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WHAT OUR POSITION SHOULD BE ON THE
FACTIONAL STRUGGLE INSIDE THE CCP

by Peng Shu-tse

In November 1965, when Mao Tse-tung launched the so-called Great Cultural Revolution, a tremendous struggle broke out between two major factions represented by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. During the subsequent two years, this struggle has intensified and made itself felt in every fiber of Chinese society. Not only the party and its youth, but also the trade unions and the government at all levels have been thrown into the greatest confusion. Deep going divisions have even developed in the People's Liberation Army. Bloody clashes have taken place throughout China, and the country as a whole still remains today under the threatening clouds of this great political storm.

In the last two years the International has not only found itself without any common position with which to intervene in the Chinese events, but also in a state of confusion and with serious conflicting political positions. To clarify this confusion in order to arrive at a correct and common position, let me first enumerate the three major political differences which have developed.

1. Comrade George Novack in his article, "The Political Crisis in China," (*International Socialist Review*, Fall 1966) after analyzing the Chinese events, stated in the name of the SWP:

At the same time we have a responsibility to the revolutionary Communists, intellectuals, students and youth in China who are being unjustly victimized and slandered for demanding more freedom of thought and expression and the rectification of errors committed by the present leadership. We are on their side in the struggle for greater democracy and a more correct course. (p. 144)

2. The statement on the Chinese events adopted by the IEC plenum, March 1967, stated:

But the information is not sufficiently clear to permit the International to identify itself with any of the tendencies or factions in the Chinese CP now contending with each other. (*World Outlook*, May 19, 1967, p. 523)

3. The Argentinian comrades in their statement on the March 1967 IEC discussion resolution stated:

The Maoist bonapartism has played, by launching the cultural revolution, a progressive role, leaving aside all its grotesque, bureaucratic aspects, because it initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy, which has its own dynamics, despite the bonapartist plans of Mao-Lin Piao.

That this mobilization has to be supported, conditionally to make its anti-bureaucratic motive more precise and to criticize its terrible Maoist limitations,

leadership and ideology;

That this critical support must not limit our active intervention in the mobilization which provoked the cultural revolution, because only this intervention, united to that of the masses, will prove to be able to overcome in the facts the Maoist leadership; (*Internal Bulletin of the United Secretariat of the 4th International*, Vol. 1967 No. 7, Oct. 1967. *International Discussion Bulletin on the Chinese Cultural Revolution*, No. 4)

These three positions are quite clearly in contradiction with each other, especially numbers 1 and 3. The task we are faced with now is to decide which of these interpretations conforms closest to the actual development of the Chinese events, in order that we might adopt it as a common basis for the International's work. To make this decision, we must begin by examining and analyzing each of the above interpretations.

Siding with those who are unjustly victimized

Comrade Novack's article, quoted above, was originally given as a speech on July 1, 1966; that is, over one year ago. At that time there was much less information available on the Chinese events than now. Nevertheless, even then Comrade Novack was able to say:

From the accusations against the dissident intellectuals and other sources, it is possible to discern the vague contours of their criticism and the trend of their thinking.

1. They doubt the infallibility of Mao Tse-tung.
2. They claim to be better Communists than the present leaders.
3. They display "sympathy" for the Khrushchev revisionists; that is, they want to unite the "socialist countries" in face of a possible attack by the United States, heal the breach, and renew the Russian alliance.
4. They have criticized the excesses of the "Great Leap Forward" and such wasteful efforts as attempting to produce steel in backyard furnaces.
5. They seek changes in economic policy and agrarian reforms.
6. They demand more intellectual liberty, freedom of expression and the right to dissent from the official line.
7. They may even have dared to suggest that Mao step down on grounds on health or age.

Taken together, these positions would constitute a serious oppositional program. . . . (p. 142)

The tumultuous events of the last year have proven, in general, the correctness of these points as well as Comrade Novack's view of their seriousness. These events have also proven correct Comrade Novack's insight that

"The publicly assailed writers, experts and scholars may be surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and the army, embracing those dissidents who are discontented with the results of the foreign and domestic policy in recent years. . . ." The events have certainly shown that Wu Han, Teng To, Liao Mo-sha, Tien Han and others were the surrogates for the real targets in the commanding heights of the party and army, such as Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Lo Jui-ching, Lu Ting-yi and others.

How is it that Comrade Novack was so accurate in his analysis? In my opinion, such accuracy was not accidental. Nor was it an accident that Comrade Novack's conclusion was similar to that of the Chinese section's, even though there was no collaboration between them. Comrade Novack as well as the Chinese section merely considered the objective facts and applied to them the method of Marxism.

Neutralism

The body of the March 1967 IEC discussion resolution was taken from the draft prepared by Comrade Livio Maitan, and was published with corrections by the United Secretariat nine months after Comrade Novack's article. During that nine months, the struggle between Mao's and Liu's factions escalated to new heights, and the basis of the conflict became increasingly clear, especially from the information in the wall posters and articles published by the Maoists attacking their opponents. Nevertheless, the IEC document still maintained that the information was "not sufficiently clear." This would tend to show that either the author of the document was prejudiced or he had not grasped the essence of what was taking place.

Immediately following the above quote, the IEC document tries to justify its position of neutralism in the following way:

The lack of information is largely due to the Stalinist methods employed by the Mao faction against its opponents, which we energetically condemn. As for Mao's opponents, such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who held and who still hold considerable means of making known their political line had they so desired, their silence on this subject compels us to be relatively cautious concerning the contents of their policies.

This justification is misleading in two ways:

1. In October 1966 during a work meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping were subjected to serious attacks by the Maoists and were forced to make self-criticism. Since then, not only have they lost all "means of making known their political line," but also, they have been held in the custody of their residences under close supervision. Under these conditions, one can easily understand that they have no possibility whatsoever to put forward their political line nor to answer the many attacks and slanders leveled at them by the Maoists. If the IEC document's condemnation of Liu's and Teng's silence is not irony, then it can only reflect an absurd ignorance of the Chinese events.

2. We should of course, "energetically condemn" "the Stalinist methods employed by the Mao faction against its opponents." But this does not mean there is insufficient

information. We should also examine and analyze the attacks of the Maoists in order to determine "the contents of their [Liu's and Teng's] policies." This has been a traditional procedure in the Trotskyist movement when examining a struggle inside a Stalinist party since the days when Trotsky himself used it in making his analysis of the events inside the Soviet Union. But nowhere in the IEC document does one find even an attempt at such an analysis.

It seems the idea of the IEC document is to put off taking a position before Liu and Teng have formally put forth their position. If this is the case, then it will be necessary to wait until Liu and Teng have captured power and the struggle is ended. But as Marxists, it is our obligation to intervene in the present struggle in order to help determine its outcome. We must, therefore, examine the Maoist attacks and accusations. For example, let us consider the following points:

1. The fundamental difference between Mao and Liu developed in 1958, when Mao arbitrarily instituted and carried out the Great Leap Forward and People's Commune policies. Comrade Novack noted in his article cited above, the difference on these policies. I myself, noted it more concretely in my interviews with Comrade Antonio Farién, especially the last one, "The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse Tung and Liu Shao-chi"—submitted to *World Outlook* last August—in which I gave an accounting in some detail of this as well as the other major differences. (See *W. O.*, August 12, 1966, and Feb. 10, 1967.) The development of the events over the past six months has more than confirmed this judgment.

Mao's attack against Wu Han's drama, *Hai Jui Dismissed*, which began the Cultural Revolution, was not by accident. Wu Han's drama of Hai Jui was really about Peng Teh-huai who Mao had purged in August 1959 at the Lushan Meeting for opposing the Great Leap Forward and especially the People's Communes. Because of his opposition, Peng Teh-huai became a symbol for all those who were opposed to Mao's policies.

Here we must note the position taken by Liu Shao-chi during and after the Lushan Meeting. The Red Guard newspaper, *Red Guards in the Capital* had this to say about Liu Shao-chi:

At a meeting called by the central committee, which was attended by 78 cadres in January 1962, he made a revisionist report. He violently attacked the Three Red Banners [The Three Red Banners are: 1. General Line, 2. Great Leap Forward, and 3. Peoples Communes], and exaggerated to the utmost errors and mistakes in our work. He felt that the temporary economic difficulties were due to these errors and mistakes—"30% due to the natural disasters, 70% due to artificial disasters". He attacked the 1959 struggle against the Rightist [Peng Teh-huai] as being excessive, and even said, in an attempt to rehabilitate the Rightists, that the struggle itself was a mistake. He maliciously said that the party lacks democracy and that party life is a "brutal struggle" and a "pitiless fight", attacking Chairman Mao's correct leadership of the central committee. (Feb. 22, 1967—"The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi")

This shows that Liu was not only against Mao's policies, but he was also for the rehabilitation of Peng Teh-huai

and his followers and for more democratic measures in the party.

The *People's Daily* and *Red Flag* in August 1967 (see *Peking Review*, No. 34, 1967), published excerpts from a resolution on Peng Teh-huai's case adopted at the Lushan Meeting in 1959. This resolution condemned Peng Teh-huai for branding the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policies as adventurism and "petty bourgeois fanaticism." These words clearly reveal Peng Teh-huai's position.

More important is the *People's Daily* editorial of August 16, 1967, which stated:

It was this person [Liu Shao-chi] who at the Lushan Meeting put his utmost efforts into a counterrevolutionary double dealing tactic, and actively backed Peng Teh-huai's anti-party activities. . . . After the Lushan Meeting he came out into the open, slandering the general line as having been put forward blindly, the Great Leap Forward as being "brought about in a rush" causing "disproportions in the economy", alleging that the "people's communes were set up too early", and "there is danger of disintegration." He even made the absurd assertion that "the Lushan Meeting made a mistake" and that "it was wrong to oppose Right opportunism." (*Peking Review*, No. 35, 1967, p. 7)

If the above ideas expressed by Liu Shao-chi are not completely correct, they are, nonetheless, progressive and reflect the moods of the worker and peasant masses in China as well as the opinions of the overwhelming majority of the CCP's cadres.

2. De-Stalinization and opposition to Mao's own cult and personal dictatorship are the most uncompromising questions dividing the Mao-Lin and Liu-Peng factions.

During the discussion at the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956 on Khrushchev's 20th Congress speech in which he denounced Stalin's personal cult and some of his crimes, Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and many other leaders voiced their agreement with Khrushchev's actions. It was for this reason that the 8th Congress, acting on the initiative of Liu Shao-chi (see the Red Guard newspaper, *Ching Kangshan*, "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," reprinted in *Ming Bao*, Jan. 18, 19, 1967) changed the CCP's statutes by omitting all references to Mao Tse-tung's thought. Teng Hsiao-ping gave the report motivating the change of the statutes in which he stated:

The significance of opposing the personal cult was explained energetically at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This will make a great impression on every communist party throughout the world. . . . The important contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is to inform us that regarding a person as a god has led to very criminal results. . . . The personal cult is an old, historical, and social phenomenon, and it is to a certain degree reflected in the life of our party and society. Our task is to carry out successfully, consistently, and with determination the directives of the central committee against individual prominence and personal glorification. (see Red Guard newspaper, *The Red Flag Battle*, "Teng Hsiao-ping Is One of the People in Authority Taking the Capitalist Road," reprinted in *Ming Bao*, Jan. 21, 1967)

The above is a reflection of the atmosphere inside the CCP on the question of de-Stalinization. Under the pressure of this atmosphere, Mao was forced to tolerate the de-Stalinization measures even though they meant severe personal blows. Nevertheless, it is clear from the history since the 8th Congress that Mao never accepted the de-Stalinization measures. He held Liu and Teng responsible for his personal loss and took every opportunity to retaliate against them and regain his old prestige. It is for this major reason that Mao's Cultural Revolution has singled out Liu and Teng as the major enemies, and exalted Mao's cult to unbelievable heights.

3. Mao's policies in the literature, art and educational fields are comparable to, if not stricter than, those put into practice in the Soviet Union by Zhdanov. Hence criticism continually arose among the cultural and educational workers. Often there were sharp antagonisms between Mao and leaders in the cultural and educational fields, and these antagonisms are the origin of Mao's accusation that these people were the Chinese version of the Hungarian "Petofi circles."

Basing herself on many reliable and varied sources, Chen Pi-lan in an interview has described in some detail a few of the most important struggles that have taken place on the questions related to literature, art, and education (see *W. O.*, July 14, 1967). I will not repeat here the rich and pertinent information contained in this interview, but will draw to the comrades' attention one important fact. In his political report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, Liu Shao-chi emphasized the point that the party should not interfere arbitrarily in the work of the scientists or artists. On the basis of Liu's report, the Congress adopted a resolution which stated:

In order to assure the prosperity of the sciences and arts, we must firmly insist on the perspectives of "Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom and Hundred Schools Contend" policy. It would be a mistake to use administrative methods to interfere arbitrarily in the sciences and arts.

The above shows that the ideas of Liu on the questions of literature, art and education are much different than those of Mao. Because of Liu's more tolerant position on these questions, most of the cadres in the cultural, educational and scientific fields have sided with him against Mao. It was for this reason that Mao singled out the leading cadres in the cultural and educational fields as the first targets of attack in his Cultural Revolution.

4. Although there is much less information concerning the differences of foreign policy, one can generally agree with Comrade Novack's observation that "they [the opposition] want to unite the 'socialist countries' in face of possible attack by the United States, heal the breach and renew the Russian alliance." This has been confirmed by the exposure of the ideas of Lo Jui-ching, the ex-chief of staff of the army. From the military point of view, Lo opposed the break with the Soviet Union.

After launching the Cultural Revolution, Mao pushed China's relations with the Soviet Union to a point just short of a complete break. At the same time he made clear his point of refusing to unite with other "socialist countries," especially the Soviet Union, for the defense of Vietnam against US imperialism. This shows, if only in the negative, that differences exist between Mao and

Liu on foreign policy, especially in regards to the Soviet Union.

5. It seemed that the Shanghai events raised even new differences between Mao's and Liu's factions, mainly the question of the people's living standards. Yet this difference has existed for a long time.

Soon after the CCP took power, Mao put forward a program to build socialism by appealing to the revolutionary spirit of the masses in the name of his thought. Hence, he created the atmosphere of sacrifice, severely limiting the improvement of the masses' standard of living. Liu, on the other hand, felt it was impossible to build socialism by not improving the living standards of the masses, that is, to ask the masses to sacrifice without compensation. Therefore, Liu emphasized, as well, in his political report to the 8th Congress, the necessity of improving the living standards of the people. And in the same resolution based on Liu's report cited above, we find the following:

If the state takes for itself too large a proportion of the national income and does not pay proper attention to improving the people's living standards not to their interests and personal needs, then harm will be done to raising the productivity of labor and to the activity of the masses in building socialism, i.e., harm to the interests of socialism.

From Mao's point of view, to improve the living standards of the people is to promote material incentives, which is for him the revisionist road. Mao arbitrarily instituted the Great Leap Forward and the People's Communes policies in order to exploit to the utmost the labor of the masses; they were forced to work longer hours than before for less pay. The dissatisfaction and resentment this produced among the masses is still a major factor in Chinese life, and it was around these very feelings that the opposition to Mao was able to organize the masses to defend themselves from the attacks of Mao's Red Guards. By giving concessions to the workers and peasants such as increasing wages and other benefits, the opposition induced the workers and peasants to resist and even strike against Mao's policies. This culminated with the massive strikes last January (1967) in Shanghai, Nanking, Nanchang, Canton and many other places. After Mao took the power in Shanghai with the army and put down the strikes, he withdrew all the concessions and accused the opposition of corrupting the masses, i.e., "economism" and "revisionism." Since these events the question of the people's living standards has become a major difference between the two contending factions.

* * *

The above five points are thoroughly documented in the many Maoist articles attacking Liu, Teng and other important figures in the Opposition. If these five points together with Comrade Novack's seven points noted above and others outlined in my interviews are not enough to "constitute a serious oppositional program," they do show that the opposition represented by Liu and Teng is a reformist tendency within the CCP which reflects more or less the aspirations of the masses and is, therefore, progressive.

The IEC document did not examine or analyze the difference between the two factions. We must ask why? The main reason is the failure of the author to employ the Marxist method. On this point the Argentinian comrades have correctly criticized the IEC document in their "Statement on the March 1967 IEC Resolution." They stated:

That this resolution contains omissions and dangerous methodological errors, . . . it does not say that all interbureaucratic differences, when they receive such a dramatic and grievous character, reflect in themselves deep class pressures and not the other way around; that merely political or tactical inner bureaucratic differences receive afterwards a class character;

In the IEC document the method of Marxism was abandoned for that of impressionism. The struggle was only superficially analyzed, hence, the assertion that it was only an "interbureaucratic conflict" (see comrade Maitan's article, "Stormy Internal Conflicts in China—1," *W. O.*, Oct. 7, 1966). With this abstract formula—"interbureaucratic conflict"—one is not obliged to analyze the differences separating the contending factions nor the social origins of those differences. This abstract formula presupposes that the two factions are essentially the same and therefore demands a position of neutralism, i.e., no support for either side. This was the theme of the United Secretariat's statement of November 1966.

Although the IEC document (March 1967) dropped all mention of the "interbureaucratic conflict" formula, it proceeded along the very same lines as those of the U.S. statement of November. Describing different phases of the development of the Chinese events the IEC document never mentions what the struggle is about nor the different political positions involved.

The IEC's analysis is not only superficial, but in several places it distorts the facts. For example, it gives credit to the Maoists for having initiated the Shanghai strikes. It then states that the Maoists split in face of the strikes over the question of giving concessions to the masses. This idea was developed by both Comrades Livio Maitan and Pierre Frank in several articles (see *W. O.*, March 10, 1967, and August 25, 1967). Comrade Maitan states in one of his articles:

. . . the Shanghai leadership has been Mao's main support when the crisis was touched off and . . . the city committee of the party decided unanimously to publish the famous article against Wu Han.

The fact is that the Shanghai leadership were not "Mao's main support." Their position can be described as neutralism. When Mao ordered Yao Wen-yuan's article attacking Wu Han's drama to be published in *Wenhui Bao* and *Jiefang Ribao*, the Shanghai leadership did not consider the matter that important, since it only involved the criticism of one individual. Therefore, they did not oppose Mao's order. However, the serious development of the events following Wu Han's disgrace, especially the dismissal of the entire Peking Municipal leadership and the Red Guards attacks on many high ranking officials of the party as well as on local party committees throughout the country, forced the Shanghai committee

to adopt certain measures in order to protect themselves. Hence they began to organize the masses and to give them concessions. This resistance on the part of the Shanghai leadership forced Mao to utilize the loyalty of the army to suppress the strikes of the workers. Almost the entire leadership of the Shanghai Municipal party committee as well as the leading cadres of the party in the unions, factories and other economic institutions, along with the editors and staffs of *Wenhui Bao* and *Jiefang Ribao*, were subsequently purged. The concessions which had been given to the workers were then rescinded by the Maoists. All of this resulted in an economic paralysis, which prompted Chou En-lai to criticize the exclusion of all the original cadres from the new leading committees. An alliance between the army, Red Guards and certain original cadres—the "triple alliance"—was then put forward as the correct means of constituting the new leading bodies and carrying out the Cultural Revolution.

The description of the Shanghai events by Comrades Maitan and Frank was not based upon the concrete events, but rather upon fictions of their imagination. Their claim that the Shanghai leadership supported Mao, that the Maoists split in the face of the workers' strike, are absolutely contrary to the facts.

When the Cultural Revolution was launched, many regional, provincial and local leaderships took a neutral or wait-and-see attitude. It was only after the struggle had developed to the stage where their own positions were threatened, that they began to take a definite position of resisting Mao. The Shanghai leadership is a good example as well as the provincial leaderships in Kwangtung and Hupeh.

Many of the army leaders also took a neutralist position at the beginning. For example, Chen Tsai-tao, the commander in Wuhan, after witnessing the severe and slanderous attacks against people like Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu, etc., and after seeing the Red Guard attacks in Wuhan, changed his original position of neutralism to that of resisting the attacks by the Red Guards and Maoists.

It is unfortunate that the authors of the IEC document did not take such important information into consideration.

Critical Support to the Cultural Revolution

The demand by the Argentinian comrades to give critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution is, in reality, a demand that we support Mao's purge of the Liu-Teng faction. The "16 Points" resolution adopted by the 11th plenum of the CCP's central committee on August 8, 1966, pointed out that the main object of the Cultural Revolution was to "struggle against and crush those persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." The subsequent events have clearly shown that this meant the purge of the leaders in Liu's faction, such as Liu himself, Teng Hsiao-ping, Tao Chu, Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching, as well as many regional and provincial leaders, such as the first secretary of the North bureau Li Hsueh-feng, the first secretary of the Northwest bureau Liu Lan-tao, the first secretary of the Shanghai Municipal committee Chen Pai-chen, the Mayor of Shanghai Tsao Ti-chiu, and almost all the leaders in the provincial committees of Kiangsi, Shansi, Heilungkiang, Shan-tung, Chinghai and Kweichow.

The only reason the Argentinian comrades give to justify their demand for critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution is the following:

The Maoist bonapartism has played, by launching the cultural revolution, a progressive role, leaving aside all its grotesque, bureaucratic aspects, *because it initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy . . .* (emphasis added).

The argument was advanced much earlier by Comrade Frank in his article on the Shanghai events in which he said:

. . . we cannot at all condemn an appeal to the masses against a bureaucratized party and apparatus, even if this appeal originates from a wing of the bureaucracy. . . . We already noted the possibility that certain appeals of the Maoists along the lines of equalitarian demands, even if they were demagogic, would not fail to have consequences. (W. O. March 10, 1967) If the Maoists actually appealed "to the masses against a bureaucratized party and apparatus . . . along the lines of equalitarian demands," then one must admit that such appeals are progressive, and therefore, we should give critical support to those who voice them i.e. the Maoists.

The opinion clearly stated by Comrade Frank above was also one of the themes of the statement issued by the United Secretariat in November 1966. I already made a short criticism of that statement in a letter to the March 1966 IEC plenum in which I stated:

Moreover, if the ideas expressed in the statement that the struggle is only an "interbureaucratic struggle" and that the Mao faction has appealed to the masses against bureaucracy using equalitarian slogans, are really considered to be true, then, it is necessary to ask why the statement did not give critical support to Mao's faction rather than take a neutralist position? Why did the statement hold back from adopting clearly the logical conclusion of the ideas it put forward?

The Secretariat's statement did not say that we should give critical support to Mao's Cultural Revolution. Nevertheless, the ideas it expressed definitely imply that we should or, at least, lead to that position, and now the Argentinians are only logically demanding that we adopt it.

The fundamental analysis advanced by the Argentinian comrades is essentially the same as Healy's group and not much different from Swabeck's or Huberman's and Sweezy's of *Monthly Review*. They too, started from the assumption that Mao organized the student masses to fight bureaucracy. This assumption, however, raises two very important questions: How were the Red Guards organized and what means were employed in the fight against bureaucracy? These two aspects were dealt with by Comrades Novack and Hansen in their answer to *Monthly Review*:

Schools were shut down and millions of youth were turned loose. They were then offered a special privilege that would be attractive even in a wealthy capitalist

country; namely, taking a trip at government expense to Peking. Transportation, free lodging and free meals were provided to a large proportion of these prospective candidates for the new organization.

The policy was to line up these youth on the side of one of the contending factions by such means and inveigle them into adopting its factional platform without being informed of what was intended, without giving the opposition currents an opportunity to present their views in a fair debate, and, in fact, with the opposition smeared and branded from the beginning without a hearing as disloyal and even counterrevolutionary, a "miserable handful" of monsters, demons, and ghosts.

The real "crime" of the accused leaders is not that they have been plotting to bring back capitalism but that they have serious differences with the Mao-Lin faction. Their views are falsified to discredit them in the eyes of the masses and to destroy them politically, if not physically.

These polemical methods which Mao and his men learned in the school of Stalinism, first applied against the Trotskyists. . . . There are no innovations in the pattern beyond peculiarities of style in applying it and even these are not very novel. (See the pamphlet *Behind China's "Great Cultural Revolution"*, Merit Publishers, p. 47-48 and 52.)

This explains very well how "Maoist bonapartism . . . initiated a mass mobilization against bureaucracy" and the methods that were used. If the Argentinian comrades have come to the conclusion that Mao's actions have been progressive, then they are on the same path which has already been blazed by *Monthly Review*, Healy and Swabeck.

The Argentinian comrades made a valuable contribution to the discussion when they criticized the IEC's "dangerous methodological errors." However, they themselves have failed to utilize the methodological procedures which they advocated. They failed to mention let alone describe and prove what "class pressures" are reflected by either the Mao-Lin faction or the Liu-Teng faction. It is only implied that the Liu-Teng faction represents the hardened bureaucratic elements who have been purged by the Maoists, the more progressive elements among the bureaucracy, and therefore, we are asked to give critical support to Mao. If the Argentinian comrades continue to insist on their position, using such methods and taking such light-minded attitude, then one cannot seriously discuss with them, and can only express regret.

Political Revolution and Neutralism

The second paragraph in the IEC document of March 1967 reads:

In the course of the violent struggle which resulted from this crisis of leadership, and in particular due to the forms taken by the "Great Cultural Revolution" the party, state, trade union, youth apparatuses, etc., were upset from top to bottom. For the same reasons, the relationships among the leaders, the apparatuses, and the masses also underwent fundamental changes. For the first time since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, the masses, and in par-

ticular the proletarian masses of the large cities, were mobilized in a process the logical culmination of which is an anti-bureaucratic political revolution.

This description and perspectives of the Chinese events should be emphasized, especially the perspective of the "anti-bureaucratic political revolution." This is the first time since reunification that the International has formally taken a position in favor of political revolutions in China. However, the IEC document in no way showed why political revolution was necessary. It did not characterize the CCP as a Stalinist party nor its regime as a bureaucratic dictatorship. If one does not illustrate these two points, then he has no theoretical basis for a demand of political revolution.

In the International there are several differing opinions as to the nature of the CCP and its regime. As far as I know, however, only the SWP and the Chinese section have extensively discussed the Chinese question and adopted a definite position—for political revolution. (See the SWP resolution, *The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath*, Discussion Bulletin A-31, Oct. 1955; and *On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and its Regime—Political Revolution or Democratic Reform?* by S.T. Peng, SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 22, No. 4, March 1961.) It seems as though the overwhelming majority of the other sections in the International have yet to seriously discuss and adopt a definite position.

The majority of the leading comrades in the International, following the 1949 Chinese Revolution, took the position that with the capture of power by the CCP it was no longer a Stalinist party, and the subsequent government established by it was not a bureaucratic dictatorship. This analysis, of course, ruled out any need for a political revolution. Now the IEC document puts forth the perspective of an "antibureaucratic political revolution." Therefore, if the nature of the CCP and its regime are not clarified in the present discussion, it is inevitable that only confusion and new contradictions will develop.

In addition and even more important, the IEC document put forth the perspective of political revolution without mentioning the social basis of the two contending factions. The lack of such an analysis cannot direct the masses onto the road of political revolution, but on the contrary, only confuse them and objectively help the more reactionary elements—the Maoists.

What does the neutralism actually mean? In essence, it means that it is not necessary to intervene in the present struggle. In other words, it is not necessary to give critical support to one side against the other. In the light of such tumultuous and historical events which are taking place in China today, neutralism—that is, standing by and regarding the events as a spectator—can only be described as the most irresponsible position for revolutionaries. And any objection to the effect that we are not interested in the struggle between Mao's and Liu's factions, but rather interested in directing the masses onto the road of political revolution to overthrow the bureaucracy as a whole, can only reflect either an ignorance of Marxism or a manifestation of sectarianism. It is not the nature of any mass movement to realize at the outset the nature of a bureaucratic regime and the necessity of a political revolution. Such a realization comes only through direct experiences. At the present the masses in China are only coming to

realize which of the two contending factions is more in tune with their own interests.

The masses, at first, always support the reformist tendencies, and it is only after they have gone through certain experiences with them, will they realize that even the reformists are unable to solve the urgent problems at hand. In other words, the masses in China will come to realize the necessity of political revolution mainly through their own experiences and not from someone standing on the side lines propagating for political revolution.

The present differences between Mao and Liu are becoming very clear. On the one hand, Mao still maintains that the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policies were correct; demands the utmost servility in the scientific, educational and cultural fields; absolutely refuses any concessions to improve the living standards of the masses; refuses to allow the masses any freedom of expression, but demands that they abide completely in accordance with his thought; and categorically rejects any united front with the other workers states, especially the Soviet Union with whom he had strained relations just short of a complete break. The opposition led by Liu, on the other hand, opposes the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policies; energetically opposes Mao's policies in the fields of science, education and culture; supports de-Stalinization and opposes Mao's personal cult and dictatorship, and thereby is in favor of freedom of expression; proposes to improve the living standards of the masses; and wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union in order to help the Vietnamese. These differences rule out any position of neutralism, i.e., being

only bystanders. We, as Trotskyists, are forced to intervene by taking a definite position based on a transitional program, that is, we must give critical support to Liu's faction against Mao and his followers. Only by doing so will it be possible to win the masses and those attacked by Mao to a revolutionary program. Only by supporting Liu's faction can we show the masses that Liu and his collaborators are incapable of solving China's fundamental problems. This is the only road to convincing the masses that it is necessary to overthrow the bureaucracy as a whole in order to build a democratic socialist China.

Conclusion

The October revolution and Stalin's seizure of power have proved to be the acid test of many groups and individuals claiming to be revolutionaries. Historically as well as today the Chinese question is only second to that of the Soviet Union. Especially since the Chinese revolution in 1949, many groups and individuals have been tested by the Chinese events. In our movement we have seen the outstanding examples of Pablo and Swaback. Therefore, I hope the International takes a serious attitude in adopting its position on China. I sincerely hope the comrades in each section will actively participate in the discussion in order to help the International arrive at a correct position to intervene in the Chinese events and put the Chinese political revolution on history's coming agenda.

November 19, 1967

LETTER OF COMRADE PENG SHU-TSE

To the International Executive Committee:

I regret not being able to attend the Plenum, especially since the Chinese question will undoubtedly be the most important question on the agenda. It is for this reason and my concern about the position to be taken in regard to China that I am writing this letter.

First of all I should like to make a few comments on the statement issued by the United Secretariat, November 6, 1966, "The Internal Crisis in China."

In general the statement seems to base itself only on a few documents and does not concern itself with the actual development of events. For example, the state-

ment takes the slogan "Politics in Command" as one of its bases, but it does not try to analyse this slogan in the context of the actual situation. It merely accepts this slogan in the abstract and then attempts to generalize from there. The result does not only *not* correspond to the facts but is absolutely contrary to them.

The truth is that the conflict between the two factions—pro-Mao and anti-Mao—originally emerged from the failures resulting from the Great Leap Forward program which included such things as the People's Communes, the back-yard furnaces, etc. The conflict was then aggravated by Mao's policies on literature and art, education and especially his attitude towards the USSR and the

war in Vietnam and his foreign policy as a whole which has led to China's isolation and to the serious defeat in Indonesia. These are concrete developments on which there have been many articles in our press, but the statement in no way considers these developments. It ignores the facts and only considers the developments from the abstract point of view, and therefore, it draws the conclusions that the struggle in China has no social basis and is only a struggle between two sections of the bureaucracy, i.e., an "intra-bureaucratic struggle."

In reality each of the factions have ideas which reflect different social bases. I have already described in my interviews to some degree the different ideologies of the two factions as well as has Comrade George Novack in several of his articles. If the statement had based itself upon these facts, it would not have been possible for the statement to reach the above conclusion of "intra-bureaucratic struggle" nor would it have been possible to take a position of neutralism.

It is stated in the statement, "that one of the most frequent ideological themes advanced by the ruling group is the one dealing with equalitarianism," but it must be asked, from where or in what documents can one find any appeals against Mao's opposition on the basis of equalitarianism?

The statement also fails to point out Mao's actions toward his opposition, such as the slandering of the opposition and not allowing them to state their ideas, the arrests, the imprisonments, the humiliations, the torture, etc., all of which have driven many to commit or attempt to commit suicide. Where do we stand in regard to the use of such methods? The statement does not only not clarify our position, but, on the contrary, it says that Mao has been "more inclined to bureaucratic paternalism than to measures of repression." Are these not similar actions as those Stalin used against all his opponents? Did not Stalin begin by slandering all oppositions by accusing them of being anti-party, anti-socialist and of being enemies of the people? Did not the Trotskyists criticize the methods Stalin used against Bukharin as well as the Left Opposition? What then is the position of the Fourth International in regard to Mao's action and methods—"bureaucratic paternalism"?

According to the statement the opposition to Mao is Khrushchevist. As I have clarified in an interview and in the Open Letter, there are two different aspects of Khrushchevism. However, this is in no way explained in the statement. In my opinion, the opposition to Mao agrees very strongly with the de-Stalinization measures carried out by Khrushchev, but I have never seen any evidence that they were in sympathy with Khrushchev's political revisionism or that they were opposed to the CCP's struggle against Khrushchev's political revisionism. It also seems to me to be the exact opposite in the case of Mao himself. He is especially against the de-Stalinization because of his own personal needs of maintaining his own personal dictatorship in the CCP.

The overall position taken by the statement is one of neutralism, and this was affirmed by Comrade Livio and Comrade Pierre in a meeting of the United Secretariat in March. When Mao uses Stalinist methods, is it possible to take a neutralist position on this question? I have made clear in my two interviews—one which was printed many months before the statement was written—

the general positions and ideas of the opposition to Mao, and I showed clearly that it was, in general, more progressive. How is it possible, then, to ignore the facts and to take a position of neutralism?

It should be pointed out that this is not just a neutralist position based upon the acknowledgment of the lack of information and therefore demanding a neutralist position until more information is obtained or until the events make themselves clearer. The statement characterizes both major factions, analyses the struggle between them and then proceeds to take the neutralist position of not being able to support either side.

Moreover, if the ideas expressed in the statement that the struggle is only an "intra-bureaucratic struggle" and that the Mao faction has appealed to the masses against bureaucracy using equalitarian slogans are really considered to be true, then it is necessary to ask why the statement did not give critical support to Mao's faction rather than take a neutralist position? Why did the statement hold back from adopting clearly the logical conclusion of the ideas put forward? The same ideas as those in the statement have been further clarified in more recent articles by Comrade Livio and especially by Comrade Pierre (for Livio's articles see *W. O.* Feb. 3, and March 3, 1967; and for Pierre's see *W. O.* March 10, 1967). According to these comrades, the workers in Shanghai intervened as an autonomous social force by going on strike and demanding higher wages as well as other benefits, in response to Mao's appeals, in response to his equalitarian slogans and in response to the general ideas and goals of Mao's "cultural revolution." This, however, in no way corresponds to what actually took place. The Shanghai workers went into motion in response to the appeals by Mao's opposition, the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee. It was they who organized the workers against Mao's faction and against Mao's cultural revolution. It was for this very reason that Mao's faction accused the Shanghai Municipal Party leaders of "economism," that is, of corrupting the workers and trying to turn the "cultural revolution" into a reactionary movement. The Maoist faction then proceeded to purge the entire Municipal Party leadership as well as many cadres and immediately brought to an end all the concessions which the opposition had given to the workers. This sequence of events is clearly documented by many articles. (If in the future it seems necessary, we will deal with this question in much greater length and in more detail.)

In regard to the recent events, it is felt by some comrades that Mao, and the bureaucracy as a whole, is retreating in the face of the threat from the independent movement of the working class, and that Mao is searching for a compromise, a solution, to which the opposition itself might also be amenable. But as we have stated above, there has, as of yet, been no real independent movement of the workers.

What characterizes the present situation, if anything, is Mao's own weakness in relation to the opposition. Mao is very weak mainly because he has no cadres in the party. It was for this reason that he was forced to go outside the party in the first place in order to carry out his purge, and it is for this very same reason that he has depended so heavily on the army from the very beginning. The present situation can best be described by saying that Mao is making a tactical retreat—not a com-

promise—in order to consolidate his gains, regroup his forces and prepare for another attack. Mao has taken several cities and now he has to try and consolidate his victories. For this he needs cadres, and it is for this reason that he is trying to regroup under his wing some of those cadres represented by Chou En-lai (it must be remembered that I have characterized the group represented by Chou En-lai as a third tendency and not part of the real opposition). Mao's attitude toward the opposition, however, has in no way changed. The "handful taking the capitalist road" are still denounced with just as much vehemence as before, and the slogan "Seize Power" is still on the order of the day for the Maoist forces in those places where the opposition remains in power. The struggle between the two factions is, then, in my opinion, one of life and death. The struggle has deep sociological roots, and it cannot be terminated or compromised so easily. It could take extraordinary circumstances before a compromise could actually become a possibility between the two factions, and this is not at all the present reality.

Finally, the proposals put forward by the statement

were only those abstract principles which can be applied to almost all the workers states. It did not deal in any way with the concrete events in China nor advance any proposals concerning them. Such abstract proposals are of no use to the Chinese comrades as far as action is concerned during the present crisis. From the few comments I have made above, I would like to ask the IEC to re-evaluate the position taken by the statement and to base themselves in the future on the actual development of the events and not on abstract possibilities, theories and ideas.

My position and ideas, as well as those of the Chinese section, have been made clear enough in my two interviews and in the Open Letter. It is, therefore, not necessary to repeat them here. We consider the position taken by the statement to be completely wrong and that such a position places the future of Chinese Trotskyism in great danger. Our conclusion is that we must take a position of critical support to the opposition against Mao's faction and his personal dictatorship.

March 1967

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE CCP AND CHINA'S SITUATION

[The following text is a resolution passed on Feb. 28, 1967, at a plenary session of the provisional National Committee of the Revolutionary Communist Party of China.]

I

The underlying basis of Mao Tse-tung's thought on China's socialist construction is that despite the poverty, backwardness and the isolation of the country, spiritual strength—leader's appeal, revolutionary agitation and examples—exertion of physical strains, and human wave tactics will make the country leap into the realm of the big powers, which will thus exert a dominating influence on the world situation. Mao's thought reflects the psychological state of the recklessness of building socialism in a single backward country after the leadership has triumphed in the revolution. This idea was even further strengthened when the Soviet Union withdrew her experts and cancelled all aid, this plunging China into a greater state of isolation.

Liu Shao-chi and other leaders within the CCP, however, after having followed Mao's line in the past, have tried to introduce some modifications in Mao's line after their illusions were shattered by the actual reality of some of Mao's policies. On the question of building socialism, they tried, to a certain extent, to take into account the objective laws in the economy, give up "the great empty talk," advance the welfare of the masses, put more emphasis on science and technology, and improve the relationship between China and other countries. This of course does not counter the idea of building socialism in a single country, but merely expresses the idea that it must be done in a more steady and cautious way.

The movement of the Cultural Revolution essentially reflects a "life and death" struggle between two major tendencies within the CCP which are represented by Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi respectively. From 1952 to 1966 there have existed inside the CCP some differences of opinion over some of the major questions. Although the differences, under the bureaucratic party system, were not able to take the form of open debate, those who were

dissatisfied with Mao's policies, gathered around Liu Shao-chi eventually leaving Mao virtually isolated within the party.

The main objections to Mao's policies are as follows:

1. On the collectivisation of agriculture—the opposition has taken issue with Mao over the intensiveness of agricultural collectivisation.

2. On the policy of the Three Red Banners—the opposition has objected to the Great Leap Forward, to the tempering of steel on an all-people basis, to the practice of Satellite Field and to the People's Communes movement.

3. On the policy of literature and art—the opposition opposes the extremely tight control on the intellectuals, the party jargon, and the modern operas taking the place of traditional operas.

4. On the cult of the personality—the opposition while maintaining the formula of "Marxism-Leninism, and Mao Tse-tung's thought," nevertheless, objects to the intensification of the cult of Mao.

Among all these differences, the most serious is over the policy of the Three Red Banners. The Great Leap Forward movement embodying Mao's recklessness, fantasies and childishness—particularly the tempering of steel on an all-people's basis and the practice of Satellite Fields—and the policy of the people's communes have virtually ruined China's economy. These policies have not only failed in making the country catch up with Britain within "15 years," but have on the contrary, plunged the whole economic construction of the country into a chaotic situation and set it back several years. As a result of this reckless economic policy, China suffered a severe famine which lasted for a period of three years.

All the above decisions were not fully deliberated on by the leadership of the CCP. Mao Tse-tung was the only person responsible for making the above policy decisions—decisions of impulse. Mao's personal dictatorship has developed to such an extent that he frequently ignores the Central Committee and even the Politbureau of the CCP. The Politbureau and Central Committee then have to accept Mao's decisions after the fact and bear the responsibility for all the disastrous consequences brought about by what Mao has decided.

During the Stalin era, the personal dictatorship was tolerated, but today after de-Stalinization, many leaders of the CCP, who have devoted themselves to the Chinese revolution find it difficult to bear it. The situation compelled Teng Hsia-ping, the party's General Secretary, and Liu Shao-chi, President of the People's Republic, as well as a majority of other leaders such as Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Chou Yang, Lo Jui-ching, etc., to group themselves together in order to resist Mao's fantasies and to lessen his outlandish policies detrimental to the bureaucracy. That Mao Tse-tung was forced to step down from the Presidency of the Republic in Dec. 1958 was symbolic, indicating that Liu-Teng and Co. had planned to curtail Mao's overgrown power. The further development of the curtailment resulted in the weakening of Mao's leading role in the party. The way Mao has complained about certain people having treated him like a deceased parent vividly describes this situation.

From the viewpoint of the Liu-Teng faction as opposed to Mao, it is not a pure struggle for personal power. Objectively this faction reflects the widespread dissat-

isfaction that has existed in the CCP for some time. In other words, the Liu faction is an echo within the CCP of the deep contradictions between the bureaucracy and the masses. That is not to say, however, that the Liu-Teng faction is really struggling for the interests of the broad masses, but only that the Liu-Teng faction is prudent enough to realise the approaching explosion of the contradictions in society as a whole. In order to maintain the bureaucracy, they prefer reforms with the aim of rectifying the blunders that could have been avoided in the first place, even under the bureaucratic regime, so as to alleviate the contradictions that exist between the bureaucracy and the masses. This has been a common trait of all reformists in history.

The control of the whole party and most of the state apparatuses was achieved by the Liu-Teng faction peacefully and gradually. At the time when they were in power, they broke up a great number of the people's communes into production teams, slackened the control on free markets and small private holdings, placed agriculture as the foundation of economic construction, slowed down the speed of economic development, loosened the grip on the intellectuals, and lessened the tense relationship between China and the USSR, etc. As a result, the economic condition which had been deteriorating, gradually began to recover.

Peking, under the Mayor Peng Chen, became an anti-Maoist center; the propaganda department and the Ministry of Culture which controlled the nationwide propaganda and cultural work, also stood on the side of the Liu-Teng faction, giving the intellectuals an opportunity to level critical attacks against Mao Tse-tung's blunders. "Evening Chats at Yenshan" and "Notes from the Three Family Village" are the most outstanding examples.

In the face of weakening power and the critical attacks, Mao found it difficult to sway the realm in Peking, therefore, he went to Shanghai where he planned his counter-attack, thus opening the curtain to the most unrelenting party struggle.

II

In comparison with Mao and Co., the opposition controlled the party and Youth League apparatuses, the trade unions and the majority of the Central Committee, the Standing Committee and the Politbureau, all sided with the opposition. Along with the Central Committee and local party organizations, the opposition also controlled most of the state apparatuses, thus leaving Mao Tse-tung in a very isolated position. Therefore, Mao could not hope to change the whole situation through the normal procedures. The only way out for him was to depend on the armed forces of Lin Piao attempting to regain his power.

Mao first launched his attack on "The Three Family Village" in the "Liberation Army Daily" and the "Shanghai Wenhui Bao," and then he returned to Peking in order to remove Peng Chen with the support of Lin Piao's armed forces. With Lin's backing, Mao also ousted a number of the Central Committee members, and then convened the 11th plenary session of the Central Committee. He reshuffled the Politbureau and the Standing Committee to pave the way for reestablishing his power in the Central Committee. Despite these drastic measures, Mao was still unable to control the whole party, the Youth League

organizations or the state apparatus.

