

POINT

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Editorial Board: Ralph Burt, Ellwood Griest, Martha Samuel, Ted Seemin, and Louis Julia.

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Turning Point's Answers

THE FUTILE MANEUVERS OF TITO AND

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1- Headline Shock--and After

"Our first reaction to the Cominform's criticism of the Yugoslav Communist Party is one of shock and pain. This is natural and understandable." So said Starobin on June 6th, two days after the Cominform shocked Tito and the headlines shocked Starobin. What Starobin says is quite true--but true in different ways for different kinds of American Communists. We would like to introduce our material by considering the impact of the denunciation of Tito on American Communists. It is "natural and understandable" that we should take "secondary" shock from Starobin's second sentence: "It's a heavy blow to learn that Yugoslavia's leaders refused to take any criticism from their peers and even refused to attend a meeting of fellow Communist leaders". PEERS?--Shades of Starobin's characterization of Gromyko's delivery in the UN as that of a "noble lord". This betrays more than literary style; it betrays one of the rare, current differences between the leaders of the CPUSA and the leaders of the CPY. The leaders of the CPY openly fight the CIB, while the leaders of the CPUSA, with the evidence of CIB influence on international Communist movement fresh in mind, prefer to carefully service "their peers". The leaders of the CPUSA--these days--seem to

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be as intent on staying on the right side of the PRINCIPALS of the international Communist movement as they are intent on staying on the wrong side of the PRINCIPLES of the international Communist ideology.

There are bound to be many surprises in the U.S. of 1948 when changes come so fast and accurate news is a luxury for rare occasions. American Communists did not know--had no way of knowing--the recent developments in Yugoslavia. What is so dangerous about the impact of the degeneration of the CPY leadership on parts of the American Communist movement is the non-recovery after the shock passed. The Tito headlines acted as a catalyst on disillusionment and cynicism wherever they existed in the American Communist movement. Some comrades finally found it possible to wonder "out loud" on the possibility of a CPSU-inspired Gangup on poor Tito.

The denunciation of Tito threw the CPUSA National Committee into panic. The N.C. was not panic stricken at the debauché of Tito, or at the great danger to the international Communist movement, or at the terrific waste of Yugoslavia's achievements and her power for peace. It was panic stricken at only one terror: the interference of the CIB, under the leadership of the CPSU(B), in the internal affairs of the CPY. In their new insomnia, the N.C. throbbed: if the CIB and the CPSU(B) can so brutally tramp their way into the inner sanctum of Tito's bureaucracy; what is to prevent them from adding the Dennis-Foster inner sanctum to their international checklist? This was a "natural and understandable" problem for our Titos. They were confronted --precisely, by "Russian aggression". What would be the repercussions from a similarly thoroughgoing analysis by the CIB of the CPUSA state of affairs? Couldn't whole sections of the CIB denunciation be applied to the CPUSA leadership by merely changing the initials CPY to CPUSA?

Despite their panic, our leading tail-ers found a solution, a technique to forestall such a threat. They rushed to the defense of the CIB (an organization they boycott) and threw indignant reproaches at Tito. On June 29th, without too much information at hand, the Daily Worker could nevertheless correctly--if with concealed hysteria--state: "The Cominform communique frankly reveals to the world a lack of democracy within the Yugoslav Communist Party which violates the tenets of Communism and which inevitably leads to attitudes harmful to the nation and therefore harmful to the peace front." This is consummate hypocrisy from the least democratic, alleged Communist Party in the world.

On June 30th, Dennis and Foster, who expel those CPUSA members who attempt to restore the CPUSA to the Marxist-Leninist path, had the hypocritical gall to parade their every confidence that the sound core of the CP of Yugoslavia will restore their Party to the Marxist-Leninist path of struggle for peace and Socialism." And on July 4th, a D.W. editorial, titled "What It's About", again bemoaned "the lack of democracy in that Party, and the anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist policies it is pursuing."

The American Titos had to go through these motions, but their lip-served words are nevertheless potentially dangerous words for Party members to hear too often. Such repeated characterizations of the CPY leadership inevitably bring to mind gruesome parallels with the CPUSA

leadership. Such ideas tend to encourage the rank and file Party members to ignore Foster's warning not to turn attention to the solution of CPUSA internal Party problems. Why is it that exposing the CPY bureaucracy helps the Communist movement and exposing the CPUSA's bureaucracy hinders it? Dangerous or not--the N.C. decided that the path of CIB support against Tito must be taken, or all would be lost. And so, it came to pass that the CPUSA supported the CIB against Tito.

Then Starobin took over. (Starobin was sent recently to Europe and assigned the highly skilled job of convincing European Communists that the American Party leadership is not as shoddy as facts might mislead them to believe. We assume that his job is to fawn his way into the highest--most "peer-ful" circles in Europe with the purpose of explaining that the inescapable resemblance of the CPUSA leadership to the CPY leadership is due only to American exceptionalism--in that, in the U.S., the rank and file constitutes the the threat of bureaucracy!) Starobin handles the situation well. Notice how smoothly he attempts to remove the CPUSA Titos from the threat of a CIB analysis by explaining that the CPUSA (on a level with the CPSU) has already been drubbed, scrubbed, and restored:

"The Cominform criticism of Yugoslavia's leaders is actually part of a vast, post-war process, which has been felt in all countries, including our own. It is the process of clarifying and strengthening the working class movement, purging it of illusions and weakness inherited from the past and magnified during the War.

"Our own American Party's struggle against Browderism was, as we can see now, a phase of this process, and should make Yugoslavia's much bigger crisis more understandable. This clarification and re-equipment has taken place in the Soviet Communist Party too, and the formation of the Information Bureau, was clearly a measure to accelerate and unify this process. Our generation will be occupied with the heavy struggles to save the peace, to advance democracy and move towards Socialism. It requires re-equipment to do that." (D.W. 6/30/48)

Starobin has a pretty good idea of the purpose of the CIB. That's why he approves of the CPUSA boycott of the CIB. Although he tries to acquit the American Party by placing it on the level of the CPSU, etc. (errors, corrections, and all), he does more than this. Inadvertently, he indicates the fate in store for the CPUSA's leadership in the event that the "clarification and re-equipment" which allegedly took place in the CPUSA proves to have been a fraud. He is painfully aware of a worldwide campaign against revisionism and bureaucracy. He, therefore, can do no less as a loyal hack than to insist that the CPUSA has already had its hotseat in the international anti-opportunist timetable. Oh, yes--way back in the dire Duclos days. But that's all over, mumbles Starobin. In the D.W. of July 2nd, continuing his work under some strain, Starobin slipped and fell:

"In the light of what's happened, the editorial in the June 1st issue CIB makes valuable reading. It opens with general remarks on the enormous growth and influence of the Communist Parties of eastern, and southeastern Europe, and mentions also the strength of the Communists in France, Italy, and China. It's interesting that

while almost every one of these parties is mentioned by name, the Yugoslav party is not singled out by name among those which have had an especially meritorious record." (Our emphasis.)

Why, then, was the CPUSA with its "meritorious record" as the CP of the aggressor nation also not mentioned -- along with the CPY? The CP of the aggressor nation, a CP worthy of its name, must have a meritorious record. Starobin's mission to Europe will undoubtedly attempt to rectify this injustice--of omission.

While every good CP in the world took the Tito case to heart and reexamined its own policies and its own inner Party democracy in the light of the CIB criticism, the CPUSA offered a dose of lipservice while it tapered off the ideological aspects of the Tito case in the D.W. Every CP member should keep the principles and ideas in the Tito case alive in the clubs of the CPUSA and apply the lessons of Yugoslavia to the American Party. CP members should not be satisfied with the D.W. current offering of a play-by-play fight between two machines -- with principles omitted.

CP comrades who, despite a prolonged period of revisionism, retained an understanding of the role of the S.U. and the CPSU, did not for a minute succumb to liberal doubts about the "justice" in this case. It was certainly hard to believe on the good word of the World Telegram and other afternoon papers that this wasn't one more vicious rumor. It was hard to believe that Tito could waste his own history and waste Yugoslavia. But when the text of the CIB Resolution appeared, with specific and convincing arguments, these comrades did not let their disappointment in the leadership of the CPY becloud the fact that here was another case of renegacy.

The long, hard campaign of the CPUSA leadership to destroy the membership's faith in the S.U. and in Marxist principles was bound to reap some reward. Wherever there was disillusionment or cynicism hidden below the surface, it burst into a rash at first contact with the headlines. The comrades with the rash did not recover with a reading of the CIB statement--if and when it was read carefully. Their demoralization as American Communists needed an international justification. They could now say: how can we be sure that the Soviet Party hasn't also degenerated? And--maybe the Soviet Party is responsible for the state of the CPUSA? And--look at Tito's record!! When American Communists could point to Tito's record while forgetting the whole meaning and function of the CPSU, Dennis and Foster had won a major victory for their monolithic bureaucratic centralism.

Perhaps, even this is "natural and understandable" to Starobin. The CP is so infested with snide remarks and slander against the S.U., with smooth comments on the alleged "infallibility" of the CPSU, that it becomes a mark of level-headedness to take the "excesses" of the CPSU with a grain of salt. The N.C. gloried in this education in cynicism for a logical reason: the less steadfast the rank and file Party membership's faith in the CPSU is, the more steadfast is its faith in the CPUSA leadership.

The only source for a careful and continuing study of the facts and

the ideas involved in the Yugoslav question was the organ of the CIB, FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRACY. This paper is not easily available in the CPUSA. At first, it was boycotted completely by the CPUSA. Of the first issue to reach the U.S. (#2), the N.C. bought 15 for its personal use. After the PR Club, CP (Expelled) put a large ad in the newspaper PM offering the organ for sale (in order to force the CPUSA to publicly recognize the existence of the paper), the leadership put up some token-show of distribution. To this day, most of the CP membership have not seen a copy, and numbers do not know of its existence. You have to be "in the know" to get your copy of the CIB organ in the CPUSA. (And we make these accusations in order to hurry the process of distributing the organ as a major task of the CPUSA.)

