

# How the Mensheviks Take Revisionism as the Key Link

## RCP Reply to Mensheviks on China, Adopted By the 2nd Congress of the RCP, 1978

### A Method to the Madness

The Menshevik opposition has produced a document which purports to answer the CC report on China. The ramblings and whinings of the authors are palmed off as new and persuasive evidence of the incorrect line of our Party. The only problem is that most of their arguments of substance—if one can be so generous—have already been answered; in fact, the bulk of what they raise was rebuffed and repudiated at the CC meeting and the substance of it was refuted in the CC Report.

But maybe—just maybe, they hope—by repeating the same arguments, like a sorcerer repeating an incantation, they can perform magic and convince someone that there's an ounce of Marxism in their argument. Maybe their confused and uncertain followers, worried by the prospect of joining up with the CP(ML) and a little sickened by the thought of embracing Teng Hsiao-ping will be temporarily distracted by these pages of muck. Maybe they can make the question seem so confusing that they can force these people to conclude that you have to be a genius to understand it.

Answering their preposterous claims puts the Party in a curious position: what's called for is almost *a Red Papers* with the CC Report, their attempted response, and the CC Report again, since nothing much new has been said by them. But there is development—more accurately, degeneration—as well as repetition here. Freed from the constraints of the Party's line, our Mensheviks have beat a hasty retreat from Marxism and the basic revolutionary positions of our Party.

In many ways their paper is similar to the BWC's first response to National Bulletin 13. On the one hand, it's very flabby. Their case against the Four is very weak and their arguments not at all compelling, especially if one adopts even a critical attitude toward what's appearing now in the *Peking Review* rather than swallowing it wholesale without questioning as our Mensheviks do. Further, it's not clear what their evaluation of Teng is and it's even less clear who the revisionists in China are, etc. On the other hand, the paper is definitely transitional and it's only a matter of time before they adopt even more outrageous positions as they free themselves totally of any influence of the Party and plunge fully into the embrace of revisionism here and in China.

Let's look more closely at their method. To begin with, the Mensheviks have never ceased yammering about facts, facts, facts. "Empty speculation," "opinions," "we want hard and fast facts," they chirp. One would have expected a richly detailed and lavishly documented case from them, but one searches in vain for such analysis. What we get instead is the pabulum and distortions of the current rulers. For instance, the Four are said to have been unconcerned about production and opposed to modernization. The proof? *Peking Review* articles that say so. Never mind the fact that in literally thousands of pages, experience and struggle around these questions were summed up in the *Peking Review* and elsewhere under the Four's leadership or that the Shanghai textbook deals systematically and fully with basic problems of socialist construction. No attempt is made to analyze the line of the Four, but only to regurgitate horror stories from the *Peking Review*.

The Mensheviks have extreme difficulty dealing with certain obvious facts. Where articles in the *Peking Review* have put forward the view of experts and professionals in command, and done this consistently over the past year, the Mensheviks can only reserve comment and promise us future discussion on these developments. Is it or is it not a fact that the three poisonous weeds are being upheld in the *Peking Review*? What do the Mensheviks have to say about them? Very little, except for some token criticism to cover up their support for the content of the three weeds. What do the Mensheviks have to say about the fact that Hua was, at the very least, associated with the "Outline Report on Science and Technology," something that the *Peking Review* has pointed out on numerous occasions? The pro-Hua book *The Case of the Gang of Four* links Hua with Teng and Li Hsien-nien in the formulation of the three weeds. Again, the significance of this is ig-

nored, the line of the three weeds and the line of the Four in opposing them is put to no analysis.

The point of all this is not to say that facts speak for themselves, because they don't. Truth and facts are not the same thing. Facts represent perceptual knowledge. Truth is higher than facts—it involves rationally grasping the interrelations between facts, this is what it means to seek truth from facts. It is possible to agree on certain facts and reach quite different conclusions. Certainly there were disruptions and difficulties in the Chinese economy over the past three years—these facts are undeniable, but is this to be blamed on revisionists and a revisionist line or the genuine revolutionaries? Does the fact that socialist new things are struggling to survive indicate that they are basically flawed or that they are coming under attack?

In other words truth has a class character and there are certain universal truths of Marxism-Leninism. There is no condition, time, or place that justifies replacing dialectics with eclectics as our Mensheviks and their revisionist mentors in China do. There is no condition, time or place that makes pragmatism ("black cat, white cat") somehow acceptable to Marxist-Leninists. And there is no condition, time, or place that warrants replacing the theory of continuing revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat with the "theory of the productive forces" and the dying out of class struggle.

The method of the CC Report is not to start from a conglomeration of scattered facts, but to compare and contrast the different lines that have been contending in China over the past period and on that basis to examine and evaluate facts. The Chinese do not, for example, publish data on absolute output in the economy for every sector. Does this mean that it is not possible to understand questions involving the direction of the economy? No, not at all, because very clear and definite lines on the development of the economy and the relationship of that to other questions emerged at the very start of the Cultural Revolution and have been fought out ever since.

The method of the Mensheviks is not to proceed from the high plane of two-line struggle. The method to their madness is to start with the assumption that the Four were rotten, self-seeking disrupters, to provide for proof of this the absurd slanders and lies of the *Peking Review* and other material put out by the current rulers, and then to reach the surprising conclusion that the Four were rotten, self-seeking disrupters. Their method is the real *a priori* one and not because they, too, had an opinion on the

events in China shortly after the Four were arrested. Hua, according to their view, represents the truth. This becomes the principle with which they examine and evaluate the situation in China. Why does he represent the truth? Here their pragmatism shines brilliantly. Hua is in office; he won, therefore whatever he says must be true. The Four lost and therefore whatever they said must be false. But how else is a *Marxist* to judge the "facts" that appear in the *Peking Review* except by analyzing what line they are in the service of and what line is being attacked with these "facts"?

In a sense our "fact"-obsessed authors hang themselves. They nonchalantly inform us that the Propaganda Ministry is controlled by the right. (By the way, with this we do agree—the Propaganda Ministry is indeed controlled by the right, and this is true regardless of which specific faction in the current regime has control—it's still the right.) This would cast doubt, it would appear, on the facts they glean from the *Peking Review* and other current Chinese sources to back up their case. But our authors, we're sure, would dismiss these sorts of observations as nit-picking; after all, of what significance is it that the right is the source of the Mensheviks' most precious information? When push comes to shove, it matters very little for them because their arguments about chaos and disruption in society and stagnation in production are the familiar and standard arguments of the bourgeoisie in China and abroad—arguments reaching a fever pitch since the Great Leap Forward. As if to impress the point on unwary readers, they gleefully report test scores—showing just what an unmitigated disaster the Cultural Revolution was. "This is one hell of a mess. I want to flit and fly away." That's how Mao described such people. Birds of a feather, these goulash communists.

#### What Defines the "Actual Situation"?

Reading through this garbled document it is possible to sift out two major assertions. The first is that the Four were unable to link and carry out work simultaneously around the three directives. We are told that they posed one against the other, confined themselves to the question of ideology apart from concrete tasks and failed to recognize that class struggle "runs through" all three directives, that is, "runs through everything." The second and related point concerns the "actual situation" that our Mensheviks are so fond of. According to their twisted logic, the period of sharp and intense class struggle characteristic of the Cultural Revolution, what they somewhat disdainfully refer to as social relations of upheaval and

rebellion, had subsided and new tasks and opportunities presented themselves—notably the development of the economy. The "Gang of Four" got stuck in an earlier period, that of the Cultural Revolution, and that was their doom. Their stubbornness and self-righteousness, their wanting to wage the class struggle from the mountaintops, strengthened the right, hastened their fall, and necessitated new alliances between the genuine revolutionaries, as represented by Hua, and the right (who the right is at this point remains unclear). (See pp. 201-214.)

What about the actual situation? Mao seems to have maintained his lucidity during this period so one would expect a fairly credible analysis from him. In 1969, following years of tumultuous struggle in factories, universities and major convulsions in the Party, in this same period that the Russians are attacking on the northern borders and the U.S. is heavily engaged, still, in Vietnam, Lin Piao comes forward and says enough is enough, it's time to settle down and push the economy forward. The argument had a certain appeal; after all there had been major disruptions and external aggression was a growing danger. But Mao emphatically rejects Lin's report, casts it aside as the "theory of the productive forces" and counter-revolutionary rubbish. Now all our Mensheviks can say about this episode is that Chou En-lai never used the blatantly revisionist language that Lin does. But they have nothing to say about why Mao rejects this orientation. They have nothing to say about what is so different about the current situation that makes Lin Piao's line correct today where it was wrong in 1969.

This is crucial because Mao saw no justification then and certainly no justification in 1976 when he initiated the struggle against Teng (a "fact" which even our authors concede—for now) for making the development of the economy the central task for the working class, which is what Teng was advocating. If Mao believed all of this he could have said it. If, as some would have us believe, the Four blocked his access to the media, he could have told Chou En-lai that the main task was modernization with a socialist orientation, he could have gotten the word out.

In fact as we indicated in the CC Report, Chou's description of four modernizations is taken from a statement Mao made in 1964. In delivering his speech to the 4th National People's Congress in 1975, Chou En-lai is not able to say that Mao recently reissued his call for the four modernizations in two stages by the year 2000. This is not to say that Mao disagreed with trying to build China into a modern socialist country,, even with the general goal of mod-

ernization by 2000. But it would indicate differences over the interpretations that were being placed on the four modernizations at the time of the 4th National People's Congress. Moreover, the four modernizations by the year 2000 were not incorporated into the new State Constitution that was adopted at the 4th Congress as they were into the Constitution adopted at the 11th Party Congress, after Mao had died. In other words they were not then, as they are now, made the "historical mission" for the next period.

What sort of things was Mao emphasizing in the last few years? In 1973 a Party Constitution is approved that emphasizes that going against the tide is a Marxist principle. This doesn't sound like a call for cooling out the class struggle, nor does a Lin Piao-Confucius campaign which not only hits at blind obedience but which actually takes time away from production. Is this the sage advice of someone who thinks it's time for everyone to put his nose to the grindstone—get back to your posts, maybe study a little if it doesn't interfere with production, and cut out all this time-consuming struggle?

Mao spends a sleepless night just prior to the opening of the 4th National Peoples Congress, and it wasn't because he couldn't find his sleeping pills. He was worried—even Hua and Company acknowledge this—and issued his directive on studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combatting and preventing revisionism. Why? Might it have something to do with the dangers associated with the implementation of the four modernizations? Mao did not attend the Congress. He could have, at least, made a symbolic appearance at the Congress to show his approval, but he did not, even though his health permitted it. His absence might well have implied that he did not go along with the political thrust of the push for modernization and the general line (or "general program") that this particular push represented.

And, at Mao's personal insistence, the right to strike is written into the new State Constitution. Again, it doesn't sound like Mao is exactly in the frame of mind of cooling things out. What does Mao say about the danger posed by people like Lin Piao? That they are few and far between and would have an awfully difficult time turning things around? No, he makes it clear, the capitalist roaders are still on the capitalist road and bitterly resent attempts to restrict bourgeois right. If they come to power it will be quite easy for them to rig up the capitalist system. Mao continually emphasized not the dying out, but the intensification of class struggle and the pervasive danger of restoration. Not that he is hysterical—quite the contrary—he is quite sober in this regard: "E very-

thing reactionary is the same: if you don't hit it, it won't fall."

Whether to continue making revolution or not, this is the key question, and whether one fails to, makes serious mistakes in the process or achieves great victories, as with the Cultural Revolution, the bourgeoisie is bound to react and at certain points jump out. It happened in the period following the Great Leap Forward, it happened three times since Liu Shao-chi, with Lin Piao and Teng and Hua. When Mao spoke of the desirability of stability and unity (apparently in late 1974) this did not mean, as he so vigorously pointed out when Teng and others tried to make it mean, that stability and unity could be raised above the class struggle or that the class struggle would die out—or even die down. As the CC Report points out, Mao felt that striving for stability and unity on the basis of a proletarian line would be advantageous to the proletariat at that time; but he certainly recognized that such a policy could in no way guarantee that the bourgeoisie would not jump out and try to disrupt the achievement of stability and unity on this revolutionary basis—which is exactly what the bourgeoisie, commanded by people like Teng, and backed by Chou, did during that very period.

The danger of capitalist restoration is no less the danger 25, as opposed to 10, years after the seizure of power. The deepening of the revolution in all spheres of society, the radical transformations that take place through class struggle and the more conscious grasp and application of the science of revolution by the masses in the course of these battles heightens their vigilance and capacity to carry forward. But socialism is a society in transition, it is in motion and new contradictions arise which present new difficulties and new tasks, especially as the working class grows more conscious of the need to effect radical ruptures with traditional property relations and ideas. Those, especially leading people, who cease making revolution become its target and the relations of socialist society even as they undergo transformations contain capitalist elements which constantly engender new bourgeois forces. The movement of socialist society to a higher level moves the class struggle to a higher level and it grows more complex, complicated and intense. This applies particularly to the struggle within the Party.

This is what Mao was drawing people's attention to, especially through the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the struggle to restrict bourgeois right. And as we shall see these instructions and warnings of Mao were not simply general admonitions, but very much related to the "actual

situation." But our Menshevik scholars bleat, you can't have a Cultural Revolution all the time, new tasks and policies are called for. The Gang of Four, they inform us, got stuck in the Cultural Revolution. This, incidentally, is the main way the Mensheviks discuss the Cultural Revolution, along with pointing out that socialist new things aren't working out too well in some places.

The Cultural Revolution was, in fact, a watershed. As the Shanghai text points out, "It was a great revolution in the superstructure, a great political revolution under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship. It could also be called the second revolution of China." This escapes the attention of the Mensheviks—in fact they vigorously disagree with it. Rather it is over with, not much different from a five-year plan superseded by another.

Of what importance is the Cultural Revolution—which, rather than being an interlude in the history of the class struggle, thrust the struggle on to an entirely different level? It is all important because how to evaluate the gains of the Cultural Revolution, which really represent an orientation for building socialism and moving towards communism, was at the heart of the struggles in the '70s. That the Four got "stuck" in the Cultural Revolution is very much to their credit because what our Mensheviks really mean to say is that they fought in it and fought to defend it and the gains and transformations achieved through it. The Mensheviks couldn't possibly have gotten stuck in an event like the Cultural Revolution because like their mentors in power they hate and despise it. It was a nuisance at best, a disaster at worst.

Most of the social base and many of the leading forces of the revisionist faction came into the struggle towards the culmination of the first phase of the Cultural Revolution in 1968-70. Jarvis of course was waving his CP program madly at the time so it's not surprising that he never quite grasped the historic importance of the Cultural Revolution. The point is that many of these people became aware of the Cultural Revolution when it was already in high gear and when many of the detested practices and methods of the revisionist headquarters had been swept away. As for the people newly involved in the revolutionary movement who have been sucked into the Menshevik madness, many have little sense of what was actually involved and at stake. Therefore it is not surprising that the faction can casually gloss over the Cultural Revolution and, ironic as it may seem, win many of the youth to the view that it was a holy mess and it's high time to pick up the pieces. Listening to the Mensheviks, you would have no idea that

before the Cultural Revolution in many factories workers had to have passes to go to the bathroom or that the operas performed on the Peking stage were often feudal romances. (Our Mensheviks also suffer a lapse in memory when it comes to the role of their heroes in China, the present rulers, many of whom opposed the Cultural Revolution or, like Teng, were a target of it. They insist that Hua was not knocked down in late 1966. This is true—he was knocked down in early 1966—though returned to office the same year. Comrades should read over *Peking Review* articles over the last 15 months which chronicle the illustrious career of our mensheviks' knight in shining armor—for some reason his brilliant achievements during the year 1966 are inexplicably missing.)

The Cultural Revolution was a necessity. Had it not occurred, had those persons in power taking the capitalist road not been overthrown, the rule of the working class would have been overthrown. Mao never minced words in getting at its timeliness. He spoke of ministries of culture and education dominated by the bourgeoisie, of factories—not a few, but many, even the majority—in the hands of people following a revisionist line—not all of whom were bad, but many of whom were. There was an encrusted Party bureaucracy and a good part of the state apparatus weighing on the masses. The capitalist roaders pushed a revisionist line and, the protestations of the Mensheviks notwithstanding, it had very tangible, very concrete effects in the real world, it led to oppression and resistance. These people had to be and were in significant numbers overthrown. It must be borne in mind that this revolution—yes, revolution—occurred after socialist transformation in the realm of ownership in the main had been completed in industry and at a lower stage in agriculture. And it must also be remembered that this revolution was intense and sharp, and provoked bitterness and hatred not only among those who were overthrown but also among many who were sharply criticized.

Mao recognized that more Cultural Revolutions would be required, that it was not enough to settle the question of ownership at a certain level, that the existence of collective forms was not a guarantee against restoration, and that, in fact, uninterrupted revolution had to take place within a given stage of ownership, especially as concerns relations among people. Furthermore there would be those who would inevitably resist the continuing advance of the revolution and organize against it. The Cultural Revolution was not a holding action, it involved very real transformations in society which laid the basis for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This revolution which overthrew many

capitalist roaders gave birth through this struggle to new things: worker-propaganda teams at the universities, barefoot doctors, revolutionary committees, open door scientific research, the revolution in art and literature, and many others.

Our Mensheviks don't have this kind of appreciation of the Cultural Revolution. Nowhere do they mention that the Cultural Revolution constitutes the forward spiral in the development of the international working class movement, that it represented the highest development of working class rule and contributed greatly—though not finally as Mao would point out—to solving the question of how to maintain working class rule. What the Mensheviks do is to slip in criticisms of the Cultural Revolution through "the back door"; they use Lenin's study on the Subbotniks to make the point that not every shoot of communism is durable or worthy of the name communist, that it is necessary to sort out the good from the bad in these new things. Here we find the essence of their stand, that the Cultural Revolution and the new things emerging out of it were at best fashionable means, good for a while, but necessarily subject to review and at this point up for grabs. (See pp. 242-255) They even tell us that some of these new things should die off, to which we could only reply in their fashion when they criticize our treatment of objective conditions "how many, which ones, where and when?"

The Socialist new things were the products of the Cultural Revolution, the fruits of its victory; a correct attitude toward them had all to do with a correct attitude toward the Cultural Revolution. The Mensheviks act as though they are raising a new question and a new problem. They call for dividing one into two on these new things, of critically assimilating them. But Mao dealt with this. He said reversing correct verdicts goes against the will of the people. There were many in China, like our Mensheviks, who seized upon the difficulties encountered by these new things and actively sabotaged them in order to overturn these verdicts. But these new things were not comparable to the Subbotnik movement, which while very significant was not a widespread phenomenon and was not the product of the titanic sort of struggle that was the Cultural Revolution. These things had been tested and proved their worth. In Party documents up to and through the Fourth National People's Congress Report they were upheld and calls were issued to defend and further develop them. The Four sought to preserve, strengthen and popularize these new things.

Any adjustments and changes in these new things were being carried out by proletarian revolutionaries on the basis of building

on these achievements in the context of this new spiral. What was at issue between the Four with Mao behind them and the capitalist roaders was exactly this question of whether the Cultural Revolution marked a new spiral. The leaders in China with whom the Mensheviks are in bed are just the people who in the words of Wang Hung-wen, "instead of seeing the development as a spiral ascent, they look upon it as a turning movement within a circle they urge the resumption of old rules and systems which have been discarded by the masses." That strengthening new things is the last thing our Mensheviks have in mind is attested to by their fascination with reliance on tests and technical expertise and even bonuses, which has been whispered by several of their stalwarts. These are (capitalist) old things under today's "actual conditions" in China. And they are not enthusiastically welcomed by the masses.

Because of the experience summed up by Mao and the crucial lessons and gains of the Cultural Revolution there can be no excuse for this sort of retreat. One could find situations in the history of the Bolshevik revolution and misread them. Lenin after all introduced the Taylor system. But nowhere in Mao's writings can you find a defense for this at this stage of the Chinese revolution. History does not simply repeat itself, if that were the case there would have been no Cultural Revolution. Raising productivity does not and should not depend on such methods as the Taylor system which represent the domination of dead labor (machines) over living labor, not after years of struggle to make workers masters of their factories and successful efforts to raise productivity through socialist activism and enthusiasm. Workers who in plants fought against bonuses and eventually eliminated them during the Cultural Revolution are now being told that they are useful instruments—if applied "fairly"—to step up production. Stalin cannot be condemned for not having a cultural revolution, but Hua Kuo-feng is to be condemned for reversing it in the name of adjusting to new conditions.

Our Mensheviks retort, "but you can't have a cultural revolution all the time." There's some truth to this, though coming from them it means something quite wrong. The class struggle does not remain at a constant level of intensity; it develops in waves. Mao recognized this in 1966 when he said, "Great disorder across the land leads to great order. And so once again every seven or eight years. Monsters and demons will jump out themselves. Determined by their own class nature, they are bound to jump out." Mao was not making the point that an exact timetable was at

work, but that there is a general law involved. (It should also be noted that Hua conveniently cuts out the sentences following the first one in order to distort the continuing dialectic between disorder and order and to fit into his call for permanent "great order"—i.e., the dying out of class struggle.) The Four also spoke to this point in the Shanghai Text, "Class struggle in the socialist society develops in wavelike motions with peaks and troughs. This is due to a difference in the conditions of class struggle and not to whether there is class struggle or not. The history of the socialist society tells us that class enemies and all monsters and freaks will show themselves. The law of class struggle requires that there be a big struggle every few years."

In 1969 Mao recognized that the Cultural Revolution had entered a new stage. It was necessary to consolidate advances and, yes, even to put somewhat more emphasis on order—stability and unity. But this did not prevent the objective laws of class struggle from asserting themselves—Lin Piao jumped out. He jumped out because the moves to consolidate the gains of the Cultural Revolution, in particular to reassert and reestablish Party leadership based on the transformations of the previous years, challenged the vested interests he had built up—the fact that he and his men had through the stormy years of the Cultural Revolution seized hold of important positions of authority through the tactic of "overthrowing all." Small wonder that he had proclaimed that revisionism was no longer a problem.

Independent of the will of individuals, class struggle goes on and every few years big struggles break out. While it was not possible to wage the class struggle in the same way as during the early stages of the Cultural Revolution when mass rebellions and seizures of power throughout society were the order of the day, it was necessary to continue to defend the Cultural Revolution and to overthrow new bourgeois elements who actively opposed it. And the sharpening and accumulating contradictions of these years did, in wavelike fashion, lead to a big struggle, the campaign to beat back the right deviationist wind. This confrontation in 1975-76 represented the most significant trial of strength between the working class and the bourgeoisie since the Lin Piao affair.

The Mensheviks, needless to say, have a fundamentally different view. The bourgeoisie, or the right as they seem to prefer to call it, does not really figure as an independent force in society, acting according to its own class interests. This right is not launching attacks on the new things, it is not trying to seize portions of power and unleashing its social forces, be it plant managers or

lower Party officials. The left is messing up and the right is kind of waiting in the wings ready to take advantage of the mistakes and excesses of the left. Is this not the argument of these people? Isn't this their view of the right deviationist wind, that it was precipitated by the errors of the Four? Comrades should read their paper over carefully. One hardly hears about the danger of capitalist restoration. The continuing exposure of the political line of these new bourgeois elements and the mobilization of the masses to hit back at their influence and pockets of strength scarcely forces the right to jump out, according to our authors. What does is the mistakes of "bad eggs" like the Four.

The picture we get from the Mensheviks is that the "Gang of 4" ruined a good thing. Conditions were ripe for bold economic initiatives what with the fury of the Cultural Revolution long past, but the "gang" insisted on broadening the target and got too dogmatic about socialist new things. What a pity! The slumbering right might have dozed off to sleep for good had the "gang" not been so dogged about ideology and all that bunk. Our authors present very little evidence to support the view that things had settled down: there is hardly any analysis of the period from the Lin Piao affair onward. We get the usual horror stories of how the Four distorted the Lin Piao/Confucius campaign and a new interpretation—and wrong of course—of the Tenth Party Congress that suggests that the development of the economy was coming to the fore as the main task. But, again, there is nothing but errors by the Four which embolden the right—and no sense of the bourgeoisie as a class striving for power. The bourgeoisie wouldn't dare attack if you did everything correctly according to this idealist logic.

Actually, as the CC Report goes into, the shock waves of the Lin Piao affair and the necessity of cleaning up in the army and reorganizing the Party called forth certain compromises. The rehabilitation of Teng makes it more possible to reshuffle a substantial number of regional military commanders and strip them of certain Party posts. The international situation makes it necessary to seek new alliances and engage in diplomatic activities which the bourgeoisie at home and abroad will try to use to its advantage. In the years following the Lin Piao affair, 1972-73, the right does gain strength. Many jumped into the fray opposing Lin Piao to really get at the Cultural Revolution and socialist new things. Others harboring profound hatred for having been criticized and pulled out sought revenge. This explains the sharp struggle over how to sum up Lin Piao and the criticism campaign of '73-'74. Should the Four have united with these elements who in growing numbers and

influence were clamoring for a return to "normalcy," that is, who on the basis of the increasing danger of war and the existence of real difficulties in the economy and society generally, wanted to reverse the verdicts and momentum of the Cultural Revolution?

Mao was clear on what the correct orientation was and this was why he relied on the Four. Lin Piao would be criticized, but the Cultural Revolution which had brought the struggle of the working class to a higher level would be upheld and the transformations in the base and superstructure must and would continue. The Four were perfectly correct in describing the Cultural Revolution as opening up a new era—the aristocratic educational system was changing, genuine worker management in the factories was developing and spreading and so on. The right perceived it in the same way and many people who had originally gone along with the Cultural Revolution joined their camp. The terms of the struggle were sharpening: in educational circles the new policies were coming under attack and in many plants management practices were reverting to the ways of the pre-Cultural Revolution etc. The arguments of the right very often assumed the same form as that of the Mensheviks: let's not be one-sided about the Cultural Revolution and let's not forget that we can't afford big upheavals now, not with all these problems we have.

