

DRAFT

Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist
Faction on the Internal Struggle in the Liga Socialista

Last September an internal struggle broke out in the Liga Socialista between members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction. The dispute soon resulted in the formation of two factions, the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista (Bolshevik Leninist Faction) and the Tendencia Militante (Militant Tendency). The latter gained a formal majority at the Second Congress of the Liga Socialista held in December 1975.

The sharpness of the struggle can be judged from the fact that the FBL felt that it had no alternative but to become a public faction, while the TM has admitted publicly (in an article by Ricardo Ramos) that some of its members "have drawn violent conclusions, which we are trying to restrain." As proof of the inclination of the Tendencia Militante to resort to violence, on January 23, about a week after the appearance of the article by Ricardo, members of the FBL who were distributing Trotskyist literature at an election rally were physically attacked by a squad of members of the TM.

Nevertheless, as can be seen from the accompanying fact sheet, no clear differences of political importance emerged in the internal struggle in the Liga Socialista up to and including the Second Congress. The Tendencia Militante did not submit a single political document to justify either its formation as a distinct grouping or its fight to gain a majority. It functioned as an unprincipled organizational clique in a power struggle.

In place of a political differentiation, the clique substituted a simplistic sociological characterization. Thus it dubbed the Fracción as a "petty-bourgeois" grouping that had to be "reeducated" by being sent into the factories. But an unprincipled organizational clique is certainly not proletarian in character; it is petty-bourgeois. Consequently the pedagogical prescription ought to be applied first to the Tendencia Militante.

The clique gained a majority at the September 1975 plenum of the Central Committee by taking advantage of an error committed by two members of the Political Committee. These two members had run across material that led them to think that Ricardo had connections with the police, although they recognized that the material might have been planted. They talked with several other members of the Political Committee and one member of the Control Commission about how best to handle the matter. One of these other members of the Political Committee began at once to circulate the rumor that Ricardo was being slandered.

At the plenum, Ricardo and his backers utilized the mishandling of the case to whip emotions to a high pitch. In this charged atmosphere and on this issue, they won a majority of votes. Besides exploiting the way the question of possible police connections was brought up with individual members of the Political Committee and Control Commission instead of these bodies as a whole, Ricardo and his backers raised other organizational matters that normally would never have led to the formation of tendencies, still less factions.

Following the plenum of the Central Committee, the new majority did not confine its course to trying to rectify the mishandling

of the Ricardo case. A discreet investigation was what was actually required, since at bottom the affair may really have involved a police provocation intended to sow suspicions and to create dissension in the Liga Socialista.

Instead of carrying out a responsible investigation of the kind indicated, Ricardo and his backers acted in the opposite way. They utilized the case to arouse hysteria, to stir up bitter feelings and recriminations, thus setting off such turmoil in the organization as to destroy the possibility of a reasoned discussion on any question.

The congress that had been convoked was held under such circumstances as to catch the ranks utterly unprepared for what happened. For instance, on the political resolution adopted unanimously by the Central Committee in September, the new majority, with no warning, gave a report against the line of the resolution. No documentation was offered in support of this oral presentation. In the very course of the congress, organizational questions, including surprise changes in the statutes, were introduced in such a way as to supersede discussion of political issues. Even consideration of the Portuguese revolution was pushed off the agenda. The way the majority blocked discussion of the Portuguese revolution demonstrated their fear of letting the delegates discuss and vote on political questions.

Thus the nature of the congress was changed while it was being held. From a normal congress of the Liga Socialista it became a hysterical show dominated by an unprincipled organizational clique.

The objectives of the clique became crystal clear in the course of their operation. Their objectives were to entrench the new majority through measures designed to isolate the former leadership, drive it out of the Liga Socialista, and deprive the ranks of the organization as a whole of ways and means to change the new leadership. The rules put into force by the majority gagged dissent, made it virtually impossible to organize tendencies, decapitated the leadership of the minority, and assured the leaders of the clique self-perpetuating domination of the Liga Socialista.