Comrades in or connected with the expelled movement had a better chance to study the facts of the Yugoslav question in detail and so were better equipped to fight Titoism--under any name or circumstance. The comrades in the expelled movement were in almost all cases expelled because they fought American CP Titoism. Logically, therefore, almost all of us could grasp the significance of the CIB denunciation. There was no question of our faith in the CPSU and the CIB upon which we depend for assistance in the final reaffirmation of Marxism in the American Communist movement.

This, nevertheless, did not prevent some expelled comrades, suffering old CPUSA diseases, from misusing the CIB statement for shoddy purposes. George evolved a thesis implying that the PR Club was pro-Tito because it had once quoted Tito (even if the quotes were perfectly ones). Dowling decided that he could smear the PR Club as pro-Tito because it had distributed the original March 23rd statement (a correct one) of a publication in North Carolina, the Road Ahead, which subsequently supported Tito. It is certainly a queer contribution to clarity to use Tito's renegacy as a slander pot for the smearing of one's opposition. It is a reflection of the unbalanced attitude of comrades who lose their bearings in the wilds of polemic.

The Trotskyites worked hard to capitalize on the shock in order to undermine--in those lost souls within their reach--faith in the S.U. and the CIB. But it has to be recognized that here and there they made a conquest. Since the CPUSA absolutely refuses to conduct organized education against Trotskyism, the responsibility falls on the expelled movement to do the job--and without delay.

An important problem can be seen clearly in the case of the Road Ahead, a publication of expelled comrades in North Carolina. These comrades were expelled for fighting opportunism in the CP. Their original statement, explaining their expulsion, exposing the crimes of the CPUSA in the South, and offering a correct position, was well received in the expelled movement. As far as we can judge, these comrades were sincere in their original fight. And yet, they fell for Tito's gags; they fell for anti-Soviet slander; they fell for Sutta's subtle Trotskyism. This cannot be ascribed merely to shock; it was the blossoming of hidden doubts, demoralization, and disillusionment--the fertilizer of Trotskyism. Their case brilliantly shows the wreckage produced by the CPUSA. It shows that even those who fight the opportunism of the CPUSA carry too heavy a load of the ideological

baggage of the CPUSA--the criminal attitudes of those whom they're attempting to fight. The Road Ahead is another warning to us to watch for alien ideas within our movement and to sweep them out as soon as they betray their presence.

After the appearance of the original North Carolina statement, we were shocked by the appearance of #1 (anti-Cominform, pro-Tito issue) of the Road Ahead. An editor of Turning Point wrote the letter which follows in an attempt to tackle the attitude which caused #1. We received no answer to our letter, but sometime later we were visited by a Road Ahead comrade and discussed the question in detail. It was then obvious that the Road Ahead had made its choice--the road of Sutta, the road of Trotskyism. The predictions in the letter had already come true, so all relations with the Road Ahead were severed. The problem remained to utilize this case to the best advantage in fighting Trotskyism in the U.S. and to expose the attitudes which succumb to Trotskyism. (In future issues we intend to deal in detail with the danger of the Trotskyite movement in America.)

In varying degrees, the disease of the Road Ahead appears in the CP and in the expelled movement, and all its aspects demand exposure through ideological examination and facts. The CPUSA has deliberately neglected this problem because it cannot delve into it substantially without exposing its own misdeeds. As in the case of Yugoslavia, the rank and file comrades in the CPUSA and in the expelled movement have to seriously undertake the job of education and organization in order to prepare a solid foundation for the end of betrayals in the style of Tito. The futility of all the wiles of the CPUSA leadership is proven in the case of Tito. The N.C. watches the CPY as a test case, knowing very well the outcome. Tito, having squandered so much for power, loses even that power. And so, the Titos of the CPUSA, watching from their 9th floor estate the Tito estate in Yugoslavia, have good reason to grow panicky.

And every real Communist in the U.S. has good reason to watch what the real Communists of Yugoslavia, with the help of the CIB, led by the CPSU, will accomplish soon enough.

II- The Road Ahead of THE ROAD AHEAD

/A letter written in refutation of the article, "Tito and the Cominform", in the first issue (July 1, 1948) of The Road Ahead, an expelled publication in North Carolina./

Dear Comrades:

July 17, 1948.

* * *

"The Road Ahead", in our opinion, is wrong from the first to the last word. Frankly, we are flabbergasted by it. The immediate reaction of some Comrades (based on their good opinion of your original statement) was that it was a forgery--that you couldn't have put it out. Your first statement did a lot of good but your issue on Yugoslavia sabotages all that and does great harm to the whole correct trend in the expelled movement.....

...Frankly, if I had read #1 without knowing who wrote it, I would have chalked it up to routine Trotskyite finagling. I don't think you are Trotskyites, but at the moment, the road ahead of The Road Ahead is Trotskyism. That's true whether it's Sutta's variety or an open one. I haven't yet read Sutta's latest (after Spark's job on him long ago, he prefers not to send it to us) and I don't know whether you have, but #1 is Sutta to a "T". Prepare to receive the passionate love of Sutta and more open Trotskyites. In fact, prepare to receive visitors from the Trotskyites--under various disguises. What I'm driving at is don't--for god's sake--get screwed by a minimum of serious thought into a position you want no part of. If you find yourself in that position already, avoid the next routine step--which is the need to forevermore justify the position of #1. The awful history of sellouts in the Communist movement includes certain honest comrades who get permanently lost through the need to justify the first error. For a horrible example of that, watch the mess Yugoslavia leaders have led themselves and their Party into.

* * *

The expose of conditions in Yugoslavia promotes the fight against opportunism all over the world. It has frightened the CPUSA so badly, that it has obviously decided to stick damn close (by lipservice) to the Cominform. Don't connect the Bering review with this. The Bering review is a mistake, and harms the movement for a real CP in the U.S. There are other mistakes which we must actively attempt to correct. I'm sure they will be corrected. But meanwhile avoid the easy rut of collecting all errors in the international Communist movement into one garbage pail of proof against the CPSU and Stalin. If you do, you will find yourself defeating your own ends; you will find yourself fighting the S.U. exactly at the time it becomes the greatest help in wiping out opportunism in the U.S. There is no justification for the appearance of the Bering article. How it got into the Cominform organ--and other stuff with it--will come out in the wash soon enough, I'm confident. Although we are set back by such mistakes, the correction will carry a wallop on our side. I won't go into the Bering article for 2 reasons. First, the territory as is is too much to cover in this letter, and, secondly, I hope very soon to send you a copy of a collective letter to the Cominform.

There's something very bad about your attitude in all this. What was the big, irresponsible rush. I bet that it became the biggest rush in your lives. You must have had to stay up all night to rush out your defense right after the news hit. Rush is OK, but definitely not when you are undertaking what you realize is a momentous switch. Then you should--as Lenin said--measure your cloth seven times first. With two incomplete bounties from the N.Y. Times, with impulsive burst of disillusionment, and with little thought and no research--you're bound to go wrong. You should have consulted with other comrades in the U.S. first before succumbing to inner broodings derived from impatience. Who is to determine the exact timetable by which all doubts and questions in uninformed American minds must be answered by the CPSU. It's becoming a ridiculous trend among a few comrades. It's the right of any Communist anywhere to demand answers and proof, but it is not his right to arbitrarily and in the face of a multitude of serious problems confronting the CPSU and other Parties to set a time limit on explanations. You

should have realized that since the main impact of your decision would be on the movement in the U.S. and not directly in Europe you had the responsibility to talk it over with other comrades first. A few other Comrades have been unbalanced by the Yugoslavia business. It's understandable--but only on the basis of knowing how weak the Marxism-Leninism of some of our best comrades is. Formerly valuable Communists have fallen for all sorts of strange bait--Curran gags, Trotskyite gags, Socialist Labor Party and Proletarian Party gags.

With a new decision to think independently--which is good--some American Communists have illogically assumed a non-Party "liberal" attitude in viewing all problems from scratch. They suddenly have no history, nobody's record to lean on; they have a new principle--beware of faith in anyone. It is not only ridiculous for a Communist to lose his faith in the S.U. and in Stalin; it is a "liberal" suicide.

You indicate that you speak for the expelled movement in this country in defending Tito and attacking the Cominform and the CPSU. This is obviously untrue, and you had absolutely no right to assume this, especially since you didn't take time to find out what our reactions were. Leaving Dowling out for a minute (because he sticks by the Cominform, as the CPUSA does these days, for "special" reasons), it's mostly the groups and individuals whom you oppose that will welcome #1. In fact, one of my hopes is that as their commendation gets to you, it will be a factor in forcing you to reconsider. Just make certain that while you think this over, you don't relinquish your correct positions in return for snide remarks about the S.U.

You say that you greeted the Cominform because you felt that it would be a great factor in helping to overcome opportunism, especially in the American Communist movement. Here again, just be sure to recognize the facts as they emerge more and more--that this is exactly what will happen. There have been mistakes in many parties, but I think that this Yugoslavia affair will turn out to be an important landmark in the ~~routing~~ of opportunism on a world scale. We must influence the Cominform with facts on America and an explanation of the harm done by the Bering article, but all you have done so far is forfeit your right to influence the Cominform and instead you have qualified for the dubious glory of an accelerating hatred for the S.U.

You have discovered that the line of the CPSU is not right just because it represents a Socialist country. Who but a Party hack ever taught you such scientific proof for the line of the CPSU. The CPSU has a glorious history and glorious names, but that very history and those very names have taught the CPSU not to rely on record and name. On the contrary, although the CPSU has pride in its history and has faith in its leaders, it guards its line and the future of the S.U. only by a vigilant adherence to Marxism-Leninism. It so happens that the history of the CPSU and Stalin gives us firm ground to have faith in them. This is especially true since nowhere in the world or in Communist history has any Party been so vigilant against opportunism as the CPSU. We have faith in the CPSU and Stalin exactly because they are always correcting mistakes, squelching bureaucrats and opportunists.