The Mensheviks ignore all of this and would have us believe that the working class has the freedom to fight the bourgeoisie when and how it wants or to shunt aside the class struggle or redefine it and go in for something else, like a new leap in the economy in which the class struggle is reduced to the question of who—the bourgeoisie or the proletariat—has a better plan for developing the economy. The big changes which the Cultural Revolution wrought don't particularly inspire our Mensheviks, which is why fighting the bourgeoisie to defend these things smacks of "petty bourgeois fanaticism." We hear of some surprise test (see p. 249) administered to students which tells us about as much about the real condition of education and the real capability of students as would a test given to a practicing doctor who had not studied for it. Of course, *some* doctors are not qualified for anything but just a test would not necessarily be the best gauge. Why don't we hear about the fact that in 1973 in Shanghai alone over 2800 of the more than 3000 enterprises had some kind of technical education programs which involved over 200,000 workers. Or that in 1975 over 260 factory-run worker colleges were in operation in Shanghai. Perhaps our Menshevik technicians agree with the current educational "reform" which will bring the

talented few of technical and scientific students directly into the universities. This we suppose is a better way of breaking down the division of labor.

The Mensheviks have even given theoretical justification to the new emphasis on tests and expertise in command. They tell us that the "key to eliminating the differences between mental and manual labor [is]. . . raising the cultural level and capabilities of the masses as a whole." This is the revisionist line that turns things upside down. In fact, it is by carrying on struggle to transform the relations of production—specifically here to restrict the division of labor—and preventing class polarization, it is only on this basis that the general cultural and political level of the masses can be raised step by step in tempo with the development of the economy.

Attempts to overturn the achievements of the Cultural Revolution were very real, indeed. The Four were not paranoid. They understood what was happening in society and if they should be damned for fighting revisionists then damn the dictatorship of the proletariat. The slogan "Be the Master of the Wharf, Not the Slave of Tonnage" was raised in Shanghai in 1974 to oppose attempts to pressure workers to quickly fulfill their quota with the promise that they could go home early if they did. Struggles intensified—particularly as the demands of production grew—over the degree to which cadres would participate in labor, whether or not worker suggestions for technical innovation would be heeded and how much of a role workers would have in formulating rational rules and regulations. The Four played a major role in these struggles—a positive one—and who but the bourgeoisie and their lackeys would fault them for challenging the revisionist world outlook and practices.

In sum, the Four were not "stuck" but rooted in and steeled by the experiences and lessons of the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution was not simply an event, but an "unprecedented event," raising the consciousness of the masses and indicating and representing a fundamental breakthrough on the road to communism. In bringing the revolution to a higher stage, the Cultural Revolution also increased the resistance from the forces representing the old order, and the transformations fought for came under continual attack. Mao did not conclude that the difficulties and setbacks encountered by many of these new things meant that there was something wrong with them or that they ought to be abandoned. He upheld them and called for their strengthening.

It was true that the class struggle did not proceed in a straight



line from the early stages of the Cultural Revolution, and the Four recognized the zig-zag nature of the class struggle. The struggle to defend these new things would not and did not take the same form as the struggle during the earlier period of the Cultural Revolution which brought them forward. There is a difference between an uprising in Shanghai against a municipal Party committee and a campaign to criticize and reject Lin Piao and Confucius. But this is the same class struggle and eventually, as Mao says, the class nature of the enemy determines that they will show themselves. Such is what happened as these contradictions boiled over with the right deviationist wind and the subsequent defeat of the Four. To accuse the Four of sectarianism for not uniting with this wind is not just absurd, but the height of hypocrisy coming from those who would not unite with the majority of our Party's Central Committee—which holds a correct line. Freaks and monsters must jump out, this is a law of class struggle.

To get an idea of just how far things have regressed comrades should look at the article in *Peking Review* #1 which upholds the work of a mathematician who has been studying the so-called Goldbach conjecture. This theorem has little practical value. What's more we learn that this mathematician "more often than not, spends all day long in the library or his office"—and this was held up as a moving example of the spirit of self-sacrifice. This should be contrasted with an article from the *Peking Review* #50, 1972, entitled "Mathematicians Among Workers." The article says, "while paying attention to the study of basic mathematical theories, mathematicians are making energetic efforts to let mathematics directly serve production and the working people." It describes how a leading mathematician who had written a popular study on planning methods which employs an approach to determine through the least number of experiments satisfactory ratios for, let's say, the amount of an element to be added to a heat of steel, had gone out with other mathematicians to workers to teach this method and conduct further studies. The 1978 article highlights how this Goldbach research has produced theoretical results approaching advanced world levels. The 1972 article emphasizes mathematics in the service of the Chinese revolution. (The Goldbach conjecture, if proven, will enable one to understand that  $8=3+5$ . We hope our earnest researcher will continue to diligently carry out Hua Kuo-feng's line, remain steadfastly in his study and make still greater contributions.)

**Class Struggle Runs Through Everything—  
Once Again, Taking the Three Directives As the Key Link**

The section of the Menshevik document entitled "Class Struggle is the Key Link" sets a new standard for eclecticism, (pp. 158-62) It resurrects Teng's formulation that the three directives concerning study of the theory of proletarian dictatorship and combatting and preventing revisionism, promoting unity and stability and pushing the national economy forward are an inseparable whole. But they pull off an intellectual coup by saying that the class struggle to which Mao refers is not the study of the dictatorship of the proletariat to combat and prevent revisionism; this is an ideological directive, they maintain, and taking class struggle as the key link means recognizing that class struggle runs through all three revolutionary movements of class struggle, the struggle for production and scientific experiment.

In a way their formulation sounds quite revolutionary—class struggle runs through everything. But upon closer inspection we find that they water down what is meant by the class struggle exactly by denying that the directive pertaining to the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combatting and preventing revisionism is the key one, is the directive which speaks to what the heart of the class struggle is. Our authors tell us "The gang wants to say, and the current CC would parrot, that the first directive is the class struggle one. Do they think that there will not be fierce class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie on the basis and the reason for stability and unity?" But what these Mensheviks won't accept is that it is precisely and only by grasping the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the fight against revisionism that one can make a correct determination of what kind of stability and unity is in the interests of the working class.

This attempt to render Mao more profound would be laughable were our Mensheviks not making it so central to their argument. What's the point of Mao attacking the formulation that the three directives must be taken as the key link if not to criticize putting them on a par with each other? Mao does not say, "What! Taking the three directives as the key link! Class struggle runs through the three directives and runs through everything!" He says class struggle is the key link. Stability and unity and pushing the national economy forward are not in themselves class struggle. Class struggle will determine the nature of this stability and unity and what road to take with regard to the national economy, but to make them class struggle is classical two-into-one logic. But what

is studying the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat and combatting and preventing revisionism if not class struggle? Of course, if Mao had issued a directive that simply said "read some books" then our Mensheviks might have a point that class struggle is something else, but again we ask our Mensheviks—Mao says study what in order to do what?

To say that class struggle runs through the directive on the dictatorship of the proletariat is absurd—it's like saying one pound weighs one pound and palming this off as a weighty statement. The point is that the first directive focused the key questions of the class struggle and the two lines at that time. Taking up this directive and putting it in first place is the basis for the proletariat to wage struggle on all fronts. Putting the three directives on a par, as the revisionists in China and their sycophants here do, can only prevent the proletariat from successfully waging the class struggle on any front.

The Mensheviks object to the CC Report's comment that the Four were "concerned that in the effort to fulfill the task of modernization the basic task—the class struggle—not be thrown overboard..." By raising this point we are accused of denying that the "class struggle does in fact and must consciously run through and guide such tasks as the four modernizations." But the point is not that the struggle for production is unimportant (more on this later) nor, for that matter, that the class struggle doesn't interpenetrate with the struggle for production or the four modernizations.

The most important question that has to be dealt with is whether or not the four modernizations are the main task of the working class. The Four were very clear about this as indicated in the CC Report. The four modernizations were a task in connection with the development of the national economy but they could not be made the historic or lofty goal to which the working class aspires as the current rulers present it. For these people the class struggle essentially boils down to whether you go fast or slow in production. For Leibel Bergman the Four sinned by criticizing and attacking the revisionist line behind the "four modernizations" scheme. According to the paper Bergman presented to the CC, the Four, instead of publishing and attacking the three "weeds", should have followed the policy of "contributing to their improvement." Failing to do this was, according to Bergman, the Four's "Final nonsense." Here we have the Mensheviks' two-into-one method nakedly advertised by their leading exponent of it—"improve" revisionism instead of exposing it—perhaps Bergman would like to rewrite Mao's directive to say study the theory of

proletarian dictatorship and improve and strengthen revisionism.

Our Mensheviks are so "into" the revisionist line in China that they accept without blinking the notion that the four modernizations should be the main task and "historical mission" for the next 20 plus years.

This is very important because two possibilities face the working class in power: to advance toward the realization of communism or to go back to capitalism. To identify and smash the restorationist activities of the bourgeoisie the working class must be able to distinguish Marxism from revisionism, socialism from imperialism, restoration from counter-restoration. It's not enough to proclaim that class struggle runs through everything, what must be grasped is what question the class struggle centers on and this is the restriction of bourgeois right in the economic base and struggling against bourgeois ideology, in particular the ideology of bourgeois right. So it is not us or the Four who are up-in-the-cloud class strugglers but our Mensheviks, with their mealy-mouthed "class struggle runs through everything" thinking, who really negate the class struggle.

We are accused of "turning over the field of economic development to the bourgeoisie" and not seeing that the "actual class struggle is raging on all fronts, not just in the superstructure and ideology." In effect our Mensheviks are denying the decisive role of ideological and political struggle and liquidating struggle in the superstructure over the big issues in society. Unless struggle is carried on in the realm of ideology and politics, it will not be possible to deal with questions pertaining to "economic development."

It was Mao who attached tremendous importance to the superstructure and the struggle over line. In his criticism of Stalin's *Economic Problems of Socialism* Mao says, "This book by Stalin has not a word on the superstructure from the beginning to the end. It never touches upon man. We read of things but not man." The struggle in the superstructure is dialectically related to the struggle in the economic base. The Four consistently paid attention to production but did this by putting revolution in command. Production developed in a socialist direction under their leadership because they armed the workers with an understanding of what was going on in society broadly and because they mobilized the workers to revolutionize the relations of production through such measures as the transformation of rules and regulations and training worker technicians.

In the supplementary reading material distributed for the China discussion, Chang Ch'un-ch'iao criticizes the slogan "con-

scientifically embodying into the tasks of production the class struggle in the sphere of production." What is wrong with it is that the consciousness of the masses, their understanding of overall line can only be raised through "the practice of concerning oneself with the revolution in the superstructure." Moreover, and very much linked with this, capitalist tendencies in other spheres of society will go unchecked and the bourgeoisie will be able to wreak havoc in the superstructure and the base if the masses are organized around a line of concentrating on carrying on the struggle for production.

Only by starting from the overall line of the Party and by paying attention to "affairs of state" is it possible to grasp how to lead the struggle for production and to wage class struggle on this front. Our Mensheviks speak of the *microscope and telescope* of Marxism-Leninism. It is quite fitting and telling that they reverse the order of the two as spelled out by Mao, who speaks of the *telescope and microscope*. Because you need the telescope first to get a picture of the whole situation and to get a long-range view of the larger questions in society before you can use the microscope to analyze particulars.

This outlook fits in perfectly with our Mensheviks' notion of class struggle in this country. Out of each particular battle—which would be the equivalent of out of each production unit in China—it is possible to draw the whole class struggle. It also explains their enthusiasm for the "prosaic tasks" of socialist construction (this appears in their criticism of socialist new things and the Cultural Revolution). Good hard work will be quite enough, and Jimmy Higgins or Chen Yung-kuei serve as excellent models for these Mensheviks. Take up political questions as they arise in the course of production or a particular battle, this is the kind of spontaneity and pragmatism for which they have enduring fondness. Don't raise a stink about two-line struggle at the commanding heights of the Party and society, line questions will be settled in due time in connection with "concrete" tasks.

The class struggle cannot be limited to individual production units—either in the handling of production questions which require, yes, that politics be put in command, or in the struggle against bourgeois methods of leadership of leading cadre. This is why the Mensheviks fall head over heels over the Tachai example which *for them* means solely working in the spirit of self-sacrifice and self-reliance. This is all very good, but it opens the possibility of a Tachai surrounded by a sea of capitalism. How different is it fundamentally from a kibbutz in Israel if workers and peasants are

not concerned with and acting on questions that go beyond their immediate experiences. The bourgeoisie in China can make excellent use of a Tachai brigade—practicing all the virtues of hard work, thrift and self-reliance—just as it does in this country with industrious farmers. The Four correctly emphasized that the peasants at Tachai and every other brigade must lift their heads and deal blows against the biggest capitalist roaders and their revisionist outlook and practices on every front, and in particular in the superstructure.

Two articles in the *Peking Review* written under the guidance of the Four present the correct view of what class struggle means in the period of socialist revolution. The first from #18, 1976, describes what it means for workers to be masters of the country and the factories. (We should point out in this connection that the slogan referred to earlier, "Be the Masters of the Wharf, Not Slaves to Tonnage," is being criticized currently.) This article says, "They [the workers] pay attention *first* [our emphasis] of all to 'cardinal affairs' which means taking an active part in the political movements led by the Party, carrying out class struggle, combatting and preventing revisionism and consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat. Meanwhile, *they also* [our emphasis] keep any eye on whether their factories are advancing along the correct line and in the correct direction and whether the Party's principles and policies are correctly implemented." The key point here is that workers must be principally concerned with "cardinal affairs" and on that basis supervise the orientation of their factories. These "cardinal affairs" first and foremost involved the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius and to take hold of educational and cultural positions long dominated by the bourgeoisie. 700 shipbuilders from this plant lectured on Legalist works at the Talien Polytechnic Institute. One wonders whether a test of competence and academic excellence has been designed for these workers by now. One wonders whether their in-plant study classes even exist any more since they get in the way of production, no doubt.

Another article from #2, 1975, describes how at an oilfield a sharp struggle developed over whether to introduce a new hoisting method. Several workers felt it would be too risky to test it out given the demands of production. The article then goes on to say, "They did not argue over the actual work of whether to adopt the new technology or to use the old method. They first criticized Lin Piao and Confucius' crime in plotting restoration and retrogression." This is not to separate or divorce theory from practice, but

to grasp questions in the ideological realm in the most sweeping way exactly in order to activate the enthusiasm and deepen the understanding of the masses and to bring to play the active role of the superstructure.

For our Mensheviks this approach would obviously be labelled idealist. Wasn't this after all their objection to the Party Branches article (*Revolution*, September 1977)—too much "line in its own right"—and wasn't this their view of the RCYB, that we should just get it on in the struggle and that it wasn't very important to wage ideological struggle, much less win students and youth to the historic cause of the working class. The "gang of 4," we are constantly reminded, separated the ideology task from the policy task. But, again, how can you be in a position to analyze these so-called policy tasks, which from Hua & Co. are nothing but revisionist calls to boost production and heal the wounds of class conflict, anyway, unless they are approached from the high plane of two-line struggle. The most important thing is to combat and prevent revisionism, that is waging the class struggle and making revolution against the bourgeoisie. The first directive was the key link. Teng put the three directives on the same par: so do the Mensheviks. Teng raised economics over politics by separating politics completely from economics. Our Mensheviks reduce politics to modernization, to the fulfillment and struggle over production tasks. Herein lies their unity with Teng.

#### Revisionists Revise Red Papers 7

Line counts for even less with our authors in their rewrite of *Red Papers 7*. (See p. 164) They chafe at the CC Report's point that "when a revisionist line leads and the leadership is not in the hands of the masses, bourgeois relations of production will actually exist." Idealism, they shout. These "bourgeois relations do not exist because a revisionist line leads. They exist because of the nature of socialism itself." It is truly amazing how quickly these people repudiate the basic line of our Party and tip-toe into the garden of revisionism—and Trotskyism, for that matter. Their attack exactly echoes the Trotskyites.

They take as their authority on this point a passage from *Red Papers 7* that although "Stalin argued forcefully (and correctly) that the law of value continues to operate under socialism, he did not draw the correct conclusion from this—that capitalist production relations must then also exist in some (often) hidden forms." But the point of this statement is not that where the law of value

operates you of necessity have bourgeois production relations, but that the existence of this law lays the basis for capitalist relations to emerge and is bound to engender new bourgeois elements. If there is any confusion on this point the Mensheviks ought to read further into *Red Papers*. On page 55 we find an elaboration and deepening of this point, "Even under socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, commodity production continues and there is some scope for the law of value. As Lenin pointed out, this provides the material basis for capitalist relations, even in socialism, and provides the material basis for capitalist restoration."

The law of value and commodity production are residues and defects left over from the capitalist system. Under the dictatorship of the proletariat the commodity system is *not* aimed at the production of surplus value and its harmful political and ideological influences are strenuously struggled against. The working class uses the law of value and commodity production to promote socialism while at the same time restricting and working to eliminate them. The bourgeoisie will try to use them to promote capitalism. If a revisionist line prevails in a particular unit, the social relations will degenerate, they will not be the same as before, they will be relations of profit in command and oppression. This is because line will transform reality—whether the Mensheviks are conscious of this or not—and it will transform reality one way or another exactly because these relations contain the seeds of capitalism. But whether they are transformed into capitalist relations or advance to a higher level of socialist relations depends on the line in command.

Perhaps our Mensheviks can't accept this view that the persistence of commodity relations implies the possibility of capitalism because that would place "ideology tasks" too far above "policy tasks". Almost in anticipation of the Menshevik argument, *Red Papers* has more to say in the above quoted section: "This is why it is not idealist to stress the importance of proletarian ideology as the leading blow against capitalism, and why it was essential that Stalin's and Lenin's proletarian line be smashed first." But the real irony of their position is that here they are grumbling about our defeatist view of socialism and now they tell us that bourgeois relations exist irrespective of the line and the transformations attempted by the working class. Socialism has become capitalism.

It is not the case that a revisionist line "creates" or "causes" bourgeois relations but that it transforms socialist relations—based on their contradictory character—into their opposite. It's curious that the Menshevik argument could have been lifted from

CL's critique:

**"We are to believe that a new bourgeoisie and proletariat emerge or do not emerge based on whether revisionism does or does not predominate in a given mine, or factory...it reduces itself to a giant checkerboard of 'units' which are now capitalist, now socialist, depending on which line the management carries out."**

But isn't this the point that Mao draws attention to in his 1969 statement that many factories were in the hands of revisionists and that China would have changed colors had the Cultural Revolution not taken place? If certain social relations, for instance the division of labor, are everywhere bourgeois then every plant manager, every Party official, even Mao are bourgeois. But what makes a member of the CC a capitalist roader or a plant manager a bourgeois is not simply his position, but the line he pushes; this is what is decisive and what transforms his position from one of relative privilege into absolute tyranny, this on account of his relationship to the control and distribution of the means of production and to the instruments of the proletarian dictatorship.

Socialist Production Relations:  
Seeds of Communism, Vestiges of Capitalism

This point must be gone into further. Capitalist production relations are first and foremost *exploitative* relations. The working class does not own the means of production and must therefore sell its labor power in order to live. The labor of the worker is a source of enrichment to the capitalist and, bound by the laws of capitalist accumulation, the capitalist must continually step up the exploitation of the workers. This of necessity gives rise to profound inequalities in the material conditions of life of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

Under socialism, production relations cease being relations of exploitation. This becomes possible on account of the revolution that takes place in the ownership of the means of production. The means of production belong to the working class and workers therefore are no longer forced to sell their labor power to another class that controls the means of production.

But while the means of production have ceased to be a means of sucking surplus value out of workers, inequality is not eliminated under socialism. In particular, inequality still predominates in the field of distribution—some people receive more than others. Here

bourgeois right still exists in large measure. On the basis of an equal standard—the amount of labor supplied by a worker—products will be distributed. Workers are paid according to the contribution they make. But since the contribution of different workers will vary depending on experience, skill and strength, some will receive more than others, even though others may be in greater need of a larger quantity of the articles of consumption. At the same time, while it is illegal to employ the labor of others under socialism, some people in society in comparison to others possess more responsibility and control over the means of production such as factory managers and government planners. This is also a form of social inequality that must be restricted under socialism.

Communist production relations represent a further negation. These relations are neither exploitative nor involve inequality. The means of production are common property and distribution of products takes place according to need so that relative advantage of strength, skill, etc. no longer determines differences in distribution—such differences are solely on the basis of need. Moreover with the extensive development of the productive forces it becomes possible to eliminate the subordination of the individual worker to the division of labor and the inequalities stemming from the different positions occupied by different workers in the social process of production.

So what we have are three different types of production relations: capitalist relations which are characterized by exploitation and inequality; socialist relations which are no longer exploitative but which still contain elements of inequality; and communist production relations which have abolished both exploitation and inequality. The contradictory quality of socialist production relations derives from the transitional nature of socialist society, between capitalism and communism.

The bourgeoisie will try to seize upon the bourgeois aspects of these relations in order to restore capitalism. The proletariat will try to restrict and eventually eliminate the vestiges and remnants of inequality that persist in these relations in order to push forward to communism. The point to grasp here is that both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie will attempt to transform these same relations in directions opposite to each other.

In China the 8-grade wage system is not a capitalist production relation. The wages paid out are not in exchange for the labor power of propertyless laborers. Yet the inequality inherent in this wage system, if not restricted and handled correctly, can lead to such a situation. How can this be? Let's take a fairly represen-

tative example from China. In the Anshan Steel Works in the early 1970's the highest paid production worker received a wage that was three times greater than that of the lowest paid worker. The highest paid engineer or technician salary was about six times that of the lowest paid worker. With the extension of bonuses and rewards as seems to be the rising trend in China today, these gaps will widen and the highest paid personnel will derive large shares of the social product. If this develops unchecked the result will be polarization. Workers organized around a line of working to make money and tantalized with all kinds of material incentives will increasingly be looking out only for themselves and this will corrode the unity of the workers' ranks. This distribution relation will react on the relations among workers and create a situation more favorable to manipulating workers and creating privileged sections that will seek to preserve and extend that privilege.

Here we can see how this distribution relation can react on the system of ownership. If we look at the manager or technician whose salary is six times that of the lowest paid worker's and this grows wider, though private ownership does not exist formally, these higher incomes will increasingly take on the character of exploiting the labor of others. This is because the mass of workers will be paid just enough to survive while a privileged stratum will be in effect accumulating surplus which will represent the unpaid labor of the mass of workers. Hence, the basis for *initial* accumulation can be bourgeois right and these people will treat the means of production as means to enrich themselves. They will be pushing the workers harder under the signboard that this is the way to get ahead—more output means more money for all of us. The extension of bourgeois right can lead to instances of exploitation, and distribution will be based on the power that some have over the productive process. This is not to say that all inequality is the same as exploitation but that at a certain point quantity will turn into quality—expanding differences, giving free rein to bourgeois right, will transform inequality into exploitation.

What must be stressed again is that such polarization and degeneration of ownership will arise out of the existing production relations. This is linked very closely to the question of the bourgeoisie in the Party. (On this very important question, the Mensheviks have almost nothing to say.) The leadership of the Party is in an objective position where the power of management and distribution of the means of production and control over consumer goods is concentrated in their hands. For those leading people who take the capitalist road this position becomes the material

basis for their role as the bourgeoisie in the Party and the core of the bourgeoisie in society as a whole. The planning commissions and ministries which are headed up by Party personnel are in a position to set wage policy, enact work rules, make investment decisions, decide on pricing policy for agriculture and so forth, which when guided by a revisionist line can lead to the separation of the workers from the means of production and the destruction of the socialist economy in the countryside. This bourgeoisie inside the Party is not just the agent of those who fight for and carry out a line of expanding inequalities and other policies favorable to the growth of capitalism. The bourgeoisie in the Party is the commander of all social forces in society who stand for the restoration of capitalism. It is able to mobilize and unleash these social forces by promoting a revisionist ideological and political line which concentrates their interests.

The proletariat represents socialist relations of production, the capitalist roaders represent capitalist production relations. The static view of social relations of the Mensheviks makes it impossible for them to draw this line of demarcation, and it also makes it that much clearer as to why they downgrade the tasks of revolutionizing the relations of production and carrying the struggle into the superstructure. If social relations are everywhere the same and if commodity relations are tantamount to bourgeois production relations then they'll be around for a long time. Social relations neither move backward to capitalist nor forward to more perfect socialist relations. Hence our Mensheviks' one-sided emphasis on fortifying the level of productive forces.

#### Basic Contradictions of Socialist Society

The socialist economic base consists of the socialist relations of production.\* There is no prescribed level of the productive forces

**•In the original "Reply," where this sentence now appears, the text read: "The socialist economic base is a unity of the productive forces and relations." This is incorrect; the economic base consists of the relations of production and does not include the productive forces as such. On the other hand, as the "Reply" explained, citing an article in Volume 1, Number 2 of *The Communist* (theoretical journal of the Central Committee of the RCP), "while the relations of production are what essentially define the economic base at any time, these relations of production are ultimately determined by the stage of development of the productive forces (The article in *The Communist* goes on immediately to say, "such is the dialectical relationship between the forces and relations of production." But that article, as well as the "Reply," did contain some confusion on this point in particular, which should be cleared up.)**

**Overall, and overwhelmingly, the original "Reply" dealt quite correctly with the dialectical relationship between the forces and relations of production, as well**

which, once and for all, acts as a barrier to capitalist restoration. Highly developed industry in the transitional period is no more a guarantee against such a regression—is no more a guarantee against yes, bourgeois social relations—than a less developed industrial base. Wasn't this the experience of the Soviet Union? The CC Report points out that there is no specific quantity in the development of the productive forces which can be associated with communism. For all we know, Marx might have considered a society that could send spaceprobes to Mars and duplicate forms of life as possessing an adequate material basis for communism. But we do know that Mao saw the transitional period as an extended one, perhaps lasting for centuries.