After Mao had "seized power" in Peking, he hesitated to continue taking power with only military forces for fear that if he depended too much on Lin's army, he would lose some of his own personal power to Lin Piao. Mao as well hoped he could regain his power under the cloak of the mass movement. At the same time, Mao wanted to take this opportunity to breed a score of new bureaucrats to take the place of the old ones.

Therefore, Mao agitated through the medium of propaganda for the youngsters to form the Red Guards. Taking advantage of his personal prestige and the rebellious impulse of the young people, Mao urged the Red Guards to launch struggles against the opposition elements.

Although the Red Guard movement is a kind of mass movement—in which a majority of participants are students—the movement was organized in a hurry and is essentially a loyalist movement, the central task of which is to protect Mao's personal power and the absolute dominating position of his thought. The Red Guard movement is in the main led by Mao's personal henchman, Chen Po-ta, and his wife, Chiang Ching. The Cultural Revolution Group under the Central Committee is in fact the temporary headquarters of the Maoists. The childish programs which are aimed at reforming the traditional customs and are carried out by the burgeoning Red Guards have only created an atmosphere of rebellion for the purpose of setting the stage for the purge of the Liu-Teng faction and the many other dissidents. In practice, the Red Guards have worked hand in hand with Lin Piao's army in an effort to overthrow the reformists who occupy many different positions in the local governments as well as all the other opposition elements who are in positions of authority.

In short, Mao's purpose is to reestablish his personal dictatorship and to cut short any reform measures. To achieve this, he has deliberately intensified the propaganda of his own personality cult, pushing it to the utmost extreme, and he has desperately made his own thought the only orthodoxy of China's 700 million people. Mao's cult of personality has even gone beyond that of Stalin's during the period of the thirties and forties. Mao Tse-tung is firmly holding onto the most conservative fortress of Stalinism in spite of the fact that he dresses himself up in the most attractive and glittering terms such as, "revolution," "anti-revisionism," "mass movement," "the Paris Commune," "Great democracy," etc. Mao is fighting against the worldwide currents of de-Stalinization in a desperate effort to maintain the gone-by "glory" which was bestowed upon Stalin. From this point of view, Mao's Cultural Revolution, Red Guard movement, power-seizing movement, etc., are reactionary in character.

The major shortcomings of the Liu-Teng faction are:

1. Although Liu, Teng and their followers are dissatisfied with Mao's policies, they are still not actually placing themselves outside of the category of Mao's thought. Since they have been showing respect for Mao's supreme position, they remain, in effect, Mao's adorers and his stewards, and thus, they are more bound to fail in vying for leadership in opposition to Mao.

2. The Liu-Teng faction has never launched any open attack on Mao's erroneous policies either within or outside the party, nor has it put forth any clear or comprehensive political program in opposition to Mao. In

the course of the struggle, therefore, they are forced "to oppose red banners with red banners." As a result, they are not in a position to show their true political colors in order to win over the masses and wage an effective struggle for power.

3. The Liu-Teng faction does not trust the masses, and they do not depend upon them. They merely carry on the struggle in the upper-most levels of both the party and Youth League. Therefore, when they encounter the attacks and are humiliated by the Maoists, they cannot gain the dynamic support of the masses.

4. The Liu-Teng faction lacks in revolutionary temperament, gratifying themselves by remaining within the bounds of the traditional ways and legal procedures (possibly hoping to avoid civil war). When Mao Tse-tung employs extra-legal methods of struggle against them, they are caught in a bind. In addition, Mao's prestige is so great that they could not or dare not unite themselves in open opposition to Mao using the state apparatus. Consequently, they have no alternative but to submit to the attacks.

The methods used by Mao Tse-tung to struggle against the opposition faction are to knit, by hook and by crook, a tissue of crimes and a web of lies which he uses to discredit and humiliate his opponents. There is no chance for the opposition to speak out and defend themselves. Whomsoever opposes Mao is dubbed as a "revisionist" and "taking the capitalist road." The Liu-Teng faction, who have worked with Mao for a number of years and who have themselves used these very same methods, understand very well what these methods really mean. While Mao launches the Cultural Revolution, Liu-Teng organize "work-teams"; while Mao organizes his Red Guards, they also organize their own Red Guards and even workers' Red Guard groups; while Mao stages mass touring, they also follow suit; while Mao calls for the great alliance, they too appeal for great unity; while Mao decides to carry out the seizure of power, they too pursue the same line except that they occasionally are put on the defensive by the anti-seizing of power. They seem to be under the shadow of Mao, the Almighty. There is no doubt, however, that clashes between the Red Guards supporting Mao and those supporting Liu-Teng, and clashes between the workers in favor of the reformists and students "loyal" to Mao have been taking place everywhere.

All the bureaucrats whose experience of the process of decomposition and unity, re-decomposition and re-unity, a process which has still not reached a decisive stage, are forced to take a stand on one side or the other.

Many of the elder generation of the CCP, such as Chu Teh, have been purged due to their dissatisfaction over the purge of their fellow comrades.

The new leader Tao Chu, who has in these turmoils been promoted from the Secretary of the Central-south Bureau to the number four position in the Politbureau, the position of the propaganda chief and to the Cultural Revolution group, was himself recently purged, though at first he seemed to be occupying a buffer position between the Maoist faction and the Liu-Teng faction.

The members of the Central Committee's Cultural Revolution group as well as the members of the People's Liberation Army's Cultural Revolution group, are constantly changing. New clashes are developing between Chiang Ching and the new leaders, causing new cleavages

within the Mao-Lin faction. It is evident that the turmoil is still developing. The question of who will actually triumph is not yet known, and there is still a rather long way to go before either side will be able to claim a decisive victory.

As for the future development of the situation, we can venture to make the following assessment:

In spite of the fact that the Mao-Lin faction has gained the upper hand in the current round of struggles, putting under house arrest many of the opposition's most important leaders, seizing power in some of the larger cities and provinces, the present situation indicates that the pro-Liu-Teng elements are spreading all over the country, are in control of several big administrative districts (in area they are much bigger than those controlled by the Mao-Lin faction) and have the support of a portion of the armed forces. To purge and outcast these tremendous forces of opposition, to pull them down from power, remains, indeed, a very difficult task for Mao and his faction.

The Red Guards and the Rebel Organizations on which Mao depends to seize power consist of well-nigh undisciplined mobs, lacking in experience and training. If we say that the Red Guards showed their childish impulse of rebellion in the initial stages, they cannot help but quarrel over bureaucratic privileges when they undertake the task of real power. New clashes which are constantly taking place have forced Mao to attack what is termed as "individualism," "gangsterism," "cliquism," etc., in an effort to avoid the contradictions within his own faction. It is very dubious whether the Red Guard organizations will be able to maintain the power after taking it, and advance economic production when the opposition has been crushed.

Whether Mao will be able to triumph over the opposition or not, he, nevertheless, seems to have shattered in a very short time the well disciplined and unified party which has gone through a variety of stages in its forty-year history.

The purging and the ousting by Mao of the most capable and experienced comrades who emerged from the generations of the twenties and forties, amounts to the destruction of the backbone of the CCP, and thus, the lowering of the CCP into its grave. It is certain that from now on there will be no stable or solid foundation for bureaucratic rule. Stalin's ruthless rule over Russia was brought to light after he was dead, but Mao's bureaucratic rule has shown itself to be disintegrating while he is still alive. This obviously indicates that history is accelerating its steps towards socialist democracy. Socialist democratization is a worldwide trend which a single Mao Tse-tung will never be able to counter.

The only real way the knot of the Chinese situation can be untied is by an upheaval of the masses. Due to all the pro-Liu-Teng ruling apparatuses being under fire while at the same time the new pro-Mao apparatuses are still in the process of being set up, the whole political shackle has been loosened, even to the point that there exists a state of semi-anarchy in some places. Appeals to the masses to struggle against any of the top bureaucrats other than Mao himself and other selected leaders will objectively pave the way for the criticism of the CCP by the masses by making use of the "decreed" democracy.

These people in power in the local governments always appeal to workers and peasants to defend them

when they are being attacked by the Red Guards. Therefore, the workers and the peasants will have the opportunity to stand up and take action. Those who were forced to transfer to the countryside in the past are returning in large numbers to the cities. Those who were put into the labor camp are participating in the struggles. The workers have emerged in the struggle demanding a change in the unreasonable living standards and working conditions set by the regime, and are asking for economic benefits, and have gone on strikes which have paralysed the country's economic and social life as a whole. The big strikes in Shanghai last January were such dramatic events. In the countryside, the members of the people's communes have taken action and have divided among themselves the accumulating funds and stocks of food-stuffs. In the initial stages, the worker-peasant movements always appear to be tinted by economic demands.

The people in power adopted an attitude of non-responsibility towards the mass movement while Mao and his followers accuse the mass movement of being a counterattack in the form of "economism" instigated by the persons in power. Mao and his supporters are not prepared to yield to the economic demands of the masses. On the contrary, the Maoists ask them to give up what they have already gained in the struggle. The pro-Maoists elements regard such economic demands as "capitalist tendencies" and call for the workers to show their "devotion," and to eliminate the "selfishness" that obsesses their minds. Mao repeatedly indicates that the living conditions of the workers and the peasants cannot be improved, which makes clear that the Maoist line runs counter to the interests of the working masses. This line will undoubtedly be cast away by the masses.

It is a matter of fact that the current mass movement is only the first step of intervention by the masses in the political events. The masses still lack a clear orientation and a correct leadership, however. Under these circumstances, the mass movement is not yet in a position to play a decisive role in the present situation. Therefore, the situation may in the near future follow the line of several possible alternatives mentioned below:

1. During the process of Mao's nationwide seizure of power, some large administrative districts or provinces under the influence of the Liu-Teng faction may take an independent position of defying Mao, and resist the Maoist seizures of power, thus creating a local or regional civil war (in fact there has already existed a local civil war in some places).

2. The opposing forces now being attacked in the border areas, such as Siankiang, Tibet, etc., may retreat to mountainous areas in armed groups in preparation for guerrilla war. Mao's past experience of launching guerrillas may be used to attack Mao himself. The August 1st Army event has indicated this tendency. The guerrillas may have gotten the support of the Soviet Union, and formed an irresistible force.

3. In the process of the mass movement, a new tendency that could cast off the reformist leadership now opposing Mao, will be just as likely to develop as the revolutionary ideas that developed during the Hundred Flowers Blossom movement, thus leading to a political revolution.

In the struggles inside the CCP, we are against the triumph of the Mao-Lin faction because their victory will block all reformist roads, revive adventurism, and intensify the frenzied cult of the personality and personal dictatorship. On the international level, Mao's victory will strengthen the Stalinist current and ruin the possibility of a socialist united front against imperialism, which will objectively benefit the warlike policy of imperialism.

While we should severely criticize the unthorough nature of Liu-Teng's reformism, some of their reform measures such as giving up the priority of developing heavy industries, doing away with the Great Leap Forward, decentralizing the people's communes, the maintaining of some private plots, loosening the grip on the free markets to a certain extent, liberalizing the atmosphere for the intellectuals by advocating that the workers in the cultural and art fields take their own initiative, opposing Mao's cult of personality, and vindicating those purged in the Peng Teh-huai events, etc. Undoubtedly these reforms reflect the demands and dissatisfaction of the broad masses, and are better than the die-hard policies of Mao Tse-tung, and will benefit China's socialist development. However, these reformist measures remain confined in the category of Stalinism, and are comparable to what has been done, or is being done, in the Soviet Union and in some East European countries. We should put before the masses all the tantalizing reform measures, so that we are able to push the masses forward onto the road of true Marxism-Leninism.

Nevertheless, even if the struggles of the masses against the Mao-Lin faction are initiated and led by the reformists in the CCP, our attitude towards these struggles should be: while maintaining our own independent policy, we shall lose no chance to stand on their side, giving them our support in the struggles against the common enemy. Only by so doing will we be able to push the struggles to a stage of wider and more thorough development, providing the masses themselves with an opportunity of advancing forward and leaving behind the reformists who may, by then, have desperately set limits to the revolutionary activities of the masses.

Furthermore then, as for our general attitude towards the struggle within the CCP against the Mao-Lin faction, we should give the opposition our critical support, because what the opposition of the CCP has been doing reflects the progressive demands of the masses. We must admit that the triumph of the Mao-Lin faction will inevitably bring to China a worse situation than has ever existed.

On the one hand, we will direct our attack together with the opposition of the CCP on the most conservative layer of the bureaucracy so as to create favorable conditions for the political revolution in which the whole conglomeration of bureaucrats will be buried. In actual class struggle, on the other hand, we will certainly be able to win over the revolutionaries to our side through our genuine Marxist program, thus further strengthening our movement in wiping out the bureaucracy and building democratic socialism in China.

Class struggle is a merciless reality. A genuine revolutionary is in no case allowed to sit on the fence in the

class struggle.

As we have mentioned before, we should always be vigilant against the compromising nature of the reformists of the CCP and against their opportunist ideology impregnated with Stalinism. In actual struggles, we should not hesitate to expose the opportunism of the opposition of CCP while we stand side by side with them to fight the most decadent stratum of the bureaucracy. We advance with the reformists in launching attacks on the Mao-Lin faction, but we should draw a definite and clear line of demarcation between our position and that of the reformists. The class consciousness of the masses is developed from stage to stage until the masses really understand that the only way to build a democratic socialist society in China is to overthrow the bureaucracy—a fact which is proved to the utmost by the past 17 years' experience—which has become a stumbling bloc to the harmonious development of China's socialism.

That is the real meaning of our critical support to be given to the opposition in the CCP.

In order to advance the movement towards democratic socialism and towards the orientation of organizing the broad masses, we put forth the following basic demands:

1. Publish immediately all conditions and information concerning the struggles, and the differences of opinions in the CCP, so that the masses, nationwide, will understand what has happened and can judge what is right and wrong.

2. Give freedom to the opposition in the CCP to voice their opinions and to defend themselves: at the same time, give freedom to all revolutionary workers and peasants, intellectuals, and revolutionary parties to speak out and criticize the opinions of others.

3. Stop immediately the forced self-humiliation and secret trials of dissidents.

4. Grant those who support the cause of the proletarian revolution and socialism freedom to think, to speak, to write, to publish, to associate, to demonstrate, to strike, to bear arms, to oppose the cult of personality and personal dictatorship.

On the above basis, a nationwide debate among the masses on the future policy should be held.

The dictatorship of the proletariat is practiced over all class enemies such as the imperialists, the capitalists, the landlords, and the rich peasants. It should, however, provide ample freedom for workers, peasants, and revolutionary intellectuals. Capitalist democracy is only for the few—it is a false democracy. Proletarian democracy is for the majority—it is a real democracy. The democracy of the proletariat should be much broader and more thorough. Unfortunately, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the Soviet Union has proceeded along the bureaucratic road ever since Stalin betrayed Lenin and persecuted Leon Trotsky. From that time, the countries of the proletarian dictatorship the world over have followed in the mold of Stalinism, with a bureaucratic system. Due to the ruthless rule of the bureaucratic hierarchy, a great number of people who fought for the cause of revolution have lost their confidence in Marxism-Leninism and socialism. Those who have lost faith in Marxism-Leninism will inevitably bow to capitalist democracy. As a result, the development of the true socialist democracy will be hampered and objectively will pave the way for the consolidation of Stalinism. This is an historical

tragedy. Under these circumstances, we should uphold high the banners of true Marxism-Leninism and proletarian democracy so as to push forward all revolutionary forces toward democratic socialism.

We believe that in the CCP and in the Youth League there are a great number of members who cherish hopes of reforming society and possess revolutionary enthusiasm. Although they are growing up in Mao's era, they have opportunity to approach Marxism-Leninism. In their daily life and social struggles, they are developing independent thinking, trying to find the correct road for China's socialist construction. We sincerely hope that they will unite themselves inside their party or outside of it to form an independent nucleus that will eventually lead to the formation of a new leadership which will in turn lead to the rational development of socialism in China. We wish to establish a comrade-like relationship with those revolutionaries or revolutionary organizations in an effort to work out the correct line for constructing socialism in China and struggling for socialist democracy.

In order to deal with the current situation, our basic proposals are the following:

1. To maintain the state ownership of property and all achievements so far gained; destroy all the plots of the imperialists, the capitalists, the landlords and the rich peasants in their attempt to restore the overthrown private ownership of property and capitalism.

2. To let proletarian democracy prevail. The workers, peasants and revolutionary intellectuals should be granted the freedom of setting up political parties, of printing, putting forth manifestos, publishing books, newspapers and magazines, of organizing the masses, staging demonstrations and strikes, and of participating in elections.

3. To abolish the right of all party committee members to control the state apparatus, educational institutions and social organizations.

4. To let the workers, the peasants, experts, scientists, experimental workers, etc., form themselves into a national economic construction committee to make an overall plan for economic development in China's socialist construction.

5. To observe the principle of having the peasants' agreement in carrying out agricultural collectivization and

communization. The state should help the peasants advance toward collectivization with mechanical and scientific technology, and consolidate the collectivization by using the influence of its economic capabilities. To let the peasants have the right to join or to withdraw from the commune.

6. All factories and production organizations in the countryside should be run by committees democratically elected by the workers and peasants themselves. On this solid principle, production can be supervised and supplies smoothly delivered.

7. On the basis of proletarian democracy, elect worker-peasant-soldier committees, at different levels, as the countrywide and local apparatus of authority. Different committees should be by-elected once a year (the duration of office for a committee member should not last for more than 3 years). The voters reserve the right to dismiss those elected to offices.

8. To abolish all the privileges of the bureaucrats. Their remunerations should not exceed those of the ordinary working man.

9. To oppose the opportunist principles of Bandung, and to give selfless aid to the revolutionary struggles of the workers and the peasants in other countries so as to advance the world revolution.

10. To establish a united anti-imperialist front among all workers states, so that an effective struggle against the imperialists and their aggressive war will be waged and true peace in the world will be achieved.

We firmly believe that only the forces of socialist democracy both in the economic and political fields will put an end to the ruthless, barbarian and dictatorial rule and that democratic socialism is necessary in order to correctly orientate the construction of socialism in China into a harmonious and reasoned direction, to improve the living conditions of the people, to provide an outlet for the creativeness and enthusiasm of the people, to regain confidence in socialism, and to exert once again China's revolutionary influence on the oppressed and and the exploited people all over the world as well as upon the future development of all the workers states. All those positive factors will eventually help advance China's socialist construction, shattering China's backward state, and the building of a harmonious alliance of world socialism.

THE RELATIONSHIP AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
MAO TSE-TUNG AND LIU SHAO-CHI

By Peng Shu-Tse

(The text of an interview given to Antonio Farien by Peng Shu-Tse July 6, 1967)

Q. Since my last interview with you (January 20, 1967; see World Outlook, vol. 5, no. 6) the development of events has become more and more serious. The struggle between the two factions -- anti-Mao and pro-Mao -- has become more and more violent.

On the one hand, since Mao openly called on the army to intervene in the struggle to help the Red Guards to seize power, the Maoists have occupied the government and party offices in Shanghai and in the capitals of Shansi, Heilungkiang, Kweichow, Fukien, Kiangsi and Kwangtung. This struggle for power has now extended into the provinces of Honan and Szechwan, as well as many other cities and districts, such as Chichi, Heilungkiang, Suchow, Kiangsu, Pinhsiung, Kiangsi, etc. The situation in Honan and Szechwan is of special significance, since according to Le Monde of June 14, 1967, during the night of June 7-8, a large scale, bloody clash took place in Szechwan in which over 300 were killed and several thousand wounded. In Honan similar clashes were supposed to have taken place, and the opposition captured the key positions of power. It was reported over the Honan radio that the oppositionists openly supported the position of Liu Shao-chi. These events demonstrate that the possibility of the struggle between the two factions breaking out into a national civil war is becoming increasingly greater. In fact, the present clashes already constitute civil war on a local scale.

On the other hand, immediately following the publication of an article in Red Flag by Tse Peng-yu (April 1, 1967), huge demonstrations of Red Guards took place in Peking, Shanghai and other cities against Liu Shao-chi, openly accusing him of being "the top party person in authority taking the capitalist road," and shouting the slogans "Down with Liu Shao-chi!" "Down with the Chinese Khrushchev!" "Down with Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and Tao Chu!" and "Bury the Black Dynasty of Liu's Family!" These and other such slogans were spread about as widely as possible by the Maoists. The Peking radio even broadcast newspaper articles attacking Liu Shao-chi by name, and reported all the news about the demonstrations and meetings which were held in order to denounce him. Judging from these events, it seems that Mao had decided to prepare public opinion for the removal of Liu, Teng, and other opposition leaders from their posts. This development is, of course, not surprising, since it stems logically from the

earlier developments. However, many people who are interested in China, and concerned with her fate, find it difficult to understand why and how these two factions have reached such irreconcilable positions. In other words, it is very difficult to understand just what the basic political differences are which separate the two factions, making all compromise between Mao and Liu impossible. Can you explain these differences and how they developed?

A. Because of the Stalinist traditions of the Chinese Communist party, the nature of all essential differences is kept secret, and it is very difficult for anyone outside of the party to understand these differences. However, owing to the wall posters and the many newspapers of the Red Guards which in recent months have openly attacked Liu Shao-chi, we can see much more clearly what the essential differences between Liu and Mao are. For example, an article, "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," published in the Red Guard newspaper, Ching-Kan-shan (reprinted in Ming Pao Monthly, January 18 and 19, 1967), and another article, "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi," published in Red Guards in the Capital (February 22, 1967), which, despite the most malicious attacks on Liu and his past activities, reveal some important facts which may be used to judge the underlying historical differences between Mao and Liu.*

However, before one can understand the present differences between Liu and Mao, one should first know a little about their past, that is, their different posts and activities, both inside and outside the party, as well as the two men's past relationships.

Q. Generally speaking, Mao Tse-tung's past positions and activities are fairly well known. The history of Liu Shao-chi is still relatively unknown and very unclear. The past relationships between Liu and Mao are even more obscure. Therefore, it would be of great interest

* It should be pointed out here that some of the facts revealed in the Red Guard newspapers have never before been known outside of the ruling echelons of the party. Therefore, it is quite evident that these articles were written, if not by, then under the direction of some very high officials close to Mao, directing the "Cultural Revolution," such as Chen Po-ta, Chiang Ching, Kang Sheng, etc.

if you could describe and explain some of the past history of Mao, and especially of Liu, as well as the relationships between them.

A. After attending the founding congress of the CCP in 1921, Mao was sent to Hunan as the secretary of the provincial committee, where he was active for about two years. In 1923 he was elected to the central committee, at the 3rd congress of the party, and was assigned to the post of organizational secretary. It was during this period that the Comintern ordered members of the CCP to join the Kuomintang and to collaborate with it, and Mao was appointed a member of the Kuomintang's Shanghai Municipal Committee, where he did all of his work, neglecting his work in the CCP.

In the autumn of 1924 Mao returned to Hunan and participated in the peasant movement, after which he went to Canton and began to work in the headquarters of the central committee of the Kuomintang as a secretary of the propaganda department and as editor of the Kuomintang's weekly magazine Political Weekly. Towards the end of 1926 he again returned to Hunan, and it was during this time that he gathered the information for his famous article on the peasant movement.

In the spring of 1927 Mao became the president of the Provisional National Federation of Peasant Associations. He held this post until the defeat of the revolution in July 1927, when the members of the CCP in Wuhan were purged from the Kuomintang.

Liu Shao-chi's work during this same period is quite different. After returning to China from Moscow in the summer of 1922, all of his work was done in the workers' movement. His first activities were among the coal miners in Anyuan, where he and Li Li-san led huge strikes and organized several trade unions, and Liu became one of the most important leaders.

In the summer of 1925 Liu went to Shanghai, where he participated in the May 30 Movement and helped in the organization of trade unions. In the latter part of the year he was sent by the party to Tsintien to help in the organization of the workers' movement there.

In the spring of 1926 Liu went to Canton, where he organized, together with Li Li-san and Teng Chung-hsia, the 3rd Congress of the National Federation of Trade Unions (NFTU), and he was elected secretary of the Congress and a member of the NFTU Executive Committee. After this Liu became well known, and one of the most important leaders in the trade union movement.

At the end of 1926 Liu went to Wuhan as a delegate from the NFTU in order to lead the workers' movement; he remained there until July 1927, when the Kuomintang purge took place.

From the above brief descriptions of the two men one may say that, generally speaking, up to mid-1927 Mao's main area of work was in the Kuomintang and with the peasant movement, while Liu's work was entirely in the working class movement. Therefore, we can say that during this period there was no direct working relationship between Mao and Liu.

After the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution, the policies of the Comintern changed from opportunism to adventurism. It was during this turn that Mao began to play an important role in carrying out the party's line by organizing the peasants into guerrilla units and carrying out the "Autumn Harvest Uprising." After the failure of the "Uprising" he became one of the most important leaders of the guerrilla and soviet movement in Kiangsi until 1934. Nevertheless, during this period Mao was still under the leadership of Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san and Wang Ming -- ideological leaders of the Central Committee of the CCP -- who criticized him very severely, especially the Wang Ming group, which dealt him a very severe blow after the Central Committee moved to the soviet base in Kiangsi in 1933. All of Mao's powers were, in reality, taken away from him, and he was left with only the name of "Chairman of the Soviet Government," while the vice chairman Hsiang Ying took over almost all the responsibilities.

The situation only changed for Mao at the meeting of the Central Committee of the CCP held in Tsunyi during the Long March, where Mao took over the leadership of the party. Yet, he did not control the whole party and the army, because the followers of Wang Ming captured many leading posts, and because a part of the army remained behind in Kiangsi, Anhwei and Chekiang led by Hsiang Ying, who was a follower of Wang Ming and refused to accept the leadership of Mao. It was not until the 7th Congress of the CCP in 1945 that Mao was able to gain complete supremacy over the party.

This same period (1928-1945) found Liu Shao-chi in much different circumstances. After 1928 Liu's work was mainly inside the party. Until about 1931 he worked in Peking and Manchuria, and then in 1932 he was sent to the soviet area in Kiangsi, where he was assigned to the workers' movement.* He arrived just about

* In reality, he had no work there, since there was no workers' movement in the soviet areas.

the time when Mao lost all of his powers.

In the autumn of 1934 Liu was sent north where he again began to work for the party in Peking, and became the secretary of the party's Northern Bureau. It was during his work at this time that he helped to launch the anti-Japanese movement of September 9, 1935. It was from this movement that Liu, along with Peng Chen* and others, was able to win many new, young and talented recruits to the party, such as Liu Lan-tao, Chiang Nan-chiang, Lu Ping, Teng To, etc.

At the beginning of 1938 Liu was recalled to Yen-an to participate in the work of the Central Committee and Political Bureau of the CCP, where for the first time he collaborated closely with Mao Tse-tung.

In 1938 Liu, as secretary of the newly created Central Area Bureau, was sent as a special representative from the Central Committee to the region occupied by the New Fourth Army (NFA).** This army had been organized out of the many small guerrilla units in the south which had not made the Long March. The commander of this army was Yeh Ting, and the vice commander and political commissar was Hsiang Ying.

At this time there was a dispute taking place between Mao and Wang Ming over the question of collaboration with the Kuomintang, and since Hsiang Ying was in agreement with Wang Ming, it was Liu's mission to try and reduce the influence of the Wang Mingists in the New Fourth Army.

In January 1941 the New Fourth Army was attacked by Chiang Kai-shek's forces, and Yeh Ting was captured and imprisoned by Chiang; Hsiang Ying was killed in action. Afterwards, Chen Yi took over as commander while Liu Shao-chi took Hsiang Ying's place as political commissar. Liu also dissolved the South-Eastern Bureau, of which Hsiang Ying had been the secretary, and incorporated its jurisdiction under the Central Area Bureau, of which he himself was secretary. Liu then became the party's most important leader in those areas under the influence of the Kuomintang and those areas occupied by Japanese imperialism. During this time he greatly expanded the influence of the party throughout these areas, and at the same time increased the numbers of the New

* Peng Chen, the Mayor of Peking who was purged by Mao in June 1966, was at this time a member of the Northern Bureau and in charge of the student movement for the party in Peking.

** The army in the North was the New Eighth Route Army.

Fourth Army, destroying in the process all the influence of Wang Ming's group. In other words, he brought the entire NFA under Mao's direction, since before, while under the influence of the followers of Wang Ming, the NFA had not always obeyed Mao's directives. This was a great contribution to Mao and his position, and there followed a very close collaboration between Liu and Mao.

In the autumn of 1942 Liu returned to Yen-an to work in the Political Bureau, and he became recognized at the party's number two leader after Mao.

During the next few years Liu helped Mao to discredit Wang Ming and his supporters in the Central Committee. He also helped Mao prepare several documents, such as the "Resolution on Several Historical Problems" (adopted by the 7th Plenum of the Central Committee in April 1945) and "The New Statutes of the CCP" (adopted at the 7th Congress of the CCP, April-June 1945).

In the first document, all the defeats which the CCP had suffered were blamed on Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai, Li Li-san, and especially Wang Ming and his group.* This document justified Mao's work as always having been correct, and praised Liu for his position from 1928-1932. The second document, which was probably written by Liu Shao-chi and which was reported on by him at the 7th Congress, stated in the preamble that "...the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the combined principles derived from the practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution," united with Marxism-Leninism, are the "guiding principles of all its (the party's) work." Liu's whole report was along this very line, praising Mao's thought as the supreme guide of the Chinese Revolution.

The Congress ended by electing Mao as the supreme leader of the party, and Liu as one of its top leaders, while almost all of Wang Ming's followers were either removed from the Central Committee or set back to candidate status.**

Following the Congress, Mao and Liu

* Ch'en Tu-hsiu was blamed for the defeat of the 1925-1927 revolution; Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san were blamed for the defeats during the adventurist period; and Wang Ming was held responsible for the defeat of the Red Army in Kiangsi, which was followed by the Long March. The Comintern was never singled out for any rebuke whatsoever.

** There were 44 members and 19 candidates in the new Central Committee. Wang Ming and a close collaborator of his were elected members in the next-to-last and last position.

collaborated closely in the struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. With the victory of the CCP in 1949, Mao became the chairman of the Peoples' Republic of China, and Liu its vice chairman; the ensuing close collaboration between Mao and Liu is well known.

Q. When did the differences between Mao and Liu develop, and over what questions?

A. During the period which I have just described, there were, of course, no major political differences. According to some of the recent news, major differences became apparent over the question of the agricultural cooperative movement. From 1955-1956, for example, the newspaper The Red Guards in the Capital reported, "Liu Shao-chi openly and frankly dared to sabotage the movement of cooperativization. In 1955 he helped Teng Tsu-hui* to cut off the formation of 200,000 cooperatives." This accusation is, of course, far from concrete. Yet it is sufficient to demonstrate that a major difference between Mao and Liu developed in 1955.

Mao proposed his plan of agricultural cooperativization in 1955, and insisted that it be completed in a very short time. His plan called for the completion of 850,000 cooperatives before the end of the year. Liu Shao-chi, Teng Tsu-hui and others, probably basing themselves on some of the past experiences of the Soviet Union, as well as on some of Lenin's ideas concerning collectivization,** advocated a much more prudent policy of long term collectivization. They were able to secure the majority of the Political Bureau for a program that called for the completion of cooperativization only in 1967. Mao was against this decision, and over the head of the Political Bureau he called a conference of municipal, provincial and regional secretaries which decided that the agricultural collectivization should be completed in 1957.

This was the first major difference between Liu and Mao, and it is clearly and closely connected with the later differences over the "People's Communes."

Q. In the last interview you explained that the most important difference

*Head of the party's Agricultural Department.

**Liu was reported by a Red Guard newspaper to have said, in a speech given at the Conference of National Propaganda Workers in 1951, that "Some comrades think that socialism in the countryside can be realized through the peasant mutual aid groups and cooperatives. This is, however, impossible. It is the utopian idea of 'agricultural socialism.' The realization of socialism in the countryside, i.e., collectivization, without industrialization, is absolutely impossible." This statement tends to indicate that Liu has studied some of Lenin's works on collectivization and industrialization.

was over de-Stalinization. You explained that while Mao was opposed to de-Stalinization, Liu seems to have been in agreement with it. Are there any facts to substantiate this?

A. Yes, it is true that this is the most serious difference between Mao and Liu. The Maoists have openly called Liu the "Chinese Khrushchev." The origin of this label is precisely over the question of de-Stalinization. The article recently published in the Red Guard newspaper Ching-kan-shan entitled "See the Ugly Face of Liu Shao-chi," stated that at the 8th Congress of the CCP in September 1956 Liu revised the statutes of the party, changing the sentence from the preamble which I quoted earlier: "...the thought of Mao Tse-tung, the combined principles derived from practical experiences of the Chinese Revolution," united with Marxism-Leninism, are the "guiding principles of all its (the party's) work," to read simply, "The CCP takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism as its guide to all actions." Thus, any reference to Mao and his thought was deleted. The author of this article considered this to be proof that Liu was in most malicious opposition to the the great leader, Chairman Mao.

The 8th Congress of the CCP not only revised the statutes of the party, removing the reference to Mao, but also emphasized that any personality cult must be prohibited. This can be seen very clearly in the report on changing the party statutes, which was given by Teng Hsiao-ping*: "The significance of opposing the personality cult was explained energetically at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. This will make a great impression on every communist party throughout the world." And, "The important contribution of the 20th Congress of the CPSU is to inform us that regarding a person as a god has led to very criminal results." And, "The personality cult is an old, historical and social phenomenon, and it is to a certain degree reflected in the life of our party and society. Our task is to carry out successfully, consistently and with determination the directives of the Central Committee against individual prominence and personal glorification."

It is very clear that under the impact of the 20th Congress of the CPSU and de-Stalinization, the majority of the Central Committee accepted the ideas of opposition to the personality cult; hence the removal of the reference to Mao and his thought from the party statutes and the prohibition of his personal cult.

* Teng Hsiao-ping became the General Secretary of the party at this congress and has, along with Liu, been attacked as one of the "top leaders in the party who are taking the capitalist road."

It is necessary to point out that the words of Teng about the personality cult reflecting itself in the society and the party are very important, as this was in direct reference to Mao Tse-tung himself. Since the 7th Congress in 1945, and especially since the CCP took power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung has deliberately established his personal cult, and has considered himself as "The Sun in the East," and "The Chinese Stalin." For example, there is a song, "The East is Red," which has the following verse: "The East is becoming Red, The sun is rising and Mao Tse-tung appears in China, He works for the well being of the people, He is the Great Saviour of the people."

After Mao's talks with Stalin in Moscow in 1950, a new song was composed, "Mao Tse-tung and Stalin are like the Sun shining in the Sky." These two songs have been scored for orchestration, and at the beginning of important meetings, and especially when Mao was in attendance, one or both of these songs were played, while everybody stood and afterwards shouted, "Long Live Chairman Mao Tse-tung!" This became almost a religious ceremony. After the beginning of de-Stalinization in the USSR, however, this ceremony was discontinued in China.

The effects of de-Stalinization in China constituted, without a doubt, a severe personal blow to Mao, and under the pressure of existing conditions Mao was obliged to make certain concessions, tolerate the changes -- if only for the time being -- and wait for more favorable circumstances in order to reassert his own cult.*

If one compares the 7th and 8th congresses of the CCP one can see clearly the decline of Mao's prestige. At the 7th Congress Mao made the political report, and with Liu's help Mao's "thought" was incorporated into the party statutes, thus establishing his personal cult. At the 8th Congress, however, the political reporter was Liu, and Mao's "thought" was removed from the statutes, and measures were taken to prohibit his personal cult. This shows what a tremendous effect

* At the 8th Congress Mao made a speech in which he declared, "The Soviet Party not too long ago held its 20th Congress, and it worked out a number of correct directives criticizing a number of existing shortcomings. One can say that their work will have a great effect on the future.... Our experiences are lacking; hence we must study as much as possible the experiences of our forerunners, i.e., the CPSU." This demonstrates that Mao at this time could not oppose the anti-cult atmosphere, and that it was only against his will that he tolerated the anti-cult actions of the party.

Khrushchev's de-Stalinization has had, and it is clear why Mao became so hostile towards Khrushchev, as well as towards Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

Q. Earlier, you stated that the differences between Mao and Liu on the cooperative movement were closely connected to the differences concerning the "People's Communes." Could you explain the differences on the question of the "People's Communes"?

A. Until recently, Liu was thought to have been a supporter of the "People's Communes" idea launched by Mao. However, the recent facts have revealed that this is not true. In the article, "The Crimes of Liu Shao-chi" it was stated, "At a meeting called by the Central Committee, which was attended by 78 cadres in January 1962, he (Liu Shao-chi) made a revisionist report. He violently attacked the "Three Red Banners"* and exaggerated to the utmost errors and mistakes in our work. He felt that the temporary economic difficulties were due to these errors and mistakes -- 30% due to natural disasters, 70% due to artificial disasters. He attacked the 1959 struggle against the Rightists as being excessive and even said, in an attempt to rehabilitate the Rightists, that the struggle itself was a mistake. He maliciously said that the party lacks democracy, and that party life is a 'brutal struggle' and a 'pitiless fight,' attacking Chairman Mao's correct leadership of the Central Committee." From the many attacks against Liu, one can conclude the following:

1) Liu opposed the "Three Red Banners" policy, that is, he opposed the "People's Communes" launched by Mao. This stems logically from his opposition to Mao's cooperativist movement.

2) Liu considered the economic difficulties as mainly the result of artificial disasters; that is, he felt that the economic troubles from 1960-1962 were a result of the "People's Communes" and "Great Leap Forward" policies.

3) Liu's opinion that the party was mistaken in the struggle against the Rightists of 1959, and in the purging of Peng Teh-huai**, Wang Keh-ching and others, means that he felt their criticism of the "People's Communes" was correct, and therefore he felt they should be rehabilitated.

* The "Three Red Banners" are (1) General Line, (2) Great Leap Forward, (3) People's Communes.

** Minister of Defense until 1959, when he was purged as the leader of an opposition to the "Great Leap Forward" program, and especially to the "People's Communes."

4) Liu's charges that the CCP lacked democracy, that the party life was "a brutal struggle" and a "pitiless fight" mean that Liu felt that Mao's purge of Peng Teh-huai and the others was a very dangerous symptom.

These four points show that very serious differences existed at that time between Liu and Mao.

Following the failure of the "People's Communes" and the economic disaster, Mao let Liu take over the reins of the party and deal with the serious difficulties. Liu, along with Teng Hsiao-ping, put into effect a rectification campaign which included many reforms, such as re-establishing private plots, a free market, personal ownership of livestock, and doing away with most of the public kitchens, public nurseries, etc. All the reforms met with a very favorable response from the great majority of the people, and therefore Liu won their respect and support, as well as that of most of the party cadres.

Q. Are there, or have there been, any differences between Mao and Liu over questions of literature, art and education?

A. Differences between Mao and Liu do exist over these questions. Your interview with Ch'en Pi-lan (see World Outlook, volume 5, number 26, July 14, 1967) explained some of the differences which exist between Mao and the opposition as a whole. The fact that Chou Yang was one of the main leaders of the opposition in the cultural field shows that it was under the influence of Liu Shao-chi. One can find proof of this in an article in the People's Daily, April 25, 1967, entitled "Crush the Counter-Revolutionary Program of Peaceful Transition -- Expose the Words of the Chinese Khrushchev Concerning the Problems of Writers." In this article it was stated that in March 1953 Liu Shao-chi asked Chou Yang and others to discuss with him questions concerning the writers. During these discussions Liu was supposed to have advocated the necessity of writers having more time to study, allowing them to write freely, and not interfering with their creative freedom.

These same ideas were expressed by Liu in his political report to the 8th Congress of the CCP, September 1956, and the Congress adopted a resolution based on Liu's report. This resolution stated that "In order to assure the prosperity of the sciences and the arts, we must firmly insist on the perspectives of the 'Let a Hundred Flowers Blossom and a Hundred Schools Contend' policy. It would be a mistake to use administrative methods to interfere arbitrarily in the sciences and arts." This shows that Liu's ideas on these questions are much different from those of Mao.

When Liu took over the reins of the party (in 1960) he carried out a much more moderate policy in the fields of literature, art and education, allowing much more freedom to the artists and writers. As a result, the work in the cultural fields improved to a certain degree under Liu's direction of the party. This, combined with the improvement in the economy, rallied to Liu's side most of the cultural workers, as well as the party cadres. The Peking Municipal Party Committee, led by P'eng Chen, is a good example. This turn of events led to the increasing isolation of Mao, and he even felt that his leadership position had been brought into question.

Q. What was Mao's reaction to this situation?

A. Mao saw the hopelessness of waging a struggle inside the party; he therefore turned towards the army. After 1960 Mao, through Lin Piao, Lo Yun-huan and Hsiao Hua, launched a broad movement in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to study Mao Tse-tung's thought, under the pretext of "correcting the mistaken line of P'eng Teh-huai and Wang Keh-ching."

Lin Piao proposed to the Central Military Committee a resolution entitled "The Correct Handling of Four Questions in the Political Fields of the Army." In this resolution Lin placed his emphasis on the importance of the role of man, politics and thought. Some time later, the Military Committee adopted a "Resolution Concerning Political Work in the Army." This resolution set forth 14 provisions. The first one stated that "It is necessary that Mao Tse-tung's thought be in command in all spheres of the Army." Before this, the slogan had been "Politics in Command," but now openly, and probably for the first time, this was spelled out clearly to mean Mao Tse-tung's thought in command.

It was following the adoption of this resolution that Lin Piao demanded "Everyone must read Chairman Mao's books, listen to Chairman Mao's words, work according to Chairman Mao's instructions, to become a good fighter of Chairman Mao."

An editorial published on January 1, 1966 in the Liberation Army Daily even stated that "every word of Chairman Mao is truth... We must firmly support and carry out everything conforming to Mao Tse-tung's thought and we must firmly resist and oppose anything which does not conform to Mao's thought." The reasoning behind such statements is very clear. No longer were the directives of the Central Committee, headed by Liu Shao-chi, to be followed, if they did not correspond to Mao's own personal thinking.

Mao also attempted to purge Liu's

supporters in the party. In September 1963 Mao proposed a resolution entitled "Some Current Problems Raised in the Socialist Education Movement in the Rural Areas" (the 23-article document). This resolution was not adopted by the Political Bureau; nevertheless, it was circulated throughout the party. This document then formed the basis of the "Four Clean-ups Movement," i.e., "The Socialist Education Movement to clean up politics, ideology, organization and economy." The main purpose of this movement was to purge those cadres who supported Liu, but the movement met with strong resistance, and in many places was sabotaged. The movement had no great effect except for the purging of some lower ranking cadres in the "People's Communes" and the district party committees. Therefore, Mao became even more dependent upon the army, and put forward a theory to carry on the struggle outside the party. The foundation of this theory was the idea that the class struggle continues after the victory of the proletariat and is reflected inside the party.

In a plenum of the Central Committee in September 1968 Mao put forward the slogan "We must not forget the class struggle!" This same plenum issued a communique, on Mao's insistence, which said, "During the transitional period from capitalism to socialism...the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie still exists. The struggle between the two lines of socialism and capitalism still exists." "This struggle is inevitably reflected inside the party...We must take heed in time, and we must firmly struggle against the different types of opportunist tendencies. The significance of the 8th Plenum of the Central Committee, in August 1959 at Lushun, is the clashing victory over the Rightist tendency, that is, the crushing of the attack by the revisionists." Here we can see that Mao is directly attacking Liu's defense of P'eng Teh-huai and Liu's suggestion that those who had been purged should be rehabilitated.