Consider the shakeup in the S.U. since the war. Position has protected no deviation from Marxism-Leninism. Such an important member as Alexandrov was exposed for perverting Marxism in his history of philosophy. There was a shakeup in the Ukraine Party leadership. There have been continuous purges in the trade unions. Right down to literature and to music they have systematically and harshly fought deviations from Marxism-Leninism in order to strengthen the S.U., in order to tone it up for the difficult problems ahead. There is no Soviet Communist who can cover his mistakes with his prestige--and this is true exactly because Stalin has forged a steel tradition of vigilance and democracy.

In a Communist, faith is not--and shouldn't be--an unthinking condition. Communist faith based on a recognition of deeds, of the records of men (not just historically but currently) is a necessity and a prerequisite for real unity and trust. It prevents the damn liberal waste of confidence; it prevents the substitution of cynicism and finally misanthropism for trust in the people you work with. We in America are subject to that cynicism because we have seen such complete sellouts veiled by hypocrisy. America is full of such disillusionment. It's understandable, but we have to fight it or we're licked no matter what we do. The people who lose faith in the S.U. because they have not seen a success for a while and become (more than they know) demoralized, fly spasmodically between two sterile positions. First they are in varying degrees blind, religious, hacky, categorical, orthodox, stooge-producing Communists. Here, they need only leading by the nose--not freedom. But often, when they wake from this stupor, they are so shocked by their former qualities that they tend to "liberate" themselves into cynical, depressed agnostics. Here, they are comforted only by a poetic disillusionment characteristic of a N.Y. Times reporter after an exhaustive 2 hour stop-over at a Soviet airfield.

Although all your points should be answered (if not in this letter) I think there is something more productive than any list of answers. Take another look at the Short History of the CPSU(B). In that book many of the expelled people--and probably you also--found not only solidly founded faith in the S.U. but also independent thinking and vigilance. It's on the basis of such books that comrades could assume the responsibility for getting a real CP in the U.S. That's the book that we made the PR Club study so that our comrades could gain knowledge and vigilance and independent thinking. It's understandable that the Bronx County, C.P. should have ordered us to discontinue the class. Everything we do is based on the experiences of such Parties as the CPSU. What Stalin has convincingly proven to the best parts of the international Communist movement is what we have used as our foundation in fighting opportunism. For this are we going to distrust Stalin?

You call the leadership of the CPSU opportunist and bureaucratic. You somehow lacked the courage to name Stalin--as Sutta did in his first vomit. Before you produce another disgrace like #1 reread a little Stalin, think of the achievements of the S.U. under his leadership, and learn how to think independently and critically from him. Learn how to avoid the sloppiness, misrepresentation and inconsistencies that comprise #1 from any work by Stalin.

You have a right to criticize Stalin and the CPSU. Just remember one thing: criticize in the Communist manner. You actually offered no Communist criticism; you attacked minus the criticism. To criticize the S.U. or Stalin or anyone you have to find the facts, analyze a position, analyze the errors and determine their derivation. Then offer constructively your solution and prove its merits. You didn't even attempt this. You were in a hurry. You only hollered that you have a right to criticize, but you forgot to criticize. In denouncing the S.U. (and you did that notwithstanding a few measured phrases about the first workers' state that all Trotskyites indulge in) you merely listed errors, real and fictional, hither and yon--all the fault of the S.U. But why or how--that was left unsaid.

Here's another example of how you turn your former incorrect understanding and a "new" discovery against the CPSU. You say that, even though you tried until now, you can no longer explain international opportunism on an individual basis. You have found that it is an international phenomenon. But you could have found long ago in Stalin's writings that important Leninist point that opportunism is an international phenomenon caused by succumbing to the constant pressure of international bourgeois ideology. What kind of incomplete thinking is it to blame this new discovery (to you) on the Marxists who expounded it, fought it, and overcame it, and are the most vigilant against it today. If you understand this Marxist-Leninist concept can you logically call it all the fault of the S.U. In the midst of the active participation of the CPSU in smashing the rank opportunism that has made a tragedy out of a wonderful country like Yugoslavia, you forget to investigate the facts, rely on an impulse and blame the anti-opportunists. And, amazingly enough, you unequivocally support one of the worst betrayals in Communist history. You had better prove first that the CPSU is responsible for specific errors in France, Italy, etc. And isn't it irresponsible to lump the French and Italian Parties (wonderful Parties despite mistakes--mistakes are made by all Parties) with the American and Canadian Parties. While the French Party admits an error and proceeds to correct it, the CPUSA hypocritically lip-serves. Beware of Sutta's disease wherein you are disturbed by mistakes in the French Party but more disturbed by the French Party's correction of those mistakes.

As more facts confront you every day, try to discover whether it isn't the CPSU which found a most dangerous case of revisionism in the Yugoslav Party and effected an international Party attack on it. This should also make us wonder how powerful an international Party attack against the CPUSA will be when it comes. The D.W. realizes this. That's why it's doing handsprings now: it sees the day of cleanup getting too close. How could you realize so little of this and swiftly take up a position of opposing the CPSU and the other Cominform Parties before you had the facts. You said very formally in the beginning of the bulletin that a new estimate of the world CP's is demanded. Notice that--such a large dish is a little hard overnight and in 4 pages - you never did that. You didn't explain any new relationships and the new basis of work. There is no new estimate at the end of the bulletin--only an attack on the CPSU and the Cominform Parties and blanket support for a Party about which you know very little currently.

I have to insist that the section you entitled "Old Stuff" is certainly new stuff. It's new stuff when you fantastically observe that to the expelled movement in the U.S. the attacks on the Yugoslav Party sound strangely familiar. In the first place--what a parallel between a criticism of the Yugoslav Party by the CPSU and the terror in the American Party. In the second place, you picked the wrong side for your sympathy: it's in Tito's Party that the terror exists. To circulate the Cominform organ in the CPUSA is begging for expulsion. To circulate it in Yugoslavia today is prohibited. Tito's opponents are in jail or fleeing the country. The double-talk that has come out in the recent speeches of Djilas etc. smacks of a very smooth polemical maneuvering--like the CPUSA leaders. The only difference is that their leaders are more shrewd than the American leaders.

-Were the Yugoslav leaders refused the right to criticize? Were they accused by two-bit bureaucrats and enemy agents as we have been? The opposite is true. The Yugoslav Party is pulling an unjustifiable stunt in boycotting a meeting of the Cominform. What reason could they have other than a realization of their own guilt. The CPUSA boycotted the Cominform subtly. The Yugoslav leaders do it brazenly. Exactly what is so commendable in this. When Party leaders go sour, it doesn't matter who they are or what they've done--they pull the same stunts within their own parties and against brother parties.

Your reasons for the Cominform's denunciation of Tito are surprising. Why you have to ignore the statement of the Cominform in this respect is beyond me.

#1 and #3--You think the Cominform couldn't countenance the criticism of other Parties by Tito. But the Cominform insisted that Tito, etc. should be able to take criticism as well as hand it out. Explain the fact that the Yugoslav leaders did get their criticism across in a meeting of the Cominform--and explain the fact that the other parties couldn't get their criticism across to Yugoslavia because they refused to appear. Who is ganging up on whom? These two points merely prove the case against your argument. In other words, the Cominform attacked the Yugoslav Party because it refused criticism and the responsibilities of Communist criticism and self-criticism. That's a good reason.

#2--The Cominform, you say, was angry because the CPY criticized the Italian Party on Trieste. My facts are limited on the Trieste situation. I imagine yours are also, despite an article reprinted in PA some time ago. Before you state #2 so baldly you have to say what you're talking about: state what you think is the correct policy on Trieste, state the Italian and the Yugoslav positions, state the position of the S.U., state the essence of the criticism by the Yugoslav leaders, and whether the criticism was acceptable to the Italian Party. To say the word "Trieste" is not to rub Aladdin's lamp. It not only proves nothing; it obviously attempts to prove nothing.

#4--You think the Cominform was attacking CPY because it proposed a Balkan Federation. On this also, like on a hell of a lot of other things, my facts are limited. You have to first explain what the idea

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of the Balkan Federation is; is it correct; under what conditions; do these conditions exist now; what was Tito's idea; what was Dimitroff's idea; what was the S.U.'s objection to the Federation. You can't skip all this with magic words such as "TRIESTE" or "Balkan Federation". What did Dimitroff really say. The Bulgarian papers say he was misquoted. Did he recant?--why? What kind of new Marxist estimate is this abacadabra of impression-pulling. I don't know why the S.U. quickly attacked the Federation idea, but I suspect that one of the reasons was the very role that Tito had begun to play. Certainly the S.U. would not countenance a consolidation and spread of Tito's nationalist plans. This Federation--at this time and considering the present role of Tito--instead of strengthening the countries involved, would merely subordinate them to the plans of the CPY leaders. In other words the timing was a bad idea. There are probably more important reasons which we are not acquainted with. Meanwhile, we shouldn't react violently with a "headline mentality" to every tidbit in the N. Y. Times.

#5--They angered the CPSU because they had a straightforward position regarding the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Holy smokes, how did you invent this. You claim for the CPY what they do not claim. One of the main deviations of the CPY was reliance on the peasantry--not the proletariat. And you can't resolve the contradiction between belief in a Dictatorship of the Proletariat and belief in the Tito idea that the People's Front, the CPY, the people and Tito were one, that the program of the People's Front and the CPY were one. Where does the Dictatorship of the Proletariat or Socialism or Marxism work in here. If you learned the technique of liquidationism under Browder, apply some of that knowledge here.