The lengths to which the clique went were shown among other things by two actions. One was the decision to purge the membership of the Liga Socialista. All members were suspended for a month and could be readmitted to the organization only after passing tests to be determined by the clique. The other was the decision to break off all relations with a sister organization of the Fourth International (in this case the Socialist Workers party which, as is known, is barred from actual membership in the Fourth International because of reactionary legislation in the United States).

Like the leaders of the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista, an unnamed SWP leader was accused of spreading rumors that Ricardo was a police agent. The clique demanded that the SWP carry out a witch-hunt of its leadership modeled on the methods they were introducing in the Liga Socialista. When it became clear that the SWP would instead condemn their methods as alien to Leninist norms they broke relations.

Publicly, the reasons for the rupture with the SWP remain undisclosed. The Ricardo clique hinted at something very dark,

saying in their newspaper account of the congress that "it is an affair that we will not ventilate publicly, since it is an internal problem that can only be discussed within the Fourth International. In this way the SWP was smeared publicly, while the truth was covered up.

The actions taken by the Tendencia Militante under the leadership of Ricardo flagrantly violated the platform of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, which includes among other things upholding the organizational principles of Trotskyism. Consequently the Steering Committee expels Ricardo from the ranks of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction.

Special note must be made of the role played by Greco and Eduardo in the internal struggle in the Liga Socialista. Both of them are members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (Socialist Workers party of Argentina). Sent to Mexico by the PST, ostensibly to help the Liga Socialista, both of them supported the worst excesses of the clique headed by Ricardo, and even called for more. Without their assistance it is hardly likely that the Ricardo clique could have gained a majority.

We want to stress the fact that Greco and Eduardo were not sent to Mexico by the LTF. At no time did they act as representatives of the LTF, although they were members of it. Responsibility for their conduct and actions lies wholly with the leadership of the PST.

As in the case of Ricardo, the Steering Committee expels Greco and Eduardo for violating the platform of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, specifically for violating the organizational principles of Trotskyism.

The Steering Committee considers the outcome of the struggle within the Liga Socialista to be a grave setback for that organization. It also represents a setback for the Leninist Trotskyist Faction and for the world Trotskyist movement as a whole. We also believe, however, that the setback will prove to be temporary. The indicated course of action is to seek to bring out the underlying political differences so that the ranks of the world Trotskyist movement can decide in an objective way on the merits of the dispute.

The Fracción Bolchevique Leninista has shown its understanding of this requisite. This was proven by its resistance to the disruptive course of the Ricardo clique and by its insistence that the clique disclose the political views associated with its organizational course.

These views may soon receive public expression. By way of anticipation, the first issue (January 16-31) of Ricardo's version of El Socialista, published an electoral platform that they signed in common with the Mexican Communist party and the Movimiento de Organización Socialista (Socialist Organization Movement). Among other features, the platform recognizes the Mexican Stalinists and the petty-bourgeois MOS as organizations that "do not hide their socialist objectives, nor their revolutionary method to gain them." Thus Mexican Stalinism is provided with a Trotskyist cover.

In addition, the common electoral platform supports "peaceful coexistence," that is, class collaborationism.

As for the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista, such errors as it made in this struggle resulted from lack of experience. This was the first time these comrades had found themselves in such a

situation. They are to be commended for standing up and fighting to the best of their ability for the norms and practices of Leninism. From the firmness they displayed in this test, we can count on them continuing in the same principled way. In our opinion, they represent the Leninist continuity of the Liga Socialista.

The Leninist Trotskyist Faction rejects the public demand made by leaders of the GCI, PST and Tendencia Militante that the comrades of the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista be expelled from the Fourth International. We are opposed to the expulsion from the Fourth International of any of the groups involved. This would precipitate a split in the Fourth International as a whole. What is called for is sharp condemnation of the methods of the Ricardo clique as alien to the traditions of Trotskyism, and a clarification of the political differences, in order to facilitate the earliest possible unification, on a principled basis, of the forces of Trotskyism in Mexico.

