we took Nanking. The Chinese people wanted peace. From our standpoint, if Chiang would be in power a new war was bound to break out, especially since U.S. imperialism was coming in. But the desire for peace of the people was something we could not fail to take into account. At that time there appeared the correct line of Mao Tse-tung and the revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi. Chairman Mao went to Chungking for negotiations and stayed for a whole year, until 1946. Marshall (then U.S. Secretary of State) engaged in mediation but actually he helped Chiang to wipe us out. So Mao's revolutionary line was "We will not give up the slogan of peace, but we will prepare for war."

Roosevelt and Stalin wanted a coalition government headed by Chiang, like in France and Italy. But Mao wanted a coalition government headed by the Communist Party. We earnestly engaged in negotiations toward that end. Chairman Mao himself went to negotiate. If the negotiations had been successful they would have produced a government led by the proletariat. But our appraisal was that the negotiation would not be successful because U.S. imperialism was coming in and because of Chiang. So we carried out land reform in the liberated areas and won over the peasantry. We developed production. And we mobilized our troops. We had two tactics, but the point of emphasis was preparing for war. Liu Shao-chi wanted to take the path of Thorez and Togliatti.

Since the majority of the peasants need socialism they can become aware of this need in the same way other workers become aware of it, through the socialist program and propaganda of the revolutionary party. The peasants can be won to fight for socialism, just as the workers, the students, the intellectuals, the professionals can. The international revolution will advance only to the extent that they do fight for socialism.

However, the Chinese Communist Party never viewed the peasantry with this perspective in mind. CCP leaders thought that the war against Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang heralded the opening of "stage two" in the two-stage process that went from "semi-feudalism" to bourgeois-democratic capitalism to socialism. But in order for the CCP to mobilize the peasants to fight for socialism, Mao, Chou, and the other leaders would have had to repudiate the line of New Democracy. They never made this self-criticism. Despite the massive class struggle led by poor peasants in China's countryside prior to 1949, the party leaders immediately intervened to halt this struggle once they were in power. They reasoned that the CCP's possession of state power and socialism were synonymous, that the reins of power would enable them to further develop the economic foundations of socialism, and that therefore the continued mobilization of the peasantry against the "national bourgeoisie" would harm this task because it would "obstruct production." In essence, they copied the Soviet model by placing the development of productive forces ahead of the masses' revolutionary socialist political consciousness. They did not understand that only the continued participation of the peasants in revolutionary class struggle could guarantee the development of socialism, and that the cessation of

this struggle in favor of "production" could guarantee only the restoration of capitalism.

* * *

The communist movement's old strategy and the strategy of New Democracy require several wrong assumptions about the nature of imperialism:

(1) That imperialism, especially its trading and financial mechanisms, creates a group of nations in which the native bourgeoisie desires to but is prevented from accumulating capital for its own account to build up local industry.

The imperialists choose to maintain pre-capitalist "semi-feudal" relations as the basis for agriculture (and the state organization). They drain off the surplus-labor-time of the peasants through unequal commodity exchange, thereby preventing its reinvestment by the national bourgeoisie.

There is therefore motivation for the bourgeoisie of these "semi-colonial" nations to enter a political movement aimed at creating an independent national framework for capital accumulation by winning political sovereignty and financial independence. Such a movement, because it is anti-imperialist, will also be anti-feudal, destroying the landlords who are a component of the imperialist arrangement and who prevent capitalist relations of production from taking hold in the countryside.

(2) But the national bourgeoisie, precisely because it has been divided and kept in a weak state by the imperialists cannot lead such a movement. The non-comprador national bourgeoisie can enter the united front as a subordinate partner. The anti-imperialist fight should be led by the proletarian party and manned by the peasantry.

(3) The largest part of the population is a petty bourgeois group of peasants working with backward techniques in small-scale agriculture, crushed by feudal rents. True capitalist agriculture is minor, restricted to plantations owned by foreigners. So the rural proletariat is also small. The bulk of the peasants own their own tools and can therefore feed their families by working their own rented land with family labor. They do not hire out as laborers or employ labor as a rule. The only political program which can mobilize these peasants is "land to the tiller," the destruction of the old landlord class, and the conversion of renters into land owners.

(4) The material conditions for socialist construction are absent, as is the class consciousness which would lead the peasants, as a mass, to follow socialist slogans. Before socialism is possible there must be a political and economic stage in which capitalism develops on the land from within the peasantry itself.

At the Second Plenary Session of the Central Committee held in March 1949, Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out that, for a considerable length of time following the victory of the revolution, it would still be necessary to utilize to the full the initiative of private capitalism in town and countryside to assist in the development of national economy." (Chen, op. cit., p. 56)

(5) The national bourgeoisie is needed after the new-democratic coalition takes power because of its knowledge of the techniques of economic management. The proletariat itself is too small and too technically ignorant to develop industry on a fully socialist basis. New Democracy is, above all, the combination of political rule by the workers and peasants with economic management of the bourgeoisie.

A further important assumption is that the complex means of production and technical knowledge needed for industrial development will be provided by the socialist camp, once all links to imperialism have been broken. Implicit is the idea that socialism requires the kind of mechanized productive forces that Western capitalism has created. This idea ruled Soviet economic policy throughout, and was challenged in China only during the Great Leap Forward.

The national bourgeoisie is that section of the bourgeoisie which is willing to treat the socialist nations as sources of funds for capitalist accumulation. Since it takes two to tango, this requires a conception of socialism that allows the victorious parties of the socialist nations to lend themselves to this.

(6) While New Democracy is a stage in which capitalism is allowed, its development is to be limited by the state and by the existence of a rival socialist or state-capitalist sector which grows at the expense of private capital. Private capital is to be expropriated in a gradual, non-antagonistic process. As the nation passes from primarily feudal relations to socialism with only a truncated capitalist period, so the state becomes a multi-class dictatorship before it becomes a proletarian dictatorship.

All bourgeoisies must continue to accumulate capital on a larger and larger scale or perish; that is the law of capitalism. This law accounts for conflicts among capitalists. In the former colonial world, which is still dominated by imperialism, the local bourgeoisies stand to gain from the conflicts between the imperialists. In general it is to the interests of the whole bourgeoisie to unite against the main imperialist dominating a given country; they do so by allying with weaker imperialists, chiefly with the rising imperialist power which is globally challenging the dominant imperialist power. When the communist movement can work out an alliance against the "main enemy" between the workers and peasants on one side, and the bourgeoisie on the other, it is objectively forming an alliance with all the secondary imperialists fighting the same "main enemy." In today's world that means uniting with Soviet, Japanese, German, French, and Italian imperialists against U.S. imperialists. New Democratic strategy justifies this opportunism by pointing to the need for further local capitalist development.

However, as we have attempted to show in this and other articles, and as bosses themselves are showing daily all over the world, capitalism has no progressive role to play, locally or internationally.

It has long since fulfilled its historic mission by producing the class necessary for its overthrow. The workers and peasants of the world do not need more capitalism, in any form. They need socialism. In order to win it, they need the leadership of communist parties that fight for the line that socialism and only socialism can bring about the liberation of oppressed people everywhere.

CONCLUSION: WIN THE MASSES TO SOCIALISM

Because the old communist movement failed to provide this kind of leadership, the revolutions and struggles it won eventually turned into their opposite. The errors that brought about these reversals were not simply the subjective idiosyncrasies of a few individual party leaders. They reflect the course of class struggle—and particularly the ideological class struggle that raged within the movement for decades and that continues today. These errors demonstrate the power of bourgeois ideas within a revolutionary movement and the Achilles' heel of parties that do not view as paramount the task of winning the masses to smash these ideas.

Capitalism can neither solve the problems of workers, peasants, and oppressed people nor meet their class aspirations. The living truths of Marxism-Leninism and the lessons absorbed by millions in the struggle of the past 100 years are still valid today. Communists must strive to make these truths and lessons the property of the international working

class. There is no guarantee for the success of revolution other than the class hatred and communist consciousness of workers all over the world. This and this alone insures the eventual triumph of socialism, despite all obstacles and temporary setbacks.

Opportunism on the question of national liberation is the main form revisionism takes today. In and of itself, nationalism is not the problem--nor are the nationalists. The problem lies with opportunists who seek to use the revolutionary desires of the masses by parading themselves as communists. Beneath the skin of every so-called communist who puts forward "two stage revolution" and "revolutionary nationalism " quivers the flesh of an opportunist.

The communist movement must tackle this opportunism head-on. No one is won to socialism except through his own experience of political struggle against the ruling class for immediate reform demands. Communists must always involve themselves in every type of principled reform struggle in order to help workers and others draw correct conclusions from their experiences and understand the need for socialism. Members of the Progressive Labor Party are presently attempting to carry out this task.

Communists must also work within any nationalist movement that influences masses of people--not to perpetuate the illusion that the movement itself can gradually be moved to the left, but to win the rank and file of the movement to socialism and the party. We must support anti-imperialist wars by fighting for the defeat of imperialism, winning workers, students, and professionals to socialism, and calling upon comrades in the combat area to win workers, peasants, students and others there to socialism. Marxism-Leninism and the experience of the past 100 years teach us that only socialism can liberate the oppressed. Proletarian internationalism means supporting all workers in struggle against all bosses everywhere by fighting for socialism to smash imperialism.

The Seventh Comintern Congress and The United Front Against Fascism

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Modern revisionism didn't fallout of the sky at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. One of its main roots goes back to the wrong strategic line that was set forth at the 7th (and last) Congress of the Communist International.

The Congress took place shortly after the annihilation of the German CP. The German party's destruction had had a profound impact on the international, and the Congress focused on the question of fascism and the impending imperialist and anti-Soviet war. In this historical circumstance, the former strategic line of revolutionary struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat was set aside and the new strategy of The Broad United People's Front Against War and Fascism emerged. This line has subsequently dominated the national and international policies of the entire communist movement" All communist parties without exception tried to apply this strategy, and it still pervades the thinking of not only the old revisionist parties, but of most of the so-called anti-revisionist parties and organizations.

The basic estimate that governed the shift to the new strategic line was that the international proletariat was too weak to win state power and thereby prevent or defeat the war and fascist danger by revolution. Therefore, the best possibility was to build a broad front which could be strong enough through mass action and the parliamentary struggle to -win a United Front or Popular Front government which would be pro-peace and anti-fascist. This government could then become a transitional form to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

With this strategic line, the struggle for socialism was set aside for a later stage. To advocate the dictatorship of the proletariat became "leftist" because it would split the united front. Thus, the unity of the working class was to be forged around a democratic capitalist program, not a revolutionary communist program. The main report by G. Dimitroff to the Congress never openly calls for unity with the lesser-evil bourgeoisie; in fact it correctly castigates the social democrats for having a line of class collaboration and splitting the working class. Yet the entire thrust of the report is to unite with the social democrats, not around a communist, program, but the social democrats' own class collaborationist program of peace and democracy. Only those social democrats who refused to unite with the communists around their own anti-fascist bourgeois democratic program were attacked as reactionaries. Dimitroff said: "The attitude toward the united front marks the dividing line between the reactionary section of Social Democracy and the sections that are becoming revolutionary." The touchstone of a revolutionary, then, is no longer the attitude toward the dictatorship of the proletariat, but the willingness to unite with Communists around a bourgeois democratic program. Unity at what price? Listen to Dimitroff:

"The working class must achieve the unity of its trade unions. In vain do some reformist trade union leaders attempt to frighten the workers with the specter of trade union democracy destroyed by the interference of the Communist Parties in the affairs of the trade unions, by the existence of Communist fractions within the trade unions.