Against this un-Marxist, psychological analysis of the real reasons behind the attack on Tito, you offer a curious--and motley--collection of evidence for the degeneration of the CPSU and the Cominform Parties. Immediately, you should make a note of an important slip. The CPY protests too much its loyalty to the CPSU while it maneuvers against it. But until this point it has not dared accuse the CPSU of degeneration. You, in your defense of Tito, have to logically accuse the CPSU of degeneration. Is this accusation your position and not the CPY's; is it also the position of the CPY but unmentionable for reasons of maneuvering; or do you inadvertently expose the attitude of the CPY by defending it too openly. Right here, let's add another case of contradiction. The CPY protests in carefully chosen words that it has stuck to the CPSU line, and then attacks under the table. You, however, pose the CPY line as against the CPSU line, and attack above the table. There's something fishy obviously. Perhaps it was in all honesty that you rushed to Tito's defense, but you chose to defend what has become a corrupt man--and not for the first time in history has this happened. Don't you fall for blind faith at this point.

In regard to your 11 reasons for giving more weight to the Yugoslav position--I can't see what the connection is between the widely different facts--or fictions.

#1 and #2--You "prove" the CPSU wrong and the CPY right by the Soviet positions on Tripoli and the Pacific Islands. I'm going to try to

dig up the necessary documents on these questions for you, and I'd like to reserve my own arguments til then so I won't be talking through my hat as you have throughout. But, aside from the facts in the matter of Tripoli and the Pacific Islands; I'd like to point out a bad approach. It was your responsibility--in honest criticism--to inform the reader of the facts in these matters and then criticize. You know damn well that our facts are limited on many international disputes. It was also necessary for you to show the connection between these cases and the CPY position. The emerging facts more and more indicate that the CPY was using an annexationist, nationalist policy in its dealings with the Balkans. What are your sources on this--what were your sources on this at the time of writing? The UN is a sphere of many different problems changing swiftly from day to day. The mere statement that the SU wants Tripoli returned to Italy means nothing but innuendo. What would you think of the bald statement that the SU marched into Poland and took over--before the war? Wouldn't you insist that the other facts must be included which prove that the SU defended the self-determination of Poland by doing this. What country has pursued such a principled policy as the SU in its dealings with Finland. It could have annexed Finland, especially after the defeat of Finland. Perhaps I can make myself clear by a point on the Palestine question which I am more acquainted with. Suppose I were to hoodwink the uninformed by attacking the SU for supporting partition. But I would be handing out a falsification via an incomplete story. I would have to include the background--that the SU supports a bi-national state, that a bi-national state is impossible at the moment because of the pressure of the imperialist powers resulting in a refusal of both the Arabs and the Jews to accept a bi-national state. The SU, instead of abstractly leaving the Palestine mess to the complete plans of imperialism, thwarted the US and Britain by supporting partition as a second best alternative. They knew--and this has now been proven--that the US and Britain did not favor partition either, that it was merely a trick to stay in Palestine. Therefore, the SU supported partition as a first measure in forcing the US and Britain out of Palestine so that self-determination would be possible. I haven't taken the space to prove this here because I think you agree on this point, and so I use it as an example of how a situation may be misrepresented.

#4 and #5--The mistakes of the French Party prove CPSU wrong and CPY right, you think. But again no explanations. I'm going to get hold of the Duclos speech you mention and reread it and write to you separately about it. As for the French CP position on Indo China, I think it was incorrect. However, remember that the French Party also thinks that position was incorrect and has criticized itself and corrected its policy. I'm sure that this shouldn't anger you as it does Sutta. I'm interested in your proof--if any--that the CPSU approved of this policy. They didn't. Even here, in all honesty, one should indicate that the French CP was in a very complicated spot, that confusion more than a definite policy operated. We cannot damn each other for mistakes--or we're all God. The French Party today is a wonderful Party with leaders of real integrity. In a very complicated position, it has resolutely led the workers. It has openly corrected itself in--as far as I know--every case. Again, you mention the French Party in

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order to uphold Tito and condemn CPSU opportunism. Where the connection is God knows. It's a wonder that you didn't blame the degeneracy of the CPUSA on the CPSU. I hope you don't reach that point.

#3--Browder went to the Soviet Union, saw Molotov, and therefore--you say--Tito is correct, etc.etc. I don't know what the story is on that trip. I can imagine--without being certain--that the CPSU wanted some badly needed information on the situation in the CPUSA, information which was not forthcoming from anyone they could trust. Therefore, they attempted to get information from someone who would be willing to discuss matters for his own slander purposes. Certainly, Browder and Foster are both opportunists as far as the CPSU is concerned. But the CPSU had to rely on its own devices to get some data on an organization so defunct that nobody it knew specifically could be trusted. As for the book agent business, it has been suggested that that was one way to remove Browder from the scene for a while at least by making him a foreign agent--registered. As far as I have been able to determine, Browder hasn't prospered on the agent deal because it was already in the hands of some other people. I can't vouch for the accuracy of this. I merely mention it as of interest to you. The important point here is that you were in a mad Sutta scramble to get a few meager facts out of context to prove the case against the S.U.

#6--That charge that Fergus McKean never got an answer to his book is probably a charge unique in the history of weak arguments. Couldn't you enumerate endless reasons why such replies were never received; why such books were never received. Remember that McKean's book was out a year or more before we ever heard of it in the U.S. It was in July 1947 that the P.R. Club received a copy and publicized it for the first time. Exactly what McKean is doing at the moment I don't know. But don't judge the international Communist movement by reactions to him. I would appreciate knowing how and from where the fact impressed itself on you--that McKean was scorned.

#7,8,9--I know the English Party was opportunist; I don't have the facts on it today. I know the Canadian Party still is degenerate. I know nothing about the Indian Party except a hash of conflicting rumors. I do know of many other examples of rank opportunism in Communist Parties. But what are you trying to prove? If you're trying to prove that opportunism is an international phenomenon, OK. If you're trying to prove that international opportunism is of course a direct result of the CPSU, you'd better start back a way and refute Lenin's teachings on opportunism. Then attack the CPSU in the light of that. Personally, I don't think you know much about these Parties, but if you do, you must certainly realize that your readers don't. Therefore, it is irresponsibility or worse to throw out such generalizations without any indication of facts or proof.

#10-- Nat Ross organized your expulsion; he was also a C.I. Rep.; you say. Pardon me if I keep your logic as ridiculous as it is: the C.I. organized your expulsion through Nat Ross. Where is such logic going to get you. When I read such statements I frankly begin to suspect your motives. Such refuse is hardly understandable as mistaken thinking. The only point I can hold in favor of considering it a

mistake is the knowledge that once a weak position is defended impassionedly, anything of a fantastic quality can come off. Point #10 is hysterical. That's the best that can be said for it.

#11--So you spent 2 weeks in Yugoslavia and you're an authority. OK, you're an authority, then, of the caliber of the disillusioned reporters of the Capitalist press. You spent these 2 weeks a couple of years ago, and you dare offer this as first hand evidence in the course of an argument against blind faith. There is nothing you can prove to anyone--or yourself--by those 2 weeks as it affects the Yugoslav mess today.

You disapprove of the Cominform first attacking Tito. But that's an incomplete fact. The Cominform effected the correction in its own Parties in many cases before this. Those Parties were equal to criticism. As for the CPSU, it started in its own house cleaning. Back in 1945, one-half the leading personnel of the Ukraine CP was removed for deviating from Marxism-Leninism. The Ukrainian C.C. was charged with failure to combat bourgeois nationalism in the Ukraine. I don't know the fine details of timing involved, but I do know that there could be very little more important than stopping the developments in Yugoslavia in a hurry.

The Cominform accuses the CPY of basic deviations from Marxism-Leninism in attitude, in its concept of the role of the working class, the vanguard role of the Party, discipline and democracy in the Party, and in vicious acts against the S.U.

On attitude. It's unforgivable that the CPY should have boycotted a meeting of the Cominform--called a strike on its brother parties--used a "get tough" policy. Even if the CPY were unjustly accused, it would still have been the duty of the CPY leaders to attend and to attempt to correct the errors. From the present behavior of the CPY leaders it is apparent that they are certainly bold enough (if nothing else) to hold their own in an argument--so why didn't they attend? The only reason is that they knew they were wrong; they wanted to cover up their traces and bluff their way out of the mess. Perhaps they thought that the Cominform and the CPSU could not afford to expose them so openly, but they now know that they were mistaken in this. What kind of maneuvering is it to boycott a Cominform meeting and then invite the Cominform Parties to a Yugoslav Party Convention. If the CPY could not afford to attend a pre-judged meeting based on slanders initiated by the S.U. isn't the invitation to play in the home ball park rather strange? What is better in this hypocrisy than what we see in the CPMSA, which also boycotted membership in the Cominform, but for maneuvering reasons invites representatives of foreign Parties to its Convention. The CPY is a little too-eager to proclaim the shattering of the foundations of the Cominform. The fight against opportunism has its most solid foundation in the Cominform and in the CPSU. Tito's opposition is understandable only because he has been guilty of opportunism in several respects. But your anti-opportunist support for opportunist Tito is not logical. Take a lesson from Tito and don't attempt to bury the Cominform over the first difference.

As I said before, you support Tito and oppose the CPSU on questions of theory where Tito attempts to prove that the CPY supports the SU. Somebody has the lineup wrong. Of course, in actuality, the CPY does oppose the SU on basic questions, but they dare not say so for fear of exposing themselves in Yugoslavia and clearing up matters for the membership.

An indication of the low pragmatic level to which theory has sunk in the CPY is their cry to judge them by practice. Instead of facing up to the CPSU, instead of owning up to its quiet revisionism, the CPY says in effect: the hell with theory; judge by our successes. Aside from the question of how successful the CPY has been in leading Yugoslavia towards Socialism there is a deliberate evasion of the problem of cringing before immediate short lived successes while long range victory is squandered. If the CPY is correct in this, then theory is a mere parlor discussion among Communists. What can be proven wrong in theory cannot work. It's amazing enough, but at this point one cannot give the CPY leaders credit for believing in the unity of theory and practice. They have not answered the points of theory in the statement of the Cominform; they have merely pointed to supposed successes. In this argument, obviously the CPY disdains theory and is therefore open to every variety of opportunism. While the CPY squirms that it should be judged by future actions, the CPSU attempts to warn against sure defeat and prevent that defeat--the defeat of Socialism in Yugoslavia. Theory is a guide to action, not a poetic postlude to experimentation. Polemically maneuvering talk on basic theoretical questions appears throughout the CPY rebuttal.