TRANSLATION

FACT SHEET ON THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN THE LIGA SOCIALISTA

In October 1972 a group of twenty-four comrades split from the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (GCI), a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International in Mexico, and constituted themselves as the Juventud Marxista Revolucionaria (JMR). When the question of splitting was debated, some of the leading comrades were not very decided, but Comrade Ricardo pressed vigorously for the course of splitting, taking an intransigent attitude in this respect. To put across the split, Ricardo even resorted to incidental organizational arguments.

The split was unjustified politically. Some political differences had arisen--such as the ultraleft coloration of the propaganda and actions of the GCI, the degree of repression that could be expected regularly from the government, and the importance of the "democratic opening"--but none of these differences had unfolded. A split was not at all justified.

In addition, although there was a problem of delays, it was perfectly possible to hold a political discussion within the GCI.

In June 1973, the JMR sought an immediate and unconditional reunification with the GCI. This change in policy corresponded with the fact that the members of the JMR had come to understand the error they had committed in splitting and wished to correct it.

However, the GCI did not accept our proposal at the time. The reason for its refusal was that its ranks were sharply divided over whether to reunify with the JMR.

In 1973 unification did not represent any problem to the JMR because it had not yet developed into an organization with its own characteristics. Because of the refusal of the GCI to unite the two groups, the JMR had to continue as a separate organization. After some success recruiting, the JMR became a well-defined and well-organized grouping. Thus upon holding its first congress in December 1973, the JMR transformed itself into the Liga Socialista.

The Liga Socialista still considered that the split had been a political error, but by this time it had become completely formed as a political organization distinct from the GCI and there were a growing number of political differences between the two organizations. Consequently on February 17, 1975, the Political Committee felt that it was necessary to bring its policy on unification into correspondence with the new situation.

The change in policy on unification was necessary, in addition, in view of the fact that the GCI finally changed

its attitude on the question in 1975. The internal differences that had existed within the GCI were resolved when the comrades who favored unification won a majority at a national congress.

After the congress, the GCI insisted on unification, and as rapidly as possible. They held that a sufficient basis for unification was to be found in the Transitional Program and the other programmatic positions of the Fourth International.

A little later, the comrades in the GCI who had opposed unification with the LS split and formed a group around the newspaper Rojo. The main cause of this split was the new position of the GCI on unifying with the LS.

The Liga Socialista now held that unification ought to be worked out as a process that included political discussions on Mexico and the accompanying tasks of revolutionists, plus working jointly in concrete projects that would show how the two organizations functioned together.

Any other course would have been irresponsible, since it would mean not trying to guarantee a genuine unification on the basis of program and principles. Thus a sharp maneuver could be pulled against the comrades of the GCI by taking advantage of their hopes for a rapid unification. In that case the objective would be a unification at full speed, setting aside political agreement and capacity for common work, the real basis being skill in inveigling and maneuvering the leaders of the GCI, who were considered not to have much political ability, perhaps picking up a few members and splitting once again.

Comrade Ricardo tried to sell this idea to the members of the Political Committee, trying to convince them to give up the concept of a serious unification as the outcome of a political process.

In the formal meetings, this concept of a sharp maneuver was voiced in proposals for a rapid unification with the GCI. Comrade Ricardo was in a small minority on this question (only one comrade supported him), but he was absolutely intransigent in his view.

At that time, the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST) of Argentina became quite interested in the Liga Socialista. On various occasions the leaders of the PST spoke of their desire to help construct the Mexican party. Needless to say, the Liga Socialista was ready, as always, to accept all the aid that sections of the international could give, especially those endowed with a long tradition and experience.

As an example of this, we sent four comrades to work with the PST in Argentina. The leadership of the PST was unable to convince the first two, who were leaders of the Liga Socialista, of the correctness of either their positions or their methods, although they tried to. On the side of the Liga Socialista, collaboration with the PST was always loyal and fraternal.

We argued, nevertheless, with the Argentine comrades over the form in which this aid could prove most fruitful for our young organization. Here some differences arose over the degree and form that collaboration with the PST ought to take.

