First Published: The Organizer, Vol. 5, No. 2, February 1979.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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In a lightning attack beginning on Christmas Day, the Vietnamese armed forces, aided by Kampuchean (Cambodian) insurgents, deposed the Pol Pot regime and established a new government pledged to reverse both the domestic and international orientation of Kampuchea.
This version of events is disputed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the USSR, which claim that the government of Kampuchea was overthrown by its internal opposition unaided by Vietnamese troops. While information from reliable sources is admittedly scant, this explanation flies in the face of what facts are known and defies common sense.
Even if we discount the numerous reports of refugees, observers, and Western intelligence agencies, it defies reason to think that an insurgent force could mount such a swift and devastating attack on a regular army, effectively destroying it in a matter of days. Such a rapid military collapse could only have been brought about by a large, well equipped force backed by substantial air support. That Vietnam would deny the undeniable only squanders its credibility and casts suspicion on its motives.
Why did Vietnam see fit to launch this aggression against Kampuchea and overthrow its government? Since the DRV chooses to hide behind the fiction of non-involvement, we have no official brief for its actions. Informed speculation must take into account the history of border conflict, the growing hostility between the DRV and the People’s Republic of China, and the DRV’s turning away from the path of non-alignment toward a closer identification with the Soviet Bloc.
All these developments are closely interconnected. The border conflict contributed to worsening relations between Peking and Hanoi, which in turn further propelled the Vietnamese toward the Soviet camp.
It is the Sino-Soviet rivalry, more than any other single factor, which explains events in Indochina. Without the context of Soviet-Chinese contention, it is unlikely that the Vietnam-Kampuchea conflict would have escalated to all-out war. Without Soviet diplomatic backing and military support, it is unthinkable that the DRV would have launched a full scale invasion of Kampuchea.
While the Soviets clearly desired the overthrow of Pol Pot, Vietnam is no Soviet puppet, taking its marching orders from Moscow. The DVR had its own reasons for its action which coincide with the Great Power interests of the Soviet Union.
Vietnam would seem to have been motivated by a desire to protect its western flank and strengthen its overall political and military position vis-a-vis China. The degeneration of relations with the People’s Republic, coming at a time when US imperialism is entering a period of deeper collaboration with China, left Vietnam isolated, sandwiched between two hostile states.
In the minds of the Vietnamese leaders this situation posed a long term, if not an immediate, threat to the sovereignty and independence of their country. What seems most likely is that the DRV acted to undercut this development.
Vietnam’s concerns certainly cannot be dismissed out of hand. The direction of events has left Vietnam practically encircled and increasingly vulnerable. US imperialism, with its numerous clients, remains a power in Asia. People’s China, fixated on building an anti-Soviet alliance, views Vietnam as a Soviet client, “the Cuba of Asia”. Kampuchea, a militantly anti-Soviet ally of China, with its own set of grievances against Vietnam, serves as an instrument of this policy.
Aggression against another country violates the socialist principle of peaceful co-existence. Aggression against another socialist country is an even more profound violation of proletarian internationalism. Yet, consistent with the understanding that every situation must be approached on the basis of concrete analysis and not abstract principles, Marxist-Leninists do not hold categorically that an invasion is never justified.
Prior to World War II, Marxist-Leninists defended the actions of the USSR in occupying the Baltic states and invading Finland as necessary defensive measures against Nazi Germany. Marxist-Leninists upheld Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 as necessary to forestall counterrevolution and protect vital interests of the socialist camp in relation to US imperialism.
Does a concrete analysis of events justify Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea? In our view it does not. Only if there were a clearcut danger to Vietnam’s independence would such a drastic course be justified, and then, only after all peaceful means to deter such a threat had been exhausted.
No case for such a danger has been made. The Vietnamese reliance on the fiction of non-involvement implies that the hard evidence for such a case is lacking. If Vietnamese sovereignty was genuinely threatened by the Pol Pot regime, then the DVR should have presented its case to the court of international opinion. The reservoir of respect and goodwill toward Vietnam, based on its credentials as a staunch opponent of imperialism, is enormous and would assure it a fair hearing.