The development of the productive forces must be understood dialectically both with respect to the relations of production and more broadly as a back and forth interaction between the base and superstructure. It will not do to say, with our Mensheviks, that "Without constant advances in the base and superstructure socialism will fail." Of course, as a general statement about the need for the two to be developed it is unassailable, but it misses the point of the dialectical relationship between the two. The essentially static view they take of social relations and the struggle to transform them and their consistent underestimation of the importance of creating the political and ideological conditions for the advance toward communism makes it important to examine this question more closely.

How are we to understand Mao's statement that "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is a strong motive force for the development of the social productive forces in our country"? Mao, of course, had defined what revolution is decades earlier, "A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another." Our Mensheviks probably view this statement, like the Cultural Revolution, as irrelevant to today's "actual condi-

as that between the base and the superstructure. And it is correct in particular in noting the ultimate dependence of the relations of production—the economic base—on the productive forces. But to include the productive forces as an aspect of the economic base is to confuse, and incorrectly combine, two different contradictions—between the forces and relations of production and between the relations of production (economic base) and the superstructure. In fact, this error is not only misleading in general, but specifically tends to underrate the importance of both the relations of production and the superstructure—and of the contradiction between them—and could weaken criticism of the "theory of the productive forces," the very opportunist line that is being exposed in this section of the "Reply" and is repudiated throughout the "Reply" as a whole. Some other slight changes were made from the original text to reflect the correct understanding of this point more clearly.

tions." How, on the other hand, are we to interpret the statement in *PR* #4 (1978) which castigates the notion that "'revolution' is always a political concept in a society where there are classes and class struggle"? Continuing further, the author writes, "can we ultimately defeat and eliminate the bourgeoisie and ensure the transition from socialism to communism simply by carrying on the struggle in the superstructure and not rapidly developing the productive forces?" The difference between Mao's statement and that of the Hua cabal is not one of degree or emphasis, they are fundamentally opposed. Mao is saying that the Cultural Revolution was exactly that, a revolution in the superstructure, and revolution is indeed political, involving as it does the struggle between classes. The eclecticism of this second statement defies belief.

First off, this statement—and the whole article of which it is a part—does not express the actual dialectical relationship between revolution and production but in effect sets them against each other; it opposes Mao's revolutionary formulation of "grasp revolution, promote production." Second, it poses the contradiction—which, as noted, it treats as essentially an antagonism—as that between "carrying on the struggle in the *superstructure*" and "rapidly developing the productive forces" (emphasis added here). Thus, while downgrading the importance of struggle in the superstructure and in fact pitting it against developing the productive forces, this statement leaves out the question of revolutionizing the economic base, constantly transforming the relations of production. And insofar as this article deals with the question of transforming production relations it treats this as a by-product of the development of the productive forces under socialism. This article even resurrects the position that attention should be paid "first and foremost" to developing the productive forces, in order to promote the revisionist line of the current rulers. (See *PR* 4, 1978, p. 8.)\*

\*In the original text of this "Reply," instead of this paragraph the following appeared: "To be sure, "simply" to struggle in the superstructure is not everything, but it is, in fact, the decisive thing. And Mao's statement is that such a struggle gave great impetus to the development of the productive forces." This formulation was criticized at the Second Congress of the RCP because it did not give sufficient emphasis to the question of revolutionizing the economic base and tended to run counter to the correct thrust of this whole section of the "Reply," which explains how overall the economic base is principal over the superstructure. What was correct and crucial in the original text, especially in opposition to the revisionism expressed in the *Peking Review* article, was the emphasis given to waging struggle in the superstructure and the dialectical relationship between this and developing the productive forces. As the "Reply" puts it somewhat earlier, "Unless struggle is carried on in the realm of ideology and politics, it will not be possible to deal with questions of 'economic development.' "

*PR #4* also raises a new "automatically" line. We are told that "the realization of farm mechanization in particular, will bring about the revolutionization of relations among all the small collectives which will in turn revolutionize the peasants' minds." Here the revisionists miss two points. One, perhaps not so salient from their standpoint, is that large-scale and more technologically advanced production will not have this effect unless there is conscious struggle in the realm of the superstructure. Two, that within a given level of ownership it is necessary and possible to constantly revolutionize relations which in turn will promote the further development of the productive forces.

Changes in the forces of production do lead to changes in the relations of production, but big changes in the relations of production lead to *big* changes in the productive forces. This is what happened in the period of the Great Leap Forward when peasants organized communes—raised the level of ownership by bringing together land and implements and establishing communal facilities—and gave tremendous drive to the productive forces. Mao summed this phenomenon up by saying that "collectivization precedes mechanization." But it is also the case that there will always be the need to improve these relations exactly because the productive forces are active and constantly developing.

In *The Communist* (Vol. 1, No. 2), we point out "while the relations of production are what essentially define the economic base at any time, these relations of production are ultimately determined by the stage of development of the productive forces. (As pointed out in the CC Report this article was written as a compromise. But even as is, it stands as an indictment of the Men-

In other words, at all times it is of great importance to pay attention to waging the class struggle in the superstructure will indeed be decisive in determining the nature of the economic base—and at such times therefore the superstructure is principal over the base, reversing the overall relationship between the two.

It should be noted here that the "Reply," including in the section in which the above change has been made, does place emphasis on the importance of revolutionizing both the economic base and the superstructure, as for example in the following statement, which appears shortly after the one changed: "Hence, the working class must carry out revolution in all spheres of the superstructure as well as in the economic base."

It should also be noted here that the Four, while attaching great importance to revolution in the realm of the superstructure, also strongly stressed the need for continuous revolution in the economic base—a point which is also made several times in the "Reply." In fact, the revisionist rulers now reigning in China have repeatedly attacked the Four for laying great stress on revolutionizing the economic base and in fact for leading the proletariat and masses in class struggle in this realm.

Some other minor changes have also been made in the text to reflect the correct understanding of these points more clearly.

sheviks and their mentors.) In this sense, the productive forces remain principal in the socialist period. The productive forces establish certain boundaries and limits to what can be achieved at any given point in history. But the relations of production exert a tremendous reaction on the productive forces. The working class can exercise great freedom within any stage in revolutionizing and transforming the relations of production, further liberating the productive forces and propelling advances toward the next stage. And at certain points in this process the relations of production will play the principal and decisive role. For instance, it is not possible given the level of development of the productive forces to eliminate the individual enterprise as a unit of production and calculation. But it is possible to bring to a higher level relations of socialist cooperation between enterprises, for instance campaigns to spread technical innovation or check up on quality of goods. For some time to come in China, the work team will remain the basic accounting unit in the countryside, but it is possible to reduce and narrow differences between them, which not only prevents polarization but which in dialectical relation with the development of the economy helps lay the basis for the advance to a higher level of ownership.

The working class does not passively wait on the further development of the productive forces in order for changes to take place, but actively seeks to transform social relations. There is, then, a continual interaction between the forces and relations of production, now one, now the other, pushing the other forward.

As pointed out before, the economic base of any given society consists of the relations of production, while these are ultimately determined by the level of development of the productive forces. The socialist economic base cannot grow spontaneously out of the old system of capitalism nor can it advance under socialism without decisive interventions by the working class itself. What is required in the first place is a revolution in the superstructure which is the seizure of state power by the working class. This constitutes only the first step of its historic mission, which is to wipe out all class distinctions and achieve communism. In order for this to happen the working class must subject production to conscious control, and this requires grasping the economic laws of society and acting in accordance with them. This, however, is possible only by sweeping away ideological influences, the force of habit and other remnants of capitalism which stand as obstacles to understanding and transforming the world on the basis of the proletariat's interests. Hence, the working class must carry out



revolution in all spheres of the superstructure as well as in the economic base.

How in light of this are we to assess the role of the superstructure in the period of socialist transition? Clearly, when the proletariat seizes power, the superstructure is principal. Without first establishing the proletarian dictatorship the new forms of ownership cannot be developed. Once established, the state power of the working class, its ideology, and its cultural and educational institutions promote the growth of the economic base. It is the economic relations of society that call forth a particular superstructure. It is not just any superstructure that can be grafted at will onto the economic base. The institutions and ideas of society are ultimately rooted in the material conditions of society.

On the other hand, socialist production relations cannot develop without the support and influence of the superstructure. To give one example: to make a leap forward in the wage system, for instance in going from piece-rates to time-rates, as occurred in many places in China in 1958, required intense ideological preparation and struggle. But, though this ideological struggle was decisive for this particular leap, what was possible under these circumstances was in the end determined by the economic base. No amount of ideological struggle could eliminate the wage system.

In sum, the economic base of society—that is, the relations of production—is principal over the superstructure. It is principal in so far as (a) it determines for the transitional period as a whole the character of the superstructure, and (b) at each stage of development of the revolution it sets the limits or terms in which the superstructure can exercise its influence. Yet, at all times the superstructure reacts upon the base and influences it enormously. This can be seen in the very powerful role that the Party of the working class and its line plays. The relationship between the base and superstructure can be seen as one in which the base is the principal or *determining* factor and the superstructure is the *initiating* one.

Under socialism there is both harmony and contradiction between the base and superstructure. It is a general law of historical materialism that the superstructure will sooner or later become an obstacle to the further development of the economic base. This is because the productive forces are the most active factor in social development and their development continually requires transformations in the relations of production. But there will come a point at which the superstructure no longer can facilitate these transformations. At such a point, changes in the superstructure become decisive. When the superstructure more impedes than fosters the

further development of the base, it becomes principal. This does not mean that only when it is principal are changes required in the superstructure; it only means that when changes in the superstructure are decisive in determining the nature of the economic base then the superstructure becomes principal.

The contradiction between the superstructure as a progressive force promoting the development of the base and as a reactionary influence assumes the form of class struggle. Every few years in a socialist society a major struggle will break out and find its concentrated expression in the superstructure. The outcome of this struggle will determine whether the working class continues to rule. Therefore at such times, the superstructure becomes principal since the socialist base will be destroyed if the working class loses power.

Such struggles will occur often under socialism since the bourgeoisie reemerges out of the productive relations of socialist society and will continually jump out under new conditions. For this reason, the transformation of the relation between the base and superstructure, with now the one, now the other principal, will go on in a way not found in preceding societies. The superstructure was principal at the start of the Cultural Revolution. Contradictions had emerged in the management of enterprises, the system of education, the relationship of the Party to the masses, etc. A fierce struggle raged between the bourgeoisie and proletariat, which initially resulted in a great victory by the proletariat. The transformations carried out in the superstructure did not simply bring it into mechanical conformity with the base but spurred further transformations in the productive relations. In fact it is a general rule that through winning victories in these major struggles concentrated in the superstructure the proletariat is able to make new leaps in transforming society as a whole.

Even when big struggles like these do not take place, class struggle is the key link. Chang Chun-chiao explains in his pamphlet: "In the various spheres of the superstructure, some areas are in fact still controlled by the bourgeoisie which has the upper hand there; some are being transformed but the results are not yet consolidated, and old ideas and the old force of habit are still stubbornly obstructing the growth of socialist new things." The bourgeoisie will try continually to regain positions it has lost and to prevent the working class from winning new ones. Out of this necessity, the working class must wage active class struggle. This is the decisive condition for carrying out any other task.

That class struggle is the key link is not in opposition to the

fact that the base is overall principal in the socialist period. Classes do, after all, arise out of the material conditions of the base, and the questions fought out by contending classes have their ultimate point of determination in the base. This can be seen in the case of a correct or incorrect line. The correctness or incorrectness of ideological and political line is decisive. Line must guide the forward advance of the working class. But any old line won't do—it is not line, but *correct* line that moves things forward. Whether or not a line is correct is determined by whether it conforms to and promotes the needs of the development of the base. This is not to say that every line struggle turns on economic questions. On the contrary, sharp line struggles also take place over cultural, educational and other questions in the superstructure. But here, too, in the final analysis what is progressive and advanced in these fields is that which contributes to the development of the economic base—to changes in the production relations which further liberate the productive forces.

The bourgeoisie will, as mentioned above, try to win back its lost positions and throw up barriers to every new advance by the proletariat. The development of the productive forces in and of itself cannot defeat the class enemy. Only resolute class struggle by the working class can and there are no circumstances under which the development of the productive forces can take precedence over class struggle. Otherwise the bourgeoisie will win out no matter what the level of development of the productive forces.

What the working class strives to do is to *liberate the productive forces* from the shackles of capitalist production relations and the remnants of bourgeois relations still existing under socialism. This is not the same thing as *developing* the productive forces, though in the long run it will have this effect. Liberating the productive forces is fundamentally a qualitative question of removing the fetters that prevent the working class from consciously using and developing these productive forces. For example, a rule that stipulates that only certain people can perform repair work in a plant stifles worker initiative and is a fetter on the productive forces. If the question is approached, as the current leadership in China does, as one of developing the productive forces, then rules which chain workers to routine and convention and uphold one-man management are justifiable if in the short run they raise production. Achieving the abundance necessary for communism can only take place through the continuous interaction of the forces and relations of production and the base and superstructure such that the working class gains increasing mastery over society and

nature.

Mao's all-important formulation "Grasp Revolution, Promote Production" expresses the dialectical relationship between waging the class struggle and developing the productive forces. Fundamentally, the fetters on the productive forces represent the influence of the bourgeoisie and the vestiges of capitalist society. Attacking and striking down these fetters to the greatest degree possible, in the superstructure and the base, on the basis of consciously grasping the laws of society will lead to the further development of the productive forces. This is the only way that the economy can continue to advance in great strides along the socialist road.

#### Two, Lines, Two Roads on the Economy

The Four were not opposed to modernization. They were not opposed to the mechanization of agriculture. Maybe Mickey Jarvis believes that Chang Chun-chiao went into plants and told people to let production take care of itself and preached against economic development. But, then again, Mickey Jarvis probably believes that the Minister of Culture, a "sworn accomplice of the Gang of Four," swallowed detergent and killed himself. It's the Mensheviks, it seems, who will swallow anything.

In fact, the suburban communes under the leadership of the Four had been making strides in the direction of mechanization. Shanghai was not exactly what you would call an industrial backwater. Major innovations in ship building, machine-tool manufacture, and textile production were pioneered in the city. Moreover, significant renovations of industrial facilities were made with little or no assistance from the state. We'll have more to say on this later.

What the Four were opposed to was modernization with a capital M. This was not a moral injunction that small is beautiful or to be backward is sublime. Rather their objections were two-fold. First, the four modernizations as they were conceived and programmatically implemented by the Teng/Hua headquarters were guided by a revisionist line. In essence it was a line that held that nothing should interfere with production and anything that gave it a boost was perfectly acceptable. Look at the "20 Points." It says that all this non-productive activity like cultural and political work in the plants that detracts from production must cease and desist. But the same document redefines the work of technicians as productive labor. Hua does this one better and

restores their titles in the CC circular. If this isn't the outlook of these people—which is to say, get rid of anything that stands in the way of production—comrades should look twice at *PR #4* (1978) which says "since we are dedicated to the cause of communism, we must, *first and foremost*, be enthusiastic about developing our productive forces." (our emphasis).

But the second objection of the Four, and very much related, was that the economic plans of the revisionists were just plain wrong, they did not reflect the realities of the world situation, the Chinese economy and the Chinese road to socialism. These plans could not utilize the real strengths of the Chinese economy since they did not flow from its actual material base. They would lead to failure and demoralization, lopsided and unbalanced development, increasing dependency on foreign powers and would have disastrous consequences militarily, when war broke out. It is to these points that we turn.

The current leadership in China paints a picture of stagnation and disappointment in the performance of the Chinese economy. We have to ask ourselves, then, why is it that in 1975 Chou En-lai presents a report to the 4th National People's Congress which upholds socialist new things and declares that "Reactionaries at home and abroad asserted that the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution would certainly disrupt the development of our national economy, but facts have now given them a strong rebuttal." To whom is he referring and what might they be saying?

Chou's report indicates that the total value of agricultural output for 1974 was 51% higher than that of 1964 and that gross industrial output increased by 190% over the same period. These are impressive gains. The Four are arrested some 20 months later. Had they in that period so botched things up that it was no longer possible to say that the Cultural Revolution was a good thing for the economy or that the assessment of the overall performance of the economy could no longer be upheld? Facts are interesting in this regard. In 1974, industry grew by only 4% and growth overall was below the 10 year average. Does this call into question Chou's report, is he running from the truth? No, it does not. Not because there were not problems, but because, overall, the Chinese road to socialism was the correct one and reactionaries at home and abroad were on the one hand trying to seize on these difficulties to justify a detour from that road and, on the other, trying to stir up further problems to add strength to their argument. The solution to these problems lay in persevering on the Chinese road to socialism. There was certainly nothing that occurred during the

years '74-76 which justifies the new turn of the current rulers in economic practices and priorities.

Mao makes the statement in 1974 that "China cannot compare with the rich or powerful countries politically, economically, etc. She can be grouped only with the relatively poor countries." (See *PR #45*, 1977.) This is an important point to keep in mind in deciding what kind of standards to apply to the development of the Chinese economy and how such development will proceed. It also focuses attention on the current leadership's insistence that "advanced world levels" be the measuring rod for future economic growth.

### The Chinese Road

Based on the fact of its underdevelopment and summing up the lessons of socialist construction in the Soviet Union as well as China's own experiences, the CPC under Mao was able to develop a model for growth which took shape with the rising struggles of the masses following liberation. This was to rapidly promote the productive forces by making maximum use of the initiative of the workers and peasants—that is fundamentally through the practice of revolution—and by practicing independence and self-reliance. Intense two-line struggle occurred within the Party over whether this was the correct path forward.

This struggle turned first and foremost on the question of whether the struggle for production had superceded the class struggle. Liu held that it did and fell back on every rotten scheme and capitalist method around to promote production, even going so far as to say that exploitation had its good points. The major problem facing the Chinese people in the development of their economy in the '50s and at the bottom of controversies over the direction of the economy is agriculture. How to boost its growth rate? This isn't simply a matter of feeding people, which is obviously of great concern given the historic condition of agriculture in China, but something upon which hinges the entire development of the economy. Marx explained about capitalist societies and those that preceded them that "an agricultural labor productivity exceeding the basic requirements of the laborer is the basis of all societies..." He also said in connection with socialist society that it "creates a material prerequisite for the new synthesis of a higher level, the combination of agriculture with industry." The working class must arrange these relations on the basis of objective laws.

The growth of agricultural production will be an important

determinant of the rate of industrial growth both in terms of the resources that can be set aside for such growth after allocations to agriculture and, more decisively, because industry depends on agriculture for raw materials, markets, accumulation funds, and labor. The revisionists, headed by Liu, had a position on this and it came to a head with the Great Leap Forward. They claimed that agriculture could not advance without first undergoing mechanization. This depended on large-scale industry supplying implements and equipment. In the main, the Chinese industrial base was not sufficient for this and, therefore, China ought to look abroad for this machinery, even if it meant going deep into debt.

Mao said that the key link was to raise the activism and enthusiasm of the peasants and on that basis to bring about collectivization. This would then provide the basis for mechanization. Moreover, the development of small-scale rural industry would make use of local raw materials and know-how, thereby contributing to the national economy, diffuse skills and technique among the peasants and help to break down differences between peasants and workers. It would serve the immediate needs of agriculture while developing into a major force for mechanization. All this related to another big question, an extremely important strategic principle, "Be prepared for war." With its population concentrated in the countryside, its transport system relatively backward, and its defense capabilities dependent on mobilizing her people, agricultural self-sufficiency and local self-reliance in industry would be key to fighting the kind of war favorable to the Chinese.

The Great Leap saw millions of peasants joining together into communes, practicing new agricultural techniques, breaking with tradition and superstition in family and social life, and carrying on political education. It saw peasants smelting steel in their back yards and manufacturing fertilizer in villages, besides the further advances in the ownership system. All this was narrowing the differences between town and country and between worker and peasant.

In industry the Great Leap Forward gave rise to new industries and technologies in the cities, the elimination of bonuses and piece rates in many plants and new management practices. The bourgeoisie never ceased to sabotage this movement. The specter of peasants making iron and steel was held up to ridicule. Small plants in the countryside were ordered shut as were many health and recreation centers in the communes. Within the communes individual plots were restored and encouraged, private markets were promoted—in a word the two most significant achievements of the

Great Leap, the communes and the "walking on two legs" principle of combining small and medium industry with large industry were systematically attacked.

It's interesting because you can look at the rural construction index for the Great Leap period and see that farm buildings, small scale irrigation and water conservancy works and small industrial facilities grew immensely. And you can see the same in cities where plants were renovated and capacity expanded. But industrial output fell and grain production which soared initially also fell on account of natural disasters. The dislocations in industry were caused in large part by the exodus of the Soviet technicians, but also a movement of this scope and magnitude was bound to cause problems, such as bottlenecks in transport and certain breakdowns in plan fulfillment.

The reins had to be pulled in, the revisionists shouted. Things were a total mess. Mao, who saw the great social and political consequences the Leap was having, even though certain adjustments would have to be made, replied "this is chaos on a grand scale"—and he regarded this as mainly good and not bad. He pointed out that this upheaval taught millions what they could not have learned in years. Nevertheless, the revisionists headed up by Liu, Teng, Po I-Po, Li Hsien-nien (and it seems, for a time, they had the backing of Chou) had the upper hand. The 70 Articles (the forerunner of today's "20 Points") represented their program of reassertion of central control over enterprises which had been run with local initiative, close monitoring of their finances, the reaffirmation of the role of specialists and the reduction of study time.

These revisionists slandered the achievements of the masses. They told them that they ran the factories badly, did not produce up to high standards. The "irregular" methods of the masses were said to be the source of countless disruptions and bottlenecks. And they cracked down (not always successfully as many peasants resisted the orders to shut the rural plants) in the name of economic efficiency. They could produce mounds of statistics to make their case and they even could show how production picked up under their regime. But what happened is that many of the projects and creations of the masses came on strong—new strains of rice, cultivation methods, dams and canals, improvements in technique—that is, they paid off and these creeps took credit for it.

The 70 Articles were introduced on an experimental basis in Shanghai in 1961. Control over workers was increased ("too much anarchy during the Leap") through the imposition of new rules and regulations, and full-time supervisors were brought in to enforce

them. Some plants had manuals with as many as 800 pages of rules (if you need this part, make out a request and put it on this form, and give it to this person and so on). *Peking Review* defends the Taylor system. This is nothing new. Around this time, in a steel works in Peking some 100 job analysts were assigned to watch over workers and make time/motion studies to be used for calculating piece rates and bonuses. Quality control became one of the main ways to control the workers and slander their defying convention. Workers would be penalized and some plants even shut because they did not meet the standards imposed on them.

There was a trust system experimented with in 1963. Each industry was to be vertically integrated, which means brought into a central command structure. Decisions regarding material and finished products would be made at the very top and the performance of these enterprises would be judged according to their profitability. This was an obvious attempt to pour cold water on a situation which had grown up during the Leap, when enterprises practicing local initiative would make use of local raw materials and waste material, help set up and assist small local industry, spread technical knowledge, and aid agriculture locally. Teng, Hua and others in '75-76 were advocating something very similar in discussions of the roles of central ministries.

Many of the same people involved in the reversal of the Leap are now in the cockpit. They are making the same arguments about disorder and inefficiency wrought by the mass movements coming off the Cultural Revolution. Like the Great Leap, the Cultural Revolution did not solve all problems, it even created some new difficulties, but its enduring legacy was that it set a new orientation. Today, it is that orientation of mass initiative that is under attack, of putting politics in command that is under attack, of being bold and critical that is under attack. We hear nothing of the creations and achievements of Shanghai shipbuilders who broke with international norms and challenged accepted designs in constructing vessels.

The Chinese road to socialism under Mao's leadership was summed up in the phrase "take agriculture as the foundation and industry as the leading factor." It meant making grain the key link and promoting locally-run industry. Industry was to direct its efforts first toward agriculture and those branches serving it. Industry was to combine small and medium size enterprises with large ones and to rationally distribute and locate them. It was a road that saw all of this as a question of political line, of breaking down the gaps between industry/agriculture, worker/peasant, and


town/country. It was based on the principle of combining local initiative and administration with central planning and predicating all of this on independence and self-reliance. This was a road which took socialist enthusiasm and activism as the main stimulus to production.

#### Performance of the Economy and the Four Modernizations

Was the economy stagnant or even shipwrecked in the last few years? This is the conclusion one is forced to reach if we accept certain propositions of the Hua cabal and their domestic lackeys. There are strange indications here that the very phenomenal changes that have taken place in China over the past 27 years are being slighted. Clearly what must be grasped is the long-run trend of development of the economy. The last two years, for instance, have seen poorer harvests than anticipated, largely because of natural difficulties. Particular sectors of the economy may lag behind or spurt ahead of others; in fact as Mao points out in his discussion of the Soviet texts it is through the unity of balance and imbalance that the economy develops. It is also the case that certain sectors such as transport will for some time to come remain relatively backward. But, overall, the development of the economy has been very positive.

Growth has proceeded at a pace that exceeds that of many other less developed countries with a similar per capita income. It is also the case that if we were to compare China's growth rate with that of major industrialized countries today such as the U.S., France, Germany, or Great Britain during earlier and more recent periods, China's rate of increase of per capita income has been extremely high. These measures by themselves don't tell us much since they really don't take into account the question of the real *quality* of growth: the elimination of poverty, the raising of skills level, the extension of social services, the equalization of income, and, most of all, the consolidation of the proletarian dictatorship.

The chart reproduced here reveals some interesting trends. It is taken from a congressional study. First it shows a rate of growth of GNP on an annual basis from 1953-1974 of 5.6%.<sup>2</sup> The makeup of this GNP shows that agricultural production has been advancing over population; industrial production starting from a small base has made rapid increases in capacity and output of industrial materials, machinery and military equipment, and very advanced technologies in nuclear weapons and satellites have been developed.