During 1963 and 1964 the Central Committee of the CCP published 9 articles criticizing the CPSU. The ninth article was entitled "On Khrushchev's Pseudo-Communism and the Historical Lessons for the World" (July 14, 1964). This article maintained that under the leadership of the revisionist Khrushchev the USSR had been transformed from a socialist to a capitalist state. The implication was, of course, that it was necessary to unleash a struggle inside the party against all revisionists, otherwise China herself would "change color."

At a meeting of the All-China Federation of Literature and Art Circles in June 1964 Mao made an address in which he gravely warned that "In the past 15 years, these associations and most of their publications have for the most part failed... to carry out the policies of the party....

In the recent years, they have even verged on revisionism. If they do not make serious efforts to remould themselves, sooner or later they are bound to become groups of the Hungarian Petofi-Club type." These words were a frank warning to those cadres working in the cultural fields under the influence of Liu's leadership.

All the arguments elaborated by Mao, such as those mentioned above, were a preparation for the purge of "those people in power who are taking the capitalist road" which was to follow.

Recently, Red Flag and the People's Daily published an article entitled "A Great Historical Document" (Hung-ch'i no. 7, 1967), in which they stated "Lenin saw that after the proletariat had taken power, the defeated bourgeoisie still remained stronger than the proletariat, and often attempted a restoration.... Therefore, in order to deal with this counterrevolutionary threat, and to overcome it, it was necessary to strengthen the proletarian dictatorship over a long period. There was no other road. Unfortunately, Lenin died too soon. He could not have solved this question in practice. Stalin was a great Marxist-Leninist who actually eliminated a great number of the counterrevolutionary bourgeois representatives who wormed their way into the party, including Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, Bukharin, Rykov, and their like."

These words not only demonstrate that Mao tries to justify his purge of the opposition led by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping on the basis of Lenin's theory, but also justifies his purge on Stalin's famous frame-up trials in the 1930's. From this one can see clearly what Mao has in mind for Liu, Teng, and the rest of the opposition.

Q. Are there any differences between Mao and Liu on foreign policy?

A. In the last interview I pointed out that the position of the opposition on foreign policy questions is much more difficult to determine, since there is less material from which to judge, and up to now I have been unable to find any new facts. Nevertheless, the position of Liu on foreign policy is different from Mao's extremely sectarian attitude. Foreign policy is almost always an extension of domestic policy. Therefore, in my opinion, Mao is responsible for China's extremely sectarian foreign policy, which would be in agreement with his extremely sectarian domestic policies. Liu, on the other hand, probably advocates a more moderate foreign policy, in line with his domestic policy. Since Lo Jui-ch'ing has been attacked as one of Liu's strongest supporters, we can almost certainly say

that Liu's attitude towards the USSR and the united front with the various socialist countries over the Vietnam war is identical with that of Lo.

Q. You have explained how reference to Mao's thought was included in the party statutes at the 7th Congress, and how it was removed at the 8th Congress, as well as the campaign carried out in the army on how everything was to be done under the guidance of Mao's thought. Now, in the "Cultural Revolution," Mao's thought stands out as one of its most prominent characteristics. Other than the personality cult aspect, can you briefly describe what Mao's thought actually is?

A. Broadly speaking, Mao's thought boils down to nothing more than the practical application in China of Stalin's theories. The essence of Stalinism consists of opportunism and adventurism, the revolution by stages, socialism in one country, and bureaucratic centralism which finds its most pronounced form in personal dictatorship. All these things can not only be found in Mao's theoretical works, but also in his actions. Here I will only give a few examples.

You will recall some of the things I have already said about the "Resolution on Several Historical Problems" adopted by the Central Committee in April 1945, in which Mao laid all the blame for all past defeats on Chen Tsu-hsiu, Ch'u Ch'iu-pai and Li Li-san. Mao never analyzed or even pointed out the opportunist or adventurist policies of the CCP during and after the 1925-1927 revolution, which had been forced on the CCP by Stalin. That is, Mao accepted Stalin's role and policies of opportunism and adventurism as being correct.

Mao's most important theoretical work is "On the New Democracy." When the party adopted the new statutes at the 7th Congress in 1945, which stated that Mao's thought should be the guide to all the party's actions, the party congress was basing itself on this work, written by Mao in January 1940. At this congress, Lin Po-ch'u, an important member of the Political Bureau at that time, said, "The theory of 'New Democracy' is the most brilliant manifestation of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism combined with the concrete revolutionary practice in China. This theory is the sharpest weapon the party and the Chinese people have in the struggle for victory." Chou En-lai said, "We are dependent on the brilliant leadership of our party's leader and comrade Mao Tse-tung. He has shown us the direction to follow in 'New Democracy.'" With such praise, we should examine the contents of Mao's 'New Democracy.'

According to Mao, after the October Revolution in Russia the national-democrat-

ic revolution in the colonial and semi-colonial countries was a "new bourgeois-democratic revolution." In this revolution, the national bourgeoisie remained a revolutionary class, and hence it was necessary to carry out the "united front" of workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie -- the bloc of four classes -- in order to destroy the imperialists and feudal forces, and to establish a "new democratic republic." That is, Mao advocated the establishment of a coalition government of four classes, as well as a "new democratic economy."

The "new democratic economy" meant the nationalization of only "the big banks, large industry and large commercial enterprises" by the state. "One must not nationalize the private property of other capitalists, and one should not prohibit the development of capitalist production which cannot control the national economy and the people's life....The rich peasant's economy in the countryside should also be permitted."*

All this is, of course, self-explanatory, and demonstrates clearly Mao's opportunism. Mao's theory of revolution by stages is clearly manifested in the following sentences: "The present tasks of the Chinese Revolution are the tasks of struggling against imperialism and feudalism. Before these tasks have been accomplished, it is not possible to speak about socialism. The Chinese Revolution must be divided into two steps. The first step is that of new democracy, and the second is socialism. The period of the first stage is relatively long."

Nor is any comment needed here, and in Indonesia, where Mao applied the theory of revolution by stages, the revolution has suffered a greater disaster than did the second Chinese revolution which Stalin led to defeat with the same theory.

Here it should be pointed out that Mao's "On the New Democracy" is still considered as the center of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The "16-Point Decision" adopted by the Central Committee last August 1966 put "On the New Democracy" as the first work to be studied in studying Mao's thought. The Liberation Army Daily published some articles explaining the contents of "On the New Democracy," encouraging all the cadres in the army and the party to study it.

In Yen-an, at a party school in May 1941, Mao made a speech entitled "The Reorganization of Our Study," in which he said, "The Brief History of the CPSU is the highest synthesis and summary of the world communist movement in the last 100

* Selected Works, Volume 3, p. 120, International Publishers, 1965

years. This is a model of theory combined with practice."* It is very well known that the Brief History of the CPSU is a "model of theory combined with practice" of Stalinism, because it contains the theoretical justification of Stalin's theories of revolution by stages and socialism in one country, as well as the justification for Stalin's adventurist policies of collectivization, industrialization and the foreign policy of the third period, the famous purges in the 30's of the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Bukharinists and other oppositions, the cult of the personality and Stalin's own personal dictatorship.

As far as Mao's methods are concerned, one can really find no difference between him and Stalin. Mao has always imposed his own opinions upon the party, and the present "Cultural Revolution" is the best example of Mao's bureaucratic methods against the great majority of the party in order to maintain his own personal dictatorship.

Q. What has been your personal relationship with Mao and Liu, and what is your personal appraisal of the two men?

A. Because my work and posts in the party were different from Mao's, I did not have much of a working relationship with him. I did have some personal contacts with him, however, only two of which I will describe.

In May 1926, after Chiang Kai-shek's coup d'etat of March 20, I went to Canton as the Central Committee's representative to discuss with Borodin, the Comintern representative. During my stay Mao visited me twice. One time he asked me to address his peasant school. The other time he brought an article he had written on the different strata among the peasantry, on which he asked my opinion. In his article he had divided the peasantry into many different strata according to the amount of land they owned. I then told him that in Lenin's opinion the peasants were divided mainly into three categories -- rich, middle, and poor -- depending upon the amount of land they were able to farm and what they needed in order to maintain their families. Mao did not reject my criticism and seemed to have accepted it.

In June 1927 I saw Mao for the last time in Wuhan. At that time he was very disappointed with the revolution, although he never discussed with me how the revolution could be rescued from the dangerous situation which existed. He was only concerned with finding a safe place for his family, and he asked my wife, Ch'en Pi-lan,

if she could help him.

My contact with Liu Shao-chi is somewhat different. In Shanghai in 1920 I studied Marxism and Russian together with Liu, and our relationship was quite close. From 1921-1922 we studied together in Moscow, during which time I was able to recruit him to the party.

After returning to Shanghai from Moscow in August 1924 all my work was in the party itself, and especially in the Political Bureau, as head of the Propaganda Department. I therefore had no real working relationship with Liu, although I saw him several times during my stay in Canton, and again in Wuhan during the summer of 1927. The last time I saw Liu was in the summer of 1929. At this time Ch'en Tu-hsiu and I had started to organize the Left Opposition. Liu, of course, understood my position in relation to the party, yet nevertheless he visited me at my home. During this visit we discussed the party's policy, and I criticized the party's present policy of adventurism as well as the bureaucratic organizational methods of the leadership. I also pointed out that during the workers' and peasants' uprising in the spring of 1927 the party should have then organized soviets in preparation for the taking of power. With all these criticisms Liu expressed his agreement, but could not bring himself to join the Left Opposition and struggle against the leadership. Liu was considered in the party at this time as a "reconciliator."

As far as my personal appraisal of the two men goes, I would say from a political point of view that both of them are Stalinists. After the defeat of the second Chinese revolution, neither of them accepted the lessons of the defeat, and they remained in the Stalinized CCP following Stalin's line on all fundamental questions. Nevertheless, from the point of view of character and personal experience, the two men are quite different. While both men are very strong willed, Mao is very arbitrary while Liu is much more considerate.

Due to Mao's experiences of working in the Kuomintang, and especially his work in organizing the peasants and guerrilla warfare, his arbitrary character has been reinforced. Hence, upon coming to power in 1949, regardless of the opinions or well being of the majority, Mao deliberately established his personal cult and practiced his personal dictatorship. The cooperativization, the "Great Leap Forward," the "People's Communes" and the present "Cultural Revolution," as well as China's sectarian foreign policy, are all the result of Mao's arbitrariness.

* Selected Works, Volume 4, pp. 19-20, International Publishers, 1956.

Liu's life's work, however, has mainly been among the working masses, and

at times under very difficult circumstances, such as after the defeat of the 1925-27 revolution when he worked for the party in the underground during the reactionary rule of Chiang Kai-shek. These environmental conditions reinforced his basic thoughtfulness, since he was obliged to listen to the opinions of other cadres in the party and workers' movement who reflected the opinions and aspirations of the masses. Hence, in his dealings with people, he is more capable of reaching a balanced solution, and this is the origin of his personal differences with Mao on cooperativization, "People's Communes," etc., as I have already explained.

Q. What, in your opinion, will be the future of China under the leadership of the two men respectively?

A. The above analysis of Liu and Mao shows clearly that Mao represents a more hardened and extreme form of Stalinism. Regardless of the circumstances or the will of the masses he has carried out his adventurist and sectarian domestic policies. While on the other hand, Liu represents a much more moderate and reform-

ist tendency in the party. He attempted to a certain degree to correct Mao's extremist policies, in order to avoid the catastrophic consequences.

In my opinion this same analysis is valid in the present struggle between the two men. If Mao should win, it would be at the expense of all the left and revolutionary elements, and he will embark China upon a most reckless and cataclysmic course, in which the Chinese Revolution would be placed in grave danger. If Liu should win, China's domestic course will most likely be similar to that carried out when the party was under Liu's leadership, with China's foreign policy becoming less sectarian and possibly resulting in a united front with other socialist countries, including the USSR, to aid the Vietnamese and their struggle.

In a China under Liu's leadership there would definitely be more freedom in the party and society, although the overall question of the Stalinist bureaucracy would not be solved. Nevertheless, Liu's victory could be a first phase in the development of a real revolutionary struggle for socialist democracy.

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

Original

Proposed Amendments

The "cultural revolution" constitutes a momentous dividing line in the political evolution of the People's Republic of China. It marks the irreparable shattering of the nucleus of veteran Communists clustered around Mao, which led the ~~(Stalinized) Chinese Communist party~~ in the civil war, founded the republic, and overturned capitalist rule, and which, since the victory over Chiang Kai-shek, has run the economy, governed the country, and directed the state and party apparatus. The "cultural revolution" tore this nucleus into contending fragments that cannot be put together.

Initiated in September 1965 by the Maoist faction in the Chinese Communist party leadership, it reached its major objective with the expulsion of Liu Shao-chi from the party at the October 13-31, 1968 "enlarged" twelfth plenum of the Central Committee. Liu, the chief of state, Mao's first lieutenant and main interpreter for several decades, his designated heir until the factional struggle broke into the open, was singled out as the central target of attack under such epithets as "the Khrushchev of China," the "first person in a position of authority who has taken the capitalist road," and, finally, as the "enlarged" twelfth plenum put it, "the renegade, traitor and scab Liu Shao-chi."

Mao has defined the internal struggle which has convulsed China as "in essence a great political revolution under the conditions of socialism made by the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes; it is a continuation of the prolonged struggle waged by the Chinese Communist Party and the masses of revolutionary people under its leadership against the Kuomintang reactionaries, a continuation of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie." (Peking Review, No. 43, Oct. 25, 1968.)

This official version bears little resemblance to the truth. The "cultural revolution" is not a "political revolution" for the promotion of workers democracy; it was not made "under the conditions of socialism"; it was not undertaken by the proletariat as the continuation of its struggle against the bourgeoisie. The suggestion that the opposition, which was denied the most elementary rights of proletarian democracy, represented the "Kuomintang reactionaries" is a slander.

The "cultural revolution" represented a phase of sharp public conflict in an inter-bureaucratic struggle between divergent tendencies in the topmost circles of the Chinese Communist party leadership which eventually affected every sector of Chinese society. It constituted the greatest single crisis experienced by the bureaucratic regime since its establishment.

establishment and expresses an important weakening of that bureaucratic regime,

both as the result of its inner contradictions and of a widespread mobilization of the masses.

2. The sharpness of the innerbureaucratic struggle in China, and the large-scale intervention of the masses in that struggle, can only be understood against the background of objective contradictions and problems which accumulated, since the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties, a growing trend of conflicts in Chinese society and a growing discontent among the Chinese masses.

The Chinese People's Republic has registered major accomplishments and made remarkable advances in many fields since the military victory over the Kuomintang in 1949, especially when measured against the relative stagnation of such colonial countries as India, Indonesia and Brazil where capitalism has not been overthrown. However, the authoritarian methods practiced by the Maoist command have grievously hampered solving the colossal problems of economic, social, political and cultural development confronting so backward a country as China with its huge population.

The period of intensified difficulties goes back to the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period.

The difficulties at home have been aggravated by the deterioration of Peking's international position due to Mao's foreign policy. This policy, in essence, expresses the narrow national interests of the ruling bureaucracy in China. It has oscillated between opportunism and ultraleftism or combinations of both.

One of the worst setbacks was the break with the Soviet Union. While major responsibility for this lies with the bureaucratic rulers in Moscow, who in the late fifties denied the Chinese government access to nuclear weapons and cut off economic aid, the initiative in extending the rift to the governmental level was taken by Peking.

Moreover, Mao's ultimatism alienated the powerful support and sympathy among the people of other workers states and the ranks of other Communist parties which China had at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Mao's unwillingness or incapacity to promulgate a united front with Moscow served to encourage the expansion of U.S. intervention in Vietnam and a mounting militant danger for China despite the nuclear deterrents which were developed at staggering cost to the Chinese economy.

However, the colossal problems of economic, social, political and cultural development confronting so backward a country as China, with its huge population, were far from having been solved, and the authoritarian methods practiced by the Maoist leadership have in addition seriously hampered the working out of such solutions.

The main contradictions which the People's Republic of China had to face during the last decade were the following ones:

(a) The contradiction between the rate of growth of the economy, which was still too low, and the rate of growth of the population, which threatened to bring to a near standstill the annual rate of growth per capita real consumption.

(b) The contradiction between the objective necessity to socialize the surplus product of agriculture, for purposes of accelerated economic and industrial development, and the political need to achieve this socialization with the approval of the majority of the peasantry.

(c) The contradiction between the objective necessity to interest materially the bulk of the poor and middle peasantry in increasing agricultural production, and the inevitable tendency to increased inequality and private accumulation which results from these "material incentives."

(d) The contradiction between the general low level of consumption of the mass of the people and the increasing bureaucratic privileges appropriated by the ruling strata in the fifties, and even the early sixties, under conditions of great hardship for the mass of the population.

(e) The contradiction between the objective needs for accelerated industrialization created by the Kremlin's sudden and

brutal economic blockade of China.

(f) The contradiction between the rapid expansion of literacy and the increase in general level of education of the Chinese youth at the one hand, and the still relatively low number of skilled jobs available in China.

All these contradictions have been intensified by the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the second phase of the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period. They created an explosive situation in the country, in which a process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses became possible. In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured. The "cultural revolution" constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy.

3. Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership. Others were greatly sharpened by the autocratic and paternalistic nature of that leadership. All were heavily increased by the sudden isolation into which the People's Republic of China was precipitated in the late fifties, by the Kremlin's sudden suppression of all economic and military assistance to China.

This criminal act by the Soviet bureaucracy, extending to state level the factional struggle between that bureaucracy and the Chinese CP inside the world Communist movement, was a stab in the back of the Chinese revolution and the Chinese people, at the very moment when they were confronted with near-famine at home and increased aggressive pressure from U.S. imperialism abroad. It lies at the door of the Kremlin the historic responsibility for breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance, and the advantages which imperialism could draw from this breakup.

The leadership of the Chinese CP, educated in the Stalinist school, has always accepted the theory of "building socialism in one country." However, in the fifties, the importance of the help which the other workers states could give to the economic growth and the military defense of the P.R. of China, made the dangerous implications of that theory inside China less important than in the USSR in the late twenties and the thirties (its international implications detrimental to world revolution continued to manifest themselves even then). The reversal of the Maoist leadership to a policy of "self-

reliance" and large-scale economic autarchy and self-sufficiency is only a rationalization of the consequences of the Kremlin's blockade and the tremendous burden imposed on China by the need to develop its own nuclear weapons, given the refusal of the Soviet bureaucracy to assist it on this field.

The more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, on several important questions, brought it nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism (an analysis confirmed in 1968 by Peking's attitude, in contrast to the Kremlin's, towards the May revolution in France, the prerevolutionary struggles in India, the Mexican students' struggles and the rising political revolution in the CSSR leading to the Warsaw Pact countries' occupation of Czechoslovakia), reflects both the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy towards the P.R. of China, and the objective impact of the rising tide of world revolution on the Chinese masses.

It is however also true that the bureaucratic character of the Mao faction have added to the international isolation of the P.R. of China and increased the contradictions and political conflicts inside the CP of China.

Although Peking maintained its resolution to defend the USSR against imperialism and the Kremlin failed to reiterate similar assurances to the P.R. of China, Mao failed to promote a consistent policy of anti-imperialist united front in Vietnam, thereby harming the defense of the Vietnamese revolution and the political influence of the CP of China in the world Communist movement.

In place of consistent development of the world revolution, which could have brought new socialist allies into being and carried the struggle for socialism into the main strongholds of the capitalist system, Mao followed a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie, as in Pakistan.

in several countries

This helped prepare for the catastrophe in Indonesia, the worst defeat suffered by the world revolution since Stalin permitted Hitler to come to power without a struggle. The development of the cult of Mao, the glorification of Stalin, and opposition to de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union crippled the defense of the Chinese revolution in other lands, reduced Peking's prestige and influence to abysmal levels and gravely injured the cause of socialism internationally.

The bankruptcy of this foreign policy became glaringly clear when, after deposing Liu Shao-chi as a "lackey of imperialism, modern revisionism and the Kuomintang reac-

It can even not be excluded that a change of line of U.S. imperialism towards China would lead to a significant modification of revolutionary militancy advised by

tionaries," Mao offered "peaceful coexistence" to the Nixon administration.

the Chinese leadership to its followers abroad -- a normalization of relations at state level with the USA being in itself of course not reprehensible.

The (disasters) in foreign affairs heightened the stresses and strains created by the sharpened tensions within Chinese society between the different layers of the peasantry as well as between the peasantry and the state, and between the working class, the student youth, the intellectuals and the bureaucracy in the urban centers. These multiple pressures generated deep differences on domestic and foreign policy in the leadership of the party, government and armed forces. The wisdom of Mao's past decisions and his omniscience came under increasing questioning.

setbacks

The high officials around Liu apparently sought to close ranks against Mao following the disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward. Liu and his close associates took fright at the appalling consequences of this adventure, counseled retreat, and succeeded in switching over to a more prudent economic course. During this readjustment, the Liu grouping took control of the party apparatus and pushed Mao to one side. Their aim, evidently, was to take this erratic pilot away from the helm and reduce his status to that of a figurehead while utilizing his prestige to lend maximum authority to their decisions and course of action. Thus they assiduously protected his public reputation for infallibility, a policy that facilitated a comeback for Mao.

SHIFT These paragraphs to Page 30

him

By 1965 Mao felt that he was in position to break Liu's hold upon the regime and regain his lost supremacy. By exploiting his immense prestige, by maneuvering between the diverse tendencies and cutting them down one after another, by slandering Liu and his men through a relentless propaganda campaign, Mao succeeded in isolating them and eroding their bases of support among the masses, in the party, the army and the provinces and completing their downfall.

4.

Because of the fragmentary, contradictory and unconfirmed nature of the information available, it is difficult and hazardous to attempt a precise delineation of either the evolution or content of (these disagreements). The available evidence indicates that a number of oppositional tendencies were involved. The Maoist machine has not permitted their spokesmen -- or they have not dared or cared -- to state their positions or platforms publicly, frankly or fully.

the disagreements inside the leadership of the CP of China.

The voluminous Maoist polemics, filled with self-contradictions, present obviously falsified accounts and distorted interpretations of the opinions of their opponents and critics. It is, for example, incredible that the head of state Liu Shao-chi, the mayor of Peking Peng Chen and other Political Bureau members such as Teng

Hsiao-peng and Tao Chu (the leading Chinese Communists most publicly identified with the Sino-Soviet clashes), the deposed military leaders, the better-known disgraced Communist intellectuals, and other alleged "renegades, enemy agents or counterrevolutionary revisionists" conspired or aspired to bring back capitalism on behalf of "the imperialists and the Kuomintang reactionaries."

Even though the roots, history and specific character of the differences remain obscure and unverified, the consequences of the conflicts they precipitated are clear. The central leading team has been broken up. A period of uncertainty as to the eventual composition and orientation of China's leadership has now opened. Great new forces have been set in motion.

The high officials around Liu apparently sought to close ranks against Mao following the disastrous results of the Great Leap Forward. Liu and his close associates took fright at the appalling consequences of this adventure, counseled retreat, and succeeded in switching over to a more prudent economic course. During this readjustment, the Liu grouping took control of the party apparatus and pushed Mao to one side. Their aim, evidently, was to take him away from the helm and reduce his status to that of a figurehead while utilizing his prestige to lend maximum authority to their decisions and course of action. Thus they assiduously protected his public reputation for infallibility, a policy that facilitated a comeback for Mao.

By 1965 Mao felt that he was in position to break Liu's hold upon the regime and regain his lost supremacy. By exploiting his immense prestige, by maneuvering between the diverse tendencies and cutting them down one after another, by slandering Liu and his men through a relentless propaganda campaign, Mao succeeded in isolating them and eroding their bases of support among the masses, in the party, the army and the provinces and completing their downfall.

The objective basis of this success lies in Mao's capacity to mobilize larger masses, especially of the youth, and to exploit the hatred which had been accumulated in the people against the bureaucracy as a whole. The Liu faction was paralyzed by sticking to the bureaucratic rules and by its inability to question the Mao myth, which it had itself largely contributed to create.

5.

The factional warfare which burst forth in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy passed beyond the confines of the ruling circles in the middle of 1966 after the showdown in the eleventh Central Committee plenum of early August which adopted the 16-point decision on the "cultural revolution." In their maneuvers, they sought support among layers extending far outside the

party. A social upheaval was touched off. This unfolded in successive waves, starting with the mustering of the student youth organized from above in the Red Guards, spreading to the industrial workers in the big cities during December 1966-January 1967, stirring up parts of the peasantry, and seeping into the armed forces.

These interlinked commotions drastically upset the equilibrium of the bureaucratic regime. Despite the present victory of Mao's faction, the turbulent events have weakened its position and power. It will not be able to regain the prestige and stability enjoyed before Mao launched the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution." The internecine struggles and the accompanying Maoist propaganda have served to generate new revolutionary energies within the youth and the vanguard elements among the working masses which will not be easily or quickly subdued.

The real situation in China is quite different from the simplistic interpretations offered by various circles. Mao's supporters, and those who take his propaganda at face value, claim that he is promoting an antibureaucratic political revolution against agents of the class enemy, a revolution which aims at and is effectively realizing a wider democracy for the popular masses.

This flies in the face of obvious facts. The authoritarian manner in which the "cultural revolution" was launched, conducted, guided and concluded; the suppression of dissenters, coupled with the conscienceless deformation of the views of the anti-Mao tendencies; the outrageous cult of Mao; the absence of elections and democratic institutions controlled by the workers and peasants; the role of the army under Lin Piao as ultimate authority -- all testify to the antidemocratic characteristics and direction of the political course taken by the Maoist faction, which has dwindled down to a small core of the old leadership.

increased authority of the army under Lin Piao -- all testify to the bureaucratic

Likewise in error are those who view Mao's present position as nothing but a replica of Stalin's tyrannical personal dictatorship. While the bureaucratic ruling castes of the USSR and China have much in common, there are profound differences between the historical situation which enabled Stalin to consolidate his power and the international and domestic context in which Mao advanced the slogan of "seizure of power" by the Red Guards. In China today, the mobilizations of the masses under the impetus of the upheaval, limited and episodic as they have been, have altered the relationship of forces between the bureaucracy and the people to the advantage of the latter. The movement of the masses weakened the bureaucratic regime. This outcome differs from Stalin's rise during the late twenties and early thirties when the masses were crushed and beheaded and fell into a state of unrelieved political passivity which did not ap-

preciably change until after Stalin's death.

The triumph of Mao's faction has by no means eradicated the power of the diversified opposition. Resisters of all sorts remain deeply entrenched in the party, the unions, the army, the universities, the regional committees, the provincial governments, the state apparatus, and in the countryside.

As against this, however, the army, under Lin Biao, Mao's new heir apparent and chief lieutenant, has gained greatly in political weight. By virtue of its interventions in the conflicts between the contending bureaucratic factions and between the masses in motion and the regime, the army -- at the expense of the leading role of the party -- has become the mainstay of Mao's rulership, the chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country. This is one of the most dangerous consequences of the "cultural revolution." However much the military high command has been shaken and its leadership divided over the past period, an ominous pattern has been set for the future.

However, Mao tends to reduce again this great weight gained by the army during the previous period, by putting the emphasis on the reconstruction of the party as the mainstay of the regime and the necessity of a single central leadership for all power apparatuses.

The "cultural revolution" was prepared and launched by Mao and his liegemen to eliminate the most irritating and persistent critics of his domestic and foreign policy, to give a free hand to his pared-down faction in the top leadership, and, by way of concession to the masses, to curb the worst abuses of the bureaucratic overlords he had himself trained, encouraged and shielded. Having been placed in a minority in the Political Bureau, Mao was obliged to take the risk of bypassing the official cadres of the party and state apparatus where his opponents were entrenched, going over their heads, and mobilizing the students of the universities and high schools as the instrument to initiate his coup d'état against the majority leadership.

6.

took

reestablish his control over the country.

Throughout its course, the Red Guard movement was highly contradictory. Unlike the rebellious student movements in the West, it was initiated from the very summit of state power. It did not have to engage in a "confrontation" with either the police or the armed forces. It operated in collaboration with them or with their blessing. The approbation of the country's living deity helped direct the energies of the Red Guard movement along the course selected for it, so that even in its rebellion against the bureaucratic authority it did not transcend the broad limitations set by the supreme bureaucrat.

except in its initial stage.

The tendency of the Red Guards toward conformism could be observed at first hand in the West when the Chinese students studying abroad were recalled (not to be replaced to this day). Some of these unfortunates went to extraordinary lengths to arrive home as bandaged heroes, victims of either the Western police or the Khrushchevist bureaucracy.

The excursions of roaming bands of youth, numbering in the millions, were fostered and financed by the state, either directly or indirectly. Besides facilitating the development of the Red Guard movement in this way, Mao used even stronger means to force its pace of growth. The schools were shut down by decree, China's entire educational system being dealt a blow of immense proportions, the effects of which will be felt for a long time to come.

The fact that the Red Guard movement was initiated from above and not by the youth themselves greatly facilitated the efforts of other sectors of the bureaucracy to counter Mao's factional action by setting up Red Guard groups under their own auspices. Since all the groups were formed under the guise of carrying out Mao's directives and Mao's "thought," the confusion was immense. Nevertheless many of the groups became differentiated sufficiently in their interpretations of Mao's doctrines to come to blows and worse.

Mao's "thought," it was difficult for broader masses to understand their political differences.

Where civil strife reached proportions bordering on civil war, whether through excesses of the Red Guards or through their incapacity to actually "seize power" for Mao in areas where opposing forces were strongly entrenched, the army moved in. Thus behind the Red Guard movement stood the army as the final authority, sometimes instigating the bands of youth, at other times restraining them or even reversing what they had done.

differences among

manipulating

It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view the Red Guard movement as merely a pliant instrument of factional politics in the domestic strife that featured the "cultural revolution." The Chinese student youth had many grievances comparable to those of youth in other lands today. These included social discrimination in the selection of the student body, inadequate living quarters, lack of campus autonomy, and scant opportunities after graduation. They resented haughty and uncontrolled bureaucratic authority; they wanted greater democracy; they wanted a political revolution to open the road to socialist democracy; they identified their fate with that of the world revolution.

This explains why Mao had such difficulty retaining control of the Red Guard movement and curbing it once it had served the main purposes he envisioned. The Red Guard movement acquired a logic of its own.

Roaming the countryside on their own, engaging in actions of a violent nature against echelons of the bureaucracy, millions of youth gained in self-confidence and boldness. The most unmanageable of these elements passed beyond the specific objectives set for them by their bureaucratic patrons and even collided with them. Their tendency to move in the direction of critical thought and independent political action was observable in many of the wall posters and mimeographed or print-

ed publications put out by the Red Guards and in some of the "seizures of power" in which they engaged. The movement became so dangerous to Mao's objectives that he finally found it advisable to demobilize the Red Guards and send them back to the classrooms or the countryside for labor.

However, ferment persists among them. The most advanced and revolutionary-minded members of this new generation, who received their political baptism in the "cultural revolution," may later detonate further mass actions against the Chinese bureaucracy as a whole, including the Maoist victors.

Of greater significance than the Red Guard demonstrations was their sequel when the proletarian masses were drawn into the expanding struggle from December 1966 through February 1967. Taking advantage of the splits among the contending factions on top and spurred into action by one or another of them, sectors of the work force began to put forward their own economic and social demands and move along independent lines. This action flared into general strikes in transportation and many plants in Shanghai, Nanking, and other industrial centers.

The movement from below, which in its further development would have threatened the control of the Maoist leadership, was stopped short by combined methods of manipulation and repression. The brevity of the massive strikes does not diminish their historic import. They signaled the end of political apathy among the industrial workers and the resumption of their autonomous action.

The Maoist press depicts the "cultural revolution" as a clear-cut class conflict between staunch defenders of socialism and the proletariat under "the wise leadership of our great leader Chairman Mao," and "a bunch of counterrevolutionary revisionists" and "representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the Party, the government, the army and various spheres of culture" in order, when conditions are ripe, to "seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie."

Actually, an assortment of political currents holding different views and oriented in various directions have emerged from the disintegration of the formally monolithic bureaucracy and the turmoil of the "cultural revolution." Some of the features of these currents are distinguishable despite the concern of all of them to wear the same uniform of "Mao's Thought."

The two principal groupings vying for supremacy in the party, state apparatus and the army centered around Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi. On the fringes of these two groupings stand oppositional tendencies of rightist or leftist coloration.

7.

Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is striving for socialist democracy or has a program of revolutionary policies at home and abroad. By Marxist standards, neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other.

actually genuine

As long as Liu's group retained supremacy it practiced the abominable customs of bureaucratic command learned in the school of Stalinism. Its doctrines and practices were indistinguishable from those of the previous period when Mao was in direct control. The pent-up hatred among the youth, the workers and peasants enabled Mao to arouse these forces against the bureaucratic majority without much trouble.

While the Mao faction has issued calls for rebellion and appeals to the initiative of the masses, its deeds do not harmonize with its words. Mao's objective was to regain supremacy for his faction and line in the bureaucracy, not overthrow the bureaucracy. This explains why he followed the Stalinist methods of slander, physical violence and the fostering of cults in his struggle and strictly limited his appeals to the masses. Whenever and wherever any segment of the people, whether among the youth, the proletariat, the peasantry or the intellectuals, has showed signs of slipping away from domination and direction by Mao to act on its own account, it has been restrained and called to order, sometimes by repressive measures.

The promise held out in section 9 of the original 16-point program in the official declaration of the "cultural revolution," adopted by the August 1966 Central Committee plenum, of "a system of general elections, like that of the Paris Commune," which would usher in an extensive democracy, sounds like a mockery today. Not only have no ~~free general~~ elections been held but the very idea is now scoffed at ("Blind faith in elections is also a form of conservative thinking.")

such

Instead of instituting an expanded workers democracy on the model of the Paris Commune, Mao has reorganized the bureaucratic regime under the auspices of "the triple alliance," regulated by the army and presided over by that part of the cadres loyal to his faction. The "revolutionary committees" set up during the "cultural revolution" have not been elected by the working masses themselves and kept under their surveillance by measures of democratic control but have been constituted of individuals handpicked by the authorities.

by compromise between contending factions under the supervision of the Mao-Lin Piao hard core.

There have been reports of elements on the left flanks of the contending top factions, both among Mao's followers and

Original

among the workers and intellectuals sympathetic to Liu and other disgraced leaders, who have revolutionary ideas and inclinations and who could form the nuclei of a genuinely antibureaucratic opposition. These revolutionists deserve international support. However, under current conditions, it is extremely difficult for such dispersed left Communists to come together, to communicate with one another, to work out a common program, select leaders, and undertake a consistent line of organized activity.

The most ironic aspect of the vaunted Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution is the damage it has inflicted upon the cultural life of China. The witch-hunt and persecution of intellectuals, the stifling of discussion and the bridling of free inquiry; the closing down of the universities and high schools for almost two years; the demand that all fields of creative and artistic endeavor submit to the arbitrary specifications laid down by state and party authorities; the universal chanting of obligatory phrases to Mao Tse-tung in the style of a primitive religion creates an atmosphere completely inimical to the development of a humanistic culture permeated with the ideals and critical thought of socialist liberation. Cultural creativity and activity must wither under conformism and regimentation of thought where the expression of dissenting views on all issues of concern to the nation are tabooed and penalized.

The grotesque cult of Mao, who has been elevated like Stalin before him to the height of a semicelestial being with powers bordering on the supernatural, is utterly antipathetic to the critical spirit of Marxism and the development of a socialist culture. Some 3.4 billion sets of Chairman Mao's writings and reproductions of his portrait have been issued during the "cultural revolution" and his name is invoked about five million times a day on the air. Ludicrous and repulsive as this after the lessons of the adulation accorded to Stalin, the deification of Mao serves a practical political function. The reverence for Mao among the masses, serving as an opiate of the people, is an indispensable source of stability for the Chinese bureaucracy. His disappearance from the scene will precipitate a problem of succession more perilous for the present regime than was the death of Stalin for the Soviet bureaucracy.

The Maoists accuse their adversaries of "revisionism." But the very arguments they invoke to justify their current course show that they are even more guilty than their opponents of blatantly revising a number of the basic tenets of Marxism.

8.

as guilty as

(1) In countries that have overthrown the bourgeoisie and abolished private ownership of the means of production, they assert that capitalism can be restored by gradual and peaceful processes through machinations

and false policies of one or another tendency in the leadership of the Communist parties. This discards or disregards the Marxist theory of the state which asserts that such fundamental changes cannot be accomplished either gradually or peacefully.

(2) They identify the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution with capitalist restoration. In doing this, the Maoists lapse into an extreme voluntarism, enormously exaggerating the social weight of ideology. Mao locates the chief cause of the danger of bureaucratic degeneration and capitalist restoration, not in the material foundations of the socio-economic order, but in the realm of ideology. He proclaims that if revisionism is not rooted out on the theoretical, scientific, artistic and literary levels, it will inevitably lead to the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Marxists have never believed that the ideas of those reactionary classes which have lost economic and political power as the result of a social revolution are capable of gradually changing the class nature and structure of the state. A colossal counterrevolution of this kind could occur only through a civil war between the former possessing classes and the toiling masses in which the masses were crushed; or through the hypothetical generation of a new bourgeoisie which became strong enough economically to launch a civil war and topple the workers state. This has not happened, and it is far from happening, not only in China but in other workers states whose leaderships are at odds with Peking, whatever the incipient tendencies may be in these countries in the direction of capitalism.

(3) No less voluntaristic is the Maoist belief that incessant appeals to the spirit of sacrifice, the idealism and enthusiasm of the toiling masses can in and of themselves suffice to surmount the immensely difficult problems arising from the inadequate development of the productive forces in China during the transition from capitalism to socialism.

(4) In defiance of the historical lessons drawn by Lenin State and Revolution, the Maoists proclaim that in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism the class struggle is bound to intensify and not diminish, and can even go on for hundreds of years. This "theory" serves to justify intensifications of the role of the state as a repressive instrument. The state, instead of withering away under socialism as Engels forecast, will endure for an indefinite period, if Mao is correct. Thus a "theoretical" excuse is provided for the worst bureaucratic excesses and abuses of power.

(5) The strategy of world revolution expounded by Mao and Lin Piao extols the insurrectionary movements of the peasantry in the backward colonial areas and systematic-

ally underrates or dismisses the key role which the industrial working class in the advanced countries must play in overthrowing the power of imperialism and helping to create the new socialist society.

The "cultural revolution" has given widespread currency to the idea that a workers state can become subjected to deformation and degeneration after the conquest of power, an idea that was previously propagated only by the world Trotskyist movement. Coming after the antibureaucratic campaigns in Yugoslavia and Cuba, the Maoist propaganda on this point, distorted though it is, has focused attention upon one of the most crucial problems confronting a victorious socialist revolution: how to protect and promote workers democracy.

9.

The need for a political revolution where state power has been usurped by a bureaucracy and all avenues of democratic control have been closed to the masses has been made clearer and more understandable to broad sections of the international Communist movement and the revolutionary vanguard. This lesson has been reinforced by the abrupt and brutal halting of the drive toward democratization in Czechoslovakia in 1968 by the Soviet occupation.

If the "cultural revolution" has helped popularize and win acceptance of the notion of political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states, its course and outcome under the tutelage of Mao Tse-tung demonstrates that the methods pursued by his faction leads to the opposite result. It is impossible to eradicate bureaucracy by bureaucratic means. The "cultural revolution" has ended in the constriction of democracy and the fortification of the positions of one faction of the bureaucracy against its rivals rather than the expansion and deepening of decision-making powers by the masses.

The "cultural revolution" has ended in an attempt to stop the mass movement and to restore a new form of bureaucratic rule, under the guise of the "triple alliance," instead of the rule of the old party and state bureaucracy which had, in its majority, supported Liu. This "triple alliance" is in reality a compromise between the Maoist faction and parts of the old majority faction, compromise initiated when the masses started to intervene autonomously into the struggle and thereby threatened the whole bureaucratic rule.

There is no other road for effective struggle against the bureaucratic degeneration of the revolution and the authoritarian regimes it spawns than the program outlined by Lenin and Trotsky; that is, the consolidation and institutionalization of workers power on the basis of democratically elected councils, the widest proletarian democracy, the right of various socialist tendencies and parties to exist legally within that constitutional framework, the limitation and progressive abolition of inequality in remuneration, the management of the economy by the workers themselves, the planned development of the productive forces, and the international extension of the revolution, above all, to the centers of imperialism.

* * *

The position of the Fourth International on the Chinese revolution, which has been set forth in numerous documents and declarations in recent years, can be summarized as follows:

10.

The Fourth International has been a firm supporter of the socialist revolution in China from its beginning. Its partisans within China and throughout the world stand for the unconditional defense of the People's Republic of China against military attack by U.S. imperialism or any of its vassal states.

The Fourth International holds the Kremlin leadership primarily responsible for the Sino-Soviet split, condemns its vengeful withdrawal of economic aid from China, and its continued diplomatic deals with Washington, Paris, New Delhi and other bourgeois governments against the People's Republic of China.

At the same time, the Fourth International criticizes the ultrasectarian attitude and bitter-end factionalism exhibited by Peking in its relations with other workers states that do not fully endorse its policies. Especially harmful has been its stubborn refusal to propose or participate in joint action with the Soviet Union, Cuba and other Communist countries against U.S. intervention in Vietnam because of political disagreements with them.

them, although some practical agreements on military assistance to Vietnam were finally concluded.

While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the opportunism of the Chinese Communist leadership. In seeking to gain influence in the colonial world, Peking uses a language that is strongly anti-imperialist. It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces as well as countries like Tanzania, thus helping to create an image far to the left of Moscow. Nevertheless, Peking's basic policy, as reiterated many times by its leaders and voiced once again upon the inauguration of the Nixon administration, has been "peaceful coexistence" with U.S. imperialism. Out of narrow nationalistic considerations and in line with its doctrine that the revolution must first pass through a bourgeois stage before it can reach the socialist stage, Peking counsels and countenances support to bourgeois governments in Indonesia, Pakistan and other countries instead of mobilizing the masses for uncompromising struggle against the neocolonial regimes.

advocates a more militant line to its followers abroad

bureaucratic centrism

It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces. This has not only created an image far to the left of Moscow but also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa. Likewise, the sharp campaign which Peking unleashed against the right-wing opportunist line of the CP's following Moscow's lead, and against some key features of the bureaucratic rule in Eastern Europe, has objectively contributed to deepen the world crisis of Stalinism and to facilitate the upsurge of a new youth vanguard the world over. Inside that youth vanguard the general sympathy for China and Maoist criticism of the Kremlin's revisionism remains deep, even if extreme organizational sectarianism and political infantilism has prevented the orthodox Maoists from stabilizing important youth organizations anywhere.

On the other hand, Peking's basic policy has continued to imply support to whatever bourgeois government in a semi-colonial country happens to diplomatically collaborate with China (yesterday Indo-

nesia, today Pakistan and Tanzania), which leads to disastrous results for the revolutionary class struggle in these countries.

The conduct of the Chinese Communist party leadership since it came to power proves that it has not shaken off its Stalinist heritage. These ~~nationalistic-minded~~ bureaucrats do not hesitate to subordinate the welfare of the Chinese masses and the interests of the international revolution and socialism to the protection and promotion of their own power and privileges.

The same features mark the policies and behavior of the Maoist groups that have appeared in numerous countries since the Sino-Soviet split. They mix adventurism with opportunism. They have shown themselves incapable of critical or independent thought along Marxist lines. As a result, most of them display little internal cohesion and tend generally to splinter into warring fragments.

In a few areas newly radicalized youth have mistaken the verbal militancy and activism of the Maoist groups as representing Marxist-Leninism in contrast to the cowardly reformism of the Social Democrats and the opportunism of Moscow and its followers. With experience this initial impression soon fades in most instances. Almost ten years after the Sino-Soviet dispute began, the Maoists have still proved incapable of creating a sizeable youth movement in any country outside of China or providing substantial or lasting programmatic inspiration to the leaderships of the new generation of rebel youth advancing into the political arena on an international scale.

