First Published: February 24,1979.
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
Copyright: This work is in the Public Domain under the Creative Commons Common Deed. You can freely copy, distribute and display this work; as well as make derivative and commercial works. Please credit the Encyclopedia of Anti-Revisionism On-Line as your source, include the url to this work, and note any of the transcribers, editors & proofreaders above.
EROL Note: This pamphlet by Irwin Silber was the first independently published text by the emerging but still secret “rectification network” that would later become Line of March.
Dear Friend;
The war clouds that have been gathering over Indochina have finally burst and we are witnessing once again the brutal invasion of Vietnam and all-out war.
It does little good to sit around wringing our hands and deploring the facts. It is critical that we begin to analyze these events and try to understand the politics that underly this development.
Lenin wrote that “war is the continuation of politics by other means,” and this case is no exception. At the heart of these events is China’s theory of the “three worlds.” Both China’s words and actions in the recent period demonstrate that this line leads to support for counter-revolutionary forces and alliance with imperialism.
It has now led to China’s invasion of Vietnam.
As a means of trying to clarify some of the complex issues that have been highlighted by recent events in Indochina, we want to share with you a document, “The War in Indochina” written by Irwin Silber, as an initial attempt to place these events in a Marxist-Leninist, context.
Without necessarily agreeing with each and every formulation, we endorse the theoretical and political assumptions which underly this document. We believe it is important for our movement that this paper be given wide distribution and that a nationwide discussion be initiated at once. It is our opinion that this must be accompanied by a parallel movement to defend the Vietnamese revolution and condemn the counter-revolutionary and objectively pro-imperialist activities of the government of the People’s Republic of China.
Tom Angotti
Francis A. Beal
Barbara Dane
Max Elbaum
Melinda Paras
Polly Parks
Abe Weisberg
Morris Wright
* * *
War has broken out in Indochina.
Toward the end of December 1978, after more than a year of intensifying conflicts along the Vietnam-Kampuchea border, forces based in Vietnam went into Kampuchean territory, broke up the armed concentrations of the Pol Pot regime, took the capital and all the major cities, established effective control over most of the countryside and proclaimed the establishment of a new Kampuchean government.
This action was taken in the name of the Kampuchean National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS), composed of Kampucheans who had fled their country after liberation. Most of those in the KNUFNS were active fighters in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Lon Nol regime. A substantial portion of the forces who entered Kampuchea from Vietnam were from KNUFNS. At the same time, it seems fairly certain that the bulk of the weaponry and large numbers of military personnel were supplied by Vietnam. There can be little doubt but that this military operation was directed by the Vietnamese government.
Approximately four weeks later, regular units of the Chinese army, reliably reported to number upwards of 100,000 troops–with at least that many held in reserve–invaded Vietnam across the China-Vietnam border. The stated purpose of this attack on Vietnam was retaliation for the events in Kampuchea. Vietnam must be “punished,” declared China’s deputy premier, Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-ping).
It should be fairly obvious that in terms of international politics, China’s attack on Vietnam is the weightier of the questions. The international ramifications of this event involving both the U.S. and the Soviet Union with their respective ties to the parties and their perceived self-interest in the outcome, immediately places the question of the danger of world war on the agenda.
No one takes seriously China’s claim that their attack on Vietnam was in response to border provocations. It is hard to believe that it is offered in seriousness. The link between the events in Kampuchea and China’s attack on Vietnam is a fact of life–made so by China itself.
Each government involved in this situation–Vietnam, China, the Pol Pot regime and the KNUFNS–claims to be socialist. In keeping with the generally idealist approach taken to socialism and socialist countries in today’s world by many who claim to be Marxist-Leninists, this assertion is usually deemed sufficient to conclude 1) that each is, indeed, socialist; and 2) any contradictions which may arise between them cannot possibly be antagonistic. It does not seem to have occurred to those who argue this way that the very events themselves have demonstrated that this second tenet of faith, at least, does not correspond to reality. We can also note that the continued designation of Kampuchea under the Pol Pot regime as “socialist” appears to be based more on faith and the credentials accruing the government because .of its role in the struggle against U.S. imperialism and the Lon Nol puppets than anything else. At the same time, few would deny that–in the generally accepted sense of the term–both Vietnam and China are socialist countries. And yet war has broken out between them. How, then, shall we view this events?