Another point which can be seen from the chart is that substantial increases in output followed the Great Leap and the mass upsurge of the Cultural Revolution. Industrial production grew at an astounding rate of 18% in 1970. What is very important to understand here is that growth has not been confined to certain sectors—although the producer goods industries have advanced impressively—but has been gradually and intentionally spread from the old and newer industrial bases to the rest of the country. This point will be gone into later, but what should be underscored here is that development has taken place according to the socialist principle of planned and proportionate development even if this has meant in the short run a slower rate of growth. What's more, as the Great Leap and Cultural Revolution indicate, on the basis of limited productive forces production relations have been radically altered. The rural industrial networks born out of these movements have played a major role in the economy providing over 50% of the nation's output of cement and 20% of its iron.

Steel has been a weak link in the economy. The Four have been blamed for its shortcomings. This weakness expresses itself in the falling off in growth in the production of steel and a shortage of special steels. The Mensheviks seize upon this to buttress their case that things were not going too well. That there were problems in steel was undeniable, but to suggest, as did a wall-poster that went up in Canton' in early January '77 (clearly reflecting the views of Hua, Teng, *et al.*) that China ought to be where Japan is at in total tonnage (in the range of 110 million tons) is absurd.

The Chinese steel industry was built on the foundations of the old, and massively expanded with Soviet technology and technical assistance. The sudden withdrawal of that aid and the ensuing

disruptions resulted in a decline in output of just about 10 million tons and it would not be until the years of the Cultural Revolution that production would reach these levels again. The rural plants which the revisionists like Teng tried to shut down played a big part in helping to get the steel industry back on its feet. The Mensheviks we suppose would have argued in the period of the Soviet withdrawal that the polemics against the Soviets and the disagreements over the terms of this assistance incited strife and retaliation. Nothing could be worse than for industrial output to suffer and, if it took begging and concessions to keep it going, then that's what would be necessary.

The Mensheviks tell us that two new steel complexes can't get going because of the lack of trained personnel. We don't know the exact details involved here. We do know that at least one of these facilities was imported, that foreign technical personnel have been associated with some of these projects and that there has been continuing controversy over the place and exact terms of these imported plants. We also know that China has made great advances in continuous casting technology—about which we hear very little from our Mensheviks—and that a caster was built in Shanghai by the workers in 18 days during the Cultural Revolution which served as a prototype for others.

The wall poster in Canton says that if Japan and China were roughly producing the same amount of steel in 1957 (about 10 million tons) then by now why aren't things equal? This analogy with Japan is hardly a valid one. The Japanese industry was rebuilding from war devastation through the '50s. Much of this involved a massive flow of investment capital from the state and foreign capital. Japan's pre-war steel output was so much in excess of China's (which hadn't even attained one million tons of output) that comparisons serve no useful purpose. The Japanese industry had as its backbone large plants with extensive application of modern technology. Taking 1957 as a common point of departure for the growth of the steel industry in Japan and China is especially misleading when we compare the productive bases of the two countries. Japan was fully industrialized at the time whereas China was and still is in the early stages of industrialization.

Fifteen per cent of the steel produced in China comes from small rural plants. These plants which continuously grow in number will add to total steelmaking capacity, while serving local needs more effectively. On the other hand, China is not going to be able to depend on the construction of big, new complexes to boost output, given their enormous cost. Production of *finished* steel in-

creased from 13.4 million metric tons in 1970 to 19.5 in 1975. It was in the years of '74-'76 that it hovered around the same levels. This was a source of concern to the leadership of the Party, but two things must be said in this connection. The difference between that performance and something approaching a more optimal level is not between 20 million tons and 60 million tons or even 40 for that matter, though there was room for significant improvement. Second, how to assess and deal with these difficulties is of major importance. Part of the difficulties of the industry stem from low grade ores and inadequate finishing facilities. These are problems which have been tackled in a variety of ways, from importing equipment to improve the quality of iron ore and coke to importing special steel. Nevertheless the quality of steel produced in China has continued to improve and local enterprises have grown by developing their own raw materials sources.

Though these technical questions loom as important ones, the vitality of the industry depends on the political and ideological line in command. The Mensheviks who see the Four behind any slowdown in production making no attempt to really analyze the struggles that took place in let's say the Anshan Works, the largest in the country, over management practices, will go right in with the "20 Points" and call for firm management and raising the status of technicians. The Four approached production difficulties differently. An article in *Peking Review* #50, 1975 describes some of the advances made during the Lin Piao/Confucius campaign. It tells how workers struggled over rules which called for the phasing out of certain equipment and departments after a set period of time. The workers felt this equipment could still be utilized. It tells of struggles over whether workers should receive extra pay for making use of leftover molten steel at their own initiative. It asks how can we best spur the enthusiasm of the workers? It describes how workers struggled against a system of material punishment which would deduct from the production quota of workers who did not leave machinery and accessories in a proper way for the next shift. It was concluded that such a system intensified contradictions among workers. Replacing such coercive measures with political measures to solve the problem led to increases in production.

It has been reported in the Western press that Mao issued a document on China's steel and iron industry in June of '75. The campaign to criticize Lin Piao/Confucius summarized above would seem to fit right in line with what Mao said needed to be examined in the enterprises: "whether or not the ideological and political line is correct; whether or not the movement to study the theory of the

dictatorship of the proletariat has really been developed; whether or not the masses are fully mobilized; whether or not a strong leadership core has been established; whether or not the bourgeois characteristics in the management of the enterprise had been overcome; whether or not the Party's policies have been implemented; and whether or not an effective blow has been struck against the disruptive activities of the class enemy. In sum, whether or not the tasks of consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat has been implemented at the basic level."

How are our Mensheviks going to explain away this directive by Mao? Here we are in 1975 during the height of the so-called "factional activities" of the Four and at a time when the steel industry is encountering difficulties. Look at what Mao puts in first place: Whether or not the ideological and political line is correct and whether or not the campaign to study the theory of the dictatorship of the proletariat has really been developed. Now if this isn't "gang of four idealism" we don't know what is. Mao doesn't ask if these mills are making up for production time lost to political discussion and study and class struggle in general. He doesn't ask if these mills are approaching world levels in efficiency. He doesn't even make a point about the four modernizations. Mao's statement is obviously a rebuke to revisionists then and today for whom the problems of the steel industry can be solved only by phasing out politics and worker management in the mills. In fact Mao knew that such problems can only be solved—in a socialist way—by putting the class struggle in command as indicated in the questions he does pose.

While the steel industry has encountered difficulties in the last few years, the oil industry has grown impressively. The line of those in power is to increasingly build the economy around it, notably as a source of foreign exchange, and therefore aggravate differences between sectors. The "20 Points" says that oil can be used as payment for drilling equipment. This was criticized in the CC Report correctly as a form of enslavement. Suppose, for instance, oil is required in greater quantities in one sector and yet this same oil is earmarked for repayment to a foreign country. Such a policy, beyond tying China's development to that of other countries, tends to undermine a unified policy of making the entire economy serve the needs of the people. One account that appeared in the *Economic and Political Weekly*, told of how in 1976 transport systems were being used to move oil for export at the expense of the movement of grains and foodstuffs to the cities and machinery and fertilizers to the countryside. The Four called for a

reduction in oil export and are now hounded for their interference.

The real interference of the Four was interference against the revisionism of Teng, Hua, et. al. Their opposition to the "four modernizations" was not an objection to pushing the national economy forward; in fact, they themselves held that in the early '70s a "new leap" situation appeared. The great advances during the Cultural Revolution did provide favorable ground for a forward thrust in the economy. But by 1974-75 the right, which had been attacking continually since the Cultural Revolution, was gathering force and it had to be dealt with by mass campaigns to defeat them politically and ideologically. This in turn would spur the whole of society forward.

The issue that divided the Four from Chou, Hua, Teng, et. al. was not whether to develop the economy or not, but how. It is necessary to set long-term goals against which 5- and 10-year plans can be evaluated. But the four modernizations as it was defended and elaborated by the capitalist roaders was on the one hand a grand blue-print, i.e. by the year 2000 going through two phases, the one to be completed by 1980, the second by the end of the century, China will have reached the front ranks of the world. It brooked no interference. The possibility of war which would surely set such an ambitious program back, which more accurately would ravage it, is not considered in these calculations. And if this "four modernizations" is the surest defense in the event of war, then it has to be completed in less than 25 years. Wasn't Mao thinking about war as somewhat more imminent than 25 years off?

On the other hand, this "four modernizations" doesn't contain much substance. The changes in planning policy and orientation were not spelled out other than to achieve agricultural mechanization by 1980. The only real attempt to put some meat on it, that is to show more exactly what was intended was the "20 Points" and it's obvious enough what's wrong with them, to any Marxist at least. The Mensheviks act like the issue was simply one of going in for growth or not. This betrays their ignorance of Marxism and the actual conditions in China, yes the *actual conditions* in which transformations in the relations of production would lead to the development of the productive forces.

While presented as a grand blueprint, the "four modernizations" could be used to justify just about anything and its vagueness could permit the most elastic definitions of its goals. The front ranks by 2000. Which front ranks? Japan, France, the Soviet Union, the U.S.? A comprehensive industrial and economic system by 1980? What does it mean? A steel industry with an out-

put of maybe 30 million metric tons? It seems unlikely. Even the mechanization of agriculture is somewhat fluid in meaning. And this may well have been adjusted downward from what it meant five years ago just like the bourgeoisie in this country toys with unemployment statistics. Mechanization presently means that 70% of agriculture is to be semi-or fully mechanized by the mid '80s. *Peking Review* #7 (1978) does put forward more specific targets for necessary increases in output from different sectors in order to meet the 70% goal. But this still doesn't change the fact that what is meant by mechanization remains vague and subject to redefinition as the circumstances dictate. For instance, at the end of the article it is pointed out that even when the 1980 targets are fulfilled "agricultural mechanization will still not be at a high level." According to this logic it could be said that agriculture in China is already mechanized but still at a low level. This emphasizes again that the call to mechanize by 1980 smacks of a big hype job.

The Four were the realists, they had the sensible and sober-minded approach to the economy. Not that they didn't think that the Chinese people could scale the heights, but that they knew it would have to be through their own efforts and by mobilizing the truly positive factors in society. It was more, not less realistic, to base hopes for increased productivity on moral incentives, political movements and campaigns in the enterprises rather than on material incentives. Any other method will mean speed-up and demoralization. Given that China is poor it is realistic to suppose that small and medium size industry can be the backbone of industrial advance. No doubt the Four opposed some of the ambitious targets that were being floated about in the discussions for a 1980 plan. No doubt they felt that it was not possible to expect China to be at the level of the U.S. by the turn of the century. But understanding this made it realistically possible to promote the most vigorous development exactly by staying on the course that had been set through the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. The fulfillment of the "four modernizations" as they were conceived by Teng and Chou would lead to lopsided development—for instance, an oil industry receiving a growing disproportion of the state's funds—and, in the end, to dependency on abroad.

"The Four were opposed to growth and Shanghai was a mess." This we are told in current issues of *Peking Review*. This question of disruptions, incidentally, is very complicated. (The Mensheviks tell us that Comrade Avakian's "left idealist" line leads to rightism and ruined the NUWO. Meanwhile, they actively set out



to sabotage work with their right line around the miners and bring confusion and dishonor to the NUWO.) Through 1974 and 1975 disruptions took place in China. Black markets increased in the countryside, there were reports of embezzling in some plants, factional disputes in many factories. But these things were the consequences of sharpening class struggle. The right would step in to sow confusion and division; they had experience with this dating back to the Cultural Revolution.

In 1975, at the height of many of these disturbances, the right pressed hard for a wage conference. The Four opposed it as we learn in the *Peking Review*. But what they opposed was the incorrect precedent that was being set—resolving grievances and unrest through wage increases. And, again, they were the realists. Worker morale could be raised only through raising consciousness and beating back the right. They were the realists because wage differentials that widened would not only lead to further divisions but, given the output of the economy, to inflationary pressures.

The line of the Four on wages was predicated on understanding that the wage system which undergoes a fundamental change with socialism—no longer the exchange of labor power as a commodity—still contains contradictory elements. From each according to his ability stands in opposition to payment according to work, and it was first and foremost necessary to rely on the communist spirit of work and not the promise of immediate reward to raise production. The Four advocated that workers' living standards be gradually improved according to the development of the national economy. This meant, especially, upgrading the lower paid workers, extending collective and state provision of social services like health, education and recreation which were not dependent on wage levels, and the maintenance of stable and declining price levels. The Four opposed piece-rates, bonuses and other material rewards which tended to promote the ideology of individual gain. They stood for the narrowing of differences between workers and peasants and, in particular, the reduction of differentials between administrative and state workers and staff and production workers.

This is a view that is not shared by the current rulers. Their latest wage increase starts simply from the premise that distribution according to work is a socialist principle. It denies what Mao stressed in the last two years of his life, that the wage system, especially as it existed in its eight grades, was a defect of socialist society. This wage increase earmarks technical workers for special consideration by rapidly promoting technical personnel.

The promotion of the lower paid technical workers is obviously

a deliberate move to restore the rites, that is to upgrade technical workers whose pay and position had been restricted over the years as a consequence of efforts to narrow gaps and break down the division of labor. Most important, this is part and parcel of unleashing the revisionists' social base. The Nov. 11, 1977 *Workers Daily* advocates bonuses paid proportionally, that is higher-wage workers should receive higher bonuses out of "fairness." This is the sort of extension of bourgeois right that the "four modernizations" is bringing with it. And it even comes in political wrapping. Wage increases will be awarded with due consideration to political attitude. It will be this combination of bribery and force (the new and improved brand of rules and regulations) that is counted on to achieve speed-up.

*Peking Review* #6 (1978), in taking on Yao's pamphlet provides some theoretical justification for the bold new wage initiatives. The article hails the distribution principle of to each according to his work as "a newborn socialist thing" which "enables workers to be concerned about the fruits of their labor and brings their enthusiasm for socialism into full play." This should be compared with Mao's statement (which Mao entitles "An Opinion") about the free supply system in 1960: "We must eradicate bourgeois jurisdiction and ideology. For example, contesting for position, contesting for rank, wanting to increase wages, and giving higher wages to the intellectual worker and lower wages to the physical laborer are all remnants of bourgeois ideology. To each according to his work [contribution] is prescribed by law, and it is also a bourgeois thing."

Things certainly do turn into their opposites. Suddenly this "bourgeois thing", this birthmark, has become "a newborn socialist thing." It's no longer so surprising that our Mensheviks would have qualms with the real socialist new things that came out of the Cultural Revolution. It should also be noted that the Four were concerned about the effect wage increases of the sort enacted at the end of 1977 might have on widening the gap between peasants and workers. These are not the kind of considerations the revisionists seem interested in entertaining.

#### The Four's Line on Agriculture

The Mensheviks try to throw more sand in people's eyes by making a series of outrageous accusations about the Four's line on agriculture. (See their section on Tachai and Worker-Peasant Alliance.) They state pure and simple that the Four opposed mechan-

ization of agriculture. This charge is so absurd that they couldn't even find a bourgeois periodical or professor upon whom they could base the claim. We are led to believe that the Four arbitrarily converted vegetable growing communes into grain producers at great pain to urban dwellers, (pp. 238-9) Where this information comes from is anybody's guess—we don't even recall seeing it in the *Peking Review*, by now. This charge, by the way is all the more interesting because it was none other than the clown prince himself, Mickey Jarvis (we assume it is fair to call him that since it was the CP(ML) which originated the phrase), who presented in his characteristically incoherent and slobbering way at the CC the view that the Four had turned the suburbs into green-belts, producing only to meet the immediate needs of the cities. Well, consistency should never be expected from a pragmatist.

By examining this question from the vantage point of line—a method which our Mensheviks shun like the plague—there is something to be said about this vegetable question. The role of agriculture in the Chinese economy has already been discussed, but a few things more can be said. Agricultural production includes food grains, silk, tea, sugar, fruits, herbs, vegetable oils, and other foodstuffs. Of all these crops, food grain is the most important and is considered the key link. Why? Because feeding her people is the first task that must be fulfilled in China; this must be done in a planned and expanded way to improve quantity and quality, to satisfy the needs of a growing population, to reduce the impact of natural disasters, and also for feeding and raising animals. But it is also the key link because of the ever-present and growing danger of war. Mao said, "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere, and never seek hegemony."

As an article in *Peking Review* #35, 1975 explained, "with adequate reserves of grain we shall be able to guarantee food for our army and people when war breaks out and win victory in the war against aggression." The principle of "self-reliance and self-sufficiency" which guided the revolutionary wars in the period of the new democratic revolution was, according to Mao, and the Four, no less applicable in the present period. The importance of grain is reflected in the fact that unlike other foodstuffs it is directly purchased from the producers by the state and sold directly to consumers in fixed quotas. Moreover, grain reserves—that left over after purchases, collective distribution, and that set aside for new seed—have increased continually. Reserves have been built up by the state, the collective and the individual in keeping with the principle of storing grain everywhere. It is not unusual for some teams

to have grain stored away to feed their members for 30 months.

Some regions in the country are more suited to growing some crops than others or engaging in livestock raising and so forth. On the basis of taking grain as the key link, these considerations are taken into account, and these communes will be assured necessary supplies of grain. But it must be remembered that China's grain production must rise by at least five million tons a year just to stay even with its population growth, and the country has *V*% the cultivated acreage of the U.S. or the Soviet Union. China has over the last 14 years continually reaped bumper harvests.

Vegetable production has expanded in China. *Peking Review* #51, 1975 carries a story which explains that "ensuring an ample supply of vegetables and non-staple food in cities is a matter of great importance." And it goes on to point out that "following the principle of serving the cities, cadres and commune members in suburban Chingchun have concentrated manpower, machinery and funds on vegetable production, water conservancy, and soil amelioration." These may sound just like fine words, but the point of the story was that the city had achieved self-sufficiency in vegetables by 1975.

It is true, though, that the priority in agriculture is in grain and the Four fought vigorously for this. This has real consequences; for instance, not much land is given over to forage crops for livestock, and agricultural technology and research is far more advanced with respect to grains than for vegetables. Chinese rice yields approach the highest in the world. The goal has been to make as many provinces self-sufficient in grain as possible, both to reduce costs of transportation borne by the state and to build up these strategic grain reserves in the event of war.

It is quite possible that land under cultivation for vegetables might have had to be cut back, we don't know, but the kind of analysis given by the Mensheviks illuminates nothing. There are facts readily available which indicate more cities became self-sufficient in vegetables in recent years, but the important thing to see is that the proportions of food grain production to other agricultural activities must be correctly handled by putting politics in command. This involves not only the strategic principle of storing grain everywhere, but the question of putting the interests of the whole, of the state, above all else. For instance, some communes under bourgeois influence might go in for cash crops rather than grain with an eye towards increasing their income at any expense. Also a line which puts undue emphasis on exports—like textiles or processed foods—as a means of acquiring

foreign exchange for machine purchases would lead to more acreage given over to cotton cultivation.

As for this question of closing rural trade fairs and alienating peasants in the process (p. 239), this requires some discussion. The situation in Liaoning Province to which our Mensheviks refer is not quite what they would have us believe. We are told that the provincial Party Committee shut the fairs down and as a result black markets flourished. Actually something else happened. What really happened was gone into in depth in an article in the *People's Daily*, May 9, 1976.

These trade fairs are places where peasants can sell farm produce grown on private plots, household side-line products and handicrafts. Their scope has been a point of continuing controversy since the Great Leap Forward, when they were extensively criticized.

In one commune in the province, the trade fair became a center of profiteering and swindling. What's more, it attracted significant numbers of peasants and this increasingly came to interfere with production tasks, especially farmland capital construction. The problem that faced the commune leadership was how to struggle with the force of habit that drew many people to the fair while, at the same time, fulfilling the functions the fair served in providing products not normally available through existing supply channels and making it possible for peasants to supplement their incomes.

What was summed up was that the old methods of containing the negative aspects of these fairs were not sufficient. It was not enough to restrict them nor to simply shut them down. Instead the commune leadership set up a "socialist big fair" in which peasants who still held private plots and engaged in side-line activities would buy and sell their private goods through the collective commercial channels, the supply and marketing cooperatives. This on the one hand put a brake on the speculation that had gotten out of hand at the trade fairs and, on the other, continued to provide peasants with an outlet for private output still necessary and useful at this stage. Overall, it had the effect of establishing new exchange relations in the countryside whereby individual bartering and bargaining was replaced by the planned acquisition and sale of these side-line goods. The principle of free trade, which is a carry-over from the old society and a continuing source of capitalism in the countryside, was being struggled with.

This was not, as our Menshevik authors would have us think, a mindless act of "ultra-leftism." Careful preparation, both ideological and organizational, went into the establishment of this new kind of fair. Extensive study and public discussions went on

and the supply and marketing cooperatives expanded the scope of their purchases and kept in close contact with peasants growing or manufacturing these products so that they became more tied into the overall production plan of the commune. While continuing to encourage some individual side-line activities, the Party Committee also mobilized peasants to take up collective side-line production in place of some private side-line production. In the period since this new kind of fair was set up, which was in early 1975, grain output rose considerably and the amount of terraced land soared over previous years' figures.

Clearly this was an ambitious attempt to restrict capitalist influences in the countryside. The example was popularized throughout the province, as it was summed up that this was a major contribution toward strengthening the collective economy and changing the world outlook of the peasants. Might there have been opposition to this from some peasants? Undoubtedly, yes, but in and of itself this means nothing. Undoubtedly some rich peasants would put up such opposition, but does this mean that the new fair should be shut down and a reversion made to the old one? Might illegal markets crop up in the face of this new exchange relation? This, too, is a distinct possibility but it is not surprising that such things will happen just as the issuance of rationing coupons for cotton might result in a temporary increase in illegal transactions by those seeking to get around the rations. Certainly the fact that there might be resistance and problems is not a basis for abolishing and condemning further advances in strengthening the positions of socialism—at least no basis for a Marxist.

This fair was a socialist new thing which, judging from the experience in this commune, was worthy of study and emulation where the conditions permitted. Our Mensheviks, for all their whining about "actual conditions," make no attempt to analyze the kind of difficulties posed by the old trade fairs nor to evaluate attempts to transform them. Rather we get an hysterical accounting whose facts are untrue (the trade fair was not simply shut down—a new kind of fair was established in its place) and whose premise is that bourgeois right is just fine.

"In the areas the gang controlled, they threw the overall plan out the window. . ." This is what we are told about those communes outside of Shanghai and Peking. But as of 1975 the peasants in the communes under the city's jurisdiction were producing and supplying the whole population of Shanghai with edible oil and vegetables, as well as other farm and side-line products. What's more these communes achieved self-sufficiency in grain

and even provided the state with a surplus. Total output of grain, cotton and oil-bearing crops doubled their 1962 levels in 1974.

And then we get the clincher, "mechanization of agriculture was never an actual part of the gang's efforts in agriculture." (See p. 239) On the face of it this charge is absurd. By 1974, communes in the rural areas of Shanghai had 82.8% of the cultivated land tractor-ploughed, a fourfold increase over 1965, and 97.4% of the land power drained and irrigated.<sup>5</sup> Usually the argument the revisionists throw at us is that in the areas they controlled the Four wanted to make things look good. Now they tell us the opposite, but the opposite of what they say is actually the truth. It was local industry in these counties and communes that gave the biggest spurt to mechanization since the Cultural Revolution, and all of this was vigorously defended.

The view of the Four was that agriculture had made great progress since liberation and especially since the Cultural Revolution, but that it still remained at a low level in terms of agricultural labor productivity and its level of mechanization. In the *Shanghai Textbook* they explain, "China's agricultural production is still in a relatively backward condition. This condition is not in line with the development of China's industry and other sectors of the national economy. Therefore, it is necessary to further realize agricultural mechanization and promote a rapid development of agricultural production on the basis of continuously consolidating and developing socialist production relations in the rural areas." Earlier the text quotes Mao about mechanization being the fundamental way out for agriculture and adds, "When the stimulative role of socialist production relations with respect to the productive forces is fully exploited and with the support of socialist industry, especially heavy industry, the pace of achieving agricultural mechanization will be quickened."

There is nothing the Four wrote and there is nothing that occurred in the Shanghai suburbs that indicates they opposed mechanization. Yao, it is said, would not have Hua's article on mechanization published in 1971. Well, so be it if it contains the same revisionist palaver' of his Tachai speech. That speech was already analyzed in the CC Report where it pointed out that it says nothing about harrowing the difference between work teams as a crucial step in moving forward to both mechanization and higher levels-of-ownership. Since the Mensheviks chose not to reply to the criticisms of the speech, we'll let those criticisms stand on their own merit.

The Four opposed any mechanization plan that was not under

the command of revolution. If going all out for mechanization meant that anything goes, then they were not for it. Their differences with Hua in 1971 may have concerned this timetable that agriculture would be mechanized by 1980, which is now only two years away. The country's steel output, not then and not now yet 30 million tons, was reason to doubt some of these targets. Not that the Four wanted to slow things down; on the contrary, they wanted to push ahead but on the basis of utilizing the economy's real strength and capabilities, rather than undermining them.

#### Slandering Workers' Achievements

The method of the revisionists is to denigrate those things which obstruct their revisionist path to the four modernizations. Hence we find wholesale attacks on the people of Shanghai and their revolutionary activities. Whether or not there were setbacks in one particular sector or city is quite secondary to the real aim of these people which is to establish a new reactionary order whose long-run effect will be real economic disorder, i.e. capitalism.

*Peking Review #4* (1978) carries an article on Shanghai which is revealing for what it omits about the development of socialist industry and how it sums up some of the weaknesses of the last few years. The article cannot deny the very impressive technical achievements of the city. Shanghai has contributed enormously to the national economy with machinery and equipment, accumulation funds, and a pool of skilled workers for other parts of the country. But then the article goes on to report industrial output value fell in 1976 and the city did not fulfill its revenue plans three years in a row. In addition, we are told the city opposed the unified leadership of central authorities.