The experience of the "cultural revolution" offers fresh evidence that ~~the crystallized bureaucratic caste headed by Mao cannot be reformed.~~ It will have to be removed from power by the new vanguard of genuine revolutionaries now in the process of formation in China who will come to the head of the aroused and organized masses in the subsequent development of an authentic antibureaucratic revolution. Such a resurgent independent movement will break the grip of the bureaucracy over China's economic, political and cultural life and really expand and consolidate the workers democracy which the "cultural revolution" promised in its propaganda but lamentably failed to deliver.

also in China, the bureaucracy cannot be removed by reforms.

AN AMENDMENT TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION
ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Fernand Charlier

The draft resolution presented by the majority of the United Secretariat to the World Congress provides, to the degree this is possible with the available information, a good analysis of the development of the "cultural revolution" and the contradictions of the present Chinese society that have contributed to transforming an interbureaucratic conflict into a vast social struggle, and provides a correct criticism of the arguments developed by the Maoists during the course of the "cultural revolution."

It has the merit of presenting a more sober estimate of the "cultural revolution" than the original draft, which was presented by the minority of the United Secretariat. In our opinion, it avoids attributing to the army the role of "ultimate authority," the "mainstay of the regime," the "chief arbiter," and "principal centralizing force." These formulations, which give the impression that China has been placed under the yoke of a military dictatorship, miss the actual situation -- the utilization of the army and the Red Guards as a "main striking force" has always been subordinated to a political aim: the destruction of the pre-1965 party and the reconstruction of a new ruling party (contrary to a whole series of speculations by Western bourgeois observers as well as certain apologists for Maoism). The "bonapartist" leadership has always paid careful attention to maintaining an unstable equilibrium between the army, the "Red Guards" and "revolutionary rebels," and the old cadres of the party considered to be "remoldable"; first in the "triple alliance" committees, today in the "new" party in process of being restructured. This bonapartist aspect of the regime is not present in the text proposed by the minority.

The draft resolution of the majority of the U.S. nonetheless appears to us to embellish the international policies of Maoism.

Thesis No. 3 begins by affirming that all the contradictions to which the People's Republic of China has had to face have been strongly augmented following the sudden isolation into which China was plunged at the end of the fifties. The blame for this isolation is placed exclusively on the Kremlin bureaucracy, which bears "the historic responsibility for breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance." To us this judgment appears both summary and unilateral. Summary because it confounds the reprisals of the USSR with the extension of the conflict on a public level and with the rupture of the solidarity among the workers states in

face of imperialism -- the draft resolution still presents as a current element the fact that Peking reaffirmed "its resolution to defend the USSR against imperialism," an allusion to the message sent by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai to Khrushchev on his seventieth anniversary April 16, 1964: "If a world upheaval of major importance ever occurs, our two parties, our two countries, and our two peoples will stand together in battle against the common enemy."* To present these positions as a current element, at a time when the Soviet leaders are presented as imperialists and new Czars, indicates ignorance, or obstinate refusal to see the changes that have occurred in the past year and a half.

The entire first half of thesis No. 3 places the blame for the rupture exclusively on the Kremlin, and to explain that the theory of "self-reliance" is "only a rationalization" (when it is a consequence of "socialism in one country"**) adapted to the low material and cultural level of backward China) is an out-and-out embellishment of China's policy.

The same holds for the passage following this and which argues for the "more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments" which has brought it "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism." Because alongside Peking's attitude with regard to events in France, Mexico, India, one can place the negative examples of its attitude with regard to Angola, Biafra, Bolivia and a whole series of other countries.

Even the imperialist experts no longer hold any illusions with regard to the more progressive positions of the Chinese. Thus the pro-imperialist expert

* Pékin Information, No. 16, April 20, 1964.

** We observed in 1964 that if the Chinese ideologists had picked up the themes of the theory of permanent revolution at the time of the "great leap forward," the international aspect of the permanent revolution was the last to be picked up by the Chinese. In "Some Defenders of Neocolonialism," fourth article in reply to the Soviet CC (end of 1963), they criticized those who held that socialism in one or several countries was "an end in itself." However, they did not deny the possibility of constructing socialism in one country. (See F. Charlier: "La Révolution Permanente en Chine," Quatrième Internationale, No. 22, July 1964.)

Ernst Halperin could write, in 1967: "One would thus expect to see a considerable Chinese effort to support the 'revolutionary struggles' in Latin America, particularly in the form of material and organizational assistance of the Leftist extremist guerrilla groups operating in several Latin American countries. In actual fact, however, Chinese support for the guerrillas has so far been largely verbal. The real Chinese effort in Latin America has been directed at a very different and far more modest goal: not against the great imperialist foe, the United States, but against Soviet influence in the area."*

In an overall appreciation of the Chinese positions this consequence of their sectarianism cannot be omitted, nor the method of economic reprisals used against Cuba that were denounced by Fidel Castro at the beginning of 1966.

As for Peking's attitude toward "the rising revolution" in Czechoslovakia, in which Peking quite simply confounds the revolutionists with the restorers of capitalism, we have here the most complete confusion! Because Peking's attitude in face of the Soviet intervention was never dictated by a position close to revolutionary Marxism in face of the political revolution; but quite the contrary, owing to the very logic of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which led it to oppose the military action of the Kremlin under pretext that the Soviet troops, by maintaining the Kremlin's control, prevented the masses from taking action to overthrow the Dubcek leadership and carry out a social revolution!

We were among those who approved the position taken by the Reunification Congress in 1963 that stated: "Thus on three of the major questions of this period -- the question of the struggle against the war, the question of the nature of the colonial revolution and the orientation of the revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries -- the Chinese conceptions [our emphasis] have as a whole proved to be more progressive than the Khrushchevist conceptions and are analogous to certain theses of revolutionary Marxism."

It was correct at the time to support these conceptions because it was clear that the conflict had been unleashed by the policies of China that were closer to Marxism. The Soviets themselves had just admitted that the conflict went back to the attempt to liberate Formosa in 1958: "This was the aim that was pursued by the noisy demonstration organized by the Maoist leaders, in the fall of 1958,

in the Taiwan Straits. It is not excluded that one of the reasons was of an internal nature....But it was a question in particular of aggravating the international situation. The results of this are known: Taiwan remained occupied, while the American militarists utilized the pretext to reinforce their positions in this part of the Far East, sending new reinforcements there. Only the firm position of the Soviet Union made it possible to overcome the threat of a serious armed conflict."*

Today, however, it is necessary to take into account (1) the fact that the Chinese positions have been submitted to the test of practice; (2) that the Chinese positions have undergone a marked evolution toward sectarianism since 1965; (3) that the world situation is characterized by a modification of the global strategy of imperialism that demands a new response, likewise global, of the revolutionary forces and that in face of these changes the Chinese positions have not undergone any enrichment.

From these three elements, which must be taken into account, it follows that methodologically we must:

(a) Bring all the aspects of the international policies of Peking within the framework of a global balance sheet -- and not fall into the error of seeing correct positions to which false positions have just been added (thus committing the same methodological error as the leaders who talk about Stalin's "merits" out-weighting his "errors"!).

(b) We must guard against falling into a journalistic fault, of a kind denounced by Trotsky when he weighed Shachtman's evaluation of the leftward development of the resolutions of the party of Norman Thomas, Shachtman having lost sight of the altered context in which they appeared.**

It is necessary to note, however, that we have fallen into these methodological errors; and that under the pressure of the factional struggle against Pablo, we have embellished the Chinese leaders for a whole period. Several examples: two big articles, devoted to the positions of the Chinese CP after the reunification, passed over Indonesia almost in silence;*** another article (of three

* L. Kiouzadjian. "La Crise en Chine: ses causes et sa nature," Moscou (1968), pp. 111-112.

** See In Defense of Marxism, (New Park edition, London 1966), pp. 133-134.

*** L. Maitan, "Encore sur les positions du PCC et quelques problèmes de l'époque de transition," Quatrième Internationale, novembre 1963; E. Germain, "Le Conflit Sino-Soviétique: un bilan intérimaire," Quatrième Internationale, juillet 1964.

* Ernst Halperin. "Peking and the Latin American Communists," The China Quarterly, No. 29, January-March 1967.

pages) concerning a resolution (of a half page) passed by the CC of the Indonesian CP did its utmost to interpret a single line in the resolution as the announcement of a turn to the left at the end of 1963.*

In 1964, E. Germain wrote: "If [our analysis] is correct, we will see the Chinese obliged, by the logic of their position, to increasingly denounce 'socialism in one country,' 'the peaceful road' and the 'bloc with the national bourgeoisie' (actually under the leadership of the latter); we will see them obliged to increasingly defend in practice the line of 'interrupted revolution,' of supporting the left 'pro-Chinese' Communist parties even in cases where they do not entirely control them (India, Venezuela, Cuba and 'Fidelism' in general in Latin America), of accepting a united front in practice with these parties and even with the Trotskyists in Ceylon, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Chile and elsewhere; of exerting pressure on the Indonesian CP to radicalize its political line and begin to struggle seriously for power; of supporting the anti-imperialist revolutionists in the French zone of influence in Africa."**

These criteria do not point to the conclusions in the draft resolution -- to the contrary.

The evaluations tending to reaffirm the "close" to revolutionary Marxism position appear to us to tend to reaffirm, against all the evidence, the old factional position. Why not say, after all, that the Chinese position was closer to Marxism than that of the Cubans with regard to the revolutionary situation in May 1968 in France? Or that the Chinese position with regard to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 was still further away from revolutionary Marxism than that of the USSR?

* * *

The text supported by the minority of the United Secretariat takes a much more critical position with regard to the Maoist line in foreign policy. However, we cannot support this text for a number of reasons mentioned at the beginning of this article; in addition, the criticisms of Mao's line are justified among other things by his offer to the Nixon administration of "peaceful coexistence," an objectively minor fact without objective consequences, and criticized in the text

* "Indonesian CP Adopts 'Four Amulets,'" World Outlook, March 13, 1964, pp. 25-27 (on a resolution that appeared in Peking Information, February 28, 1964).

** Article in Quatrième Internationale cited above, p. 26.

with an a priori sectarianism.

We do not exclude the possibility that the mass mobilization against the American aggressor and the Soviet revisionists, which put the two adversaries on practically the same plane, and which was organized beginning in 1965, that is, at the most dangerous moment of the escalation in Vietnam, aimed at preventing the threat of war from becoming a reality. Because within the perspective of the approaching war, the widening of the rupture with the objective ally was a factional act difficult to imagine. It is difficult to conceive that the bureaucracy at this point lost awareness of the coincidence of its interests with that of the noncapitalist base of the Eastern states. The argument about Mao's senility does not explain how this opinion could have carried. Thus it is not excluded that the mobilization at that time aimed on the one hand to demonstrate to the imperialists that they could count on an invincible resistance, while on the other hand preparing public opinion for a compromise with imperialism, a compromise making it possible to counter the "diabolical" maneuvers of the revisionists, and to present the rupture of the USA-USSR alliance as a victory.

But we refuse to go along with including this speculation among these fixing a line based on the most probable hypotheses.

* * *

To conclude, we thus propose:

- (1) To reject the text presented by the minority.
- (2) To replace thesis No. 3 in the text of the majority of the United Secretariat by the new text submitted as an appendix to this article.
- (3) To adopt, with this amendment, the text proposed by the majority of the United Secretariat.

March 22, 1969

APPENDIX: AMENDMENT

New paragraph 3:

(3) The contradictions faced by the People's Republic of China have been greatly sharpened as a whole as a result of the isolation in which the People's Republic of China has been thrust, owing to the withdrawal of Soviet aid the worsening of this isolation as a consequence of the policies of the Chinese leadership, and a series of grave setbacks suffered by China internationally.

Following the violation of the agreement on exchanging nuclear informa-

tion, the brutal suspension of all Soviet economic aid to China in July 1960 and the sudden withdrawal of all the Soviet specialists and engineers working in China was an extremely grievous blow to China.

At the root of the conflict were divergent attitudes as to the status quo internationally. The Soviets were responsible for having extended this conflict to a governmental level; but by refusing to see that the fundamental antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on a social plane provided not only the objective possibility but also the imperative necessity of united action, Maoism weakened the Chinese position by refusing to propose a united anti-imperialist front and coordinated actions with the Soviets to support Vietnam, and it assumed the responsibility for transforming the conflict between governments into a rupture between states.

Since 1963, when the Chinese documents as well as certain projected actions presented a more progressive character than the policies of the Kremlin bureaucracy, Peking's international policies have undergone the acid test of practice.

The policies of the Chinese leaders have led to disastrous defeats and in various countries their record has proved hardly more brilliant than that of the Kremlin bureaucracy: Algeria, where they supported the June 19 coup d'état of Boumédiène; Indonesia, where the policy of the largest Communist party in the capitalist world led to a tragic defeat; Bolivia, where the pro-Chinese Communist party of Oscar Zamora took a wait-and-see position with regard to Guevara's guerrilla struggle which Fidel Castro denounced as cowardly, etc.

It is not excluded that on a whole series of points involving foreign policy, Mao's position of rejecting any united front, became the object of criticism from the left among his opponents. It is not excluded that Mao's critics (without thereby adopting the positions of Soviet revisionism) demanded that discussions be reopened with Moscow and demanded a call for a united anti-imperialist front.

Because of its radical verbalism (statements on the events in France, Mexico), Maoism attracts a certain sympathy among revolutionary circles of the youth. However, on the level of building independent movements, Maoism has suffered crushing setbacks everywhere, and the movements which it does influence are far from corresponding to the prestige (although this, too, has diminished) which the People's Republic of China enjoys in the world. In a series of countries, China has followed a policy of collaborating with the national bourgeoisie, and even with feudalists and progressive princes. Pakistan, where the Maoist movement has taken positions opposing the mass movement, is a real betrayal of the interests of the revolution.

On the other hand, the sectarianism of the Maoists with regard to all the other tendencies in the working-class movement (including even Maoist tendencies themselves) has grown strongly since 1967, leading them to consider most of the workers states as capitalist countries. The position of the Chinese leadership with regard to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops, must be viewed as a consequence of the deterioration in relations between China and the USSR and the ultraleft sectarianism of the Chinese leadership rather than as a position coming closer to revolutionary Marxism with respect to the rising political revolution in Czechoslovakia. This position led Albania to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact on the grounds that it is an imperialist pact, and it led the Chinese leadership to define the Soviet Union as a new type of imperialist state.

The setbacks in foreign affairs have heightened the stresses and strains created by the sharpened tensions within Chinese society between the different layers of the peasantry, as well as between the peasantry and the state, and between the working class, the student youth, the intellectuals, and the bureaucracy in the urban centers. These multiple pressures generated deep differences on domestic and foreign policy in the leadership of the party, the government, and the armed forces. The wisdom of Mao's past decisions and his omniscience came under increasing questioning.

AN UNACCEPTABLE AMENDMENT

By E. Germain

Comrade Charlier's amendment is unacceptable for three main reasons:

(1) Because he states that the Chinese positions represent only radical verbalism, while the resolution of the majority of the United Secretariat correctly states that the Chinese CP has "also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa."

We do not state that the Chinese favor revolutionary developments everywhere. To tell us about this with regard to Indonesia before October 1965, Pakistan, Bolivia, is to break open an open door, because point No. 3 of the resolution of the majority of the U.S. says exactly the same thing.

But to stimulate armed revolutionary struggle and a turn to the left of the CPs of Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, Malaysia, is not "verbal" radicalism. It is a radicalism that has objective and positive repercussions in the revolutionary struggle in these countries.

(2) Because he states that Maoism was responsible for transforming the Sino-Soviet conflict from a governmental level "into a rupture between states."

We frankly admit that the distinction between "government" and "state" in this case appears too subtle.

There was an ideological conflict between the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy and the Maoist leaders. In this ideological conflict, the Kremlin leaders replied with a conflict between governments and states. How can one otherwise interpret the stopping of economic and military aid, the withdrawal of the specialists, the refusal to furnish the promised contribution to the manufacture of Chinese nuclear arms? For Comrade Charlier, after these two stages, there exists a third one, the "rupture between states," for which Mao bears the responsibility because he...refused to propose a united anti-imperialist front and coordinated actions with the Soviets to support Vietnam. We will return later to the Vietnam business. But how the refusal to propose a united front -- that is, refusal to conduct propaganda on a certain point! -- represents a rupture between states, appears to us completely mysterious. Comrade Charlier takes us from political, economic and military relations to the field of ideology, in order to mask the rupture between governments and states

provoked by the Kremlin.

(3) Because he implies -- without saying so clearly -- that if in 1963 the Chinese documents or certain actions which they projected presented a more progressive character than the policy of the Kremlin bureaucracy, this is no longer the case today. Yet, as point No. 3 of the resolution of the majority of the U.S. observes, both with regard to the revolution of May 1968 in France and the events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the two main revolutionary explosions of the past year, both the Chinese CP and the Maoist groups manifested a position closer to that of the revolutionary Marxists than that of the Kremlin and the CPs adhering to it. In fact, they were fighting on the same side of the barricades as our comrades most of the time, while the Khrushchevists were on the other side.

Comrade Charlier states that the Maoists were on the right side for bad reasons -- ultraleft and sectarian. We believe that is too great a simplification. But even if he were right, the fact remains that to fight on the side of the socialist revolution in France, of the political revolution in Czechoslovakia, even with bad motives and a detestable ideology, is obviously more progressive than the fact of combating the revolutionary mass movements in these countries, as the Kremlin and its agents did. To deny this difference is to deny the evidence.

Comrade Charlier's mistaken position arises from an essentially ideological and strongly formalist approach to the problem. Instead of seeing the objective roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which reside in the difference between the relations imperialism-Kremlin and imperialism-Peking, as well as in the differences between the relations world-revolution-Kremlin and the relations world-revolution-Peking (differences which one can reduce in the final analysis to the differences between the stages of bureaucratization of the USSR and China), Comrade Charlier attempts to discover the secret of Maoist policy in an overall view of the Maoist ideology, going so far as to affirm implicitly that Mao is able to reverse his attitude with regard to imperialism since he considers the USSR to be an "imperialist and fascist" country. The experience of Stalinism should have taught Comrade Charlier that the ideology of the bureaucracy is by definition pragmatic, unstable, fluctuating, that it can change from one day to the next, making the most brusque and unforeseen turns, and that it is certainly not in the internal logic of this ideology

"globally" that the secrets of Maoist policy are to be found.

Several examples will suffice to illustrate Comrade Charlier's methodological error.

"At the root of the conflict were divergent attitudes as to the status quo internationally," Comrade Charlier states in his amendment. We do not agree. "The root of the conflict" was the objectively different situation of imperialism with respect to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet bureaucracy. The ideological difference over "peaceful coexistence" was only the product of this difference in the objective situation. As long as imperialism does not modify its attitude fundamentally with regard to Peking it is vain to await a "turn by Mao toward peaceful coexistence." If imperialism should modify this attitude, many "turns" will become possible (without thereby becoming inevitable, because there is still the other factor -- the attraction of the world revolution on the Chinese masses, and their own revolutionary ardor, above all among the youth, which singularly limit the possibilities for Mao-Lin Piao to maneuver in this respect).

"This position [ultraleft sectarianism] led Albania to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact on the grounds that it is an imperialist pact," writes Comrade Charlier. Once again, he reverses the relation between cause and effect. Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact because the latter was utilized as an instrument to overturn the leaderships of workers states opposed to the policies of the Kremlin, as the example of Czechoslovakia tragically demonstrated. Does Comrade Charlier believe that the Albanians would have done better to act like Dubcek with respect to this? The ideological justification for the withdrawal was obviously stupid, ultra-left and sectarian. But to believe that the withdrawal flowed from this ideology, and to "forget" the Kremlin's responsibility for the discredit cast on the Warsaw Pact in the whole revolutionary vanguard in the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, signifies forgetting the essential social and political reality for its ideological shadow.

On the "coordinated actions with the Soviets to support Vietnam" Comrade Charlier's information -- drawn from Khrushchev sources -- does not correspond with that coming from the Chinese and the Vietnamese. The latter in particular have contested the story spread by the Kremlin in this regard. They just repeated the denial once again several weeks ago.

As for the common action to support Vietnam, it is necessary to be concrete with respect to this. The Vietnamese don't

want any kind of common armed action on Vietnamese territory, and they are right! Outside of this, any common action can have only two forms: either the joint provision of military aid -- and this is being done -- or common action at other points on the globe, to cut the noose around the Vietnamese revolution. And with regard to this, it is necessary to pose the following question to Comrade Charlier: what is the main obstacle on the road to such "common actions" -- the ideological characterization of the USSR as "capitalist" by Mao, or instead the obvious refusal of the Kremlin to break with its policy of "peaceful coexistence" with Washington?

Does Comrade Charlier believe that it would suffice for Mao to moderate his language with regard to the Kremlin for the latter to agree to common revolutionary action, let us say in Indonesia, India, Iran, Western Europe? Does Comrade Charlier believe that if Mao had abstained from denouncing the Soviet government as a bourgeois government that the fundamental line of the Soviet bureaucracy would have changed? But it is this fundamental line of the Kremlin that makes impossible realizing "two, three, many Vietnams," and not Mao's sectarianism. Hence Mao should be blamed not for having blocked common anti-imperialist action (a blame hypocritically placed on Mao by the Kremlin and its agents); he should be blamed simply for not making the policy of betrayal by the Kremlin more difficult by intelligent propaganda for a united front. In other words, we blame Mao not for having blocked a united front, but for having fought in a clumsy and sectarian way the policies of the Kremlin that made this united front impossible.

In regard to this, it is necessary to remember an essential aspect of the problem. China is closer to Vietnam than the USSR. It has no reasons for fearing a "conventional war"; but it has every reason to fear a nuclear attack by American imperialism, which, moreover, does not hesitate to make public threats of precisely this nature. Yet, despite repeated appeals from many revolutionary movements, including our own, Moscow has refused to issue a nuclear guarantee against such an attack. Doesn't Comrade Charlier believe that this fact alone has had a thousand times worse effect on the possibility of reconstituting a united Sino-Soviet front than all the ultraleft propaganda and all the sectarian ideology of the Chinese?

Comrade Charlier's archivist talents are well-known. This time, however, he seems to have been caught short. Because the reconfirmation of the Chinese determination to defend the Soviet people against imperialism did not occur in 1964 and was not signed by Liu Shao-chi. The date was March 22, 1966, that is, after

the beginning of the cultural revolution. ("The Soviet people can remain assured that if the Soviet Union is made victim of an imperialist aggression and resists it resolutely, China will be at their side in the common struggle against the enemy." Pékin Information, March 28, 1966.) We do not know if that position remains the position of the Maoist team. We simply say that seven years after the rupture between states provoked by the Kremlin, the Chinese reaffirmed their determination to defend the Soviet people against imperialism, while one waited in vain during that time for a single Soviet declaration of the same kind, which would have been much more to the point in view of the development of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

We cannot reply to all the arguments raised by Comrade Charlier in his article. His accusation that it is because of the logic of the factional struggle against Pablo that we have defended a no longer tenable 1963 position is unfounded. It has been solid facts that convinced us that on several essential questions, the position of the Chinese remains closer to that of the revolutionary Marxists and more progressive as a whole than that of the Kremlin. It requires facts -- and not an ideological evolution -- to convince us otherwise.

His accusation that we underestimated or even passed over in silence the opportunist position of the Indonesian CP is particularly misplaced, because it is precisely Comrade Livio Maitan and I who were the first to call attention to this problem, beginning in 1961-63. But as we foresaw in our article of July 1964, the Indonesian CP was obliged to turn to the left, as the Maoists did likewise in Pakistan. To cite that article turns instead against the thesis of Comrade Charlier, because it shows that we grasped the fundamental dynamics of the Sino-Soviet conflict, as it has continued to unfold up to now.

No one has ever wanted to minimize the baneful effect of Maoist opportunism

in these precise cases. But here, too, the difference with the Kremlin obviously leaps out. After the Indonesian disaster, for which the Kremlin completely shared responsibility with Peking, the Indonesian CP, supported by Peking, made a turn toward revolutionary armed struggle, while Moscow continued to aid the fascist Indonesian counterrevolution militarily, including training its cadres militarily. Does Comrade Charlier dare to affirm that these two positions are equivalent?

Let us summarize our position. It is not a matter of embellishing the position of the Chinese, their foreign policy or the line they dictate to the Maoist groups throughout the world, nor of underestimating the baneful consequences, from the standpoint of the world revolution, of the opportunist and ultraleft errors of the Maoist leaders. On this level there are no differences with Comrade Charlier nor with the comrades who support the minority resolution of the United Secretariat.

We do not believe, and we have never said, that the leadership of the Chinese CP is revolutionary. It is a question of a bureaucratic centrist leadership. The fact which we have never ceased to stress is that it is impossible to identify this leadership with that of the Soviet bureaucracy or with Stalinism. It is indispensable to distinguish between them, because this corresponds to the objective reality and because otherwise an effective struggle against Maoism becomes more difficult.

It is because Comrade Charlier's amendment begins to slip toward such positions of identifying them, and places in question the fundamental responsibility of the Kremlin in all the negative aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict at the state level -- even the ultraleftism of the Chinese must be included as a reaction, unjustified certainly, of people who have been outrageously ridiculed, cheated, betrayed and hit with a policy of the worst kind -- that we consider it unacceptable.

April 3, 1969

THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE SITUATION

By Chen Pi-lan

Before discussing the draft resolution on China, I should like to provide the comrades with certain materials which should help them to understand the present situation. I will limit myself to the period between April and July, 1968, during which huge clashes took place throughout China and to the important events since last September. (We have dealt with the important previous events in a series of interviews. See especially the interview "The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi," Internal Bulletin of the United Secretariat, No. 8, Vol. 1968; or International Information Bulletin published by the SWP, January 1969, Part 2.)

Since Mao organized the Red Guards to seize power in early January 1967, no part of China has been spared the spectacle of huge and brutal clashes between the different factions and tendencies. It is specifically these clashes which characterize the dramatic and new stage in the so-called cultural revolution. The high point of these sanguinary events took place between April and July, 1968, mainly in the provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Yunnan, Tibet, Sinkiang, and Fukien. The scale of these clashes could in reality be considered as a local civil war. For example, in Kwangsi, the Red Guards were divided into two different groups. One called itself "The 22nd of April Rebel Army," the cadres of which were composed of students, a few workers and some army units, and was under the direct leadership of the Cultural Revolutionary Group in Peking. The other referred to itself as the "Kwangsi United Rebel Headquarters," the cadres of which were composed mainly of workers and peasants, army units, party functionaries, and students. This latter group was organized and controlled behind the scenes by the first Kwangsi provincial secretary, Wie Hue-ting, as well as by a top army commander. The struggle between these two groups reached the crucial state in a clash during May in Wo Chuo. The most modern weapons were used -- from modern rifles and machine guns to heavy artillery and tanks -- by both sides, which left thousands of dead and wounded from each group. According to reports published in the Angry West River Tide (Si Kiang Lu Chow) put out by "The 22nd of April Rebel Army" group, their side suffered several thousands killed and wounded, more than 3,000 captured, of whom 317 were executed. They also reported that over 2,000 homes were destroyed. Similar battles also took place in other Kwangsi cities, such as Lanlin, Liuchow, and Kweilin, as well as in those provinces I noted earlier. For example in the province of Yunnan, the Kunming (capital of

the province) army commander Tang Fu-chen said on July 3, 1968, in his personal report to Mao in Peking that over 30,000 had been killed throughout the province of Yunnan. Mao replied that he estimated the number to be closer to 80,000. "According to the local papers," Mao said, "160,000 were killed. This is perhaps exaggerated. I would judge that at least 80,000 have been killed." (People's Daily.)

As a result of the serious situation I have just described, Mao was forced to take certain measures to alleviate his precarious position. First, on July 3, 1968, an emergency order was published, and then on July 24, an emergency appeal was issued. These demanded immediate cessation of all struggles between the different Red Guard and workers' groups. At the same time, army detachments from Peking were sent to such areas as Kwangsi, Yunnan, Fukien, and Sinkiang in order to intervene in the struggle. It was only in this way that Mao was able to put a stop to the local civil-war situation. Mao also demanded that the revolutionary committees be established in the five remaining provinces of Kwangsi, Yunnan, Tibet, Fukien, and Sinkiang, as well as in their principal cities.

Here we should point out first that the so-called revolutionary committees were either directly controlled or dominated by army officials, and secondly that the leaders of the different participating groups included many of Mao's opposition, to whom Mao was forced to make concessions. Formally, then, the struggle between the opposing groups, under the signpost of the so-called cultural revolution, was thus terminated. The activities of all Red Guard and workers' groups ceased; the students returned to the schools and the workers and peasants to their jobs.

Due to the above serious struggles, Mao saw that not only were the student Red Guards no longer useful to him, but that they actually threatened his own position. Therefore, last September he began to take certain measures to purge the dissident elements among the students. First he demanded that the revolutionary committees throughout the country establish "workers' Mao Tse-tung's thought propaganda teams" with those worker elements who were loyal to Mao. These teams were then sent into the schools and colleges along with army units in order to carry out "the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation" and a "revolution in education" (Peking Review, No. 44, 1968, p. 12). Whereas Mao began by purging the party with the students, he now used cer-

tain worker elements to purge the students. These so-called worker propaganda teams entered the schools and colleges under the protection of the army and replaced the normal curriculum and instructors. The classrooms were transformed into discussions of the students' own history, ideas, and experiences -- especially those during the so-called cultural revolution -- self-criticism and criticism of others. At the same time the members of the "workers' propaganda teams" gave lectures on Mao's thought and led the teachers and students in discussions of Mao's thought. This is what the Maoist propaganda refers to as the "educational revolution." Such a situation has created much discontent and aroused much resentment on the part of many teachers and students who, nevertheless, are powerless in face of the army which protects the propaganda teams. The atmosphere and position of many of the teachers and students are intolerable.

This "struggle-criticism-transformation" movement is in reality a mass purge in the schools and colleges. Thousands of students and teachers have been sent to work in the countryside, factories, mines, and even to desolate frontier regions. The Chinese specialists in Hong Kong estimate that at least two million students and teachers have been subjected to this fate.

The purge in the schools, however, only reflects the purge being carried out by Mao in Chinese society as a whole. These same "workers' propaganda teams"

have been sent into "all spheres of the superstructure." That is, Mao's loyal followers have gone into all the cultural organizations, government, and administrative offices, etc., in order to carry out the so-called struggle-criticism-transformation movement, i.e., to purge those elements who were against Mao's so-called cultural revolution and even those who did not actively participate in it. Most of these people made up the cadres of the old party or youth. Their fate has been the same as the students and teachers I described earlier. The estimation in Hong Kong is that around six million of the old party cadres have been dismissed and sent to the countryside, frontier regions, etc.

The purges being carried out by Mao have two essential purposes. One is to drive out the student and teacher oppositions in the schools and colleges in order to obviate struggles both inside and outside the schools and colleges. The second is to purge all those who are now loyal Maoists in the different organizations, the administrative offices, the government offices, etc., not only to obviate struggles, but also to open the way for the Ninth Congress, that is, reestablishing the Chinese Communist party under Mao's absolute control. In the long run, of course, such policies as Mao is carrying out in China's educational institutions cannot be successful, because they destroy education itself. There also exists a very good possibility of those banned elements organizing the masses, with whom they have been ordered to work, against Mao and his faction.

MINORITY REPORT TO THE WORLD CONGRESS

By Peng Shu-tse

Comrades:

First of all I should like to point to the fact that it has been almost three and a half years since the eruption of the so-called "Cultural Revolution." The Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which just opened in Peking, formally marks the end of this movement. However, at this point -- the end of the "Cultural Revolution" -- the International finds itself still in the beginning stages of a discussion on this most important event. I feel profoundly that such a situation is a disgrace to the International. It is clear that the International's concern over the Chinese events is by no means to provide a guide to action but merely the leisurely production of documents and resolutions for the International's archives. Every comrade in the International should be on guard against such a procedure in the International's future work.

In addition, the document on China was only adopted by the United Secretariat one month before the congress, and I did not receive this document until three weeks before the congress. Naturally, the comrades living outside of Europe would most likely have received this document even later, if they received it at all before the congress. Hence, it was impossible for the rank and file or, for that matter, the leaderships of the sections, to have any serious discussion on the basis of this document. All the resolutions submitted by the United Secretariat, particularly on such important questions as China, should be prepared and sent to the comrades at least six months before a world congress, otherwise there can be no fruitful discussion in the International. The truth is that only one resolution appeared anywhere near six months before the congress, while all the others appeared only during a six-week period preceding the congress, and some were only made available at the congress itself. It is evident that the cadres of each section were not able to discuss the world congress resolutions. Such a situation demonstrates a most serious weakness of the International's leadership which must be corrected in the future.

Since the so-called "Cultural Revolution" has been terminated, the resolution presented to the congress is already out of date. Nevertheless, I by no means want to reject a discussion on the basis of the United Secretariat resolution, since it contains many mistaken ideas and contradictions on such problems as the nature of the CCP and its regime, the causes, aims and development of Mao's

"Cultural Revolution," the differences between the Mao and Liu factions and their origins as well as social basis, and the meaning and significance of the Chinese events. All of these problems have yet to be discussed seriously in the International, and it is for this reason that after three years of the "Cultural Revolution" the International is unable to arrive at a common interpretation of the Chinese events, and even finds itself in a state of intolerable confusion on these problems, and committing big mistakes relative to the Chinese question. In order to arrive at a common and clear interpretation of the Chinese events as well as to correct our past mistakes and avoid future ones, the International must launch a thorough and serious discussion on China. Otherwise more serious, irreparable, and even disastrous mistakes are in store for the International and its sections.

As for the draft resolution adopted by the majority of the United Secretariat, I will limit my remarks to several important points, since I have already expressed my opinion in the written discussion in such documents as my letter of March 1967 to the IEC and my article, "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle Inside the CCP," of November 19, 1967.

1. The draft resolution of the United Secretariat majority is based upon a draft resolution submitted by the Political Committee of the SWP. However, we find many important ideas were removed by the United Secretariat majority from the original draft, while many new and mistaken ideas were added. For example, in the first paragraph of the original document the United Secretariat removed the word "Stalinized" from the phrase, "which led the Stalinized Chinese Communist Party in the civil war." This, combined with the refusal of the United Secretariat majority in their resolution to characterize the CCP as Stalinist clearly demonstrates that the majority of the United Secretariat does not regard the CCP even today as a Stalinist party.

This attitude of the majority of the United Secretariat has its historical origins at the Third World Congress in 1951. At that congress there were three main tendencies on the Chinese question. One tendency was represented by Pablo, who considered the CCP to be a revolutionary Marxist party inasmuch as it had taken power against Stalin's own personal advice. My position was, on the contrary, that the CCP remained a Stalinist party in spite of its taking power, since it did so only because it took militant ac-

tion against the serious attack launched by Chiang Kai-shek; and this action was approved by Stalin. The third tendency was represented by Comrade Germain who considered that the CCP had become a left-centrist party upon gaining power.

Owing to the differences among the leaders of the International on the nature of the CCP, logical differences followed as to the nature of the CCP's regime. Pablo, considering the CCP to be a revolutionary Marxist party, held that the regime constituted a dictatorship of the proletariat. Pablo's ideas were later developed more concretely. In the Quatrième Internationale of November 1958 one can find the following sentence in the article "Uninterrupted Revolution in China," by Jean Paul Martin. "The administrative committees of the communes are in reality 'popular town councils,' soviets." From this it can be seen that Pablo considered the regime of the CCP logically to be a dictatorship of the proletariat based on "'popular town councils,' soviets." Of course, today everybody knows that Pablo himself has done a flip-flop on the Chinese question and now considers the Chinese regime to be even worse than Stalin's regime.

The SWP in 1955 took the position that the CCP was a Stalinist party and its regime a bureaucratic dictatorship, and therefore advocated political revolution (see "The Third Chinese Revolution and Its Aftermath," Discussion Bulletin A-31, October 1955). At approximately the same time, I too arrived at the conclusion that the CCP regime represented a bureaucratic dictatorship, and hence, agreed with the conclusion of political revolution. The position of the present majority of the United Secretariat on the nature of the CCP remains consistent with Pablo's original analysis; and up to now it has not decided on the nature of the CCP's regime. The majority draft resolution only states that there is a bureaucracy in China; it avoids defining the CCP's regime as a bureaucratic dictatorship. In spite of this, however, the United Secretariat majority resolution proposes political revolution. Here we can clearly see a fundamental contradiction in the resolution. A bureaucracy existed in the Soviet Union even under the leadership of Lenin and Trotsky. But we would not expect the majority of the United Secretariat to try to justify a position of calling for a political revolution to overthrow the Soviet regime headed by Lenin and Trotsky merely because a bureaucracy existed.

2. It is worth examining several of the additions made by the majority of the United Secretariat, such as those singling out "the main contradictions" of China -- a,b,c,d,e,f, -- as well as the conclusions drawn by the United Secretar-

iat majority from these contradictions. In point "a," for example, the resolution says: "The contradiction between the rate of growth of the economy...and the rate of growth of the population...." This "contradiction" is a very common phenomenon in almost all the backward countries; but it has no direct connection with the "Cultural Revolution." In point "d" we read, "The contradiction between the general low level of consumption of the mass of the people and the increasing bureaucratic privileges...." This, too, is a common phenomenon existing in all the workers states ruled by Stalinist parties; but it has no direct connection with the "Cultural Revolution". The other four "contradictions" under the letters b,c,e, and f are also abstract and scholastic. Nevertheless, the authors of the United Secretariat majority resolution use these contradictions to draw the following conclusions:

"All these contradictions have been intensified by the damage done to Chinese agriculture and economy during the second phase of the Great Leap Forward and the 1959-61 near-famine period. They created an explosive situation in the country, in which a process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses became possible. In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured. The 'Cultural Revolution' constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy."

This conclusion contains three very important factual errors.

a) A "process of political differentiation and increased political activity of the masses" did take place during "the hundred flowers bloom and hundred schools of thought contend" movement in 1957, a prime example of which was the revolt by the 3,000 high-school students in Han Yan (near Hankow). This movement developed to the point of threatening the CCP's regime. Mao was obliged to suppress the movement after this revolt in order to check the revolutionary tendency of the masses.

The serious famine of 1959-61 (not "near-famine") created by the Great Leap Forward (in reality by the People's Communes policy) of course "created an explosive situation in the country." But the reforms carried out under the leadership of Liu Shao-chi after 1960 such as putting an end to the Great Leap Forward, modifying the People's Communes policy by allowing the peasants to have their own plot of land, restoring the free market in the countryside, etc., and making concessions to those people working in the cul-

tural and educational fields, appeased to a great extent the discontent of the masses and ameliorated the danger faced by the bureaucracy. That is, "a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy" was diverted.

b) The "Cultural Revolution" launched by Mao in no way "constituted objectively an attempt...to divert the social forces...from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy." The "Cultural Revolution" was, on the contrary, an attempt by the Mao faction to oust Liu and his followers in order to safeguard Mao's own personal dictatorship. This is a self-evident fact which everybody understands except the authors of the majority document.

c) To say that "the 'Cultural Revolution' constituted objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy," is to say that the Mao faction represents a reformist tendency, i.e., a progressive tendency in relation to the other sectors of the bureaucracy. Then why doesn't the resolution give Mao's faction critical support against the other sectors of the bureaucracy? Is this not an important contradiction? The real reason, it would seem, why the resolution gives Mao's faction a reformist label, i.e., progressive label, is to cover up its reactionary essence.

3. The draft resolution states that "By Marxist standards, neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other." This paragraph is a repetition of the position expressed in the "Discussion Resolution" of the IEC meeting in March 1967. I have already listed five differences between Mao's and Liu's factions which prove the latter to be the more progressive (see "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle Inside the CCP," November 19, 1967). Here I will not repeat those points, but will ask the comrades to take special note of the following two facts:

a) In regard to the "de-Stalinization" movement in the Soviet Union, Liu's faction gave it support as is clearly demonstrated by Teng Hsiao-ping's report to the Eighth Congress of the CCP which I have quoted in my article (*ibid.*, pages 5-6). On the other hand, Mao's faction took a very strong position against "de-Stalinization." The following question should be answered by the authors of the majority resolution: Is there absolutely no difference between the positions of the two factions on the question of "de-

Stalinization"? The majority comrades of the United Secretariat must give us a clear answer to this question.

b) I have cited many sources which prove that Liu Shao-chi and especially Peng Teh-huai were opposed to Mao's Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policy. Peng's opposition can clearly be seen from his letter to Mao dated July 13, 1959. (Published in the Fatherland Magazine, March 1968 in Hong Kong.) In this letter, Peng said that the Great Leap Forward had been executed in such a rush that all proportion in economic development had been destroyed, and had resulted in huge waste (2,000,000,000 Chinese dollars). He claimed that "the People's Communes were set up too early which made for the setback in agricultural productivity." Peng said that the origin of the mistakes was due to "petty-bourgeois fanaticism." He also said, "In the opinion of some comrades putting politics in command can replace all other laws. They forget that it is impossible to replace economic laws with politics..." Therefore, he demanded that the party "correct the leftist tendency."

While the ideas in Peng's letter are generally correct, Mao attacked him in a vicious way, saying that "Peng Teh-huai is an ambitious person. He deliberately wants to split the party...organizing their clique in order to build their own opportunist party." He also accused Peng of trying "to destroy the dictatorship of the proletariat."

In other words, the position expressed by Peng Teh-huai on the Great Leap Forward and People's Communes policy was generally correct, and without doubt, much more progressive than Mao's. Therefore, we must ask the comrades, especially the comrades of the United Secretariat, to reconsider their position with regard to the differences between the two factions, in order that we might reach a correct political position on China for the International and the Chinese section.

4. The draft resolution says:

"In seeking to gain influence in the colonial world, Peking uses a language that is strongly anti-imperialist. It has extended material aid to guerrilla forces. This has not only created an image far to the left of Moscow but also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa."

The ideas expressed in the above quotation are in complete opposition to the idea of political revolution in China. If Peking's political position and action have "objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the

world," why does the resolution not give the Peking regime critical support instead of advocating political revolution to overthrow it? The position taken by the authors of the draft resolution is clearly a contradictory one.

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the main author of the majority document, Comrade Livio. I must frankly state that Comrade Livio does not have the capacity to write a resolution on China. For one thing, he knows very little about the Chinese situation and seems to know hardly anything about the evolution of events in China since the CCP took power in 1949. It is necessary to understand that the Chinese situation and its problems are very complicated and the most difficult in the world to understand, especially for westerners. Trotsky himself recognized this fact and took a very serious attitude toward the Chinese question. He even asked Radek, the president of Sun Yat-sen university, to pay special attention to the Chinese question. Radek, who undertook a serious study of the Chinese question, had a number of the Chinese students help him collect material on the economy, sociology, and history of China. The work of Radek was very useful in helping Trotsky to understand the concrete situation. But Comrade Livio has never seriously studied the Chinese situation and its

problems. It is evident that he bases his opinions on certain documents or articles appearing in the Chinese press (those that are translated) and on some of the material found in the western press combined with suppositions from his own imagination and narrow prejudices. The result is that the documents drafted by him not only contain many mistakes in fact, but also many contradictory ideas.

One of the worst things, however, is that Comrade Livio never asked the Chinese section to express its opinions on the "Cultural Revolution," and didn't even consult with me before preparing the document on China. Such an attitude toward national sections can only be compared to that which existed in the Comintern under the control of Stalin. It should also be pointed out that I have made many criticisms on the Chinese documents written by Comrade Livio, such as the statement adopted by the United Secretariat in November 1966, and the discussion resolution adopted by the plenum of the IEC, March 1967. But to date, Comrade Livio has made no reply to those criticisms or attempted to clarify his position in regard to them. One can only conclude from this that Comrade Livio has deliberately avoided discussing the differences. This reflects such arrogance on his part as to make him politically irresponsible.