"To depict us Communists as opponents of trade union democracy is sheer nonsense. We advocate and consistently hold the right of the trade unions to decide their problems for themselves. *We are even prepared to forego the creation of communist fractions in the trade unions. (if that is necessary in the interests of trade union*

unity."

Here Dimitroff assails the reformists (social democrats) for lying about the communist attitude toward union democracy and then gives substance to the charge by asserting his willingness to abandon Communist fractions in the union. This means the willingness to forsake the communist goal of socialist revolution. Is it any wonder that the CPUS failed to build a communist base in the C.I.O. even as it led the historic struggle to organize the industrial workers? By miseducating communist cadres, members and supporters to believe that it was OK to set aside, abandon, or subordinate the struggle for socialism for the sake of a broad united front for peace, democracy, and economic reforms meant to spread the bourgeois ideology of pacifism, liberalism, and reformism. Thus, the 7th Congress line set the CPUS on the road to supporting FDR and even to liquidating the CP in form, as it did in content. William Z. Foster's fight against Browder after

W. W. II never resulted in a criticism of the 7th Congress and so revisionism was never really dealt a fundamental blow.

IS WAR INEVITABLE?

The 7th Congress correctly indicated that the imperialists needed war because they were in a crisis, wanted to redivide the world for imperialist plunder and wanted to forestall the growth of the revolutionary movement by smashing the communists and attacking the Soviet Union. Yet the Congress maintained that war was not inevitable. While the proletariat was not strong enough to win state power, it was argued that it was strong enough in an alliance with a broad people's front for peace and democracy to block war. But how is it possible to block war without overthrowing the ruling class? Only by arriving at the conclusion that the ruling class is split into two: one part that is against war, the other pro-war. Hence, the United People's Front lines up with the liberal bourgeoisie against the reactionary, pro-war bourgeoisie. This was the very line the social democrats advanced to justify their bloc with the bourgeois democratic parties.

Those communists who held that imperialism inevitably breeds war and that only revolution could defeat the class enemy were attacked as "ultra-leftists." For example Dimitroff said:

In addition to the openly reactionary leaders who disrupt the unity of action of the international proletariat in defense of peace there are also "Left" phrasemongers who propagate fantastic views to the effect that war is inevitable. ...Since the fundamental cause of war is capitalism, then, they say, so long as the latter exists, it is impossible to avoid war, and it is hopeless and useless to fight for the maintenance of peace. Such people are out and out doctrinaires, if not simply imposters.

Here within the 7th Congress line we see Khrushchev's revisionist thesis at the 20th Congress that war is not fatalistically inevitable under imperialism. Historical experience has amply demonstrated that the imperialists will always resort when necessary to war to defend their vital class interests.

WORKERS CAN DEFEAT FASCISM

As the revolutionary movement develops, as millions of workers are won to the goal of revolution, and socialism and to the leadership of the communist party, the capitalist class will see the maneuverability it enjoys under bourgeois democracy drastically reduced and will be forced to consider fascism as a means of

keeping itself in power. In this sense, an attempt by the ruling class to establish fascism sooner or later is inevitable.

Fascism is not a revolution by the petty bourgeoisie, nor is it a state above the bourgeoisie and proletariat, nor is it the usurpation of power by a fascist political party representing a minor section of the bourgeoisie against the will of the dominant monopoly capitalists. Fascism is the open terroristic rule of the same small financial oligarchy that had previously maintained its power by bourgeois democratic methods.

Fascism represents a qualitative change in the way in which the monopoly capitalists exercise class dictatorship over the working class, the petty bourgeoisie and other sections of the people. While ruling class force and violence are the daily way of life under bourgeois democracy (strikebreaking, frameups, police brutality, national guard assaults, etc.) nevertheless the ruling class relies mainly upon bourgeois democratic illusions, reforms, and bribery to minimize opposition to its policies and to keep the revolutionary forces in check. Under fascism, the ruling class does not tolerate any opposition. It swiftly moves to jail and kill militant fighters, especially revolutionary communists.

There is nothing inevitable about the triumph of fascism. On the contrary: the defeat of fascism is as certain as the defeat of the ruling class and all its forms of state power. Fascism can be met head-on and smashed by the working class and its allies. It is a form of bourgeois state power and must be combated as such. Although the tactics of revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie under "democracy" and under fascism may differ somewhat, the strategic outlook of communists and workers must always be to fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism. The only solution to the fake choice between "democratic" and fascist bosses, the only way to defeat both "democratic" capitalism and fascist capitalism is to overthrow the entire ruling class.

History shows that fascism and fascist wars intensify the masses' class hatred and willingness to smash the ruling class. Communist movements can grow by leaps and bounds under fascism. Communists should welcome the opportunity to lead the masses in struggle against fascism--not as champions of bourgeois democracy, but as communists, revolutionaries who seek the defeat of the imperialist system and the victory of international socialism.

HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES OF UF

Numerous examples of the disastrous effects of the 7th Congress line abound in every country of the world. Castro had a clear field in leading the struggle to overthrow Batista because the Cuban communists had long discredited themselves for having developed a united front with Batista, incredible as it may seem, in the name of fighting against fascism. Blas Roca, leader of the Cuban communists, said at the party's 3rd Congress on Jan. 1, 1939:

We must impress upon the people the need for a positive attitude toward Batista, and do our utmost to support his progressive endeavors. We are saying unequivocally at this moment that the first task of the revolutionary movement is to struggle for national unity based on a democratic program. Faced with the advance of Hitlerism and fascism, with the possibility of a German-Italian victory in Spain, the threat of the Rome Berlin Axis against America, Cuba must work in close collaboration with the democratic governments of the world and in particular with that of the United States.

The Spanish CP's popular front strategy facilitated the victory of Franco. The Spanish workers amply demonstrated their revolutionary aspirations when they seized power in Barcelona under anarchist leadership during the civil war.

But revolutionary aspirations were decried by the Spanish communists as "left adventurism." Dolores Ibarruri addressing the Central Committee of the Spanish C.P. on May 23, 1938 said:

There are some who say that our 13 point program will win us the war but lose us the revolution. I can not help smiling...We declare in the face of their unjust attacks that here in Spain we are fighting neither for libertarian communism, nor for socialism, nor for dictatorship of the proletariat. We are fighting for a parliamentary democratic republic. ...

The experiences of the French communists in developing the United Front strategy is particularly noteworthy in as much as French CP was held up as a model at the 7th Congress for all parties to follow.

They fought for capitalism and lost the fight against fascism as well as the revolution in Spain, in Cuba, in Italy, in France and indeed throughout the world.

The French Communist Party (PCF) put the UF line into practice before the 7th Congress. At the Congress Dimitroff said:

France, as we know, is a country in which the working class is setting an example to the whole international proletariat of how to fight fascism. The French Communist Party is setting an example to all sections of the Comintern of how the tactics of the United Front should be applied; the Socialist workers are setting an example of what the Social-Democratic workers of other capitalist countries should now be doing in the fight against fascism."

Frightened by a mass pro-fascist demonstration in February 1934 and by ultra-reactionary trends in the government, the PCF negotiated a pact with the Socialist and Radical parties. The Socialists advocated a program similar to Roosevelt's "New Deal." The Radicals had a program closer to Herbert Hoover's Republicans. In his speech to the Congress Thorez spelled out the conditions of the pact:

In order to conclude the pact, we had agreed to a concession in the manner of limiting criticisms. We subscribed to the following text: "During this common action, the two parties will reciprocally abstain from attacks and criticism of the bodies and functionaries loyally participating in the action. However, each party, outside the joint action, retains its independence to develop its own propaganda without insulting or outraging the other Party, and to ensure its own recruitment of members.

In other words the communists would forsake its ideological struggle against social democracy and abandon the workers' struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In a word, they would cease to be communists in practice. Instead, the PCF would strive to be the best bourgeois democratic antifascist nationalists. Thorez told the Congress:

We do not intend to let fascism usurp the flag of the Great (bourgeois) Revolution, nor the Marseillaise, that hymn of the soldiers of the Convention.

The first action of this United Front bloc was a joint mass demonstration on July 14, 1935, Bastille Day. In this

demonstration the PCF symbolically forsook its traditional red flags and marched under the bourgeois national tri-color flag and instead of singing the "Internationale" they sang the French national anthem.

In May 1936 the PCF-Socialist-Radical "Front Populaire" won overwhelmingly in the parliamentary elections. The first "united front government" after the 7th Congress took power. Its initial task was to stem the tide of a massive workers' movement that was sweeping the country. A general strike prevailed. Workers were seizing the factories. The bosses were in a panic. The "united front government" stepped into the breach, on the one hand holding out the promise of a few fake reforms to induce the workers to go back to work, on the other hand using the police to beat the workers into submission. The United Front government saved the day for the capitalists.

The three United Front governments, two headed by Blum, the Socialist, and one by Chantemps, the Radical, lasted almost two years. Some of their more famous achievements in service of the capitalist class were:

1. a devaluation of the franc causing great hardships to workers, farmers, and the elderly.
2. a massive rearmament program to strengthen the bourgeois army;
3. giving Hitler the green light to take over Austria;
4. maintaining imperialist oppression of the people. in Indo-China, Algeria, Morocco, and other French colonial states in Africa and other lands;
5. adoption of compulsory arbitration of strikes;
6. assisting the fascists in Spain with an active blockage of arms for the anti-fascists.

The minister of war under the "united front government" was Daladier, a Radical. In April 1938 the capitalists dumped the communist "united fronters" and put Daladier fully in charge. He soon became famous for his trip to Munich where Czechoslovakia was handed to Hitler. It is less well known that scarcely a year and a half after the end of the "united front government" Daladier was ordering the wholesale arrest of communists. The PCF was banned, its papers suppressed, its functionaries kicked out of parliament, and thousands of its members thrown into concentration camps, not by the open fascists, not by the Nazis, but by so-called friends of the united front. "

During the anti-fascist war the communists played the leading role in organizing armed resistance. The line of the united front dominated the struggle: the French working class was mobilized to reform fascism by restoring "bourgeois democracy rather than to squash both fascist and "democratic" capitalism and establish socialism. After the anti-fascist victory another "united front government" with communists was established, this time headed by General De Gaulle. The price for admission was communists' agreement to get the workers to hand over their arms. Having been ideologically prepared only to restore bourgeois democracy, the workers acceded to the old United Front deal. Soon after the workers were disarmed, the bourgeoisie dumped Thorez out of the government.

