

OCTOBER LEAGUE, MARXIST-LENINIST: PART I

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 17, 1975

Mr. McDONALD of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the October League, Marxist-Leninist—OL—is a nationally active, self-proclaimed Maoist Communist organization attempting to, in its own words, "lead the people to make a revolution." The OL asserts that its "main task is to build a new Communist party" which will lead the masses in that revolution.

A constituent disaffected because of what was termed opportunism, basic racism, lack of concern for racial problems in America, and the lack of even token democracy within this totalitarian Leninist organization, has made available to me as a good faith gesture a confidential internal OL document entitled "October League Manual on Open and Secret Work, May 1975."

This 28-page packet sets out for the OL cadres the methods by which the league is building an underground secret organization fully equipped for illegal revolutionary activities in the planned revolution. The October League Executive Committee states in the introduction:

At times we will be compelled to change our tactics in order to work under conditions of extreme illegality. . . . In the course of leading the people to make a revolution, many of us will have to sacrifice our lives. It is this that is the basis of all our efforts when we speak of security.

The secret October League manual is composed of previously circulated OL Organizational Department directives, new material produced for the manual, and reprints of Communist Party, U.S.A., documents and Comintern instructions dating from the 1930's.

The October League proclaims its conspiratorial and illegal revolutionary aims, page 3:

. . . our organization is out to overthrow capitalism. . . . we are democratic centralists. . . . [our basic units] are mainly factory based. . . . our members are cadre striving to become professional revolutionaries.

OL continues:

. . . we are now, as well as later under worse conditions, a mainly secret organization, capable of functioning in a clandestine manner. Though the degree of open work will increase or decrease according to conditions, the basic organization and apparatus always remain secret.

The OL Organizational Department describes the type of Communist party it is building in the following terms, page 4:

. . . the party we are building will be capable of functioning effectively while suffering the most ferocious attacks of the state. It will be able to recruit and train new members who are subject to the most brutal repression. Able to conduct propaganda and agitation under any conditions, it will be a party that leads the struggles of the people while withstanding the open terror of the

state. In short, it will be a fighting party, a party of insurrection. [emphasis added].

The building of a secret, illegal organization is not a task to be put off and dealt with later. It is a Marxist-Leninist principle that reflects our understanding of the state as an instrument of class dictatorship and our strategy for revolution. In what is to be done, Lenin pointed out the price revolutionaries must pay for their primitiveness, and stated that we must use relative legal periods to build up our secret work and dig deep among the masses.

Even now, during such a period of relative legality, it is necessary that the factory unit be basically secret * * *.

The October League founded in May 1972, as a merger of the Georgia Communist League—M-L—a group formed after the breakup of SDS in 1971 by persons associated with the Southern Student Organizing Committee—SSOC—and the RYM II faction of SDS, and the Los Angeles based October League developed by Mike Klonsky.

The OL has been visibly active in the Atlanta, Ga., area for several years. It first came to prominence when several OL cadre took leading agitational roles in the 7-week Mead Corp. wildcat strike in 1972 at Atlanta. Since then OL cadres have been involved with the Georgia Power Project—from which OL borrowed the "smokey factory" graphic on page 12 of "Open and Secret Work"—and the Southwide Coalition To Stop South African Coal.

The seriousness of the threat posed by this clandestine revolutionary organization is such, that before proceeding to an analysis of its known activities, I herewith insert the text of the "October League Manual on Open and Secret Work, May 1975," for the enlightenment of my colleagues.

This material includes the first three chapters of the manual, "Introduction," "The Historic Viewpoint of Communists," and "A Matter of Principle."

The text follows:

OCTOBER LEAGUE MANUAL ON OPEN AND SECRET WORK

INTRODUCTION

For as long as our organization has existed, we have understood the necessity of mastering the Bolshevik principle of combining open and secret, legal and illegal work. It is for this reason that we have endeavored to build the OL as a mainly secret organization, though at the same time, taking advantage of every possibility to have an open face to the masses.

The last several years have seen the growth of the OL, both in size and in our influence among the masses. Taking note of this, the imperialists, who seldom hesitate to strip away the mask of even "bourgeois" democracy when it suits their purposes, have increased their attacks on us. Sometimes the attacks take an open and legal form—such as the use of the state apparatus (FBI, police and courts). In some cases, these attacks are through "extra legal" means, such as the bombing of Unidos Bookstore, sending agents into our ranks to spy and disrupt. Whatever form such attacks may take in the future, we can certainly expect them to increase.

Facing these conditions, it is important that we implement the new security rules and policies with the political understanding of their purpose. The main purpose of all our security policies, rules, methods and procedures is: To preserve the organization

and its ties to the masses under any and all conditions. This is diametrically opposed to the concept of simply "preserving the organization" or "preserving our cadre." There is no use in having an OL or a party if we are unable to function in carrying out our line.

At times we will be compelled to change our tactics in order to work under conditions of extreme illegality. But we will never allow the imperialists to drive a fascist wedge between us and the people. In the course of leading the people to make a revolution, many of us communists will have to sacrifice our lives. It is this that is the basis of all our efforts when we speak of security. The greater our understanding of this, the less likely we are to commit right or "left" deviations.

The right error around security is in essence a bourgeois rather than a Marxist analysis of the state. People who hold this view think that our security policies are "cumbersome and unnecessary." They see the state as "neutral" rather than as an instrument of class dictatorship. This rightism manifests itself in several ways. Take for instance, the national security rules which were put out almost two years ago. In one district they were never distributed to the cadre, and in most districts the newer cadre have never seen them. They are almost never reviewed in the cells and discipline is seldom enforced against violations.