A CRITICISM OF THE UNITED SECRETARIAT MAJORITY
DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Kyoji Nishi

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* * *

The Chinese "cultural revolution" is not only of immense importance in the current international class struggle, requiring our International to clarify its position on it, but is also of vital significance to our existence as an independent leadership in the world proletarian movement. Inasmuch as the "pro-Peking" or "Maoist" Communist parties, with a powerful center in the People's Republic of China, now wield influence in the international revolutionary movement, helped by a pseudo leftist stand in struggles around the world, we face the possibility of the Fourth International losing its reason for being if we remain unarmed with a clear position and consistent policy on this.

The draft resolution proposed by the majority of the United Secretariat should have appeared much earlier, since it is a matter of great importance in the current world situation. Moreover, it lacks sufficient clarity to determine our political line. It is, so to speak, a mere centrist explanation of the situation in China.

I.

First of all, in dealing with the Mao-Lin faction's "cultural revolution," we must always make clear whether we offer it "critical support" or oppose it.

It is true that the draft takes a critical position toward the Mao faction which initiated and advanced the "cultural revolution." But it fails to oppose or fight against it in a clear way in face of the necessity felt by the Mao tendency to resort to purge measures in the course of the struggle. The draft resolution reads:

"The 'cultural revolution' constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction [e.g., the direction of a political revolution] from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy."

It is true that the Mao faction took advantage of the popular discontent with the bureaucracy to mobilize masses of the young generation against Liu Shao-chi and others in the "opposition." But

what was the basic course followed by the Mao faction in seeking to "reform" the bureaucracy? It was neither to grant concessions to the masses nor to moderate the bureaucratic repression. Actually they carried out their "reform" in order to reestablish bureaucratic rule under the dictatorial Mao faction, overthrowing a group of bureaucrats who had given way to the mass pressure, dared to force Mao aside, and partly adjusted Mao's autarchic policies.

In other words, the essential nature of the Mao-Lin "cultural revolution" is to be seen in the "reform" they sought of firmly establishing the bureaucratic dictatorship by crushing in the bud any attempt at creating an independent mass movement or any sign of a possible political revolution, though they certainly took advantage of the justified popular discontent. It is, therefore, very much out of focus to interpret the real nature of the "cultural revolution" as "an attempt...to divert the social forces pushing [in the direction of a political revolution] from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy."

Apparently there are quite a few comrades who have been taken in by Mao Tse-tung's "leftist" or "revolutionary" slogans and who have been blinded by the fact that his faction succeeded in mobilizing large numbers of the young generation.

Here, however, we ought to recall some historical facts. The fascists, appealing to the discontented petty bourgeoisie who had been brought to the brink of ruin, successfully mobilized great masses. A recent instance of a similar nature was the antirevolutionary mass mobilizations in Indonesia in which the militarists made full use of discontented youth against the Sukarno government behind which stood the Stalinists.

We must not overlook the fact that the Mao faction, though they certainly managed to mobilize a considerable number of people, with the "Red Guards" serving as a spearhead, had to face persistent resistance on the part of the masses; above all the city workers, who certainly lacked an organized opposition leadership.

II.

Let us review a bit of the historical development of the situation in China up to the time in question.

After the "Hundred Flowers" campaign in 1956, the Peking bureaucracy,

frightened by the enormous outpouring of mass discontent, followed a policy of severe repression under guise of an "anti-rightist" campaign in which the bureaucracy mobilized considerable masses of people. Then Mao Tse-tung tried to break the existing deadlock with the "Great Leap Forward" and the "People's Communes." These movements were carried out with an enormous mass mobilization, creating among the masses the temporary illusion that the Peking leadership was of a revolutionary character. Even in our International some were to be found who gave almost unconditional "critical" (!) support to the "People's Communes" movement. The developments that followed -- economic disorder and the threat of famine -- showed clearly that the discontented peasantry replied to the movement with a slow-down on a broad scale. The seeming mass enthusiasm was only the surface reaction of the peasants of China to the movement imposed from above. The end result was a loss in economic balance that brought the country to the verge of catastrophe. Thus the economic policy imposed by bureaucratic decree proved to be a costly one. Far too little scientific planning went into it.

This outcome brought Peng Teh-huai and others to dare to challenge Mao Tse-tung at the Lushan conference in 1959. They tried to bring under control the bureaucratic "petty-bourgeois enthusiasm" that had been aroused by the Mao faction.

We do not know what stand Peng Teh-huai's group took on other important problems, above all, the Sino-Soviet dispute. Certainly, in an article published later, the Mao faction attacked Peng Teh-huai for having been praised by Khrushchev; but it should be noted that nowhere has Mao attacked either Liu Shao-chi or Peng Teh-huai for defending the Kremlin in the Sino-Soviet conflict. This is all the more important since some persons, influenced by the clamor against the opposition and the shower of epithets such as "the Chinese Khrushchev," "reformist," etc., are unconsciously inclined to attribute the "leftist" position in the dispute solely to the Mao-Lin faction and to conclude that the opposition holds a position similar to Khrushchev's. As a matter of fact, the leading figures on the Peking side of the Sino-Soviet dispute were among the now purged opposition group, although Mao himself stood at the head. These leading figures, as is well-known, were Lu Ting-yi, Peng Chen, Teng Hsiao-ping, and Liu Shao-chi himself.

In any case, the central issue at the Lushan conference was not the Sino-Soviet dispute but the campaigns involving the "Great Leap Forward" and the "People's Communes." Evidently the criticism made by Peng Teh-huai's group on this issue, despite its moderate and conciliatory style and tone, pointed toward a

basically correct course and direction. The conference marked the first time the split inside the bureaucracy found expression in a confrontation between Mao's faction and the opposition.

After that the Liu Shao-chi group elevated Mao, so to speak, onto a pedestal, gained supremacy in the state apparatus, and carried out the "adjustment policy." This was a policy of "concessions" to the masses aimed at saving the Chinese economy from possible collapse and reestablishing ties with the peasantry. For the bureaucracy it constituted the inevitable setback it had to suffer.

The Liu faction carried out this policy in fundamentally the same bureaucratic way practiced in the preceding period. They sought mainly to rescue the Peking bureaucracy from a fatal situation. They did their utmost to cover up the split inside the bureaucracy. Under the name of Maoism they pursued their course without any public self-criticism. Instead of organizing a democratic discussion among the masses, they advanced their policy of granting concessions and mitigating things from above without consulting the masses.

Their policy beyond dispute revealed their bureaucratic nature. It was an exact reflection of their position as an upper layer of the Peking bureaucracy even though they constituted an opposition within the regime. Thus this is one of the points which we must subject to sharp criticism. We must state that the Mao faction was able to make its comeback in the "cultural revolution" owing to the role played by the "party persons in authority," just as the draft resolution points out.

We must grant, however, that so far as the economic "adjustment policy" was concerned, the opposition had no other recourse. Truly it was a policy of making concessions to the masses. In contrast, the Mao faction arbitrarily refers to the opposition's policy in a piecemeal way and slanders the Liu group by claiming that the policy of making concessions signified taking the "capitalist road." The leaders of the Mao faction, however, have been utterly unable themselves to present any scientific analysis of these developments. In other words, the Mao faction has not assailed the Liu group because of its bureaucratic nature and its infringements of workers democracy but because of its concessions to the masses. Thus the assault leveled by the Mao faction against the Liu faction derives from a standpoint quite the opposite of ours, of Trotskyism.

The Mao faction has charged Peng Teh-huai and Liu Shao-chi with having "crazily opposed" Maoism. But what was

the nature of Mao Tse-tung's policy that led them to oppose it so vigorously? Wasn't it a policy that was proved wrong by history? Wasn't it a policy that whipped the masses into action and brought a half famine to the country during the "Great Leap Forward" and the "People's Communes"?

When Stalin in the Soviet Union of the thirties drove the first five-year plan forward by bureaucratic orders from above, imposing collectivization on the peasantry, he called for "liquidation of the kulaks," but brought about only an enormous imbalance in the national economy. Trotsky, unlike Liu Shao-chi (possibly), did not hesitate to oppose the bureaucratic Stalinist way of operating the economy. He firmly stood in opposition, not only after the policy proved wrong, but at the very beginning; and he offered a practical policy together with a theoretically consistent and scientific criticism.

Despite the dangerous loss of balance in the Soviet economy resulting from the first five-year plan, the Stalinists took the risk of repeating the experience in the second plan. Trotsky, armed with a detailed analysis of the realities, issued a warning:

"The Left Opposition in its own time was the first to demand the inauguration of the Five Year Plan. Now it is duty bound to say: It is necessary to put off the second Five Year Plan. Away with shrieking enthusiasm! Away with stock jobbing! There is no reconciling them with planned activity. Then, you are for retreat? Yes, for a temporary retreat. And what about the prestige of the infallible leadership? The fate of the dictatorship of the proletariat is more important than blown-up prestige." (Trotsky: Soviet Economy in Danger, p. 42.)

Today this criticism sounds as if it were directed against Mao Tse-tung's "Great Leap Forward." The Peking bureaucracy, above all the Mao faction, speaks constantly of "politics first," "spiritual incentives," "socialist education movement," and repeatedly insists on "taking firm hold of the revolution and promoting production." "Material incentives" and "economism" are held in supreme contempt. But what generates a revolutionary spirit? A scientific policy of building up the economy cannot be replaced by that sort of spirit, overlooking its objective foundation.

Unlike the Stalinists, Trotsky never dealt with the problem of building the Soviet economy separately from the world market or from the international class struggle; he emphasized the importance of scientifically analyzing the ob-

jective economic relations underlying the interlocking world struggles in order to build the economy in the Soviet Union. Repeatedly he insisted on recovering "measure and scale" in the management of the planned economy. And betterment of the standard of living of the masses remained his constant concern. Today Trotsky's insistent criticisms could, with but little modification, be brought against the policies of the Mao-Lin faction with telling effect.

Thus we see that Peng Teh-huai and some others at the Lushan conference dared, though hesitatingly, to criticize Peking's policies from a correct angle. And for that very reason they were purged from any sort of position enabling them to wield influence. Then the Liu Shao-chi faction tried to modify Mao Tse-tung's policy from the same angle as the purged critics though they did this in bureaucratic fashion.

It is, therefore, important for us to remember the principled criticism of the Peking bureaucracy made by Comrade Peng Shu-tse and many others of the Chinese section, strictly along Trotskyist lines, already at this stage of developments. (See: "A Criticism of the Various Views Supporting the Chinese Rural People's Communes -- What Our Attitude Should Be" by Peng Shu-tse, Sept., 1959. In SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 1960.)

III.

On the factional struggle inside the CCP leadership, the draft resolution submitted by the United Secretariat majority, before proceeding to criticize each of the chief factions, states:

"Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is actually striving for socialist democracy or has a program of genuine revolutionary policies at home and abroad. By Marxist standards neither of the chief factions deserves political support against its rival. From the available information -- and it is admittedly scanty and inadequate -- neither faction can be judged to be more progressive than the other."

The question as to which of the two factions we should give "critical support" or which we should single out for main attack cannot be answered by determining which of the factions has followed a political line, registered by history, coming closest to ours. In reaching a judgment, our first concern must be the concrete problems now at issue.

What is the meaning of the words "Marxist standards" in the draft resolution? As a matter of fact, both factions

are revisionist according to "Marxist standards"; neither faction is Trotskyist, since they are of the Stalinist school. That, however, does not deprive Marxists of the right to give critical support to one or the other of two Stalinist factions struggling against each other. In the Sino-Soviet confrontation, if we went by "Marxist standards" in this sense of the term we could by no means support either side. But, of course, we must not approach the problem in that way.

Again let us quote from the draft resolution:

"As long as Liu's group retained supremacy it practiced the abominable customs of bureaucratic command learned in the school of Stalinism. Its doctrines and practices were indistinguishable from those of the previous period when Mao was in direct control."

This is correct. Though Liu's group made a few practical improvements in Mao's policy, they never criticized the preceding policy nor exercised any self-criticism. They never turned against the cult of Mao. They held fundamentally the same doctrines as the Mao group. This criticism of the Liu group in the draft resolution, therefore, is absolutely essential.

The necessity to make such a criticism, however, should never lead us to conclude, bearing in mind the confrontation of their political lines, that we must reject supporting one of the factions and attacking the other. We conclude only that we must never give any political support to the doctrines of either group.

Another part of the draft reads:

"While the Mao faction has issued calls for rebellion and appeals to the initiative of the masses, its deeds do not harmonize with its words. Mao's objective was to regain supremacy for his faction and line in the bureaucracy, not overthrow the bureaucracy. This explains why he followed the Stalinist methods of slander, physical violence and the fostering of cultism in his struggle and strictly limited his appeals to the masses. Whenever and wherever any segment of the people, whether among the youth, the proletariat, the peasantry or the intellectuals, has showed signs of slipping away from domination and direction by Mao to act on its own account, it has been restrained and called to order, sometimes by repressive measures."

Certainly, the Mao faction called for "rebellion," and insisted on the slogan of "boldly rouse the masses." The first impression is that they called for mass struggle against the bureaucracy.

But here close examination of the facts is required. In accordance with what line and against whom did the Mao faction call for the masses to "rebel"? Clearly the call for rebellion was directed against the "party persons in authority who are taking the capitalist road." The Mao faction called for struggle against Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Teh-huai, and others. In other words, those who had resisted Mao Tse-tung's directives, revised his policies, opposed his ultraleftist adventurism, and adopted the policy of retreat and adjustment -- these were the people selected as the targets of attack and assault. They were the ones accused of "taking the capitalist road." From the beginning, therefore, no "rebellion" at all was allowed against Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao themselves. Their banner of "boldly rouse the masses" was very clear from the start: "What stand does one take to Maoism, whether one accepts or denies, whether one defends or opposes, whether one cherishes or confronts -- these are the watershed and touchstone to distinguish real revolution from false revolution, revolution from counterrevolution, Marxism-Leninism from revisionism..." (Liberation Army Daily.)

So, if we make a precise analysis of their words, we can see that their deeds fit rather harmoniously with their words even from the beginning, despite a tremendous amount of demagoguery. Besides, in the opening stage, when the Liu Shao-chi group had a rather free hand in the central bodies of the state, the Mao faction did not call for mass "rebellion" from below. Mao and Lin first gained control of the central machine of the Liberation Army, and then at the end of 1965 they began to move mainly in the culture and propaganda section of the party leadership as well as the party machinery in Peking. From the end of 1965 through the beginning of 1966 they mounted threatening attacks, mainly through the Liberation Army Daily and some Shanghai newspapers, against the intellectuals inside the culture and propaganda machine or under its influence.

We are not in position to confirm the rumored mobilization of army troops to disrupt the Peking party committee and dismiss Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, Lo Jui-ching, Yang Shang-kun, and others. But mysterious talk of a February coup and a subsequent official denial are enough for us to suspect some kind of frame-up committed by the Mao faction.

It was only after the Mao-Lin faction got hold of the culture and propaganda machine and gained control of Peking, depriving the Liu "opposition" of every means to express their views and organize nationally, that the Mao group issued their call for mass rebellion, and

mobilized the Red Guards so as to purge the opposition. It was not at all accidental that the Mao faction started their factional struggle under the name of the "great cultural revolution," since the culture and propaganda machine of the party was the very first target. It was started in this sector of the party in order to deprive the opposition of the means to speak out.

Therefore, as Comrade Peng Shu-tse pointed out, it is a serious misunderstanding of the situation to say, as the 1967 resolution of the International Executive Committee did: "As for Mao's opponents, such as Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping, who held and who still hold considerable means of making known their political line had they so desired, their silence on this subject compels us to be relatively cautious concerning the contents of their policies."

It is true that the Liu Shao-chi group, when they were in control of the party and had considerable leeway, never attempted any public self-criticism or criticism of the sectarianism of the Mao faction. Moreover, it is possible since then that they hesitated to make their political line known to the workers internationally, perhaps out of bureaucratic faithfulness to party discipline even in the difficult situations that came about later. But at least we can see with little difficulty that since the so-called plenary session of the Central Committee in 1966, they have been deprived of every single means to make known their political line, except, for whatever it may be worth, through hints and allusions in the process of "self-criticism."

Little observation is needed to see that the Mao-Lin faction has never assailed the opposition for not clearly expressing their opinions. Attacks without fail would have taken place had they remained silent within the party. Consequently the real reason why no attacks were made on this point is quite apparent. The Liu group has not refrained from expressing their opinions; the Mao-Lin faction has denied the opposition every possibility of speaking out and has blocked their way to the masses.

If in this situation we simply say that neither faction "deserves any political support," then, objectively, we put ourselves in the position of abetting the Mao faction in its destructive deeds against the masses. Consequently, is there any choice open to us but to direct the heaviest fire against the Mao faction which has completely suppressed proletarian democracy, not to mention what it has done with regard to the cult of Mao?

IV.

Now it still seems difficult to draw a clear line between the two factions in foreign policy.

In the Sino-Soviet dispute, as mentioned above in part II, many of the important members of the opposition were leading figures on the Chinese side, and there is no reason at all to suspect them of wanting to compromise with the Kremlin. Even in the most slanderous attacks, the Mao faction has not presented a single bit of evidence showing the "Chinese Khrushchev" to have been an ally of the Kremlin.

On the other hand it is not unlikely with regard to the problem of a united front with the Soviet Union against imperialism, above all in providing support to the Vietnamese revolution, that the opposition took a more flexible stand and that the Mao faction represented the worst kind of sectarianism. And it is needless to say that this remains the most important question in the international class struggle today. As already pointed out by Comrade Peng and generally accepted, Lo Jui-ching's confrontation with Lin Piao is another confirmation of this assumption. Moreover we know that Mao's attitude in his discussion with representatives of the Japan Communist Party proved him to be the one responsible for the Chinese sectarianism in this problem.

As was pointed out much earlier by Comrade Yamanishi, Peking's rejection of a united front against imperialism, for which the Mao faction itself was responsible, had its historical precedent in Stalin-Thälmann's ultimatic policy in the struggle against Hitler in Germany in the thirties. On the basis of no more than this, we must excoriate the Mao-Lin faction.

When we look at the varying shades of sectarianism to be seen in the radical student and youth movement today, and note the role played by Maoism in this, our International is duty bound to take a firm principled stand and in the interest of the international struggle refuse to follow the prevailing inclination.

We do not know what differences might have existed within the Peking bureaucracy over the problem of the underdeveloped countries and the national bourgeoisie. It is probable that a serious confrontation occurred over the counter-revolution in Indonesia. But this can only be guesswork, which is best avoided.

As for the Peking policy of collaborating with the national bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries in order to

advance the bureaucracy's own nationalist interests, we can name some figures bearing considerable responsibility for this course even in the current opposition. For instance, Peng Chen who publicly lauded Sukarno-Aidit's NASAKOM in Indonesia. With regard to this, not only Chou En-lai but the whole Peking leadership, including Mao Tse-tung himself, shared the same responsibility for the fulsome hailing of Aidit's policies. Moreover, the notorious "intermediate-zone theory" is Mao's own invention, as he has stated. Consequently it is quite natural that the "party persons in authority" have not been assailed once for the disastrous defeat in Indonesia save for silly heckling over Liu Shao-chi and Wang Kuang-mei's diplomatic mission.

Taking advantage of the opportunity, I should like to venture my personal opinion on the question of Indonesia. In my opinion, it is too optimistic a view to conclude that the conversion of the PKI leadership to Maoist leftism, following the defeat, represents a conversion to a revolutionary program. Although it is only a surmise lacking sufficient proof, I am afraid that what they have adopted closely resembles the Stalinist line of ultraleftist insurrection following the defeat of the second Chinese revolution. To me it looks like a zigzag course, now in the phase of the ultraleftist strategy of guerrilla warfare.

Finally, the draft resolution should include a sufficient criticism of the disastrous policy which the Mao faction has been following in the field of culture and art.

V.

It is now quite clear that we must above all struggle against the Mao-Lin faction's dictatorial course in defense of the rights of the opposition. To be taken in by an apparently correct expression of the justified mass discontent, and to permit what is an isolated phenomenon in the context to prejudice our judgment would reveal failure to grasp the direction in which the gigantic struggle is moving.

Generally in an enormous class struggle, a considerable proportion of the masses lend themselves, through goodwill, to being exploited by the reactionaries. Yet the fact that the Mao faction encountered great resistance among the city workers despite the mass mobilization backed by the army and with complete control of the propaganda machine, the fact that the masses mobilized by the Mao faction differentiated internally to such a degree as to lead to armed struggles, and the fact that these situations compelled the faction to compromise with the masses to a certain extent, suggest the

bureaucratic and reactionary nature of the "great cultural revolution" and nothing else.

It is, then, necessary for us to take our stand on the side of the masses, who, although lacking any leadership worth mentioning, could not help but resist the oppression inflicted on them by the high-handed Mao group. We must expose the reactionary nature of the Mao faction before the international proletariat, and firmly establish a political line of struggle against it.

VI.

The draft resolution submitted by the majority of the United Secretariat is, as a whole, unduly conciliatory to the Peking bureaucracy, above all the Mao faction. It states:

"The leadership of the Chinese CP, educated in the Stalinist school, has always accepted the theory of 'building socialism in one country.' However, in the fifties, the importance of the help which the other workers states could give to the economic growth and the military defense of the People's Republic of China, made the dangerous implications of that theory inside China less important than in the USSR in the late twenties and the thirties (its international implications detrimental to world revolution continued to manifest themselves even then). The reversal of the Maoist leadership to a policy of 'self-reliance' and large-scale economic autarchy and self-sufficiency is only a rationalization of the consequences of the Kremlin's blockade and the tremendous burden imposed on China by the need to develop its own nuclear weapons, given the refusal of the Soviet bureaucracy to assist it on this field."

Certainly this is a possible explanation. In the final analysis, it is also possible to say that Stalin's theory of "building socialism in one country" was only a rationalization of the isolation of the Soviet Union internationally owing to the setback of the European revolution in the twenties. But it is against the Kremlin's economic blockade of China and exclusive possession of nuclear weapons that we must counter our internationalist line. The Peking bureaucracy, in opposition to this, takes a nationalist line stemming from their bureaucratic position. Even though primary responsibility rests with the Kremlin, why should we offer excuses for the Peking bureaucracy?

The draft resolution emphasizes that the "cultural revolution" has urged "acceptance of the concept of political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states." This is true, not at all be-

cause the Mao faction arrived at such a position through its "theory," but because of the objective fact that Stalinist bureaucratic rule plunged into a crisis, leading to serious splits within its own regime. The "acceptance of the concept of political revolution" started with the concessions made by Khrushchev and other bureaucrats in the USSR, and was brought to public attention on a world scale by, among other things, the great Hungarian revolution. (It is worth recalling that Peking played the worst role in smothering the Hungarian revolution.) The Sino-Soviet dispute further advanced this process. But there are no grounds for identifying Peking's criticisms of Moscow, which are positive and valid in many points, with the Mao faction's attack against the opposition. It is just the opposite, constituting nothing but an aspect of the Mao cult, the counterpart today of defending Stalin which is the negative side of the Chinese stand in the Sino-Soviet dispute advanced by the Mao faction in the most vigorous way.

The masses struggling for a political revolution in Czechoslovakia and other East European countries are demanding workers democracy as their first goal. They hardly expect any ideological support from the Mao faction. Judging from the fear displayed by Mao Tse-tung over the Hungarian revolution, Peking's opposition to the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia should be rated as merely a posture assumed for diplomatic reasons. The Mao faction has bureaucratically distorted the concepts of political revolution and permanent revolution, and is utilizing them to further the purge of the opposition and to fortify its dictatorial policies.

In its conclusion, the draft resolution states:

"The experience of the 'cultural revolution' offers fresh evidence that also in China, the bureaucracy cannot be removed by reforms. It will have to be removed from power by the new vanguard of genuine revolutionaries now in the process of formation in China...."

This is correct. But the draft resolution, as a whole, seems to draw this conclusion because a political revolution by bureaucratic means, so to speak, proved impossible, as shown by the course of the Mao faction during the "cultural revolution." The fact is that a genuine political revolution has proved to be all the more necessary, because the Mao faction, as has been clearly shown, when faced with a crisis within their own bureaucratic machine are ready to resort to every illegal and violent means to defend their narrow dictatorship even at the cost of sacrificing a greater part of the

bureaucracy.

"The new vanguard of genuine revolutionaries now in the process of formation in China" will, therefore, be trained and formed amid the struggle against the purge. The vanguard of revolutionaries will emerge only in a united struggle with the opposition in defense of their legitimate rights. The foundation for the platform of such a struggle has been formulated explicitly in "An Open Letter to the Members of the Chinese Communist Party" by Comrade Peng Shu-tse. [See World Outlook, March 24, 1967, p. 322.]

VII.

For some time, Comrade Livio Maitan and other members of the United Secretariat hesitated to take a definite stand on the Chinese question, excusing themselves for "lack of information." As a matter of fact, lack of information never prevented us from analyzing the Chinese situation and drawing necessary conclusions. And yet it is true that many people were misled by insufficiency of information and by the one-sided handouts of the Mao faction.

What is the source of this "lack of information"? The Mao faction's repression of the opposition. Consequently it is self-evident that our first task is to fight energetically in defense of the opposition's right to speak out against their repression by Mao. Naturally, discomfiture over the "lack of information" makes this all the more imperative.

In the Soviet Union in the late twenties, the Trotskyists of the Left Opposition were deprived by the Stalinist bureaucrats of almost all opportunity to make their struggle against the Stalin group known to the workers internationally. The Stalin group supplied revolutionaries throughout the world only with demagogy and lies. The result was that the profound struggle that was to determine the destiny of the first workers state and affect the fate of the world revolution in subsequent decades remained hidden from the international proletariat. Thus partisans of the world revolution were deprived of any means to intervene significantly in the struggle in the USSR.

The enormous struggle being fought out in China is of incalculable importance not only to the Asian revolution but to the world as a whole from now on out. Thus it is inexcusable for us as Trotskyists to take an ambiguous stand on the question, pointing to the "lack of information." It is our duty, from every angle, to intervene vigorously against the repressive Mao dictatorship.

If so many Chinese revolutionaries,

denied any opportunity to voice their opinions, are liquidated, and if even minor economic demands raised by the masses are unreasonably suppressed because they run counter to Mao's will, then we Trotskyists must never abstain from helping them to defend their legitimate rights.

Of course, I am not saying that Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, and the others are great revolutionaries. They do not at all qualify for comparison with Trotsky. But what has been the fate of Chinese militants who have remained faithful to the revolution, and the leftist revolutionaries whose names are not known to us? There are probably revolutionaries, too, among the people deceived by the Mao faction. We know quite well what the Maoists insist upon as the criterion in distinguishing whether one belongs to the "revolution" or the "counterrevolution" -- it is the degree to which one has been "absolutely faithful to Chairman Mao or not." It is quite natural that the more revolutionary-minded a militant is and the more independent his attitude is toward the bureaucratic authority, the more he is inclined to resist a criterion of that sort.

For the Chinese Trotskyist revolutionaries, no other way is open for intervention in the struggle than participation in a united struggle in defense of the opposition's rights against the baneful Mao faction and its repressive measures, however Stalinist Liu Shao-chi and Peng Teh-huai may be.

VIII.

Additional Explanation

In the above I have insisted that we should defend the opposition in the stand it has taken during the course of struggle in the "cultural revolution" started by the Mao faction.

Comrade Peng Shu-tse appeals emphatically for critical support to the "Liu Shao-chi faction" as the central core of the opposition, saying:

"Je crois seulement qu'à l'heure actuelle et du fait même du caractère très tranche de la situation délibérément créée par Mao Tse-toung, Liu Shaoqi ne peut pas ne pas être le porte-drapeau de tous les opposants et que les opposants le savent." ("La révolution culturelle chinoise et la rivalité entre Mao Tse-

toung et Liu Shaoqi vues par Peng Shuzhi; une interview de Claude Cadart, 1967.)*

* "I merely think that at the present time, owing to the very sharp character of the situation deliberately created by Mao Tse-tung that Liu Shao-chi cannot help but be the standard-bearer for all the opponents and that the opponents know it." ("The Chinese Cultural Revolution and the Rivalry Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi as Seen by Peng Shu-tse; an Interview by Claude Cadart, 1967.")

The reason I am not prepared to "support the Liu Shao-chi faction" but just support the opposition in general, is that I have reservations as to whether Liu Shao-chi is capable of being a reliable center of the opposition which is currently not united.

The following points have entered into my reservations:

1. I am inclined to believe that Liu Shao-chi hopes to restore relations between his faction and Peng Teh-huai's. It still remains obscure, however, what the relation between the two groups was when Liu gained the dominating position after the divestiture of Peng and Huang's group at the Lushan conference.

2. For a short period after Peng Chen, Lu Ting-yi, and others had been purged in March-April, 1966, Liu Shao-chi, as he made clear in his "self-criticism," superintended the central party body in Peking. Consequently the question arises as to the attitude Liu took toward the purge of the Peng Chen group, and also whether he took any action capable of gaining the confidence of Peng, Lu, and others.

Judging from the papers of the Red Guards, Teng Hsiao-ping can never become the symbolic figure of the opposition. But the case is different with Liu Shao-chi, who has sought to take the attitude of at least not betraying the opposition.

Still I have ventured to reserve agreeing to the slogan of "critical support to the Liu Shao-chi faction" because of the reason indicated above. This, of course, involves a difference of only secondary importance with Comrade Peng Shu-tse's view.

May 1969

THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO DOCUMENTS
ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Joseph Hansen

[Based on a report and discussion at two meetings of the New York branch of the Socialist Workers Party June 11 and June 18.]

* * *

I assume that all of you have read the two resolutions published in issue No. 5 of the International Information Bulletin and that you may have had some difficulty in determining the meaning of the differences to be found between them.

We had the same problem in the national leadership when we received the suggested list of amendments to the original draft. To facilitate the analysis, we prepared a document with the original resolution running in one column and the suggested amendments in a parallel column. By following this, it was easier for us to see what was involved. It appeared to us that the amendments were of considerable scope, really representing two divergent approaches, and that it would be in the interests of clarification to stand on the original document without making any changes. It would thus be easier to follow the discussion from its very origin.

We intended to distribute the document presenting these dual columns at the world congress. Unfortunately the bundle was forgotten, and that's why we have a number of copies here so that you will be able to follow the columns in the discussion this evening.

Comrade Livio Maitan gave a report on the "Cultural Revolution" on behalf of the majority of the United Secretariat. This will be published in a forthcoming issue of Intercontinental Press, and you will be able to read it and study it there for yourself at your leisure. To forestall any expectations, I should like to mention that Comrade Livio in his report does not deal directly at all with the differences appearing in the two resolutions. This was somewhat of a handicap to clarifying these differences at the world congress.

There were two opposition reports. One was given by Comrade Ross Dowson on behalf of the minority of the United Secretariat. This is the position represented by the resolution in the left-hand column, called "original" in the document which you have before you.

The other opposition report was given by Comrade Peng, who, as you know, was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist movement. Briefly, Comrade Peng

took the position that critical support should have been given to the Liu Shao-chi faction. He was against abstaining in the factional conflict in China. Comrade Peng's report is not yet available. However, his position can easily be studied, having been presented in previous bulletins.

As I mentioned, the two resolutions on which the congress had to decide may appear at first glance to be almost the same. Therefore, to many delegates it seemed rather strange that these two resolutions should be presented as opposing resolutions. Yet the main interest at the congress when this point came up on the agenda centered around the differences between them.

I don't want anyone to think that we regard the original text as something sacred. It has never been our tradition to elevate any text into something untouchable. And I would say that the comrades of the majority rather took the same attitude toward their version after they had finished working on it. In their view, I imagine, it still remained unsatisfactory. This is indicated by the nature of the report which Comrade Livio Maitan gave, which appeared to me to be intended to fill in the gaps as they saw them and to strengthen the resolution from their point of view.

In considering the resolution -- the original, that is -- it is quite essential to understand its purpose. This was conceived as being, first of all, an assessment of the "Cultural Revolution" in China as an event that had occurred since the previous congress -- no more than that; simply assess the "Cultural Revolution" without taking up the much broader question of the Chinese revolution as a whole. In addition to that, the purpose of the resolution was to set a political line in relation to the "Cultural Revolution," to the factions involved in the struggle in the "Cultural Revolution," and to set a political line in relation to the Maoist tendency internationally.

We began with the assumption that it had been recognized by our movement that a hardened bureaucratic caste and a corresponding regime exist in China and that the "Cultural Revolution" provided incontrovertible evidence of the accuracy of this estimate.

The "Cultural Revolution" did not lead to any greater proletarian democracy in China. It did not lead to any greater control by the masses of the regime in China. And the main strategic objective in

the resolution as we prepared it was a political revolution. In the process of advancing this aim, our position was that it was inadvisable to support either the Mao faction or the Liu Shao-chi faction.

Thus, the resolution was intended to serve a rather narrow function, that is, to make a political delineation between Trotskyism and Maoism.

The sharpness of tone in the resolution was intended for a specific purpose. That is, to set a general attitude, a general political way of looking at the Maoists and their position. It was not intended to be a balance sheet of the Chinese revolution, a much more ambitious project. It did not attempt to probe the origins of the "Cultural Revolution" in detail, because in our opinion there is not yet sufficient factual material to enable us to do that satisfactorily. There are very few documents available in China or abroad presenting accurate, detailed information on the positions of the different contending forces, what their origin was, and how they developed.

And the original resolution did not attempt to forecast the ultimate consequences of the "Cultural Revolution." That's rather difficult, and rather hazardous in the absence of sufficient material to determine the exact origin and development and relationship of forces in China.

In short, the original resolution was intended to be strictly conjunctural. It was intended simply to provide a guiding line for the immediate period ahead, following the congress and up to the next congress, which should be held within two years or so.

The original resolution was tied in with what we conceive to be the main task of the international Trotskyist movement in the immediate period ahead, that is, to win leadership among the radicalizing youth, where we find ourselves faced with the challenge of Maoism, which we have to meet in any number of ways, in different areas, including inside the U.S., as you well know. These were the considerations that determined in our thinking the character and limits of the resolution.

At the congress, we discovered that these limitations, which were deliberate ones, met with a good deal of criticism. Various delegates considered this not to be a high-level document. By "high level," they mean a document that covers a wide field, offers an abundance of material, and generally includes a liberal number of footnotes to show that the available printed material in the field has been consulted.

So evidently there were two concepts

at the congress of what a resolution of this nature should seek to accomplish. Some comrades seemed to be of the opinion that the best type of resolution is a "flood" document. We preferred one stripped down to the essence of the question, making it easier to single out those aspects on which one may have a disagreement. The bulky side, in our opinion, is best supplied in signed articles, or statements of an article type, which can be published in conjunction with current events.

So now with these preliminary remarks, what I want to do is take the two documents as presented in the two columns and indicate why we reached certain opinions and conclusions concerning the changes that were made in the original.

The first one, in the first column, is simply one word. The word "Stalinized" has been deleted from the phrase "Stalinized Chinese Communist party."

When I first saw that deletion, I did not immediately hit the ceiling. From an editorial viewpoint, we very often have to take out adjectives, and we're not too concerned about that, because we don't hold adjectives to be sacrosanct. It was only later, as we proceeded studying the changes, that we began to think that possibly there were other reasons than editorial ones for removing this particular word. My first reaction, as I said, was that the comrades thought it might be misunderstood; maybe it could be regarded as an epithet.

But then the question arises, who will object to such an epithet? Why should the leaders of the Chinese CP object to their party being called "Stalinized," when they're very proud of Stalin and their association with him, display portraits of Stalin, hold him almost in equal reverence with Mao himself, and are utterly opposed to de-Stalinization? From their viewpoint, the word "Stalinized" might be taken as a compliment.

Actually, the only people who could really feel uncomfortable about our using the word "Stalinized" in connection with the Chinese Communist party are those who want to support Mao, but who do not want to support him in a package deal that includes Stalin. They're the ones who object to it.

At the congress, this type of objection was not raised very seriously, because it was very hard to maintain that the Maoists would take offense at being called Stalinists, a label they consider to be very apropos.

Several delegates did raise the objection that if we used the word in this particular place it would indicate a cer-

tain concept of the Chinese Communist party when it took power -- that it was Stalinized then. This would then create a great theoretical difficulty, it was maintained, because how can a Stalinized party take power?

It would have been interesting to have had a discussion on this point at the congress, but this did not occur. And so I can only raise certain questions in the light of what was intimated on this point at the congress.

For instance, if you say that the Chinese Communist party was not Stalinized than the opposite conclusion can be drawn, the conclusion that you must say it was revolutionary, since only a revolutionary party can take power. We had some discussion on this question in the SWP, and you will recall that this was essentially the position taken by Arne Swabeck. He eventually came to the position that the Chinese CP could not have come to power unless it was revolutionary. Since it did come to power, it was therefore revolutionary.

The question nevertheless arises, when did it become revolutionary? We know that at one point it was not revolutionary; it was Stalinist. At what point did it change? This is a very crucial question from the viewpoint of theory.

Other questions arise. What was the evidence of this change? What was the point of qualitative change? Answering these doesn't get us out of the woods either, because the same questions must be asked concerning the regime today. Is the regime today a Stalinized regime? If it is not a Stalinized regime, then why should we call for a political revolution?

If it is a Stalinized regime, but was previously revolutionary, when did it become Stalinized? If you hold that the CP was not Stalinist when it took power, but is Stalinist today, the question must be answered, when did it change from being not Stalinist to being Stalinist? What was the point of qualitative change? You have to determine that to adequately complete our theoretical appreciation of the Chinese revolution.

There's still another possibility that can be suggested. That is, you can eliminate the label "Stalinized" or "Stalinism" altogether in reference to the Mao regime. Just not use such words. There are various ways this can be plausibly done.

You can do it, for instance, by saying that Stalinism only applies to the Soviet Union. The difficulty with that is that Stalinism is an international phenomenon -- a well-known international phenomenon.

Or you can take another tack; you can say that Stalinism existed only for a period in the Soviet Union, the period of the purges, the period say from 1934 to 1937. If you do that, then, of course, it is easy to come to the conclusion that the label "Stalinism" is not applicable to China. You can't apply the term Stalinism to China, if it's only applicable to the Soviet Union in the period 1934-37.

But then we run into another problem -- what about the reverence with which Stalin is regarded by the Maoists? How do you explain that? Still more important, what about the business of carrying on Stalinist practices? Of imitating the Stalinist pattern of rule? Of fostering special privileges, however modest the scale, in the Stalinist tradition?

Moreover, if you are to be consistent, then you should say that in the Soviet Union Stalinism ceased to exist after about 1937. It ceased to exist during Stalin's lifetime.

That would confront us with a major problem -- how to explain on the level of theory the continuity of bureaucratic rule in the Soviet Union from that period up to the present time. Not to mention the question of "de-Stalinization."

So you see that if we try to simply eliminate this designation, we create a lot more problems than we evade.

My opinion is that we ought to retain the label, and try to find some other solution.

So much for the first change in the original document.

At the bottom of the same page -- page 1 -- a phrase has been added. The phrase refers to the weakening of the regime owing to its inner contradictions and the mobilization of the masses during the "Cultural Revolution." We have no objection to the statement being included here. The point is made later in the resolution, so it could be argued that it is superfluous to add it here.

On page 2, we come to a rather considerable substitution. The first paragraph of the substitution, which begins with the number 2, is merely introductory. Further down is a list of contradictions, beginning with "a" and ending with "f."

Comrade Livio Maitan's report was devoted almost wholly to proving that these contradictions are real and do exist in China. He cited considerable evidence with regard to this. Now we have no objection to that; as a matter of fact, I think there is nothing wrong in making a list of contradictions like this. In studying the Chinese revolution as a

whole, it is necessary to begin with such a list. But the question remains to be answered: How do they relate to the "Cultural Revolution?"

Comrade Peng made the point, for example, that contradiction "a" -- which deals with the rate of growth of the population in relation to the rate of growth of the economy -- has been true of China for the past 100 years and is also true of some other countries. To include this contradiction in a list offers little to enable us to better understand the specific phenomenon of the "Cultural Revolution." Comrade Peng made a telling criticism, I think.

His criticism is even substantiated by the statement made by the comrades of the majority on page 3 in the paragraph beginning with the number 3: "Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership."

If this statement is correct -- and I think that it must be granted that it is correct -- then at least some of the contradictions listed would not enable us to distinguish between developments under the Mao regime and under a regime headed by a Lenin or Trotsky. No matter what the "nature of the leadership," we are told, some of the contradictions listed would have confronted the country. For the sake of clarity, it would have been well if the comrades of the majority had indicated which ones.

Further, on this same point. If some of the contradictions listed by the majority would have "manifested themselves" no matter what the nature of the leadership, they offer no means for making a precise analysis of the "Cultural Revolution," for it follows that the "Cultural Revolution" could have occurred just as well under a Trotsky as under a Mao.

The contradictions listed are, in fact, so general that the comrades of the majority felt compelled to say that they would have manifested themselves no matter what China's general situation might have been both domestically and internationally.

It must be admitted that Comrade Peng put his finger on a considerable weakness in the majority's list of contradictions when he called attention to their extremely abstract nature.

And when you read Comrade Maitan's report, which will soon appear in Inter-continental Press as part of the documents of the world congress, you will be able to see for yourself that with regard to the crucial question of precisely how these general contradictions came to be specifically expressed in the "Cultural Revolution," he has nothing to say. There is a gap in his report precisely where concreteness is demanded.

To fill that gap it is necessary to consider at least five more contradictions which were apparently overlooked by the comrades of the majority.

Let me list them:

1. The contradiction between the narrow national interests of the bureaucracy and the international interests of the Chinese revolution.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the foreign policy followed by Mao and the possible criticisms of it in China from various quarters that may have helped precipitate the intense factional dispute which Mao called the "Cultural Revolution."

2. The contradiction between the objective national need to overhaul policies and leaders from top to bottom, that is, to break up the bureaucratic crust, and the need felt by this social layer to retain its position, its power, and its special privileges.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the specific disputes in the "Cultural Revolution," whether they involved the masses against the bureaucracy as a whole, or sectors of the bureaucracy in dispute with each other, or combinations of these.

3. The contradiction between the professed aims of the Great Leap Forward and its actual catastrophic results.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the references among the contending forces in the "Cultural Revolution" to the period of the Great Leap Forward. In the minds of all the politically conscious layers in China, the Great Leap Forward remains the outstanding example of the ill-advised and costly ventures which the regime is capable of plunging the entire country into.

4. The contradiction between the need for a thoroughgoing criticism of the Great Leap Forward and Mao's need to foster, maintain, and expand the cult of his personality and Thought.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding the obscure disputes, formation of cliques, tendencies, and undeclared factions that culminated in the "Cultural Revolution."

5. The contradiction between the need for de-Stalinization and Mao's need to maintain the prestige of having been right in hailing and following Stalin and in reproducing in China the Stalinist pattern of rule.

Understanding this contradiction is basic to understanding why the "Cultural Revolution" ended in the monstrous growth of the Mao cult instead of the establishment of any institutions of proletarian democracy let alone elections on the model of the Paris Commune as prom-

ised by Mao at the beginning.

No doubt other contradictions of a similar nature could be added, but these should be sufficient to indicate the point.

If it were possible to obtain concrete material on these five contradictions, we could at once gain a very clear understanding of the specific origins of the "Cultural Revolution," its specific course and outcome, and the specific stands of the warring factions. But it is precisely here that the Mao regime has made it most difficult to obtain the facts required. In this way, we have mute testimony on how real these contradictions are and how sensitive the regime is to any probing into them.

Without being able to analyze how these five contradictions were specifically expressed, we are unable to relate the "Cultural Revolution" in a specific way to the very general six contradictions listed by the majority. To deal with the six contradictions in abstraction from the five -- in fact without even mentioning the five -- becomes a barren exercise not without its overtones of scholasticism.

Let me call your attention to an item in the left-hand column on page 2 that was deleted by the comrades of the majority when they substituted their list of general contradictions. This is the sentence in paragraph three from the top which reads, referring to Mao's foreign policy: "This policy, in essence, expresses the narrow national interests of the ruling bureaucracy in China."