Very important in the Cominform statement is the expose of CPY's quick switch. First capitalism was gaining and the class struggle sharpening in Yugoslavia. Then when the SU exposed this, the CPY attempted to cover up with a few left decrees which multiplied their errors. From lagging they jumped to haste. All this could be disastrous. The class struggle is not dissolved by decrees, and forced collectivization (remember Trotsky on this) leads only to disaster. Tito could not answer the Cominform on this: if the original condition of the growth of Capitalism in Yugoslavia was dangerous, how much more so was a hasty collectivization and nationalization. Was this haste or demagogic declaration? In the matter of demagogic declarations, you should be an expert as a member of the CPUSA. Why can't you recognize this in the CPY? Although the CPY insists that the Socialist sector is growing (in other words that the decrees were not mere cover-ups) it avoids a discussion of the accuracy of the SU's observations before the switch, because such a discussion might expose a few untruths to the Yugoslav people. In this respect, we certainly know what kind of a Party it is which can not face its mistakes. If there isn't honesty in a Communist Party's leadership, there is nothing there.

What mystical reasons indicate to you a tie between Tito's opportunism and expelled ideas in this country. Whereas we fight for the vanguard role of the CP, Tito was burying that and gradually liquidating the CP. How can you who have watched the Party liquidate itself in the 3rd Party beginnings accept the CPY liquidation within the People's Front and the CP. The CPUSA doesn't have the achievements of

the CPY to its credit, but it does have the suicidal errors which are now engulfing the CPY. It may well be that the good training that Tito once gave Yugoslav comrades may yet come to the fore and remove Tito and his clique. I say clique because only a clique could operate as the CPY leadership does today. I think that events will prove that the people we stand with in Yugoslavia today are those who are in jail, hounded, and misrepresented.

What do you think of the cooption practices in the CPY? The CPY squirmingly answers that they lost 10 Central Committee members in the war. That doesn't justify continued cooption 2 years after. There is a wonderful report ZHDANOV gave at a CPSU Congress in which he recounted the suicidal practices of cooption in the S.U. and CPSU did a lot of purging to clean that out. All the CPY can do is excuse itself, and its hierarchy. The last weeks have proven the charge of military methods within the CPY correct. Any Party which has to "protect" itself against the encroachments of CPSU ideology is moving rapidly CPUSAwards. A reporter for telepress was thrown out for reporting one branch which supported the Cominform.

The leaders of the Cominform Parties may make mistakes, but they comprise some of the most tried and trusted Communists in the world with long records of consistent Party integrity. It sounds like CPUSA dirty talk to lump them into one heap and accuse them of a gangup because they stick by the analysis of the CPSU. Who can say that the CPSU has not the right and duty to organize its brother Parties wherever possible against the degeneration of a Party.

I don't have many facts and I don't feel in the position to prove factually the truth of all situations in Europe. We in the U.S. have a hard time getting any information. But, exactly because of my experience in the CPUSA, I can smell the ambition, the grandeeism, the disdain, and the conceit of the CPY leadership. It has happened before to brilliant Communists in the highest positions. But our international history proves that such power is temporary. The sharp action of the CPSU in this case is just another indication to me that we will win in the U.S. with the help of our brother Parties--and even if before that point they err in certain respects regarding the situation in the U.S.

I can believe that certain Soviet Communists make mistakes, but I know that the first to correct these mistakes is the CPSU. I cannot believe that Soviet Comrades in Yugoslavia were guilty of the actions Tito has accused them of. The CPY has already indicated in an unCommunist way what it considers "unethical".

On the other hand I can believe the Cominform accusations of anti-Soviet acts on the part of the CPY, simply because of the recent actions of the CPY. I believe the main protection of the New Democracies is the Soviet Union. I believe the S.U. would do everything possible--and has--for the benefit of those countries. But the S.U. expects and deserves the support of all workers. What the CPY has done is sabotage, not only of the basic symbol of the ability of the international working class to successfully win Socialism, not only of

the united international front of CP's, but very simply of the camp of peace. It matters very little that you include the feeble statement that Socialism does exist in the SU and as you say contrary to the Trotskyite thesis. You forget that modern streamlined American Trotskyism has found it necessary--with a few exceptions--to accept "the workers state", "the necessity to defend the workers' state" (in words), etc. Trotskyites have attempted to infiltrate here by praising Stalin--quite a strain. Trotskyism has no theory today. It is, as Stalin said some time ago, a bunch of gangsters. They also can say anything for reasons of maneuver. Can you expect people to believe your one protestation of faith in the SU in the scenery of your #1 issue. You forget one important point about the S.U. If the CPSU is opportunist, then the SU is moving towards Capitalism. That follows logically. I'm sure you don't think that the SU is slipping, so in reverse, consider your own reasoning.

Take an indirect lesson from Tito. Even in maneuvering against the SU and Stalin, he has to dishonestly stand by Stalin. He appeals to Stalin to rectify errors. But what more proof of Tito's present dirty dishonesty do you need than the fact that in appealing to Stalin, he throws a barrel of innuendos. First, he knows that the decision of the CPSU is not something apart from Stalin. Stalin is, after all the leader of the CPSU. Secondly, why does the People's Front of Yugoslavia send this appeal--instead of the CPY. Tito has fallen for the show of strength and bluff technique. He forgets that the good that he once built against all odds was based on something stronger--principle. The worst condemnation of Tito exists in a report he made in 1940 to a crushed almost non-existent CPY. In this he exposed all the evils he is guilty of today. He knew the correct manner of work and ideological struggle then.

To a faraway observer with even a minimum of facts, the CPY leadership has damned itself. It has slandered the country of Socialism and without reason. It has attacked the man who has done more for the success of world Socialism than anyone living. It has cast innuendos of bureaucracy at Stalin who has not only insured the integrity of the CPSU through many complicated situations, but who has trained such a corps of Communists in the highest spirit of honesty and hard thought that the integrity of the CPSU through vigilance is insured. Isn't that the most that could be said of any leader--that he trained other people so well that consistent progress does not depend on one man. One more thing, the most amazing phenomenon in the world: the leadership of Stalin has built a nation of new men that is something new in the history of the world--the dream of Marx and Engels, the one vision of philosophers considered impossible through history. You know that I am aware of faults in the world or in Communists as much as you. But it's a matter of balance. We have a right to marvel at a nation like the SU where the people as a whole under the leadership of the CPSU are great because they can correct themselves, because they will never again lose their gains through acquiring the old habits of the Capitalist world. They have their hands firmly on a science of vigilance and self-criticism--not just a science of analysis.

I share--but for different reasons of course--your feeling that

out of this mess will emerge a strengthened world Communist movement. The Parties like the CPUSA who have hypocritically rushed to attack the CPY have done so exactly because they feel their doom near. One day soon they will be greeted with such shocks as will make the Tito attack look like a routine affair.

I think that you've committed a serious error. We'll all pay for this error, for the confusion that results from it and from its misuse by the CPUSA. Certainly if all dirty Dowling can see in your statement is a vehicle for attacking SPARK (mentioned for the first time in NCP), how well will the Dowlings of the Party use it. That is your worry--not ours, because we can take care of that well enough. We have no reasons for regretting the circulation of your original statement, and we have no need to offer excuses to anyone.

Let me suppose for a minute that you were to reconsider this whole matter--and I certainly hope you will. You would then have the responsibility of not only correcting your errors, but of analyzing why you made those errors. To analyze one error down to the hilt is to avoid a million more errors--it's the surest method of learning how to think in a balanced way. I've tried to indicate my ideas--the reasons how you could have arrived at such a conclusion--and with two-bit psychology omitted. But you only are the best judge about how to really analyze it for yourself and for others. You can undo the harm and contribute something valuable in this way by heading off other honest people who will commit similar errors.

I hope that you will arrive at agreement with us and then put out an issue of "The Road Ahead" that will harshly criticize the hell out of yourselves. Although the sooner the better--from our point of view --don't rush this as you did #1....

* * *

III-Tito's "Get Tough" Policy

No sooner had the Cominform denunciation of Tito and the CPY leadership taken place than the capitalist press discovered that the Communist Parties of the world were falling apart. It informed us that a "Communist schism" was growing in Hungary; that there were two factions in the Party: one anti-Semitic; the other, Semitic and "Muscovite". (N.Y. Times, 6-30- 8) A purge was reported started in the Rumanian CP for reasons of nationalism and "independence of Moscow". Georgiu Dej, Sec'y General of the Rumanian C.P., was one of those to be purged. (N.Y. Times, 7-1- 8) The alleged split spread to Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia, Gottwald and Clementis were said to be the next victims.

These rumors constitute one of the helping hands extended by the capitalist press to Tito in the attempt to becloud the actual facts, in the attempt to help Tito prove the degeneration of the world Communist movement. But although the capitalist press tries to make it appear as though the criticism of Tito reveals a weakening in the Communist movement, Communists throughout the world realize that the

opposite is true. Czech Communist Bares recently wrote that the open criticism of the leadership of the CPY meant: "A great strengthening of our Communist Party. We will have the possibility of clearing up in a great ideological campaign all the lessons emerging for us also from the basic questions defined in the resolution." The criticism of the CPY by the C.I.B. was supported by Communist Parties all over the world.

In its haste, however, to trumpet forth all the manly deeds of Tito and his gang, the capitalist press does help provide us with a daily record of the degeneration of the CPY. The reply of the CPY to the C.I.B. resolution denied all, but the actions of the CPY belie this denial.

The CPY never printed the resolution of the CIB and banned the sale of For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy. Any Party which honestly carried out a policy of open discussion and self-criticism and was willing to correct its mistakes would have distributed the Cominform statement and the Organ.

