First Issued: n.d. [1979].
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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This spring the Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center (OCIC) held three regional conferences to consolidate its position on Point 18 of its Principles of Unity. Five members of BASOC attended the west coast conference.
Our report summarizes:
A. background on pt. 18 and the political development of the OCIC
B. debate around the point
C. the west coast conference
D. participation of the BASOC delegation.
In the last few years, a tendency has developed in opposition to the dogmatism and sectarianism of many organizations in the anti-revisionist communist movement. Five local organizations began meeting together to develop a plan on how to build and strengthen the tendency, which is characterized by scattered and decentralized local groups with uneven political development. The Committee of Five (Socialist Union of Baltimore, Potomac Socialist Organization, Philadelphia Workers Organizing Committee, Detroit Marxist-Leninist Organization, El Comite-MINP) held a conference in February, 1978, which was attended by twenty-some organizations and developed a plan to build a national ideological center for the anti-revisionist, anti-“left” tendency. This founding conference drafted 18 Points of Unity to draw lines of demarcation with both revisionism and ultra-leftism. The most controversial of these is Point 18, which states:
The working class must practice the principles of proletarian internationalism; it must take up every struggle against imperialism anywhere in the world and champion it as its own struggle. In the present context’ the practice of proletarian internationalism is impossible without correctly identifying the main enemy of the world’s people. By “main enemy” Marxist-Leninists understand the main obstacle to the consolidation of national liberation, democracy, peace and socialism. Today that main enemy is US imperialism.
This point of unity and demarcation was drafted in opposition to the class collaborationist and flunkeyist political line of many anti-revisionist Marxist Leninist organizations. At first, organizations were admitted into the CCIC that had not reached unity on Point 18, but had not consolidated in opposition to it, either. Several of these groups supported the position of the Proletarian Unity League (PUL), which has never been admitted to the OCIC, partly because of its position*on Pt. 18, and which maintains that it is wrong to draw this line of demarcation, at this time. The conference this spring followed several years of polemics on the subject, and concluded that Pt. 18 is a correct line of demarcation for the OCIC; it is now expected that CCIC organizations will actively support Pt. 18.
The following summary of the debate over Pt. 18 attempts to counter-pose the two positions.
There are two questions about Pt. 18. On the one hand, is the content of the principle correct: is it true that US imperialism is the main enemy of the world’s people? Then there is the question of demarcation: is this an issue on which the OCIC should require unity at this time?
However, the question of content has not been tackled head-on since opposition to the content of Pt. 18 was not admissable within the OCIC. The issue has frequently shifted to whether the dominance of the US has been adequately proven (the kind of analysis and criteria necessary) and whether it has been fully struggled over within the OCIC.
The OCIC maintains that:
1. U.S. imperialism, not the Soviet Union, has world dominance. This position has been achieved through a complicated network of economic relationships (including the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, direct investment, foreign “aid”, U.S. bank loans, etc.) which serve as the basis for political and military control of most of the non- communist world, including the “third world.” The Soviet Union lags far behind in its economic influence and capacity for influence. While it has strategic parity in the military sphere, the U.S. has the edge in tactical weapons, and U.S. military superiority is clear when the superpowers are considered with their allies rather than in isolation. The political gains of the Soviet Union have been uneven. Basically, though, it is the economic dominance of the U.S.–consider the fact that it would require a revolution to dislodge U.S. imperialism from a dependent country–that is the principal consideration.
2. This analysis is adequate to demonstrate the correctness of the content of Pt. 18. The more extensive analysis demanded by the opposition forces would require a more centralized body to undertake the necessary study; meanwhile that demand holds back the OCIC from moving to consolidate so that it can do more intensive, methodical theoretical work. The three years of discussion within the OCIC on this point justify this minimal level of agreement at this time.
3. The political mistake underlying opposition to pt. 18 is “left internationalism”–raising the struggle against revisionism above the struggle against imperialism. This parallels “left” mistakes in domestic policy, like exaggerating the significance of the revisionist CPUSA.
4. “Left internationalism” is not an incidental feature of the ultra-left line; it is central to that line. Historically, the anti-left movement arose as a split in the communist movement over the struggle in Angola. The “left” line on the international situation has led organizations that otherwise opposed ultra-leftism–like BACU–into the ultra-left camp. It is crucial to draw the line of demarcation to keep such forces out of the OCIC’.
5. There is no basis for organizational unity with such groups. It is essential that the U.S. working class be correctly oriented in the international struggle against its own ruling class. Groups that don’t see the U.S. as the main enemy have been led, in practice, into class collaboration. Unless we practice proletarian internationalism correctly, we will not be able to defend our position on national liberation struggles in the third world to members of national minorities in this country.
6. Groups with a “two superpowers” line should be able to unite with Pt. 18 as long as they don’t see the Soviet Union as the more dangerous superpower. The opposition to Pt. 18 doesn’t come out and say it, but in fact they do consider the Soviet Union the main enemy and accept the Three Worlds Analysis.