We'll come to this point several times -- Mao's foreign policy and its relation to the national interests of the bureaucracy. In our view it is necessary to underline this relationship, whereas the comrades of the majority take a different position. At this point the difference was expressed simply by their removing this particular sentence.

Note the very next sentence: "It has oscillated between opportunism and ultraleftism or combinations of both." I will return to this later, since it came up in the discussion at the congress in another connection. Meanwhile it is worth noting how early we injected the item of the ultraleftism fostered by Mao.

In our opinion, this is one of the most dangerous aspects of Maoism, since it is least understood by the radicalizing youth. One of our main responsibilities is to make it clear to them.

In the next paragraph of the original text on page 2, the point is made about the responsibility for the break

with Moscow. It is clearly stated that the main responsibility lies with Moscow. But it is also pointed out that the Chinese government has some responsibility in the matter; that is, in taking the initiative to deepen the rift.

What has happened in general -- in this substitution on page 2 which continues on page 3 -- is a substitution of general abstract statements of contradictions in place of concrete, specific political characterizations of the policies of the regime.

To continue. On page 3, in the column "Proposed Amendments," we come to the paragraph beginning, "All these contradictions..." In the last part of the paragraph, we read the sentence, "In this situation, conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured."

We, of course, welcome the decision of the comrades of the majority to adopt the position of calling for a political revolution. It could be said to be one of the positive results of the "Cultural Revolution." Before that they avoided taking a clear position on this question.

Let us take the next sentence: "The 'Cultural Revolution' constitutes objectively an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy." In other words, they are of the opinion that Mao is trying to block a political revolution, which was maturing, and trying to carry out a kind of reform instead.

Now they don't say that this was his intention; they say that this constitutes an attempt "objectively." But this is rather obscure. It leaves us with a great big question, what were Mao's subjective intentions? What were his political aims? What was he trying to do consciously, as a political figure, looking at the forces as they stood in China? This is very important to understanding the reasons for the "Cultural Revolution."

Now I go over to page 4, to the second paragraph in the second column: "The more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards revolutionary developments since the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict which, on several important questions, brought it nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism..." Some instances are cited of where this is presumed to be true. This coming nearer the positions of revolutionary Marxism, we are told, "reflects the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy towards the People's Republic of China, and the objective impact of the

rising tide of world revolution on the Chinese masses."

When we analyze this statement, we run into some interesting things from a general theoretical viewpoint. First, on the statement that the Maoists come nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. (The reference, of course, is nearer than the Khrushchevists.) If the declarations of the Maoists are placed in a scale and weighed against the declarations of the Khrushchevists, the scale no doubt tips in favor of Peking. But this is so abstract that it can be misleading. It is necessary to distinguish revolutionary verbiage and throw this out, since for purposes of determining which comes "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism," only those declarations should be considered that are in correspondence with the actions of the regime. These actions in turn must come "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism" if any validity is to be found in the point.

As soon as we do this, everything becomes more uncertain, or at least more complex. For one thing, the consequences of the actions have to be taken into consideration and also placed in the scales.

How much weight should be given the catastrophic defeat of the Indonesian Communist party in placing this item in the scales? Isaac Deutscher considered the defeat in Indonesia to be comparable to the defeat in Germany in 1933. No doubt he had in mind what the consequences would have been in the world if there had been a victory in Indonesia. While Moscow also bore responsibility, Mao's responsibility was much more direct and decisive. The opportunism of the Kremlin was well-known. But Mao advanced his policies and influence as a revolutionary alternative to the Khrushchevists and their line. It is precisely because of his success in appearing to stand nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism that Mao bears the greater responsibility for the defeat in Indonesia. His guilt is truly colossal and it is out of the question to even raise the question of how "near" he stands to the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

One of the conclusions we ought to draw from this is that the posture of standing nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism can be a deadly trap for those who mistake it for standing within the framework of Marxism.

But if it is necessary to assign different weights to the items that are placed in the hypothetical scale, perhaps it would also be well to examine the scale itself. Is it really adequate to the task?

In my opinion, this way of consid-

ering the policies of the two regimes is altogether too abstract. It leaves out completely the most important item that must be considered if we are really to determine the relationship between the positions of the two regimes and the positions of revolutionary Marxism. That item is, what is their direction of movement?

Let us take Peking, for instance, and the date of 1963, a rather arbitrary date, but one which is convenient inasmuch as that was the time our movement took a formal position on this question at the Reunification Congress, and inasmuch as the comrades of the majority referred to these formulations during the discussion at the congress.

What has been the evolution of the Maoist leadership since 1963? Have they come nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism or have they moved further away? The answer to this is absolutely decisive so far as the immediate point is concerned.

If we judge by Mao's actions and declarations, it is obvious that his own opinion was that the majority leadership of the Chinese Communist party even before 1963 was moving away from Marxist positions. He accused them of having taken the capitalist road. That was why, if we are to believe him, he launched the "Cultural Revolution."

We thus come to the period from the eve of the "Cultural Revolution" to its close. How should we estimate this period? During these years, the cult of Mao reached monstrous proportions; Chinese literature, art and science suffered blows comparable to those in the darkest days of Stalin's rule in the USSR; the educational system was closed down; a murderous, unprincipled factional war was opened up; and the struggle for proletarian democracy in China received fresh blows. Did all this represent a movement on the part of the Mao leadership nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism? Is that how we should estimate the outcome of the "Cultural Revolution"?

It is hardly necessary to debate the question any longer in our movement. The comrades of the majority themselves drew the conclusion that what is now required in China is a political revolution. They could hardly have come to such a conclusion if they had not decided that the Maoist leadership moved further away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism, not nearer.

We are thus led to the conclusion that there must be virtually unanimous agreement in the leadership of the world Trotskyist movement that both Peking and Moscow are moving in a direction which,

in the past six years at least, has taken them further and further away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism. And it can be added that this view is an accurate reflection of the reality.

Consequently, at best, it becomes rather meaningless to try to measure which of them stands nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. At worst it can be quite dangerous since it can convey the impression to our own ranks that the top leadership of the world Trotskyist movement believes that the Maoist leadership actually stands near to the positions of revolutionary Marxism and not merely relatively nearer in comparison with the Khrushchevists as both of them race away from revolutionary Marxism.

From the methodological point of view it is rather deplorable to rest on the statement made in 1963 without taking into account the direction in which the Maoists have been moving since then. Such an approach is static and not at all dialectical.

It might be argued that it is quite true so far as domestic policy is concerned that the Maoist leadership, like the Khrushchevist leadership, has been moving further and further away from the positions of revolutionary Marxism but that this does not hold true for foreign policy, which is the point under discussion.

But this is hardly tenable either. Such a stand would signify a conviction that there is no relationship between the domestic policy of the Mao regime and its foreign policy, or still worse that its foreign policy is the precise opposite of its domestic policy -- that while moving further and further away from revolutionary Marxist positions domestically, Mao was moving nearer to Marxist positions internationally.

Such a stand would fly in the face of basic Marxist theory which views foreign policy as merely the extension of domestic policy.

Naturally, if anyone can really prove this point, then Marxist theory would have to be reexamined. We suspect, however, that the "proofs" would turn out, on close examination, to be examples of the ultraleftism fostered by the Mao regime in many parts of the world -- instances in which it tries to make its pseudorevolutionary mask look more real.

Ultraleftism is not nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism than rank opportunism. In certain situations ultraleftism can be more dangerous than opportunism because it is less well understood and because it appears to be more revolutionary than opportunism.

Ultraleftism is not always merely a disease of small sectarian groupings separated from the masses and with very little chance of overcoming their isolation. When used by conscious opportunists it should be viewed as preparation for a new opportunist betrayal. An ultraleft turn is very deliberately undertaken by such opportunists in order to undercut a revolutionary opposition or to gain a fresh following to be used for bargaining with reactionary formations. The history of Stalinism provides illuminating examples of this. An ultraleft posture can be extremely dangerous for the revolutionary Marxist movement when it is undertaken by a state power with vast material resources and the prestige of a revolution at its disposal. For our movement, the ultraleftism of the Maoists is a very important question.

The truth of it is that Peking's foreign policy has been oriented to seeking bases of support for the regime in two areas. One is with any national bourgeoisie that cares to enter into a mutually profitable relation with the Mao regime, including the extension of "peaceful coexistence" to domestic class relations. These deals, as we have seen, above all in Indonesia and Pakistan, can reach degrees of opportunism not much different from the opportunism practiced by the Khrushchevists and certainly not different in its disastrous consequences to the revolutionary movement.

The other area where Mao seeks bases of support outside of China is among radicalizing sectors of the population. The Maoists assume an ultraleftist posture which corresponds to the impatience and lack of experience of these sectors, their rejection of the crass opportunism of the Social Democracy and the Kremlin, and their search for an alternative revolutionary leadership and policy.

At the world congress it was implied by some of the comrades who mentioned this point in taking the floor, that if the resolution did not stand on the 1963 statement concerning the Peking leadership being "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism" then this would signify giving up our position favoring China in the Sino-Soviet conflict. It was even implied that it would signify shifting to the position of supporting Moscow in this conflict. This argument was not very well thought out, in my opinion.

In taking sides in an interbureaucratic dispute like this, we base our estimate on what will best advance the interests of the world revolution. Our stand does not necessarily hinge on the policies advocated and practiced by the two sides, although I will agree that it could be a sufficient reason if one or the other of

the contending parties were actually to begin moving nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism. Unfortunately, in this instance, time and events have shown that neither of them is moving in this direction. Consequently it is necessary to base our stand on other considerations.

While we are dealing with this particular paragraph of the amended draft on page 4, I would like to call your attention to the phrase about "the specific relationship of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy..."

What this phrase reflects is the opinion that the foreign policy of the Mao regime is in essence determined by the attitude of imperialism, and not by the national interests of the bureaucracy. This is spelled out a little bit more clearly by Comrade Germain in his polemic with Comrade Charlier, which appears in International Information Bulletin No. 8 under the title "An Unacceptable Amendment." This has some interesting ramifications but I will reserve comment on it for the time being as I plan to make a contribution to the Bulletin on that particular exchange of opinion.

And then we come to still another phrase, "the objective impact of the rising tide of the world revolution on the Chinese masses." The meaning of this, if I interpret it correctly, is that the Chinese masses, responsive to the rising tide of the world revolution, exert some kind of pressure on the regime to which the regime in turn responds. This raises a series of questions that ought to be answered. In what way does Mao respond to the pressure of the masses? Through what measures and through what institutions? Or, looking at it from a different angle, through what actions and through what institutions do the masses pass the pressure of the world revolution on to the regime? Democratic ways and means of exerting pressure or control by the masses are missing in China. Other means, such as strikes, demonstrations, and slowdowns are not welcomed, to say the least.

How can the masses even voice their opinions in China? It is true that at a certain stage of the "Cultural Revolution," wall posters were permitted. But this was hardly adequate; it was intended as part of a factional maneuver, and it was soon ended. The truth is that critical thought -- thought responsive to revolutionary developments abroad -- is not allowed in China. Finally, what information do the masses have about events in the world except the information doctored up with Mao Tse-tung Thought that is fed through the Chinese press and radio?

On the same page 4, in passing, note the small addition of the words "in several countries." This was defended at

the congress as being one of the improvements added to the document. From our viewpoint, it watered the document down a bit. Instead of stating that the regime followed a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie, the document is changed to read that this policy was followed "in several countries" -- implying that in other places, it was not followed.

It's not a big point, but it's something to be noted. Was the regime doing its best to follow a consistent policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie? Or did it happen only in several countries because they were inconsistent in following a revolutionary policy? In other words, did Mao follow a revolutionary foreign policy in general, with only some temporary aberrations in several countries? Such a view may stand in back of a small change like this, even though the modification in and of itself is not a great one.

The final fate of this sentence is not without interest in revealing the thinking behind the small insertion of "in several countries." Here is how the paragraph reads that will appear in the version adopted by the majority for publication:

"In place of conducting a policy stimulating a consistent development of the world revolution, which could have brought new socialist allies into being and carried the struggle for socialism into the main strongholds of the capitalist system, the policy led the Maoist tendencies in Pakistan several times to oppose the mass movements that developed there."

If this final version means anything, it means that Peking sought to follow a policy of stimulating the world revolution but did not do so consistently. This inconsistency led the followers of Maoism in Pakistan into the error "several times" of opposing the mass mobilizations that occurred there.

This comes perilously close to permitting the blame for the results of Peking's opportunism in Pakistan to fall on the local lieutenants of the cult instead of the real criminal, Mao. However, they fell into this error only "several times." Next time they may do better.

It should be observed how the original sentence concerning Mao's following a policy of collaborating with the colonial bourgeoisie was finally washed out.

And notice how the logical sequence of the paragraphs has likewise been washed out. For the one paragraph now ends, saying how the Maoist tendencies in Pakistan several times opposed the mass movements there and the next paragraph be-

gins, "This helped prepare the way for the catastrophe in Indonesia..."

I fail to see why this should be listed as an improvement in the document.

This still does not end this point. At the end of the document (fourth paragraph from the end), the comrades of the majority inserted a paragraph which states that Peking's basic policy has continued to "imply" support to whatever bourgeois government in a semicolonial country "happens to diplomatically collaborate with China...which leads to disastrous results for the revolutionary class struggle in these countries."

I suppose this is intended as consolation to the minority. It is nevertheless hard to understand why the comrades of the majority would want to subject the plain, simple paragraph in the original to such torture.

Farther down on page 4, the characterization about Peking's prestige and influence having been reduced to "abysmal levels" has been deleted. Again, this is not much. But, in our opinion, the original statement was accurate, if you compare Peking's present prestige with the colossal prestige it enjoyed at the beginning of the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Naturally, if a better phrase can be found to characterize the decline in Peking's prestige, we are for it. But the comrades of the majority apparently were not interested in measuring whether Peking's prestige was nearer or further than an abysmal level, and so left it rather high.

At the bottom of page 4, we come to an interesting substitution. The original notes that after a big campaign against Liu Shao-chi, in which he was branded as a lackey of imperialism, etc., etc., the regime topped off the campaign by itself offering "peaceful coexistence" to Nixon's administration. This created quite an impact in Washington. A great deal of material appeared in the capitalist press concerning the significance of the move. In our opinion, the move was consistent with the basic policy of the Peking regime, which is to express the narrow national interests of the privileged bureaucracy.

But if you do not hold that view of Peking's foreign policy, then the gesture toward the Nixon administration could appear to be merely an aberration, an aberration in a course that is otherwise more or less revolutionary, an aberration that really ought not to be noticed.

This deletion, consequently, was taken by us as a possible indicator of divergent estimates of the Peking regime.

On page 5, you will note that the word "disasters" has been changed to "setbacks." When an observation was made by Comrade Dowson at the congress concerning the consistency in direction of such changes, the majority comrades pointed out that the word "disasters" was left in other places in the document. Thus it appeared that we were being unreasonable in insisting upon the word "disasters." But we would never fight over a single change like this. What interested us was the pattern revealed by the series of changes.

The next change is the shifting of two entire paragraphs over to page 6. We have no objection to a shift of this nature. The phrase "this erratic pilot" was mentioned at the congress by the comrades of the majority as an instance of where the tone of the document was out of keeping with the seriousness that ought to characterize a resolution of this nature, and which they thought it advisable to delete. We do not insist on any phrase like this but it was hard to understand the objection. What Maoist publication does not hail the great chairman as at least a "pilot" or "helmsman"?

Further down on the same page is another change. We are indifferent to this one since it is required for continuity once the previous paragraph has been shifted.

On page 7 what has been changed is the estimate of the role of the army. The original sentence states that during the "Cultural Revolution" the army under Lin Piao served as the ultimate authority. This was changed to "increased authority of the army under Lin Piao." And the "antidemocratic characteristics" of the leadership was changed to "bureaucratic." In this instance we are indifferent to whether the adjectives "bureaucratic" or "antidemocratic" are used, although we are curious as to why such a change was thought necessary.

The question of the weight of the army came up for some discussion at the congress, although not a great deal. In our opinion, the army was, in fact, the ultimate authority during the "Cultural Revolution." The evidence is abundant showing that in key disputes in a number of different places, the force that played the role of ultimate authority was the army. If the army was not the ultimate authority during the "Cultural Revolution," what force was the ultimate authority? The shattered party? The divided bureaucracy? The chaotic Red Guards?

Of more importance is the role of the army following the "Cultural Revolution." For if the army played the role of ultimate authority during the "Cultural Revolution," as it did, then a certain

precedent has been set that cannot help but have significance for the succeeding period.

So we must ask, just who is the ultimate authority in China today? Is it the party? The youth? The secret police? The unions? The government apparatus? The educational system? The Red Guards? What force in China today constitutes the ultimate authority if not the army under Lin Piao?

It is already possible to trace a certain rise in the role of the army. Let us recall the report that at the October 1968 plenum of the Central Committee, Lin Piao brought in the army to make sure of a majority for Mao. That was the decisive instrument with which Mao won his majority.

One of the consequences was that at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist party, Lin Piao was designated the heir of Mao. This is perfectly consistent with the role played by the army in the previous period, during the "Cultural Revolution." I don't think that Mao utilized the new constitution to designate Lin Piao as his heir simply as a personal favor to a close friend, no matter what the favors Lin Piao may have performed for him. The designation of Lin Piao as heir was made for political reasons.

Why the comrades of the majority insisted on this change becomes all the more obscure in face of the fact that they let the following sentence in the original stand: "By virtue of its interventions in the conflicts between the contending bureaucratic factions and between the masses in motion and the regime, the army -- at the expense of the leading role of the party -- has become the mainstay of Mao's rulership, the chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country. This is one of the most dangerous consequences of the 'Cultural Revolution.'" That sentence is to be found in the second paragraph on page 8.

How did the army become the "chief arbiter and principal centralizing force in the country" following the "Cultural Revolution" if during the "Cultural Revolution" it did not serve as the "ultimate authority"? It is difficult to follow the reasoning of the comrades of the majority on this point.

To this should be added the fact that on page 9, in the third paragraph from the top, they left the sentence in that reads: "Thus behind the Red Guard movement stood the army as the final authority, sometimes instigating the bands of youth, at other times restraining them or even reversing what they had done." All they changed in that sentence was the word "instigating." They let the

phrase "final authority" stand.

Yet at the congress, several delegates scored the way the original draft has used the phrase "ultimate authority" in characterizing the role of the army during the "Cultural Revolution."

To finish with page 7. Further down, the one word "episodic" has been deleted. In analyzing the mobilizations, we said they were "limited and episodic." The comrades of the majority did not like the word "episodic." This is a question of estimate. It is my impression that the comrades of the majority conceived the mobilizations as being more continuous during the "Cultural Revolution" than we were able to ascertain them as being. To us it appeared that the regime very early sought to reduce the scope of the mobilizations and to keep them under control so as to be able to turn them off when they had served their designated function. Thus while some large mobilizations did occur -- we don't deny that or their importance -- they turned out to be episodic, not continuous on a tremendous scale. The sharpness of the civil strife, which led to considerable bloodshed, particularly as the army moved against the strongholds of the opposing main faction, is another question.

On page 8, we come again to the question of the army. Following the sentence I already quoted concerning the army now being the "chief arbiter and principal centralizing force," a sentence notes the "ominous pattern" that has been set for the future. In place of this, the comrades of the majority substituted the assertion that Mao "tends to reduce again this great weight gained by the army during the previous period, by putting the emphasis on the reconstruction of the party as the mainstay of the regime and the necessity of a single central leadership for all power apparatuses."

We were much more cautious. In our opinion, the sentence they introduced implies confidence that that's what Mao intends to do -- reduce the power of the army. Against that, you've got to weigh his political relations with Lin Piao, particularly his making the head of the army his heir. In any case, we felt it better to be more cautious about Mao projecting a reduction in the role of the army, at least for the time being.

The next change is a small one -- from Mao was "obliged to take" a risk to Mao "took" a risk. The original formulation was consistent with Mao's being in a minority position which thereby obliged him to take a risk in violating the will of the majority. If he was not in a minority, then he would not have been obliged

to take the risk. If he had been in a majority, he could have taken the step without any risk. We wouldn't battle about that change. We just don't understand the reason for insisting on changing a sentence that was logical into one that is somewhat illogical.

At the end of the same paragraph, the phrase about Mao initiating a "coup d'etat against the majority leadership" is replaced by a very mild phrase, "re-establish his control over the country." The original designated very specifically what Mao did. In place of this, an abstract formulation was substituted. This leaves unanswered the question, how did Mao reestablish his control over the majority? Was it through a decision of the majority? Through their democratic assent? Just how did it happen? Our impression was that it was through the use of the army in a very forceful way, and thus constituted a coup d'etat against the majority. That seems accurate whether you are in favor of the coup or against it.

We come to the next change. This involves deletion of the whole bottom part of the column and the top of the column on page 9, several paragraphs dealing with the nature of the Red Guard movement and the nature of its rebellion. We, examining the Red Guard movement, came to the conclusion that in order to understand it better -- particularly its relation to the radicalization of the youth in the Western countries, and in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union -- it was necessary to note how much it was deliberately inspired and fostered and then shut off by the Chinese government.

The tendency exists in certain sectors in talking about the radicalization of the youth on a world scale to cite the Red Guard movement in China as a magnificent example of what has been happening. It is equated with the rebel movement of the youth in the U.S., France, the Soviet Union, and other places.

We think that this is wrong. We recognize that there was a rebel component in the Red Guard movement; but the mobilization as a whole was different from the mobilization in the Western countries in that it was inspired and fostered by the government, and partly financed by the government. This is a very important element in reaching a correct judgment on the nature of the Red Guard movement in China. It requires us to discount that movement rather heavily as a genuinely rebel formation.

Let us recall that where the Red Guards ran into trouble in "seizing power" they were backed by the army. Where they couldn't carry through in the Maoist way, as called for, the army came in behind them and completed the job. In other

places where the Red Guards went too far, the army pulled them back. The army exerted its control in every situation like that.

Finally, we saw that whole vast movement, presumably involving millions upon millions of rebel youth, brought to a halt rather rapidly, and retired from the scene as if they were responsive to orders from above. That isn't a characteristic of a real rebel youth movement. It tends to move in a revolutionary direction despite any promulgations from the Establishment on how they should behave or what they should do.

In our opinion, these were the real rebels in China -- the ones who rebelled against being demobilized. But just who were the rebel contingents? Where are they today? These questions are very difficult to answer in the absence of any information. But this should be borne in mind in considering this movement.

In the deletion at the top of page 9 we run into another question. This is in relation to the school situation. Part of the means used to mobilize these millions of youth in China was to shut down the schools. This facilitated getting them into the streets. The teachers were given other employment or different tasks than educating the youth. What did this do to the Chinese educational system?

Our opinion was that this constituted a blow of immense proportions to China. We made this judgment in light of the fact that besides the arms race in the world today, there is also an educational race.

The educational race between the Soviet Union and the United States is well-known. Quite frequently we see estimates of how it is proceeding, who is ahead, what subjects are receiving the most attention in the curricula. You will remember that for a while there was talk about how much attention was being paid to the teaching of mathematics in the Soviet Union in contrast to the United States. This was held to be an example of how the Soviets were winning the educational race, and that there should be some adjustments in the American system to make it possible to catch up.

We know that in the educational field, Cuba is not doing so badly. They have eliminated illiteracy in Cuba, and they're continuing to turn out cadres in various fields on a stepped-up basis. What about China? Here the educational system was shut down for the duration of the "Cultural Revolution." Shut down.

It could be that there was a national emergency of such immense import

that it required shutting down the schools and utilizing the youth as a factional battering ram. If that was so, then you must admit that even if it was justifiable, some damage was done to the educational system. But the comrades of the majority simply removed this, and put nothing in its place. So we are left with a resolution that says nothing about this important question.

On the same page 9, there are three other changes. In one, the word "confusion" is eliminated and replaced by something else; "excesses" is changed to "differences among"; "instigating" is changed to "manipulating." We have no big argument to make on any of these changes. We simply note that they follow the same general pattern of toning down characterizations of what the Mao faction did in China.

On page 10 there is another deletion of some importance. The original presented the Maoist view of the "Cultural Revolution," then sought to show that this view of the "Cultural Revolution" was not correct, but fraudulent, and that in contrast to the Maoist presentation of the "Cultural Revolution," what was really involved was a multiplicity of warring tendencies -- not just two, but a multiplicity.

This was designed to help lay the basis for rejecting the Maoist claims and for deciding not to support either Mao or Liu Shao-chi. We support a different tendency which, insofar as we can ascertain, does exist in China, is moving towards Trotskyism, and may have conscious Trotskyists within its ranks. This position is developed in the subsequent paragraphs.

I imagine that what the comrades objected to was quoting from Maoist sources to indicate how the Maoists picture the "Cultural Revolution." The phraseology used by the Maoists is not exactly scientific. On the other hand, is there a more accurate way of indicating the picture presented by the Maoists of their "Cultural Revolution?"

On page 11, at the top of the page, two words are added. Again this is a small item that might be presented as purely editorial. The sentence as changed reads: "Neither of the chief factions contending for supremacy within the Chinese Communist bureaucracy is actually striving for socialist democracy or has a program of genuine revolutionary policies at home and abroad."

Those interested in questions of style might observe how an adjective or adverb can alter the meaning of a noun or verb, even though rather subtly. The two chief factions, we might now conclude, could be striving for democracy, could be

striving for revolutionary policies, but from our viewpoint what they are striving for is not genuinely or actually democratic or revolutionary.

Towards the bottom of page 11, the phrase "free general elections" has been changed to "such elections." This, in my opinion, is a good change. I'd accept such a change because the formula originally used could be misinterpreted if you didn't read the whole paragraph carefully. Moreover, it could be torn out of context and an enemy could say, "You see, the Trotskyists are talking about having free general elections in China." What we were really referring to is Mao's promise to have elections on the model of the Paris Commune.

At the bottom of the page, a change has been made in the sentence concerning the composition of the "revolutionary committees" that were set up during the "Cultural Revolution." The original states that the committees were constituted "of individuals handpicked by the authorities." This has been modified to say that they were constituted "by compromise between contending factions, under the supervision of the Mao-Lin Piao hard core."

I really do not know where the comrades of the majority found this kind of information. A compromise suggests that the leaders of the two factions got together, in whatever is the equivalent of a smoke-filled room in China, and made a deal. But there's no evidence that this is what happened. We'll come to this point again.

On page 12, two paragraphs are deleted. The first deals with the damage done to the cultural life of China by the "Cultural Revolution." The other deals with the outcome of the "Cultural Revolution" in bringing to new heights the monstrous cult of Mao.

At the congress, several comrades stated that the resolution ought to say something about the damage done to culture in China by the "Cultural Revolution." None of these comrades appear to have noticed that this point was included in the original resolution and was deleted by the comrades of the majority. It was evidence of a kind to show how difficult the delegates found it to compare the two resolutions. Perhaps some of them did not read the original resolution too carefully; or, if they did, they tended to forget items like this.

In any case, in the final draft, the one to be published, the point is squeezed in as a result of the requests of some of the delegates who favored the majority resolution at the congress. Let me read it: "In the field of culture prop-

erly speaking, the Chinese leadership has advanced anti-Marxist positions of a Zhdanov type, defending the notion of 'proletarian culture' and bureaucratically submitting literature, art, and science to the 'party line.'

The name of Zhdanov -- the miserable instrument of Stalin -- is used to characterize what was done in China to culture under the "Cultural Revolution." Why the squeamishness that requires such a euphemism? Why are the comrades so reluctant to say what terrible blows have been struck against Chinese culture by Mao carrying on the practices of Stalin?

And why is Mao's gangsterism in this field pictured as if it involved a dispute over the concept of "proletarian culture" when what was involved was a brutal war against China's intellectuals as the opening move in a rabid factional fight?

In our opinion, it is important to speak out on what was done under the "Cultural Revolution" to literature, art, and science. This is one of the most telling examples that can be used in explaining to intellectuals -- and to students and workers who are interested in culture -- what the difference is between Stalinism-Maoism on the one hand and Trotskyism on the other.

The same goes for the cult of Mao. This should be in the forefront of our propaganda in relation to the Maoists so as to compel them to become increasingly ashamed and embarrassed every time they are compelled to discuss the question in front of an objective audience.

It is a strange polemical method that acts as if China's abomination, the Mao cult, which is patterned on the Stalin cult, and even exceeds it in grotesqueness, should not be heavily scored -- as if we were carrying on a dialogue in polite company in which certain subjects are just not dwelt on, and preferably not even mentioned. At least it was like that in polite company until the present generation of rebel youth broke into the parlor. Why should we be demure in telling them our opinion of the Mao cult?

Not to speak out is to bend in the direction of those Maoists who are shamed about the cult, but who remain staunch Maoists nonetheless.

At the bottom of page 12 is another small deletion in which the phrase stating that the Maoists are "even more guilty" than their opponents of blatantly revising Marxism has been changed to "as guilty as." We will let this go. Perhaps the comrades of the majority are right about the inadvisability of trying to

measure which of the factions comes nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism, or which has revised Marxism the most.

On page 14, we return to the question of an alleged "compromise" between the Maoists and "parts" of the main opposing faction, a compromise that was allegedly "initiated when the masses started to intervene autonomously into the struggle and thereby threatened the whole bureaucratic rule."

This is a pure deduction. There is no direct evidence available that I know of that the factions got together and made a compromise making it possible to reach an amicable end to the murderous factional war carried on under the fraudulent title of a "Cultural Revolution."

The word "compromise" suggests equality, or at least a kind of balance of power between the factions. What was more likely involved in a situation of this nature was that certain concessions were made to some of the losers in order to speed up the consolidation of the Maoist victory.

The announcement of the convocation of the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist party came after the resolution was written and was thus not taken into consideration in the original draft. The announcement itself, however, rather confirmed that Mao had scored a crushing victory. He felt strong enough at this point to hold the first party congress since 1956.

Why did he feel that strong? Because he had reached a compromise with his opponents? That would have signified continuation of the struggle in a new way. That's what a compromise would have meant -- deferment of the showdown until another time. It would have meant continuing to operate with the other faction. It is much more likely that Mao conceived the Ninth Congress as a finishing blow, the registration of the complete rout of the other side.

They had already been capitulating. The capitulators were given a certain recognition here and there.

The original formulation, while it does not spell things out -- the facts were lacking to do that -- fits the situation better than the formulation declaring that a "compromise" was reached between the two factions.

On page 15. The first change from the word "them" to the expanded phrase is acceptable. I count it to be an improvement over the original.

On the same page, a little bit

farther down, we come again, as I promised earlier, to the question of foreign policy. The sentence in the original states: "While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the opportunism of the Chinese Communist leadership." This has been changed to read: "While recognizing that for its own reasons Peking often advocates a more militant line to its followers abroad than Moscow, the Fourth International also criticizes the bureaucratic centrism of the Chinese Communist leadership."

Two changes have thus been made: "advocates a more militant line to its followers" in place of "pursues a more aggressive diplomatic policy than Moscow" and "bureaucratic centrism" in place of "opportunism."

Let us take the first change -- Mao's diplomatic policy and the line he advocates to his followers abroad. I think two questions are mixed up here. What Mao suggests to members of his cult is not necessarily identical with the regime's diplomatic policy. Even in the case of a healthy workers state the diplomatic policy of the government might be at variance with what the leaders of the revolutionary party in that country might suggest to revolutionists abroad.

Thus this change shifts us from the question of Peking's diplomatic policy to a different subject, the allegedly more militant line it advocates to its followers abroad.

Why this change was made, I do not know. It was not explained at the congress. To strike out mentioning Peking's diplomatic policy could be taken to mean that it is not worth mentioning or that it is of no interest to us.

The substitution is not without its faults in its own right. It could be interpreted as implying that Peking, in advocating a more militant line to its followers abroad, is coming nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism.

The insistence that Peking comes nearer than Moscow to the positions of revolutionary Marxism can lead some comrades to conclude that Peking is not only near to those positions but is actually coming nearer or could come nearer. The comrades of the majority, we have deduced, do not hold this position, but they are far from having made this crystal clear. So perhaps we should take a minute or two to explain the consequences of thinking that Peking is coming nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism, or could come nearer.

If Mao is capable of projecting a

more militant line to his followers abroad, what is to prevent him from projecting a more and more militant line? A revolutionary line, or something close to it? If it is really possible, then we should prepare for it.

But then it is ridiculous to call for a political revolution in China. What revolutionists everywhere ought to do, if the possibility is a real one, is struggle to push Mao more and more in that direction. However, that runs counter to the line of trying to mobilize the masses in China to overturn Mao's regime through a political revolution. If Mao can project a more and more revolutionary line, then in the intrabureaucratic struggle between Mao and Liu Shao-chi, we ought to try to form a bloc with Mao in order to crush the danger from the right wing. That would create conditions in which it would be much easier to push Mao further to the left.

Fortunately, the comrades of the majority are completely against any such perspective and reject it out of hand. They stand for a political revolution in China.

It appears to us, however, that there is a certain inconsistency in this stand and the formulations demanded by the majority comrades concerning a supposedly more militant line advocated by Mao to his followers abroad and the supposedly more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments. We wondered what concepts they had in mind that led them to insist upon such formulations.

Let's turn to the second change in this sentence on page 15, the change from "opportunism" to "bureaucratic centrism." That seems like a very small change, a tiny unobjectionable change, but it turned out to be one of the points that stood out in the discussion on the "Cultural Revolution" at the world congress.

In his contribution, Comrade Pierre Frank explained that while he was not the one responsible for suggesting the change, he voted for it. In defense of his vote he said that "bureaucratic centrism" was the correct label to put on the policy of zigzagging between opportunism and ultraleftism which the comrades of the minority themselves included in the original draft.

(We would have been willing to settle for the original sentence about Mao zigzagging between opportunism and ultraleftism in his foreign policy. Unfortunately the comrades of the majority deleted it.)

In any case, Comrade Pierre said, in defense of his vote, that the formula

"bureaucratic centrism" was used by Trotsky in 1928 in his introduction to The Third International after Lenin.

It should be mentioned that a new edition of The Third International after Lenin was published this spring in France under the editorship of Comrade Pierre, who also supplied a preface. This edition has been checked against the original Russian manuscript in the Trotsky archives at Harvard. It is an improvement over the old English edition and includes a foreword by Trotsky, written in 1929 after he was exiled from the Soviet Union, which does not appear in the English edition.

In the foreword Trotsky mentions "Stalinist centrism," and he also refers to its zigzag course in foreign policy. He calls Stalin's policies "a variety of the same centrism" as that represented by "Friedrich Adler & Co." but "based on the ideological and material resources of a state that emerged from the October Revolution."

What Comrade Pierre had in mind, I suppose, was not this foreword, in which the term "Stalinist centrism" is used, but the subsequent item in the French edition, a letter written by Trotsky from Alma Ata in 1928, which actually constitutes an introduction to the main document in the book, the famous criticism of the Draft Program of the Communist International. In the English edition, this letter, entitled "What Now?" follows the main document. It is here that Trotsky uses the term "bureaucratic centrism."

What did Trotsky mean by this term? To begin with, I don't think he identified it with zigzagging, although zigzagging is one of its characteristics. For example, Trotsky speaks elsewhere in The Third International after Lenin of the "inevitable Leftward zigzags of the Chinese bourgeoisie." Evidently "bureaucratic centrism" -- which certainly does not refer to any bourgeoisie -- has a deeper content than mere oscillations in policy.

Comrade Peng made what I thought was an effective rebuttal on this point. As he put it, we no longer stand in the period of 1927-28. The situation has changed. As a matter of fact, Trotsky, and the whole Left Opposition internationally, dropped the use of the term "bureaucratic centrism" in reference to the ruling group in the Soviet Union when the orientation of calling for a political revolution was adopted in 1933. Trotsky in 1927 and 1928 had not yet reached the position that a hardened bureaucratic caste had crystallized out in the Soviet Union which could be removed from power only through a political revolution. "Comrade Pierre Frank, of course, understands this very well," Comrade Peng said, "but then

he did not explain it."

Comrade Peng maintained that if one believes there is an analogy between the situation in China today and the situation in the Soviet Union in 1927-28, then it is inconsistent to call for a political revolution in China.

On the other hand, if you call for a political revolution in China, then to be consistent in drawing an analogy with the Soviet Union, you must say that the situation in China today is comparable to the situation in the Soviet Union after 1933, or after it became clearly established that a hardened bureaucratic caste had seized a monopoly of power and consolidated its position so firmly that it could be removed only by a political revolution.

For myself, I would like to add a few observations on Trotsky's use of the term "bureaucratic centrism." In 1927-28 he distinguished between the Right, which was intertwined with the growing bourgeois tendency observable in the Soviet Union at the time, the Left, represented by the Left Opposition, which was carrying on the tradition and program of Leninism, and the Center, the key figure of which was Stalin. Trotsky's terminology, as well as his platform at the time, was shaped by the view that the Communist party in the Soviet Union and the Comintern on a world scale could still be reformed. Thus in the letter "What Now?" -- which I assume Comrade Pierre was referring to -- Trotsky states the position of the Left Opposition as follows:

"In any case, the Opposition, by virtue of its views and tendencies, must do all in its power to see that the present zigzag is extended into a serious turn onto the Leninist road. Such an outcome would be the healthiest one, that is to say, involving the least convulsions for the party and the dictatorship. [Trotsky means the dictatorship of the proletariat.] This would be the road of a profound party reform, the indispensable promise /premise?/ of the reform of the Soviet state." [Emphasis in the English original.]

We can see in this the consistency in Trotsky's use of the term "bureaucratic centrism" and his program of reform rather than political revolution.

This is not the end of the matter, however. In 1935 Trotsky returned to this question and brought things up to date both as to terminology and the great historic analogy he saw between the degeneration of the French and Russian revolutions. He did this in an article entitled "The Soviet Union Today." This was published in English in the July 1935 issue of The New International and repub-

lished in the summer 1956 issue of the International Socialist Review.

Trotsky explains in this article that "bureaucratic centrism" has given way to "bureaucratic absolutism"; or, in relation to the historic analogy he was discussing, "bureaucratic Bonapartism."

In the period 1926-27, Trotsky recalls, the question of the "Thermidorean" reaction was intensively discussed among the opposition circles. A split even occurred over the question. At the time, Trotsky projected the possibility of a Thermidorean triumph only in the future, and even then, of course, only if the growing rightist tendencies in the Soviet Union were not halted. Looking back, he continued, it can be seen that the analogy was used in a faulty way. Actually the Soviet Thermidor began in 1924. And the "Thermidoreans can celebrate, approximately, the tenth birthday of their victory." The present political regime in the USSR, he said, is "the regime of 'Soviet' (or anti-Soviet) Bonapartism, closer in type to the Empire than the Consulate."

Trotsky did not say in his article whether he considered it to have been an error to use the term "bureaucratic centrism" in the earlier period. He was concerned only about correcting the broad analogy with the French revolution; and he said that whatever adjustments this correction might call for, it did not alter the correctness of the program and policies which the Left Opposition had fought for. These had been vindicated completely by events.

We note that by 1929, in his foreword to The Third International after Lenin, he used the term "Stalinist centrism" instead of "bureaucratic centrism," and distinguished "Stalinist centrism" as a specific variety of centrism, observing that in distinction from centrism in general, as hitherto seen in the workers movement, it had at its disposal the ideological and material resources of the state that had emerged from the October Revolution. By 1935 he had adopted the term "Soviet Bonapartism."

Whatever we may say today about the use of the term "bureaucratic centrism" in the late twenties, it is clear that the shift to the term "Stalinist centrism" and then "bureaucratic absolutism" or "Soviet Bonapartism" did not signify that the Trotskyist movement had taken the view that the Kremlin could no longer follow a zigzag course. During his pact with Hitler, Stalin ordered a sharp left turn for the Communist parties in the Allied countries. Again in the period following World War II, Stalin finally shifted far enough to the left in Eastern Europe to topple a number of capitalist states.

All of this has an important bearing on our appreciation of the course of the Chinese revolution, but I will leave that for another time.

In relation to the question of using the label "bureaucratic centrism" to designate the bureaucracy in China, Comrade Livio Maitan made the point, if I understood the translator correctly and the translator was translating and not betraying Livio, that the phrase "hardened, crystallized caste" is not a scientific designation. The term "bureaucracy" is meaningful but the term "hardened, crystallized caste" does not signify anything in a scientific sense. I think this relates to Comrade Livio's view that the term "Stalinism" should be reserved for the specific period of the worst excesses under Stalin in the middle thirties, a view I do not at all agree with.

Aside from that, we have used the term "hardened caste" and similar terms to designate the development of the bureaucracy to such a point in a workers state that it completely displaces proletarian democracy and establishes its own rule. In the political arena, we have recognized this qualitative difference from "bureaucratism" in general by calling for a political revolution.

The attitude of the bureaucracy toward political power -- towards proletarian democracy -- is a certain indicator of the degree to which a caste has been formed. If it succeeds in eliminating proletarian democracy, refusing the masses any possibility to express themselves; if it prevents the formation of independent proletarian tendencies and political parties, you can be certain that it has special reasons for this and that it understands these reasons quite well. The point of qualitative change in the crystallization of this peculiar formation is registered by its success in monopolizing state power, which it then uses to consolidate and defend its special privileges at the expense of the interests of the masses and the revolution.

In comparing the bureaucracies in China and the Soviet Union from this standpoint, I would say that differences between the two can be recognized. The Soviet bureaucracy is older, more hardened, more entrenched, with the greater wealth and resources of an advanced industrial power at its command, able to afford a more crass display of opportunism. In other words, a number of differences in quantity or degree can be found -- and these are important -- but qualitatively, the two formations are pretty much the same. In both instances, we are compelled to call for a political revolution and by that fact we recognize that a certain identity or equivalence does exist despite the differences.

It may seem that I am belaboring the point. But it also seems to be of considerable importance to the comrades of the majority. Even after the discussion at the congress they insisted on their formulation with but a small modification. Here is how it reads in the final draft which is to be published as the majority document:

"While not forgetting that the Chinese leadership is led by the defense of its own interests to inspire among its partisans in the world a more militant line than Moscow's, the Fourth International criticizes the bureaucratic centrist nature of the policy."

We would very much like to know why the comrades of the majority are so insistent on the forty-year-old label "bureaucratic centrist" which Trotsky dropped so long ago.

In the next changes on page 15, several points are involved. We will begin with the question of granting aid to guerrilla forces. In the original, it is indicated, although not stressed, that Peking's chief purpose in this is to create an image to the left of Moscow. In the reformulation, the stress is placed on the objective consequences of granting material aid in this way. Once again the objective consequences of Peking's ultra-leftism are left out.

Without a break in the paragraph, the reformulation then brings in Peking's attacks on the right-wing policies of the Communist parties under Moscow's influence, and its attacks on some of the features of bureaucratic rule in Eastern Europe, all of which are described as "objectively" contributing to deepening the crisis of Stalinism and facilitating the upsurge of the new youth vanguard. These sentences replace the sentences in the original, pointing to the fact that Peking's basic policy is "peaceful coexistence," that the leaders of the Chinese bureaucracy are motivated by "narrow nationalistic considerations," that their line is that the revolution must first pass through a "bourgeois stage" before it can reach a socialist stage, that it "counsels and countenances support to bourgeois countries," and does this as a substitute for "mobilizing the masses for uncompromising struggle against the neo-colonial regimes."

These points, deleted from the original, appear completely valid to us, both empirically and theoretically. They are completely explainable from a Marxist standpoint if it is granted that what exists in China is a bureaucratic formation so hardened that it can only be broken up by a political revolution.

Of course a problem is created if

it is maintained that such a formation does not exist; then it is more accurate to say that what does exist is "bureaucratic centrism."

To stress the objective consequences of Peking's actions at this point is out of place, particularly when it is substituted for something more fundamental to understanding the nature of the regime and the origins of its policies. A clear appreciation is required of the nature of the bureaucracy in China, its degree of development, and its motivations. Otherwise we can run into the error of substituting questions of a secondary order for the more important primary questions, as has occurred in this instance.