The People's Front of Yugoslavia (at the instigation of the CPY leadership, of course) "innocently" sent a note to Stalin asking that he remove the "unjust accusations" of the CIB resolution. This was done despite the obvious fact that the CIB resolution not only was endorsed by but initiated by the CPSU(B), and that the famous leader of the CPSU(B) is Stalin. This was naivete full of experienced maneuver. Was the implication that Stalin could or would wave aside a decision of the CPSU? Was it that Stalin is something apart from and above the Party--as Tito thinks of himself? On the other hand, was it a pseudo-subtle statement of the fact that the whole Yugoslav people (hence via the People's Front and not the Party) was against the CIB, the CPSU, and also Stalin--if he answered incorrectly? Whatever polished innuendoes Tito had in mind, he betrayed his revisionism even here: he treated the situation as if there were no difference between the CPY and the People's Front in Yugoslavia; in answer to criticism from a brother Party, he had the government of Yugoslavia counter-attack. In any case, Tito betrayed his New York Times-concept of the power politics workings of the Communist movement, wherein decisions mean nothing--only deals with the power "above".

Tito delighted the world with strong-arm methods alien to the international Communist movement. The CPY leadership and the government brazenly threatened the other Balkan nations. They demanded that Albania punish those who had committed "insults" against Tito (removing his picture, etc.) "Otherwise the Yugoslav government does not consider itself responsible for the consequences which might arise as a result". (D.W. 7- - 8) Tito has the fraternal tone of an imperialist country giving an ultimatum to the weakest of its colonies.

In an effort to squelch reports and leaks to other nations regarding the healthy reactions of Yugoslav Communists to the CIB resolution, the Yugoslav government expelled a Telepress correspondent from Belgrade for issuing a report about a Belgrade University CP Branch which had endorsed the CIB resolution.

The terror in the Party was such that, although CPY leaders claimed that the membership was wholeheartedly behind Tito, Lajos Dudas, a member of the Yugoslav Parliament, was forced to flee to Hungary to avoid arrest as a result of his agreement with the CIB resolution. Colonel-General Jovanic, former chief of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, who fought the Tito terror, was murdered trying to cross the border. Zujovic, Colonel-General of the Yugoslav Army and Hebrang, member of the Political Bureau of the CPY (mentioned in the CIB resolution) who had

backed the Cominform's criticism, remain prisoners condemned as "saboteurs, traitors Utashi agents."

A letter from a group of students of Belgrade University, contained in #20 of the CIB Organ, exposes the charges leveled at these two men and the way in which the Party members were permitted to discuss the charges. They write: "With regard to the cases of Zujovic and Hebrang, the first we heard was different versions of the matter from non-Party people and from abroad. Only later were we summoned to a meeting and informed that the two men had been removed from the Central Committee because of inimical activities..." Documents of the Political Bureau of the Party charged that "Zujovic, during the fifth German offensive against the Partisans influenced one of the Partisan divisions to try to break through the enemy encirclement. He did this on his own without any regard to the plan of headquarters. Due to this action, the Partisans allegedly found themselves in a critical situation. But our questions: Why was Zujovic not tried then and there as a traitor? Why was he promoted to the rank of General for his part in that particular operation? remained without an answer. Nor did we get an answer when we asked: Why are we only hearing of this 'mistake' now?"

This is the gangup that the CPY leadership is practicing on its own most loyal members as it hollers gangup at the actions of its brother Parties. This is the technique of all Party bureaucrats who institute terror as the discipline of their Parties. How much bureaucrats and revisionists must resort to this terror to maintain control of a Party we have witnessed ourselves in the CPUSA in answer to every attempt to keep the CPUSA to the Marxist-Leninist road.

Yugoslav leaders have stated that they would continue to support the S.U.'s foreign policy. Djilas, one of the CPY leaders denounced by the CIB wrote: "We do not feel isolated because we know that the U.S.S.R. will not abandon us to the imperialists since the U.S.S.R. will not and cannot be indifferent toward imperialists" (N.Y. Times, 7-7-48) However, later in the same statement, Djilas contradicts himself and also the CPY's denial that it considers it possible to build Socialism in Yugoslavia without the aid of the S.U. and the new democracies: "As for the isolation and solitary position of Yugoslavia...this of course does not depend on the line of the Cominform and the propaganda of 'brotherly' Parties against the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. It depends on Yugoslavia herself."

The hypocrisy in their professions of loyalty to Marxism-Leninism and the S.U. is exposed by the actual deeds of the CPY. It lipservices the S.U. but talks tough to Balkan nations for backing the CIB criticism and the criticism of the CPSU. For a time, they avoid an open condemnation of the S.U. while they attack the new democracies for taking the same actions as the CPSU (e.g. refusing to attend the CPY Congress).

At the Congress of the CPY, when Kargelj, Vice-Premier, said that Yugoslavia would continue to support the S.U.'s foreign policy, he ignored the fact that the CPY had already opposed that policy by calling for a Balkan Federation of Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania--an idea which the S.U. had already condemned. The proposing of a federation at such a time as the answer to the CIB's charges can only be interpreted as a brazen call for an anti-Soviet bloc and proved the truth of the CIB accusations.

Evidently, the CPY technique for support of the S.U. in international meetings

had not been hammered out at the time of the Regional Broadcasting Conference in Geneva. Was it Soviet support when, according to the N.Y. Times (7-11-48) the Yugoslav delegation "refused to vote with the Eastern bloc nations in the Regional Broadcasting Conference" (on July 9th).

"Yugoslav delegates abstained on a vote to decide whether the conference decisions should be made by a simple majority or by a two-thirds majority. Eastern bloc nations supported the motion for a two-thirds majority, but it did not carry." Evidently, a short time after this, the CPY leadership decided that they would expose themselves less to the Yugoslav people if they put up a show of Soviet defense in international bodies. But, even to this hypocrisy, they have been unable to hold. The brilliant revisionism of Moïshe Piyade still had to break the bounds of the planned technique and attack the CPSU(B).

Tito does not find it necessary for a time to cloak his slander against the new democracies. His unfrustrated thoughts are projected for him by his henchmen. Babitch, leader of the pro-Tito faction in Trieste stated in a newspaper interview that "The extraordinary Congress (Congress of the anti-Tito Trieste CP) has criticized (Tito's) policy, while it knows that Yugoslavia has given her Eastern friends wheat, fats, wine, and cattle and has received in return only fifth columns". Evidently the Tito gang envisages its own little bulldozing Marshall Plan.

The sudden solution of the longstanding controversy between the U.S. and Yugoslavia over the frozen gold and Yugoslavia's improved relations with the U.S. generally, carry an unhealthy odor. There is more than gold that is unfreezing in the U.S. towards Tito. Imperialist hearts are warming up to Titonic Socialism all over the world. So understanding are these capitalist friends that they warn each other openly that they must not press Tito too much or too fast. Tito's mission takes time and tact. Let him just keep fighting the CIB and the CPSU. Certainly, this is logical--for the camp of imperialism. With a little more discretion than this, Olsen, former governor of California declared after speaking with Tito that he had gone away from the meeting feeling that Tito "desired improved relations with the U.S. but on the condition that such relations would not force Yugoslavia to abandon her relations with the Eastern European bloc." (N.Y. Times 7-25-48) Of course, it is understood that the U.S. does not have to force Yugoslavia to ruin her relations with the Balkan countries; that is something she is doing admirably without U.S. pressure--a little item Olsen certainly understands.

This sudden tendency on the part of Yugoslavia for trade agreements with the U.S. "unhampered by political considerations" (statement Tito to Olsen, New York Times 7-27-48) sounds as though Tito would like also to become a mainstay of the Marshall Plan temporarily "unhampered by political considerations." Does Tito think--perhaps with an addition to Leninism by Piyade--that he can take the middle road (have his cake and eat it too; play the socialist part of the world against the capitalist part)?

The CPY Convention was held on July 21, 1948 in Belgrade. Having boycotted a meeting of the CIB called to discuss Yugoslav problems, the CPY clique stuck its collective tongue in its cheek and with a sugary sarcasm invited the boycotted parties to its rigged convention. Of course these fancy invitations were refused. The CPSU which Yugoslavs are led to believe stands by it also refused. Aside from all other considerations of principle, the other Parties did not have to attend such a rigged convention. In CPUSA fashion, such conventions are planned,

controlled, and finished before the opening speech. The Yugoslav leaders boasted that the CPY convention would unanimously endorse Tito. This, quite an accomplishment for a Party leadership fighting the CPSU -- to be endorsed unanimously, under alleged democratic procedure. We in the U.S. are not impressed with such monolithic bureaucracy, having lately witnessed the ghost of a Tito convention in the U.S. Of course, not only Tito's lieutenants had foresight regarding unanimity. The N.Y. Times has its opinions about such things too: "In view of the formidable Party and state apparatus based on an intricate system of controls it is indeed a very remote possibility that any members who have heeded the Cominform's call to rebellion would be able to survive detection...The security and military apparatus are in the hands of Marshal Tito's most faithful and intimate lieutenants." (7-1-48)

An article in the N.Y. Times of July 22 speaks of 2,000 delegates elected by Party organizations in all parts of Yugoslavia. "They have been pledged by local organizations to the support of Marshall Tito and his deputies and to endorse without reservation every Party policy denounced by the CIB."

A letter sent to the CIB organ (#19) from Belgrade tells of the atmosphere in which the Congress was held. Belgrade was put under martial law. "The State Security forces were reinforced with army artillery in full fighting order." "The last time I had seen so many armed patrols was at the end of the war. But then Chetniks and Utashi bands were operating in the country.

"There were several cases of 'unreliable' delegates being replaced by other. In Zagreb, for instance, two students, old Party members and former partisans, had their credentials taken away because they questioned the integrity of the present leaders.

"In selecting 'reliable' delegates, the Rankovic machine quite frequently resorted to slander and even arrested comrades who expressed the slightest doubt. Some delegates, elected at meetings on instructions from the top, but who later questioned the correctness of the Central Committee's line, were immediately replaced. The Party membership, of course, was not informed of this.