Within the Liga Socialista, we also ran into some difficulties in maintaining loyal and fraternal collaboration with the PST, since within the leadership Comrade Ricardo on various occasions adopted an intransigent anti-PST attitude. Several times we had to prevent Ricardo from slandering the PST before the ranks of the Liga Socialista. In fact, he reached the point of maintaining that we must break relations with the PST.

In reality, what the PST did was to intervene in the internal affairs of the Liga Socialista. This was unacceptable to us and we never gave a millimeter on this question, holding to our concept that the leadership of the Trotskyist party in Mexico had to be formed by national cadres, by a national leadership team able to resolve the problems of constructing a mass revolutionary party. The only aid acceptable to us was that designed to help in the construction of cadres and a national leadership team, never aid that would block this process.

However, the PST decided that it had to intervene in one way or another in the internal life of our party. It resorted to working under the surface, behind the back of the leadership of the Liga Socialista, among a nucleus of comrades who sympathized with its methods.

At the August 1975 meeting of the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, in a closed session, Comrade Moreno took up a series of problems that had arisen in various countries with cadres of his party. Among the countries he dealt with was Mexico. Comrade Moreno said, quite correctly, that what had happened in these countries were errors that had been committed by some cadres of the PST and that they must not ever be repeated.

At the same time as the August meeting of the LTF was being held, a comrade from the PST arrived in Mexico, Comrade Greco. His purpose was to sell Revista de America in this country. However, since sales of the magazine were slow, he dedicated his free time to talking with rank-and-file comrades of the Liga Socialista on a whole series of organizational problems faced by the party.

Up to the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee of the Liga Socialista, which was held September 14-15, 1975, the only difference that had arisen in an open way was the one over unification with the GCL.

The Sixth Plenum began with a closed session. Two members of the Political Committee had run across material indicating that Comrade Ricardo was an agent of the police. These comrades thought from the beginning that there were two possibilities: either the material was accurate, or it involved a police provocation.

Because of lack of experience and knowledge on how to handle such a case, the comrades decided to ask the opinion of three other comrades on the Political Committee and one member of the Control Commission on the alternative that was posed by the material and what to do.

They did this in place of the correct procedure, which would have been to immediately transmit any suspicion or information they had to the party's Control Commission.

One of the members of the Political Committee with whom they consulted, Comrade Nava, told Ricardo and other members of the Central Committee, as well as Comrade Greco of the PST, about the suspicions. In this way, Comrade Nava undertook to circulate the rumor among members of the Central Committee, and even outside the party, that Ricardo was being slandered.

None of the comrades who followed the wrong procedure with regard to Ricardo have filed or submitted any charges against Ricardo.

The majority bloc of the Central Committee was formed on the basis of the error committed by the comrades of the Political Committee in handling the problem that arose around Ricardo. (These comrades later became the leaders of the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista (FBL). Nava developed into one of the leaders of what was later to become the Tendencia Militante (TM).)

This turn of affairs was utilized by the Argentine PST, which undertook to provide the bloc with positions, at first merely organizational in nature. By itself, the bloc did not have the capacity to advance any consistent alternative to the tradition, program, organizational methods, and political line of the leadership that built the Liga Socialista.

The Sixth Plenum had been convoked to discuss the proposal of the Political Committee to call a second congress, open a period of discussion, work out an agenda for the congress, and approve the general line of the reports and documents that the Central Committee would present for discussion. Greco attended the open sessions of the Sixth Plenum. He was the only international guest.

At the first meeting of the Sixth Plenum, an organizational counterreport was given. This, naturally, was a surprise.

In the whole discussion held by the Central Committee only one fact became clear: the newly formed majority wanted to eliminate the organization's branch structure and substitute for it a structure of "fronts" similar to that of cells.

The Liga Socialista had begun to function on a branch basis that same year (1975) and one of the objectives of the Sixth Plenum was to correct some errors that had been committed during the first months of this way of functioning.

In addition to the "fronts," the comrades posed only the necessity of being "more active."