While all the pertinent statistical data is not available, by looking at *Peking Review #9* (1976) we can get a different picture of what was actually happening in Shanghai. First off, the technical transformations which are simply enumerated in the '78 article are analyzed as the product of "socialist cooperation" in the earlier article. This kind of cooperation within and between enterprises went so far as to break down barriers between different trades and involved over 300 factories, hospitals, and scientific research institutes in the transformation of the medical appliances industry. By 1976 it was capable of producing high precision tools. On its own, one trade, it is summed up, could not have possibly done it. It gives another example of a whole new industry coming into being—TV manufacture—thanks to joint efforts of enterprises to set

aside manpower and materials. To what does this article attribute the great surge in socialist cooperation? The Cultural Revolution, of which there is *no* mention in the 1978 article.

This point of "opposing unified leadership of central authorities," the attack on low output value, and the concluding part of the article which simply lists what output tasks lie ahead for different sectors, takes on wider significance when we look at another example of socialist cooperation from the 1976 article. This concerns an engineering equipment plant that manufactures two major products. One is a certain machine that uses much material, but little labor, and is high in output value. The other is a toothpaste filling machine which has a low output value.

Workers from this plant visited a nearby toothpaste plant and found that nine toothpaste filling machines were urgently needed in order to achieve automation. But the problem these workers faced was that if they went ahead with the project their output target of 300,000 yuan might not be met. The question put to discussion and debate was whether to help the toothpaste factory boost production even if it put an additional burden on them. They launched a criticism of the revisionist line of management which held that it was better to do light work and shirk the heavy and decided to do what they had to, to assist this plant despite the possible consequences to their output. In the end, it just so happened that they met their output plan, but the point should be fairly obvious. They went in for what was in the long-run interests of the working class—to help this plant achieve automation, which would ultimately raise output—even though there may have been some short-run loss in their output value.

This is how the Four ran Shanghai. This is how they combined unified leadership with enthusiasm from all quarters. This is how they integrated lofty line struggle with the actual process of production. That output value may have fallen in 1976 as the recent *Peking Review* article indicates may or may not be true. But, clearly, what is under attack is this principle of socialist cooperation and the role of mass campaigns. These relations between enterprises represent the kind of local initiative that is vital to the success of central planning and which can hasten the spread of technologies and the establishment of more advanced socialist relations. This was a focal point of the struggle with Teng during the right deviationist wind, when he strongly advocated bringing industries under the stricter control of the respective ministries, something which has the effect of cutting off these local relations between enterprises and removing local and central party control.

The 1978 *Peking Review* article also calls for special attention being paid to developing Shanghai into a scientific base "ranking among the world's advanced." The socialist cooperation described above gave rise in the city to thousands of meetings, exhibitions, and centers with workers and technicians taking part in activities to exchange these experiences. Why Shanghai should all of a sudden have to "become" an internationally renowned scientific center is understandable only by recognizing the revisionist world outlook of those running China today for whom all this cooperation and technical exchange is just so much "sabotage" and "interference." Small wonder they ooze with delight over the 10% increase in profits since the Four fell.

#### Line on Technology

Leibel Bergman made the point in his paper presented at the CC that the Soviet Union under Stalin imported about 50% of its machine tools. He cites that in connection with China's increasing desire to acquire advanced technology from abroad. Teng and Hua in the "Twenty Points" explicitly refer to a policy of exchanging oil for advanced equipment. The growing stress on technical study reflecting international standards points in a certain direction as well. Technical innovation is made to increase production. The question is, is any technical innovation going to boost production as well as another, and how should the process of technological advance be expected to develop?

While paying attention to building up a modern industrial sector, the technological policy that Mao advocated was to avoid concentration of investment in big facilities and to promote the development of small and medium enterprises which could marshal local resources and know-how in both meeting local needs and contributing to the growth of the national economy. As far as possible, plants should be capable of supplying as much of their required parts and accessories, and in the case of some plants producing final goods, even machinery.

Moreover, the question of increasing output cannot be seen as a one-to-one relation between more equipment and more production, for two reasons. First, under the relatively poor conditions of China a good part of technical innovation has to take place by "digging out of potential capacity," that is making better use of and renovating existing capacity so as not to put a drain on the state's accumulation funds. Second, even with the addition of capacity, production will not necessarily rise where the masses are

not guided by a revolutionary line.

Mao's is an approach which yields quick returns and thereby accelerates development and which, again, makes it possible to fight a people's war to victorious conclusion. It is an approach that limits dependence on foreign countries. Foreign technology must be used in such a way as to promote this general development. In short, the most favorable conditions must be created so that the workers can constantly improve and revolutionize the methods of production and this struggle in production must be seen as the principal source of technical progress. This is what guarantees also that technical innovations can be extensively applied and learned from.

The process of technological change is one that develops from a lower level to a higher level, from quantitative to qualitative change. In other words simple methods will progress to more complex ones and the simple methods of change will be the ones that initially will have the widest applicability and which will be most easily mastered by others. The Four's line on this appears in an article from *Red Flag*: "Two young electricians in a sweater factory, taking the practical needs of production as their starting point, set out to create an innovation by simple methods. At a cost of only \$72 they created a light and electricity control box that automated four working processes. Due to its low cost and effectiveness, it was warmly received by the workers. In half a year's time, the device was popularized sufficiently to be found on some 1500 knitting machines and raised efficiency by 15%. ***This device has been further popularized and is employed in twenty factories including steel rolling...***" [our emphasis].

This sheds light on what it means to achieve greater, faster, better, and more economical results. It is not simply the introduction of an advanced piece of equipment. The technical innovations that will have the most sweeping consequences are those that start from the current and actual conditions of production. Foreign methods can be integrated with indigenous methods on this basis. This same article points out, "we must absorb what is useful, reject what is useless, and add what is peculiar to us making foreign things serve our purposes." And, at the same time, it is on this basis of ***breaking through the barriers of the given level of production and technique***, through unleashing the inventiveness and creativity of workers, that advanced world levels can be reached.

Study and scientific experimentation must go on to sum these kinds of experiences up and to learn from international experience. But this must reflect the laws of development of the productive

forces and class struggle to promote all-round development. This is where Bergman goes wrong on two counts. First, while not correct altogether, the Soviet Union could import the machine tools it did and employ them because it had a more developed productive base relative to China. Second, China in the 1950's did, in fact, import roughly 50% of its industrial equipment from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and its industrial output grew on an annual basis at a faster rate than at any time since.

But while this might initially have led to rapid growth, in the long run it would operate to the detriment of the balanced development of the economy. This experience was summed up negatively because this dependency on Soviet technique became self-perpetuating as more sophisticated parts and equipment were constantly required and this widened the gap with other sectors. This technology was not suited to the existing conditions in China since it could not be integrated throughout the economy, but was rather grafted onto a portion of it.

The current push to learn advanced technology in China does not reflect Mao's thinking on the development of technology and the economy. It represents a shift away from the indigenous experiences and technologies in Chinese society and basic scientific research on them. It is not enough to study and understand a given technology, to grasp its laws. It must be introduced into the productive base and if this technology does not reflect its actual conditions, dependency and distortions in the economy will result. In rural industry, in particular, what must be paid attention to is just what kind of advanced experiences can be learned from. The simple fact that some technicians (no doubt those who will now under the new educational policy go directly to school without intervening work experience) have mastered advanced design and development will not make it any more feasible than if they knew nothing about it.

What accounts for China's advances in technology is the process of fully utilizing its industrial base in connection with mass movements and mobilizing all trades and professions into a big socialist cooperation. This has led to continuous advances from a lower to a higher level of technological proficiency and to major innovations which can be popularized and diffused. Technical innovation groups consisting of workers, cadres and technicians had been formed in factories and breakthroughs like automatic production lines, high efficiency equipment, many of which were unorthodox and irregular as far as international standards go, were common. Nevertheless, and exactly because these innovations

came out of the experiences of the masses, they proved to be durable. The city of Tientsin before it was hit by the earthquake had between 1972 and 1975 adopted 82,000 technical innovation and transformation items, produced or renovated 23,000 pieces of special purpose equipment and introduced over 600 automatic or continuous production lines, all of which contributed to large increases in output.

The view of the Hua leadership comes down to this as summarized in *Peking Review* #30 (1977): "Only when we admit in a down-to-earth manner that there is a gap between the level of our science and technology and the world's advanced levels can we realize how compelling is the need to quickly catch up with and surpass them." This is based on the observation that "while...there are things in our country that are approaching or have surpassed the world's advanced levels...this is only a part of the picture and a rather small part at that..."

These people have not been in power long, but the direction is unmistakable. In 1973 the Kwangtung *Southern Daily* editorialized against too many small hydroelectric projects, reflecting the influence of Teng. This was an attack on a development that had brought electricity to more than half of the production brigades in the country. Teng had later gone around the country complaining about "too many bright local ideas." On the other hand, when in 1973 and 1974 attempts were made to construct generators and turbines with large capacities, Teng had said that China was not in a position to build this kind of electrical power equipment and that foreign imports should be increased. Workers in Shanghai breaking with convention successfully built it.

This, of course, is based on information from the nefarious "gang of 4". But there is every reason to believe that it is accurate. The Four in articles on electric power used Kwangtung as a model and pointed out that while big and small and medium stations should be built simultaneously, the medium sized and small hydroelectric stations which already supply about  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the country's electricity should receive the main emphasis. The revisionist line they criticized was that big networks built by the state were the way to solve local power needs. They also upheld the emergence of peasant-technician teams, numbering some 26,000 in Kwangtung in 1975, who could oversee the construction and maintenance of these stations.

What about the standards of these small and medium stations. Did they approach world standards? Well, yes and no. They did not compare in their sophistication of design and obviously in their

capacity with the mammoth stations that have been built in other parts of the world—which employ extremely advanced technology. On the other hand, these small stations have been exported and are considered of high quality by foreign engineers. The engineering work involved in these small stations is relatively easy and within the grasp of rural areas which build them to serve their local needs. But these rich experiences and mass initiative have made them of "high quality."

On the other hand, if we look at *Peking Review* #3 (1978) we find, again, the point that "a big gap still exists between China and the developed industrialized countries in the power industry." And what flows from this is a changed emphasis on the relationship of big to small and medium-sized stations. The article states that *big* ones "are the mainstay." But worse, the article puts forward the rankest expression of the "theory of the productive forces" yet, declaring that "electricity would eventually destroy capitalism."

#### The Two Lines Summed Up

In sum, what can be said about the economy, its performance and direction under the Four? To begin with, it was not the case, as some would have us believe, that it was foundering. By all estimates, granted that no official data base is available, the economy was growing at a clip of anywhere from five to six percent a year in GNP terms; industrial output was rising perhaps at an average annual rate of ten percent since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Small, but gradual, improvements in the people's living standards occurred in this period as reflected in food consumption, clothing allowances, improved education and health services, particularly in the countryside, and consumer goods like bicycles and radios. There was progress and it rested on internal momentum. Some sectors, like steel, coal and transport suffered from erratic output, comparatively lower growth rates, or long-term structural problems. But, this was not a one-sided thing either. Technical innovations had been made in these sectors, like steel, and new ports had been opened, some highly mechanized. The Four were not complacent about China's growth. The last three years of *Peking Review* under their editorship shows what kind of efforts were being bent to raise output.

In talking about how well China was doing, like the song says, "compared to what?" To throw up the standard of Japan or the U.S. is misleading and downright stupid—to say nothing of reactionary. This is a country that had only 13,750 miles of railroad

track in 1949, a country that was producing 5.5 million tons of oil in 1960, and which in 1976 was still overwhelmingly poor. Yet, it has, for the most part, achieved agricultural self-sufficiency and greatly expanded its industrial capabilities based on a rational investment program which begins with the needs of agriculture. The kind of breakthrough that had taken place in China coming off the Great Leap or the Cultural Revolution were not the sort that would take her from being poor to rich right away, but which would thrust her economy forward in the context of her still being a less developed nation. This would be a path that would lead to communism not by attempting to go through the same forms of development of advanced capitalist countries where industries are centralized and populations concentrated in the cities. It would be based on uniting agriculture and industry and town and country in new social forms.

1976 was a bad year. Farming was hit by unprecedented disasters; the earthquake ravaged several industrial installations; and the right jumped out. It was to be expected that the economy would suffer, but even this was not without its bright spots: the early rice crop set an all-time record in per unit and gross output.<sup>5</sup> If we want to be technical about these sorts of things, then blame Hua Kuo-feng for last year's disappointing harvest and the fact that 12 million tons of grain were imported from Australia and Canada. If the Four in some places "made things worse" by politically mobilizing people in such a way that temporarily disrupted production in some places, it would have in the long run, had they won, been to the benefit of economic growth.

The Four actually understood the needs and capabilities of the economy better than these bureaucrats and administrators who palm their wares off as economic wisdom. They understood, with Mao, that China was a poor country and would stay that way for some time to come. They did not make a principle of this. They saw it as something that was necessary to overcome, but in a way that would allow China to develop into a powerful *socialist* country. They also recognized the awesome revolutionary potential of its people and the distinctively Chinese path forward: walking on two legs, the use of simple technologies, giving a practical orientation to education, linking research closely with production, squeezing the most out of existing capacity, local raw materials and waste, practicing economy and frugality.

The transfer of resources—technical, financial, and manpower—to the countryside and the stress on despecialization will in the long run promote economic growth, even at the expense of

short-run gains. This kind of development will make maximum use of resources and reduce transportation costs. If old and obsolete equipment rather than being discarded can be used in small and medium plants this will be a boon, a plus, to accumulating funds. Industries can assist each other, spread skills and through this raise the level of the economy as a whole, avoid lopsided development and bring into being an engineering industry which can serve the needs of the whole economy. Yes, there were lags in China's technical work force, but Mao's line was not to produce the same kind of technical work force that existed in the capitalist countries, but one which would help China develop in a socialist way. The starting point for this kind of technical work force is that the main source of new technology is both on-the-job experimentation and self-reliance and the conscious and organized spread of knowledge and technical know-how.

The point is that the Four were not operating with idealist notions that the only thing that matters is a correct idea, to hell with the economy. The fact is that they understood it. Reports have circulated that they might have opposed the 1976-80 plan of doubling average annual GNP to 16%. It might very well be true. These were get-rich-quick schemes which would only lead to defeat. The current leadership, complaining of dismal economic performance, goes ahead with a wage increase involving maybe 60% of the workforce. They're calling for massive investments in research and development, doubling the size of universities, the installation of new equipment and technology. Where will the finances for this come from? What kind of development will this lead to?

What may sound ambitious on their part is actually ambition for restoring capitalism. It is guided by revisionist thinking and does not reflect the realities of China. It is a short-cut that will keep China poor and dependent, whatever they say. These changes in university policy are going to create a technological elite, not raise technical standards generally. The program they advocate can only be based on bribes, (Taylor system) speed-up, and foreign dependency.

These revisionists have only been in power for 18 months. But let's watch how they act. The Mensheviks tell us the Chinese haven't changed their commercial policies with respect to foreign trade. But changes are being discussed and they know it, because they read the *Far Eastern Economic Review* and read of delegations visiting Germany and Great Britain exploring new ways of doing business. It's also a fact as reported in the *U.S. China Business Review* that China is now pressing companies like Mitsui



to deposit savings in the Bank of China. These deposits, quite substantial already, are not really different from loans to finance trade. Some of these things have been advocated for some time by the likes of Teng and even practiced before the Four went down. But they opposed it. The current leadership lets us know how much the Four hated Chou's foreign trade policies.

The military purchases these revisionists are negotiating abroad—let's see how they are financed. Let's see what happens to petroleum exports. Let's see what happens to petroleum derivatives, like fertilizers, synthetic fibers—if they even get manufactured in China under this new regime—and whether or not they are used to finance heavy technology purchases—at the expense of planned and proportional development. The example cited earlier of the transport problems caused by oil exports in 1976 shows how an incorrect exports policy can undermine the domestic economy.

That this is the direction things are going in can be seen from a commentary in *Red Flag* last year:

**"We have the superior system of socialism in our country, and our people are diligent, intelligent, and courageous. What foreigners can create and invent in science and technology we Chinese people can achieve likewise, and in certain cases we may even do better. However, we face the problem of how to race against time and contend for speed."**

The article then goes on to quote Lenin:

**"Our present objective is to sign a trade agreement with Great Britain so that trade can be regularized and the machinery needed for the tremendous plan of restoring our national economy can be purchased as soon as possible. The quicker this job is done, the larger will be the basis on which we can free ourselves from economic dependence on foreign countries."**

What is the point behind all of this?

#### Lessons of Soviet Union and the Fight Against Capitulationism

The bottom line for the revisionist axis in China is the notion that unless China becomes an economic power it will lose a war. The Mensheviks, for their part, say that "big strides in developing the national economy were necessary for many reasons..." and they list as one "to put the country in a better position to deal with war." They don't elaborate too much on this which would seem to

indicate some cultural lag with their Chinese counterparts. But this theme runs through major statements from the Chinese leaders. For instance, in the previously mentioned article "We Must Catch Up With and Surpass World's Advanced Levels Within This Century," it says that "catching up with and surpassing the world's advanced levels in science and technology is urgently required if we are to defend and build up the motherland..." Yu Chiu-li, the planning minister, makes the point more strongly, "A world war is bound to break out some day...Lenin sharply pointed out: 'Either perish or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries economically as well.'" Hua takes up the theme at Taching when he sets the four modernizations in the context of imperialist war preparations, "We cannot afford to let time slip through our fingers..."

(Of course, if the revisionists don't succeed in "catching up and surpassing" on the technical front, they can always fall back on some other front—like sports. The March 1978 issue of *China Reconstructs* contains a Howard Cossell-like description of international meets the women's volleyball team has recently competed in. Complete with scores and graphic accounts of the thrill of victory and agony of defeat, it ends on a somber note. The women must, the author points out, improve their game because "they have a long way to go to catch-up with the world's strong teams." Actually what might seem at first to be a grotesque parody of the "outstrip or perish" line is part of the calculated effort to pervert and destroy the socialist superstructure by promoting competitiveness and the "championship mentality." Nowhere in this article is friendship first mentioned. The situation in China where amateur and mass participation in sports has flourished is sure to take a back seat to this push to attain world levels. All this is dialectically related to putting a bourgeois line in command of the economy.)

The presumption that the Chinese can overtake the U.S. by the end of the century is highly dubious at best and it represents, as we have indicated, a departure from Mao's views on the development of the economy. To suggest as the current leaders do that the Chinese can beat the Americans or Russians at their own game, that is in economic and military superiority, flies in the face of reality even more. The hope for China militarily lies in its ability to wage a people's war, to establish self-sustaining base areas, to lure the enemy in deep, surround it and destroy it. It is not likely and not really to China's advantage to expect its borders to be defensible. But the strategy of the current leaders seems to turn on exten-

sive modernization of the armed forces meaning, in particular, modern arms and equipment along with a sophisticated back-up force of technicians.

Mao was extremely concerned over the effect that the growing war danger and the necessary measures taken by the proletariat in power to put it off and protect its flanks would have on the revolution. It is a law that imperialist countries will always try to subjugate and vanquish socialist countries and it is also a law that even where open war has not broken out, international class struggle will be reflected in the socialist countries and react upon the internal class contradiction. The crucial problem in this regard was not whether people were acting quickly enough to confront the danger of war, but whether in the name of that forces would jump out to reverse the revolution and undermine it—which would lead, in the end, to capitulation. The CC Report speaks to this where it points out:

**"with the growing danger of an attack on China by the Soviets, in particular, and with the necessity to make certain agreements and compromises with reactionary and imperialist governments, with the whole 'opening to the West,' and all the bourgeois influences that inevitably accompany this, there was bound to be a powerful pull away from taking the socialist road."**

In the early '70's, there arose a need to shift policy internally and externally. The Lin Piao affair made it urgent to reestablish and strengthen party leadership. Many cadre who had gone down were returned to their old or new posts and the sharp and scorching criticisms characteristic of the early years of the Cultural Revolution tapered off. This was a policy that the right would seize upon to settle old scores. At the same time, the growing war danger called for new initiatives on the diplomatic front; for China to seek and forge new alliances. The Mensheviks deny that there was compromise involved here. They say this came from strength, not weakness. The point, however, is that it came out of *necessity*. That China could pull it off—for instance, that Nixon came to them and that they held other talks with lesser imperialist powers—was a product of its strength, the strength of China and the people of the world. But this doesn't alter the fact that these moves arose out of real *necessity*—the need to fend off and delay an attack on China.

If there wasn't compromise to all this—and no one is going to say that supporting the Shah's military build-up doesn't involve

compromise—then why does Chou in the Tenth Congress Report make a point of distinguishing necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and the imperialists from betrayal? And if there wasn't real danger connected with these sorts of policies, why in the same speech does it point out that "in both international and domestic struggles, tendencies may still occur similar to those of the past, namely when there was an alliance with the bourgeoisie, necessary struggles were forgotten..." Chou goes on to mention the opposite danger of all struggle and no alliance, but it is rather obvious from the context of the speech and the overall situation what is being pinpointed.

There was a precedent for this concern. Lin Piao on the basis of the growing war danger held that the productive forces had to be developed at the expense of class struggle and, ultimately, that China had to seek the protection of a stronger power, notably the Soviet Union. The right, though they attacked him mercilessly, actually had a similar perspective. Not in the sense that they necessarily agreed that falling under the wing of the Soviet Union as opposed to the U.S. was the correct strategic choice right then, but that China could not stand up on its own. It was objectively necessary to reach some agreements and tactically maneuver for position with the bourgeoisie internationally which called for compromise. But would the working class continue to make socialist revolution and uphold and strengthen the dictatorship of the proletariat under these circumstances or have it whittled away in this united front?

Mao's line was to take full account of the international situation and make use of every contradiction, but not to give up the class struggle on the basis of the real necessity to build the international united front. The war danger aggravated the pull toward revisionism and Mao was determined that China go into the war situation on a revolutionary basis. The shifts that were called for and the bourgeois influences that would accompany them made it necessary to wage struggle and while it might be possible to do it without the form of the mass upheavals of the Cultural Revolution, it was no less important to combat revisionism, to fight capitulationism.

The campaigns of the last few years of Mao's life must be seen in this context. Mao was not only summing up the experiences of the Chinese revolution, but the lessons of history. China was not the first socialist country to be faced with the prospect of war and the need to make rapid preparations for it. The Soviet Union had gone through this experience and Mao, clearly, saw its two

aspects—the Nazis were defeated, but ten years later the revisionists won out.

The Mensheviks remind us that China is poor and blank. Is this a good basis to build socialism, they ask? They answer, yes it is. But while it is primarily a good thing, it has two aspects. The imperialists on the basis of a less developed country's backwardness will try to blockade and strangle it. They will try to bully it militarily. They will try to penetrate and corrode it ideologically and culturally in attempts to reinforce notions of inferiority. Being poor and blank is something that is not seen as a source of strength by petty-bourgeois and bourgeois forces in a poor country. In fact, nothing rankles them more than such economic and cultural backwardness—it inhibits their ability to flower into a big self-confident bourgeoisie.

But being poor and backward takes on added meaning in the context of inter-imperialist war preparations. The likelihood of an attack and with it the possibility of devastation and ruin causes alarm among the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois forces; war is seen as a complete and total disaster. Something must be done and done quick. The external situation interpenetrates with the internal one and the demand for order and for stability to cope with the threat of attack grows and influences other strata. Powerful pressures are generated to put a lid on the class struggle.

In China, historically, the bourgeoisie in the face of backwardness and the threat of foreign invasion raised the slogan "only industrialization can save China." Mao raised the slogan, "only socialism can save China," in opposition to this. But as pointed out in the CC Report, many elements who rallied behind this banner did so on the basis that socialism is the best way to catch up with the rest of the world and the best way for them to get ahead.

Stalin in 1931 made the prediction, "We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us." Was this Mao's strategy? Did Mao anywhere suggest that only under certain material conditions could China defeat the social imperialists? He did say "dig tunnels deep, store grain everywhere and never seek hegemony," and put forward the directive to push the national economy ahead, but nowhere did he put forward a comparable strategy to Stalin's for industrialization and link it with the war danger.

Was Stalin wrong in what he said? The experience of the patriotic war shows the very important part that the massive industrialization of the preceding years played in supporting the

front lines and holding the economy together. The Soviet Union's industrial base was at a higher level than China's is today and they were in some ways able to "make good this distance." Nevertheless, it must be recognized that this "forced march" industrialization was linked with putting technique and technicians in command in economic affairs. It led to some lopsided development in the economy, particularly the emphasis on heavy industry, and went together with the denial in theory of the existence of antagonistic classes in the Soviet Union, which weakened the proletariat. In sum this process must be seen from two sides: it materially contributed to the defeat over the Nazis, but gave vent to bourgeois forces and influences which Stalin began to attack only after the war. Mao felt that China could not fight a war of "steel" and, moreover, that unless the political and ideological forces unleashed by this changing international situation, which reacted upon the internal class contradictions, were dealt with before and not after the war, the whole thing would go down the drain, as happened in the Soviet Union.

In *Red Papers* 7 we describe some of Stalin's efforts at the end of the war to deal with some of these problems. There were attempts to rectify the party's recruitment policies and to counter bourgeois influences which had entered from the West during the war. This was the campaign against what was called cosmopolitanism. But Stalin was not able to successfully mobilize the masses to correct these problems inside and outside the party and following his death the revisionists took over.

The Dictatorship of the Proletariat campaign that Mao launched in 1975 came at a time when powerful forces inside China were clamoring for less class struggle and more hard work. These people who are presently in power were saying then as they are saying today that only industrialization can save China. Mao was reaffirming that only socialism can save China and this campaign was designed both to raise people's understanding of the nature of the socialist transition and to combat the bourgeoisie and its influence right then, in particular the ideological and material manifestations of bourgeois right. If China were to successfully stave off a military attack and continue down the road to communism, then socialism had to be strengthened; modernization was part of this, but by no means the major part. By the same token, when the Four launched struggle against bourgeois art and music it was not to deny the need or to undercut making use of contradictions and the "opening to the West," but to resist corrosive influences which would weaken the proletariat in the class struggle.

