First Issued: March 1979.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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5 March 1979
Steering Committee
Organizing Committee for an Ideological Center
Box 7275
Baltimore, MD 21218
Dear Comrades,
As you know, BPO has long opposed the view that the Organizing Committee forces should adopt P. 18 as a principle of unity for the OC. In our opinion, the OC should be thought of as an early step in the organization of a tendency capable of combating the dominant “left” opportunism in our movement. Adopting P. 18 as a principle of unity hinders our ability to build that tendency by excluding forces that are as staunch fighters against “left” opportunism as those assembled under the banner of P. 18.
We drew some incorrect conclusions from this correct position, however, which hindered both our own development as an M-L organization and our ability to conduct struggle within the OC (and the pre-OC). In the course of a self-criticism we conducted this summer, we began to clarify the nature of some of our errors, and started to rectify them. We want to share our conclusions with you for two reasons:
1. We think that self-criticism of the erroneous aspects of our line will help clarify what remains correct in it.
2. Certain aspects of our rectification require we inform the OC of some of our new conclusions.
We used to argue that since a position on the international situation should not be a principle of unity right now for the beginnings of an attempt to organize the anti-“left” reaction, then it should also not be a required principle of unity for an M-L organization that recognized party building as our central strategic task. Many comrades in the OC argued that we must be wrong about this – political lines were necessary for carrying out our tasks. They were right about this; we were wrong. Indeed, our Incorrect position inevitably led us to liquidate all those aspects of party building and communist work that did not fall under the heading of “taking the first steps in building a trend capable of combating ’left’ opportunism.” Even more, we confused taking the first steps with building the trend itself.
We now hold that M-L organizations require (at least rudimentary) lines on a number of questions, as would a full-fledged anti-“left” opportunist trend, and, of course, a party. Among these questions International line must rank as one of the most important. Without a line on the international situation we could not carry out anti-imperialist tasks, we could not engage in agitation and propaganda about the world situation, and we could not forge principled M-L unity.
We maintain our previous position that it was incorrect of the Committee of Four to require prior agreement with its particular position on the main enemy of the world’s people as a condition for attending meetings whose purpose was to build a trend capable of combating “left” opportunism. In the absence of open struggle and published analyses, taking a vote among the forces that attended such a meeting means very little. It was no more than an administrative method of solving a political problem that can only be resolved by means of ideological struggle. On the other hand, we in BPO were wrong to maintain that as M-L organizations we should not have lines on the international situation. That was a testament to our own inadequate development and low level grasp of M-L. We were correct, however, to argue that organizations with different positions on the International situation could meet together under the common banner of opposition to ultra-leftism, make some genuine steps in resolving their differences on this and other questions through study, discussion, and struggle, while working together in other areas. In this way we could actually combat ultra-leftism in practice, in the name of our common commitment to the needs of the proletariat.
We finally began to rectify our position that we needed only those political lines that were necessary to begin the construction of an anti-“left” trend in the summer of 1978. At the same time we were engaged in writing the minority position for the OCB #1, finally published under the title, “Opposition to Revisionism is not Ultra-Leftism.” Our sum-up of our developing position on the international situation was begun in January and completed in February of this year.
BPO has held, since the winter of 1976, that capitalism had been restored in the Soviet Union, that the Soviet Union was a state monopoly capitalist country, and that the Soviet ruling class was properly characterized as a state bourgeoisie. We found the work of Charles Bettelheim particularly useful in our study of these questions. We were not prepared to say in 1976, however, that the Soviet Union was an imperialist superpower “in the same sense as the U.S.,” nor could we come to a conclusion as to the identification of the main enemy of the world’s people. It was on this agnostic basis that we entered the OC.
Our most recent period of study has convinced us that the Soviet Union is a superpower, capable of contending with the U.S. on a world scale. Militarily, the S.U. is not a second rate power indeed, it ranks ahead of the U.S. in several crucial areas and the trends indicate this will continue to be more and more the case. While the Soviet Union is less strong than the U.S. economically, it is far and away stronger than any other capitalist power than the U.S. Indeed, the centralized nature of its economic system makes it potentially formidable, while the U.S. has been, and continues to be, in the grip of a worsening crisis for several years now. Politically, the Soviet Union also has certain strengths; it has an enormous repressive apparatus that has so far successfully stifled most of its opposition; it still has credit with many progressive forces who view it as marching under the banner of socialism. We saw only two choices: Either the Soviet Union is socialist, therefore a friend of the world’s people, and by virtue of its strength, a bulwark in the fight against U.S. imperialism; or the Soviet Union is capitalist, an enemy of the world’s people, and by virtue of its strength, one of the two main enemies of the world’s people.
We approached the problem of resolving this question by studying the various lines proposed for the communist movement by the CPC, by Albania, by the Guardian, and by the PWOC, in relationship to the real situation as it developed around the world in recent years. We asked whether the Soviet Union’s support of Ethiopia’s attempt to wipe out the Eritrean people’s struggle for national liberation was better explained by thinking of the Soviet Union as a friend, a vacillating friend, or an enemy of the world’s people. We asked the same question when considering the role of the Soviet Union in backing Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea, in toppling the government in Afghanistan, in promoting coups in the Arabian peninsula, and elsewhere around the world. The answer was obvious to us. Wherever it acts around the world today, the Soviet Union does so to further its own imperialist aims, not out of proletarian internationalism or solidarity with the people’s struggles. Even when it “supports” a national liberation movement, it does so because this suits its overall global and strategic imperialist aim. This is not unusual. The United States “supported” the liberation forces in the Philippines in 1898 for exactly the same reason – to replace Spain, the declining imperialist power. More recently, the United States “supported” the national independence of Egypt against the invading imperialist powers, England, France, and Israel in 1956. In neither of these cases was the United States acting as a friend of the Philippine or Egyptian people. We conclude that the Soviet Union is an enemy of the world’s people – one of the two main enemies.
We are well aware that this conclusion puts us outside of the formal unity of the OC, but we are somewhat at a loss as to what to do about it at this particular moment. We are scheduled to represent the minority position in plenary speeches at the Eastern and Western Regional Conferences. In view of the significant role we have played in the history of OC struggles over this question, we think it would be a loss to the OC if we were prevented from delivering those speeches.
We know that we have not given the SC a lot of time in which to make a decision. The timetable and pace of our internal discussion proceeded in parallel to developments within the OC, which accounts, in part, for the fact that we consolidated our position so shortly before the OC Conferences.
We shall await your reply. In the absence of any word to the contrary we shall assume that we will deliver the plenary speeches and attend the Conferences.
Comradely,
B.P.O.
P.S. We request that you circulate this letter to OC members along with whatever statement you make explaining the situation and presenting your decision.