On the basis of these differences, the majority of the Central Committee took the following actions at the same meeting of the Sixth Plenum:

1. The Second Congress of the Liga Socialista was convoked and the discussion period was opened (the majority had not yet presented any document explaining its new organizational position).

2. The entire structure of the party was immediately changed, the members of the branches being redistributed in the new "fronts."

3. The Political Committee was changed "to give a majority" to those who had argued for the proposed "fronts."

4. The organizational secretary was changed. Formerly the task had been shouldered by Comrade Horacio. He was replaced by Ricardo.

Immediately after this, a process was opened that aimed at destroying the minority, without a single political or organizational difference that warranted a sharp division in the party.

The new Political Committee adopted the following measures:

1. In the meeting of September 19 it was decided that the bodies in which the ranks were assembled did not have the right to elect their leaderships. It was proposed, for the time being, that anyone who wanted to could enter the leaderships of the "fronts." The criterion was also laid down that the Political Committee could send persons to function as leaders of "fronts" without the need to be elected or even ratified on a local basis. Those sent by the Political Committee had to be automatically incorporated in the leadership of the "fronts." In addition, the Political Committee had the right to ratify or rectify members elected by the "fronts" as their leadership.

2. On September 27 the decision of a majority of the Central Committee to immediately launch the construction of a youth organization was put into practice. In the meeting of "leaderships of fronts" held to implement this policy, some comrades tried to voice their disagreement, dissent, or doubts. They were told that they had no right to question or discuss something that had already been decided by the Central Committee or Political Committee, and that they had no alternative but to submit to discipline and immediately put into practice what they had been told.

3. On October 23, the majority of the Political Committee presented for the first time a political difference. This difference was at the same time a surprise for the members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction.

A comrade of the LTF presented a report on Portugal to the Political Committee. Comrade Greco, a member of the Argentine PST, asked for time to present a counterreport. This was the first time, as members of both the Liga Socialista and the LTF, that we learned that the leadership of the PST was not in agreement with the position expressed in the document "Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution" adopted in August 1975 by the Steering Committee of the LTF.

At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee, Portugal had been discussed, a point on which Greco had participated along the lines taken by Moreno at the August meeting of the Steering Committee of the LTF. At the Central Committee it was not possible to discern any important difference, and the vote on the line on Portugal was unanimous.

It was after the meeting of the Political Committee that took up Portugal that we decided to inform the LTF of what was happening in Mexico, since it was perfectly clear that what was at issue was not an internal problem of the Liga Socialista, but a problem that affected the LTF and the entire international.

4. On October 30, the majority of the Political Committee removed the editor of El Socialista for not being able to work for a month and a half because of sickness and not having officially advised the Political Committee of this fact.

5. On November 13, after a meeting of the members of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction in Mexico which was called to discuss Portugal and which was attended by two members of the Coordinating Committee of the LTF, the majority of the Political Committee voted to change the two members of Liga Socialista on the International Executive Committee because they did not support the position of the majority of the Political Committee on this question.

6. It was decided at this same meeting that from here on the line of the Liga Socialista on Portugal would be that of the majority of the Political Committee, although no document had been presented enabling the ranks and the other members of the leadership of the party to determine what line had been imposed on them.

On November 15, the Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista of the Liga Socialista was constituted on the following platform: (1) the general line of the document "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista," (2) the general line of the document "Tasks and Perspectives," and (3) the general line on Portugal followed up to that time by El Socialista.

7. On November 20, the TBL proposed that the Political Committee postpone the congress that had been convoked for December 19-21. The Tendencia Militante refused to postpone the congress because of "the urgent need for a decision by the congress to put into complete practice the new method of constructing the party."

8. On November 20, the Political Committee voted by a majority to censure the TBL for having included Section III in its document "For Internal Democracy in the Liga Socialista." In this section, the TBL took up the anti-democratic measures that had been adopted by the majority of the Political Committee beginning with the September meeting of the Central Committee. The majority of the Political Committee complained that they had not been consulted about included a criticism of the measures they had taken. In addition, the majority of the Political Committee demanded that this section be withdrawn from the TBL's document, and that we should not talk about the minority being victimized because of its political positions.

