Documents 3 to 17 and 19 to 24 originally published in Internal Bulletins of the SWP and the International Bulletins of the International Committee
Dear Jim:
I was glad to get your letter of June 4 and the enclosed material. After a long time without more than a general notion of what was going on at your end, I have in recent weeks had a veritable flood of bulletins, resolutions, minutes, etc. I am only just emerging from it. Meanwhile I have had to have prolonged conversations with Burns and others. Since my free time is considerably restricted and my eyes have been troubling me a bit lately, I have only been able to work haphazardly on a reply to your letter, really only on notes, that I started over a week ago and am now trying to knock into shape.
As you indicated, there could be no doubt about my agreeing to your proposition. I assume, therefore, that you were not waiting anxiously for confirmation from me. It is necessary, however, to clear up a few matters and to get a good, thorough mutual understanding.
The material you enclosed was very interesting all around and revealed to me more than ever that on all kinds of subjects our thoughts were running in the same or similar channels. There are some questions on which I have a somewhat different opinion from yours, but these are minor to my mind.
I have also seen the main political resolution of the Plenum and can vote for it with both hands. It was sorely needed at this stage internationally.
As I proceed, I shall try to make clear my own particular views.
Plenum Results
Everybody on this side too heaved a great sigh of relief at the outcome. I personally think that the peace, even if it turns out to be only a prolonged armed truce of the kind which this instable world of today has come generally to accept as a substitute, is a very good thing. The swift pace of objective developments nowadays is a great help in correcting erroneous views, for one thing. In a calmer atmosphere of discussion this could possibly serve to mend the fissure which has appeared in our ranks. In any case, there is a considerable time lag in understanding the issues between the place where the dispute arises and other places. A slower tempo will therefore aid in crystallizing a firm international opinion. Moreover, there are a good many questions which have only been posed in the discussion (particularly on the recent developments since Stalin's death) and on which everyone needs self-clarification.
Meanwhile I ought to inform you about the reactions of others at the first news of the Plenum settlement.
Here in London, while there was relief and approval, there was a certain amount of skepticism. The outbreak of hostilities came suddenly for most people, and just as they began to sort out what was what and who was who, the reestablishment of the peace came just as suddenly. One view expressed is: perhaps the differences were not so serious as contended. Another view: perhaps the peace is not as real as it appears. It will take some time before the proper perspective on the struggle will be in focus. The resolution on the 'Internal Situation' has just come in. No doubt it will help in this respect.
Most people are studying the bulletins very carefully, nevertheless, although there are very few who have been able to get beyond those dealing with the New York discussion up to now. (This will give you an idea of the time lag.)
Burns showed me a letter from Paris in which Jerome jubilantly expresses the following opinion more or less: The peace settlement is due to Jim's wisdom, to the great ideological cohesion of the minority, to the Paris intervention which those at whom it was directed could not fail to understand, and also to Burns' group's resolution which acted in the same sense (presumably as the Paris intervention). He writes that it was a great victory for the SWP and for the international movement, which it was of course. Since I am not acquainted with the contents of the intervention, however, I cannot presume to understand this reaction altogether. You will probably be in a better position to.
Your Conclusions from the Experience
You underscore that the factional struggle was instigated in Paris and that a new flare-up is impossible unless it springs from the same source. Elsewhere you repeatedly refer to the 'conspiracy against the SWP leadership.' It is necessary to be very cleat on how this is meant.
If you conceive of the whole thing as a plot hatched by evil people for unclear motives, then I must say you are putting it on rather thick. There is no doubt about what you refer to as 'Cominternism' in organizational procedure, the long standing unrealistic concept of super-centralization and all the foibles that have gone with it. But I think we have always asked ourselves in similar circumstances: what are the politics behind the organizational procedures? It is necessary to do so in this case as well.