It is not enough to point out how some of Peking's actions "objectively" assist the revolutionary process. It is not enough, either, to point out how some of Peking's actions "objectively" aid the counterrevolution, leading to such catastrophes as the one in Indonesia. It is necessary to first grasp the nature of the bureaucracy in China, its narrow, nationalistic interests and preoccupations. From this we can gain a correct and balanced appreciation of the political aims of the leadership of that bureaucracy both domestically and internationally. Then, in the light of the international situation and the contradictory forces in operation on a world scale, we can better determine the portent of Peking's actions and to what degree they must be assessed as objectively revolutionary or counter-revolutionary, or a combination of the two.

Otherwise we can have a bad echo of such disputes as whether the ultra-left phases of Stalin's course did not objectively further the world revolution, or at least come nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism than the openly opportunist phases. Or, to reduce things to an absurdity, whether Stalin's publication of the works of Lenin did not objectively help the world revolution.

On second thought, that might not be so absurd. Some circles have maintained that publication of the little Red Book by the tens of millions has had objectively revolutionary consequences. One wonders whether this comes nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism than Stalin's publication of the works of Lenin.

In the final sentence in this same paragraph on page 15, you will notice that the substitution by the majority mentions that among the youth vanguard, sympathy for the Maoist positions in relation to Moscow remain deep; and it is asserted that the reason the Maoists have been unable to stabilize any important

youth organizations anywhere is because of their "organizational sectarianism and political infantilism." Note that there is no suggestion here of a connection between Peking's policies or the meaning of this important and telling failure. The whole question is reduced to the organizational level. I don't know what is meant by "political infantilism" -- but I can't help observing that the phrase comes from the same comrades who considered it a journalistic epithet to describe Mao as an "erratic pilot."

I'll return to this point in a moment.

On page 16, I am sure that no one by now will be surprised at the deletion of the characterization of the Chinese bureaucracy as "nationalistic-minded." Since nothing is offered by way of a substitute, one wonders if it was felt that the Chinese leadership is internationally-minded. Or perhaps something in between, neither completely international, nor completely national. A series of questions arises, in fact, as to how the majority comrades really view the leadership of the Chinese Communist party.

On the very eve of the congress, the national interests of the Chinese bureaucracy came into such sharp conflict with the national interests of the Soviet bureaucracy that shooting broke out in several places along the Sino-Soviet border and hundreds were killed in pitched battles over a patch of land in the Ussuri River.

I was glad to see that in the final draft, the Ussuri battles were mentioned, although the narrow nationalism motivating both sides was not brought out. Major responsibility was placed on Moscow, and the answer of the Chinese was said to have been determined by "bureaucratic interests and prestige considerations" and "in the final analysis" by a "concept" -- the concept of "socialism in one country." Perhaps it would have been better in this instance to have stressed what kind of minds function in accordance with such concepts. The word "nationalistic" seems the most appropriate.

On page 16, the entire paragraph concerning the "newly radicalized youth who have mistaken the verbal militancy and activism of the Maoist groups as representing Marxism-Leninism" has been deleted. This deletion is, of course, counterbalanced by the addition on the previous page of a reference to the "political infantilism" and "extreme organizational sectarianism" of the helmsman steering the ship of state in China. Such a meager reference hardly provides us with a high-level understanding of this question.

In trying to win youth who have been

leaning in the direction of Maoism, or who have gone through a more intimate experience with this disorienting political current, it is important for our movement to stress both the incapacity of the Maoists to build a youth movement -- which is a glaring fact -- and the political reasons for it; namely, the ultraleftism of Maoism which repels thinking youth after first attracting them, as does the cult of Mao, the ritualistic waving of the little Red Book, and the total mis-education it gives its adherents.

In our opinion, if this particular paragraph required alteration -- and we do not deny that it could be improved -- it should have been sharpened, expanded, and explained in greater detail. We did not do this in the original because of our objective in drawing up merely a line document, leaving it to the world Trotskyist press to provide the necessary supplementary material in the coming period.

A good example, in my opinion, of what is required is the series of articles by Mary-Alice Waters in The Militant examining one Maoist organization, Progressive Labor.

The problem of Peking's initial attractiveness to the youth, which is comparable to the initial attractiveness that Moscow once had to the youth, is a very real one. At bottom it involves the error of identifying the leadership of a workers state with the workers state itself and the revolutionary process that brought it into being.

The resolution on the "Cultural Revolution" required at least a specific reference to the problem of Maoism and the newly radicalized youth, not only because it is related to the "Cultural Revolution" but because it is connected with the major task facing the entire world Trotskyist movement in the immediate period ahead -- taking maximum advantage of the extraordinary openings provided by the appearance of a new generation of radical youth.

At the bottom of page 16, we come to another change which likewise can hardly be characterized as unexpected. The phrase "the crystallized bureaucratic caste headed by Mao cannot be reformed" has been altered to read, "also in China, the bureaucracy cannot be removed by reforms." By now, we have become well aware that the comrades of the majority are acutely sensitive to the words "crystallized bureaucratic caste" and do not want such a characterization in the resolution.

In our opinion, this demands explanation. Why shouldn't we use this characterization? What's wrong with it? If China does not have a crystallized bureaucratic caste, what kind of social formation does

rule China? And what is the nature of the leadership that represents and defends the special interests of this formation?

It's not an exploiting class -- a class like we have in the United States or Mexico or elsewhere in the capitalist world. It's not a mere bureaucracy such as is found in the trade unions. It's not like the bureaucracy to be found in Cuba. So what is it exactly? Is it just to be called "bureaucracy" -- bureaucracy in general? Is it not possible to give it a more precise sociological definition?

This is very important from a theoretical standpoint. A series of questions are involved.

If in China we do not have a crystallized bureaucratic caste, which is consciously fighting to preserve special privileges, why is Mao so concerned about maintaining secrecy in China? What has he got to hide? Why all this tremendous apparatus in China to prevent anyone from coming in and seeing what is really happening?

The secrecy in China is even worse, if anything, than it was in Stalin's day in the Soviet Union. There are certain areas in China that no one from the outside, from any party, no matter from what country, has ever seen since the revolution so far as we know. What is the political significance of this? How do we estimate it politically, the fact that a regime in a workers state acts this way?

A closely related question concerns explaining why it is that this regime does not turn to the revolutionists in seeking allies abroad. They turn to either the national bourgeoisie, with whom they seek to make some kind of deal or other along the lines of "peaceful co-existence," or they seek sycophants and paid agents. I leave aside people who are sucked in, the innocents and inexperienced who think that Maoism is revolutionary, the people first becoming radicalized. I'm talking about people in the know.

What kind of ruling group is it that exercises power this way in the world today if not a crystallized bureaucratic caste and its representatives?

This is a real question, not a matter of splitting hairs or engaging in a scholastic exercise. It's a real question, dealing with a real formation. And we have to account for it on a theoretical level as well as meet it politically.

Perhaps you feel some relief at having come to the end of the two documents. I hope that by way of compensation you noticed that the final item concerning the existence in China of a crystal-

lized bureaucratic caste actually involves the question of Stalinism. That was the point we started with, wasn't it? So we have come full circle back to the beginning. Almost like Hegel, isn't it? On a higher level of integration of ideas, I trust.

It at least shows that there's a certain consistency in the logical structure of the original resolution. The same note was struck at the beginning and the end, and actually the end indicated the essential grounding for the position that what is required in China is a political revolution.

What has been indicated by the differences that have emerged between the original draft of the resolution and the modified version submitted by the majority? They are rather important from the viewpoint of seeking clarification and arriving at greater homogeneity in the position of the world Trotskyist movement on the question of the "Cultural Revolution" and the nature of the regime in China.

Let us note some of the main divergences observable in the two documents, without attempting to put them in any kind of order.

1. It's evident that there are different estimates as to the degree of damage done by the "Cultural Revolution." This includes damage done to the educational system and to culture in China.

2. There are differences over the nature of the Red Guard movement. We seek a better differentiation of the tendencies within the movement so as not to foster any illusions about its nature as a whole and so as to be able to see better what component was instigated by the regime and was responsive to it and what component constituted genuine rebel youth.

3. There are different estimates of the role of the military -- over the role played by the army in the "Cultural Revolution," its current position in the bureaucratic structure as a whole, and its weight in the regime. We realize that this is difficult to determine in view of the secrecy of the Maoists.

4. There are differences over how the "Cultural Revolution" ended. The comrades of the majority are convinced that it ended in a compromise between the two main factions. We were more cautious about this. We are inclined to conclude that Mao has won a crushing victory which he is now trying to consolidate with the help of widespread capitulations.

There is no disagreement, it should be added, over the instability of the situation and the likelihood of fresh convul-

sions in the coming period.

These differences will no doubt be resolved rather easily as more information becomes available. However, other differences have emerged that go somewhat deeper. A tentative list of these may prove useful.

1. There are differences over the significance of the cult of Mao. We view the cult as a very serious matter. The comrades of the majority discount its seriousness somewhat. They don't disregard it; they are opposed to it. But in the resolution they tend to discount it and this no doubt reflects their judgment of how much attention should be paid to it.

2. There are differences over the nature of Mao's foreign policy. We think Mao's foreign policy is not revolutionary; that he alternates between ultraleftism and opportunism or combinations of the two and that fundamentally he seeks "peaceful coexistence." The majority comrades do not speak so clearly on this. We are not sure if they think Mao's policy is revolutionary, sometimes revolutionary, or just what. In the resolution they assert that it is "objectively" revolutionary. They appear to dismiss its subjective, or consciously calculated aspects.

3. There are differences, apparently, over the nature of the regime. In our opinion, it represents the interests of a narrow, nationalistic, bureaucratic caste, a bureaucracy of a certain specific character. The comrades of the majority appear to view the regime as "bureaucratic centrist" in the sense of the term used by Trotsky in 1928 to characterize the Stalinism of that period before he reached the conclusion that it could be broken up only through a political revolution.

4. Back of this difference may stand different estimates of the meaning of the term "Stalinism." We consider Maoism to be a variety of Stalinism. Where the comrades of the majority stand on this is not clear to us.

5. To clarify this difference, or possible difference, may require a discussion of the origin of the Chinese revolution and the role played in it by the Maoists. A number of theoretical questions come up, such as explaining how a "Stalinized" Communist party could come to power in China.

Some of these questions have not been probed extensively by our movement. Perhaps it is now requisite for us to go into all this in greater detail. Such a discussion will most likely prove valuable in removing sources of differences that could prove even more troublesome in

the future than they are now.

6. It is possible that differences of a political nature could arise in the course of the discussion. These would hinge on what attitude to adopt toward Maoism and could generate a certain warmth in the discussion. I don't think this will occur. Nevertheless, it is worth noting a certain insistence on the side of both the majority and the minority as to the correct attitude to adopt in approaching the Maoist youth. This could adumbrate a political difference.

Our opinion is that it is best to make a sharp delimitation and attack the positions of the Maoists in a vigorous polemic while at the same time seeking to engage them, wherever possible, in common actions. Naturally, in a common action working relations have to be established. But on the political and theoretical level, a sharp demarcation is required, otherwise we can lose our own ranks to the Maoists.

The majority comrades think that this sharpness is unnecessary and even stands in the way of approaching the Maoists for the purpose of recruiting from them. At the congress, the majority comrades constantly referred to the fact that during the May days in Paris, the Maoists were to be found on the "same side of the barricades" as our comrades. Therefore, they maintain, a sharp tone should not be adopted in polemicizing with them.

Beyond this tactical question involving the comrades in Paris in May 1968 we see a much bigger question, the problem of ultraleftism, which goes beyond Maoism -- Maoism being only a contributing current, although an important one.

How big is the problem of ultraleftism today? How serious is it to the world Trotskyist movement? What are we going to do about it? There are evidently differences over how we should estimate this. Our opinion is that ultraleftism has made inroads into our ranks in some parts of the world and constitutes a considerable problem.

7. Finally, looming behind all of these differences is the question of how to go about building a revolutionary combat party. In the United States, this concerns us a great deal. We see it in relation not only to the Communist party, which is no longer the great problem it once was, but in relation to the ultraleftism of Progressive Labor, of tendencies in the SDS and other formations, notably the Black Panthers. We have the impression that other sectors of the world Trotskyist movement face comparable problems in their daily work of forging a combat party.

Does unanimity exist on how to solve these problems? Here the test of practice is decisive and we think it would be very fruitful if a better exchange could be reached between the sectors of our movement as to their experiences in grappling with ultraleftism.

In closing, let me indicate where the comrades of the majority think we are in basic agreement and what our opinion is on this.

They maintain that we both agree that a privileged bureaucracy exists in China, and that there is a need for a political revolution.

We think this is a correct judgment in general but that the comrades of the majority are unclear or inconsistent in their characterization of the bureaucracy and still more unclear or inconsistent in relating the need for a political revolution to their view of the bureaucracy and its policies.

They maintain that we both agree that the "Cultural Revolution" represented an intrabureaucratic struggle in which we supported neither of the two main contending factions.

That is accurate in general, in our opinion, but again it appears to us that the comrades of the majority are inconsistent and that various things they argue for really imply offering critical support to Mao in the intrabureaucratic struggle.

They maintain that we both agree that the masses were mobilized in China and that this weakened the bureaucracy. We think that is accurate but we differ on the degree of mobilization and perhaps the degree to which the bureaucracy was weakened by the mobilization.

The area of agreement is substantial and should enable us to undertake an educational discussion without undue friction arising.

Finally, I should like to add that in my opinion this is only the beginning of the process of clarification. We hope for a free discussion throughout the world Trotskyist movement, and we are fully aware of the fact that this takes time.

In the next phase, I trust, we will be able to proceed beyond the necessity of examining two texts that on first glance appear to be almost identical.

THE ORIGIN OF THE DIFFERENCES ON CHINA

By Joseph Hansen

The following is the text of the report made by Joseph Hansen at the Twenty-third Convention of the Socialist Workers Party.7

* * *

At the recent world congress, Comrade Germain stressed the fact that although various differences had arisen as the international Trotskyist movement sought to formulate its stand on the "cultural revolution," the area of agreement remained broad and substantial.

On this, I believe that Comrade Germain is correct. There is agreement on such key questions as the following:

1. That a workers state exists in China.
2. That it is a deformed workers state.
3. That there is no proletarian democracy in China and no possibility of achieving it under the present regime.
4. That a political revolution is required in China to establish proletarian democracy.

In addition to these very basic points, Comrade Germain is correct in citing agreement among most Trotskyists on two more points:

1. That the "cultural revolution" was essentially an intrabureaucratic struggle.
2. That the mobilization of the masses during the "cultural revolution" weakened the bureaucracy in China.

The common position reached by all sectors of the International on these basic questions is a very real and valuable achievement. It means that the International is assured in advance that in assessing current events in which these issues are involved, its political stand will reflect a virtually unanimous view.

This makes it possible to have a very free discussion on the differences that have arisen.

The Differences

The disagreements that appeared at the world congress and during the discussion period leading up to it can be listed as follows:

First, differences over interpretation of some of the aspects of the "cultural revolution."

These include the role of the youth, primarily the Red Guard movement; the extent of the mass mobilizations and the degree to which they were kept under control or escaped control; the extent of the damage done to culture, education, and possibly other institutions, such as defense, science, the atomic industry; and, finally the role of the military, or its role since the end of the "cultural revolution."

These questions should give rise to no serious problems, since they will be settled by new events and additional information.

In a somewhat different category is the difference over the emphasis to be placed on the cult of Mao. Everyone at the congress, of course, opposed the cult. The question was what weight should be placed on it in an official resolution of the Fourth International.

Associated with this was the question of what tone to adopt in polemics with Maoists. Here it was a matter of judgment, or practical experience, as to the best way to approach revolutionary-minded youth who have been influenced by Maoism.

In relation to this, it was noted that the problem extends into the International. In a few places losses have been suffered to the Maoists.

At the congress, a related question also came up. How important is the danger faced by the International from the widespread ultraleft mood among the youth? In our opinion this is a rather serious question, one not easily solved. Others held a different view.

Comrade Peng's Position

Besides these differences, the position taken by Comrade Peng played a role at the congress. He voted for the minority draft of the resolution on the "cultural revolution," but he proposed that critical support should be given to Liu Shao-chi.

In my opinion, this particular difference was of a tactical order. Comrade Peng held that the Liu Shao-chi group favored de-Stalinization whereas Mao was dead set against it, and therefore the interests of the Fourth International would best be served if Liu Shao-chi won out.

At the congress, Comrade Peng held that the possible opening for the Fourth International in intervening in the

"cultural revolution" had been missed. The Liu Shao-chi group had been crushed. Thus the issue was no longer current. Comrade Peng maintained that it is nonetheless of historical interest, and of importance in drawing lessons for the future.

As the discussion progressed, differences of another order began to emerge. These were perhaps more important, in the final analysis, than the points of immediate dispute since they concerned the theory of the Chinese Revolution. The following questions came up:

1. The specific nature of the Chinese Communist Party and the correct label to place on it. Is it a "Stalinized" party? If we call it a "Stalinized" party, what does this do to our basic position on the counterrevolutionary nature of Stalinism?

2. The specific nature of the bureaucracy and the correct label to place on it. Is it a "Stalinist" bureaucracy or just a bureaucracy in general?

3. The specific nature of the foreign policy of this bureaucracy. Is it "bureaucratic centrist" or "Stalinist"? Is its basic objective "peaceful coexistence" or the fostering of socialist revolutions abroad?

Origin of the Differences

A clear understanding of the origin of these differences in theoretical appreciation of the Chinese Revolution is very important. It can help set the correct tone for the discussion and keep it at a proper level.

The differences were not injected artificially. They arose through the efforts of the international Trotskyist movement to come to grips with a major domestic development that had worldwide impact -- the "cultural revolution."

To have differences over such a development is quite natural and nothing to get excited about in a movement that maintains proletarian democracy.

Some of the divergences can be traced back ultimately, in my opinion, to the first attempts of the leaders of the Fourth International to assess the Chinese Revolution theoretically. During the years in which the movement was split, some of the assessments remained frozen; others underwent modification without the benefit of a fruitful exchange of opinion because of the factional struggle.

The discussion has already aroused lively interest internationally. In the SWP, several comrades, perhaps a little prematurely, at once offered contribu-

tions, taking advantage of the opportunity afforded by the pre-convention discussion period.

One of these early contributions may have created a rather negative reaction because of its tone. This is the contribution made by Comrade Mike Tormey entitled "China -- a Fundamental Difference." (SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol.27, No. 8.)

I will take it up at this point because of the advantages it may offer in further indicating the frame of the discussion and some of the things that ought to be avoided.

Comrade Tormey's Position

Comrade Tormey maintains that the reunification of the world Trotskyist movement in 1963 took place "with two divergent positions on China" without the divergences being "clarified." "The SWP," he writes, "has not fought for its line inside the world movement, and we have compromised our theoretical position on China. The leadership has not carried out its responsibility to the rank and file of either the party or the International, especially to the Chinese section."

Comrade Tormey maintains that "the only reason a discussion is on the agenda today is that the United Secretariat majority wouldn't let us smuggle in our line and rewrote the SWP's document."

Besides "smuggle," Comrade Tormey also uses words like "appeasing" and "obfuscating" in relation to the course followed by the leadership of the SWP. He even finds means of employing words like "dishonest" and "betray."

I hope that any comrades who may feel tempted to answer Comrade Tormey in the same tone will not do so. In a discussion of this nature, it is a mistake to permit oneself to become provoked into arguing on such a level. It is better to try to see what point Comrade Tormey is trying to make.

If I understand his underlying thesis it is that the 1963 reunification was a mistake, that it took place on an unprincipled basis, and that the leadership of the SWP in the intervening six years has conducted itself in an unprincipled way because it did not initiate a faction fight over such questions as the theoretical appreciation of the Chinese Revolution and the precise way it was affected by Stalinism.

Perhaps I am overstating Comrade Tormey's thesis. If this is the case, I hope he will not object to my attempting to answer it just the same. My purpose

is to try to help prevent the discussion from becoming diverted into the channels implied by his arguments.

A Principled Reunification

First of all, the reunification in 1963 did occur on a principled basis. A document was drawn up, codifying the principles on which the reunification took place. No one in the world Trotskyist movement challenged this document at the time and no one has challenged it since.

It is especially to be noted that the Healyites, who were the loudest in shouting that the reunification was "unprincipled" and a "betrayal," never published this document, never made it available to their rank and file, never submitted it to criticism.

The reason for this was that the leadership of the Socialist Labour League could not find any good reason for not accepting the reunification on the basis of this document. Had they published the document at the time, explaining that it had been accepted by the majority of the International Committee, they would have exposed the completely unprincipled nature of their own course -- which was first to initiate concrete steps pointing toward reunification, and then to split when they found themselves in a minority in the International Committee on such questions as the nature of the Cuban Revolution.

It is quite true that the movement did not unite in 1963 on a monolithic basis. We are opposed to monolithism. As a political party, the Fourth International reunified in accordance with political principles. It would have been wrong to demand agreement on all questions of theory or of historical interpretation, although agreement did exist on the big questions of this nature traditionally associated with our movement.

The main area of disagreement was well known to both sides -- it concerned the responsibility for the split some ten years before. Whatever the final determination on that might be, it was the revolutionary duty of both sides to seek to heal the split so as to open up the possibility for united action in taking advantage of a series of exceptional opportunities that had appeared, such as utilizing the favorable repercussions of the Cuban Revolution and participating actively in the Algerian Revolution; and, on the other hand, joining forces against both opportunist and sectarian tendencies that had appeared in some sectors of the Trotskyist movement, notably Ceylon and Latin America (Posadas).

Reunification would also make pos-

sible an eventual historic estimate of the split in the most objective way possible and with the least likelihood of injuring the continued unity and growth of the world Trotskyist movement. That could be done only at a later date, in the light of fresh experience and with the old factional lineups liquidated.

This way of proceeding was not only the most rational and objective. It was in the Trotskyist tradition. In the SWP we learned this directly from Comrade Cannon. He learned it from bitter experience -- and from the Russians.

An Instructive Precedent

A similar question, it might be mentioned, came up when Trotsky first reached the position in 1933 that a Fourth International had to be built.

Jean van Heijenoort, one of Trotsky's secretaries, tells the story: "A few voices raised the question: haven't we waited too long? Shouldn't we have recognized the need of a new International much sooner? To this Trotsky answered: 'This is a question we may well leave to the historians.' He was undoubtedly profoundly convinced that the change in policy would have been incorrect several years sooner, but he refused to discuss this question because it was no longer of practical and immediate interest."

This bit of history can be found on page 63 of the new Merit publication, Leon Trotsky -- The Man and His Work.

Thus we can see that a willingness to leave to the historians questions that are no longer urgent in immediate political practice is not without precedent in the history of the Fourth International.

Naturally, this does not mean that such questions have been buried forever. They can come up in connection with new issues. In that case they can acquire a certain currency; but in a quite different, and, it is to be hoped, more favorable context.

The truth is that among the differences that led to the split in 1953-54, the question of theoretical appreciation of the Chinese Revolution did not play a prominent role at all. It is therefore not difficult to abstract the question of China from the differences that led to the split. It is true that differing theoretical appreciations of the Chinese Revolution existed in those days and that these may have had an indirect relation to the issues involved in the split. But anyone holding that view, if he is to be objective in assigning historical responsibility, should very carefully

note what role was played in this by the slowness of the SWP in coming to the position that a workers state had been established in China.

In the SWP we could afford to take our time. As in the case of our analysis of the meaning of the overturn of capitalism in Eastern Europe following World War II, we wanted to be sure that we had thought through all the possible consequences that might follow from our theoretical conclusions. The delay did not affect any immediate, practical political positions of the party. However, this slowness may have had an adverse effect in the International.

If this was the case, we who were associated with the International Committee would have objected ten years later in 1963, at the time of the reunification, to any demand that we "repent," to use Comrade Tormey's phrase. But then none of the comrades of the International Secretariat displayed the least inclination to demand that we repent, and vow that in the future we would think things through at a faster pace.

At the moment they were faced with a deep division within their own ranks. In 1963, comrades Pierre Frank, Ernest Germain, and Livio Maitan stood on one side, Pablo on the other. Among the questions in dispute was their theoretical appreciation of the Chinese Revolution.

Pablo's Turn on China

This internal difference among the comrades with whom we were uniting was of considerable interest. Obviously it was a reflection inside the world Trotskyist movement of the Sino-Soviet dispute.

Pablo had made a decided switch in his position on the Chinese Revolution. He now viewed Maoism as one of the chief obstacles standing in the way of de-Stalinization. This judgment was not without an element of truth, in my opinion.

In trying to explain the nature of Maoism, Pablo had come to view it as a Chinese version of Stalinism. This likewise appeared to me to be not without a certain validity.

But Pablo had gone further than that. To explain Mao's Stalinism, Pablo had decided that a stage of Stalinist retrogression is inevitable in any revolution in a backward country. Perhaps even worse, he had reached the conclusion that Tito's regime in Yugoslavia had developed a correct way of combating this tendency toward degeneration -- workers self-management. Thus, as against what had happened in China under Mao, Pablo offered

what had happened in Yugoslavia under Tito.

As an immediate practical political conclusion in the Sino-Soviet conflict, Pablo favored opposing Mao and giving critical support to Khrushchev, the de-Stalinizer, who was then the head of the Soviet government. Pablo maintained that to do otherwise would mean giving objective assistance to the worst Stalinist forces in both China and the Soviet Union, the forces utterly opposed to de-Stalinization.

Comrades Pierre Frank, Ernest Germain, and Livio Maitan were up in arms over both the deep-going theoretical conclusions and the political position Pablo had reached. They won a solid majority against him in the congress which they held on the eve of the Reunification Congress.

At the Reunification Congress there was no attempt to plaster over these differences with Pablo. They remained on the agenda for further discussion in the normal course of political life in the reunified International. The same held true for the theoretical appreciations of the Chinese Revolution maintained by the majority of the International Committee insofar as these differed from those held by the International Secretariat.

In relation to China only two political issues had to be decided on -- which side to favor in the Sino-Soviet conflict and whether to call for a political revolution in China. The first point was easily handled, since both the International Committee and the International Secretariat already favored giving critical support to Peking. In the united organization, only a small minority supported Pablo's contrary view.

On the second point, each side made a concession. Pending further discussion, the comrades of the International Secretariat agreed to a formulation that included the substance of the position of the International Committee, while the International Committee agreed not to insist on the designation "political revolution."

We thought that this was a good temporary solution inasmuch as it removed the possibility of ambiguity in the political position of the International on this question while permitting the comrades who held reservations to consider it further and to await the test of fresh events. The principled nature of this solution was shown by the complete agreement on the specific points drawn up as a political platform in the struggle for proletarian democracy in China.

The reunification of the Fourth In-

ternational made it possible for us to look forward to future discussions on this and other subjects within a reasonable time that would lead to still greater homogeneity of views.

Fresh Splits

The prospect of a strengthened International did not meet with universal approval. On the side of the International Committee, a minority headed by Gerry Healy refused to join in the reunification, deciding instead to split from the world Trotskyist movement.

On the side of the International Secretariat, a minority headed by Juan Posadas had already split for much the same reasons as those motivating Healy.

Before long, Pablo followed their example.

All three of these groups, of course, were strong advocates of democratic centralism. They also practiced democratic centralism quite vigorously -- so long as they remained in the majority. As a minority, however, they found many reasons for not practicing what they preached.

Some changes inside the SWP since 1963 should likewise be noted. A few who agreed with Healy -- Wohlforth and Robertson among them -- found it impossible to abide by the rules of democratic centralism. A few others, who took an uncritical view of Maoism, lost interest in further internal discussion and left the party.

Thus, since 1963, the situation within the International and the organizations in fraternal sympathy with it has altered in various ways. One of the most important has been the addition of sizable new forces through the recruitment of youth.

So far as the composition of the movement is concerned, the discussion today takes place in quite different -- and, in my opinion, much more favorable -- circumstances than existed in 1963.

In addition, some major events have provided fresh material. These include the deepening crisis and decomposition of world Stalinism, particularly the further sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict, the catastrophe in Indonesia, and the big convulsion in China called the "cultural revolution." These developments greatly facilitate a fruitful discussion.

I hope that this is sufficient to answer the question that appeared to be implied in Comrade Tormey's contribution concerning the procedure followed at the Reunification Congress in 1963.

I should like to turn now to a couple of points which he makes that are more directly related to the differences that have arisen over the "cultural revolution."

Question of Liu's Program

Comrade Tormey maintains, if I understand him correctly, that the refusal of the SWP to support Liu Shao-chi amounts to "appeasing" the majority of the United Secretariat in questions of principle relating to the Chinese Revolution.

In the effort to substantiate his case, he ascribes to Liu Shao-chi a program that is very far to the left. The method followed by Comrade Tormey in this is hardly a model of objectivity. In the fall 1966 issue of the International Socialist Review, in an article on the "cultural revolution," Comrade George Novack wrote that from the accusations lodged against the dissident intellectuals and from other sources, it was possible "to discern the vague contours of their criticism and the trend of their thinking." Comrade Novack drew the conclusion that if the points he listed were taken together, "these positions would constitute a serious oppositional program to the policies of the Peking leadership."

Comrade Tormey assumes that this was the program of the Liu Shao-chi faction. As Comrade Tormey puts it, "Comrade Novack has obviously outlined part of the program of the Liu Shao-chi faction."

This may be obvious to Comrade Tormey, but George Novack did not draw that conclusion. He stated that the list represented the "vague contours" and "trend" of thinking of the opposition as a whole. He did not say that this was the program of Liu Shao-chi.

It is not accurate to say that we were "neutralist" in the factional struggle. With our call for a political revolution, for the establishment of proletarian democracy, we stood in opposition to Mao.

But it is accurate to say that we did not offer critical support to Liu Shao-chi, although we defended his right to be heard. There was good reason, in our opinion, for not supporting Liu Shao-chi. So far as we were able to judge from the available information, Liu Shao-chi did not represent the most radical trend. He did not even organize a faction on a declared program in opposition to Mao.

To the Left of Liu Shao-chi

In contrast to the readiness with which he ascribes a serious oppositional program to Liu Shao-chi, Comrade Tormey dismisses out of hand any possibility of a tendency in China moving toward Trotskyism. "This position of Comrade Hansen's," he says, "is totally off the wall."

I have the impression that Comrade Tormey did not take time to think this through. If no tendency exists to the left of Liu Shao-chi, and if Liu Shao-chi nevertheless advanced a quite revolutionary program, then we are compelled to conclude that Liu Shao-chi took this progressive step on his own volition. That means that Liu Shao-chi is consciously a revolutionary Marxist or very close to it. Since he originated in the bureaucracy, and was in fact considered for many years to be Mao's chosen heir, and still represents a wing of the bureaucracy, then we have to say -- if Comrade Tormey is right -- that at least part of the bureaucracy carried out self-reform under the leadership of Liu Shao-chi.

Suppose that similar reasoning were applied to developments in the Soviet Union -- that no tendency stands to the left of Khrushchev. Would not the logical conclusion be that Khrushchev represents a tendency in the Soviet bureaucracy moving toward self-reform?

Comrade Tormey, I am sure, will agree that Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization consisted not of self-reform of the bureaucracy but of granting concessions to the masses under the pressure of a rising mood of opposition that could easily foster Trotskyism. In the case of the Soviet Union, I am sure that Comrade Tormey would agree that we were fully justified in assuming that groupings could form under these conditions that would gravitate toward Trotskyist positions; that perhaps they had already formed, at least in an embryonic way, and that genuine Trotskyists might already be found in their ranks.

Why weren't we justified in taking a similar attitude toward the situation in China during the "cultural revolution"?

Comrade Tormey, however, insists that we support Liu Shao-chi unless we can tell him specifically whereabouts in China a more revolutionary tendency exists and what its program is.

All we can say in response to that demand for empirical proof is that Mao's totalitarian method of rule and the wall of secrecy he maintains around China preclude any easy access to such information. We must confine ourselves pretty much to indirect indications that tendencies to the left of Liu Shao-chi do exist.

However, I can call attention to three specific items of unusual interest in this connection.

In Mao's Prisons

The first is a couple of paragraphs in the article by George Novack in the fall 1966 International Socialist Review which Comrade Tormey evidently overlooked. The paragraphs are from a report by a veteran Japanese Trotskyist leader. He explains that one of the reasons for the militancy of some of the adult leaders accused by the Mao regime of being counterrevolutionists is the resistance of many young men and women for a number of years.

"We should not forget the existence of many victims of the 'Great Leap Forward' and other affairs," writes this Japanese Trotskyist leader. "Each one of these has involved thousands of young men."

"We know of one prison alone in the suburbs of Peking where hundreds of youthful political prisoners have been doing heavy labor for many years, resolutely refusing release on the condition of recanting. They are not Trotskyists, at least they do not call themselves such. (Many Trotskyists who were arrested in 1949 and later also remain in prison.) Many Chinese youth and students know of their existence and resistance."

The second item is a very brief report carried by Agence France Presse January 22, 1967, that Kang Sheng, a member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, had been attacked in wall posters for protecting "a Trotskyite student, Tan Li-fu, arrested in December."

We reported this item in the February 3, 1967 issue of World Outlook and commented at the time on its possible meaning.

The Sheng Wu Lien Tendency

The third item is from the most recent issue (June-July) of International Socialism, published by the state capitalist tendency in Britain. Tony Cliff, the leader of this tendency, has this to say:

"In IS 29 (Summer 1967) I wrote an article on the Cultural Revolution in China; 'While there is without doubt a "Bukharinist" wing in the Chinese Communist Party, and a Stalinist (Maoist) wing...there is not a Trotskyist or Left-Oppositionist wing.' I added, however, as the final sentence of the article 'The crises from above may also spur on a new, revolutionary working-class movement below.'

"Much sooner than anyone expected,

echoes of just such a movement reached our ears."

Tony Cliff cites a speech made by K'ang Sheng, the minister of public security. (I don't know if this is the same Kang Sheng who was accused the previous year of protecting a "Trotskyite" student.) On January 24, 1968, K'ang Sheng attacked a grouping called "Sheng Wu Lien" -- which is the shortened form of "Hunan Provincial Proletarian Revolutionary Great Alliance Committee." This committee was composed of more than twenty organizations. According to K'ang Sheng, it was organized on a declared program that claimed that the "cultural revolution" had remained merely reformist up to this point.

"It may be seen from an article by Yang Hsi-kuang," said the minister of public security, "that they have probably collected some counter-revolutionary works of Trotsky..."

Tony Cliff writes further: "At last one of the documents of the Sheng-wu-lien, entitled 'Whither China?' came into our hands." In his opinion, it resembles the manifesto issued by Kurón and Modzelewski in Poland, and Tony Cliff concludes from this that "it is clear that the struggle against Bureaucratic State Capitalism as well as monopoly capitalism is really a world-wide struggle." For the benefit of readers of International Socialism, he published four pages of extracts from the document "Whither China?"

We were able to obtain a copy of the complete text of this document as well as the speech by K'ang Sheng, the minister of public security, plus several other items on this subject, including a short speech by Chiang Ch'ing, the wife of Chairman Mao, and a copy of the program of Sheng Wu Lien.

From this material, I would judge that Tony Cliff is overly optimistic in concluding that this is a state capitalist tendency. It could just as well represent a tendency that is seeking to take some of Chairman Mao's proclamations to their logical conclusion, such as demanding that the state machine be smashed and a Paris Commune type of state be established. Some of the formulations, however, read as if they had been written by someone familiar with at least some of Trotsky's writings or the writings of his Chinese followers.

I am of the opinion that more material of this kind will eventually turn up. But this ought to be sufficient to indicate that there is substance to the view that tendencies to the left of Liu Shao-chi did appear during the "cultural revolution."

A Tactical Question

Before leaving this point, it ought to be noted that the Sheng Wu Lien grouping did not offer critical support to Liu Shao-chi. Instead it offered critical support to Mao Tse-tung.

This should serve as further confirmation of the dangers involved in trying to determine from afar what is the best tactical course to follow in a situation so complex as the one in China and with so many unknowns. Such decisions should be left to the comrades directly involved in the field of action.

Perhaps Comrade Tormey can be persuaded to adopt this view. He says that if a new tendency moving toward Trotskyism actually exists in China, then "Naturally, it would be automatic to support such a tendency..."

What if this tendency thought it was tactically advisable to offer critical support to Liu Shao-chi? In my opinion, the best course for the world Trotskyist movement would be to back them up in their judgment. And what if this tendency thought it was tactically advisable to offer critical support to Mao? Would not the same considerations impel us to back them in that even if we held reservations as to the correctness of their judgment?

The question is one of tactics, not principles, during a certain stage of the struggle for a political revolution in China to establish proletarian democracy.

I would like to turn now to a different aspect of the question -- our theoretical appreciation of the Chinese Revolution.

This was not on the agenda at the world congress, but the debate touched on it and there can be no doubt that the logic of the discussion is to move in that direction.

Real Origin of the Difficulties

In his contribution "Thoughts on the History of the Chinese Revolution and the Present Discussion of Maoism," (SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 27, No. 8), Comrade Jan Garrett lists three traps which he warns that we can fall into if we just "muddle along," as he thinks we have, on the question of the Chinese Revolution.

He calls these the "objectivist" theory, the "accident" theory, and "eclectic dualism."

The labels are attractive. However, I think they are rather arbitrary.

I have the impression that Comrade Garrett reached his conclusions on this

point by mistaking the origin of the difficulties. He appears to assume that the source is to be found in theoretical incompetence or ignorance. I deduce this from his assertion that many SWP members have been just muddling along on the question of the Chinese Revolution. He misses the mark because he does not refer to the real origin of the difficulties.

At the time of the victory of the Chinese Revolution over Chiang Kai-shek and his imperialist backers, our movement was confronted with the necessity to explain the contradiction between certain long-held theoretical postulates and the actual course of events. The postulates were as follows:

1. The peasantry as a class cannot lead a revolutionary struggle through to a successful conclusion.
2. This can be achieved only by the proletariat.
3. The proletariat cannot do it except by organizing a revolutionary Marxist party.
4. Stalinism does not represent revolutionary Marxism; in essence it is counterrevolutionary.
5. Stalinism represents a temporary retrogression in the first workers state; the advance of the revolution will doom it and it will not reappear.

Despite these postulates, which appeared to have been thoroughly established by both weighty theoretical considerations and a mountain of empirical evidence, in the Chinese Revolution the proletariat did not play a leading role as a class. Instead, this role was assumed by the peasantry.

Moreover, no revolutionary Marxist party was formed on a mass scale. Instead, a Stalinist party stood at the head of the revolutionary forces and came to power in a struggle that ultimately toppled capitalism.

Finally, Stalinism was quite consciously cultivated by the new regime. Today this school of thought has culminated in a cult of the personality that if anything has outdone its model in the Soviet Union.

The problem that faced our movement was to explain these contradictions and to determine what lessons should be drawn and what they portended for the future.

So far as the political positions of the world Trotskyist movement were concerned, no problem existed. Without exception our positions were correct, ranging from full support to China, despite Chiang Kai-shek, in the struggle against Japanese imperialism to full support for the revolution against Chinese capitalism and the vestiges of feudalism despite the

Stalinist nature of the leadership that was thrown to the forefront.

It is very important to remember this, for it constitutes the most positive kind of proof that our movement is a dynamic political formation and not a church dedicated to maintaining the purity of a set of dogmas. One can feel proud in reading the political platforms presented in the documents of that time. They were very good, standing up remarkably well under the test of events.

Problem of the Proletarian Content

As to the attempts to find solutions to the contradictions between the reality and our theoretical postulates, some of these were clearly in error from the beginning. Others have not held up, or only created fresh difficulties.

In the main, the attempted solutions centered around locating the proletarian content which it was felt must lie at the heart of the Chinese Revolution despite its strange forms and the role of Stalinism.

For instance, in the case of the peasantry, there was speculation that perhaps its true nature had been misjudged. Unlike the peasants of Western Europe and elsewhere, perhaps the Chinese peasants had achieved a proletarian or even socialist consciousness either because of the peculiarities of China's historic background or because of the impact of imperialism on the country.

A current example of this line of thought is to be found in Comrade Moreno's contribution in Fifty Years of World Revolution.

Much greater attention was paid to the nature of the Chinese Communist Party. This was only natural since our movement from its very inception has considered the question of the party to be primordial in the process of bringing a revolution to victory. Thus it appeared that the key to the success in China must be sought in the nature of the Chinese Communist Party.

One line of speculation was that Trotsky had made a mistake in concluding that the Chinese Communist Party under Mao had become a peasant party.

Another was that if Trotsky had been right in his conclusion at the time, then it must have changed back into a proletarian organization.

Comrade Morris Stein argued, for instance, if I recall correctly, that there was a steady flow of workers from the cities who went into the countryside and joined the Chinese Communist Party.

Their influence, he thought, was sufficient to give a proletarian character to the party.

Another line of speculation concerned the personal qualities and influence of Mao Tse-tung. Some comrades felt that despite everything, when Mao Tse-tung was faced by the supreme test, he had adhered in practice, if not in program, propaganda, or diplomacy, to revolutionary Marxism.

Still another variant was that the very Stalinism of the Chinese Communist Party gave it a proletarian character. The line of thought here was that Stalinism is connected with the workers state in the Soviet Union and that this association therefore makes it proletarian.

At bottom, this view represents an identification of Stalinism with the workers state. It is quite a change from Trotsky's position that Stalinism stands in contradiction to the workers state, that it is a cancerous growth. As against the proletarian tendency represented by Leninism and the Left Opposition, Trotsky considered Stalinism to be petty-bourgeois in nature.

Another line of thought, flowing in the same general channel of trying to find something proletarian about the Chinese Communist Party, was the view that this party changed from a peasant party to a "centrist" party, then a "left centrist" party, then an "opportunist workers party," and finally a "workers party."

In the current discussion, the view that Mao's policies should be designated as "bureaucratic centrism" may fall within this frame. At the world congress Comrade Pierre Frank argued for the latter point. Through an error in translation I was under the impression that someone else had introduced the amendment to this effect in the resolution on the "cultural revolution." But Pierre has written me since then that he was the one who suggested it.

While I am on the point, I should like to say that I fail to see what is gained by this nomenclature. If we ask what is the class nature of "centrism," whatever its variety, we are compelled to say that it is petty-bourgeois. That is also the class nature of Stalinism. It is petty-bourgeois.

Thus the introduction of the general term "centrism" does not help in answering whether a Stalinist party can become a revolutionary party. It merely suggests a succession of stages in which the class essence of the gradation or series of steps remains obscure.

Marcy, Swabeck, Posadas, and Healy

It was quite clear from the beginning that all these tentative answers to the central problem carried implications that could prove quite dangerous politically; and we were soon to experience repercussions in our ranks. I will mention some of them.

Sam Marcy and his group rapidly came to the conclusion that Stalinism in power equals a workers state. Since a Stalinist party had gained power in China, this signified that a workers state had been established.

From this position, Marcy evolved into a Maoist of such fervor that he was capable of swallowing even the new constitution, announced at the Ninth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, designating Lin Piao as Mao's heir.

The consistency with which the Marcyites identify Stalinism with a workers state was shown in the most striking way during the Hungarian uprising when they offered critical support to Khrushchev in using Soviet tanks and troops to crush the proletarian rebellion.

The Marcyites adopted the same position in relation to the current invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia. They even went so far as to help the Kremlin in its efforts to find a propagandistic cover for crushing the upsurge that was pointing in the direction of a political revolution in Czechoslovakia.

Later in the SWP, we had the sad case of Arne Swabeck, one of the founders of the American Trotskyist movement, who proceeded from the theoretical position that only a revolutionary Marxist party can lead a successful revolution. Inasmuch as the Chinese Revolution was successful, he concluded that the Chinese Communist Party must have been a revolutionary Marxist party, and he ended up as a Maoist.