For the text of the section, see the attached addenda, "Antidemocratic Measures."

9. On December 12, delegates were elected from the "fronts" in Mexico City on the basis of the documents presented by the Tendencia Militante and the Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista. The documents of the TM included a document "Joint Platform for the Dissolution of Tendencies," which had not yet been presented to the members of the Liga Socialista.

This "Joint Platform. . ." was to be the basis, according to the comrades of the majority of the Political Committee, for the dissolution of the TM and the TBL. Nonetheless, the "Joint Platform. . ." codified all the anti-democratic measures taken by the majority of the Political Committee, and deepened them.

These were the conditions under which the supposed Second Congress of the Liga Socialista met. Various branches in the provinces did not have an opportunity to elect the delegates they were entitled to because they had not received the documents of the different tendencies.

Just a few days before the congress, another member of the PST arrived in Mexico. This was Comrade Eduardo, a member of the Political Committee of the PST. Eduardo said that he had come to the Mexican congress as a representative of the Political Committee of the PST.

At the Second Congress, the Tendencia Militante, openly inspired and supported by the Argentines Greco and Eduardo in their speeches, adopted the following measures:

1. Comrades Roberto (TBL) and Nava (TM) had drawn up, a few days before the September meeting of the Central Committee, a draft political resolution. This draft was discussed by the Political Committee and unanimously adopted. Nevertheless, at the congress the Tendencia Militante presented a report offering a line distinctly different in content from the draft that had been adopted unanimously.

2. A decision was passed to suspend all the members of the party for a month, after which it would be decided who would be readmitted and who would not.

After the congress voted for this purge of the members of the Liga Socialista, the TBL decided that it could no longer remain at the level of a tendency, and that to fight against the completely anti-Leninist organizational methods that were being used by the Tendencia Militante, a more adequate instrument was required; that is, the TBL informed the congress that it was converting itself into a faction to check these destructive organizational methods and to combat the leadership that was implementing them.

3. It was voted that the local bodies had no right to elect their own leaderships, since the Political Committee could order persons to take over the task of leadership in the "fronts" at any moment.

4. It would be up to the Political Committee to decide what local bodies could elect their own leadership.

5. It was voted that the members of the party could dissent from directives issued by the Central Committee or Political Committee, but the directives could not be discussed unless the top leadership decided they represented changes in party strategy. Any directive issued by the leadership bodies had to be immediately put into practice.

6. The Tendencia Bolchevique Leninista was characterized as a petty-bourgeois minority and the necessity was posed of "reeducating" its members "inside the factories."

7. The statutes were changed to give almost total power to the Central Committee and the Political Committee so that the ranks no longer had any way of controlling the leadership.

8. The statutes were changed to remove all the clauses granting minority rights within the party.

9. The four central leaders of the Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista were denied places on the Central Committee under the accusation of "lack of revolutionary morality" because of the Ricardo case. In addition, it was decided that these four comrades and the two comrades on the outgoing Control Commission who belonged to the FBL could not hold any post of responsibility in the organization because of alleged "moral reasons."

The Tendencia Militante decided that the Central Committee would be composed of thirty members (twenty-four full members and six alternates). The FBL was given ten members (eight full and two alternates). The TM refused to accept the FBL slate because it included four of the six comrades whom the TM had "suspended from any post of responsibility."

The TM said that they accepted the other six members of the FBL slate. The FBL rejected this. The TM then voted to elect their own slate plus a new list to be presented by the FBL to the Central Committee, but without the four comrades. The FBL rejected this likewise. Thus the FBL remained without representation in the Central Committee.

10. Relations were broken with the Socialist Workers party because of the alleged participating of one of its members in weaving suspicions against Comrade Ricardo.

11. The point on Portugal was removed from the agenda of the congress. The account of how the Tendencia Militante evaded discussing Portugal is as follows:

At the Sixth Plenum of the Central Committee a position was unanimously adopted on Portugal and it was decided that this point would form part of the agenda for the Second Congress and that it would be discussed during the pre-congress discussion period.