The factional struggle in the SWP was certainly instigated in Paris if you mean by this that the political fountain head was there I think this should be clear to all by now. When Frankel says that the 'new thinking' is not going on in New York alone, that is a pretty broad hint. (By the way, of all that has been written up to now on the opposition's side, Frankel's contribution appears to have been the most impressive, the only thing effective, among people here, and should be taken up in the coming literary discussion.)
In my opinion the 'new thinking' is not by any means finished, but is developing. In the sense that further developments in political line may cause another flare-up of the struggle, what you say about the future is quite true.
The root is political, and I shall try to explain my view of the politics when I come to the point on the Third Congress documents. Now the question is, how does this tie up with the organizational procedures! As I see it, here is the picture.
What Happened in Paris?
The essence of the 'new thinking' is that the objective situation has developed along lines unforeseen by our movement, by our theory of Stalinism. It was anticipated hypothetically -- not as a genuine possibility -- in some of Trotsky's writings. But Trotsky was a genius, whereas the cadres he left behind are not. The movement has to be rearmed, but the old cadres are putting up a conservative, 'sectarian' resistance. Hence arises the need to reorganize the cadre everywhere, to lop off the deadwood, to shape and mold the cadre anew.
That, put in the most objective terms (there is no need here to go into the fallacy of all this), is how the problem very likely appeared in Paris after the Congress. What followed concretely between say Jerome and Livingstone, was a tacit understanding, a sort of 'entente.' There was broad agreement, but not necessarily any specific commitments. L. must have made up his mind that he would open up a fight in the SWP at that time and perhaps told J. that. The latter may have advised caution and probably explained that in any case, in view of his position, he would have to retain a certain impartiality, as the struggle unfolded. Aid from him could therefore only come in the form of developing the political line. That, too, may requite concessions of a secondary nature to the conservative resistance, as was the case with the main Congress documents -- he may have continued to explain -- but nothing essential would be 'given away.' As to direct organizational support, time would show if and when that would become practical.
You can interpret that as duplicity, as a conspiracy, or what you will, but it is evidently politically motivated and that must be borne in mind all the time, as the key to an understanding of the struggle. Knowing the men involved intimately, and having observed their way of thinking and acting, I would say it is not a matter of bad faith f producing bad politics, but of bad politics rationalizing what appears to be bad faith.
Burns' Opinion
I dent know what Burns can tell you specifically about the facts regarding what you call the 'conspiracy.' I have transmitted your request to him and know that he has sent you a first reply; meanwhile he is trying to reconstruct incidents in his memory. But he is sure of his overall impression that there was collaboration from the beginning, correspondence and so on.
In any case, he says, Gabe's last letter (among the material you enclosed) is striking not so much for evasion or dissimulation as it is in revealing what his position has been. I think he has a point there.
The Third World Congress
You write that you were 'surprised and disappointed' at my 'impulsive action' in regard to the Third World Congress documents. I presume that by 'action' you mean my last conversation with Manuel and the message I asked him to convey. I am sorry to hear that you were disappointed, and puzzled at your surprise. But I assure you it was not impulsive, but deliberate.
I had expressed reservations on these documents from the first and this was fairly well known in the leadership. If I am not mistaken it was even recorded in the minutes, I had early expressed the opinion to members of the present majority that it seemed to me Clarke's interpretation of the documents was the interpretation meant by the authors. After the correctives introduced by the X Plenum, I agreed that I might possibly be mistaken. I thought it could not hurt to wait and see, and meanwhile assume that it was a matter of the line straightening itself out, so to speak, I acted everywhere on that assumption.
From observation in various places, in the ensuing months, it became plain to me that Clarke was not the only one to have such an interpretation, but that it was fairly wide-spread among people who had nothing but the documents too by. After the November plenum I became convinced that the line in Paris was not only not straightening itself, but on the contrary. It was shaping up more and more according to Clarke's concept of it. I dropped Bob a few lines in that sense. It became urgent, in my opinion, to counteract this trend and, above all, to alert the majority that if they expected political solidarity from Paris in the fight, they were due for great disappointment.