The "leftist" deviation, though less prevalent in our organization, often manifests itself in a bureaucratic approach, and is actually as harmful to security as the rightest errors. In one district a leading cadre tried to use "concern for security" as a shield to deflect criticism from himself and stifle the ideological struggle. Another example is in one district there is a policy that cadre can't call contacts from their home phone. The result of such a policy is to identify to the police or whoever is tapping the phone, who the OL cadre are, because the only people called outside of family would be other OL members. Compare this policy with a policy that OL cadre should call a large number of people and conduct normal conversations with everyone. Not only would the police have no idea who were cadre and who were not, there would be no small group of people for them to easily target in on.

Having said this it should be emphasized that both views disregard security. We hope that this packet will help raise the entire organization's consciousness around this question, as well as give specific guidance to our work. It should be recalled that because this question of whether to be basically an open organization or a secret organization so adequately reflects an understanding of the state, the Comintern made agreement with it a precondition for admission to its ranks. The whole organization should study this packet seriously and put it into practice as a step toward protecting our work now and in the future.

THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE.

THE HISTORIC VIEWPOINT OF COMMUNISTS

Since our main task is to build a new communist party, we must deepen our understanding about the kind of organization we are building now and in the future, particularly around the questions of open and secret, legal and illegal work. The struggle around organization is not just a question of style or tactics for a given period, but is a struggle between two political lines. Our approach to this question determines not only how we function under repression and illegality, but also how we function today, in a relatively legal period.

There are basic differences on questions of organization that distinguish us from the revisionists, social-democrats and other op-

portunists. Basically it is this: their organizations are suited to carry out reform struggles under capitalism; our organization is out to overthrow capitalism. While they have bureaucratic structures at the top, and ultrademocracy at the lower levels, we are democratic centralists. Their basic units are election district or community based, while ours are mainly factory based. The majority of their members are inactive or poorly trained, while our members are cadre, striving to become professional revolutionaries. And just as important, they build their organization to function only in an open and legal fashion, while we are now, as well as later under worse conditions, a mainly secret organization, capable of functioning in a clandestine manner. Though the degree of open work will increase or decrease according to conditions, the basic organization and apparatus always remain secret.

"... the organization of revolutionaries must consist first, foremost, and mainly, of people who make revolutionary activity their profession. That is why I speak of organizations of revolutionaries, meaning revolutionary Social Democrats..."

"... in view of this common feature of the members of such an organization, all distinctions as between workers and intellectuals, and certainly distinctions of trade and profession, must be utterly obliterated. Such an organization must of necessity be not too extensive, and as secret as possible..." Lenin, *What Is To Be Done*.

Unlike the revisionist CPUSA, SWP, NAM and others of their ilk, the party we are building will be capable of functioning effectively while suffering the most ferocious attacks of the state. It will be able to recruit and train new members while subject to the most brutal repression. Able to conduct propaganda and agitation under any conditions, it will be a party that leads the struggles of the people while withstanding the open terror of the state. In short, it will be a fighting party, a party of insurrection.

The building of a secret, illegal organization is not a task to be put off and dealt with later. It is a Marxist-Leninist principle that reflects our understanding of the state as an instrument of class dictatorship and our strategy for revolution. In *What Is To Be Done*, Lenin pointed out the price revolutionaries must pay for their primitiveness, and stated that we must use relative legal periods to build up our secret work and dig deep among the masses.

Even now, during such a period of relative legality, it is necessary that the factory unit be basically secret if it is to maintain its continuity and contact with the workers. We are not immune to attack or suppression. For some time our organization has been under surveillance by local and federal agencies. The FBI "visits" our cadre, their families, friends and employers. They send agents to infiltrate for the purposes of spying and provocation.

Some time ago, a cadre who has since left the organization wrote a paper criticizing our line of building mainly secret organization. He felt that for us to do so was to "hinder the mass work and stifle the internal life of the organization." He viewed secrecy as being cumbersome and unnecessary in the immediate circumstances; something to put off until later when we had established firmer ties with the masses.

But it is this same line of reasoning that encourages passivity and retreat when our "legality" and "democratic rights" are torn away.

In fact, it is only through secret organization and conspiratorial methods that we can ensure that the organization's ties and contacts with the masses remain unbroken; that the organization will be in a position to advance correct tactics and methods of struggle under the most repressive conditions.

At the same time this comrade was criticizing our line on building a secret organization, he was urging us not to sell The Call at a certain factory where we regularly encountered difficulties with a few reactionary elements. One day he underestimated dangers we face from the state and the next day he urged us into hiding from the masses! Neither course will do for us.

Preserving our organization from the state is one thing. Doing so, while at the same time continuing to function in our mass work and recruitment is another. What we must master is hiding from the state while at the same time not being hidden from the masses. Communists understand that conspiracy is not an end in itself, or merely being able to hide a leading group. It is a method—a tool—of maintaining our ties and organizational leadership of the masses.

Building along secret lines does not mean sapping the life of the organization—either internal or external. Just the opposite is true. It means conducting a struggle against bureaucratic centralism and strengthening the initiative of the whole organization, particularly the cells.

How do we strengthen the initiative of the organizations? It is not a question of lower bodies functioning autonomously, a problem we currently face. First, it is a question of strengthening centralism. The entire organization must function with iron will and unity, and this can only happen by being consolidated around Marxism-Leninism and our political program.