At the meeting of the Political Committee in which Greco and the new majority of the PC pulled the surprise of letting it be known that they had differences, it was decided that a point of such great importance merited opening a broad discussion in the ranks.

After the meeting of the LTF, the new majority of the Political Committee decided that since the members of the International Executive Committee belonging to the Liga Socialista did not have the same position as they did, and since Portugal was of such great importance, it was necessary to replace them by members who held the position of the majority of the Political Committee. Up to the present, this position remains unknown to anyone but them, since they have never presented a document in which they state their views.

At this same meeting, the majority of the Political Committee decided to take the point on Portugal off the agenda of the congress and reduce it to various oral reports--one for the majority of the Political Committee, one for the Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista--which did have a clear position--one for the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista, one for the Leninist Trotskyist Faction, and one for the PST. There would be no discussion or summaries on this question because of lack of time.

Finally, at the congress, the Tendencia Militante decided that a decision on Portugal would be taken at a regular or broadened meeting of the Central Committee, since the point was too important and required a serious discussion.

During the congress, the comrades of the PST spoke in behalf of the conceptions of the Tendencia Militante on a whole series of points, such as their organizational methods. When the election of a new Central Committee came up on the agenda, and the TM called into question the right of the leaders of the FBL to be elected because they had not correctly handled the items concerning the Ricardo case, which they held to be an issue involving "lack of proletarian morality," it was the two comrades of the PST, Greco and Eduardo, who made the most dramatic speeches against the comrades of the Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista. In fact, Greco maintained that not only should they be rejected as members of the Central Committee or any other leadership body, but they ought to be expelled from the party.

In the meeting of the Central Committee following the congress, a new Political Committee was elected. Here again the FBL was denied the right to choose its own representatives.

Nonetheless, some of the members of the FBL attended the first meeting of the Political Committee. In this meeting, the majority decided:

1. To oppose taking minutes of Political Committee meetings, since minutes were considered to be unnecessary. After a strong protest from the FBL, the comrades agreed to take minutes of Political Committee meetings and circulate them. But there was to be only one copy for Mexico City and a carbon copy for each "front" in the provinces.

2. To have in the apparatus only an editor of the paper and an organizational secretary. The organizational secretary, Comrade Richardo, was designated to decide on the formation of new "fronts," new posts that might become necessary, the naming and removal of members of any secretariat that might be set up, the distribution of members in the fronts, etc.

3. That members of the FBL, owing to their petty-

bourgeois character, could not participate in "apparatus" functions, as the TM called them, because of the necessity to "reeducate them."

4. It was held over to another meeting of the Political Committee to decide if the minority had the right to state their positions if they differed from those of the majority of the Political Committee.

In face of all these facts, the Fracción Bolchevique Leninista decided that it would be doomed if it accepted the new rules established by the new majority in the course of the Second Congress, the objectives of which were to entrench the majority and smash the minority. The FBL decided therefore that it was necessary to express its point of view publicly to save the tradition and program of the Liga Socialista as well as the program and organizational methods of Trotskyism. That is, the FBL considered that it was necessary to constitute itself as a public faction of the Liga Socialista.

At no point in the discussion did clear political differences emerge. The whole debate turned by necessity around the issue of democratic centralism and Leninist organizational methods. Nevertheless some political differences did begin to appear, although they were not debated and no document was written concerning them. These political differences are as follows:

1. On the character of the Mexican government. The Tendencia Militante maintains that it is a "bonapartist" government, that it is making genuine and important concessions to the workers and other exploited layers. The Fraccion Bolchevique Leninista holds that the Mexican bourgeois government has not granted real concessions to the masses, but is taking away many of the things gained in previous struggles. The FBL believes that this is one of the causes of the deepening and broadening radicalization occurring in Mexico.

The TM holds that it would be difficult for the government to again resort to massacres as a means of maintaining control over the masses, and that it is following a foreign policy with nationalist characteristics reflecting the pressure of the masses along this line.