Some people seem to feel that if they solemnly proclaim their anguish at the sad sight of “socialist countries fighting with each other,” they have discharged not only their internationalist responsibilities but any responsible attempt at analyzing the events and their underlying causes and effects. Such a view brings to mind a comment of Lenin’s that “a resolution like that is extremely safe and completely insured against error, just as a man who talks, and says nothing, is insured against error.”
In the present instance, we will go further and say that this appealingly neutralist view is not at all insured against error because it has the objective effect of condemning equally all the parties to the dispute. Those who take such a stand indulge themselves in the unpardonable luxury (unpardonable for communist, at least) of avoiding the underlying political and class contradictions which, inevitably, are at the heart of the matter.
Others take the approach that the key question is “invasion.” China is wrong, they say, because it invaded Vietnam. By the same, token, it is argued, Vietnam is wrong because it “invaded” Kampuchea. While there seems to be somewhat more political substance to such an approach, in essence it too is devoid of politics, as is the approach taken by those all-too-numerous grouplets and individuals who will automatically endorse the actions taken by either the Soviet Union or China on any given question. Let us contrast all these ways of looking at the question with Lenin’s approach:
How can we disclose and define the ’substance’ of a war? War is the continuation of policy. Consequently, we must examine the policy pursued prior to the war. the policy that led to and brought about the war . . . The philistine does not realize that ’war is the continuation of policy,’ and consequently limits himself to the formula that ’the enemy has attacked us,’ ’the enemy has invaded my country,’ without stopping to think what issues are at stake in the war, which classes are waging it and with what political objects .... For the Marxist, the important thing is what issues are at stake in this war. (Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 33)
Now let us contrast Lenin’s approach to the way in which some Marxist-Leninists view the situation in Indochina We will turn our attention first to the question of Vietnam and Kampuchea. A fairly common view–shared by many liberals as well as by the State Department–was summed up by the Guardian this way: “The principal aspect of the question is the Vietnamese invasion and the secondary aspect is the nature of the Pol Pot regime.”
The Philadelphia Workers Organizing Committee (PWOC) takes a similar stand. “The character of the domestic policies pursued by the Kampuchean government has no bearing on the legitimacy of Vietnam’s actions.” This is wrong on two counts. First, how can communists say that the Pol Pot regime’s domestic policies have “no bearing” on determining a crucial political question. Second, Pol Pot’s “domestic policies” are inextricably linked up with the provocative policies the regime pursued toward Vietnam around the border question.
But where is the political content in such a formulation? In fact, those who put forward this view do not even claim to have much knowledge of the Pol Pot regime. The Guardian says: “On the surface, the Kampuchean government appears to have been implementing an ultra-“Left” line and was repressive in handling contradictions among the people. If it was as half as repressive as its critics say, it should have been overthrown–but by the revolutionary forces of Kampuchea and not by invading armies of another socialist country.” So, no matter what the actual political character of the Kampuchean regime might have been, even if it were a regime that “should have been overthrown,” this question will still be viewed as secondary to the question of “invasion.” What is this but the standpoint of narrow nationalism, “my country right or wrong.” It is not the viewpoint of communism.
If we make a judgment that Vietnam is wrong simply because it “invaded” Kampuchea and that this supposed fact transcends the politics of the situation, then we are elevating the question of territory to one of principle and the thesis of national sovereignty to an absolute. Such a view is completely contrary to Marxism-Leninism. “The several demands for democracy, including self-determination, are not an absolute, but only a small part of the general democratic (now general-socialist) world movement. In individual concrete cases, the part may contradict the whole; if so, it must be rejected.” (Lenin, CW, Vol. 22, p. 341) “The democratic interests of one country must be subordinated to the democratic interests of several and all countries.” (Lenin, CW, Vol. 22, p. 345)
Now we should hardly be surprised to learn that many liberal supporters of Vietnam are extremely “troubled” over the recent events. They are “troubled” precisely because they are liberals and, therefore, bourgeoise democrats (advocates of the bourgeoisie living up to its democratic pretensions) who see the question of democracy–and the territorial integrity of a nation is certainly a democratic question–as one which transcends all others. But this cannot be the way a communist looks at such questions. A communist is always willing to violate the democratic rights of the capitalist class of any country and to violate the “democratic” right of any reactionary regime to impose its will on the oppressed.