Thus the experience of France (the very model of a modern major united front) shows that:

1. the capitalists welcome "communists" of the Thorez stripe into united front governments to help them suppress and disarm the workers.

2. the "united front government" is just as much a form of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie as is a fascist government.

3. the line of the united front has led the French CP down the path of revisionism and nationalism. The post-World War II experiences have substantiated the conclusion that the French CP has become the main prop of the capitalist class within the working class. The events of May 1968 alone have revealed the depths to which the French CP has sunk.

THE SECOND WORLD WAR

Two contradictions affected the development of the Second World War. One was the contradiction between the international proletariat and the imperialists and the other was the contradiction among the various imperialist powers. Hence the war had both revolutionary and counter-revolutionary aspects.

The basic error of the communists during this period was the failure to differentiate between these two contradictions. Instead of relying upon the main contradiction, the world proletariat vs. the imperialists, Stalin, the architect of the 7th Congress, chartered the global strategy of the united front with the "democratic" imperialists against the fascist powers.

In "Road to Revolution II-we tried to justify this alliance by saying that a temporary unity could be established because both the Soviets and allied imperialists fought to crush the Axis powers but for different reasons. This was incorrect. The revolutionary forces should have fought the fascist powers with socialist banners and also should have fought to take state power from the "democratic" imperialists. Even the tactical unity was a sham unity (the delay of the second front till after the victory of Stalingrad which was the turning point of the war). Because the strategy was not based on revolutionary goals, the Soviet masses were mobilized behind nationalist banners and the international proletariat behind bourgeois democratic banners. The fascists were defeated tactically, but not strategically. The same fascist ruling class is still in power in West Germany, Japan, and Italy, but now it maintains its rule with bourgeois democratic forms. Fascism is still an ever-present danger. Nationalism, acting as a substitute for revolutionary internationalism, dulled the class consciousness of the Soviet masses and helped pave the road for the Soviet Union itself to become a fascist-imperialist state.

In Eastern Europe the revisionists took over because the masses had not been won to Marxism-Leninism. Most of the present resistance to Soviet Imperialist domination in these countries comes from the right and is therefore a sham resistance.

In Italy and France, despite the heroic leadership of communists in the anti-fascist struggle, the masses had not been educated for socialist revolution. Hence Thorez and Togliatti could make a deal to surrender the people's weapons in order to enter post-war popular front coalition governments from which they were soon booted out.

By adhering to the strategy of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the international communist movement could have emerged everywhere from the Second World War with a greatly strengthened mass base and party. The false thesis that the proletariat can make useful tactical alliances with strategic class enemies lies at the root of the strategy of the broad united front with the liberal bourgeoisie. This concept inevitably leads to revisionism because in order to justify the alliance to the masses, communists must create illusions about "good" imperialists, "good" bourgeois nationalists, and "good" revisionists. The bourgeoisie's conditions for the United Front also force communists to set aside the strategy for socialist revolution (and thereby play down the development of socialist class consciousness) because the bourgeoisie will not make an alliance to destroy its own class.

But it is argued that where the 7th Congress line was correctly understood and practiced-as in China -the revolution triumphed, Of course the great revolution in China will go down as an historic mile-' .tone in proletarian revolutionary history just as the great October revolution and Paris Commune 10. But this does not mean that there were no serious errors in strategic outlook in the Chinese revolution as there were in the Paris Commune and October revolutions. The Commune has taught revolutionary Marxist-Leninists the necessity for ,mashing the state power of the bourgeoisie and the need for the working class to establish its own state power. The October Revolution has taught us he necessity for winning the peasants (the rural proletariat) to the banners of socialism in order to :consolidate the proletarian revolution. The Chinese 'evolution has confirmed that lesson. and also taught IS that we must not set aside the dictatorship of he proletariat for an alliance with the national bourgeoisie.

ON NEW DEMOCRACY

Mao's celebrated thesis on New Democracy is a combination of Lenin's strategy of a worker-peasant alliance to complete the bourgeois democratic .evolution in order to advance the socialist revolution and the application of the 7th Congress line of he United Front.

This can be seen by the following ideas set forth by Mao:

It would be sheer illusion to try to build a socialist society on the ruins of the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal order without a new democratic , state, , .without a thoroughgoing bourgeois democratic revolution .of a new type led by the Communist Party.

Why do we say our revolution in the present period is bourgeois democratic in nature'? We mean that the target of this revolution is not the bourgeoisie in general but national and feudal oppression, that the measures taken' in this revolution are in general directed not at abolishing but at protecting private property and that as a result of this revolution the working class will be able to build up its strength to lead China in the direction of socialism, though capitalism will still be enabled to grow to an appropriate extent for a fairly long time."

These ideas flow directly out of Lenin's strategy. The United Front 7th Congress line is reflected in Mao's alliance with the national bourgeoisie and conception of the new democratic state as a joint dictatorship of the working class, peasants, intelligentsia and national bourgeoisie, led by the working class. The new democratic state was not a socialist state, 110t a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat but 1 transitional form. Mao said:

Thus the numerous types of state systems in the world can be reduced to three basic kinds according to the class character of political power: (1) republics under bourgeois dictatorship; (2) republics under the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) republics under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes.

Mao then indicated that the first kind were the old capitalist states, the second are the socialist states and the third kind is the transitional form of state for revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial areas, Mao clearly asserts that the new democratic state is not a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. He said:

Some people are suspicious and think that once in power, the Communist Party will follow Russia's example and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and a one-party system. Our answer is that a new-democratic state is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is our view that there is no such state power as a joint dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasants, the intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie. This thesis contradicts the Marxist-Leninist analysis that the state is a system of armed force, prisons, etc., an instrument of a ruling class to oppress or suppress other classes. The joint dictatorship thesis comes very close to the Khrushchev thesis of a state of the whole people.

Mao confuses the governmental form of the dictatorship of the proletariat with the class essence of state power. In Russia the dictatorship of the proletariat took the governmental form of an alliance between the workers and peasants. (Initially the left Socialist Revolutionaries were represented in the government.) The dictatorship of the proletariat means that the proletariat controls the armed force necessary to suppress hostile class (bourgeois) opposition to carrying out policies that are in its class interest. When the Soviet Union was a socialist state the government and state apparatus (after the ouster of the Socialist Revolutionaries) was under a one-party monopoly. In the thinking of the international communist movement and the international proletariat, a one-party system (the Communist Party) became identical with the concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was a grave mistake. It narrowed the base of the dictatorship of the proletariat and confused and inhibited the development of proletarian democracy.

Under the dictatorship of the proletariat the Communists must lead (but not monopolize or dominate) the working class (industrial and agricultural, urban and rural) in its alliance with other class friends (middle peasants, and other petty bourgeoisie, revolutionary intellectuals, professionals and students).

New Democracy, as put into practice by the Chinese—an alliance of classes led by the working class was not a transitional form to the socialist revolution but in fact a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat. That is why we maintain that the Chinese revolution established the dictatorship of the proletariat in China even though it differed in governmental form from the one-party system in the Soviet Union.

Should the working class ally with the national bourgeoisie to develop a broad base in order to defeat imperialism and establish socialism? Mao's analysis of the national bourgeoisie is that it has dual aspects, both a revolutionary side and counter-revolutionary side. Therefore he maintained that the working class should unite with the revolutionary (anti-imperialist, anti-feudal) aspect and struggle against the reactionary (anti-working class) aspect. This appears to be very dialectical, but is it? All phenomena have dual aspects, but dialectical materialism teaches revolutionaries to gear their strategy and tactics to the main aspect. Historical experiences have amply confirmed the fact that the main aspect of the national bourgeoisie is its own class interest which is directly opposed to the working class. Communists must not sacrifice that long range fundamental interests of the working class for what appears to be an immediate gain. This is the root of much opportunism. Mao incorrectly maintained that the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie could be non-antagonistic, could be adjusted, if only handled correctly. Mao said:

Of course there are still contradictions among the classes, notably the contradiction between labor and capital. ...But throughout the stage of new democracy, these contradictions, these differing demands, will not grow and transcend the demands which all have in common and should not be allowed to do so; they can be adjusted." (Vol. III, p. 280)

...the people have a powerful state apparatus in their hands—there is no need to fear

rebellion by the national bourgeoisie. (Vol. IV, p. 419)

That was said in June 1949, but Mao continued to say more than seven years after the victory of the revolution that the contradiction between the workers and bourgeoisie could be adjusted, if correctly handed, and that the bourgeoisie could be won to socialism by a peaceful transformation (On Correct Handling of Contradictions). No need to fear the bourgeoisie, it's a friend! Here we see how the opportunist line of the 7th Congress, which paved the way for the CPUS to prettify the U.S. ruling class, affected the thought of Mao. By making alliances with class enemies, the working class is disarmed ideologically and politically and undermined organizationally.

The revisionists were able to seize complete control of the party and stage, not because they were all "hidden spies," "scabs," or "traitors," but because of systematic opportunist and revisionist policies. The thesis of usurpation by hidden agents to explain Khrushchevism and Chinese revisionism is insulting to the intelligence of the masses. Its purpose is to serve as a cover for the lack of criticism and self-criticism of and by the "infallible" leader, Chairman Mao or Stalin. The effect is to undermine valuable past contributions of Mao or Stalin and to perpetuate serious mistaken policies that are still being made by revolutionaries, not only in China, but also around the globe.

THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE

In April, 1955, 600 delegates representing the governments of 29 Asian and African countries assembled in Bandung, Indonesia for the first Asian-African Conference in history. The Conference represented the epitome of the 7th Congress's broad united front against imperialism and for peaceful coexistence. Included at the conference were governments in open alliance with U.S. imperialism in NA TO and SEA TO, Japan, as well as so-called neutralists (India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, etc.) and socialist China. (A sort of Afro-Asian United Nations, the UN being even a broader united front, if only China were admitted.)

The Conference was hailed as historic, Khrushchev said that it "struck a powerful blow at the plans of the colonialists and aggressors." Liu Shao-chi said in the report to the CCP's 8th Congress that:

...there are a number of countries in Asia and Africa which have shaken off the colonial bondage and achieved national independence. These nationally independent states, our great neighbor India included, have a total population of more than 600 million, or one fourth of the human race.

Here Liu, speaking for the central committee, including Chairman Mao, makes two mistakes: 1. none of these countries had shaken off imperialism, and 2. he ignores the class differences within the countries and speaks only in quantitative terms. Liu continues:

The overwhelming majority of those countries are all pursuing a peaceful, neutral policy.