"Congress discussion was manipulated to prevent delegates from debating the charges made by the Information Bureau against the Party leadership."

Definitely, this type of convention does not need to be attended to be understood. It does not have to be held--except for publicity purposes. This amazing unanimity somehow did not hold for those Yugoslavs far enough away from Tito's terror to think and act openly. On July 12, the N.Y. Times reported that Yugoslav officers studying in the S.U. had supported Tito unanimously. But on July 21, the Times reported that six of these supported the position of the CIB.

In Trieste, while a pro-Tito faction split away from the Party, the Party supported the CIB Resolution, even though, with the exception of Yugoslavia itself, Tito's control is most powerful in Trieste.

That Yugoslavs are fighting Tito can be seen from the purges in the CPY. A dispatch in Borba, organ of the CPY, told of three cabinet ministers of Montenegro who had been dismissed because of their opposition to Tito. (N.Y. Times, 8-15-48) In a purge of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina which preceded this, it was announced that four ministers had been removed from office. (Times 8-15-48) On August 5th, the Yugoslav government deprived Radouje Golubovitch, former Yugoslav

ambassador to Rumania of his citizenship for supporting the CIB. (Times 8-15-48)

On August 15th, the Times reported that: "On Aug. 9 the Yugoslav Government cancelled all outstanding diplomatic and ordinary passports and announced that holders of these passports could not leave the country unless they applied for new documents."

On Aug. 28th, an article in the Times reported that the purge involves those who refuse to adhere to the Party program of the Fifth Congress of the CPY of July 21 which took an anti-Cominform stand. These people are charged with wanting to overthrow Tito by Civil War and it is thought that their existence constitutes a threat to the Party and the State.

A letter from students of Belgrade University to the Organ of the CIB supports the position of the CIB and says that "there is a definite liquidationist tendency in the Party. The Party never does anything in the name of the Party." The letter accuses the leadership of permitting "former collaborationists and stooges of the invader" to occupy posts in the Party and State organs. The CPY leadership boasted that all organizations of the Party had approved the stand of the Central Committee. The letter states that they got this approval:

- 1) "Through pressure exercised by the leadership on every member of the Party!"
- 2) "by means of inciting nationalistic sentiments among the members of the Party, especially in relation to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia..."
- 3) "because the Central Committee of the CPY "are forever beating their breasts, saying that they fought the enemy for four years, that they love the Soviet Union,--and while this is certainly true of the membership and masses, the same cannot be said for the leaders."
- 4) "because instead of discussing the policy of nationalism, the Central Committee has actually replaced this question by discussing the solution of the national minorities question."
- 5) "because the Party is being educated in the spirit of militarism."
- 6) "by gambling on the fact that the Party consists of fighters who scorn death."
- 7) "by circulating the assurances of the leadership that the situation is changing, that it is getting better, by saying that all charges are based on slander, and that the CP of the S.U. will apologize."

Discussing democracy in the Yugoslav Party, the letter says:

"The majority of the members either due to confusion or fear of expulsion are reluctant to say what they think..." "The slightest criticism is followed by reprisals. The Party is ruled by military methods..." "Discussion within the Party is impossible since Army officers are conducting explanatory work in all civil organizations, in the Party, and in the People's Front."

The methods of the CPY are not evolved to fight a rumor. They are the military, bureaucratic methods designed to destroy a powerful pro-Cominform sentiment. That the methods grow harsher and more open is more testimony to the fact that opposition to Tito is growing. We can expect with the publication of the NEW BORBA in Rumania, the unification gradually of the open fighters against Tito outside of Yugoslavia with the underground movement against Tito in Yugoslavia. One should certainly not judge the opposition to Tito by the visible reactions in Yugoslavia, because that opposition means jail or murder. The distribution within Yugoslavia

of the letters from the CPSU(B) to the CPY must have a powerful effect, especially since it is seditious to distribute them. The trusted diplomatic service of Yugoslavia is deserting the Tito regime--from UN delegates in N.Y.C. to the Yugoslav ambassador to Egypt, in the latest case, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary. Obviously, support for Tito ends with the border and Tito's border police. This is an indication of what must be going on beneath the surface in Yugoslavia.

Tito and his cohorts cannot win because military bureaucracy under the name of Communism cannot win. And at the point that Tito drops the cloak of Communism, he will be completely exposed and have little left to confuse Yugoslav Communists with. And we think that day isn't far off.

* * *

LETTERS AND DISCUSSION

Dear Editors:

Monday, July 26, 1948

I have read the Franklin letter, plus the first issue of Turning Point and would like to direct a number of questions to you for answer.

Being a member of the Communist Party for a number of years it is naturally difficult to conceive of the present CPUSA leadership as constituted acting in interests other than interests of their class and Party. However, recent expulsions, including those of Franklin, the P.R. Club, etc., the unseating of Max Bedacht at the New Jersey Convention, the total failure to distribute For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy to the branch and section leadership (let alone rank-and-file comrades for argument sake - though it is equally essential to get it into every comrade's hands), and finally the repeated blunders in the field of trade union struggle, have caused deep concern for me and other comrades who do a degree of independent thinking.

This does not mean that I can accept your premise and go over to your position. For a number of reasons: Firstly, in every publication of the expelled groups centered around your forces I do not see any analysis of the present leadership's position in regard to the situation today. Your literature persistently regards the personal leadership of Foster, Dennis, Stachel, Gates, etc., as the main evil, divorced from whether or not the position of the American CP is correct. Fundamentally, an analysis of the role of a CP must be based upon the general line of the Party and whether or not it is being carried out. This, thus far, is totally absent from the first issue of Turning Point.

Secondly there are a number of flagrant distortions and untruths recorded by you which certainly has to be considered by me or anyone else before he can make a judgment as to the validity of your position. In regard to your statement that the CPUSA "has substituted lawyers for mass pressure or organization" one cannot go along on this considering the mass pressure and organizational leadership given by the CPUSA in the struggle against the Mundt Bill which thus far, culminated in a success, no matter how temporary it is. In addition the CPUSA carried out broad organizational struggles around the Taft-Hartley Law, though not successfully.

Thirdly, Turning Point makes no mention why the FBI and State Dep't. has singled out the leadership of the Party for Deportations and imprisonment, and particularly the mass arrests last week of Foster, Dennis, Davis, Winston, Stachel,

Gil Green, Carl Winters, Gates, etc. Nor does Turning Point even protest against these arrests by the bourgeoisie. Simultaneously, it is significant that not a member of these expelled groups have been in any way molested by the FBI.

While I do not think that the CPUSA has rid itself of the bulk of Browderite refuse, nor that a Dennis is fully capable of such a task, I do believe that these problems will have to be worked out by the CPUSA itself considering the weakness and demagogic character of much of your material.

Knowing that a Communist would not even bother corresponding with expelled groups in general I have taken this liberty to write because I am disturbed by those events outlined in the first page of this letter. These are elements that have to be answered...but thus far you have failed to provide a sincere approach to the entire question. Under such circumstances I can only conclude that your expulsion was justified. However, if answers can be provided, if an honest program can be evaluated, if these things can be measured up in pure Communist standards then I would be very anxious to proceed with further communications, presenting my own analysis of trends as I see them.

I was at the State Convention two years ago when F. Franklin disturbed the calm and simplicity of the entire National body and feel that his expulsion may be the result of his challenging the smooth mechanism that was established by Foster and Dennis. However, I am not convinced that that is wholly so.

This letter should be published in Turning Point to open fundamental questions. Its absence would indicate an undesirable admission and would terminate any interests I and my associates would have in you.

Sincerely

M. C., Brooklyn

ANSWER TO LETTER FROM M.C., BROOKLYN

We print M.C.'s letter because we believe that in various ways, not all of them perhaps intended by the author, it mirrors the moods of uncertainty, frustration and unreasoning anger which are common among Party comrades today. These moods have been induced we think by the Party's consistent failure to carry out in practice the Marxist-Leninist theory which (for the most part) it preaches, and by the consequent disastrous retreats which have been suffered by every facet of the progressive movement.

M.C. lists a number of the leadership's serious blunders as the cause of her deep concern. Then, no doubt feeling guilty, since "a Communist would not even bother corresponding with expelled groups in general", and mentioning only one statement with which she disagrees, i.e. that the CPUSA "has substituted lawyers for mass pressure or organization" (We will return to this later.), she redeems her sense of Party loyalty by accusing us of "a number of flagrant distortions and untruths" without naming them, speaks of "the weakness and demagogic character of much of your material" without specification, concludes that we "have failed to provide a sincere approach to the entire question" (of the Party's shortcomings), without even suggesting the basis for her charge, and that "Under such (unnamed-Editors) circumstances I can only conclude that your expulsion was justified." Her demand that we print her letter or else...bears the authentic stamp of CPUSA bureaucracy

with its rejection of real collective work or democratic centralism.

Nevertheless we feel that H.C.'s letter contributes to our discussion, not only as a clinical study of rank-and-file jitters, but also by raising several pertinent issues of general interest which we will treat in order:-

(1) We agree that "Fundamentally an analysis of the role of a CP must be based upon the general line of the Party and whether or not it is being carried out." (our emphasis.-Editors) T.P. disagrees with the Party's "line" in that it fails to relate the immediate struggles of the workers to the fight for Socialism, thus denying any real perspective of Socialism and substituting economism. It seldom speaks of the Class Struggle (fighting words to the bourgeoisie), and never of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat. Nourished on this milk toast diet the Party's militancy first languished, then departed. Where the "line" is correct, (and we agree that with significant, emasculating lapses such as the above, it has been) that correct line is consistently disregarded in practice. We regard this flagrant and habitual violation of the unity of theory and practice as the principal (but by no means the only) devices, by which the CPUSA has revised Marxism-Leninism into social-democracy. In the Supplement to its July issue (Letter to Communist Information Bureau), T.P. deals at some length with this question, and we shall continue to harp on it.