Our weakness in this area is illustrated by the Dump Nixon campaign. When the directive for this campaign went out, all the cells and committees at every level should have studied and discussed it in order to implement it in their particular factory, community or other area of work. This is what is meant by putting politics in command.

Instead, in a number of districts, the DO either shelved the directive or simply turned it over to a cadre in charge of united front work, without the DC or any other units having a discussion or a plan for how the campaign was to be carried out locally.

On the other hand, democracy and self-initiative of the units must be expanded together with strengthening centralism, because the factory and other cells are the key links of the organization to the masses.

"The essence of illegality does not lie in hiding a small group of people from the enemy, but lies in carrying on uninterrupted mass work, and in having constant influx of new help from the masses—this with the help of a strongly hidden organization."—"On The Question of Illegal Work," The Communist International, 12/1/1933, p. 854

There are three components of developing the self-initiative of the cells. Most important is having a firm grasp of Marxism-Leninism and the line of the organization. This will enable the unit to quickly get its bearing and act in the spirit of the organizational line and policies, even if cut off from higher levels.

Second: Our practical contact with the masses must be strengthened, through trade unions and other organizations, so that the cell is able to rapidly mobilize the workers to follow our program. This also includes raising the political consciousness of the workers and drawing a group of sympathizers around us to help carry out the work. An example of this would be a CALL distribution network that could clandestinely distribute literature and other materials throughout a factory.

Third: It is a question of organization and apparatus. The cells must master secret methods and techniques, from recruiting new members, arranging meeting places, producing literature from the center, to produc-

ing its own agitation, development of codes, etc.

In concluding, there are two points to be made. First, we must tighten up the organization by strengthening democratic centralism. Second, this will give the lower bodies, especially the cells, the political understanding necessary to implement the decisions and policies of the organization without having to go higher to get advice on every detail. This will give us an organization in which the cells, even under the open terrorist dictatorship of the imperialists, could function even when cut off from leadership or from the organization as a whole.

The question of open and secret is a question of principle. It is a part of the organization's line on party building. To liquidate the need for building a mainly secret organization is to abandon Marxism-Leninism and our task of party building, and can only lead to ultimately abandoning the masses.—Reprinted from Spark No. 4 1074, Organizational Department, October League.

A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE

The following excerpts are taken from two articles first appearing in the Communist International (#8, May 15, 1932 and #9, December 1, 1933) and from the book *The Bolshevization of the Communist Parties of the Capitalist Countries by Means of Overcoming the Social-Democratic Traditions* by O. Platnitski, head of the Organization Bureau of the Communist International and from other people.

i.

... The Social-Democratic and Socialist Parties which already existed as mass parties in the principle countries abroad in the 90's, adapted themselves to the existing regimes and legislations. Before the world war the political struggle conducted by the Social-Democratic Parties was a struggle for reforms in the field of social legislation and for universal suffrage, the struggle itself being carried on chiefly by means of the ballot.

While they did not reject in words the ultimate goal of the struggle of the proletariat, socialism; in reality they did nothing of a serious practical nature to prepare for and wage the revolutionary battles, to train for this purpose the necessary cadres, to give the party organizations a revolutionary policy, to break through the bourgeois legality in the process of struggle, etc.—a parliamentary majority, in order to then "inaugurate socialism."

ii.

... The illegal condition of the Bolshevik Party (in Russia) as per the reasons given, compelled it to establish Party groups in the factories, where it was easier and more convenient to work. The Party structure of the Bolsheviks thus began with the factories, and this yielded excellent results both during the years of reaction, after the February Revolution, and particularly during the October Revolution of 1917, the civil war and the great construction of socialism. During the reaction following upon 1908 when in places the local party committees and the party leadership (CC) were broken up, there still remained in the factories and mills a certain base, small party cells which continued the work...

... Abroad... the main task pursued by the Socialist Parties was to gain electoral victories, to fight by means of the ballot, and the Party organization was therefore built along residential lines, which made it easier to organize the Party members for the election campaign in the respective election districts.

... The Communist Parties immediately after their formation took over the organizational forms of the Social-Democrat Parties, because they did not know of, they were

not familiar with, the peculiar Bolshevik forms and methods of Party structure . . .

iii.

That the absence of Party organizations in the factories strongly affects the work of the Communist Parties is shown by such an example, for instance, as that of Germany in 1923, when the Party failed to utilize the revolutionary situation for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, this being due in no small degree not only to the absence of a truly revolutionary leadership, but also the absence of extensive and firm connections with the workers in the factories . . .

iv.

The Bolshevik Party knew only one form of lower organization, the cell in the factory, office, army barracks, etc. Taking into consideration the conditions abroad, the Comintern was forced to introduce an additional form of organization—the street cells. They were introduced for such members of the Party as housewives, small artisans, etc. . . . But instead of making it into a subsidiary organization, the Communist Parties (e.g. USA) made the street cell the predominant organization. They began to create street cells on such a scale that they embraced 80%, and sometimes even more, of the Party members . . .

v.

The Parties in the principle capitalist countries are legal, but the cells must be illegal. Unfortunately they do not succeed in working unnoticed. The employers and their spies detect the revolutionary workers and throw them out of the factory without meeting any protest on the part of the reformist trade unions, or on the contrary, the latter frequently act themselves as the initiator of the expulsion of the Communists from the factories. But inasmuch as the work of the Communists in the factories is weak, as a rule, the workers do not defend the discharged Communists (though there have been opposite cases, of course). Under these conditions the factory cells do nothing in most cases, or if they display the least activity, their members are thrown out of the factories, owing to failure to conceal even their insignificant work. There are frequently also cases when the Communists are thrown out of the factories even when they do nothing there, simply because of their membership in the Communist Party . . . The Communist Parties suffer very much from their inability to conduct conspirative work in the factories, losing members and revolutionary workers, through their expulsion from the factories . . .

vi.