Here the mistaken idea that neutralism is an anti-imperialist force is set forth. Within a short period of time the great neutralist friend of China, Nehru, representing of course the Independent, neutral, anti-imperialist national bourgeoisie, was to engage China in an aggressive border war.

For the sake of the broad united front, Chou En-lai in his report back from this Conference even prettified Japanese imperialism (after all, aren't they in contradiction with U.S. imperialism?) Chou said:

Of all Asian and African countries, Japan is developed more than others. If it will give up its old practice of colonialism, Japan too can provide technical assistance to other countries in Asia and Africa.

Here, Chou reduces Japanese imperialism to a "matter of mistaken governmental policy that can be set aside with a change of outlook by the Japanese ruling class. Is this not a reflection of Khrushchev's thesis that the imperialists can change their nature and become reasonable? Lenin castigated Kautsky for just this kind of revisionist nonsense!

The Bandung (United Front) Conference proved to be as much an instrument in preventing imperialist aggression as the United Nations. Both formations arose with the help of communist parties who mistakenly thought that a united front with class enemies could be useful to the international proletariat. Such formations that are dominated by imperialists, revisionists, and bourgeois nationalists should be exposed and opposed by revolutionaries in order to alert the masses as to the class nature of these organizations. To ignore the class struggle within all countries, to characterize bourgeois governments as representing the aspirations of the oppressed and exploited masses, and to perpetuate the illusion that these bourgeois governments had actually broken out of the imperialist system and could even build socialism without the dictatorship of the proletariat is to deceive the peoples of the world.

The Bandung Conference line, the continuation of the 7th Congress line, has never been repudiated. Indeed it is being pursued more vigorously than ever. Only during the Cultural Revolution was the Bandung line of unity with and support for bourgeois nationalist governments challenged. Liu Shao-chi was castigated by Red Guards for having united with Sukarno. But Liu was only pursuing Mao's line.

Some people may believe that such policies as Bandung are merely useful diplomatic maneuvers to overcome isolation, but in our view isolation from the class enemies of the exploited and oppressed masses is not a bad thing. The concern of proletariat revolutionaries must always be how best to serve the revolutionary interests of the international working class. This can never be done by regarding the class enemy of one sector of the international proletariat as a class friend of another sector. *The class enemies of the proletariat within every country must be regarded as the class enemy of every M-L party in the world.*

In this we are guided by the fundamental communist principle that was proclaimed by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto:

The Communists are distinguished from other working class parties by this only: 1) In the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front the common interests of the entire proletariat, independent of all nationality. 2) In the various stages of development which the struggle of the working class has to pass through, they always and everywhere represent the interests of the movement as a whole.

This is the real guide to proletarian internationalism. Only the reactionary bourgeois ideology of nationalism which divides the proletariat along national lines could mislead revolutionary communists to advance the theory and practice of united action with the so-called lesser-evil imperialists, lesser-evil revisionists, lesser-evil bourgeoisie.

In rejecting united action with the Soviet revisionists (a line which was supported by the so-called independent Marxist-Leninists, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il Sung, and Fidel Castro) the CCP correctly declared that such a course would be to deceive the peoples

The following is the list of the heads of the delegations at the Bandung Conference:

Opening address was given by Sukarno

Afghanistan: Foreign Minister Sarcar Mahmud Naim

Burma: Prime Minister U Nu

Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk

Ceylon: Prime Minister Sir John Kotelawala

China: Prime Minister Chou En-lai

Egypt: Prime Minister Nasser

Ethiopia: Foreign Minister Akitlou

Gold Coast: Minister of State Otsio

India: Prime Minister Nehru

Indonesia: Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo

Iran: Minister of Finance Dr. Ali Amini

Iraq: Foreign Minister Muhamad Fadhil Jamali

Japan: Economics Minister Takosaki

Jordan: Foreign Minister Salah

Laos: Prime Minister Sassorith

Lebanon: Prime Minister Sami Bey Saleh

Liberia: Secretary of State Momolu Dukuley

Libya: Ambassador to London Muntassar

Nepal: Prime Minister Thapa

Pakistan: Prime Minister Mohammed Ali

Philippines: General Carlos Romulo

Saudi Arabia: Crown Prince Amir Faisal

Sudan: Prime Minister Azhari

Thailand: Prince Wan Waithayakon

Turkey: Minister of State Zorlu

North Vietnam: Foreign Minister Pham Van Dong

South Vietnam: Minister of Planning Nguyen Van Thoai

Yemen: Prime Minister Saifel El Hassan

of the world. *Peoples Daily* and *Red Flag* on Nov. 11, 1965 declared:

Revolution, the fight against imperialism and the fight against revisionism all have right on their side. Beyond all doubt, it is perfectly right to discard these decaying old revisionist groups and build new revolutionary parties. We resolutely support all the forces in the world that persevere in Marxism-Leninism and revolution. It is our lofty proletarian internationalist duty to strengthen united action with all Marxist-Leninists forces in the world.

But how can the CCP strengthen united action with revolutionary Marxist-Leninists when they have united action with the class enemy of the revolutionaries? Is it any less of a deception on the peoples of the world to have unity with so-called lesser-evil revisionists, imperialists, and bourgeois nationalists? Lesser evils, lesser deception? No! It is

precisely those liberal imperialists, these so-called independent revisionists. those so-called progressive nationalists who are misleading the revolutionary masses. Therefore they must be opposed and exposed by genuine Marxist-Leninists because otherwise they will continue to mislead the revolutionary masses. The struggle to further expose and oppose Soviet revisionism must continue but Soviet revisionism is long discredited and no longer plays a vanguard role. The anti-revisionist struggle is international in scope and cannot be confined to the Soviet bosses alone. Indeed, this was never the case. The new and more dangerous center of revisionism has now shifted to Peking!

"MILITANT" REVISIONISM NO IMPROVEMENT

Millions of oppressed people throughout the world understand that imperialism cannot solve their problems and that an all-out struggle to overthrow the capitalists and win socialism is the order of the day. Modern revisionism acts in direct contradiction to the needs of the masses because it seeks an accommodation with imperialism. Under the guise of "live and let live," it implements a policy of "exploit and let exploit."

However, because of the masses' class hatred against imperialism, their rebelliousness, and their desire for socialism, modern revisionism requires a militant cover for its love-affair with the bosses. Every opportunist move made by the revisionists is carried out to the tune of "advancing the revolution."

The revisionists' favorite left cover of all is armed struggle. Marxist-Leninists believe that revolution and socialism can come about only as the result of violent, protracted class war against the world bourgeoisie. But Marxist-Leninists also believe that the primary aspect of this war is the ideological outlook of the masses who are waging it. Who is leading the struggle? What ideas are the masses won to? What are the goals of the struggle? Revolutionaries believe that unless the long-range goal of the struggle is the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialism and unless the masses are won to fight for this goal, the struggle will inevitably become nationalist and be taken over by bourgeois leadership.

The sharpest recent example of armed struggle conducted on an opportunist basis was the Tet offensive of 1968. Tens of thousands of heroic Vietnamese workers and peasants willingly gave their lives in this magnificent attack against U.S. imperialism. They proved that the united struggle of oppressed people can defeat the bosses. Yet this struggle did not succeed in driving imperialism out of Vietnam, because the primary goal of the Vietnamese revisionist "leaders" was to "force" U.S. imperialism to the bargaining table. The best fighters in Vietnam were sacrificed so that Vietnamese opportunists could haggle out a deal that will allow the imperialists to remain in Vietnam.

The militant-sounding "foco" theory of Fidel and Che that substitutes the isolated action of a few elite guerrilla bands for the protracted struggle of masses for socialism has done great harm to the revolutionary process in Latin America. On the one hand, he is a loyal supporter of Soviet revisionism, an admirer of Allende's peaceful transition to "socialism" in Chile, and a friend of the "revolutionary" military junta in Peru.

In our own country, the ruling class constantly pushes individuals or groups who dress up in militant disguises but who are opportunists at heart. The Weathermen threw bombs at university campus workers but were all for the Paris negotiations and various domestic power-sharing schemes like "community control of the police."

Guided by narrow nationalism ("We won't criticize you openly if you don't criticize us openly") the CCP revisionists have consistently shunned the ideological struggle against the opportunists (Castro, the North Vietnamese sellouts, Sihanouk) and against the so-called "independent" Marxist-Leninists (Kim IL Sung). The

Mao leadership has failed to provide genuine leadership in the struggle against international revisionism in all its forms.

On the contrary: with their ping-pong diplomacy, their readiness to deal directly with U.S. imperialism, and Mao's reference to Nixon as a "relatively good" imperialist, they are in effect providing leadership to the class traitors and revisionists of the world.

STRUGGLE FOR THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT

The strategic outlook that must guide the international communist movement must be the ideological, political, and armed struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is what differentiates communists from revisionists and centrists. This strategic outlook is based on the analysis that the main contradiction in the world is between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. The main content of our epoch is determined by the main contradiction. Hence we live in the epoch of the rise of world socialism and the overthrow of world capitalism. Such an epoch will inevitably be full of sharp class conflict, wars, fascism and revolution.

Formerly Marxist-Leninists spoke of the anti-imperialist struggles of the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America as bourgeois democratic revolutions and national liberation revolutions. Historic experience has shown that the epoch of bourgeois democratic revolutions ended when the entire globe became imperialist-dominated and the October revolution opened up the epoch of the proletarian revolution. Not a single liberation struggle has succeeded in breaking out of the imperialist system. Only the revolutionary struggles of the Chinese and Albanian peoples which were led by the proletariat and established the dictatorship of the proletariat temporarily broke the imperialist bonds. However, the alliance with the national bourgeoisie and the failure to develop the socialist class consciousness of the masses as to the socialist nature of the revolutions paved the road to revisionism.

The struggles of the oppressed masses in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are an integral part of the proletarian world revolution. These revolutionary struggles must not be regarded as a reserve of the proletarian revolution, nor as an ally of the proletarian revolution; they must be understood as being as much an expression of the proletarian revolution as that of the proletariat within the imperialist countries. The industrial and agricultural proletariats of the world are class brothers and sisters.

Only the proletariat can destroy the old relations of production and establish new relations of production—a new mode of production, socialism. Only a socialist revolution can destroy imperialism! This must be the communist slogan everywhere.

Communist strategy must guide communist tactics. Tactics should not contradict strategic aims. Hence the proletariat must unite with its class friends and never its class enemies. This is true both nationally and internationally. Unity with class enemies undermines the proletarian revolution.

The unity of the industrial and agricultural proletariats of the world must be the foundation for the broader alliance that must be forged with middle peasants, revolutionary students and intellectuals, and other petty bourgeois forces who can be won to the banners of socialism. As Marx and Engels pointed out in the Communist Manifesto, the role of the proletariat must be to appeal to their (the petty bourgeoisie's) future class interests.

The contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is always antagonistic. The future class interests of the bourgeoisie are always linked to the growth and maintenance of the imperialist system. Hence this contradiction can never be adjusted, nor can the bourgeoisie be peacefully transformed, as Mao projected in his strategy of New

Democracy.

The failure to repudiate the strategy of the 7th Congress and its variants such as new democracy has caused and continues to cause grave harm to the revolutionary struggle. The Indonesian communists suffered grave losses as a result of Aidit's (Mao's) line of unity with the national bourgeoisie, of state power being jointly shared in a coalition government. The Vietnamese communists have abandoned the dictatorship of the proletariat for the sake of the broad united front for a neutralist, coalition government with the national bourgeoisie. The United Front with the national bourgeoisie has also wreaked havoc with the Indian communist movement. Coalition governments with the class enemy are disastrous for the working class. Mao's offer of a coalition government with Chiang after the defeat of Japanese imperialism was rejected by the Chinese bourgeoisie and its U.S. imperialist sponsors. But just as the working class makes errors so can the bourgeoisie miscalculate. Over-estimating their strength, they launched civil war. Instead of wiping out the communists, they were wiped out. This was a good thing. The imperialists also draw lessons from their mistakes. Nowadays they are all too willing to go along with coalition governments as an alternative to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In the U.S., the 7th Congress line long ago reduced the once militant communist movement to the status of a mild "left wing" for the Democratic Party. The Black Panther Party took over the United Front Against Fascism line, openly using Dimitroff as a text. They had a united front with the revisionist Communist Party. They filled their paper with stories of fascist attacks. They urged support for bourgeois politicians who work for community control of the police. They relied upon revisionist lawyers whom they hailed as revolutionary heroes. The subsequent demise of the Panthers is a consequence of their adherence to revisionism. Now the BPP advocates black capitalism.

THE UNITED FRONT FROM BELOW - UNITE THE MASSES

Marxist-Leninists don't reject the concept of unity. We champion it. We strive to unite the broad masses to struggle against their class enemies, but not to build a united front with class enemies. Therefore we reject the united front with the trade union misleadership, but strive to unite the masses of workers against them and the bosses. To unite with and support the Meanys, the Reuthers, and the Harry Bridges would be to deceive the workers. We, also reject a united front with the misleaders of the black workers, whether they are open ruling class apologists like Wilkins, King, Young, or "militant" nationalists like the BPP leaders, but we do strive to unite the black masses in struggles against the ruling class. To unite with black misleaders also would be to deceive the people. Only racists and nationalists would refuse to unite with white misleaders but would unite with black misleaders.

Communists strive to unite the masses in class struggles around their immediate needs and interests. We fight for immediate gains and defend those reforms that the working class has won in battles against the ruling class. We fight to defend the rights of the workers to openly organize, demonstrate and struggle to win tactical victories of either a defensive or offensive nature. But we will not sacrifice the revolutionary struggle for socialism for any illusory immediate gain. On the contrary we utilize the immediate tactical struggles to raise the revolutionary, socialist consciousness of the workers, and to build the revolutionary party. We do this in the only way possible, by bringing communist ideas to the people, and by drawing lessons from actual experiences. To fail to bring Marxism-Leninism, the banner of socialism, to the masses means reliance on spontaneity and a strengthening of bourgeois ideology, as Lenin pointed out.

We communists are not purists. We do not unite only with those who support Marxism-Leninism, or the dictatorship of the proletariat. We unite with the masses on the basis of their immediate contradictions with the ruling class, and through the particular class contradiction we strive to raise their understanding and help them grasp the general class contradiction, nationally and internationally. Workers learn that it is not only our own boss who is our enemy but a

class of bosses that is the enemy of all workers. Workers learn that our brothers and sisters are not just our fellow workers in our own shop or industry but our brothers and sisters are a class of workers throughout the country and throughout the world. Within all workers, including communists, bourgeois ideas have deep roots. It can not be otherwise for we are materialists and our ideas will reflect the class nature of the world in which we were born. The struggle to overcome the heritage of bourgeois ideology will exist throughout the entire epoch of the transition from world capitalism to world socialism and from world socialism to world communism. Therefore to think that it is possible to build unity among the masses only on the basis of pure communism is unadulterated idealism. It is precisely because we are conscious of the depths of bourgeois ideology that we struggle hard against it, within ourselves and among the masses. We will always strive to unite with the masses, no matter how ideologically backward, in all those battles that are directed at the class enemy, and that can further the revolutionary interests of the workers.

Fight Sectarianism – Build Party Unity with the Masses

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EXCERPTS FROM A NATIONAL COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE PARTY, JULY, 1971

The present political situation is wide open. The bosses have launched their sharpest attack against workers in decades. This attack covers all aspects of life: speed-up, layoffs, intensified racism, welfare cutbacks, rent increases, increased police harassment. The U.S. ruling class is in trouble, and they are trying to bleed the workers dry in order to get out of it.

Conditions are ripe for rebellion. The bosses know this. They are afraid to organize even the most conventional sellout movement. because they understand that it could easily blow up in their faces. They got a taste of workers' anger recently in Brownsville, N .y ., when a bunch of reformers and nationalists organized a pro-liberal rally, and thousands of people tore the place apart, burning buildings and shooting at cops.

Our party has an unparalleled opportunity to move ahead in the coming period. A great deal has already been accomplished. In the past eighteen months, since the decision was made to reach out to the working class with communist ideas, many workers have come closer to and have joined the party. In every place where we have made an effort to build Challenge-Desafio clubs, they have attracted numbers of stable, militant workers, many of them black or Spanish-speaking.

However, this is not a time to pat ourselves on the back or congratulate ourselves for past accomplishments. While we have moved ahead slowly in the last year and a half, we have barely begun to touch the tip of the iceberg. We can and should be doing much more to advance the class struggle and win masses to our party and its base. Only our own weaknesses prevent us from doing so.

The national committee feels at this time that sectarianism is the principal obstacle holding back the work. This manifests itself particularly in the low level of our participation in mass struggle. The decision to concentrate heavily on the sale of Challenge-Desafio was correct and indicates that workers will respond directly to communist ideas. However, often this work .is carried out in a one-sided manner, as though we believed that a revolution can be made by only hawking a communist paper on a street corner or by organizing small groups of people to discuss the ideas in the paper .

In a period like the present, many people will follow the direct leadership of a communist party. Our recent experience proves this. Without our open agitational work, we could not survive as a revolutionary organization. On the other hand, many others -- millions -- want to fight, have to fight, but do not yet see the need for a revolutionary party, working class dictatorship, or socialism. Virtually all of these people are winnable to the party's ideas, but we cannot win them if we take the attitude that we are interested in them only if they join Challenge-Desafio clubs, sell the paper regularly, and subscribe sight unseen to every nuance of the party's line. The logic of doing work only with the "most advanced" sections of the masses leads to the belief that only a small elite understands what life is all about and that everyone else is too limited. This is the line the Trots take: "Go ahead and struggle on your own. You'll find

out soon enough how dumb you are. Then we'll step in with our recipe for instant revolution and 'help' you."

Millions of people are engaged in countless forms of struggle every day of the year. All of these struggles are over reform issues. Workers have to fight back in order to survive. If we don't join these fights, help lead them, and integrate ourselves with the people who are waging them, how can we win masses to socialism? If people in a neighborhood want to organize to get their garbage picked up, if workers in a factory want to fight compulsory overtime, if people want better medical care, if a group of tenants wants the boiler fixed, on what basis are we going to win them to socialism if we hold back from participating in their fight to stay alive?

Of course, there is a right way and a wrong way to engage in reform struggles. Earl Browder once said that the old C.P. was the best reform organization that ever existed in the U.S. He was probably right.

But the C.P. died because it made the revisionist error of never winning anybody to revolutionary ideology. We can learn from this experience. Carrying out this work correctly is not easy. Every time we fight over an issue, we have to try to advance the political understanding of those with whom we unite. We have to raise the party line. On the other hand, we can sabotage a struggle and drive potential friends away if we try to make absolute agreement on the party's line a condition for building the united front. In addition, we cannot make the opportunist error of putting forth any issue regardless of its politics. We would not support a fight for black foremen, more minority cops, or community control of anything.

There are potential dangers in doing this work, and we have to try to avoid them. But we are now in danger of making the biggest error of all by not doing the work in the first place. It is always possible to make opportunist errors in united front activity, but this does not mean that united front activity in and of itself is "opportunist." If we believed this, then we would limit ourselves to working with a tiny handful of ideological "purists." We would say that the only things in life that weren't "opportunist" were selling Challenge-Desafio and debating the ideas in it. In the meantime, millions would go on fighting the bosses without us, and at best we would be useless to their struggles.

To the extent that the party has held back from engaging in mass struggle and united front work, the national committee believes that it is primarily to blame for giving inadequate and incorrect leadership. Sectarianism in the party begins with the national committee. In the first place, some of us have resisted giving leadership to the party in mass struggle. In the second place, we took the lead in offering 'political' rationales for not doing the work: some of us were among the first to put forth that working in large mass struggles and organizations would inevitably compromise our line. Finally, the national committee comrades who did view this position as sectarian did not struggle hard enough against it within the national committee.

1. Recently, the party and some of its friends held a steel conference in the Midwest to prepare for the possibility of a strike in the industry and to form a national caucus of steel workers. The conference was a very positive development. Thirty steel workers from several cities attended. This would have been unthinkable a year ago and represents real progress. However, a sectarian plan of work was developed. What emerged from the conference was the idea that these thirty steel workers and anybody else they could get should invade the union hall to demand either a strike or no sellout. Militancy in this situation is a good thing. We should be militant in all our activities. But this plan could only have led to demoralization and the quick negation of earlier good work, because it did not contain an approach of unity with masses of steelworkers. At best it was a plan for "exemplary" action of a one-shot variety, not a plan to involve masses in struggle. The plan that should have emerged at this conference and that the party will now try to carry out to rely on the thirty workers who came to the conference to build local on-the-job caucuses, to fight around local grievances in shops. We already have the names of 1,000 steel workers in the Midwest. Most of them are not yet ready to adopt the entire program of a communist party, but many undoubtedly want to help lead fights against the boss and the union phoney. If we can win ourselves and those friendliest to us to wage struggles alongside these

1,000 workers -- and we believe that we can -- then we can begin to build the foundations of rock-solid base of support for our party in one the major industries in the U.S.