But, it is argued, Vietnam is a “big” country and Kampuchea is a “small” country. Such comparisons invariably evoke sympathies from certain “fair-minded” individuals who think that the essence of the struggle between David and Goliath was their respective sizes. But a “small” country may be reactionary–there are more examples than we could possibly give–and a “large” country may be progressive and revolutionary. In fact, there is considerable evidence to indicate that in the situation between Kampuchea and Vietnam, this was precisely the case.
But, it is further argued, revolution cannot be “exported.” If a certain regime is oppressive, it is said, it is the task of the people of that country to throw it off. Unfortunately, this very practical expression of Marxism-Leninism has been turned into a moral principle by some who parade as Marxist-Leninists. Communists are not opposed to “exporting” revolution as a matter of principle. If exporting revolution could succeed, we should advocate the constant, steady, uninterrupted export of this commodity all over the world. But experience has shown that, by and large, it is necessary for each people to make its own revolution if the new social order is to take root and develop in a particular country. If conditions in a country have not ripened to the point of revolution, then its “export” cannot possibly succeed.
Having said this much, we should be abstract Marxists indeed-more likely we would be abstract moralists, which is much the same thing–were we not to recognize the possibility that in certain particular instances, “outside” intervention by a socialist country or a revolutionary force may well prove to be the decisive factor in a revolutionary struggle. Moreover, there may be certain circumstances in which conditions have developed in such a way that intervention is required. Such was the situation in eastern Europe in the closing days of World War II when the Red Army was obliged to install arbitrarily communist governments in the various countries from which it expelled the Nazis. German fascism had done its work very well for a period of a decade, to the point where the communists had no real political base in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany. Nevertheless, governments were set up by communists, many of whom had spent much of the war in Moscow and elsewhere, with the military power of the Soviet army as its base. This fact undoubtedly had a negative effect on subsequent developments in eastern Europe–but who would argue that any other course should have been followed?
The PWOC says, “if as seems likely the Pol Pot regime was guilty of excesses and pursued a generally ultra-left line in its efforts at national reconstruction, then this is a matter for the Kampuchean people to decide and correct.” In the case of Kampuchea, this “generally ultra-left line” was given concrete expression in large numbers of genuine Marxist-Leninists being persecuted and executed by the Pol Pot regime, including many of those most capable of leading the Kampuchean people to a righting of the wrongs committed against them. Many of the best leaders of the Kampuchean people, communists who had experienced the struggles over the decades in close comradeship with the Vietnam Workers Party, were apparently liquidated by the Pol Pot regime; in fact, their historic association with Vietnam seems to have been a decisive factor in the decision to liquidate them. Others, many tens of thousands, fled to Vietnam and these make up most of the leadership of the new government in Phnom Penh.
In such a situation, the principle of relying on indigenous forces to lead a revolutionary struggle clearly must be modified by the concrete circumstances.
Nevertheless, some governments, parties and individuals seem to think that by invoking such phrases as “invasion,” “exporting revolution,” “territorial integrity,” and “national sovereignty,” they have settled the question. Romania carries this thesis to its logical conclusion: it liquidates the question of revolution entirely. Romania, says its government organ, “highly disapproves of the support granted to some elements who have risen against the leadership of their own country, resorting to military force in order to remove from the head of Democratic Kampuchea–a socialist country, member of the UN–the government and the legally constituted bodies that are recognized in the international order.” What relevance Kampuchea’s UN membership has to the question at issue is hard to fathom at first. The Romanian government makes its position clearer:
No reasons and arguments whatsoever can justify any form of intervention and interference in the affairs of another state, especially when two socialist countries are involved.”
Here we must note the word “especially,” since while it gives the matter of relations between socialist countries a special emphasis, it also serves to underscore the fact that Romania’s position is one based on absolute principle irrespective of the political character of the government involved or the nature of its economic system.