The Barr-Short-Herrick letter arrived. Taking that into consideration as well as Manuel's views in a number of conversations, I asked him to convey to you my full opinion, and told him he could convey it to Jerome as well. I suppose this last part is what you consider impulsive. That was deliberate on my part and meant to get Jerome to show his hand.
I think it served the purpose. His reaction was a letter to you (in reply to the Barr etc. letter, I believe) which was a giveaway. Burns showed me~a copy at the time, saying he thought it was a 'mistake.' It started him thinking, however. For all I know, it had the same effect at your end.
What are you disappointed about? What is the argument? Was there a question of discipline involved? I am not aware of any, unless discipline applies retrospectively, so to speak.
Perhaps there is some further misunderstanding as to what my action consisted of. In that case I had better clear it up. I did not propose to reject the documents, or to ask you to reject them. Here is what I had in mind.
There had been a good deal of uncritical 'hoopla,' to borrow one of Frankel's expressions, about these documents that was part and parcel of the developing 'Cominternism,' in my opinion. I thought it necessary to begin a re-examination of what was written and to speak up critically. It was becoming self-evident that you could not go on very long talking about two different lines and upholding one and the same text as a basis. A new clarifying statement of position was becoming urgent.
For my part, it was not a matter of reading fine print for of granting special rights to priest-interpreters, by implication or otherwise but of facing reality. There were obviously contradictory elements in the documents on the basis of a general agreement on the new relationship of class forces in the world and on the broader, long-term perspectives. These contradictory elements were so weighted or slanted that I could not -- and believed that the SWP could not -- continue to support the documents without further elucidation. Let me point out how I viewed this, as briefly as possible.
How the Documents are Slanted
1. While stress is correctly laid on the new element in the relationship of forces, which has become irreversibly favourable for the working class and socialism, this is given a slant so as to make it appear that the process is from now on more or less automatic, will not face any major obstacles or delays. (It is partly from this conception that the notion is fed about Stalinism being no longer able to betray. I leave aside for the moment the question as to how this ties up with the idea that we are in for an epoch of deformed revolutions, with which one of the authors was preoccupied in previous discussion, whether this represents a reversal.)
2. Due weight is given to the new fact of Stalinist leadership being forced in the post-war period to head revolutionary mass movements which tend to get out of hand (mainly in Asia, that is, by adapting to the colonial revolution). The overwhelmingly counter-revolutionary role of the Stalinist parties in the capitalist countries (particularly in Western Europe), still quite recent, is barely given a place in the balance-sheet. (This one-sided presentation further feeds wrong notions about Stalinism.)
3. Correcting a previous misconception, the drive toward war (and its character of international civil war, war-revolution) is put forth in fresh and incisive fashion. But there is a tendency to go overboard here, too, to lay major stress on the time-table attributed to imperialism, to allow for no serious hitches, (This is continued in subsequent writings and is in contradiction to the concept of huge masses entering the political arena which in itself could -- with events of recent months, obviously does -- put a brake on the war drive.)
4. 'Growing homogeneity in each of the two camps' is set forth as the perspective, although the crisis in both capitalism and Stalinism is dealt with at length in the abstract. The unity of the capitalist camp is overstressed altogether. The unity of the capitalist camp is overstressed altogether. The dynamics in the anti-capitalist camp is not given much attention. (On this last point, the latest documents dealing with the USSR are an effort to make up for this.)
5. From all the foregoing the conclusion is drawn that a large-scale 'deal' (that is, an accommodation of the Stalinist bureaucracy to imperialism) is virtually excluded, although there is mention of possible partial, temporary, incidental agreements. (This further feeds the notion that Stalinism can no longer betray.)
6. The basic counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism is set forth correctly in the abstract, but in the concrete the revolutionary qualities of the Stalinist cadre is given undue and altogether incorrect emphasis. (A mountain is made out of a mole-hill and the illustration of how this works out in practice was given by the minority in the SWP.)
7. As a result there has been a serious misjudgment of the trend in Stalinist policy, particularly after the XIX Congress of the Russian CP -- the latest aspect being the virtual ignoring of the recent 'peace' maneuvers.