It is possible and necessary to carry on real Party work connecting the Party slogans with the very every-day struggle in the factories, without calling oneself a member of the Party or cell. It is always possible to find appropriate forms for this . . . In short, everything in the spirit of the decisions of the cell and Party, though in form there is no shouting about it; it may even appear "innocent."

vii.

Underestimation of the importance of the struggle against terror, of all forms of this kind, the mass fight against provocation—is fence of the CP and the revolutionary organizations, organizational measures for the safety and protection of the Party organizations, the mass fight against provocation—is unquestionably a Social-Democratic hang-over in our ranks. The basis of underestimation of the importance of the fight against terror, of the adaptation of the Party organization to illegality is legalism, the glossing over of the role of the bourgeois state as a class apparatus of violence.

Whenever the Party is obliged to assume illegality—which is determined by the concrete relation between our forces and those of the enemy—it must do so with a fight in every section of its mass work, for then the Party does not become isolated from the struggle of the masses, but, on the contrary, maintains live contact with them in illegality, maintaining a continuity in struggle.

viii.

The basic difference between legal and illegal methods of work does not lie only in conspiracy. It lies in a different system of mass work; in the cohesiveness of the party; in its ability to tie itself up with the masses, and find a road to the masses through the hardest conditions of terror. Underground work demands a different structural system; different systems of leadership, of connections, of cadres, different methods of recruitment and of holding new party members; different methods of publicity and of distribution of publications. Thus, the essence of the thing is not only conspiracy itself, but the task of conspiracy is to make all this work easier, and to secure its inviolability.

ix.

Every experienced underground worker knows that in underground work the more responsible comrades must carry out a number of technical-organizational tasks independently, and search out technical resources for themselves. Lordly disdain of this work is especially peculiar to comrades who have little underground experience, and legalistic and bureaucratic habits . . .

The strength of the Bolsheviks, before the Revolution, as well as during the civil war, lay in the fact that their local cadres were able to orient themselves at once in any situation, and further to take the correct position independently, without communication with the center. All CPs must attain such a condition . . .

A party which has strong section committees can withstand the most brutal blows of terror with the least losses; for the basic losses resulting from the blows of terror are not so much on account of arrests, as on account of the loss of separate organizations and party members because of lost connections. The section committee is the leader of the most important acting link of the party—the cells; which carry on direct work with the masses. It is therefore, through its very nature, the decisive link in the system of leadership (especially in the illegal parties, and at critical moments) . . .

The aim of the entire organizational policy of the Party, of its entire system of leadership, advancement and education of cadres, is: maximum development of the mass work of the units, and especially of the factory cells. The work of this basis of the party, of these directly fighting links, which penetrate into the thick of the masses—this work determines the work of the party as a whole. The cell is not only a lower administrative division; the party unit is the basic lever of the party's influence on the masses. Every party directive remains a mere empty sound if it is not brought down to the units, if the unit is not mobilized to carry it out . . .

x.

The cell is the part of the party which has advanced furthest into the masses, but it is on no account the most vulnerable point of the party organization. On the contrary, when it works skillfully, the cell becomes the link of the party that is most protected by the masses. A cell which carries on daily mass work surrounds itself with a layer of non-party activities, and has its own system of transmission in the working masses. The scope of the mass work of the cell degrades on its ability to develop the activity of the cadre of non-party workers whom it leads . . .

xi.

Illegality is not something set and absolute. The extent to which the party must go underground depends on the correlation of forces, on the activity of the party, and on the party's ability to get to the masses through the barriers of terror. Only a sectarian party, which is isolated from the masses, can be driven completely underground. . . .

Conspiracy is a method of preserving party secrets; it changes in accordance with the concrete situation. But the basic thing under all conditions is—the strictest discipline in the work, and a sense of responsibility for the work that is being carried on, and for the preservation of the party organization. Responsibility in conspiratorial work must stand on a level with responsibility for carrying out the party line. Neglect of conspiracy must not go unpunished (regardless of who the guilty person is!!). Regrettably, we meet with this phenomenon at every step; it is often the most responsible comrades who give the most glaring examples of lack of conspiracy. Most often, when they violate conspiracy, comrades offer the excuse that they were in a dilemma: they were forced either to give up carrying on the work or to violate conspiracy. In other cases, inactivity is "justified" by the requirements of conspiracy. Both come to the mistaken conclusion that conspiracy throttles the work of the party. If that is so then why is conspiracy necessary at all? In actual fact, that there is no situation where it is not possible to work both actively and conspiratorially. In the first case we have a typical manifestation of petty bourgeois looseness and flippancy, screened under personal "heroism," and in the second—simply cowardice and opportunism.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

HON. JOHN BRECKINRIDGE

OF KENTUCKY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, June 17, 1975

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. Mr. Speaker, due to the hearings held by the Subcommittee on Tobacco of the House of Representatives Agriculture Committee held in Bristol, Tenn., and Lexington, Ky., I was unable to be here for part of the proceedings on H.R. 25, the Energy Conservation and Conversion Act of 1975. Had I been here I would have voted "aye" or "nay" to the following amendments which were considered by the House:

TITLE III OF H.R. 6860

Fisher and others amendment to section 311, "aye."
O'Hara amendment to section 311, "nay."
Sharp amendment to section 311, "aye."
Tsongas amendment to section 312, "nay."
Guyer amendment to section 322, "nay."
Solarz amendment to section 331, "aye."
Gibbons amendment to section 331, "nay."
Jacobs amendment to section 331, "nay."
Goldwater amendment to section 332, "nay."

hopelessly misguided legislation which is intended to cure this Nation of all its ills.