2. Recently, an East Coast area conference of college teachers and graduate students was held in New England. One hundred and fifty people attended the conference, which was sponsored by the University Action Group, an SDS-type faculty organization we are helping to build. In terms of numbers, this conference represented a breakthrough in the work and reflected at least some ass ties. The party attempted to put forth its le on culture at this conference. In and of itself, this was good, but the line was advanced in such a way that those who disagreed with it would have to feel that the party regarded them as hopeless reactionaries. The overwhelming majority of people at the conference were not party members; presumably, many of them did not agree with the party line. If we did not change our approach, we would find ourselves in the foolish position of making these people believe that we had called a conference merely to tell them that we considered em our enemies! This sectarianism was compounded by a plan for another conference to be held in the fall. This plan proposed to gather five hundred people for a discussion of the finer points revolutionary communist ideology and theory. A conference with such an agenda would help the work; would undoubtedly involve a lot of struggle; perhaps we should call one. But, we should not entertain the illusion that at the present time we can get five hundred intellectuals to debate the party's line and nothing else. If we could get even two hundred people to a conference to discuss establishing the U.A.G. as a broad-based campus organization of faculty and graduate students, we would be making progress. Working in a broad-based organization means working with people who have disagreements with us on many issues. We should discuss our disagreements in a principled way; we should never hide our politics. But if faculty members who do not agree with us that capitalist universities and culture are thoroughly rotten and must be smashed want to fight around racism, layoffs, jobs, or anything else within the aim of principle, then we can never win them to our full position unless we fight alongside them in the struggles they want to wage now. The party now has the outlook of helping to build for a UAG conference in the fall that will involve as many people as possible in a discussion or program and activity for the organization. We will certainly raise our independent line in this context -- but in such a way as to build the V.A.G., not turn it into a fake "socialist club."

3. In NYC, the party and its friends recently carried out a plan of attack against municipal budget and tax hearings. We went down to City Hall three times. The first action was excellent. It involved 150 people. It was very militant, with chanting, arrests, and fighting against the cops. Only forty came to the second hearing, however. Many were reluctant to go. Some called the action adventurist. Others raised fear of the cops. Others said that since the point had been made once, it was unnecessary to make it again. The forty comrades and friends who did show up carried out another militant action that was warmly applauded by virtually everyone who heard about it. The third time, no objections were raised, but only thirty people showed up. Again, within the framework of its limitations, the action was worthwhile and enabled us to move ahead. These is sues affect just about everybody in NYC . Objectively, we can unite with millions around this issue, and right now, we should be able to involve hundreds directly in actions of the type described above. Naturally, if the best we can do is to involve the same handful of people, then battle fatigue will set in very quickly, and the work will soon degenerate. If, on the other hand, we take the viewpoint that almost everybody -- neighbors, friends on the job, fellow students in the schools and colleges -- is a potential ally in this fight, if we unite with them in caucuses, committees, etc. to launch struggles around their immediate grievances, then we will be able to win many, many more to larger party-wide actions and eventually to the party. We have to win ourselves and our friends in Challenge Clubs to this perspective. Many other examples could be brought forth to illustrate the need to overcome sectarianism in our work. They all point to one conclusion: We have to immerse ourselves in mass struggles and join forces with the millions who are fighting the ruling class now and the thousands who have already shown that they want to unite with our party. There will be many tactics to make use of accomplishing this process. In some cases, we will have to set up groups ourselves. In other cases, we will work with groups that already exist. In some cases, we will be able to engage in higher forms of struggle more rapidly than in others. The key question here is whether or not we understand the main idea of "Road to Revolution III -- to rely on the masses to carry out and advance our line. Everyone we meet, everyone we know, everyone we bring around the party has contradictions with the ruling class. These contradictions are sharpening. Every day, whether we recognize

it or not, we encounter dozens of possibilities for developing left-center coalitions against the bosses. The fact that we have not grasped and acted upon the need to do so sooner is a sign of political flabbiness on our part. The national committee bears the primary responsibility for this.

We believe that virtually everyone in the party can be won to participate in broad forms of mass action and struggle. On the basis of its independent work alone, the party has already emerged in many areas as the leading force in opposition to the ruling class. If we can expand the work and engage in sharper fights involving greater numbers of people, we can come forth even more as the revolutionary vanguard of all oppressed workers in the U .S.

None of the above is in contradiction to the continued growth of our independent work. On the contrary: the more actions we build, the more fights we launch, the more will we be able to spread our ideas and win people to them. Our party exists for the purpose of waging class war against the bourgeoisie. No battle or skirmish in this war is too small to be overlooked. No aspect of the class struggle is so "insignificant" that we should stand aside from it. We will make many errors in the process of conducting this struggle. We will suffer casualties. But the main thing is that if we unite with masses in the class struggle, we will grow. If we carry out the line and rely on the people, our base will mushroom, and will make PLP a revolutionary party of the working class.

THINGS ARE WIDE OPEN -- ONLY WE CAN STOP OURSELVES

One would have to be deaf, dumb and blind not to realize that the bourgeoisie is in deep trouble. The growing crisis is manifested by the "Pentagon Papers." Unquestionably, these papers must undermine the confidence in the state apparatus among the people. These papers have appeared because the bosses are in trouble, and a great fight is raging in their ranks over how best to wiggle out of their present situation.

The political and economic crisis the bosses are in explains -- in part -- -Our being able to make advances these past two years. But this would have been impossible if we hadn't come forward more boldly among workers. Whatever actions we now take in N.Y.C. we involve a considerable number of workers, especially black and Latin. Our study groups are more heavily weighted with workers especially minority workers.

Throughout the party many more people have political relations and ties to people at work and at home. These ties explain why we have been able to involve many more people in action than ever. It also explains why the party is slowly growing. But, given the objective situation, we should and can be making greater progress. There are still many weaknesses in the work. These weaknesses hold us back and prevent us from fully capitalizing on the objective situation, or from fully exploiting the growth in or around the party. In this paper, we would like to deal with one: Base-building. What has to be said isn't exactly new. But we should sum up problems of base-building and its relation to the work -- taking into account our current situation.

Very often people in the party raise objections or questions about carrying forward mass action. They explain that they are very busy "base building." They conclude that mass activity against the bosses -- whether larger party wide actions, such as March 20-May Day-June 19, or even job or community actions -- contradicts their efforts to "base build." Naturally, it is a good thing that people have been won to the idea of "base building." Certainly, the party leadership doesn't want to do anything which will injure this development. But what we have to examine is: What are we building? and, in some cases, are we building anything?

When we develop ties to people one object is to . win them to the party. Winning people to the party isn't an abstraction. It means winning people to fight the bosses with communist ideas. It means relying on the masses to grasp these ideas, enlarge them, and put them into practice. If you could sum up the essential aspect of our line

expressed in "Road to Revolution III" or in previous periods, the thing which should emerge is reliance on the workers. Our line is that people can be won to socialism and that they will try to carry this idea forward within the context of the present situation. So, revisionism in this period can basically be measured by what kind of a base you have or are building and who is being won to the party. This is opposed to the old idea that first people have to be won to "advanced" capitalist ideas which then act as a transmission belt to socialist ideas and action. We have been saying that this is wrong, because any bourgeois idea, holds back the class struggle and gains are often more illusion than reality .

So any base which is being built is not in contradiction to the party line, because the party line is .for the workers to be won to socialism and carry the class struggle forward. Well, people say everyone we know isn't yet won to the party line. Fair enough. But if you have been in the party a considerable length of time and have not been able to win anyone to the party line then there is something wrong. Obviously, the ties to people are then less than adequate. Many people have not yet thoroughly integrated their lives with those people whom they are trying to win. This is why we often hear of being too busy to organize. What can we be so busy doing? Presumably we are trying to build our base consistently. This always puts us in touch with people who. we are trying to win to an action, to a group, to the party.

Now there are many people who have some ties, see people regularly , and win people to the party. Good. But what kind of leadership do we give these people. Do we exhibit them as our "base?" Do we drag them around to every function without considering how they should develop their ties? After all, these people aren't "ours." They are potential communists who should be leading other workers in struggle. But there is a reluctance to give this kind of leadership to people won closer to the party. This reluctance has several aspects. Firstly, we have a bad sectarian trait of not trusting people. We are afraid to give them their head. We are afraid to share responsibilities or spread them out. Secondly, some people become very proud that they have won some people and display this like new clothes. They forget that political preening isn't what we are after. New people often can go further than us and be more effective. Presumably, this could be the case because many of the newer people in or around the party are workers with many ties and years of experience on the job or in their community. So there is a holding back, because we might be outdone or because more action by new people will force us to do more. After all, if we win people to class struggle, then they will expect us to do at least as much as they.

Finally, this leads to the point of no return; because more struggle means more fighting with the boss and his stooges. More fighting means more casualties -- jail, getting hurt, etc .So there is a tendency to cool it. At the moment the class struggle is sharpening. This period requires more action, boldness -- not retrenchment or retreat. If people are hit .with more unemployment, racism, higher rent, higher food prices, less schools and hospitals, more garbage et. al., it isn't exactly the period to be more cautious. Now, there is a thin line between boldness and recklessness. And this must be determined at every point. But one yardstick which can be used is the issues involved; are they of concern to large numbers of people? and can we involve others in the action? This brings us full turn to the original point -- what kind of a base if any do we have? If we have to start each activity off from scratch, people will have little enthusiasm for the action. They know they will have to go out and beat the bushes for some contacts to produce. This inherently creates sectarian one-sided relations. If people think that the only basis for the relation is being called to an action or meeting, will they resent it? They may come to one or two but, not really being won to the politics, they tend to disappear. Naturally, people in the party don't like to go through this procedure, so they recoil from action with the exclamation: "What! another one?" If on-going relations exist, these relations, which can spread to many others, as well as new contacts, should always keep the party in touch with numbers of people who can be won to action -- not by badgering, but by understanding the politics. If our ties with people are thin or non-existent, then we don't really carry out the line of the party, and of course, the party actions become an absolute curse.

It is hard to believe that with all the problems people face there couldn't be more people coming forward to take

initiative. Certainly, this problem should ease in a period of intense class struggle. If base-building becomes a crutch by which to avoid the class struggle, then base-building is misunderstood or people do not really want to build a base.

During the past year our party in NYC has come into contact with thousands. This has come about because of paper sales, ever growing mass action, and because many people are bringing new people around. But how many people slip through our fingers by default? Many people brought around are really followed up. There may be a phone call, a visit, etc. But that isn't sufficient. People must be asked over to our homes. We must ask people to go out with us, etc. People should not feel that we are interested in them basically as a "communist body count." Sure -- "we can't win them all now." But we could be winning many more. A good deal of our time is spent indulging ourselves, not the party. We are still reluctant, afraid to ask a name, a phone number, an address. Without an expanding base, problems of organization }are difficult to solve. For example, we won many people to go down to the first City Council Hearing on the Budget. Generally, the action was excellent. In the shops, communities and schools of these people.. PL members and friends were further identified as those people fighting the ruling class. In case after case, workers gave money for bail and noted the fact that the party and its friends were the only ones fighting. However people were reluctant to go back to the second budget hearings. Some said it would be adventurist. Some just said plainly that they were afraid of the cops. Some said it conflicted with their basebuilding. Others said the point had been made at the first hearing; why do it again? In and of themselves anyone of these objections could have merit. None of them were outlandish. But the main problem wasn't raised; how come party members and their friends couldn't bring more people to the budget hearings? After all, the budget cuts affect many others besides the party forces. And the overwhelming sympathy of the workers in the city was on the side of the party. Person after person exclaimed, "that they were glad someone was fighting the budget cuts."