Now it is very understandable that Romania, which has been pursuing an independent course from that of the Soviet Union and certainly must be concerned with the protection of its national integrity, should see in the Kampuchean situation a question of great consequence to itself. It is likewise understandable that other small countries who adjoin great powers would be fearful of the possibility of an invasion from their more powerful neighbors. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Brezhnev’s proclamation of the doctrine of “limited sovereignty” are fresh in everyone’s mind.
Nevertheless, these concerns cannot be elevated to the absoluteness of a universal principle. There are at least two historical situations involving “invasions” by socialist countries which the international communist movement has summed up as being politically justified. One was the invasion of Finland by the Soviet Union in 1940 when Nazi war preparations against the USSR were escalating and it seemed clear that Finland was being prepared as the base for launching another front against the Soviet Union. The other was the case of Hungary in 1956 when Soviet troops put down what had developed into the momentary hegemony of counter-revolutionary forces which at the time were probably supported by a majority of the Hungarian people as a result of the abuses of socialist legality by the Soviet-backed regime. In both cases, Marxist-Leninists ultimately concluded that the military action taken was justified, although, as now, many liberal-minded people and groups condemned the actions. Further, in any way to suggest that a socialist country should not aid indigenous revolutionary forces is a gross betrayal of Marxism-Leninism.
But what if two “socialist” countries are involved?
First of all, we must recognize that the mere self-designation of a country as “socialist” does not settle the matter. The actual character of any government must be determined by its practice and its policies and not merely by the fact that those who control the government apparatus may claim to be basing themselves on Marxism-Leninism. This much is obvious.
Secondly, even where a country has embarked on a socialist path, we are under no obligation to assume that every policy its government pursues is automatically progressive or correct. Revisionists, narrow nationalists or ultra-“leftists” may assume control over a nation’s destiny for a period of time and pursue policies which have an extremely negative effect not only on the development of socialism within its own borders but on the international working class movement as a whole. When such policies develop to the point of antagonistic contradiction with other socialist countries or the international movement, it is obviously not out of the question that this contradiction will ultimately emerge in the form of armed conflict, however much we may deplore the fact that events have developed in such a fashion.
In terms of the Vietnam-Kampuchea situation, it is only elementary Marxism to state that we cannot begin our analysis at the point where the contradiction escalated to full-scale warfare. This point is frequently lost sight of or deliberately ignored by those who argue that “it is incorrect for socialist countries to resolve contradictions with other socialist countries through armed force.” For if they wan to judge the situation on that basis, their principal criticism should be directed to the Pol Pot regime. Border fighting, instigated by the Kampuchean regime, occurred sporadically in 1976 and 1977. But during 1978, the fighting took on the character of a full-scale border war. This war was initiated by the Pol Pot regime. Its stated purpose was to take by force territory inhabited by Vietnamese citizens which the Pol Pot regime claimed was legitimately Kampuchean. The attacks intensified throughout the year and resulted in extensive loss of life.
On a number of occasions, Vietnam counter-attacked. These responses were deliberately limited and clearly intended as a warning to Kampuchea that the attacks must halt. They did not. They escalated. When Vietnam proposed negotiations over the territorial questions, the Pol Pot regime refused by proposing unacceptable conditions on the negotiating process. At the time of the invasion, the overwhelming bulk of the Kampuchean army was massed on the Vietnam border. There is considerable evidence to indicate that throughout this process China encouraged the Pol Pot regime in its stand and may even have manipulated that regime in order to provoke a response from Vietnam which, in turn, would provide Peking with the pretext it felt it required to attack Vietnam.
Even with the limited information available to us, it seems fairly evident that the Kampuchean regime’s general conduct in the dispute was provocative and Vietnam’s restrained for a lengthy period of time.
What about the internal policies of the Pol Pot regime? The information available is even more limited. But the evidence continues to mount that the political conceptions guiding the regime were based on an ultra-“left” view of social development in which social and political relations we would associate with the epoch of communism were being imposed on the country arbitrarily and, therefore, with a considerable measure of repression. Some may view this as merely a mistaken “excess of zeal” in the pursuit of admirable aims. But in life, this is not the case. Just as adventurism and ultra-“leftism” in the conduct of the struggle against capitalism leads inevitably to defeat and is objectively reactionary, so the application of similar views to the construction of socialism leads inevitably to the destruction of socialism. To hold otherwise is to deny the validity of the basic precepts of Marxism-Leninism and to blur the distinctions between scientific socialism and various schemes which call themselves “socialist” but which are, in effect, Utopian fantasies incapable of being realized. When such policies are pursued through the utilization of an armed state apparatus, they must lead to the employment of large-scale coercion against the masses. Once again, there is increasing evidence that this was the case in Kampuchea.