During the past 6 months, as a Member of the National Legislature, I have witnessed repeated efforts by many of my colleagues to place the Federal Government in the role of the grand inquisitor, that omnipotent individual that knows all that is good makes all subservient to its wishes in the name of goodness and righteousness.

These claims do not stem from my imagination. In the fields of health care, education, consumer credit, agriculture, and flood control the Congress is daily trying to expand its influence into the private sector. There is a credit reporting bill, for example, the ultimate purpose of which is to maximize availability of credit for national priority uses by having the Government determine when and for what purposes the Nation's banks should loan out money. S. 200, a Senate bill designed to establish an independent consumer agency to protect and serve the interests of consumers, for example, would place the Government in the position of deciding when farmers are paying a "fair and equitable" price for every single item they might use in their business. These items range from seed to farm equipment. The language is simple, but the potential affects of such legislative language are not. Nowhere are "fair and equitable" defined; nowhere is it stated why the Congress and the Federal bureaucracy should go into the farming business. Nowhere is there mention of all the contingencies on which the supply of necessary goods to the farmer depends. Nor does there seem to be any kind of recognition of a free market system.

Yet this is not all. Just recently, an amendment to the recently-considered energy legislation called for the creation of a Federal agency to buy and allocate imported oil. On what basis would the Government determine just where and to whom that oil should go?

All these actions are rooted in the past, in the Social Security Act of 1935 which, by setting 65 as the retirement age at which individuals could receive social security, attempted to allocate jobs to the young by removing the elderly from the labor force. Now that law was in response to a national emergency and there is no doubt that in times of distress, Government may have to take drastic action. But when such action becomes institutionalized into laws and Federal agencies which become impossible to manage, we become one step closer toward giving up personal choice to the whims and the fluctuations of the Federal Government.

The time has come when we must say that enough is enough. It is time to admit that Government has caused as many problems as it has attempted to remedy, that the Government does not have all the solutions to the problems of individuals, that the Government is not omnipotent and has no sure-fire way to determine what is good for its citizens and what is not. Our Government was intended by the Founding Fathers to allow all to participate, so that one could

not dominate. Well, the day is approaching when the one, in the form of a vast and uncontrollable Federal bureaucracy, will be beyond the reach of the individual, the Congress, and the President. Its wishes will become ours, and its decisions will become our masters. Its notion of goodness will drown out the cries of those of us who are still willing to admit that every citizen has something to say and something to contribute, and that every citizen must have the freedom to pursue his own destiny.

OCTOBER LEAGUE, MARXIST-LENINIST: PART II

HON. LARRY McDONALD

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. McDONALD of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, the October League, Marxist-Leninist—OL—is a Maoist Communist organization which became publicly active in my State in 1972, following the merger of the OL and the Georgia Communist League, a small Marxist-Leninist revolutionary group composed primarily of former SDS and Southern Student Organizing Committee activists after the disintegration of Students for a Democratic Society in 1969.

Organized and led by Mike Klonsky, son of long-term Communist Party, U.S.A. functionary Robert Klonsky, the organization of the October League is also reported to date to post-SDS 1969. Headquartered in Los Angeles, the OL publishes a monthly "political newspaper," the Call, from Post Office Box 2278, Bell Gardens, Calif. 90201.

Herewith submitted for the consideration of my colleagues are chapters 4 and 5—"Make Every Factory a Fortress," and "Rules of the October League"—from the "October League Manual on Open and Secret Work," May 1975:

MAKE EVERY FACTORY A FORTRESS

Since our Second Congress, the October League has made continuous advances. But, as with all steps forward, new problems arise and short-comings are revealed. One of these is how to combine open and secret work.

Many comrades have asked, "How can we keep our organization well-hidden from the imperialists and at the same time bring Communist leadership to the masses?" Bolshevik methods of organization provide the answer to this contradiction.

This article will look at the work of our factory cells and show its role in insuring unbroken ties with the masses—no matter what kind of terror we face. It is a summary of investigation and study by the National Security Commission. We hope it will provide both theoretical and practical guidance for solving these problems.

TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE!

Today, US communists enjoy a period of unprecedented legality. Unlike comrades who are building parties in other countries, our newspaper has not yet been outlawed and neither has our organization. This is because the imperialists have suffered many setbacks at home and around the world.

With the sharpening crisis, excellent conditions exist for communists to lead the

fight-back and win thousands of new fighters to our final aims.

But more than once, our Chinese comrades have warned that "While you may have legality today, things can change overnight!"

We must take the fullest advantage of these conditions. First, we must use this time well to dig deeper roots among the masses. They are our first line of defense! At the same time, we must take full advantage of this legal period to build our illegal and secret work.

The key to this lies in strengthening our basic work in the factories and training our shop cells in open and secret work.

In certain cases, "security" has been used as an excuse for economism and a refusal to bring communism to the workers. Inactivity is justified. "If we are too bold, we will lose our jobs and our factory unit will be out the door."

Side by side exists a view that "security is a hindrance to our work". The extra precautions and careful planning which secret work requires are said to be unnecessary and "dogmatic".