In response to these arguments, several groups within the OCIC (Milwaukee Alliance, Boston Party-Building Organization, Boston Communist Unity Organization, and St. Louis Worker Unity Organization) proposed an alternative version of Pt. 18 that states, “The chief responsibility of U.S. revolutionaries is to overthrow U.S. imperialism while fighting against all imperialism.” They suggested a more extensive study program before consolidating around international line. They argue that
1. It is not so clear that U.S. imperialism is overwhelmingly stronger and more dangerous. There has been some empirical comparison of different aspects of the world situation, but not a thorough analysis of all the factors and their relative significance. In any case, even if the U.S. is the main enemy at this moment, the situation is very much in flux and Pt. 18 does not reflect the contention between the two superpowers with the possibility that their relative strength may change.
2. It is necessary to make this much more thorough analysis, with more struggle within the OCIC. In fact, more struggle is needed within the international communist movement to sum up the recent changes in the world; the class struggle is still unfolding and it would be wrong to render a premature verdict.
3. The analogy between the Soviet Union and the CPUSA is wrong because revisionism in power is a whole different beast. The OCIC does not have unity on the nature of the Soviet Union; in fact, some forces in the OCIC consider the Soviet Union a socialist country and an ally (although a vacillating ally) of the national liberation movements. No international line can be developed without unity on the question of restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union. The underlying disunity and incorrect thinking on this question result in a wrong formulation. For .instance, the OCIC counterposes the Soviet Union, rather than Soviet imperialism, to U.S. imperialism– reflecting their inability to accept the truly imperialist nature of the Soviet Union.
4. The OCIC’s “historic break” over Angola does not define the entire anti-“left” movement. Others have broken with the dogmatists over the sectarianism of their party-building line, their participation in democratic rights struggles (bussing), their trade union work; the split in the RCP is a break with ultra-leftism. Using Pt. 18 as a line of demarcation cuts out people with different political backgrounds, many of them members of national minorities, many of them with experience we could learn from, Just because these people do not share the same understanding of the international situation at this time is no reason to exclude them; Pt. 18 “forecloses struggle where our task is to organize struggle.” Rather, the critical break with ultra-leftism should be en party building line.
5. There is room for a lot of common work between groups who have differences on international line. If the OCIC begins to exclude such groups from its conferences on national minorities, health care work, trade union work and so on, this would be an incorrectly sectarian approach to party-building.
6. In fact, forces with a “two superpowers” analysis could not join the OCIC because they see both superpowers, not just the U .S., as the main enemy. The OCIC incorrectly implies that the only alternative to its position is complete unity with China’s foreign policy. The opposition groups have differences with and criticisms of China; if the OCIC is building a trend in opposition to China’s line, it should say so explicitly.
The west coast conference, held the weekend of March 31, included voting delegates from OCIC groups in the western U.S., members of OCIC groups who were not voting delegates, observers from fraternal organizations (like BASOC) and observers from other parts of the country.
The conference included a debate between Clay Newlin for the OCIC and a member of the Boston Party Building Organization for the opposition; workshops; and a plenary session at the conclusion of which a vote was held (see attached resolution). The content of all these discussions covered the points already summarized in this paper.
There was a major contradiction within the conference. On the one hand, it was called to facilitate thorough, democratic discussion and debate on this controversial point. On the other hand, several factors inhibited a lively interchange. 1. No west coast OCIC members held the opposition view. The opposition was “imported” to the conference. 2. Several procedural decisions obstructed debate. Nonvoting people (which included all the opposition) were allowed to speak only if the chair recognized a delegate who yielded the floor to them. This obstructed free discussion in the plenary where each delegate had only one chance to speak on each issue and would forfeit that opportunity by giving a non-delegate the floor. It made even the small workshops awkward. 3. The opposition was represented in the opening debate by a member of the BPO. They asked that the rebuttal be given by a representative of the Milwaukee Alliance, which has a somewhat different political perspective. The conference organizers said this would disrupt the continuity of the debate and confuse the issue. The Milwaukee Alliance representative had to practically beg the plenary to get a chance to speak at all. 4. The political level of the workshops was, in the opinion of the BASOC observers, disappointing. There was an uneven level of understanding of the implications of Pt. 18, which meant many people were unable to respond to challenges to their position or to attempts to push for greater unity. The general mood seemed to be that the conference was a formality with a foregone conclusion (the voting was unanimous).
The conference was held for the internal consolidation of the OCIC, not as a movement debate on international line. However, before the conference the BASOC delegation began meeting together, having been told that we were encouraged to participate in the conference. Since none of the OCIC delegates had differences with PT. 18, observers who would raise differences would be given the chance to do so at the conference. With this understanding, six of us began a series of discussions (the five delegates and one alternate met, the second alternate deciding not to participate). We realized that our role would be very limited–partly because we were merely observers, not OCIC members and partly because we were merely individuals, not representing an organization with a consolidated line. However, we agreed that if our discussions before the conference raised issues we wanted to bring up at the conference, we would take the opportunity presented to participate in the debate.