The line "outstrip or perish" precisely because it was not realizable would lead to capitulation. In the name of catching up, in the name of being strong and modern, in response to the "unsatisfactory pace" of industrial development in China, the bourgeoisie would cave in and barter away China's national interests. Why does it have to go that way? Because, once the assessment is made that the country cannot go up against an aggressor given its economic and military capabilities and that these must be radically improved, certain things follow. Lacking the internal ability to produce this kind of equipment and technology the revisionists look abroad for the needed technology and this opens the floodgates to the "advanced" techniques of the West along with its cultural influences. Because of the great gap between China and her potential adversaries, catching up with them can only mean relying on them and eventually selling out to them since it becomes clear this gap cannot be bridged. Mao was keenly aware of the pressure and temptation of this path. What came to be called the comprador philosophy outlook was an important element of the Lin Piao campaign and the fight against the right deviationist wind. But it was especially prominent in the *Water Margin* campaign.

Our Mensheviks have very little to say about this campaign. At the CC meeting the "herky-jerky theoretician" included a speech by Wang Tung-hsing as part of his argument that the *Water Margin* campaign was aimed at the Four. This argument has since been dropped from their arsenal (though comments from this so-called speech still appear, the fact that this speech was supposedly about the *Water Margin* campaign has been curiously omitted) since as was pointed out at the CC meeting the speech is at best incoherent and at worst a fraud perpetrated by Taiwan (as investigation seems to suggest)—it doesn't fit in at all with the themes Mao was raising around the *Water Margin*.

In August of 1975 Mao issues an instruction to study the novel, *Water Margin*. The merit of the book, he points out, "lies precisely in the portrayal of capitulation." What happens in this novel—which kind of has a Robin Hood flavor to it—is that a lower ranking member of the landlord class penetrates the ranks of the peasant movement at a time when it is engaged in fierce struggles against the landlords. He maneuvers for leadership and pushes a capitulationist line. But this is not a line of going out and prostrating himself before the enemy. Rather he fights corrupt officials—another faction of his class—and then surrenders to the emperor whom he never challenged. Having built up his bargain-

ing strength he accepts an amnesty and then proceeds to turn on the genuine peasant rebels, swearing his eternal allegiance to the emperor. The lesson of the novel according to the *Red Flag* article which carried Mao's instruction was "whoever practices revisionism practices capitulationism."

Why is Mao stressing this theme of surrender and national betrayal toward the end of 1975? Why does he earmark a character who fights, but only to a degree, and who will not persevere in struggle to the end? Why is the theme of the dying out of class struggle (revisionism) linked to national betrayal (capitulationism)? This was not a literary exercise; it had all to do with those within the party who were bent on toadying up to imperialism, particularly social imperialism. The criticism of the novel argued by analogy that there was a struggle in the party over whether to fight resolutely against imperialism or to kow-tow and give up. Previous capitulationists like Liu and Lin did not start that way, but their revisionism dictated ultimately that they would betray their country. As an article linking Lin Piao with Confucius explained in the same month that Mao's instruction was published, "Because he wanted to practice revisionism in China, he was extremely isolated among the people. Awed by the strong might of the dictatorship of the proletariat, he felt that his own strength was inadequate and had necessarily to form an alliance with international revisionism."

While the exact parallels and analogies are quite complex, it is possible to extract from what Mao says about the novel certain major questions and points. To begin, the main danger to the revolution comes from within, from among the ranks of the rebels; in particular, from those who for a while put up a fight but never carry it on in a thoroughgoing kind of way. That the protagonist in the novel is from the landlord class would indicate that this danger of subversion comes from the more venerable elements of the party, i.e. some veteran cadre or bourgeois democrats who fought the "corrupt officials," but never the emperor. This would signify that these people were willing to fight the abuses of the old society but never to make a complete break with systems of exploitation and oppression, that is to say, never became thoroughgoing revolutionaries. Second, is the notion that there is a direct relationship between wavering on the class struggle at home and capitulating to the foreign enemy, or as L B J used to say, one's foreign policy is a reflection of one's domestic policy.

The comment by Mao then would seem to indicate two lines on how to deal with the current situation. There are those who hold

that "social peace"—minimal disturbances in the country, i.e. "great order"—is the best defense against aggression since sharp class struggles make the country more vulnerable to attack. This leads to a line of peace at all costs in order that China can prepare for the war danger. But the greatest threat to this kind of peace comes from those who persevere in making revolution. Sung Chiang, the main figure in the novel, doesn't simply come to terms with the emperor; he attacks the genuine rebels. Mao has pointed out that those who preach the dying out of class struggle always attack the revolutionary forces. In sum the program of these revisionists is to appease, coddle up to and eventually sell out to imperialism, and to go after the real revolutionaries.

In opposition to this, and obviously representing Mao's line, is the view represented by the genuine rebels who persist in struggle, aiming their blows at the emperor and the whole landlord class. This is the idea that the unity of China can only be forged through sharp class struggle—through opposing revisionism—and that concessions to the enemy, i.e. attempts to get amnesties from them, will get you nowhere but into capitulationism. Again this makes the question of the capability and will to resist foreign aggression conditional on waging the class struggle which will strike hard blows against those who would betray their country.

In China at the time there were many issues related to foreign policy that this campaign was evidently opening up to discussion and evaluation. There was the question of border negotiations with the Soviets, the capture and subsequent release of several Soviet helicopter pilots, the negotiation of trade protocols with the Soviets, the extent to which foreign military technology could be depended upon. The fact that Chou was from an aristocratic background and the fact that he was generally associated with the policies of putting stress on modernization in the context of a peaceful atmosphere, led many bourgeois scholars, among whom was Leibel Bergman, to conclude that Mao was directing this campaign against Chou. When Bergman was reminded of this at the CC he whined, "yeah, I thought that, but I didn't like it, did I?"

Teng, who was linked with the release of the helicopter pilots, which was accompanied by a virtual apology to the Soviets, was also a likely target of this campaign. But the general theme of this campaign is that whoever liquidates the class struggle at home is going to sell the country out. These people may challenge and threaten the enemy abroad, and even militarily resist an attack for a time, but only to get a better deal.

These themes became more explicit with the campaign against

the right deviationist wind in which Teng's liquidation of class struggle is directly linked with bartering away to foreign interests China's resources and eventually bringing China under the wing of an imperialist power. The message is that these people have to be ferreted out before they betray us. Right now, just because the current leaders are banging away at the Soviet Union doesn't mean they won't eventually capitulate to it. There are compelling reasons to see this as a likely possibility. For one thing, the Soviet Union is a powerful enemy that is right there on the border with over a million troops massed and missiles targeted for Chinese industrial and population concentrations. For another, the more the current leaders practice their Soviet-style line internally the more likely it is for them to come to terms with the social imperialists and patch up their differences.

That revisionism could triumph in China is very much related to the international situation, and the program of these revisionists reflects it. What they see in the enemy is its military and economic superiority, and they take that as their point of departure for policy. "We must catch up." It becomes essential to build up the economy, and the military. In order for this to happen, a modern technological base is required. And this requires that directors take their rightful place at the head of research institutes instead of revolutionary committees running them. It means increased imports. Old cadre must be brought back, regardless of politics, the wasteful political activities of the Cultural Revolution must not stand in the way of production and the workers must be motivated—paid more—to set this machine in motion while being whipped into line with oppressive rules and regulations. Since everything turns on technological and military superiority, the outstanding characteristic of China is its *weakness*. The Mensheviks, for all their yammering about the strengths behind China's foreign policy and the unlikelihood of capitalist restoration, basically operate within this framework.

This is a perspective that will have disastrous military consequences. It will lead, step by step, to making weapons the decisive question and the means to get them the central economic issue, and to putting professionalism ahead of politics in the armed forces. It is a recipe that will lead to concessions to foreign powers, dependency and, finally, defeat. China cannot, as the CC Report went into, fight this kind of war of steel. Mao stuck to that conclusion and we'll stick with him and his facts. Mao did place stress on upgrading the quality and technology of China's weapons—the nuclear weapons and missies programs he obviously approved of.

But this was not the basis for China's defense; what was, was the infantry and militia and the strategy of people's war. Any attempt to manufacture and equip the Chinese army with the kind of weapons that measure up to Western standards would require a massive redirection of the Chinese economy. This shift of investment priorities would bankrupt it outside of foreign assistance. The alternative is to export needed goods to get foreign exchange, which would have the same negative effects on planned and proportionate development of the economy.

By their own standards, these revisionists could be no match for the imperialists and that's why they'll put up a little resistance, like the character from *Water Margin*, and then, when the moment is ripe, capitulate. Mao knew two things: China couldn't fight the kind of war these revisionists are whooping it up about (with their hometown cheerleaders) and the class struggle would be lost anyway if they got the upper hand.

The Chair is accused of Trotskyism for making a Marxist-Leninist analysis of the situation in China and showing that its backwardness is an important factor to grasp in assessing the reasons that revisionism triumphed. Nowhere did he say that it was impossible to build socialism, only that there were formidable difficulties which the bourgeoisie in China and abroad would seize upon and which the working class would have to overcome through revolutionary struggle. But who, we have to ask, are the real Trotskyites? Who is saying that a certain material level is required for socialism to survive in China? Who is really saying that if China doesn't become "modern" soon, it's all over with?

We are told that the Four didn't promote the development of the productive forces. But, as we have said repeatedly, this is a question of what line would guide that development. Indonesia today has a faster growth rate than China. So what? Had the revolutionaries stayed in power, China would have continued to develop in a self-reliant and *socialist* fashion. If it's a question of going fast with capitalist roaders at the helm or going slow with proletarian revolutionaries in leadership, we'll take the latter, even if Chang Chun-chiao said it first. Hua said the question of speed is a political question. Indeed it is—how fast he and his revisionist wrecking crew can drag China down to capitalism and dependency.

#### Where is the Defense of Chou En-lai?

Frankly, we were disappointed by the Mensheviks' defense of Chou En-lai. (p. 180) We expected some real fighting words, some

real exaltation of "beloved Comrade Chou." Instead we get complaints about too many "obviouses" and too much argument by "logic." Actually, this section contains some rather curious logic, itself. First, the authors concede that, "All contradictions develop. But all contradictions do not develop with people winding up on opposite sides." If that's true then why can't it also be the case that some contradictions do develop that way—which is "obviously" true? Mao and Chou worked together for 45 years, they tell us, and their differences did not develop in the straight line way we say. Well, we don't say that. It was exactly the new spiral coming off the Cultural Revolution and the Lin Piao affair that brought them into conflict, not 45 years of gestating contradictions. And isn't it to be expected that high party leaders will come into fundamental opposition over key questions, because line struggle is concentrated at those levels? Hasn't that been the history of the Chinese Communist Party?

Our Mensheviks, who liken the CC Report to a legal brief, find that it falls short on the incriminating evidence: "Where is the statement from Chou that shows he is violating Mao Tsetung Thought?" If only class struggle were that easy. We can't help it if Chou and Mickey Jarvis play their cards close to their vest and refuse to put much down on paper. It is revealing though to look at Chou's interview with Hinton in *New China* from the Spring of 1975. The whole thrust of this interview makes it understandable and compelling that Chang Chun-chiao would raise questions about Mao's analysis of classes back in the period of the new democratic revolution as it applies today. Chou basically operates in that mold. He discusses landlords, workers, peasants, urban capitalists and the like but doesn't get around to the question of the new bourgeoisie until Hinton prods him. And even in this regard the existence of capitalist roaders in the Party is downplayed. Earlier in the interview he states, "in the countryside, under socialism, classes still exist. There are, of course, some special places where old exploiters are few in number or even absent," the point being that this is who to look for as far as the class enemy goes.

There are other written materials which have been attributed to Chou. They may or may not be authentic and so must be treated with some caution. However they are consistent with the outlook and policies of those associated with Chou. For instance, in a report<sup>10</sup> that Chou was supposed to have delivered to the party on the international situation in 1973 he says, "The most important kind of strategic deployment is to have a great leap forward in all

areas, such as industry, agriculture and technology *by adopting the advanced techniques of other countries*" [our emphasis]. (The original source is an excerpted speech that appeared in *Issues and Studies*, the source of the two speeches by Chang and Wang and much of the other material which our Mensheviks used as exhibits at the CC, so it is not entirely unjustified that we throw some of their own sources back at them.)

The line of modernizing by adopting advanced techniques from abroad was officially associated with Teng during the campaign to beat back the right deviationist wind—which went on while Mao was alive. The Four in attacks on certain foreign trade policies were, according to the current rulers, railing at Chou for his part in formulating them. Chou's statement quoted above would appear quite in line with his overall approach to modernization which the Four saw as tying China's development to the coattails of imperialism.

(There is another document" purporting to be the will and testament of Chou that was originally broadcast on Japanese radio. According to the radio commentary it was circulated to the CCP Central Committee by his wife. Its authenticity is even more difficult to ascertain than the above quoted speech, but again the points it makes are quite in keeping with the character of the two-line struggle that was raging in the period just prior to his death. According to reported quotes from this "will" Chou lays major stress on the development of heavy industry which fits in with an emphasis on advanced foreign technology. Also, according to the same report, Chou describes the Cultural Revolution as a "mistake" that should not be repeated, a position which was actually held by quite a few members of the CCP and which is essentially echoed by our Mensheviks. Finally, according to these sources, Chou does not mention in his assessment of the international situation the Soviet Union—which would give credence to the idea that Chou was angling for 'reconciliation' with the Soviets.)

If these documents are forgeries we have to ask why do certain themes—such as reliance on advanced technology—consistently appear in these documents? Were there or were there not powerful currents in China promoting these views? And aren't there strong indications, including the words of these forces themselves, that Chou was associated with them?

The Mensheviks make no effort to answer the arguments of the CC Report. Why doesn't Mao issue a statement following Chou's death—when the air was full of tension—and settle his case once

and for all? Mao did not do that. Everybody from the Four to the current leadership agrees that Chou and Teng were closely allied. Is this a good or a bad thing? The editors of the *Peking Review* inform us that Chou was instrumental in pushing for changes in the educational system that were "hampered by the gang of 4." But, Mao gave his support to the students at Tsinghua in 1975 when they rose up against the backsliding ways of the administration. The Mensheviks make a principle of ignoring what the current leaders want no one to forget, namely that Chou and Teng were like lips to teeth.

Another point they wish to be oblivious to is the infatuation of the right with Chou. Why, we have to ask, is it the right that always "exploits the masses' feelings towards Chou?" At Tien An Men it is Chou who is venerated, his four modernizations that are consecrated, and Mao that is excoriated. Why? The Mensheviks criticize the CC Report for failing to indicate the class forces. But Chou and Teng were closely associated since Teng's rehabilitation and it is more than coincidence that Teng can only be brought down after Chou dies, which would indicate something about how the class forces line up. Mao could have stopped it, the only problem being that he ordered it! We suppose this is unfair because the Mensheviks haven't passed the final verdict on Teng yet. But, really, these people almost put their feet in their mouths: "The question of blocking the bourgeois rightists from using the death of Chou to advance their position was a real one confronting Mao. . ." One of the few true statements in this compendium of garbage.

Since we're on the subject of the right, we ought to remember that the Mensheviks regard the propaganda ministry as a stronghold of the right, in fact controlled by them. Yet, this same propaganda ministry is building up Chou En-lai as though he were the new Confucius. If Chou were such a staunch revolutionary these rightists would be making at least some veiled attacks on him. They've certainly found ways of rubbing Mao into the dirt by upholding the three poisonous weeds which he obviously disapproved of and so forth.

The Mensheviks claim that Chou steadfastly agreed with the line of the Tenth Party Congress. This Report upheld socialist new things, but Chou did not play a positive role in defending them—he initiated and fought for many "adjustments" which amounted to reversals, especially as regards education. Of course, one way they can avoid unhinging Chou from the Tenth Congress Report is to tell us that it was laying out the task of economic development,

which in the sense that the Mensheviks mean it, is simply not the case.

Speaking of that Congress, what followed was the Lin Piao/Confucius campaign. The "herky-jerky theoretician" presented a paper at the CC which had this to say about the campaign: "Who exactly this was directed at is a major question, whether against some rightist *or even Chou En-lai* is significant, but whichever, these points were the essence of the movement" [emphasis added.] This is conveniently dropped from the new improved version. The Mensheviks deleted this point not simply because it would more closely associate Mao with the Four. More than this, if the campaign were at least, in part, aimed at Chou it would throw to the winds the charge of the Mensheviks that the Four were hell-bent on broadening the target just out of spite or fancy. Chou En-lai was a powerful force, he commanded tremendous loyalty among large sections of the party and he was respected by many of the masses. This would on the one hand point to the difficulties inherent in prosecuting the campaign and, on the other, to the fact that, as it deepened, it would force many cadre and social forces to jump out in defense of Chou's policies. In other words, the target would objectively have to be broadened—it would broaden itself. And by the way, this would certainly lead to many instances of disruption and so on. These kinds of questions the Mensheviks refuse to entertain.

To ignore the arguments made by the CC Report about Chou, the Mensheviks must out of desperation and ideological bankruptcy seek refuge in emotionalism in order to cover over the line questions involved. Basically, the Menshevik argument, shorn of all its quibbling over detail, comes down to this: how could such a great revolutionary go bad? How could someone who was so loved and cherished by the Chinese people sell out? It's not possible. But many, if not most, of the revisionist chieftains in the Chinese Party were "heroes" of one sort or another. Peng Teh-huai was a veritable folk hero, a veteran of the liberation war and a hero of the Korean campaign. He was extremely popular, but he betrayed the revolution. This came as a shock to many cadre and the broad masses, but it was a fact and Mao fought it out with him. Liu Shao-chi was, like Chou a venerable party and state leader. Lin Piao's picture hung in the homes of millions of peasants. But the class struggle can't be fought with sentimentality. Our Mensheviks chafe at the CC Report for being so callous as to think that Mao would actually struggle with his old comrade Chou on his deathbed. Our Mensheviks tell us it defies "human reality." So

now Marxism is to be replaced with humanism!

Similarly, and you can almost see the tears streaming down their cheeks, how could we disagree with what we said in the CC statement at the time of his death? We loved him then and why don't we love him today? In fact, it was not clear at the time to our Party what Chou's role was. To the extent we understood the situation we knew that Chou was identified with Mao and if Chou stood with the forward march of the revolution for a lifetime it was certainly worthy of commemoration. It was also known at the time that there had been differences between Chou and Mao on different occasions and that there may have been differences more recently. The fact that Mao did not issue a statement to clarify Chou's role (a point which our Mensheviks will not address) raised more questions. But on the basis of our knowledge at the time it was correct to have gone ahead with the memorial meetings. Not to have done so would have been to pass a negative verdict on Chou in fact. Our knowledge has grown since then and we militantly repudiate the statement issued upon his death. If the Mensheviks want to enshrine it, fine. In that case it would be far better if they would break with their tradition and habit and be honest enough to openly repudiate Mao Tsetung and Mao Tsetung Thought.

Our Mensheviks cannot resign themselves to the most obvious facts. Mao Tsetung initiates a campaign against Teng Hsiao-ping and the right deviationist wind in the last half of 1975. If Teng, and the substance of this wind, including the three poisonous weeds, are being upheld today while they were being criticized in 1975-76 as counter-revolutionary, Mao was obviously, with the Four, arrayed against some powerful forces. We have to ask our Mensheviks what line was Chou giving support to, what line is Chou associated with by *both* those in power and those who have been overthrown? And, as the CC Report asks, if Mao and Chou were so tight why does the struggle fall out the way it does, with Teng, in line to be Chou's successor, going down only after Chou dies and the Four going down only after Mao dies? The CC Report analyzes the lines that would explain these important facts. Our Mensheviks can only fall back on sentimentalism and Confucian idol worship.

We have analyzed actual statements by Chou such as the Hinton interview, along with others that seem quite credible like the foreign policy speech, and still others that may be more questionable as with the "will." But the key issue is not the words that he uttered or put down on paper, but the forces to whom he gave his support and was allied with and the lines and forces he op-



posed. This is, in fact, the most important evidence to examine and the evidence which quite clearly reveals Chou to be a revisionist.

Why does the question of Chou loom as such an important one to the right in China and to our Mensheviks? Why is his reputation and standing such a cutting edge of struggle between the Four and the right and why is it necessary that we take a position on his role? It is because of the particular function he served to these forces.

In the last years of his life Chou's policies and lines on key questions promoted the interests of the right. But more than this, he had the allegiance of powerful forces in society, including large numbers of cadres, intellectuals, etc. At the same time Chou became a shield for the right. He had a distinguished record as a veteran revolutionary and his name was associated with that of Mao, and a large section of the masses had respect—or at least reverence—for him, for both good and not so good reasons (yes, Mensheviks, the masses *can* be influenced by non-proletarian ideology, including Confucian traditions, as well as the idea of the dying out of class struggle, etc.)

In all this Chou conferred respectability on the designs of the right as well as giving them protection. In China the right, in the face of resistance and opposition, could raise the specter of Chou being attacked to whip up an emotional appeal to cover over their policies. By the same token our homegrown Mensheviks raise the Chou En-lai question—the fact that he was coming under attack—to shield their support for revisionism and their utter bankruptcy.

#### How The Mensheviks Make Revisionism Serve Revolution

If revisionism has any meaning to these Mensheviks, it beats us because their defense of the Eleventh Party Congress is so shameful that it's laughable. (See p. 191) They have an easy explanation for the very significant change in the Eleventh Constitution which replaces the word 'overthrow' with the word 'eliminate' in talking about the bourgeoisie in the socialist period. It doesn't affect them one iota that the formulation "the complete overthrow of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes" appears in both the Ninth and Tenth Constitutions, written when Mao was alive. Oh, no, Mao didn't understand what they do; namely, that overthrow refers to the period in which the proletariat *comes to power*—from there on out it's a process of eliminating the bourgeoisie.

In other words, the overthrow of the bourgeoisie is a task of the

past according to the Mensheviks and the revisionists in China, on whose ideological authority they speak. But Mao didn't think so and that's why the formulation was written into the Constitution at the Ninth Congress and retained at the Tenth. As the Chair points out in his paper, "eliminating the bourgeoisie, Mao stressed, meant repeatedly *overthrowing* it..." The Mensheviks would have us believe that it just so happened at this Congress that a new and better formulation appeared. No way. Mao deliberately changed the wording when he was alive because the word "overthrow" expressed the reality of how the struggle would develop. The revisionists have deliberately changed this wording—taken "overthrow" out—because it expresses the reality of their class interests. If eliminate is so much better, then why didn't Mao have the foresight to make the change? It certainly wasn't the first time the question came up.

The Mensheviks rationalize other changes in the Constitution with their stock-in-trade argument that the excesses of the "left" strengthened the right and made it necessary for the center to unite with them. The provision for "active ideological struggle" has been removed because the Four abused it in the Lin Piao and Dictatorship of the Proletariat campaigns. The addition of new disciplinary measures was occasioned by the Four's vigorous recruitment of new, and mostly working class, members who fell under "their spell." The Mensheviks, in their own perverted way, have given new meaning to negation of the negation: first there is the Eighth Party Congress Constitution which was summed up as revisionist. It is changed in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Now it is negated—revisionism is brought to a higher level.

For these Mensheviks everything is condition, time, and place. Yes, they would say, active ideological struggle was good but some people went too far or went their own way with it and it's gotta be toned down. Sure, they would concur, the Cultural Revolution was important but times have changed. In short, for these Mensheviks everything from active ideological struggle to the Cultural Revolution is a task or tactic to be replaced by another. There are no universal principles for them, only the particular needs of the moment. What the Chair says hits the mark exactly, "There is no justification on any basis for this [removing ideological struggle as a requirement of basic units]..." But the Mensheviks tell us that "there is no basis for such a document [the Eleventh Party Constitution] to stay the same after intense class struggle." This is the kind of statement that is aimed at a social base that has not been trained in Marxism. These people have been fed revisionism and

are getting another dose of it.

The fact of the matter is that the Cultural Revolution is of universal significance to the international working class because it brought the struggle of our class to a whole new level. As for active ideological struggle, Lin Piao certainly banged people over the head with "active ideological struggle" setting off "atomic explosions of the soul" and so on, but this didn't convince Mao that it ought to be taken out, because it is a general principle under all conditions. But if the Cultural Revolution and the new—born things are tactics and if ideological struggle is a negotiable issue with the right, then even revisionism can be a tactic, a useful weapon in the hands of the genuine revolutionaries.

That's where all this leaves them. They say it right at the outset of the section "Smashing the Gang...": "Waging and consolidating the battle against the Gang has made necessary not only aiming the blow away from the right, but close unity with rightist and revisionist forces in the Party." This is the double-edged sword of the Mensheviks. They can blame some of the obviously bad things going on in China on the right who were given a new lease on life by the Four. Hence some of the defects and errors of the three poisonous weeds. But because of the "4's crimes," these weeds are not so poisonous after all and will help straighten the situation up.

At times, it is necessary for Marxist-Leninists to make concessions and compromises, but never with basic principle. We can even conceive situations in which it is necessary to have some temporary united front with revisionists, but never on the terms of revisionism. What we have here is not a united front of opposed class forces, but unity in opposition to socialism and revolution, with differences over just how to carry out counter-revolution-opposite poles of the same stupidity. By the way, it is the height of hypocrisy for our Mensheviks to accuse us of calling Mao a coward for having to make some *temporary concessions* to the right, with the appointment of Hua, etc. These Mensheviks have no compunctions about excusing what's going on in China today by telling us repeatedly that Hua has all this necessity to forge "*close unity with rightist and revisionist forces* [our emphasis]."