Both views capitulate to the ruling class. Neither will do. Secret work is necessary only for the purpose of maintaining our contacts with the masses (not for protecting individuals. On the other hand, without secret work, we will have no hope whatsoever under severe repression.

Especially under favorable conditions today, we can certainly resolve these problems. There are four basic points which each factory unit must give attention to:

- (1) Recruitment.
- (2) Division of Labor.
- (3) Building a Network of Sympathizers.
- (4) Developing the Self-Reliance of the Unit.

RECRUITMENT

In many factories we still have only a handful of comrades. As the saying goes, "the best defense is a good offense." The bolder our communist agitation and recruitment, the less chance of them wiping out our units.

Many comrades have already "previously recommended themselves" to the police through past activities. This makes our units who are mainly composed of former intellectuals particularly vulnerable. The more workers, the smaller the percentage of well-known comrades. We must eliminate the idea that the majority of comrades should appear as "middle workers." Unless we become bold in recruiting, we will never escape this vicious circle.

At the same time, shop cells must be organized secretly and strengthen their security. Meetings should never be held in the homes of open members. Phone calls to comrades should not be noticeably different than conversations with contacts.

DIVISION OF LABOR

(1) Open Members: There should not be more than one or two of this type of person in the plant (they shouldn't be the majority). These people should be very active in doing socialist propaganda as well as mass work. In the past, this type of comrade had to suffer the consequences of being a communist but we have not utilized their open status for doing work. While they should be known as a communist to the progressive workers, they should maintain the position of "prove it" or "that's not the issue" with the backward or reactionary workers. They are not "spokesmen" for the OL, in the sense of being listed as such in our newspaper or formally representing the OL. Every unit of 3-4 comrades should have one "open member" like this.

(2) Secret Members: Most of the members should be in this classification. What is important to stress here is that these people

should not be "middle workers". As much as the advanced workers in the plant, these comrades should carry out the mass shop and political campaigns of the organization (caucus work, Anti-Repression Day, etc.). They should conceal the fact they are communists from almost all workers. At the same time, they can open up to one or several trusted workers with the approval of the cell. The question of their buying or secretly selling THE CALL depends on the conditions.

(3) Open Spokesmen: This is an individual who is known to everyone as a member of the OL, who is identified as such in our press and who may formally represent us. This type of cadre should only be used where we have a large base of strength and a large unit (we have a few such comrades). This classification requires the approval of the district committee.

(4) Closed Cadre: This is a member who is being "held in reserve" or being used for special work. They do not actively participate in campaigns but appear as just a middle or even sometimes a backward worker. They are not open to anyone and they don't buy the Call.

These last two classifications will be used more in the future as our work develops and we have larger units with a higher division of labor. All units must be sure that each member understands their status and what type of activity it requires.

NETWORK OF SYMPATHIZERS

The cell is the part of the party which has advanced furthest into the masses. This makes it the least vulnerable to attack. A cell which carries on daily mass work surrounds itself with a network of non-party sympathizers who can become a transmission belt to the masses. It is through this network of sympathizers that we can initiate our actions, recruit new comrades, and protect our units.

By sympathizers, we mean people who we can "depend on" to mobilize for campaigns, to buy and sell THE CALL to other workers, who contribute financially to the OL and our mass organizations.

Little attention has been paid to developing this network in a systematic way. If tomorrow we were outlawed from selling THE CALL outside the factory gates, most units would be in a fix because they have not established any secret distribution network with these sympathizers.

After identifying sympathetic workers, they must be developed politically through consistent discussions, home visits, and mass work. Consistency is important. Systematic check-up is needed and as the list increases, more sympathizers should be recruited to our ranks. Only if we surround ourselves with workers who will help carry on work and follow communist initiative can we really speak of being rooted in the shops.

"MAKE EVERY FACTORY OUR FORTRESS"

This was the slogan raised by Lenin in his famous article Letter to a Comrade on Organizational Tasks. The center of gravity was the large factories. Because their basic units were well entrenched among the workers there, they were able to maintain unbroken connections with the masses even under periods of severe terror and repression.

Any Bolshevik campaign began in the factories and from there allies among the peasants and intellectuals were built. Whether they were fighting for an 8-hour day, for women's emancipation or against the Czar's government, it was the industrial workers who took the lead. From the plants they streamed out to demonstrations or to the barricades.

Why are factory units better suited for our tasks and for carrying on secret work? Marx wrote in the Communist Manifesto:

"Of all classes that stand face to face with

the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class.

"Modern industry has converted the little workshop of the patriarchal master into the great factory of the capitalists. Masses of laborers, crowded into the factories, are organized like soldiers."

It is in the factories that the common interests of the workers is most clear. The shop brings together workers of all nationalities and from every different community under one roof.

As for insuring secret organization, the factory workers labor and struggle side-by-side. Because they know each other well, agents can better be sniffed out and the most dedicated fighters can also be found at the points of production.

The ruling class has already increased its efforts to isolate us. Much of this will be a hundred times more difficult if we firmly root the majority of our units in the shops. Even if they arrest or murder many of our leaders, work will certainly continue. Especially with lay-offs we must redouble our efforts.

MASTER OPEN AND SECRET WORK

But factory units alone will not be sufficient. Each of our shop cells must master secret and open work. The shop unit is at all times basically secret, its open face taking different forms depending on strength and concrete conditions. Too often, comrades have thrown up their hands when faced with contradictions.