If people didn't have to come alone they would be less afraid and it wouldn't conflict with base-building. The point could be made again and again that involvement with other people would clear away the question of adventurism. In as much as the budget cuts and other attacks are the sharpest in modern times, it paid to go again and again", despite our obvious weaknesses. By the third hearings, people went (by and large alone) with little argument but with little enthusiasm. On balance every one agrees that we did right and that it helped us to draw people closer as they saw the party as a fighting party. But we all know that we could have done better. With the class struggle growing each moment more action is required each day. Many people don't like this, because it leaves them little "breathing room." We should welcome stepped up action because it means it brings us a little closer to beating the ruling class. I(each action is viewed as something unto itself rather than another battle in a protracted war we will lose heart. Battles and actions all have to be evaluated by whether they help us win new people; has the party grown? Are we in a better or worse situation to go ahead? And finally, what errors did we make so we can correct them and improve. Wars are made up of zillions of battles and skirmishes. They appear never ending. War with guns is only one level of the war. The nature of the war now is mass action. Unless we develop mass action to greater and greater heights the war with guns is just a fool's dream. If we are tired WE should rest. But we should know the war goes on and when our rest is over we go back to the front. One thing is certain the ruling class will still be there. They aren't about to yield power without a fight.

In this period of growing class struggle both within the party and without, building a base becomes all important. Virtually every person that left the party over the years with some big pronunciamento was isolated. Almost all of them, in sequence, have gone into political oblivion. Politicos without a base are useless and impotent. Politicos who build a base on opportunism are dangerous and harmful. We can only prove the correctness of our politics to the extent we can involve people. If we fail to do this we too shall become impotent and extinct. People are open to our ideas; they will take the paper if we bring it to them; and some will become involved with the party if we LET THEM.

At this stage in the class struggle it is possible to build a base. No one in the party should be isolated. More to the

point, we should win our new friends to build their base, enter other groups, win more and more people to the line. We should not let the party get identified in people's minds as a group of loners. "If I can get my one person I can be in or around the party also." Party members must become leaders of people. Workers must respect the party because the party is part of the people. Party members who still have great fear of the people will not be party members for long. As pointed out, "differences" usually spring up out of isolation. Some leave as friends; others as enemies -- but the essence is the same -- isolation.

Because of hammer-like blows from the ruling class, and because more and more people realize the inability of this system to satisfy their needs, the working class reaches out for our party. Don't dodge; don't duck. Grasp those hands because this is the only way the working class and the party can survive. This is the only way we can win. All of our current experiences show us that the party and the working class are filled with fighters who want to win other fighters. We must bear down.

By the time the summer is over we will try and get the entire party in a better position for the fight ahead. We will try and intensify the struggle for base-building (confidence in the working class) in all our clubs, groups, etc. We cannot afford isolation and we cannot afford complacency -- because the work is going ahead. This progress can easily be reversed if we allow opportunism to grow in our ranks. Interestingly enough, people in the party who have little or no base complain the loudest about how mass action is contradictory to base-building; or how the party leadership is remiss in fighting for base-building. Comrades, relax. The party's base will grow. Perhaps yours won't. We will try to get it to grow. If we do not succeed we can try other forms of organization so we can continue to work together around those things we find mutuality on. **BUT THE PARTY WILL BUILD ITS BASE.**

The Paris Commune of 1871

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March 18, 1971, was the 100th anniversary of the Paris Commune. It was the first attempt of the working class to take over and hold state power. It was the first notice for the bourgeois class that their ownership of wage slaves was not eternal.

There is a habit among all of us to idealize working class history. This is bad and erroneous. Real men, and women fought and died for the Paris Commune. Twenty thousand people daily were involved in heated political discussion over how the commune should be run. Many mistakes were made just as there were many triumphs. That was because it was real. No dream. No figment of imagination. Real lessons could be learned that would and did advance the working class towards power and their aspirations all over the world.

Masses of working class people were involved in the running of government and in the destruction of the hold of religion over their minds. Women were involved in fighting male chauvinism. And the working class was learning how to grow into the only class. Internationalism took a real form -- French, Polish, Italian, German fighters and workmen stood side by side and defended what was called the "International Republic." The working class ran almost all the service functions of government from the top down. No super specialists were needed. These were all real things. The anger and fear of the bourgeoisie was also real. They destroyed half a city the so-called "heart of western culture" -- in order to crush the working class and smash their state.

They held no quarter. There was no discussion about whether to have workers' power or not. The ruling class, no matter what their differences, when it came to either they or the workers owning state power were of one opinion. The so-called radicals, Liberals and Rurals all said, "Smash them so they may become once more cattle, so we can represent and suppress them."

In this article it is not necessary to go into the Revolution of 1917, the Revolution of 1949, the Chinese Cultural Revolution. But the history and lessons of the Paris Commune were carried on by communists and the anger of the working class for their situation has grown worldwide from that small start in Paris 100 years ago.

The New Napoleonic Empire of 1851-70 had been one of depravity and profit. The many orgies were known to all far and wide in France. Many bourgeoisie had grown fat wringing profits out of wage slavery. It was surely the best of times for these bosses. Many new, wide boulevards had been constructed in Paris not so much for their beauty, but rather in memory of June of 1848 when the working class had consciously become aware of their won demands and tried to grasp the government for their own. The narrow streets of Paris had been easy to barricade, so a lot of ruling class lackeys' blood had fallen. Not that the bosses cared about that, but they came close to losing power -- and that was something to more than think about. Baron Haussman had made a fortune on the boulevards as others had made it in metal, food, garment (306,567 workers -- 208,383 women) and construction (125,371 workers -- 63,675 women). Over the period 1857-67 real wages had dropped because, though wages 'ere steady, food, clothing and rent had risen. The Parisian working class had not sat back idly but ad been involved in the International Workingmen's Association. In 1867 the metalworkers union won strike victory, with the help of the International hen it was only 600 strong. So the prestige of the International quickly grew until by 1870 it had 70,000 members in Paris alone. As the depression worsened working class anger rose.

In Germany Bismarck had a need to finally tie the country in one united nation, so that the bourgeoisie could really get down to sucking all of the German workers' blood. A war with France would be just the answer -- a real unifying force, heady nationalism would be in the air, and the working class and small shopkeepers could forget their problems. Bosses' militarism and nationalism was the thing. So, too, in France, Napoleon realized as the anger of the masses grew that he would need a few square miles on the other side of the Rhine -- a thought to send icy tingles up the spine of any nationalist Frenchman -- in point of fact most bosses. So the two godfathers of their own national bourgeois interests, Napoleon '1 and Bismarck, blew the trumpets of nationalism and money.

The workers of France and Germany and England, seeing well what was the intent of their lords, sent cries of international brotherhood. July 12 the International Workingmen's Assoc. sent the following manifesto from the Paris International: "Once more, on the pretext of European equilibrium, of national honour, the peace of the world is menaced by political ambitions. French, German, Spanish workmen! Let our voices unite in one cry of reprobation against war! ...In answer to the warlike proclamations of those who exempt themselves from the blood tax, and find in public misfortunes a source of fresh speculations, we protest, we who want peace, labour and liberty! ...Brothers in Germany! Our division would only result in the complete triumph of the despotism on both sides of the Rhine ...Workmen of all countries! Whatever may for the present become of our common efforts, we, the members of the International Workingmen's Association, who know of no frontiers, we send you, as pledge of indissoluble solidarity, the good wishes and the salutations of the workmen of France."

By July 16th, answers had come by masses of workmen from Brunswick, Chemnitz and Berlin, Germany. In Chemnitz a meeting of delegates representing 50,000 Saxon workers adopted unanimously a resolution to this effect: "In the name of the German Democracy, and especially of the workmen forming the Democratic Socialist party, we declare the present war to be exclusively dynastic... We are happy to grasp the fraternal hand stretched out to us by the workmen of France...Mindful of the watchword of the International Workingmen's Assoc.: Proletarians of all countries, unite, we shall never forget that the workmen of all countries are our friends and the despots of all countries our enemies."

France and Germany went to war, "and in a few weeks the German army had routed the French at Metz and Sedan. The Parisian working class was not told the news immediately. The government knew well what would happen. A few days later on September 4th, 1870 the masses found out and went into the streets in the hundreds of thousands. "We must defend Paris for now we must build the Republic." As the Prussian armies marched on Paris with the pressure of civil war on the ruling class, they formed the Government of National Defense. The Liberals: Jules Favre, Gambetta and Co., assumed office and answered some of the demands of the masses.

The masses demanded weapons for all who could handle them and so almost the whole able-bodied male population of Paris was enrolled in the National Guard. Sheep, cattle and other livestock were brought into the city from all around. A collection for the production of cannons was made among the masses. Food was grown in Paris parks and the city prepared itself for siege. The government of national defense chose Trochu, a Napoleonic sympathizer and general, to lead the defense of Paris. He made quite clear what he thought about the defense. He said, "I will try my best, but Paris can't be defended." During the siege the working class National Guard became more despondent with the government and the leadership of the Guard. So, throughout the 20 sections of Paris the Guard started to form their own committee. This became known as the Central Committee of the National Guard and started to wrest leadership from the bosses' flunkies. They soon became a most formidable group and automatically ran the National Guard from below.

With the Prussians around Paris the Govt. of National Defense, besides, sending out a few badly prepared sorties against the encircling army, did nothing but wait until hunger and thirst and cold would destroy the strength of the people of Paris. For the bosses this would mean a weakened working class. However, when this sellout government

capitulated owing Bismarck and Co. millions of francs, the working class' strength was not sapped; rather, their anger grew. Elections for a new assembly, to collect the millions, were called for with much haste so that many of the people of France did not know the situation in Paris and many did not vote. Thiers, the dwarf, became premier, and rubbed his hands in glee. As he later said about the working class takeover in Paris, "We do not want it to come to a fight, but if it does we'll hit them without mercy." Thus was the "representative government of the people" ready to deal with the masses. Meanwhile the real government of the workers, the Central Committee, arranged a silent, rigid, strong city for the, entering Prussians who soon breached forts on the north and west of Paris. The government fled Paris silently, feeling as they did the tremendous militancy of the Parisian workingmen. They fled to rural Versailles there to enact such bills as immediate payment of back rents from a weak and food-starved city. However, in their hasty dash, they had forgotten the arms caches and cannon.