But let's for a moment accept the brutal logic of the Mensheviks and see how it can't possibly explain certain "facts." O.K., the Four were smash and grabbers and were on the verge of usurping supreme power. Mao saw through them, criticized them and threw his weight behind a new headquarters. The Four grew more desperate and dangerous. So why didn't Mao—with the prestige

and authority that is distinctively his—settle the issue, while he was alive? Why didn't he unite with the right and put them down? The Mensheviks don't speak to this. They don't tell us why Hua Kuo-feng did what Mao couldn't or wouldn't do—unite with the likes of Teng to smash the Four. Oddly enough, they themselves have to admit in discussing the fire the Four were coming under (ostensibly from Mao) that "he [Mao] did not speak out boldly in support of them, as he had of the left during the Cultural Revolution every time it came under fire. Instead he let the struggle develop *taking a hand only in initiating and in tempering the campaign against the right deviationist wind* [our emphasis]." This is all that Mao did, to launch a campaign against the right rather than slap the Four on the shoulders and say I'm with you 100%! But who were Teng's biggest antagonists, if not the Four? Mao knew full well how to give timely support to proletarian revolutionaries, even if he didn't put them on reviewing stands right then.

Hua, all of a sudden, has so much necessity that he has to unite with the right. More than this he has to unite with their program, the three poisonous weeds (which isn't all that odd when you get down to it since he assisted in drafting them, but never mind that), and there you have it, revisionism in the service of revolution. It's a heady brew. But, comrades take heart, they bellow. The class struggle is still raging. This is their last refuge from reality. It sounds just like the old refrain from apologists for social-imperialism confronted with certain distasteful lines and practices: "Oh, but there's heavy struggle going on in the Soviet party." Which, by the way, is not really much different than what Jarvis thought back in 1968-69.

To sum up this point on the 11th Congress Constitution, let the Menshevik paper speak for itself: "For it to stay the same as the 10th would be for the Chinese leadership to lie to the Chinese people about the current situation." How true! The proletariat is no longer in power. . . and the Constitution reflects it.

#### More On Their Method

By now it should be obvious, yes, obvious, that the Menshevik paper is nothing more than a feeble attempt to promote more eclecticism and revisionism. It's a conscious effort, on their part, to wipe out the last traces of Marxism in their thinking and to keep their followers as ignorant and stupefied of the science as is possible. It would take a long time to respond to every point they make,

which is why we have concentrated on the major ones, though, again, there isn't much they have raised that isn't already answered in the CC Report. And, as past experience has shown, fairly soon their paper will be superseded by another one. But we should take a cue from history. Late in 1976 and early 1977 the right deviationist wind became Comrade Teng's "revisionist line errors" and soon after he became the Four's fall guy and victim. He got his reward at the Eleventh Party Congress for his meritorious revisionism and it won't be long before our Mensheviks at home who are presently at the stage of criticizing his "line errors" will make the leap. Barring the unlikely prospect of Hua muscling out Teng in the near future in a bourgeois factional struggle, our Mensheviks will soon be fully and openly embracing Teng (as some of them have already done).

The method of the Mensheviks is so bankrupt that even where they wander past the *Peking Review* and sources based on the revisionist propaganda mill they pick up boulders only to drop them on their own feet. It was the Mensheviks who produced those two speeches by Wang and Chang apparently to show just how two-faced and out of touch with reality the Four were. But these speeches have shown just the opposite and we thank the Mensheviks for locating them for us. The "herky-jerky theoretician" took up the theme that the Four were criticized for not identifying both empiricism and dogmatism as being elements of revisionism and refused to mend their ways; in fact, suppressed the criticism. In his rambling discourse he makes a big point of the fact that Mao had to go to someone else, other than the Four or their followers, to write an article criticizing their error. He cited an article in *Peking Review* #20 (1975), "The Sole Purpose of Mastering Theory is to Apply It" by Tien Chun to prove his point. At the CC meeting this article was analyzed and it was shown to be an article written with the themes the Four had been stressing all along like the emergence of new class relations. So this stunning evidence he produces to show just how unrepentant the Four are establishes that they accepted the criticism and summed it up. The new version of their paper simply says that the head of the New China News Agency was forced by Yao to deep-six Mao's criticism.

#### The Central Committee Report is a Revolutionary Document And That's Why the Mensheviks Must Criticize It

In sum, the method, the stand and outlook, and the conclusions of the Mensheviks smack of the most twisted logic and naked revi-

sionism. At one point we thought it was enough to point out to some of these people the flagrant reversals of the Cultural Revolution that could be found in the *Peking Review* and the repudiation of the themes that Mao had stressed these last few years. It has now become abundantly clear that the reason the Mensheviks were so stubborn at the CC and so unconvinced by the Chairman's paper that revisionism has won out in China was that they saw nothing wrong with revisionism. They see nothing wrong with experts and profit in command. They see nothing wrong with top-down methods of management. They see nothing wrong with making the fulfillment of production quotas the highest goal to which the working class can aspire. These Mensheviks would neither recognize nor repudiate revisionism in China since it is precisely what their approach to the class struggle in this country is.

The Mensheviks find it impossible to accept the fact that the revisionists have triumphed in China. That such a thing could happen defies their most fundamental assumption of the class struggle—that if you plug away and work hard, you've got to win. Theirs is a view of socialism that minimizes the danger of capitalist restoration and the forces operating against the working class. They come straight out and say it: if you have a correct line things will everywhere and all the time go your way. The Four went down, they lost and therefore they could not have had a correct line. Hua, he's in power, so he must have the correct line. Nothing succeeds like success.

You see, if socialism turns out to be a struggle of great difficulty and endurance then maybe the struggle to overthrow capitalism won't be as easy as the Mensheviks want to believe. Maybe it'll take more than telling the workers that "we've got the power" and all we have to do is to get things "spinning" and we'll spin our way to communism. Because, in fact, there are bigger things involved. There are laws of society which more than any leaflet we can distribute now or 20 years from now will propel millions into motion and, just the same, laws which if we don't grasp them and help the masses to grasp will continually smack us in the face.

The class struggle as we have emphasized does not develop in a straight line. It goes through twists and turns and the working class is bound to suffer setbacks. But in spite of these difficulties, history is moving in the direction of the working class emancipating itself, which the old and new bourgeoisies cannot alter. For the Mensheviks the law of class struggle comes down to this: if you do everything right, if you have it all together and luck out a little here and there, you can't go wrong. If the bourgeoisie beats

you back, it's because you messed up. This is why they hated the miners article ("Miners' Struggle At a Crossroads," *Revolution*, December 1977) with such venom. They couldn't reconcile themselves to the fact that while we have to fight like hell in the day-to-day struggles, we can only go so far in these struggles. Unless we begin to help the workers to realize the limitations of these struggles and take up bigger questions, the gains we make will turn into their opposite.

The Mensheviks regard the struggle for communism not in terms of the working class grasping the laws of society and its historical mission, but rather as a question of strategy and tactics in the most vulgar and pragmatic sense. "The Four couldn't unite with people," they chant. Around what and for what, that doesn't matter; what does is the fact that they didn't master the politics of compromise. They couldn't finesse their way to communism. They didn't know how to maneuver for position. They were not the "tough cookie" that Teng Hsiao-ping is.

The Mensheviks do not understand that socialism is a transitional period and that it involves making a radical rupture with all traditional property relations and ideas. They do not understand that the socialist period is one of making continuous revolution in stages in order to dig out the soil that breeds capitalist relations and gives rise to the bourgeoisie. Nor, for that matter, that it involves big clashes with the bourgeoisie precisely because socialism aims at wiping out the very conditions of its existence. This is why our Mensheviks find it impossible to accept that 27 years after the seizure of power the working class in China would be confronted with and temporarily defeated by the most serious challenge from the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks gasp in amazement: how could it be that bourgeois influences could be so powerful in China, they've been struggled with for all these years. The working class could not possibly lose it all, not after this much time. This is how our Mensheviks look at history, not as one of spirals in which the working class and bourgeoisie are engaged in repeated trials of strength over whether society will move forward or backward, but as a straight line where the working class gets stronger and the bourgeoisie dies out.

This is why our Mensheviks are so enamored of the "hard-nosed" and "realistic" rulers in China. All that one has to do to get to communism is carry out the economic tasks of the day and sprinkle them with a little socialist propaganda. It's really the Chinese version of their program for the U.S. working class—"fuse" Marxism with the day-to-day struggles, never mind

any qualitative developments in society or the need to raise the overall level of struggle of the working class.

The bourgeoisie does have many advantages in the socialist period—the force of habit and the pull of spontaneity, the strength of international capital, etc. And it must be frankly admitted that the working class has not been able to hold onto power for an extended period of time. But the international working class is not at point-0. It is not as though history simply repeats itself. The working class movement has advanced to a higher level through the experience of making revolution, learning from past experiences, summing up new conditions and charting out a clearer path forward. It was only a little more than 100 years ago that the working class first rose up in an organized way and established the first workers government, the Paris Commune. It was short-lived, but it put the question of workers' rule on the front burner. The problem of seizing power and consolidating the rule of the working class was resolved through the experience of the Bolshevik revolution. And with the Chinese revolution, the problem posed by the Soviet experience, how to mobilize the masses to prevent restoration, was theoretically and practically resolved through the Cultural Revolution.

But each of these resolutions brought forth new contradictions and difficulties which will be resolved through the world-wide experience of the proletarian revolution. For this reason, though the working class held power in China for a shorter time than in the Soviet Union, its ability to push past the contradictions posed by the Bolshevik revolution has brought the working class movement to a higher level. Mao Tsetung Thought concentrates these experiences and lessons of class struggle and will make it possible for the working class to advance even further. For the Mensheviks, there is no spiral development and so if the Chinese working class was defeated all is lost. Things go straight forward or straight backwards.

Our Party regards the CC Report and our stand on China as a great victory. It is a great victory not because we are happy to see dogs like Hua and Teng trampling on the achievements of the Chinese working class and restoring the bloody rule of capital, but because we did not follow in the wake of the rulers of China and sink into the swamp of revisionism, could distinguish genuine from sham Marxism, and remain the vanguard of the U.S. working class and stay on the high road. Our defeat of the Mensheviks, who would have turned our Party into a revisionist party and failing that tried to wreck it, is a concentrated expression of that victory.

The Four persevered on the high road. This was not a road of bribing workers or speeding them up or lulling them to sleep with the sort of "I'm OK, you're OK" pabulum of Hua Kuo-feng. The Four set out to arm the masses with line, to arm them with an understanding of the decisive and crucial questions of socialist society so that the masses could transform it and more consciously battle the bourgeoisie's attempts to stage a comeback. And, always, they approached these problems and difficulties from the standpoint of the final goal of achieving communism, which the Four correctly understood to mean the abolition of classes. If this is what our Menshevik authors disparagingly refer to as "Gang of Four Thought," and if the *Peking Review* under their leadership is what "Gang of Four Thought" is all about, then we'll stand with it over the goulash and drivel of "Chou En-lai and Hua Kuo-feng Thought." We'll stand with it because it is the application of Mao Tsetung Thought.

The Mensheviks have thrown up a lot of sand in people's eyes because they know their arguments could not get over in the Party—after all, they were defeated at the CC—and this is why they split. Had their followers stayed within the Party, the large part of them would have been won over to the correct position, which explains why the leaders bolted and took what they could with them. Their paper is so light-weight and flimsy, so eclectic, that it tends to depress people's ideological and cultural standards. Nevertheless, it does give us the opportunity to deepen our grasp of the CC Report. And we can see why truth is higher than facts, why the truth of the CC Report synthesizes the most important facts—what lines and class forces were contending in China. The CC Report stands as our answer to the Mensheviks: Revisionists Are Revisionists and Must Not Be Supported, Revolutionaries Are Revolutionaries and Must Be Supported.

#### Footnotes

1. Data based on Chinese sources cited in Andors, Steven, *China's Industrial Revolution* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977).
2. Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975).
3. Cited in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February, 1977.
4. *Hua-chiao jih-pao* (New York), February 28, 1977. Cited in *China Quarterly*, September, 1977.
5. *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay), December 3, 1977.

6. *Peking Review* #40 (1975).
7. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 1, 1976.
8. *People's Daily*, August 25, 1976.
9. *Red Flag* #4, April 1, 1977.
10. *Chinese Law and Government*, M.E. Sharpe, Spring, 1977.
11. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, January 29, 1976 {Tass broadcast of article appearing in Japanese newspaper *Sankei Shimbun*}. Other sources cited in text.

#### Appendix I: Verdicts May Be Reversed in Literature and Art— But Not the Will of the People

The present rulers in China are step by step transforming culture according to their bourgeois outlook as a key part of promoting and implementing their revisionist line. In the last round of struggle they mounted an intense attack in this sphere beginning in 1974. Since seizing power, they have begun to carry out their line fully. They are on the one hand systematically taking culture out of the hands of the masses and putting it in the hands of "experts." At the same time, they are unleashing a social base among professional literature and art workers which views art as above the class struggle (art for art's sake), as a creation of "geniuses" and "experts" and which resents ideological remolding and going among the masses into the midst of struggle to create socialist art. The revisionists can not do any of this without reversing correct verdicts, particularly on the leadership of Chiang Ching in revolutionizing literature and art, and the model works. Furthermore, they must attack Marxist theory. This shapes up presently around the question of "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend." The revisionists reduce its meaning simply to a question of "quantity." It was put forward by Mao Tsetung in *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People* as a question of forms and styles in art and a question of method (letting them develop freely) and settling questions on the basis of discussion and struggle and not coercion.

They use certain relatively minor errors on Chiang Ching's part in this respect and comradesly criticisms Mao Tsetung probably made of her to go against Mao's correct line and attack Chiang Ching's overall very correct work and real contributions, and thereby attack the proletariat.

In this our Mensheviks entirely agree and cheer. As is the case on other questions, the Menshevik indictment of the leadership of the Four, Chiang Ching in particular, concerning culture turns out to be an unintended confession of their own revisionism.

They give Chiang Ching no credit for leading the struggle to revolutionize Peking Opera, while hypocritically paying lip service to upholding that struggle and its results. Like their counterparts in China, they know that to uphold the struggle is inseparable from upholding Chiang Ching's leadership of it. For the model operas were not just the product of "hard work" though there certainly was hard work, but were principally the product of a correct line, something our pragmatic revisionists regard as "hot air." Yes, a correct line which developed in opposition to and in fierce struggle against a revisionist line and which united cultural workers to sweep the bourgeoisie off the stage of Peking Opera.

For as soon as the words of praise are out of our Mensheviks' mouths, they immediately call what they have praised "... the rigid development of these model operas—under the signboard of not tampering with socialist new things—that completely stagnated the development of revolutionary culture in China."

In fact, Chiang Ching led the struggle to actually implement Mao's revolutionary line and in opposition to the revisionist line of Liu Shao-chi and Chou Yang (head of the Ministry of Culture at that time, now rehabilitated by the revisionists.) She personally participated in and led the struggle to create the first five model Peking operas, *Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy*, *The Red Lantern*, *Shachiapang*, *On the Docks* and *Raid on the White Tiger Regiment*; the model dance dramas, *Red Detachment of Women* and *The White Haired Girl*; the model symphony *Shachiapang*. In the early 1970s, added to the list were the Peking Operas *Song of the Dragon River*, *Red Detachment of Women*, *Fighting on the Plain* and *Azalea Mountain*; the piano composition *The Red Lantern*; the piano concerto *The Yellow River*; the symphony *Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy*. Several other dance dramas, operas, etc. were being experimentally performed (i.e. the performances were for criticism and not yet broadly popularized) as of 1974.

That adds up to nine model operas and six other model productions (another was added in 1974.) Our opportunists claim only eight operas. They are either lying or they think that doing a symphony of an opera or vice versa is to do the same thing. If they had ever *investigated* Chinese culture they would know better. Peking Opera (and other forms of Chinese opera, like Hopei Clapper Opera) is completely different than western symphonic music and western opera. It is sort of sing-song regular lines whereas the symphonic forms are a fuller musical interpretation of the story. To make an analogy, the one is like doing a sing-song play on the civil war, the other is like a choir singing "The Battle Hymn of the

Republic." Both are obviously needed. Our revisionists neither investigate the facts nor interpret them correctly.

The struggle to revolutionize Peking Opera was taken up by art and literature workers at great risk to their freedom and for some even their lives in the beginning of the Cultural Revolution. Through this struggle many lessons were learned about how to actually apply Mao's line. For example, the question of how to portray proletarian heroes and how to portray reactionaries was consciously taken up and resolved on a whole new basis. This did not occur before in the history of the international communist movement, including in the Soviet Union when it was socialist. These lessons learned by our class in struggle have been taken up by revolutionary fighters on the cultural front in this country and others and they will not be so easily forgotten as our Menshevik butchers would like!

With what line did Chiang Ching lead? What did this lead to in practice? In the pamphlet, *On the Revolution of Peking Opera*, Chiang Ching's speech in 1964 affirmed Mao's line on culture and gave concrete guidance to the struggle then beginning to mount. Her line is by no means dogmatic or "ultra left." She sums up several points:

1.) The orientation should be to serve the majority, the workers, peasants and soldiers and to serve and develop the socialist economic base.

"It is inconceivable that, in our socialist country led by the Communist Party, the dominant position on the stage is not occupied by the workers, peasants and soldiers, who are the real creators of history and the true masters of our country. We should create literature and art which protect our socialist economic base. When we are not clear about our orientation, we should try our best to become so."

2.) She sums up the present situation concretely, listing all the various professional companies and what they produce, exposing the fact that the bourgeois line is dominant in Peking Opera.

"Theaters are places in which to educate the people, but at present the stage is dominated by emperors, princes, generals, ministers, scholars and beauties—by feudal and bourgeois stuff."

3.) She calls for putting stress on contemporary themes "which reflect real life in the fifteen years since the founding of the Chinese People's Republic and which create images of contem-

porary revolutionary heroes on our operatic stage" and gives guidelines for how to evaluate historical works.

- 4.) She calls for the development of pace-setters or models.
- 5.) She identifies the main problem in carrying out the task as producing scripts, and as the method of solution calls for writers to go among the workers, peasants and soldiers in three-way combinations of the leadership, the playwrights and the masses;
- 6.) She sums up experience where the artists on that basis have been willing to revise and develop their work and therefore created good works welcomed by the masses.
- 7.) At the same time she warns against lightly knocking down what has been accomplished and gives examples of how works some wanted to knock down were revised on the above basis and were excellent works.

These are only the major points. What did her line lead to? To go deeply into just one example: *The White Haired Girl*, originally written during the Yenan Period, was revised.

1. The love theme between the heroine and the hero was downplayed so that the class struggle was the motive force, not love between two individuals.
2. The father of the heroine fought the landlord's troops when they came for the daughter instead of killing himself.
3. The heroine fought off the attempted rape by the landlord instead of being debased.
4. The hero was told about the Red Army by an underground Communist and went to find it as opposed to running off and being found by the Red Army.
5. Many other revisions in choreography and music were made in line with showing the peasants as strong and not downtrodden.

Now the present rulers, led by Hua Kuo-feng, are "restaging" *The White Haired Girl* as it was before the Cultural Revolution (see *China Reconstructs*, May, 1977). The changes that were made under the leadership of Chiang Ching were correct and warmly welcomed by the masses. They were not "rigid" or "stifling" to anyone but the bourgeoisie. "Proposed changes" have been put into effect by the revisionists. Chiang Ching and others tried to "repel" these "proposed changes" and they acted in the interests of the proletariat.

Our Menshevik scoundrels stand entirely with the bourgeoisie in jeering at the creations of the proletariat, at the successes of the proletariat won through the bitterest, most soul-stirring struggle. They say, "In a 9 year period, a grand total of 8 model operas [sic] were developed to serve China's 800 million people."

It is exactly a tremendous inspiration and victory that in *only* a 10 year period so many truly revolutionary works were created, the like of which was never before seen! The ugly features of the bourgeoisie, the class stand and world outlook of the bourgeoisie, are fully reflected in the shameless attack of these revisionists on the victories of our class.

Chu Lan (a pseudonym used in some articles written under Chiang Ching's leadership) in *Chinese Literature*, September, 1974, page 93, answered this same revisionist attack:

"If we review the history of the literature and art of mankind, we see how many years the exploiting classes took to create a literature and art of their own. Under feudalism it took thousands of years and under the bourgeoisie hundreds, yet only a limited number of works have been handed down. By the time it reached the stage of imperialism, capitalism was in its decadence and decline. The stage became a platform for the 'modernist school,' fauvism, strip-tease and other degenerate rubbish. The works are numerous and varied but share the common characteristic of poisoning or lulling the minds of the people. . . . Contrasting our decade with the thousands of years and hundreds of years of the landlord class and bourgeoisie, we find that 'The landscape here is beyond compare,' as Chairman Mao's line runs."

That so-called "dogmatist" Chiang Ching is entirely correct. Her method is to view things from the high plane of the class struggle.

Persisting in the revisionist road they have taken, our Mensheviks hasten to clamor, "Also, how many times can 800 million people sit through 8 operas, as the main form of socialist culture, before they get bored and disgusted?" Come now! Really! All 800 million Chinese people, *unfortunately* have not seen all or most of the model works. Former comrades, China really *is* an underdeveloped country! Furthermore, the three great differences *actually* exist and this has real meaning as regards the difference in cultural levels between the city and countryside. In this context by 1974 the task of popularizing the model works was only *initially* completed.

Shanghai's Peking Opera Company and others have undertaken tours in the countryside, with bicycles pulling carts of equipment and artists walking with back packs to both perform for the peasants, especially in remote areas, and to assist the spare-time groups in performing all or parts of the model works, while at the same time viewing local works and learning from them and

popularizing them. The PLA has done this too.

In China the record, radio and TV industries are not very developed. Broadcasting for TV is several hours a night and not every night of the week in normal times. Almost no masses own TV's and not all neighborhood committees or communes or brigades have them. Many commune brigades have loudspeaker systems over which they play radio broadcasts and records but many do not. In the cities large numbers of masses have radios, but there is a big difference in the countryside.

Besides, there is a political question involved in how much emphasis you give to such media forms as opposed to the masses themselves in social and production units throughout society actively taking up and taking part in culture.

As for films, first off China's film industry is not all that developed. The movie industry did not develop in America until after World War I, when the U.S. became a major world power. What makes our revisionists think that China's film industry should be so advanced? Still, steps like developing movie projectors light enough for transport on one bicycle were undertaken under the "evil influence" of the Four (or the Five including Mao Tsetung) so that films could be taken to even remote areas. This is actually dealing with the difference between town and country. Without taking such measures, and putting them in the forefront, the level of culture in the cities would advance while the countryside would be left to "rural idiocy." Moreover, in the national minority areas steps were taken to adapt the model works to the local forms and language.

Once again, the main problem still was that the majority of the population had not even seen all or most of the model works, that popularization of the model works remained an important task. This is clear from reading the *Chronicle* sections of *Chinese Literature* over the past years. To cite just one example, from *CL*, August, 1974:

"The model revolutionary theatrical works have also greatly helped the transformation of many of China's local opera forms, and experiments were made to transplant the model works. *The Red Lantern* has been transplanted into the form of Hopei clapper opera, *Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy* into pingchu opera". . . etc. . . "People of the minority nationalities in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Kwangsi and elsewhere are also staging them in their own languages and art forms. The Uighur opera, *The Red Lantern* has won wide acclaim among the many nationalities of the vast Sinkiang Uighur

Autonomous Region."

In the same quote referred to earlier, our revisionists (out of stupidity or more likely in a vain attempt to cover their ass) maintain that the model operas are "the main form of socialist culture."

Lie if you like, but don't be ridiculous! Neither in theory nor in practice have the model productions ever been the "main form of socialist culture" for the masses. The model works are exactly models, meant to act as pace-setters, as Chiang Ching laid out in 1964. They have played the role of setting a political and artistic standard and at the same time of inspiring the masses of people and literature and art workers to create new works of socialist art. This has actually happened. For example, *Chinese Literature*, November, 1975, page 110, reported:

"In recent years, the broad masses in Huimin Prefecture, Shantung Province, have done a great deal of literary and art work which reflects our socialist revolution and socialist construction, thus effectively occupying the ideological and cultural front in urban and rural areas.

"Huimin Prefecture, situated by the lower reaches of the Yellow River near Pohai Bay, consists of twelve counties. Before Liberation, the labouring people there lived too hard a life to give any time to art and literature. Before the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, owing to the revisionist line in the cultural field, mass literary and art activities were discouraged and their development was hampered. During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution the people and cadres in this district criticized the counter-revolutionary revisionist line. They organized and trained a contingent of literary and art workers, so that socialist literature and art began to flourish. Now many communes, production brigades, factories and schools have set up spare-time groups of writers and artists, most of whom are workers and peasants. Since 1973, the whole district has already produced 55 plays, more than 180 short stories, more than 300 revolutionary tales, more than 2000 poems, over 180 new songs, more than 200 ballads, 12 serial-picture books and more than 300 art works."

Even a casual glance at *Chinese Literature* for the past three or four years, not to mention the past ten years, will prove to anyone interested in investigation that this is typical of most provinces, not at all the exception but the rule!

The most important point is that communists applying a correct line must lead so that socialist culture is more and more



created by the masses themselves and used in the social and production units throughout society as a weapon in the struggle against the bourgeoisie—and against nature—as well as being popularized throughout society along with works produced by revolutionary professional literature and art workers.

The masses of workers, peasants, etc. have not only performed all or parts of the model works but have created new works, and these have been popularized. This our Mensheviks spit on and ignore. This the revisionists in China are abolishing, starting with the spare-time teams in the factories, which are "divorced from production"—see the "20 Points" and Yu Chiu-li's speech at Taching (*PR* 022, 1977).