SELF-RELIANCE

An important aspect of building an insurrectionary organization, capable of operating under any conditions, is developing basic units which are self-reliant. We must prepare for the possibility of losing links between the cells and districts or national leadership for periods of time.

The most important task is developing the units politically. It is here that we must train our cadre and our cells must become "living schools for Marxism." Our goal is to develop seriousness of study and grasp of line so that even if cut off, a unit can quickly get its political bearings under difficult conditions. Right now, the units should utilize this pre-Congress period and the Marxist Education Campaign to make advances in political self-reliance.

Self-reliance must also be developed organizationally. Finding secret meeting places, developing the ability to print leaflets on their own are cell responsibilities. One example: that units could use as an indicator of self-reliance is that of a leaflet:

(a) Could your unit apply the general line of the OL to a political event (such as Nixon's resignation) and write a communist leaflet on this?

(b) Are you closely enough connected with the workers to be able to secretly distribute it in the plants and through that to the masses?

(c) Could you find a way to secretly produce it and raise the necessary funds from sympathizers to do so?

CONCLUSION

These are a few of the lessons we have learned by summing up our open and secret work in the factories over the past few years. These policies have been adopted by the Executive Committee and should be studied along with the other documents in this packet.

RULES OF THE OCTOBER LEAGUE

1. Internal Life of the Organization:

Discussion around an individual's or cell's practical work should go on only in the cell, or with other members of the cell, or the District Committee [DC], District Organizer [DO] or other higher levels of leadership. All discussion and ideological struggle must be

principled. No gossiping, rumor-mongering, factionalism or cliquishness. No contact is allowed between cadre of different districts, unless authorized by the Executive Committee. Any violations of democratic centralism by carrying internal discussion or struggle outside the ranks of the organization is grounds for immediate expulsion.

2. Secrecy of the Organization:

It is the District Committee and the cell that determines who is an open member or an open spokesman. Anyone not so designated is absolutely forbidden to admit membership.

Every member of the OL will be instructed as to what to do in case of arrest. (Who to call, who not to call.) Cadre are never under any circumstances to divulge organizational information, identify other members, or sign any confessions or papers.

If a cadre is ever visited by the FBI, police or other investigators, the cadre should say ONLY, "I have nothing to say to you."

Cadre should never let them into their houses, or tell their names, nor answer any of their questions. Cadre should never let themselves be caught off-guard, or think that such investigators can be "outsmarted" by asking questions or leading them on.

3. Documents:

All internal papers—SPARKS, directives, etc.—must be kept together in a lockable container that is easily transported (like a suitcase or metal box). This container must be kept out of sight. This will enable the cadre to quickly locate all such documents in the event it is necessary to hide them or destroy them, as well as keeping the papers from being scattered everywhere, where a visitor to the house would have a chance to see or read them.

No documents, notes or papers should be retained beyond the time they are needed. They should be turned into the cell leader or destroyed. Also, no one should xerox or otherwise reproduce any internal papers, or show them to anyone outside the organization unless the District Organizer approves.

4. Firearms:

Every member, or at least every household must have a reliable firearm and an ample quantity of ammunition. A shotgun is the recommended weapon, because they are the least regulated, most difficult to deal with ballistically and easiest to fire and maintain.

These weapons, which are for home use, should be legal—meaning that they must not be stolen and must be registered if required by law. Only the DO may make exceptions to this rule.

Every cadre should be trained in the fundamentals about firearms and marksmanship. This is a task of the cell, but if no one in the cell is capable of teaching the other cadre, the cell should request help from the District Organizer. Special attention should be paid to women comrades who are traditionally not trained in this area.

5. Use of the Telephone:

Never, repeat never, talk about these things over the phone:

- Finances of the organization.
- Leaders of the organization (exposing the chain of command).
- The distribution network.
- Internal political, or personal contradictions.

E. Others secrets—such as how many members or units, secret members, meetings, etc.

The best way to protect the organization when using the phone is to surround ourselves with sympathizers and contacts, just as we do in the factories. Making a wide variety of calls, using the same tone and manner with cadre and non-cadre alike, with the bulk of calls being to non-cadre, is the best way to deny information to the police.

Of course, secret members should discuss

only mass work on the phone, but a code might be used to cancel a meeting if it was not obviously a code. There should never be any arguing over the telephone.

Open members should limit their calls to secret members as much as possible. This will help us build the OL as a more secret organization by helping to keep recently-recruited members secret. A certain number of secret members should never be called by open members.

Open members can discuss some organizational business if it does not violate the above.

All phone numbers should be kept together in a safe place in code. Memorize as many as possible. Never take a phone book, or anything else you don't want the police to have, when you go to see THE CALL, or to a demonstration or when there is any possibility of encountering the police.

6. Meetings:

Open members' houses should not be used for meetings. Meetings should not take place out-of-doors. Meetings should take place mainly in the private residences, but this does not mean only in the homes of OL members. If a cell has built up a broad network of sympathizers, it may be possible to have meetings in a friend's house when they are away, or in their basement, etc.

Great care must be taken when going to and from meetings. Cadre should always check to see if they are being followed. If so, they should try to lose the tail, but should not go to the meeting unless they are certain. Arrival times and departure times should be staggered. Do not park near the meeting place. Make sure no police or other suspicious cars are parked outside. If there are, drive away and phone the house from a pay phone to make sure all is well.

If a cell is forced to use a motel room or other public place (church, YMCA) for a meeting, it should be paid for with cash and no phone calls should be made from there.

7. Travel:

When a cadre leaves town, either for vacation or business, he or she should check with the cell leader or DO in advance.