8. This whole line of reasoning also affects the otherwise quite correct estimate of the effect of Stalin's death: Insofar as it sees the elimination of the restorationist danger on part of the bureaucracy at a time when, in my opinion, it arises more concretely than ever before with the weakening of the bureaucracy on the threshold of the showdown with imperialism. All past experience has been that an obsolescent social force, before disappearing from the historical scene, makes common cause with all that is outlived and reactionary in the final showdown. If this does not hold true of Stalinism, then we are in for a serious revision of theory in one respect or another.
To sum up: the slant given in the Third Congress documents is too one-sided, too pat and formal in its logic, in reality too superficial to serve as a correct estimate of the objective situation and in outlining perspectives with regard to Stalinism (although the document did introduce important modifications that were very valuable). In this sense it lends itself to misinterpretation in the direction of revising our basic theory of Stalinism and makes for faulty analysis of new events which can disorient our movement.
That is the way I see the problem in brief. I could go into great detail, with chapter and verse, but obviously this is not the place. The question is what to do about it?
In my opinion, it is not a matter of withdrawing support from a general line, but of explaining what we understand by it. This has largely been done in the discussion. It further requires encouraging a critical attitude to the documents. They are not a finished analysis, but an important contribution which must be made more precise. Meantime, if there is to be no open conflict with Paris politically, it is necessary to find a formula for an understanding on current operation of the line.
On this last point, I would be perfectly satisfied with your Plenum resolution as a basis. Could such agreement be found? That is really the key question as to whether a resumption of the factional struggle will be 'instigated by Paris.' For the formalism and one-sidedness of their politics is merely reflected in the super-centralization and lack of realism of their organizational procedures.
I agree with you that our attitude to Stalinism 'can become terribly complicated and clouded if the slightest suspicion of hidden motives and double meanings enters into consideration of the question and the interpretation of documents.' I am only too well aware of the danger. At the same time I think that the greatest danger is an ambiguous political line in this respect. You have your resolution on 'American Stalinism' and that is excellent. Unfortunately, however, Stalinism is not just an American problem, if I may permit myself an understatement.
These are my views on this whole question. I don't know if this will please you, but I am sure you should know them.
For my part, I don't see any obstacle to coordinating myself with you.
Majority Faction
In view of the present circumstances, your decision is fully justified. As far as I am concerned, I am quite willing to work with you on the basis you propose, but want to stress to you the need of the fullest possible consultation before any important move is undertaken.
Burns
Burns has declared his complete political support of the Majority, and has stated to his committee that he will act in this sense in Paris. While the committee as a whole has not yet taken a position, there are a few who share his stand and most of the others want time to go over discussion material. For some time to come, therefore, his will be a delicate situation, although there has not been an opposition to the stand he has taken and none is expected. I am sure you will take this into consideration in any steps you contemplate.
I have shown him all the material you sent. In this connection I ought to tell about his reaction to your caucus speech. He appreciates the SWP cadre as perhaps no one else on this side does, because he really knows from hard experience what building a cadre means. Whatever his shortcomings, he has done most toward that end here. It is a group far superior to anything they have had here in the past. He therefore winced when he came to the part where you make comparisons and remarks that in this respect you were thinking in terms of ten to fifteen years ago.
I think there is a good deal in what he says, and it would be well to bear it in mind. His group has got to be regarded as a partner, and there will be other partners as well, I am sure. And the problem of relations with them will have to be given some thought.
Problems Raised
You write that in case of any overt act against you, you will undertake an international roll call. How do you envisage that? It is rather sticky question, as they say here.
In my opinion Jerome will be very cautious about any 'intervention' now. The danger is that he may just throw in the towel, as he has threatened to do a number of times in the past when he was under similar pressure. That could create all sorts of problems.
The best thing would be to try to find some modus vivendi with him for the time being, and to work out a long-term solution carefully and by close consultation.
Fraternally
Tom
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