March 18th at three in the morning the bosses' army marched stealthily into Paris to grab the cannons and other weapons of the workers paid for by the workers from subscriptions. It was a cold foggy morning. General Lecomte had to capture 171 guns in the Montmartre district. The army took its position in the morning, surrounding the weapons. The army was one of raw provincial levies. The young men stood awkwardly in the morning and had no real idea what their mission was. The working class women of Paris came to the communal pump in the morning for water, saw the soldiers and were very friendly with them. However, when they realized that they were there to take away the weapons, they begged the soldiers not to. After some time a crowd of women, children and National Guardsmen swept around the Montmartre hill breaking the troops' half-hearted resistance. Lecomte ordered his men to shoot into the crowd. There was silence. He ordered them again to shoot into the crowd. The troops turned the butts of their rifles and handed them to the people shouting "Long live the Republic!" Later Lecomte and another general were shot by the angry masses.

The Central Committee of the National Guard had taken over the Hotel de Ville (town hall) and ran up the red flag. The red flag was the blood of the workers that had been spilled for many years in fighting the ruling class -- it was the flag of revolution. It was to be the communist flag. The rest of the army of Thiers was chased out of the city. Those who wanted to join the workers' army stayed. The Central Committee's first proclamation to the people: "Citizens, the people of Paris have shaken off the yoke which it was attempted to impose upon them...Thanks be to all and may Paris and -France together lay the foundations of a republic acclaimed in all its consequences, the only government which will close forever the era of invasions and civil wars...The people of Paris is summoned in its sections to hold its communal elections."

Thousands of people were conscious that a great step forward had been made in the freeing of the working man from kings, princes, bankers and politicians. The Central Committee called for elections for the Commune on the 26th of March. In the meantime the Central Committee started to put the city in order. Most of the regular civil servants had run to Versailles, which meant the total disruption of most of the essential services of the city. Six thousand sick were abandoned in the hospitals. The post office was left. The cleaning of the city had not been done in months and there was much debris left over from the, siege. The sewers were overflowing. The Central Committee reorganized all of these services by using regular workingmen to fill these posts.

On the 25th, the day before the polls, the Central Committee put out its working class advice, "Citizens our mission is ended; we are about to yield our place in your Hotel de ville to your new representatives, your regular mandatories. ". If our advice' may claim some weight in your resolutions, permit your most zealous servants to tell you, before the ballot, what they expect of the day's voting. Do not lose sight of the fact that the men who will serve you best are those whom you choose from amongst yourselves, living your life, suffering your ills. Distrust the ambitious no less than the upstart: both consult only their own interests and always end by finding themselves indispensable. Distrust also talkers, incapable of translating words into action they sacrifice everything to a speech, an oratorical effect, an empty phrase. Avoid, too, those whom fortune has too highly favoured, for only too rarely is he who possesses

fortune disposed to look upon the workingman as his brother. ...In short, seek men of sincere conviction, men of the people, men resolute and active, men of sense and' recognized honesty. Give your preference to those who do not ostentatiously solicit your suffrages; true merit is modest, and it is for the voters to recognize their men."

Almost half the people who could vote, voted which was considered to be a very heavy vote. On the 28th, red flags were everywhere. The working class had Paris. The first act of the Commune was to smash the use of a standing army replacing it with the National Guard. Anyone who was fit to serve would join the National Guard. The bourgeois battalions of the National Guard were disbanded by the Commune. The bosses' army cannot stand without the workers' army. The Commune decreed that the Versailles government's orders were null and void, that the working class government of Paris would now administer. The next thing the Commune attacked was the binding of state and religion. From now on, religion would be a purely private matter.

"In their revolutionary practice the insurgents of the Paris Commune repudiated the views of Proudhonism and Blanquism on the question of the state. Instead of striving for a state of anarchy as advocated by Proudhonism, they established the state organs of the proletariat. Instead of building up a dictatorship of a few revolutionaries as advocated by Blanquism, they took the first steps in exercising the dictatorship of the proletariat by relying on the revolutionary enthusiasm and the initiative of the proletariat."

The Commune made 6,000 francs the highest salary of anyone who worked for it. This was to stop careerism and place hunting so that it would be close to a worker's wage. The rents that the Landlords and the Versailles government had tried to collect were suspended. Gambling was suppressed. The religious budget was suppressed and all clerical estates declared national properties. The Commune ordered both the old and the new guillotines to be burnt publicly on the 6th of April. The Commune pulled down the column of Bonaparte at the Place Vendôme, symbol of national chauvinism, -- bosses' militarism, and the negation of international rights. The Commune abolished political and professional oaths. The Commune elected Frankel, Hungarian-German member of the International saying that the flag of the commune was that of the universal republic and that foreigners could have a seat in it. All things pawned -- work tools, bedding, furniture, were redeemed free so that workers could work with their tools. The Commune gave orders to make no distinction between ladies called illegitimate or legitimate. The Commune passed a law that bosses' fines against workers' wages, deductions, etc. as punishments were to be abolished. The manufacturers had always controlled the judges, executors, and arbitrators. Many workshops that had been closed because of the depression were handed over to cooperative workmen's societies with some small indemnity for the capitalist deserters. Prostitutes were swept away and became workers. The hospitals were run by the Commune. In the schools, though no time was given for them to change the education, with the removal of religion, the school children breathed working class ideas. There were no multiple salaries for concurrently held posts. The Commune in ten short weeks virtually changed the complete idea of what a government was. Marx, in explaining in the Civil War In France, the necessity of this form of government in order to bring about the working class as the only class said this: "The multiplicity of interpretations to which the Commune has been subjected, and the multiplicity of interests which construed it in their favor, show that it was a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of government had been emphatically repressive. Its true secret was this. It was essentially a working class government, the product of the struggle of the producing against the appropriating class, the political form at last discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor. Except on this last condition, the Communal Constitution would have been impossibility and a delusion. The political rule of the producer cannot coexist with the perpetuation of his social slavery. The Commune was therefore to serve as a lever for uprooting the economical foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule. With labor emancipated, every man becomes a workingman, and productive labor ceases to be a class attribute."

In The Great Lessons of the Paris Commune Engels explained how the Commune made the first exploratory steps to prevent the degeneration of working class state power. They had a most profound and far-reaching significance.

Engels said: " Against this transformation of the state and the organs of the state from servants of society into masters of society -- an inevitable transformation in all previous states -- the Commune made use of two infallible means. In the first place, it filled all posts -- administrative, judicial and educational -- by election on the basis of universal suffrage of all concerned, subject to the right of recall at any time by the same electors. And, in the second place, all officials, high or low, were paid only the wages received by other workers. The highest salary paid by the Commune to anyone was 6,000 francs. In this was an effective barrier to place-hunting and careerism set up, even apart from the binding mandates to delegates to representative bodies which were added besides!

"The masses were the real masters in the Paris Commune. While the Commune was in being the masses were organized on a wide scale and they discussed important state matters within their respective organizations. Each day around 20,000 activists attended club meetings where they made proposals or advanced critical opinions on social and political matters great and small. They also made their wishes and demands known through articles and letters to the revolutionary newspapers and journals. This revolutionary enthusiasm and initiative of the masses was the source of the Commune's strength.

"Members of the Commune paid much attention to the views of the masses, attending their various meetings and studying their letters. The general secretary of the Commune's Executive Committee, writing to the secretary of the Commune, said: 'We receive many proposals every day, both orally and in writing; some are from individuals and some are sent in by the clubs or sections of the International. These are often excellent proposals and they should be considered by the Commune.' The Commune, in fact, seriously studied and adopted proposals from the masses. Many great decrees of the Commune were based on proposals by the masses, such as abolishing the system of high salaries for state functionaries, cancelling arrears of rent, instituting secular education, abolishing night work for bakers, and so on and so forth.

"The masses also carefully checked up on the work of the Commune and its members. One resolution of the Communal club of the third arrondissement said: The people are the masters...if men you have elected show signs of vacillation or stalling, please give them a push forward to facilitate the realization of our aim -- that is, the struggle for our own rights, the consolidation of the Republic, so that the cause of righteousness shall triumph. The masses criticized the Commune for not taking resolute measures against the counter-revolutionaries, deserters and renegades, for not carrying out immediately the decrees it passed, and for disunity among its members. For example, a letter from a reader appeared in the April 27 issue of *Le Pere Duchene* saying: 'Please give members of the Commune a jolt from time to time, ask them not to fall asleep, not to procrastinate in carrying out their own decrees. Let them make an end to their private bickering because only by unanimity of view can they, with greater power, defend the Commune!'"

The battle of the working class in Paris to bring to life socialism was mirrored by attempts in other cities of France (Marseilles, Toulouse, Narbonne, Lyons, etc.) -- to also bring this dictatorship of the working class to power with some success. However the bosses' government at Versailles played a waiting game until they had plenty of arms to attack Paris. The Commune made only one attempt to smash the bosses' government and this, because of no overall party leadership, failed.

Here we can point to the mistake of not having a party to lead the work -- plenty of democracy but not much centralism. While the central committee was the main tactician of the Revolution things moved forward fast. They should have maintained power longer.

The Versailles bosses' state attacked the workers' state with an army to be bought in taxes of the workers' sweat. Later, the German bourgeoisie releasing the prisoners of Sedan and Metz the army attacked and the workers thought

the Central Committee put out this exhortation to the working class:

Workers, do not be deceived. It is the great struggle. Parasitism and labour, exploitation and production are at death grips. If you are sick of vegetating in ignorance and squatting in the muck; if you want your children to be men gaining the reward of their labour, not a sort of animal trained for the workshop and for war, fertilizing with their sweat the fortune of an exploiter or pouring out their blood for a despot; if you want the daughters whom you cannot bring up and watch over as you would to be no longer instruments of pleasure in the arms of the aristocracy of wealth; if you want debauchery and poverty no longer to drive men to the police and women to prostitution; if finally you desire the reign of justice, workers, be intelligent. Arise! and let your stout hands fling beneath your feet the foul reaction. Citizens of Paris, merchants, industrialists, shopkeepers, thinkers, all of you that labour and seek in good faith the solution of social problems, the Central Committee adjures you to march united in progress. Take your inspiration from the destinies of our country and its universal genius.

The Central Committee firmly believes that the heroic, people of Paris is about to immortalize itself and regenerate the world. Long live the Republic! Long live the commune!"

The communards fought heroically but against unbelievable odds, when the bosses' army came to the main working class section of Paris, Belleville and near the Pere Lachaise Cemetery. The workers fought to a standstill.

Much of Paris was destroyed by the paraffins and gunnery of the bosses but Thiers, the bosses' head man, could look forward to an end of working class struggle. Of course this was bunk. The main lessons that a Marxist-Leninist party must remember from the commune are:

1. The need to smash the bosses' state completely and set up a workers' dictatorship. Had the commune been organized to pursue the retreating bosses' army to Versailles, destroy it and spread the revolt far beyond Paris, it would have been more able to maintain its power.
2. The need for the equality in pay between state functionaries and working people.
3. Immediate recall of leadership if they do not carry out workers' demands.
4. The need to destroy the bosses' standing army. All arms distributed to the masses who can guard their interests without being repressed.
5. The need for a communist party led by workers to organize class war.

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