We represented a range of opinions on Pt. 18. One of us accepted the point as written; another was unsure about the correctness of the content; the rest of us felt that it was barely adequate and needed improvement. After some discussion, we generally united around the importance of presenting to the conference our thinking on the weaknesses of the point.
Most of us felt that Pt. 18 was so minimal that it failed as either a description of world forces or an orientation for political work. It ignores the role of the Soviet Union and its relationship to U.S. imperialism. This reflects the fact that the OCIC hasn’t developed an understanding of revisionism, which is basic for a tendency calling itself anti-revisionist. The OCIC even makes the mistake of stating that revisionism has a petty bourgeois essence (pt. 16). We felt it is wrong to demarcate with imperialism and not with opportunism; it is important to point to the bourgeois essence of revisionism and to strengthen the attack on the Soviet Union as an enemy of world revolution.
We discussed having Pat (the first alternate) attend the conference, mainly because he best articulated some of these ideas. He participated in our study sessions, has a strong background in anti-imperialist work, and helped draft an alternative to Pt. 18. We contacted the conference coordinators about sending a sixth observer. When this was turned down, we discussed sending Pat instead of one of the other delegates. After some discussion there was collective agreement among the six of us that Pat should take Richard’s seat.
We had no expectations that our position–see the alternative Pt. 18 enclosed–would be adopted or even voted on at the conference. We raised it to advance the struggle to further the level of unity and of debate within the OCIC. Some of us spoke at our workshops on the weaknesses of Joint 18 in omitting any reference to the Soviet Union and revisionism. We gave a short presentation during the plenary debate on each topic (the plenary discussed whether Pt. 18 was an appropriate line of demarcation and whether it implied a position on the class nature of the Soviet Union). We made it clear that we spoke as individuals and that BASOC did not have unity, and hadn’t even begun to discuss international line.
Afterwards, we felt that distributing cur written position was an important contribution to the ongoing development of the OCIC. Several of us felt our participation in the workshops was useful. However, we did not make effective use of our speaking time at the plenary–due to the pressure of arranging to be recognized by the chair, speaking briefly before a large group, and becoming pessimistic about people’s receptiveness. Although we had met together several times, external circumstances like car troubles and tight schedules prevented these discussions from being as complete as they might have been.
We felt good about our ability as a group of six people with differences on this question to unite on a position to present. We felt our participation in the conference was a positive one and that it was a valuable chance to talk with representatives of different groups in the western region, an opportunity we took full advantage of. We did leave the conference with some concerns.
We remain concerned that the OCIC take up the struggle against revisionism in a more consistent way, if it is to develop as a truly anti-revisionist force. It seemed the low level of discussion at the conference reflected not just a minimal level of unity but also a minimal level of understanding’ of the questions. The OCIC characterizes China’s foreign policy as ultra-left; we think its errors are rightist and that this description indicates the need of the OCIC to further develop its thinking. We hope the conference marks the beginning of a new stage of struggle on these questions within the OCIC.
We are also concerned that the OCIC not develop the characteristic sectarian “center of the world” approach. We were disturbed by Clay’s speech at the conference, which did not seem to take the opposition seriously (a tone found again in his recent polemics with the Club Network). An underlying question at the conference is, how will the OCIC regard and relate to forces outside it with whom there is both unity and disunity? How will it view its role in party-building?
Whereas no viable revolutionary current can sake a practice of ccllabrating with its ova ruling class; and
Whereas all the advocates of ’left’ internationalism have developed a practice based on collaborationism with U.S. imperialism to one degree or another; and
Whereas ’left’ internationalism shares with other major aspects of the ultra-left line an absurdly ’left’ approach to the struggle against right opportunism generally and revisionism in particular; and
Whereas the break with ’left’ internationalism formed the watershed of the ultra-left line in the party building movement; and
Whereas the formulation–“imperialism is the main enemy of the peoples of the world”–separates the advocates of ’left’ internationalism from the adherent; of proletarian internationalism:
Be it resolved that it is correct to uphold the identification of U.S. imperialism as the main enemy of the world’s peoples as a correct line of demarcation for building a trend in opposition to ultra-leftism.
18.) The working class and its vanguard party must practice the principles of proletarian internationalism. Thus it must struggle against imperialism in any form anywhere in the world and champion this struggle as its own. In the present context the practice of proletarian internationalism is impossible without correctly identifying the principal enemy of the peoples of the world. Marxist-Leninists understand the principal enemy to be the main obstacle to the consolidation of national liberation, democracy, peace, and socialism.
In the present epoch U.S. imperialism is the principal enemy of the international working class and peoples of the world. The U.S. bourgeoisie have fought continuously in ever-growing sophisticated ways to maintain and extend their domination of the world.
The Soviet Union, once the recognized center of the international communist movement, has undergone qualitative changes in this same period. Decades after the success of the Bolshevik revolution, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has become a revisionist party and the center of the world-wide revisionist forces. Revisionism, because it opposes the fundamental long-range interests of the proletariat, represents the interests of the bourgeoisie. The CPSU, which continues to exercise state power in the Soviet Union, is also a dangerous enemy of the international proletariat and peoples of the world.