(2) When T.P. said in its No. 1 issue that CPUSA "has substituted lawyers for mass pressure or organization" we made a general statement of an overwhelming trend away from the militant mass organizational actions such as the proudly-remembered unemployment demonstrations of the early 1930's, the mass meetings in defense of the Scottsboro defendants, etc. Now the Party contents itself with postcard campaigns to "influence" reactionary Congressmen, an occasional delegation to Washington, and for the rest fund-raising for the "legal" defense of those accused of being Communists. We agree that full advantage should be taken of legal technicalities when it can be done without denying Communist principles, but that is seldom possible when the crime alleged is believing in Communism. To rely chiefly on "legal" defense against laws and in courts contrived to defend the status quo is fantastic defeatism. All the lawyers can do is prove the defendants are not real Communists. Is that good?

If the CP displayed some vestigial signs of militancy in its fight against the Mundt Bill, so much the better, they were the exceptions that proved the rule, but at that they were no more than vestigial. Nor will it be lost on workers whose unions have been wrecked by "the repeated blunders in the trade union field" that the CP "vanguard" fights harder when its own chestnuts are in the fire than it has for those of its working class allies.

(3) Why is it, H.C. asks, if Foster, Dennis, et al are wrong and T.P. is right that they stand in the shadow of jail while TP's editors have not been arrested? An interesting question. It implies of course that the FBI is the best judge of just how dangerous ideas are to American capitalism; that Communists therefore can determine who are the correct exponents of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and practice simply by observing whom Mr. Hoover cracks down on first and hardest. In view of the virtual absence of theoretical literature and discussions in Party units in recent years, the use of this FBI substitute Marxist yardstick by the membership is scarcely surprising. It cannot however be considered entirely reliable for the following reasons:-

(a) In pragmatic America the dangerousness to the status quo of radical ideas is judged by the size of their following more than by their ideological content. The CPUSA allegedly has 70,000 members and some hundreds of thousands of sympathizers; whereas our groups of expellees are numerically negligible.

(b) The Communist Party moreover by virtue of its proud name is judged and feared for the accomplishments of its great namesake, the CPSU, rather than by its own. Police officers and Congressmen may not be able to evaluate ideologies but they have deep respect (if little affection) for the name Communist Party.

(c) Whoever red-baits to avoid being red-baited himself is a sucker who by his betrayal of his brothers unwittingly prepares his own fate. The SJ members in the Stock Exchange strike learned this the hard way. "We're anti-Communists", they pleaded to the officer. "I don't give a damn what kind of Communists you are", retorted the cop as he clubbed them into the Black Maria. The CP leadership made the same mistake when they drafted and supported the CIO red-baiting resolution at Atlantic City, when they supported the Marshall Plan at Boston and even stood and applauded the General, when they refused to affiliate to the CIB because as they said the capitalists would "seize upon such action as a pretext for provocations and repressions", to mention only a few instances. And now these CP leaders have got in effect the same answer that the cop gave the sailors.

To keep the record straight it should be stated that expelled Comrades have not been immune from persecution for their political views. Vern Smith has been convicted of contempt of the Tenney Committee and three members of the Building Trades Club of San Diego have been cited by the same committee. To say that the CP of Calif. has been given no support to these comrades is putting the matter mildly.

(4) TP believes that the Party makes an inexcusable subjective mistake when it refuses to help defend persons accused of radical views on the ground that it does not concur in their views. The high command of the drive to American fascism and war must be secretly delighted at the spectacle of a Communist Party unwilling to submerge its political differences on other matters in order to fight shoulder to shoulder with all those who seek to preserve the basic constitutional liberties of the American people. We think that H.C. is absolutely right in expecting TP (and any other individuals or groups who call themselves Communists or even Democrats for that matter) to join whole-heartedly in support of the arrested leaders of the CP. The fact that we consider these leaders renegades to the Communist movement in no way lessens our support since they are being persecuted on the ground that they are Communists. (H.C. however betrays again her compulsion to smear TP, no matter how baselessly. How otherwise can one explain her indignation that we failed to rally to the support of the victims of the mass arrests in TP No. 1, when as a matter of fact the arrests did not take place until two weeks after the publication of TP #1)

The FR Club organized the first meeting and defense committee for Eisler in NYC; defended the legality of the CPUSA and the civil rights of its leaders in the AVC fight over that question; organized the Woodward and Leftridge cases in the Bronx; organized the E. Bronx Anti-Discrimination Committee and later the first Bronx chapter of the Civil Rights Congress. In every case, the CPUSA leadership attempted to sabotage our efforts--while the CP rank-and-file supported us. In fact, in the case of an arrest, the CP rank-and-file packed the court and helped win our case. It is not that we have not helped the defense of Civil Rights of the CP leaders; it is the CPUSA leadership which has ordered the sabotage of our work--even for their defense.

LETTERS and DISCUSSION

Letter from M.S., Oakland, Calif.

Dear Friends:

July 21, 1948

Thanks for the July issue of "Turning Point". Basically, I am in full agreement with it. However, in citing the failures of the CP, as in sections VI and VII, I think it important to relate specific instances in detail; otherwise, the supporters of the status quo charge the critics with making general accusations which they do not back up with the facts.

I have heard it pointed out, in justification of the present CP program, that it has not been criticized by the C.P. of the Soviet Union nor by the other European parties since the Duclos letter. I should like to hear a good answer to this.

Sincerely,
M.S.

Reply to Letter from M.S., Oakland, Calif.

TURNING POINT No. 1 was of course our DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, -our aims, perspective and attitude. As a concise statement of our conclusions it properly made no attempt to submit in detail the evidence which has led us to these conclusions. Every issue of SPARK and FOR A NEW AFT has presented detailed documented charges of the bureaucracy and opportunism of CPUSA leadership; and we think that IS will agree that the omission which she notes in TP No. 1 was made good in the Supplement to No. 1 (Letter to Communist Information Bureau).

We do not pretend to know precisely why the Cominform or its affiliated Parties have failed to criticize the CPUSA and its record. We can however report certain facts. The only Parties which have been criticized or attacked to date by the Cominform or its affiliated Parties are Parties which exercise state power as in Yugoslavia and Poland, or which are preparing to assume state power as in Eastern Germany. Obviously the harmful possibilities of revisionist trends in such powerful and dominant Parties, strategically located on the borders of the Soviet Union, gives top priority to the fight against opportunism in those Parties.

Toward Communist Parties elsewhere the policy of the Cominform organ, FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLES' DEMOCRACY, appears for the time being to be to publish only such documents or reports (including self-criticism if any) as are submitted by the party in question, and to dispense with any extended editorial comment or analysis. The announced purpose of the Communist Information Bureau upon its formation was to correlate the work of its member Parties. It is not improbable in view of recent events in Yugoslavia, Poland, etc. that it still regards that as its task.

Then too there are other considerations. The main responsibility for the emergence of a bona fide CP in this country rests upon American Communists. as SPARK and FOR A NEW AFT have repeatedly pointed out a blast against CPUSA from the Cominform at this time could only confuse American Communists without helping to solve their problems. The Duclos letter failed to dislodge the opportunist and bureaucratic leadership (except for Browder and his immediate entourage-somebody had to be the

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goat) because there was no organized anti-opportunist movement inside the Party to challenge their return to power. Frightened but unrepentant after this experience they moved quickly to take even tighter top-level control, to stifle criticism, and to illegally expel all members who dissented from their flagrant opportunism. Thus by the time of the recent Convention it was apparent that only by combining forces with expelled comrades could the anti-opportunist rank-and-file, constantly deprived of the help of such of their number as dare to express their doubts, much less make a stand, succeed in breaking the stranglehold of the faithless National Committee and restoring the Party apparatus, property and newspaper to the membership.

But the expelled movement is itself divided and in the painful process of eliminating wrong trends and phonies through open polemic, and exposure, -a process which it is TP's purpose to stimulate and accelerate. Once this is accomplished, once the main body of expelled and other former Communists who are sincerely striving for a bona fide Marxist-Leninist Party have reached ideological unity and have established a national center, they will be able to give more effective organizational assistance to the now amorphous and constantly beheaded anti-opportunist movement inside the CPUSA.

We hope this stage can be reached very soon, for the American movement is dangerously behind schedule. But in our view, then and not until then could "another Duclos Letter" or Cominform blast contribute effectively to the establishment of a real Communist Party, Marxist-Leninist in its actions as well as in its declarations, in place of the social-democratic party in Communist nomenclature which the renegade leadership has superimposed on the CPUSA. Once such a correct "expelled" center is established and makes contact with the anti-opportunist rank-and-file in CPUSA, criticism from abroad instead of leaving the membership confused and frustrated, will present it with an alternative, an ally, and a place to go. The opportunist leadership by the same token will have no viable alternative. It will then have to take its orders from the world Communist movement or be prepared to go out and make an unaccustomed living at honest work. We do not know of course that the Cominform Parties agree with this analysis; we can only say that their action in withholding criticism at this time would be correct on the basis of such an analysis.

We are rather intrigued by the audacity of the CP hacks in attempting to bolster their consistently opportunist record with such a specious argument. TURNING POINT which bases its principles and program squarely on the Cominform Declaration has been called presumptuous for calling the attention of the C.I.B. to certain errors of fact and interpretation in a signed "book review" which appeared in FOR A LASTING PEACE, FOR A PEOPLES' DEMOCRACY. What then can we say of the apologists for the CPUSA top leadership. That leadership refused to take advantage of the opportunity offered by the Duclos letter to put its house in order, it rebuffed the invitation to join the C.I.B., it sabotaged the C.I.B.'s fight against the Marshall Plan in the trade unions and again in the national elections, (see our Letter to the Communist Information Bureau), and has refused to distribute the Cominform newspaper. Yet now it has the monstrous effrontery to offer as proof of the rightness of its opportunist course the fact that the Cominform Parties, having experienced the repeated refusal of CPUSA to accept their criticism or advice, now offer none.

Available on request: September issue, "The Crisis in Harrison George & Co."
November issue, "Analysis of the Elections; The Future of the Progressive Party".