The border conflict with Kampuchea in and of itself certainly provided no threat to Vietnam’s independence. It remains murky as to who was the aggressor in this border conflict, but in any case Kampuchea is small and militarily weak compared to Vietnam. The People’s Republic of China, of course, is neither small nor weak, but there is no evidence that China was or is contemplating any military action against Vietnam. Aside from the political morality of such a move, it would be foolhardy adventurism from the standpoint of the Chinese with several million Soviet troops on their northern border.
In short, while we can recognize that developments in Southeast Asia along with the shifting relations between Washington, Peking, and Moscow negatively affect legitimate Vietnamese interests, no threat to these interests was posed that justified violating the norms of peaceful co-existence and launching a wholesale aggression against another socialist state.
The character of the domestic policies pursued by the Kampuchean government has no bearing on the legitimacy of Vietnam’s actions. If, as seems likely, the Pol Pot regime was guilty of excesses and pursued a generally ultra-left line in its efforts at national reconstruction, then this is a matter for the Kampuchean people to decide and correct. Marxist-Leninists make no brief for imposing a correct line at bayonet point from a foreign invader.
While the emergence of a pro-Moscow regime in Kampuchea would appear to be a plus for the Soviet Union, the more far-reaching implications rebound to the advantage of US imperialism. The invasion will propel China further in the direction of alliance with the US, and thus enhance the US overall position in Asia.
Any immediate advantage gained by the Soviets is more than offset by the distrust and hostility Soviet actions have created, especially among third world and non-aligned countries. As in the case of Czechoslovakia, when the Soviet leaders believe their Great Power interests are jeopardized, they do not hesitate to trample on the rights of another country, even a socialist country.
The newly independent countries, long bullied by the imperialists, are naturally not going to look with favor on a Soviet backed invasion of one of their number. This was born out in the UN where all the countries on the Security Council, with the exception of the Soviets and, ironically, Czechoslovakia, voted for the removal of all foreign troops from Kampuchea.
The invasion of Kampuchea reminds us that China’s concern with Soviet hegemonism has a definite basis in reality. At the same time the People’s Republic-has hardly acted in a way that is consistent with proletarian internationalism in relation to Vietnam. When the border dispute between Kampuchea and Vietnam escalated, rather than use its good offices to bring about a peaceful settlement, China, with its eye ever on building the “united front against hegemonism”, sided with Kampuchea.
Similarly motivated, China interfered in Vietnamese internal affairs, charging ill treatment of ethnic Chinese. In fact this “ill treatment” consisted predominantly of the expropriation of the privileges of Chinese merchants and traders. China’s actions objectively extended support to counter-revolution in Vietnam.
China’s turn toward the US, ignoring the US’ continued hostility toward Vietnam was hardly a policy designed to build solidarity with the DRV. China’s actions helped provide the context in which Vietnam more closely tied itself to the Soviet Bloc and felt compelled to take the action it did in Kampuchea.
What will happen in Kampuchea now? While the new regime may garner a certain amount of popular support on the basis of its repudiating the ultra-left policies of Pol Pot, it is unlikely to establish widespread legitimacy for its rule.
The National United Front for the Salvation of Kampuchea, as the new powers style themselves, would seem to be hopelessly compromised by virtue of being installed in power, not by the Kampuchean people, but by a foreign occupying army. The ousted followers of Pol Pot may well establish a successful resistance based on an appeal to patriotic sentiment. Thus there is the bizarre prospect of an Indochina war pitting the Khmer Rouge against Vietnam, with China and the Soviet Union as the principle backers and antagonists by proxy.
In opposing Vietnam’s actions, we must be careful to distinguish our position from the hypocritical stance of the US imperialists, and be vigilant against any attempt by the US to further its advantage through more active intervention. The pious phrases coming from the State Department condemning Vietnamese aggression, coming on the heels of a genocidal war waged by the US against the Vietnamese people, should take no one in.
The US refusal to honor its responsibility to aid Vietnamese reconstruction and its continued opposition to diplomatic ties underline that US hostility to Vietnam is not ancient history, but present reality. The possibility of US intervention in the future cannot be ruled out, especially since the struggle in Kampuchea shows every sign of continuing.