The most significant confirmation of this comes not from the bourgeois press or from Vietnam. It comes from the supporters of the Pol Pot regime. Many commentators have noted from China’s disapproval of the policies of the Pol Pot regime. And Prince Norodom Sihanouk, delegated by the Pol Pot government to make its case before the UN, freely admitted and amplified on many concrete examples of what this policy meant in practice in Kampuchea.
Perhaps some believe that an ultra-“left” deviation from Marxism-Leninism is somehow less dangerous or counter-revolutionary than a rightist deviation. For those who may entertain such a notion, let us simply remind them that Trotskyism was, and continues to be, an ultra-“left” deviation from Marxism-Leninism and that this fact has not made it any less dangerous to the working class movement.
Clearly there must be a connection between the ultra-“leftism” of the Pol Pot regime’s view on the building of socialism and its external relations with other countries. At the least, the forced expulsion of hundreds of thousands of people of Vietnamese descent from Kampuchean territory as well as the continued escalation of the border war with Vietnam would seem to be closely related to the policies being pursued internally.
What links the internal and external policies of the Pol Pot regime? It is narrow nationalism. It seems obvious that in the situation prevailing after liberation in 1975, it was in the interests of all three countries of Indochina– Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea–to establish close relations, to cooperate economically, to resolve contradictions between themselves quickly and peacefully, to pool their collective limited resources to the extent they possibly could. But the Pol Pot regime rejected such a course. Its view may be explained by fears that Kampuchea, being a much smaller country than Vietnam, would be “overwhelmed” by its neighbor. They may also be explained by the attitude of China. The Chinese leaders took great exception to Vietnam’s political line which continued to uphold the struggle against U.S. imperialism as the principal task before the international revolutionary movement at a time when China had already committed itself to building an alliance with the U.S. against the Soviet Union. This difference was not merely “ideological.” It had significant political repercussions. This would account for China’s attempt to exploit historic feelings of antagonism toward Vietnam by Kampuchea and to promote fears among the Kampucheans that any close association with Vietnam would lead to a loss of their own national identity. It would also account for both Kampuchea’s antagonism to Vietnam on the border question and the decision by the Pol Pot regime to go it alone in terms of economic reconstruction even if this meant massive and arbitrary reorganization of every aspect of Kampuchean life. Since the rationalization for the internal repression was the danger of Vietnamese domination, the provocation and escalation of the border war became both a self-fulfilling prophecy and a necessary adjunct of internal policy.
With this connection, we should now consider the charge that what Vietnam is really after is the establishment of an “Indochina Federation” that would include itself, Laos and Kampuchea–and that the stand of Kampuchea has been one of resistance to such a development. It is another example of bourgeois thinking replacing a Marxist-Leninist stand that it is sometime deemed sufficient to cite the very idea of an Indochinese Federation is reprehensible in itself.
In fact, the common history of struggle against French colonialism and U.S. imperialism by all three countries–as well as common material interests in terms of natural resources, waterways and economic development indicates that close cooperation between all three would objectively be in the interests of their respective peoples. There is also a common political history dating back to almost 50 years to the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party by Ho Chi Minh. Some people point to this as an example of Vietnamese “hegemonism.” But would Marxist-Leninists wish to uphold such a view? Was not the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party a great step forward for all the peoples of Indochina? Was it not correct for the Communist International at the period and Ho Chi Minh to develop a vision that embraced all of Indochina and not merely its separate parts?