8. Personal Conduct:

In every aspect of personal conduct, comrades should be expected to put the organization first. OL members should live modestly and neatly. Members must strive to keep personal relationships principled so that they strengthen—not weaken—commitment to the struggle. Our goal is to adopt the best characteristics of the working class and keep the prestige of the organization high in the eyes of the masses. Nothing should separate us from the masses but our advanced aims.

Specifically, the following is forbidden:

- a. using dope, including marijuana.
- b. public drunkenness.
- c. promiscuity.
- d. homosexuality.
- e. fighting or arguing in public (with other cadre or members); when attacked:
 1. self-defense is the general rule.
 2. it should be reported.
3. retaliation and protection of individual cadre should be supervised.
- f. petty theft, such as shoplifting, or other crimes.

9. Security Officers:

Every cell must have a security officer. The main responsibility of the security officer is to do political work around security.

Other responsibilities include:

- a. explaining the rules and policies to new members.
- b. report violations of the rules to the cell for criticism and discipline.
- c. to receive reports from other cell members in case of security problems.
- d. periodically to sum up and evaluate cell's practice around security.
- e. initiate discussion and self-criticism with individuals.

WEST HILLS HOSPITAL—A MONUMENT TO HEALTH

HON. BARRY M. GOLDWATER, JR.

OF CALIFORNIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. Speaker, all the Members of this body have been deeply concerned about the health care of the American public. The quality of health care and its cost have been of particular concern in California during the past few months as a result of the rising cost of malpractice insurance for doctors.

In the middle of all the discussion is the institution of the hospital, and its relationship to the future of health care. The role of the hospital is vital to a community. Its importance as a center for emergency care has increased. With the advent of new devices for communication, it has become more effective in saving lives. The private hospital has done an excellent job in many instances in taking an active role in the community.

I am happy to take this opportunity to point with pride to one such public spirited hospital in my congressional district, West Hills Hospital in Canoga Park, Calif. West Hills Hospital and its administrator, Saul Gofarb, can serve as an example of the interest of the private sector far beyond that of a simple profitmaking business. Their involvement with senior citizen health care and other public concerns should be noted. I think they can serve as an example for other institutions around the country.

On June 29, my colleague JAMES CORMAN and I will participate in the dedication of a new \$15 million addition to this highly innovative facility. West Hills Hospital is a source of pride and security for residents throughout the west San Fernando Valley.

This 180,000 square foot, 236-bed facility stands as a monument to the preservation of health and the enrichment of life for all people. Here, more than 200 doctors representing 24 medical specialties are assisted by a nursing staff of the highest caliber. A total of 23 separate departments render direct patient care as well as behind-the-scenes support.

West Hills' commitment is evident in the threefold philosophy of internally assessing the quality of its care; continually educating its already-skilled staff in the newest procedures; and placing superior patient care far ahead of all other considerations.

West Hills sponsors a licensed vocational nursing school and provides clinical experience for students who are training to be operating room technicians and respiratory therapists. Numerous other educational activities range from classes in health care advances for nurses to the allied health program, focusing on the efficiency of support functions for medical and nursing departments. These and countless other programs have helped West Hills Hospital earn accreditation by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals and the California Medical Association.

West Hills Hospital has established and maintains the highest quality in standards of professional health care, but all efforts are directed toward the goal of offering the very finest patient care. This goal is reached daily by everyone at West Hills Hospital, and it is with pride and pleasure that I commend this hospital to my colleagues.

CAPITOL HILL WOMEN'S CAUCUS RELEASES JOB DISCRIMINATION STUDY

HON. BELLA S. ABZUG

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Wednesday, June 18, 1975

Ms. ABZUG. Mr. Speaker, I wish to call to the attention of my colleagues a study recently released by the Capitol Hill Women's Political Caucus entitled "Sexists in Salary? A Study of Differences in Salary by Sex Among Employees of the U.S. Senate."

The study, despite its limitations, indicates that there is a vast disparity between salaries paid to men and women employed in Senate offices, with women receiving salaries generally lower than those paid to men in similar positions. This fact, and the fact that congressional employees are exempt from laws providing legal remedies for sex discrimination in employment, is a matter that should concern all of us.

For the information of my colleagues, I ask that portions of this report be inserted in the Record:

EXCERPTS OF STUDY BY THE CAPITOL HILL WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAUCUS

INTRODUCTION

We would like to begin this paper with a brief explanation of who we are and why we undertook to do a study of salary discrimination between the sexes on Capitol Hill.

The Capitol Hill branch of the National Women's Political Caucus was established in November, 1971, when Bella Abzug hosted a party to interest women employed by Members of Congress in forming a branch of the National Caucus. The unique role such women could play in promoting the passage of vitally needed legislation beneficial to women, the strength in skills and support they could provide the increasing number of women seeking public office, and the glaring inequities of employment opportunities in Congressional offices were reasons enough to create a Capitol Hill organization with the resources and power to make substantial changes in the character of the political system. Thus, the Capitol Hill Women's Political Caucus was formed.

It has been a loosely organized group of women who work for Representatives, Senators and on Committees. When the group was started, we sensed that the salaries paid to women were less than salaries paid to men, and that women were promoted to professional jobs less often than were men. Our major goal, therefore, has been to improve the status of women on the Hill.

After many months of informally discussing whether or not women were in fact paid less than men, we in the Caucus decided to find out.

Focusing our attention on the Senate, since it was of more manageable size than the entire Congress, we used the Report of the