They are working to stop the initiative of the masses in cultural and political affairs in the social and production units, as an important part of destroying the political life in these units, and to transfer all the initiative to the top, by relying on that section of the artists who go in for "art for art's sake" and think of themselves as stars and geniuses who are above the masses. To do this they must destroy the model works and along with them and as a prerequisite for doing so the political lessons that were learned in their creation.

True to their Confucian mentors, our revisionists here reveal in their statements their notion that the masses themselves cannot create socialist culture but that this is the sole province of "talented" big shots. Their mentors in China cannot take this step without going even farther and separating the professional literature and art workers from the masses. Overcoming such separation was a major part of the creation of every model work and it was a tremendous struggle to unite people who considered themselves "stars" to go and learn from the workers and peasants.

Our Mensheviks are great defenders of the proletariat so long as there is no bourgeoisie, and no bourgeois offensive against the proletariat. This is utter metaphysics. They state: "While rightists at this point could only aspire to reverse correct verdicts, Chiang Ching was doing so on a daily basis. . ." (p. 246)

What is their proof? They "quote" Mao Tsetung, as reported in recent issues of *Peking Review*. When did these quotes appear? After Mao died and the Four went down, which 1) makes their legitimacy highly questionable and 2) certainly leaves doubt as to whether the target of these criticisms were the Four or not. And what do our Mensheviks say about *Peking Review*? They say, don't pay any attention to *PR* because the right controls it. You can't have it both ways, former comrades. At any rate, assuming

the quotes are legitimate and they were directed at the Four, Chiang Ching in particular, SO WHAT!!!

One thing is certain. The criticisms have to be taken in the context of Chiang Ching's handling of a right wing offensive against the advances of the Cultural Revolution starting in the cultural sphere with the production in 1973 of the opera *Going Up to Peach Peak Three Times*, a dirty mummy originally produced by Liu Shao-chi's wife, and slightly revised in name, and which *in practice* overthrew and reversed most of the verdicts on what constituted proletarian art, both in form and content, and in essence called for reversing the verdict on Liu Shao-chi. (See *Chinese Literature*, July, 1974, page 79.)

These criticisms Mao supposedly made of the Four around culture are all to do with method. Never once is Chiang Ching's basic orientation or line criticized. There is certainly nothing that says the way forward is to reverse the verdicts on art of the Cultural Revolution, which is *exactly* what the current rulers are doing, even widely promoting bourgeois music, literature and other such art from the West, as well as old reactionary stuff from China itself (as reported, for example, in an article on Chinese culture in *Eastern Horizons*, November, 1977).

To our Mensheviks all these things the revisionists are doing are either just fine or "justifiable" because, "The methods of destruction and the methods for advance look similar, and basically the only way to make a distinction requires an analysis of concrete conditions." In typical agnostic fashion, they say that in actuality the left looks like the right and it's impossible to tell the difference between the two, and they cover this shameful agnosticism by calling for a concrete analysis of concrete conditions which they do not attempt to do!

They are as eclectic as they are agnostic. They say, "But even though these socialist things are being supported [sic] it is important to grasp class struggle runs through everything, which always implies the possibility that these things could be reversed." One might as well say that the dictatorship of the proletariat is being "supported" but since class struggle exists it might be reversed. This is indeed true, but there is no way in hell you can support it and reverse it at the same time! There is likewise no way you can support genuine socialist new things and reverse them at the same time.

Mao Tsetung said, "The right is more arrogant, but the left is more tenacious." These revisionists, in China and our own, will be laid to rest in the sewer of history where they belong.

### Appendix II: Two Lines On Learning from Tachai and Taching

With sweeping profundity our Mensheviks have announced to the world that (in addition to many other "crimes") the Party has repudiated Mao's two red banners of Tachai and Taching. But as the CC Report states:

"There are two ways, not just one, to pull down the red banner of Tachai. One is to openly pull down the banner, but the other is to paint the banner white. In other words, it is quite possible to pervert the real lesson of Tachai, as Hua Kuo-feng and Co. have indeed done."

As an example of this process, let's first look at the example of Taching. Before and during the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution at least three industrial institutions were upheld by Mao as examples: The Anshan Iron and Steel Company in 1960, the Taching oil field in 1964, and the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in 1968. Each was upheld in the course of particular struggles against revisionism, and not on the basis of production statistics, although each had outstanding accomplishments in production as a result of victorious struggles in the realms of ideology and the relations of production.

For example, Mao praised the Constitution of the Anshan Iron and Steel Company in the thick of the struggle against the revisionist line of rationalizing the work process through bourgeois rules and regulations (as opposed to placing reliance on heightening the consciousness of the workers and mass movements) and the revisionists' insistence on single manager responsibility in socialist enterprises. Referring to the line of Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and others, Mao wrote:

"They were opposed to launching vigorous mass movements, to the principle of cadre participation in productive labor and worker participation in management, of reform of irrational and outdated rules and regulations and of close cooperation among cadres; they relied on just a few people working in seclusion. Many favored the system of placing responsibility solely on the factory director and were against the system of the factory director designated to undertake responsibility under the leadership of the Party Committee. They held that the 'Charter of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Combine' (a set of authoritative rules practiced in a big steel plant in the Soviet Union) was sacred."

This was Mao's stand in the struggle against the "70 points" of Teng and others.

In 1964 Mao raised the slogan "In industry learn from Taching!" after a protracted struggle against the revisionist line in the construction of the Taching oil field. Taching was a product of the Great Leap Forward. Its initial work force consisted of demobilized PLA men and veteran oil workers from the Yumen oil field, many of whom were accompanied onto the great Manchurian plain by their families. The exploration of this area, the former bed of an inland lake, was in defiance of the advice of Soviet geologists who said that such formations would never yield oil. One aspect of Taching was this break with slavishness to things foreign. The first oil was struck in 1959, but in 1960 the Soviet Union abruptly withdrew all technical assistance and placed an oil embargo on China. (The U.S. had already established such an embargo.)

It was at this point that Liu Shao-chi vigorously opposed continuing the Taching effort—without the Soviet aid he held it impossible. Yet the workers of Taching refused to give in, they engaged in a mass study of Mao's philosophical works, heightened their consciousness, and created new and favorable conditions through their own efforts. It is interesting to note here that one major criticism by the Four of the film "Pioneers" is that it completely leaves out this aspect and thus white-washes Liu Shao-chi.

Beyond their perseverance and ideological study, the workers of Taching and their families began to create new and revolutionary social relations. While in the cities, Liu was pushing the practice of bringing women into the workforce as low-paid helpers to skilled men in state-owned industries, the family dependents in Taching responded to Mao's call to develop industry in an all-round way, bringing closer together the different sectors of the economy, striking a blow at the three great differences, and bringing women into the productive work force without dependence on state capital investment. Starting with "three shovels" the families of the oil workers took up the reclamation of the wasteland in which the oil field was located and pioneered the development of "worker-peasant villages" in which industrial and agricultural workers lived side by side. It was as a result of this intense struggle that Mao held up Taching as a red banner, and again pointed to it in his famous "May 7 directive" (actually a letter to Lin Piao, after which the May 7 cadre schools are named):

"Likewise, workers should, in addition to their main industrial work, learn military affairs, politics, and culture,

and take part in the socialist educational movement and in criticizing the capitalist class. Under adequate conditions, they should also engage in agricultural production, following the example of the Taching Oilfield."

**The Shanghai Machine Tools Plant was upheld by Mao as a result of the struggle of the workers there to break open the doors of technological education to the workers and to unleash the initiative and skill of the working class in technical innovation. Mao's comments on this question were released in a famous report on July 21, 1968, after which the July 21 universities in the factories are named. In this struggle Mao forcefully upheld the leading role, not just of proletarian ideology, but of the workers themselves in the sphere of technology. Slashing at the Liu-Teng line on science and technology, the same line which is now being implemented, Mao wrote:**

"It is still necessary to have universities; here I refer mainly to colleges of science and engineering. However, it is essential to shorten the length of schooling, revolutionize education, put proletarian politics in command and take the road of the Shanghai Machine Tools Plant in training technicians from among the workers. Students should be selected from among workers and peasants with practical experience, and they should return to production after a few years' study."

**The point which our Mensheviks try so hard to evade is that Mao consistently held up as examples those units which were exemplary in the struggle against revisionism (and in fact against the same lines that are now being implemented by Hua & Co.). The significance of Taching was not that it excelled in the production of oil (which it certainly did—as a result of grasping revolution), but in the fact that it was a stronghold of proletarian politics in the intense class struggle in China in the early sixties.**

**In this light then, let us see who it is that is really upholding the red banner of Taching and who is casting it down. At the National Conference on Learning from Taching in Industry, Hua Kuo-feng delivered a speech which contained, scattered throughout it, many correct statements and assessments, e.g. "Taching vigorously stimulates the growth of production by making revolution in the superstructure and in the relations of production," or:**

"...Taching also undertakes agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side-occupations and fisheries, increasing collective welfare step by step and building up an

oilfield of a new type which combines industry with agriculture and town with country. All this contributes to narrowing the three major differences between workers and peasants, between town and country and between manual and mental labor, restricting bourgeois right and preventing the emergence of a class of bureaucrats."

**Yet read as a whole, Hua's speech elevates the tasks of production to equality with the tasks of class struggle (and equates class struggle with rooting out the influence of the Four), upholds the "historical mission" of the working class as making China a "great and powerful modern socialist country," by the year 2000 and most importantly serves as the introduction and seal of approval on the main report by Yu Chiu-li wherein the concrete programmatic goals of the conference are laid out.**

**If indeed Mao's red banner of Taching were being upheld, one might expect a concrete program placing the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie up-front (the film "Pioneers" tended to present the principal contradiction as between China and the encircling imperialists and social-imperialists), and calling for continuing revolutionization in the superstructure and the relations of production, strengthening of the socialist new things, continued restriction of bourgeois right, etc. Instead Yu offers a ten point program as follows, summarized by key quotations. (*The National Conference on Learning From Taching In Industry, Selected Documents, Foreign Language Press, Peking 1977.*)**

1) "What we mean by rectification is carrying out a widespread Marxist education movement, carrying out education in political line, and settling one by one those issues over which the 'gang of four' created confusion."

2) "Special attention must be paid to selecting and appointing the two top leaders in each enterprise."

3) "The leading bodies concerned should strengthen management, institute strict discipline in financial and economic affairs, and take appropriate measures to solve the actual problems in mapping out plans for the enterprises, in linking production with supply and marketing and in co-ordinating the work of various enterprises."

4) "All enterprises should take Taching as the example, . . . establish and improve their organizations, systems and rules of political work, and take effective steps to strengthen political and ideological education." . . . "They should launch large-scale mass campaigns to comment on the ideology and outlook of the comrades, compete with one another in making contribu-

tions, elect model workers and select pace-setters.

5) "... work out ways and means to reverse the situation of certain enterprises running at a loss, improve quality, lower consumption of materials, overhaul and repair equipment and installations, and ensure safety in operations."

6) "The number of non-productive personnel in general should not exceed 18% of the total payroll in an enterprise."

7) "We must strictly carry out the Party's policy of uniting with, educating and remoulding the intellectuals and bring into full play the role of technical personnel."

8) "A special conference will be held to study and tackle the problems involving employment and wage rates."

9) "Enterprises should strengthen centralized Party leadership and institute the system of division of labor and responsibility under the leadership of the Party Committee. Responsibility for the daily work in production, construction and management in an enterprise rests with the chairmen of the revolutionary committee."

10) "Work by city authorities must be done in line with the principle of serving production and the masses of workers, with great efforts being made to run educational and public health institutions, public utilities and commerce and the service trades well."

**This isn't learning from Taching—it's learning from Khrushchev!**

#### "Learning from Tachai"

The treatment of Tachai by our Mensheviks is no less gruesome. Sure that they have a winner this time, they devote six pages of their "Smashing" paper to Tachai and the question of mechanization of agriculture. In studying this point people should again re-read pages 40-42 of the CC Report on China which covers the basic issues of Hua's and Chen Yung-kuei's line on agriculture. But a bit of background on Tachai itself and why Mao upheld it as a red banner is in order.

Mao issued his call "in agriculture, learn from Tachai" in 1964 after several protracted struggles with revisionism in the field of agriculture. Immediately following the victory of the New Democratic Revolution in 1949, a fierce struggle broke out between the line of Mao which insisted on moving at once into the socialist transformation of society and Liu Shao-chi's line of extending the period of "new democracy" during which time a "synthesized economic base" of both capitalist and socialist sectors

would build up China's productive forces.

In the agricultural field, Liu opposed the cooperative movement after land reform as being "utopian agrarian socialism" and maintained that mechanization must precede cooperation. On June 14, 1950, Liu wrote: "Only when conditions are mature for the extensive application of mechanized farming, for the organization of collective farms and for the socialist reform of the rural areas, will the need for a rich peasant economy cease, and this will take a somewhat long time to achieve." Liu further advocated a policy of "four freedoms": freedom to buy and sell land, to hire tenants, to select crops to plant, and free markets and pricing. He sought to justify this policy by saying it was necessary to preserve the united front of the four classes in the New Democratic Revolution and to unleash the "natural" productive forces in the countryside.

In contrast Mao called for a mass movement of the peasants against the re-emergence of exploitation in the countryside, saying, "The greatest efforts must be made to organize various mutual assistance cooperatives and for the improvement of agricultural techniques." "In no way can the spontaneous forces of the countryside be allowed full play."

It was in this setting that Chen Yung-kuei repeatedly sought permission from county authorities to set up a cooperative, which was granted in 1953 with the provision that it be limited to 30 households!

Even after the establishment of a people's commune in 1958 the class struggle in no way let up. Following the three bad years of natural disasters, in 1961 Liu Shao-chi proposed his infamous *sanzi yibao* solution: extend the private plots and free markets, set agricultural output quotas by the household and not by the collective, and promote small enterprises with private responsibility for profit and loss. County representatives who came to Tachai to preach this rightist wind were sternly rebuffed, but at the national level Liu was distributing his revisionist Sixty Regulations on agriculture.

At the Tenth plenum of the eighth Central Committee in 1962 Mao again called attention to the centrality of class struggle in preventing China from "changing color." One can just imagine Teng sitting in the corner grimacing as Mao declared: "Class struggle must be talked about every year, every month, every day."

In 1963, Mao issued guidelines for a Socialist Education Movement. But Liu Shao-chi, by issuing further guidelines to "clarify" Mao's original instructions tried to pervert the Socialist Education Movement in the countryside by transforming the "four

cleanups" campaign into a "knock down the many to protect the few" affair—a technique frequently employed by the rightists in the Cultural Revolution. Rather than unleashing the masses through their mass organizations (Poor Peasants Associations, Women's Associations, etc.), Liu said "the problem lies with the leadership" and dispatched work teams to the countryside to "rectify" the situation.

One such work team, headed by Liu's wife, Wang Kuang-mei, was dispatched to a relatively well-off brigade at Taoyuan. After secretly interrogating most of the local cadre, a bureaucratic "rectification" was carried out, and a report of the Taoyuan experience was circulated by Liu as a model for how to carry out the campaign. Chou Yang, Minister of Culture, ordered his staff to work producing plays and movies about Taoyuan.

In the meantime, the little brigade of Tachai in the Taihang mountains had been persevering on the socialist road, had refused to accept state aid when natural disasters struck, had accomplished wonders in land capital construction, and had posted impressive gains in agricultural output. Revisionist officials immediately dispatched a workteam to investigate the "exaggerated claims" of tiny Tachai. After weeks of struggle the workteam withdrew after the Tachai Party committee refused to knuckle under. Summing up the experience of the Socialist Education Movement in January 1965, Mao wrote: "The main target of the present movement is those Party persons in power taking the capitalist road."

Mao upheld Tachai as a model of *class struggle* (which had in turn resulted in phenomenal growth in Tachai's productive forces). Hua & Co.'s perversion of this can be found even in our Menshevik's Bible "Tachai—The Red Banner." As the CC Report notes, this book is generally eclectic. Along with statements about politics in command, etc., it lays out the same line as *PR #1, 1978*, whose revisionist purpose is clear: "Why do we say the socialist system is superior? In the final analysis, it is because the socialist system can create higher labour productivity and make the national economy develop faster than capitalism." This is the real line of Hua, *et ai*, on Tachai. Contrast the "Red Banner" book with a 1972 pamphlet "Tachai—Standard Bearer in China's Agriculture," whose line is based on this theme: "The fundamental experience of Tachai. . . is that the poor and lower-middle peasants and other commune members are ever better grasping Mao Tsetung Thought and that the peasants in their millions are consciously farming for the revolution." Unlike the "Red Banner"

book, this pamphlet does not combine such statements with the "theory of productive forces," the "revenge line" and empiricism.

Leery, and rightly so, of Hua's open support of the theory of productive forces in agriculture, our Mensheviks have developed their own "original" analysis to support the same conclusions. In a nutshell, their argument is that mechanization of agriculture is the key to socialism because the workers supplying the peasants with tractors is the material basis for the worker-peasant alliance, and hence the continued rule of the proletariat. Opposition to primary emphasis on mechanization is thus tantamount to attempting to break up the worker-peasant alliance. Further, in the whole question of mechanization, our Mensheviks discern an important line difference between Hua and the "rightists."

In the first place our Mensheviks are quite wrong in their analysis of the importance of mechanization. For them the only point is a "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" relation between workers and peasants for the purpose of keeping the alliance in state power. They even take this so far as to oppose any kind of disruptive class struggles in the cities which might interfere with production and hence upset the worker-peasant alliance. It's truly a wonder that China made it through the Cultural Revolution what with all the worker-peasant disruption that must have caused!

The introduction of mechanization into agriculture, the creation of sideline industries in the brigades, the building of chemical fertilizer plants in each county, the introduction of scientific farming and technology in general to the peasants provides the material basis for *the transformation of the peasants as a class into agricultural proletarians*. This smashes down the distinctions between city and countryside (note however our Mensheviks: "The peasantry, and especially in the collective form of organization, *depend on the cities* for agricultural implements, supplies, fertilizer, etc. as well as consumer goods."—emphasis added). In short, this is crucial in narrowing and eventually eliminating the differences between city and countryside and workers and peasants.

None of this however occurs spontaneously as a result of the mechanization of agriculture. What happens if spontaneity holds sway in the mechanization of agriculture is rural capitalism. Mechanization must be led by the conscious dictatorship of the working class and accomplished through class struggle carried out by the masses of peasants.

A decisive question in this is restricting bourgeois right. Given the fact that bourgeois right has not been completely eliminated

even in the sphere of ownership—that is, ownership is collective and not by the whole people—and that there still exist commodity relations in the accumulation of means of production, especially in the countryside—that is, accounting units sell part of their output and buy machinery, etc.—the spontaneous tendency will be for the rich to get richer and the poor, poorer, for the more well-off units to be able to acquire more advanced technology and go further ahead with mechanization, while the less well-off ones fall further behind in this. Unrestricted, this will lead to a vicious cycle and to tremendous polarization.

To overcome this and make further strides along the socialist road in agriculture requires conscious policy to restrict bourgeois right, to assist the poorer teams, brigades, communes, etc. to catch up with the more advanced, in the context of making overall strides forward in agricultural mechanization and production. It requires constant education in line and sharp class struggle over questions relating to the superstructure and the economic base in order to overcome spontaneous capitalist tendencies and defeat the forces of capitalism in the countryside (and throughout society). It is very significant in light of all this that the current rulers are more and more openly attempting to deny the importance of such questions, even, for example, downplaying the significance of the fact that ownership in the collective form has many defects that can provide an important basis for the reversion to capitalism—this stands out sharply, for example, in the article "Why Did Chang Chun-chiao Kick Up a Fuss Over the Question of Ownership" (Pfl#1,1978), whose title is a hint of the revisionist line of the article.

For the revisionists in power in China revolutionizing the relations of production is now a mechanical result of raising the productive forces. A most instructive article (by negative example) on this subject is "Is It Necessary to Develop the Productive Forces in Continuing Revolution" (Peking Review #4,1978. Note also this article demotes *Chairman Mao to Comrade Mao.*):

"With regard to the social change in agriculture, the switch-over (sic) from the small-scale peasant economy to collective ownership with a low level of public ownership merely (sic) frees the productive forces from the trammels of outdated relations of production. Even in the absence of technical revolution, this change can be effected on the basis of hand tools and draught animals already in use.

"But the switch-over or transition from collective ownership to ownership by the whole people in agriculture

is quite a different matter. It can be achieved only through a large-scale technical revolution for accomplishing the mechanization and electrification of agriculture and creating a new kind of agricultural productive forces based on modern techniques."

Lest anyone get the mistaken idea that class struggle will be the key link in this process, the revisionist line of the Sixth Plenary of the Eighth CC is brought alive like Frankenstein's monster: "Since we are dedicated to the cause of communism, we must, *first and foremost*, be enthusiastic about developing our productive forces" (emphasis added).

Revolution, of course, follows automatically on the heels of increased production. The article goes on: "...doesn't it follow that under socialism the development of large-scale industry, and the growth of industry in the rural areas and the realization of farm mechanization in particular, will bring about the revolutionization of relations among all the small collectives which will in turn revolutionize the peasants' minds?" No, it doesn't follow. It only follows when the working class and its party heeds Mao's call in 1962: "Never forget classes and class struggle!"

Most pathetic is the attempt of our Mensheviks to breathe life into their theory of "three lines" in China, a theory which can serve only to blind people to what is actually happening in China and play upon people's subjective desires that it somehow isn't so that revisionists are in command. After asserting again and again with no substantiation that the Four opposed mechanization of agriculture they proceed to describe the other *two* lines:

"The debate over agriculture is relatively open. Different articles in different publications put the stress on different sides of the question, and so the lines become clear. The right is stressing grain production and fullfilling and exceeding the plan. The revolutionaries under Hua, and including Chen Yung-kuei, are stressing the need for both immediate production while providing the peasantry with sufficient time to energetically take up farm land capital construction and mechanization." (see p. 241)

Here once again we have an effective demonstration of two poles of the same stupidity. The "rightists" we are told stress only production, while the "revolutionaries" on the other hand stress not only production but *also* farm land capital construction and mechani-

zation! For our Mensheviks, the touchstone of proletarian ideology on the agricultural front is the question of mechanization. They assure us that: "Capitalist roaders of all stripes, either those like the gang [of four] or those like Liu Shao-chi all oppose the mass movement to mechanize agriculture." Now this is demonstrably false. The Soviet revisionists for example sought to make quick gains in agricultural output by selling off the assets of the socialist Machine Tractor Stations to the more profitable collective farms. The result of course was to unleash the spontaneous forces of capitalism in the countryside, leading to direct competition between units for accumulation, the conversion of collective property into private plot farming, and increased polarization in the countryside. Making the general point that mechanization if not carried out correctly will not strengthen but weaken socialism, Mao in his note on agricultural mechanization (March 12, 1966) rhetorically asks: "Wasn't agriculture in the Soviet Union basically mechanized?"

Here once again it is valuable to review the critique of Hua's speech to the first learning from Tachai conference contained in the CC Report (pp. 71-2) and to compare Hua's speech with that of Wang Chin-tzu (here the point is not to see if one can find lip service to class struggle in Hua's speech or to determine whether Wang today does or does not support the current rulers—the point is to compare the obvious differences in the overall emphasis, the different political lines, which the two reports reflect). As the CC report points out, Hua sees the danger of capitalism in the countryside primarily in the form of corruption and grafters on the local level with the material basis being small production. And the spearhead is to be directed at the local cadre. The solution proposed is strikingly like that employed by Liu Shao-chi in the Socialist Education Movement; Hua says, "The provincial, prefectural and county Party committees must send large numbers of cadres to the basic levels and carry this education to success in one-third of the units at a time. As for those communes and brigades which have very grave problems, the county Party committee leadership should personally go into the primary units and mobilize the masses to 'lift the lid' on class struggle and solve the question of leadership."

What is so strikingly missing is an understanding of the dangers of capitalist relations in the large scale socialist collective and thus the primacy of promoting proletarian ideology and consolidating the all-round dictatorship of the working class. This is a problem which can never be solved simply by mechanization and land capital construction (although both are necessary to China's

socialist development). That mechanization does not in and of itself equal socialist development is dramatically demonstrated by such countries as India, Iran and others where various forms of bourgeois agrarian "revolution" have led to mechanization, all right—with a handful of well-to-do farmers able to purchase and utilize advanced technology, while large masses of the peasantry are driven into complete destitution. This is why such great attention must be paid to restricting bourgeois right in agricultural development. To inscribe in stone the bourgeois right of "to each according to his contributions" and to each work team according to its marketed commodities, is to make a mockery of socialism as transition to a classless society. Instead it sanctifies the basis of polarization in the countryside.

Hua's six criteria for a Tachai-type county, while each in and of itself has merit, are singularly lacking in promoting socialist new things, the transformation of the world outlook of the peasants, fighting the spirit of individual unit accumulation and promoting the outlook of "farming for the revolution" of which Mao spoke. Taken as they are the criteria and the campaign for Tachai-type counties basically calls for all-out competition in land capital construction, productivity, in marketing to the state and in improving the living standard of commune members. Nowhere is there any serious attention paid to the question of equalizing the severe disparities of economic levels between units as a crucial part of moving to higher levels of collectivity and social ownership. There are no criteria promoting unpaid labor donated to state or collective projects, or giving aid to poorer units, or cultural achievements, or the restriction of private farming and marketing. Ultimately what this leads to is the picture in *Peking Review* #1, 1978, p. 10 of the "happy peasant" counting his money—the kind of picture which, while Mao was alive and the Four were around, would have been justly condemned as disgusting revisionist poison.

This, despite some empty words about politics and class struggle, is where the line of Hua & Co. leads on the question of agriculture—put money not politics in command, put output above outlook and production above revolution. To say that this is upholding the *red* banner of Tachai is the grossest perversion. That the Four fought vehemently against *such* "learning from Tachai" and the same kind of line of the current rulers on "learning from Taching" is entirely to the Four's credit and completely consistent with their stand of fighting with and for the proletariat and masses of people in taking the socialist road.