While it would clearly be incorrect for Vietnam, as the largest of the three Indochina countries, forcibly to impose such a federation, there is nothing at all incorrect in proposing it. But we will go further and say that it was just as much the communist responsibility of Kampuchean Marxist-Leninists and Laotian Marxist-Leninists to advocate the establishment of such a federation as it was of the Vietnamese Marxist-Leninists. Clearly such a federation would have would have to be entered into voluntarily and with complete and full guarantees for the democratic rights of the different peoples–including the right to secede from the federation. But the concept of such a federation is fundamentally progressive. While defending the right of self-determination for peoples and nations, Marxist-Leninists in general stand for the voluntary merger of nations on the basis of equality as being the best interest of the laboring masses of the respective countries and the international working class as a whole. The economic basis for this view is obvious. The construction of socialism requires, as a material foundation, the development of large-scale industry and mass production; it requires centralized economic planning over the widest possible range of enterprises so that the most efficient division of labor can be developed that will move the socialist economy as a whole forward.
Now, as always, we stand and shall continue to stand for the closest association and merging of the class-conscious workers of the advanced countries with the workers, peasants and slaves of all the oppressed countries. We have always advised and shall continue to advise all the oppressed classes in all the oppressed countries, the colonies included, not to separate from us, but to form the closest possible ties and merge with us. (Lenin, A Caricature of Marxism, p. 42)
Clearly, it is impossible to make a proper appraisal of the Vietnam-Kampuchean situation without taking into account the political line and role of China. Chinese policy toward Vietnam, particularly since the signing of the peace treaty with the U.S. early in 1973, has been one of increasing antagonism. Vietnam has charged–and the Chinese leaders have not denied it–that after the withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from the south. China urged the Vietnamese not to pursue the policy of working and fighting tor the complete liberation of South Vietnam. Again, the political motivations of the Chinese leadership add further credence to the charge. For it was with the conclusion of the direct U.S. military presence in South Vietnam that China began to articulate its new international line that the principal enemy of the world’s peoples had become the Soviet Union, a conjunction that strongly suggests not an internationalist revolutionary conception by China’s leaders but a narrow, ethnocentric view of the world relationship of forces.
As a result, China began to urge the U.S. not to abandon its presence in Asia and the western Pacific. U.S. imperialism was seen as the “buffet” that would prevent the Soviet Union from expanding into Southeast Asia. Political and economic pressure was applied against Vietnam to get that country to weaken its ties with the Soviet Union and come closer to China. It is logical to assume that China, recognizing the objective limitations on its own ability to assist Vietnam with the arduous tasks of reconstruction, feared that Soviet economic aid would draw Vietnam closer to the USSR. Concerned that a “pro-Soviet” Vietnam would, in effect, “surround” China, the Chinese leaders set out on a policy of “surrounding” Vietnam, to which end they undertook to exploit contradictions between Vietnam and Kampuchea and to maintain those contradictions to the point of antagonism. It is safe to say that a peaceful resolution to the disputes between Kampuchea and Vietnam was not deemed to be in China’s “interest” and that the Chinese leaders therefore encouraged Kampuchea to continue and step up its harassment on the borders and to make unreasonable demands on the negotiating process. It is also reasonable to assume that the Chinese leadership, recognizing the unviability of the Pol Pot regime (its whole economic outlook ran completely contrary to the views of the new Chinese leadership after the ouster of the “Gang of Four”), promoted the present confrontation with a view toward ridding itself of the embarrassment of the Kampuchean government and assigning blame for the result to Vietnam and, thereby, the Soviet Union.
In 1978, the situation worsened. When Vietnam took measures to expropriate the sizeable merchant class operating in the south–a large number of whom were of Chinese descent - the Chinese leadership accused Vietnam of attacking the “overseas Chinese” on an ethnic, chauvinist basis. They spread rumors among Vietnamese of Chinese descent in the northern sections of Vietnam that they would be persecuted and killed because a full-scale war with Kampuchea was in the offing, a war in which they would be considered a “fifth column.”
(Here we must note that the very concept of “overseas Chinese” is itself an expression of national chauvinism that is completely contrary to Marxism-Leninism. How can there be a special status for citizens of a socialist country simply because they are descended from people who emigrated from another country? The view that there is an overriding patriotic loyalty to China by people of Chinese origin resident in other countries is an ethnocentric expression of great power chauvinism.)