The FBL believes that the government is ready to resort to any extreme to maintain its control over the proletariat and its allies; that is, the government will not hesitate to utilize different degrees of repression, even the most extreme, if it considers it necessary. Hence the struggle against repressive measures that the government is continually ready to use must be one of the central axes of our propaganda. The FBL holds that in its foreign policy the government is trying to take advantage of the interimperialist squabbles to blackmail U. S. imperialism and gain better deals.

2. On the elections, the TM maintains that it is valid to form electoral fronts advancing a common program with petty-bourgeois groups, including the Stalinists. The FBL holds that above all in the electoral arena the revolutionary party must put forward its own program in the clearest possible way, since the only reason for participating in the elections staged by the enemy class is to win people to our program. The FBL is against any front or bloc that violates our principles.

3. Policy in the unions. The TM maintains that in the plants where the workers are becoming radicalized and going into action, it is necessary to support a struggle to break away from the big bureaucratized trade-union federations, since there is no other way of breaking the control of the bureaucrats over the workers. They believe that the party must help impel the workers to form small but militant unions.

The FBL holds that the struggle for union democracy in Mexico centers on winning in the union federations, which belong to the workers and not to the bureaucrats. The FBL holds that it is necessary to continually advance methods and forms of struggle designed to strengthen the unity of the workers and not divide them.

The only political differences that the TM has openly indicated is over Portugal; but not even this was debated, since the TM did not present any document and held that the point on Portugal did not warrant discussion at the congress.

January 1976

Political Committee of the Fracción
Bolchevique Leninista of the Liga
Socialista

Antidemocratic Measures

Up until the first results of the discussion that arose in the Central Committee could be evaluated, many facts remained obscure: the hasty way in which the organizational line of the counterreport was applied without minimum consultation with the members, the struggle to win leadership of the LS at all levels in Mexico City, the measures adopted against members of the Political Committee. We can now draw up a preliminary balance sheet of the situation, and we must say that it is not very heartening.

If the logic of the document goes in the direction of substituting administrative measures for political issues, the practice of the comrades who wrote "Balance, . . ." could not but be the same.

In place of discussing and clarifying the organizational issues, a high-pressure attempt was made to apply a whole "new" line; and despite all the efforts made to collaborate in the Political Committee, new administrative measures were taken. First, the removal of the editor of El Socialista as a disciplinary measure for having fallen behind in her work during a period of illness. The measure was all the more out of place since it involved a founding member of our organization whose work as the comrade in charge of our newspaper had been commended by the Central Committee (the highest authority between congresses).

Finally, the absurd measure was adopted "changing" the fraternal observers of the Liga Socialista in the International Executive Committee (a measure that could not effect a real change, since members of the IEC, even fraternal observers, are nominated and elected by the world congress of the Fourth International. What-

ever the arguments that might be advanced, both measures adopted by the majority of the Political Committee fall into the dynamic of substituting administrative measures for political discussion.

Thus a crisis has been developing in the leadership of the LS. The only way to reverse its negative effects is to make a retreat. How can comrades of the LS have confidence in a leadership that by majority decision adopts measures against comrades who hold a position different from theirs?

The reply to this question lies with the comrades who have maintained the positions of the "Balance, . . ." in the leadership. Will they offer guarantees that they will not adopt new administrative measures against comrades who hold positions different from theirs? Or do they now plan new measures and changes against comrades of the rank and file or medium leadership level?

If guarantees are offered, it does not matter how deep the differences in the discussion may go, we will leave aside the whole issue that we have posed in this final section of the declaration. In addition to assuring the comrades of the LS of their right to hold positions contrary to those of the majority of the leadership, and thus ending any worry over the crisis becoming deeper, the above-mentioned guarantees would have the additional effect of avoiding the possibility that issues like these could hinder the discussion on political questions.

We sincerely hope that the comrades of the Political Committee who uphold the positions of the "Balance, . . ." will retreat by declaring that guarantees exist at least from now until the Second Congress and that we can count on ratification of the traditions of our movement.