Using the alleged persecution of the “overseas Chinese” as a pretext, China completely cut off all economic assistance to Vietnam. This action was quickly followed by Vietnam’s decision to join COMECOM, the Soviet-organized economic bloc, a move which itself further intensified China’s hostility toward Vietnam. As the border conflict escalated, as China’s threats grew more intense, as the Chinese leaders began to call Vietnam the “Cuba of Asia,” Vietnam signed its friendship agreement with the Soviet Union. They can hardly be blamed for seeking to find a form of military protection in this rapidly deteriorating situation.
(That the Soviet Union was itself motivated by great power ambitions is hardly open to question, but quite beside the point. The argument that Vietnam was a surrogate for Soviet expansionism into southeast Asia may satisfy the consciences of some who feel that the invocation of the “social imperialist” spectre is sufficient to justify any action, but it bears no resemblance to reality. Pro-Chinese apologists made a similar argument in Angola when they opposed the MPLA because of its unwillingness to accept substantial military aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba.)
As China’s views on other situations makes clear, any weakening of U.S. imperialism in the world today is seen as an advance for the Soviet Union which must be opposed. Given the role of U.S. imperialism as the chief exploiter and oppressor of the world’s peoples, it is hard to imagine a more reactionary political line.
That line is based on the freely acknowledged thesis that a united front between U.S. imperialism, China, the western European capitalist countries and Japan against the Soviet Union should be the principal strategic objective of the world’s revolutionary forces. That such a strategic concept is inherently class-collaborationist is so overwhelmingly obvious as to hardly require further amplification. Translated into policy, this concept has already led to betrayals of proletarian internationalism in relation to Angola, Chile, Zaire, Palestine, and Cuba.
It has now led to an armed attack against Vietnam. Deng Xiaoping makes no bones about it. The political objective of China’s military aggression against Vietnam is to “teach Vietnam a lesson,” to “punish” it for the events in Kampuchea. But Vietnam is not the only country China is trying to “instruct.” It is also trying to teach a lesson to U.S. imperialism. That lesson was telegraphed in advance by Deng when he declared that “the measures the U.S. has taken in Iran and dealing with Cuba are no good.” China’s invasion of Vietnam was designed to set an example for the U.S. to follow elsewhere–a move whose irony will not be lost on those for whom China’s action will invoke memories of the last great power that attempted to “punish” Vietnam.
Nor should we take at face value the self-serving comments of the U.S. government trying to disown responsibility for China’s attack on Vietnam. Deng made China’s intentions abundantly clear during his visit to the U.S., and Carter had a thousand ways to dissuade China of this course if that were his true intention. Despite the public denials, it seems clear that the U.S. gave China the green light for its assault on Vietnam. Certainly the Chinese attack was the interest of the U.S. And if there were any doubts on this score, they should have been cleared up when Treasury Secretary Blumentahl went ahead with his trip to China, on schedule, with the fighting in Vietnam at its height. In the world of international diplomacy, this is a clear-cut signal of support.
Deng’s comments on Iran are particularly instructive, since the Khomeini-led revolution in that country can hardly be characterized as an example of Soviet expansionism. Not even the U.S. has made such a charge. It reveals more than any other recent example that the present Chinese leadership has adopted completely the world view promoted by John Foster Dulles in the 1950’s which characterized every national liberation struggle and revolutionary movement as pan of a Soviet (and, at that time, Chinese) “Conspiracy.”
This is the political essence of China’s attack on Vietnam. It is this, even more than the reprehensible fact of the violation of Vietnam’s territory, that gives the Chinese action its reactionary character.
But if China is pursuing a reactionary, counter-revolutionary international policy and if there are serious doubts about the Pol Pot regime’s internal and external policies, what about the general policies and record of the Vietnam Workers Party? Its record as a genuine Marxist-Leninist party is unimpeachable. Its role in leading the principal revolutionary struggle of the past two decades against U.S. imperialism might be sufficient to validate these credentials, but its record goes beyond even this decisive question. This party has been exemplary in its internationalist outlook and fighting spirit. In the course of pursuing its own just struggle, it never lost sight of the larger interests of the world revolutionary movement of which it saw itself as a detachment, given the honor of one historical moment, of being the vanguard. Further, its accomplishments in socialist construction in the north over a lengthy period of time offer living proof of the correctness of its leading line and the Marxist-Leninist quality of its leadership.
Surely such a history must be taken into account in weighing both the credibility and relative political merits of the positions taken by the Vietnam Workers Party and the Pol Pot forces, particularly when there are serious doubts about the political character of the latter.
But even this is not the decisive question. Let us go back to Lenin: “What issues are at stake in this war?” The political essence of China’s position is that the stand of every country in relation to the Soviet Union is the decisive question. Is a country that is nominally close to the Soviet Union moving away from it? Then that country (Romania) is not only progressive, it is suddenly “socialist,” even though there is no measurable difference between relations of production in that country and its neighbors not so designated. Is a country willing to move closer to China and maintain its independence from the USSR? Then that country (Yugoslavia) also magically becomes a “Socialist.” Does a country close to China criticize this point of view? Then that country (Albania) is cut off from economic assistance. Does a reactionary despot, the Shah of Iran, willingly take on the role of being U.S. imperialism’s policeman in the Middle East, opposing not only the Soviet Union but revolutionary movements in the area, then that monarch is described as “objectively anti-imperialist.” Does a “liberation movement” accept and depend upon support from the CIA, carry out the policy objectives of the U.S., collude with South Africa and oppose the historically developed national liberation movement of that country–as in Angola? Then the authentic liberation movement, because it asks for and receives aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba, is denounced as being a Soviet puppet while the collaborationist movement is designated as being patriotic and revolutionary.
And when Vietnam stands up to this policy, when it is forced into closer association with the Soviet Union because China cuts off economic aid in an attempt at political pressure and the U.S. refuses to live up to the peace agreement and make just reparations for the war, Vietnam is attacked.
But the stand of Marxism-Leninism, a stand consistently upheld by the Vietnam Workers Party in word and deed, is that the decisive question in today’s world is the stand taken toward U.S. imperialism. The essential critique of the Soviet Union and revisionism, developed by China in the period 1957-1963, was that it conciliated U.S. imperialism and objectively subordinated the interests of the international movement to the narrow self-interest of the USSR. The Soviet Union’s development of its theses on the viability of peaceful transition to socialism, the centrality of peaceful coexistence with the U.S. as a cornerstone of the international line of the world communist movement and the possibility of a “warless world” even while imperialism existed–this was the political basis for the split in the world communist movement. China’s prestige among revolutionary forces grew in direct proportion to its critique of revisionism and its advocacy of a revolutionary line internationally.
Marxist-Leninists must still apply the same criteria to world developments. Today, China’s international line and actions, represent a greater concession to U.S. imperialism than the Soviet Union ever dared propose. The Soviet Union’s relationship with the U.S. was characterized by both collusion and contention. In time, the contentious aspect became primary, as it is today, in great measure because the U.S. ruling class felt that it was losing ground through even the limited collusion (“detente”) that had developed. But relations between China and the U.S. do not seem to be characterized by contention at all, or only minimally. Clearly collusion is the primary aspect of the relationship and China’s complaint is that the U.S. imperialists are reluctant to collude more.
In essence, is this not the principal political issue at stake in the China-Vietnam war? To side with China in the conflict is to uphold its political objectives. To suggest that China’s attack on Vietnam was, in some respect, justified by Vietnam’s role in Kampuchea, is to side with China and give it a cover. This is the stand taken, naturally enough, by U.S. imperialism and its ideological practitioners. In its gleeful comments on the situation, the Wall Street Journal notes that “the whole thing started when the Vietnamese attacked one of their traditional victims, the Cambodians.” And the Guardian, sad to say, sounded the same theme when it noted–just before China’s attack–that the mounting tension between China and Vietnam was “an inevitable consequence of Vietnam’s invasion of Kampuchea.” After all the seeming even-handedness is dispensed with, what comes across from these commentaries is that the chief source of the conflict today in southeast Asia is Vietnam.
This cannot be the stand of Marxism-Leninism.
Beyond all the questions of territory, borders, negotiations, and who fired the first shot rests this fundamental question: the Vietnamese revolution has come under attack from forces whose political objectives are aimed at promoting the interests of U.S. imperialism and building an alliance with it.
Shall we stand with the Vietnamese revolution?
Or shall we stand with imperialism?