Juan Posadas followed a similar line of thinking, but with an odd twist. Because of Mao's supposed receptivity to genuine Marxism, Posadas came to believe that Mao derived his finest thought from reading the speeches and writings of J. Posadas. Just how this was accomplished was never made quite clear. Perhaps Posadas believed that Mao had set up a Latin-American Bureau in Peking that occupied itself with translating Juanposadas Thought into Chinese ideograms so that Chairman Mao could imbibe at this fountain.

The identification of Stalinism with a workers state took a different and

perhaps still more remarkable twist in the thinking of Gerry Healy. He maintains that there are two, and only two, roads to a workers state -- either under the leadership of a Trotskyist party or under the leadership of a Stalinist party.

Thus in the case of Cuba, Gerry Healy refuses to recognize the existence of a workers state because the revolution was headed by neither a Trotskyist party nor a Stalinist party.

Wohlforth Lays It on the Line

If you wish proof of this aberration, it has conveniently been made available in the most recent issue of the Bulletin (August 26). On pages S-5 and S-6, Tim Wohlforth, who seems to have displaced Cliff Slaughter as Healy's chief apologist, explains this remarkable theory.

In Eastern Europe, he says, "The very process of expropriation of capital in these countries was accompanied by a process of the creation of this workers' bureaucracy through the taking over of the government by a workers' party, the Communist Party, and the purging of the government of all forces unreliable to the tasks this party had to carry out -- some positive social tasks as well as reactionary tasks."

Wohlforth continues: "The Castro government is in no sense a workers' bureaucracy. In fact Castro has carried out a series of purges against even Stalinist elements within his government -- as illustrated by the two Escalante affairs -- and maintains complete control in the hands of the petty-bourgeois nationalist forces who came to power with him."

Then Wohlforth gets down to the nitty gritty: "In Cuba, and only in Cuba, the nationalizations were not accompanied by the emergence of a government controlled by the Stalinists."

We hardly need any further enlightenment from this Healyite theoretician. His position is that if the process that actually occurred in Cuba had been led by a Stalinist, say Blas Roca or Anibal Escalante, then the Healyites would have at once agreed that a workers state had been established. If Blas Roca or Anibal Escalante had purged Fidel Castro and Che Guevara this would have been proof positive.

But since the Stalinists in Cuba were outflanked and bypassed from the left by fresh revolutionary forces, the Healyites find it incompatible with their dogma to admit that a workers state has been established there.

It is this reactionary theory that has led the Healyites, out of concern for

consistency, to commit such abominations as to call Castro another "Batista," to offer critical support to Cuban Stalinism when Castro became alarmed at the growth of bureaucratism, and to speculate, as they did openly in their press after Che Guevara left Havana in 1965 for another "assignment," that Castro had murdered his comrade-in-arms.

Now for the icing on the cake. The Healyites make a great show in their press of alertness to the danger of succumbing to Stalinism. However, they have not set a very good example in practice. Besides succumbing to the temptations of Stalinism in Cuba, they succumbed in China.

During the "cultural revolution," the Newsletter suddenly blossomed with rave articles about Mao's Red Guards. It was quite a sight to see the great red banner of Maoism lifted high in the Newsletter. This lasted but a short time. Praise for Mao's Red Guards vanished as abruptly as it had appeared. For the past two years, the Newsletter has hardly mentioned the "cultural revolution."

What happened? No explanation was ever offered. I suppose that the headquarters gang managed to get the ailing author of the articles back into a straitjacket and that was that. It never occurred to them that he was only acting in strict consistency with Gerryhealy Thought.

Four Main Results of War

The world Trotskyist movement never landed in such blind alleys as the ones in which Marcy, Swabeck, Posadas, and Healy are now to be found. At the same time, I think it is just to say that we have not yet achieved a fully satisfactory unified theory.

Perhaps we are now in position to accomplish this. With good fortune, this may be one of the outcomes of the current discussion.

The method we should follow is that of historical materialism -- not the "objectivist" theory, the "accident" theory, or "eclectic dualism." Studies pursued in accordance with the method of historical materialism are the most likely to bring solid results. So let us look at the process that brought into the world the second generation of workers states.

World War II had four main consequences: (1) the victory of the Soviet Union; (2) the weakening of world capitalism as a whole; (3) the resulting temporary strengthening of Stalinism; (4) an upsurge of revolutionary struggles in both the imperialist centers and the colonial areas.

These four results shaped the course of history for some time, above all the advance of the world revolution.

Eastern Europe

In the case of the East European countries that were occupied by the Soviet armies as they moved toward Berlin, the overturn of capitalism in those areas was explainable as a direct consequence of the victory of the Soviet Union over German imperialism.

The armed struggle was carried on by the Soviet armies and the resistance movement operating in conjunction with them. The capitalist governments collapsed as the Soviet troops advanced. They were replaced by governments in which Moscow, standing behind local Stalinist parties, exercised power.

For a time the Kremlin retained the capitalist structures in Eastern Europe, evidently as bargaining pieces in trying to reach some kind of world settlement with Western imperialism.

When this bid was turned down and Washington opened up the Cold War, Stalin responded by destroying the capitalist structures in the countries occupied by the Soviet armies.

Imperialism was too weak to block the overturns. Naturally, there was a great hue and cry. But no capitalist country in Europe had the armed forces required to push back the Soviet armies. Even the U.S. armed forces were disintegrating.

The economic forms that replaced the capitalist structure in Eastern Europe were patterned on the economic forms in the Soviet Union. The structure of the state was likewise based on the Soviet model.

The proletarian element in these newly set up workers states clearly derived from the economic forms that were "structurally assimilated," to use the descriptive phrase applied by the comrades in Europe at the time.

The source of the reactionary Stalinist element, that is, the totalitarian political forms, was the Kremlin bureaucracy, the parasitic ruling caste which was keenly alert to the need to set up a replica of its own formation in these satellite states. Possible sources of political dissidence were handled with frame-up trials and purges.

We, of course, favored the overturns in Eastern Europe although we were absolutely opposed to the means used. To us, the overturns constituted fresh proof that the October Revolution was still

alive. Stalin had not succeeded in destroying the foundations of the workers state. Despite himself he had had to export Soviet property forms, if only as a defensive measure against imperialism.

At the same time we were fully aware that the basic policy of the Soviet bureaucracy was "peaceful coexistence" with imperialism and that in accordance with this policy Stalin had once again, during these very same years, betrayed the big revolutionary upsurges in Italy, France, and elsewhere.

Yugoslavia

Let us now consider Yugoslavia. Here again, the Soviet victory was the decisive element. This victory served to inspire the Yugoslav people who had already become armed during their struggle against the German occupation.

The Yugoslav Communist Party had played an auxiliary role in the Soviet military defense by organizing the resistance in Yugoslavia against the German occupation and by pinning down German forces through guerrilla warfare. The armed struggle in Yugoslavia was thus linked to the victories of the Soviet armies.

But the Soviet armies did not play a direct role in Yugoslavia as they did in countries like Bulgaria.

British and American imperialism sought to counter the government set up by Tito by bolstering the forces favoring the monarchy. However, they were too weak to succeed in this, even with the connivance of Stalin. The armed forces under Tito smashed the counterrevolution and became the sole real governing power in Yugoslavia.

This government, in turn, took the steps ending capitalism in Yugoslavia. The economic forms that replaced capitalism were modeled on those in the Soviet Union.

In the political arena, Tito, in true Stalinist style, crushed all dissidence or what might appear to be a potential source of dissidence from the left.

Although the independent role played by the Yugoslav Communist Party under Tito was much greater than that of the Communist parties in countries like Rumania and Czechoslovakia under the Soviet occupation, the basic pattern of the process that ended in the establishment of a deformed workers state in Yugoslavia was the same.

Let us turn now to China. The main condition for the peculiar form which

the revolutionary process took there was the same as in the East European countries and Yugoslavia -- the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II.

The two other conditions following from this one were likewise the same -- the weakening of world capitalism and the temporary strengthening of Stalinism.

As for the revolutionary upsurge touched off by the course of the war and its outcome, this occurred on the colossal scale of the most populous country on earth.

As in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia, the Soviet armies played a certain role by their proximity in the final stage of the war against the Japanese imperialist aggression, but to a lesser degree than in the European theater.

There were other differences, some of them of an unexpected nature.

China's Historic Pattern

I should like to suggest that the first of these was the strong resemblance of the opening phases of the third Chinese revolution to the revolutions of former times in Chinese history.

The earlier revolutions followed a cyclical pattern. When the exploiting classes in China reached the point of exerting intolerable oppression on the masses, the entire economic system tended to break down. The remarkable canal system upon which so much of Chinese agriculture depended fell into disrepair. It became increasingly difficult to feed the population. Famines began to occur. The central authority became increasingly hated. Finally, the peasantry, goaded to desperation, began to link up, and, more importantly, to organize for battle.

A phase of armed struggle opened, with its guerrillas, focal centers, and peasant armies. Eventually these armies conquered, and a new government, headed by the leaders of the insurgent armies, came into power.

The new government at once went to work to repair the ravages of the civil war, to reduce the exploitation of the peasants, to divide up the land at the expense of the former landlords. The canal system was rehabilitated and extended, once again assuring a dependable supply of food for the population.

The army hierarchy that constituted the new government naturally soon displayed concern for its own comfort, ease, and even modest luxuries. The hierarchy developed into a privileged bureaucracy. The land became concentrated once again in fewer and fewer hands and the new

dynasty came to represent the new landlords. The oppression of the peasantry became worse and worse and the system began to break down once again.

The most interesting part of this ancient pattern is the way the peasants succeeded in uniting and building armies imbued with a central political purpose and capable of smashing the old regime and putting a new and better one in power.

A comparison of this phase of the old pattern with the first stages of the third Chinese revolution would, in my opinion, prove highly instructive.

For one thing, it should help counteract the compulsion felt by our movement for so long to find some kind of proletarian quality in the Chinese peasants to account for their remarkable capacity to create a peasant army imbued with revolutionary political aims.

In any case it would make a very good research project for some young Trotskyist theoretician. So much for that point. We come now to more important items.

New World Context

Upon achieving their victory in 1949, the peasant armies of the third Chinese revolution were, of course, confronted by a quite different world from the one their forefathers faced.

First of all, the class nature of the enemy was not the same. In addition they found themselves up against the invading armies of Japanese imperialism, and a little later a fresh threat of invasion from Chiang Kai-shek's American backers, who launched the Korean War and carried their aggression up to the Yalu River.

On top of this, the Chinese peasants established their government in the age of nuclear power, television, jet engines, intercontinental missiles, space rocketry. It was a world dominated by two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union -- the one tied in with Chiang Kai-shek and standing behind the armies of President Truman and General MacArthur, the other associated with the common struggle against Japan, economic planning, and the immense achievements since 1917 that had lifted Russia out of abysmal backwardness.

Thus the consequence of the victory could not be a mere repetition of China's ancient cycle of revolution and counter-revolution, hinging on the status of agriculture and the private property relations associated with it.

The victory won by the Chinese peasant armies was bound to be shaped by the international context in which it occurred.

Role of Armed Struggle

The capacity displayed by the Chinese peasants to mobilize themselves in the absence of leadership from the Chinese proletariat gave the armed struggle in China extraordinary force and staying power. Here, too, a special study might provide our movement with very valuable new material.

In checking back in the documents written when China first came up for intensive discussion in our movement, I was struck by the absence of consideration of the role played by the sustained armed struggle.

For instance, in the May 1952 resolution of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, which was published in the July-August 1952 issue of Fourth International, there is a list of the ways in which the Soviet bureaucracy sought to block the Chinese Revolution from developing into a proletarian revolution. Among the ways, we are told, was the following: "By the pressure exerted upon the Chinese CP to maintain the tactic of guerrilla warfare, and not to attack the big cities."

This could be taken to mean that Stalin favored rural guerrilla warfare for a prolonged period, but was against urban guerrilla war or, more likely, was against the deployment of the peasant armies to take the big cities when that stage of the guerrilla struggle was reached. At one time, of course, he inspired an opposite course -- of attacking cities prematurely.

The resolution contains nothing more than this about the import of the armed struggle in the Chinese Revolution.

It is obvious, I think, that if the 1952 resolution had been written in the light of the Cuban experience, or even in the light of the Algerian experience, that a quite different approach would have been taken on this question.

The truth of it is that quite large forces were involved in the armed struggle even in the early stages. In his successive campaigns to liquidate the so-called soviets set up by Mao in Kiangsi in the early thirties, Chiang Kai-shek utilized armies numbering in the hundreds of thousands.

Three of these massive campaigns were defeated by the revolutionary peasant armies, and in 1931 Mao proclaimed a "Chinese Soviet Republic" in this region.

It took two more huge campaigns to dislodge this government and compel Mao to begin the Long March in 1934.

A new base was established in Shensi. For a time the armed struggle against the Chiang Kai-shek government was given up in favor of an alliance with the Chinese bourgeoisie and its political representatives. However, the armed struggle continued for a number of years against the Japanese imperialist forces; and in this struggle the revolutionary peasant armies gained in experience and above all in size until they numbered in the millions. We can well appreciate the pressure they exerted to carry the struggle through to the end.

These armies were highly organized -- as was required to defeat the enemy -- and thus gave rise to a structure of command with vast ramifications. It would be a great contribution to our knowledge if we could know the absolute size of this network, its relations with other mass organizations, and what changes may have occurred in its outlook after the victory.

Workers and Peasants Government

The role of the peasant guerrillas and the peasant armies is intimately linked to the role played by the successive governments that were set up in the bases controlled by them.

According to Mao, the government of the Chinese Soviet Republic in Kiangsi had 9,000,000 persons under its rule. In relation to China as a whole that was only a modest number. Just the same it was greater than the population of Cuba today.

In 1937, Mao reduced the "Chinese Soviet Republic" to a "regional authority" covering Shensi, Kansu and Ninghsia. The number of subjects was probably a couple of million at most -- say a population something like that in Albania today. Nevertheless from this base, Mao's regional government expanded on a big scale during the war against the Japanese imperialist invaders. Similar regional governments were set up until a hundred million persons or so came under the rule of "Red" or "People's" China.

Thus when the workers and peasants government was established in Peking in 1949, long years of experience in wielding government power had already been accumulated by the apparatus under Mao's command.

How to handle a huge military structure, undertake public works, collect taxes, apply oppressive measures, grant concessions, judge which political currents should be ruthlessly stamped out

(such as the Trotskyists) and which should be brought into a "coalition" (such as the "democratic-minded" capitalists and their political parties); how to conduct a foreign policy in keeping with the interests of the apparatus -- in short, the whole business of running governmental affairs was already old stuff for the Maoist team.

Thus the workers and peasants government headed by Mao that was established in 1949 had a long background of experience that was invaluable in the task of getting things going and rehabilitating the country after the destruction, dislocations, and havoc China had suffered under Chiang Kai-shek and the imperialist armies of Japan.

In the early years not much attention was paid to the sector of China governed by Mao. Thus it is difficult to form an accurate picture of the way Mao ruled in the period before moving to Peking in 1949 and establishing his fourth capital there. (Juichin, Pao An, Yen-an, Peking.)

What kind of justice prevailed under Mao during these decisive years? Was it balanced and fair? Was democracy practiced? Did even a semblance of democracy exist? Or did Mao follow the practices he admired so much in Stalin?

I think that we can make a fairly good guess.

When the peasant armies finally took the cities, they not only put Chiang Kai-shek and his forces to flight, they suppressed every move of the proletariat to engage as an independent force in the revolutionary upsurge. In following this policy, Mao was not initiating something new, he was continuing what he had practiced for years. Stalinism was congenial in the new regime.

Stalinism, a Temporary Phenomenon

Perhaps this is the place to consider Trotsky's thesis that Stalinism was a temporary phenomenon, doomed to disappear with the advance of the revolution. This is absolutely correct on a historic scale. Trotsky based it on the consideration that with the success of the proletarian revolution in one or more advanced capitalist countries, the standard of living could be raised so rapidly as to destroy Stalinism economically, since Stalinism arose as a product of a backward economy in a country subjected to extreme isolation and pressure by world capitalism.

But Trotsky did not speculate on what might occur if the proletarian revolution in the advanced capitalist countries was delayed for several more de-

cedes while the revolution conquered in areas still more backward than Czarist Russia.

We have seen what happens in this case. It is a matter of history. Stalinism is temporarily strengthened and its death agony is prolonged.

Trotsky's thesis nevertheless caused many comrades to scan Maoism with the hope that it might prove to be anti-Stalinist and thus provide early confirmation of Trotsky's prognosis on the historic fate of Stalinism.

Mao's policy in Indonesia and his course in the "cultural revolution" have shown how misplaced these hopes were.

Birth of Chinese Workers State

Let us continue with our analysis.

The workers and peasants government that began wielding power in Peking in 1949 was decisive in another respect in shaping the ultimate outcome of the Chinese Revolution.

It was this government that finally destroyed the capitalist state and established a workers state in China. This took place despite Mao's "New Democracy" program of maintaining capitalism for a prolonged period. The tasks faced by the new regime, particularly when they were compounded by the aggression of American imperialism in Korea, were of such order that they could be met only through economic forms that are socialist in principle.

The establishment of a workers state in China offered the most striking testimony as to the validity of the basic premise in Trotsky's theory of the permanent revolution; namely, the tendency of revolutions in the backward countries to transcend the bourgeois-democratic phase and turn into socialist revolutions. Our movement has correctly placed a great deal of stress on this; it is not necessary for me to repeat it here.

What I should like to call special attention to is the link in the revolutionary process through which this qualitative leap was made possible -- the workers and peasants government.

From the theoretical point of view this is the item of greatest interest, for it was this government that set up the economic forms modeled on those existing in the Soviet Union, repeating what had happened in Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia.

The possibility of workers and peasants governments coming to power had been visualized by the Communist Interna-

tional at the Fourth Congress in 1922. But the Bolsheviks held that such governments, set up by petty-bourgeois parties could not be characterized as proletarian dictatorships, that is, workers states.

The Bolsheviks were firmly convinced that petty-bourgeois parties, even though they went so far as to establish a workers and peasants government, could never move forward to establish a workers state. Only a revolutionary Communist party, rooted in the working class on a mass scale so as to be able to lead it into action, could do that.

The experience in China showed that in at least one case history had decreed otherwise.

This came on top of the experience in Yugoslavia and in Eastern Europe where it can be argued that the implications were not so clear cut because of the role played by the Soviet armies, the catastrophe suffered by German imperialism, and the revolutionary crisis suffered by the other capitalist powers in Europe.

It was precisely because of the adjustment that would be required in the hypothesis advanced by the Fourth Congress of the Communist International that our party moved so cautiously and sought to explore every possible alternative before it agreed to recognize that a workers state had been established in China. We take a very serious attitude toward theory.

The thoroughness with which we sought to examine the consequences of the Chinese experience served as good preparation for what happened in Cuba some ten years after the Chinese victory. We were able to follow the pattern of events in Cuba with ease.

The most gratifying aspect of this from the standpoint of theory was that the pattern of the Cuban Revolution decisively confirmed the principal conclusions we had reached with regard to China.

Cuba and Algeria

The key item in Cuba was the workers and peasants government established in 1959 by a petty-bourgeois political force, the July 26 Movement.

As in the case of China, this new Cuban government, which had been brought to power through a hard-fought armed struggle and a revolution of the most deep-going and popular character, could not meet the giant tasks it faced, particularly in face of the violent reaction of U.S. imperialism, without toppling the capitalist structure and establishing economic forms that were socialist in principle.

Once again, these were modeled by and large on those in the Soviet Union. Even more than in the case of China, the very possibility of a workers state in Cuba of any durability hinged on the existence of the Soviet Union. The appearance of a viable workers state in Cuba was thus a consequence, in the final analysis, of the victory of the Soviet Union in World War II.

The pattern was similarly visible in the Algerian Revolution. In this instance, however, no workers state was established. Instead the workers and peasants government was brought down by a military coup d'état in June 1965 after some three years in power.

This was proof that the establishment of a workers and peasants government does not automatically guarantee the subsequent establishment of a workers state.

In the case of Cuba, a significant new development was to be observed. The leadership that came to power, while it was petty-bourgeois, was not trained in the school of Stalinism. It stood to the left of the Cuban Communist Party.

The importance of this cannot be overemphasized. The team headed by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara constituted the first contingent of a new generation of revolutionists that cannot be brainwashed by either Moscow or Peking.

Trend Toward Classic Norm

On the broad scale of the post World War II period, this constitutes a watershed.

The deformation of the revolutionary process in Eastern Europe, in Yugoslavia, in China, in North Korea and North Vietnam was a resultant of the revolutionary upsurge following World War II coupled with the temporary strengthening of Stalinism.

The expansion of Stalinism, however, intensified its internal contradictions and this led to a series of crises that finally culminated in the Sino-Soviet conflict and the spread of "polycentrism." Stalinism has thus been greatly weakened. Even in its Maoist form, Stalinism now faces an increasingly dim future.

On the other hand, the establishment of a series of workers states as the consequence of successful revolutions has greatly strengthened the world revolution and its perspectives.

This means a growing tendency internationally toward a revolutionary pattern that comes much closer to the classic norm in which the proletariat

moves into the foreground. Evidence of this is to be seen in the shifting of the axis of revolutionary struggles in the backward countries from the countryside to the cities. The events in France in May-June 1968 showed what explosive potential now exists in the imperialist centers of the West. The ghetto uprisings in the United States and the upsurge among the student youth internationally have offered further corroboration of the trend.

We can conclude from this that the next revolutionary victory, wherever it comes, will in all likelihood go even further than the Cuban Revolution in departing from the deformation imposed by the pernicious heritage of Stalinism. The Leninist norm, calling for construction of a fully conscious revolutionary-socialist combat party, will acquire full force and validity as revolutionary situations develop in the strongholds of world capitalism.

Consequences

What are the main consequences of viewing the Chinese Revolution along the lines I have indicated so far as the current discussion is concerned?

First of all, I would say that it is much easier to see the role played by the peasantry and its petty-bourgeois leadership. We can call them what they are, petty-bourgeois, without seeking to conjure away this fact or to ameliorate it by speculating that after all these forces must have been proletarian in some shape or fashion, otherwise the peasantry and the Stalinized Communist Party could not have played the role they did.

Secondly, we can see much more easily how a proletarian element did finally come into play in the Chinese Revolution through the governmental power that established economic forms modeled on those of the Soviet Union.

Thirdly, we can more easily see the continuous thread of Stalinism in China from the very beginning up to the current stage marked by the crisis and fierce factional struggle of the "cultural revolution." It is not necessary to look for periods in which Stalinism presumably vanished -- only to reappear. We eliminate this awkward hypothesis which would require us to explain how Stalinism in China could have died in the flames of a peasant upheaval only to arise again from the ashes of the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

Fourthly, we can much more easily grasp the origins of the bureaucracy in China, how it was shaped by Stalinism as it came into being, and what a substan-

tial element this bureaucracy actually is in the Chinese social and political scene.

Fifthly, we are in better position to understand the interrelationship between Mao's domestic and foreign policies, and particularly in the case of his foreign policy to see how its basic design is to safeguard and advance the position of the bureaucratic ruling caste and why this gives his foreign policy its nationalistic "peaceful coexistence" characteristics and its capacity to alternate between rank opportunism and adventuristic ultraleftism. It becomes easier to see the true origin of Mao's foreign policy and to avoid the error of mistaking the resultant of the clash between Peking's policy and the contending policies of other countries with what Mao seeks to achieve.

Sixthly, by considering the pattern of the Chinese Revolution in conjunction with the patterns in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Algeria, we can much more readily appreciate the limitations of the lessons to be drawn. It is easier to avoid unwarranted and incorrect extrapolations that could prove very misleading and dangerous.

In mentioning these consequences, I should like to stress that they are derivative. They follow from viewing the Chinese Revolution in the way I have suggested.

What is most important, of course, is to weigh the validity of this analysis of the pattern of the Chinese Revolution and its connection with the patterns in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Cuba, and Algeria.

In any case, as the discussion develops internationally on this subject, the most fruitful contributions may well be those that seek to fill in the extensive gaps that still exist in our knowledge of some of the phases of the Chinese Revolution that are of the greatest interest from the standpoint of theory.

State Capitalism

Postscript:

Because of time limitations it was not possible for me to do more at the convention than barely refer during my summary to a point that should be considered logically in conjunction with the question of the degenerated or deformed workers states and their relationship to Stalinism. This is the peculiar state structures of countries like Egypt and Burma.

As is well known, in these countries the government has taken over the bulk of the means of production with the

exception of agriculture.

The nationalizations are so extensive, in fact, that quantitatively the situation appears comparable to what exists in the workers states. As a result it is tempting to equate them with workers states; and this has been done -- incorrectly so -- by various currents.

One procedure of those who make this error is to call them workers states. Another is to call them state capitalist; but -- still equating them with workers states -- to call countries like the Soviet Union and China "state capitalist."

The essential difference between states like Egypt and genuine workers states is to be found in their different origin. In every instance, the workers states, whether deformed or otherwise, have emerged as products of revolutions. Through armed struggle, through upheavals involving the masses on an immense scale, the people have overthrown their capitalist oppressors, displacing them from power in the most thoroughgoing way.

In countries like Egypt, upheavals on this scale have not occurred. The usual pattern is that a sector of the officer caste takes over, generally through a coup d'état, occasionally ratified through partial mobilization of the masses, who, of course, are in favor of ousting the old regime.

The new government is fearful of the masses. One of the first things it does is to block the masses from mobilizing, at least in a massive revolutionary way. The new government aims at giving capitalism a new lease on life after a period in incubation under auspices of the state apparatus.

The officialdom is thoroughly aware of the ultimate perspective, and conducts itself accordingly. How the state machinery is used to spawn millionaires was graphically demonstrated in Mexico.

It is obvious that the qualitative nature of nationalizations is determined by whether they originate in a thoroughgoing revolutionary struggle or in measures undertaken by a sector of the officer caste or their political representatives, who may even have in mind forestalling a popular revolution by setting up a simulacrum of a workers state. This phenomenon can be quite correctly placed under the general heading of state capitalism.

What is demonstrated by the extensive nationalizations in countries like Egypt -- and the less extensive ones in Mexico and elsewhere in Latin America -- is the enormous pressure being exerted on

a world scale to bring capitalism to a close and to move into the epoch of socialism. Private capitalism has become so antiquated, so outdated, that capitalist governments everywhere are compelled to intervene more and more extensively in the very management of industry if they hope to prolong the death agony of the system a bit longer.

The growth of state capitalism also testifies to the depth of the crisis in revolutionary leadership observable on an international scale. Prime responsibility for this lies with Stalinism.

The overhead cost of the many betrayals of the most promising revolutionary openings, from Germany in the early thirties to Indonesia three decades later, can be measured, among other ways, by the growth of statism, the direct intervention of the capitalist state in the economic system.

The importance of the occurrence of a revolution, as one of the criteria in determining that a workers state has come into existence is very clear in the case of Cuba.

Because they do not recognize this criterion, the Healyites refuse to acknowledge that a workers state exists in Cuba. They lump Cuba with Egypt, Burma, Syria, and so on.

They are inconsistent in not placing China and Yugoslavia in the same category. They seek to avoid this inconsistency by making the existence of Stalinism the decisive criterion. This shows that in the final analysis they are incapable of distinguishing between revolution and counterrevolution.

The qualitative difference that a revolution makes in nationalizations is evident in the difference in durability of the takeovers in countries where a revolution has occurred and countries where it has not occurred.

This is because of the fact that the old ruling class is smashed in the one instance and only temporarily displaced in the other while the state structure is used to rejuvenate the system. The marked difference in popular consciousness is likewise of prime importance.

Cuba and Burma offer striking examples of these differences.

A comparative study along these lines would undoubtedly prove highly instructive.

CRITICISM OF A CRITICISM
(In reply to Comrade Nishi)

by F. Charlier

The article of Comrade K. Nishi (1), written in May, 1969, reached us late and consequently we excuse ourselves, vis à vis its author, for the lateness of our reply. The article of Comrade Nishi constitutes a criticism of the draft resolution on the "Cultural Revolution," presented by the majority of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International as part of the preparation for the Ninth World Congress, which was held in April 1969 (2). At the time when Comrade Nishi's article was written, the draft resolution, as amended by the delegates at the congress, had already been adopted as a resolution (3). To the extent that the majority of the delegates to the Ninth World Congress supported the draft presented by the majority of the United Secretariat, of which only a few points were modified -- a new paragraph in the resolution is devoted to the Sino-Soviet frontier incidents, in which the responsibility of the Soviet bureaucracy, as well as the Chinese response, are severely criticized; the Chinese leadership is elsewhere criticized, in a different paragraph, for its Zhdanovist-type position in the cultural field -- the criticism written by Comrade Nishi applies to the definitive text of the resolution as well. That is why it is still necessary to reply to it.

I. THE SOCIAL ROOTS OF THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

The principal weakness of the position defended by Comrade Nishi, like that of Comrade Peng (4), is the following: they cannot furnish a satisfactory explanation for the social causes which were at the basis of the outbreak of the "Cultural Revolution." While the documents elaborated by the International endeavored to supply this fundamental explanation (Declaration of the IEC, March 1967; Resolution of the Ninth World Congress) in interpreting the "Cultural Revolution" as an attempt to divert a whole series of social forces which aspired to a radical change and to channel them in the direction of a reform of the bureaucracy, Comrade Nishi rejects this interpretation in favor of the following thesis: Mao derived certain advantages from discontent but his essential goal was to reestablish the bureaucratic regime of Mao, against some bureaucrats who had pushed Mao aside and had made concessions to the masses. From this it follows that the only explanation for the "Cultural Revolution" is the desire of Mao and Lin Piao to eliminate a group of bureaucrats who had taken "critical" positions ("critics," let us note by the way, who had put Mao on a pedestal and had participated in his cult). Now, the explanation by means of the will of an individual is manifestly unsatisfactory

when what is involved is a movement which embraced millions, if not tens of millions of people. What set off this vast mass movement? An individual and his "will to power?" Such an explanation would be anti-Marxist. The bureaucracy? But in its majority it was behind Liu Shao-Chi and Teng Hsiao-Ping, the Party Secretary. The peasants? But Comrades Nishi and Peng deny it. The workers? They deny it even more forcefully. The "Cultural Revolution" thus becomes an undecipherable mystery, all the more so since it is Mao who, as Comrade Nishi admits, was able to "[take] advantage of the justified popular discontent." (Nishi, p. 3)

II. A QUESTION OF METHOD

The method which consists in starting with the affirmation that internal political criticisms of the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) were at the origin of the events which shook China from 1965 to 1968 (in fact, that Mao wanted to get revenge on those who had dared to criticize him, which would be the only "rational" explanation: and Comrade Peng said it expressly in his report to the World Congress: "The Cultural Revolution was an attempt by the Mao faction to eliminate Liu and his partisans with the aim of safeguarding the personal dictatorship of Mao"--International Information Bulletin Number 10, July 1969, p. 10) is not a Marxist method. To analyze the situation in China, it is necessary to start first of all from the social contradictions and increasing tensions inside the country. From this point of view, Comrade Nishi bases himself on two fundamentally erroneous allegations: the first deals with the appreciation of the situation after the "Great Leap Forward;" the second concerns the discontent against the bureaucracy.

1. According to Comrade Nishi the movement of the people's communes ended, due to the opposition of the peasants, in a catastrophe, which brought about, under the direction of Liu Shao-Chi, a readjustment and a policy of concessions to the peasants which were concessions to the masses. This thesis is based on the positions, developed earlier by Comrade Peng, according to which the people's communes were nothing but a vast movement of forced collectivization(5). The reality is different. The concessions were only a necessary retreat which led to new contradictions. Indeed, the concessions consisted -- besides in the abandonment of the back-yard furnaces and of the idea that a modern industry could develop, based on local initiative -- in a restitution of the brigade (the former cooperative) as the unit of property, in a restitution of individual patches of ground to the peasants,

while the free markets for the sale of agricultural produce functioned once again. This necessary retreat led to new contradictions and social differentiations in the country, in industry; the advantage of these concessions benefited not the workers whose wages were frozen (except in 1963 when there were increases following changes in categories), but the management personnel, the superior staff members and the technicians. In the country, rich peasant layers developed once again. A product which hardly increased at all was shared more and more unequally, increasing the importance of the privileges and social inequality. The return to a kind of "NEP" was fatally bound to reproduce the contradictions of the NEP. Comrade Nishi does not, however, appreciate this situation as we do: indeed, and that is the source of his error, he compares the communes to the forced collectivization carried out by Stalin in 1929-30, just as Comrade Peng systematically searches, in every move made by the Mao Tse-Tung leadership, for a replica of a position taken by Stalin!

2. The hatred against the bureaucracy, considered as a whole, was very strong among the youth and among the urban masses, as the first objectives of the mobilizations of "Red Guards" and "Revolutionary Rebels" proved. This anti-bureaucratic resentment did not come only from the bad results of the "Great Leap Forward" and the "people's communes," but also -- and above all -- because of the oppression exercised on the society by the bureaucracy. Those who represented and led this bureaucracy were precisely Liu Shao-Chi, Teng Hsiao-Ping, and all the local apparatus chiefs. It is precisely for this reason that the elimination of these leaders was not received with hostility by the masses.

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MASS MOVEMENT

After underestimating the social contradictions which were at the basis of the Cultural Revolution and which were mentioned in the resolution of the Ninth World Congress (6), Comrade Nishi commits the error of underestimating the importance of the mass movement. He even goes so far as to compare the Red Guards movement to a mobilization of the petty bourgeoisie by the fascists, a recent example of which "was the antirevolutionary mass mobilizations in Indonesia in which the militarists made full use of discontented youth against the Sukarno government behind which stood the Stalinists." (Nishi, p. 3) Such a comparison with the fascists or with the Indonesian generals is completely out of place. To our knowledge, the only persons who have dared to make such a comparison -- without, however, evoking Indonesia -- have been, apart from the least objective bourgeois organs, the Soviets and their agents, like Wang Ming (7) who writes in his pamphlet on the

Cultural Revolution: "In the second half of 1966, Mao Tse-Tung undertook, basing himself on the support of the military units that he had deceived and on the 'Red Guard' and 'revolutionary rebel' organizations created under pressure and by falsehoods, under cover of a 'cultural revolution,' to carry out a military coup d'état, anticommunist, antipopular and counterrevolutionary and terrorist." When we speak of mass mobilizations, we are not speaking of demonstrations of people assembled under strict police control, but of genuine mass mobilizations, that is of an autonomous activity of millions of youth, high school and university students. It is all the more astonishing that Comrade Nishi does not recognize this aspect, given that some Japanese comrades who had had eyewitness reports on the situation in China have alluded to this as being the principal aspect of what occurred in China up until 1967. It is only when it is understood that there was a genuine mass mobilization that it can also be understood why Mao was unable to control it, why sizable factions of many thousands and tens of thousands of persons formed, and confronted each other at intervals and massively and dramatically at times, as at Shanghai in January 1967, at Wuhan in June-July 1967 and at Canton in August 1967 (8).

The Red Guard movement, like the "Revolutionary Rebels" movement, had a dynamic of its own which could not be "annulled or suppressed by the will of the tops and by use of traditional organizational instruments" (Livio Maitan, op. cit., p. 89): it is sufficient to think of the appeals to moderation, made repeatedly by Chou En-Lai, against "excesses" which frequently threatened to affect the bureaucracy.

From this it follows that we must ask ourselves the question: if the Liu Shao-Chi tendency genuinely expressed, as Comrade Nishi states, "concessions to the masses," how then does it happen that no significant faction of partisans of Liu Shao-Chi ever made its appearance among the youth in motion? It is known that there were, among others, semi-Trotskyist tendencies: for example the group called Scheng-Wu-Lien (abbreviation for the name "Committee of the Great Proletarian Revolutionary Alliance of Hunan Province"), denounced as Trotskyist by Kang Cheng himself, or those such as the student Tan Li-Fu (9).

It is known that there were anarchist, spontaneist tendencies, such as the so-called "May 16" group which was attributed the attack of August 22, 1962 on the British embassy (the attack was accused of being inspired by Tao Chou, Wang Li and Kuan Feng) (10).

How does it happen, then that there was no Liu Shao-Chi tendency? It is not

true that Liu and his tendency no longer had the possibility of addressing themselves to the masses after the August 1966 plenum: in fact, certain of his principal partisans retained control of entire cities, if not provinces, up until the end of the movement of formation of triple alliance committees (September 1968). As for Liu and Teng themselves, the 11th and 26th of November 1966, at the time of the last gatherings of the Red Guards, they had again appeared at the tribune of Tien An Men.

How does it happen, then, that not one political appeal from a single of these partisans of Liu is known, addressed to the masses, and containing a political platform? Perhaps, quite simply, because these bureaucrats were afraid to mobilize the masses, fearful as they were in ever case of losing their positions? This is, in any case, a hypothesis on which Comrade Nishi ought to have reflected.

IV. THE TOTAL BALANCE SHEET

The estimation which Comrade Nishi makes of the balance sheet and the effects of the "Cultural Revolution" is false and it is here that the difference between his position and that of the majority of the United Secretariat which was approved at the World Congress can be seen the most clearly. Comrade Nishi says that the essence of the Cultural Revolution was the reinforcement (the firm establishment) of the bureaucratic dictatorship by the crushing of all attempts to create an independent mass movement. We, on the other hand, say that the essential result of the Cultural Revolution was to weaken the bureaucracy and to permit much more independent activity of the masses than before. Of course, from the time that the movement went beyond the objectives fixed by the Mao-Lin Piao group, from the time that the masses mobilized following their own dynamic, with their own objectives, they introduced an explosive element for the bureaucratic system and the leading group opposed it by various means. But it is no less true, for all this, that the independent activities of the masses were, during the cultural revolution, much more significant than they had ever been since the fall of the Chiang Kai-Shek regime, including during the so-called "Hundred Flowers" period in 1956-57. This is extremely clear.

It is sufficient to ask oneself where, therefore, were "independent mass movements" during the period extending from 1961 to 1966, the period when Liu Shao-Chi and Teng Hsiao-Ping had control of the party and the government apparatus. They were quite simply nonexistent, while after 1966 there were mass mobilizations and mass organizations of a size never attained and encompassing not only an

autonomous activity of youth, but also a large number of strikes, and demonstrations of industrial workers. The root of the error made by Comrade Nishi is to confuse the cautious and moderate criticisms of some Peking intellectuals, formulated between 1962 and 1965 (the so-called "Village of the Three") in the narrow framework of internal discussion within the bureaucracy, with an "independent mass action."

V. THE QUESTION OF THE UNITED FRONT

In his document criticizing the draft resolution of the majority of the United Secretariat, Comrade Nishi writes: "As was pointed out much earlier by Comrade Yamashita Peking's rejection of a united front against imperialism, for which the Mao faction itself was responsible, had its historical precedent in Stalin-Thälmann's ultimatic policy in the struggle against Hitler in Germany in the '30s. On the basis of no more than this we must excoriate the Mao-Lin faction." (Nishi, p. 7) We are not familiar with the text of Comrade Yamashita to which Comrade Nishi refers here, but the comparison made by Comrade Nishi between the necessity for a united front against Hitler and rising fascism and that of a united front against American imperialism in Indochina is erroneous because it is purely formal. Obviously, in both cases it is a matter of a refusal to adopt a correct policy: the tactic of the united front. But it is necessary to not cling to formal analogy, and to correctly evaluate the general historical context of this refusal. In the case of Germany the united front was a possible and indispensable thing in order to avert the rise of fascism: it was possible, because the bureaucracy of the German Social Democratic Party had a real and immediate interest in preventing the rise of Hitler to Power (the latter not being able to triumph without physically destroying the social democracy). It is precisely this aspect of the situation which made the policy of Thälmann and the Comintern so criminal. In the case of a united front to aid the Vietnamese revolution, the situation is different. In fact, the Soviet bureaucracy, itself, is not in mortal danger of being destroyed by the imperialist aggression in Vietnam. The American aggression in Vietnam has for its objective stopping the rise of the colonial revolution, and the Soviet bureaucracy has no more interest in a triumph of the colonial revolution than it has an interest in a victorious socialist revolution in Western Europe or Japan (of course, this cuts across the interests of the workers' states and can definitively turn back against, among others, the Kremlin bureaucracy, but that is another question). The result of this is that the attitude of the Soviet bureaucracy in face of the Vietnam war is ambiguous: it does not wish for the American imperialists to win the war, but it also does not desire the Vietnamese people to win. The result is that the situation of the Chinese in relation to the Kremlin is different from the situation

of the KPD in relation to the SPD from the point of view of the possibility (of the possibility, not of the necessity) of the united front: whatever the Chinese leadership does, a genuine united front is an impossible thing, given that this would signify the extension of the revolution to other countries and the rupture of the status quo, all of which the Kremlin is 100% opposed to. Our criticism of the Maoists should therefore be different from the criticism which Trotsky made of the "Third Period" errors of the Communist International under Stalin. Our criticism should indicate that, by their ultraleft and sectarian phraseology, the Maoists facilitate the crimes of the Kremlin against the Vietnamese revolution. Definitively, but in an indirect way, this phraseology which refuses to put the Kremlin on the spot, renders service to the Kremlin, makes more difficult the political revolution which itself will permit a genuine united front. But in no case can we say that, by their refusal of a united front, the Chinese have made this impossible or have made it fail. Once again: pushing historical analogies too far is to be distrusted.

In the chapter of his document devoted to the foreign policy of China, Comrade Nishi makes another hasty historical analogy, in the case of Indonesia this time. After indicating that there are few reasons for placing the responsibility for the support given by the CCP to the opportunist policy of D.N. Aidit exclusively on one of the factions involved, Comrade Nishi profits from the occasion in order to advance a "personal opinion" on the situation in Indonesia. By "personal opinion," Comrade Nishi by all indications means: a hypothesis of which he is less sure than he is of other questions raised in his document. He then advances the opinion that the self-criticism of the Indonesian CP after the defeat of 1965 does not represent a passing over to revolutionary positions, but "closely resembles the Stalinist line of ultraleftist insurrection following the defeat of the second Chinese revolution." (Nishi, p. 8) In other words, after causing the PKI to follow a policy similar to that which brought the CCP to a bloody defeat in 1927, the Maoists could only follow exactly the same policy as Stalin and fall into an ultraleft policy. We have here an example of the use of the method of historical analogy in order to draw conclusions without even being concerned about the verification of the conformity of the theory to reality. Marxism uses an entirely different method and it is necessary to recall it: our theory is not a law fixed in advance in order to regulate reality, but an anticipation of the development that reality follows. It results from this that we should not look for the conformity of events with theory, but to the contrary, it is necessary to verify theory in relation to the developments of this reality. This seems

elementary to us.

Our position on the self-criticism of the PKI is different: we have said that there was a self-criticism and rejection of the reformist theories of Aidit concerning the nature of the Indonesian state, (theory of the two aspects of the state, etc...) and that this signified a step to the left. We have said moreover that this self-criticism was made in recognition of the necessity for a military struggle under the leadership of the proletariat to establish a new state, but that it nevertheless presented insufficiencies, to the extent that it was not any clearer than Aidit on the nature of the new state to be established (11). To affirm that this partially corrected theory corresponds to a totally ultraleft practice represents an appreciation which can only be made on the basis of a concrete analysis of the situation and of the struggle in Indonesia. We refuse to draw this conclusion on the basis of simple analogies, without verifying the facts.

VI. OUR INTERVENTION

The essential aim of our analyses is to permit a correct and effective intervention. In other words, this intervention is only possible if our perspective is correct. What is Comrade Nishi's perspective? His perspective is that the new vanguard being formed in China (that is, the perspective of the reconstruction of a Chinese section of the Fourth International on the continent) will come out of the struggles against the purging of the "opposition" (that is, Liu Shao-Chi, Teng Hsiao-Ping and company). We are not in agreement with this perspective, for we are of the opinion that the new revolutionary vanguard in China will come from the extreme left of the "Red Guards," where the criticism of the cult of Mao and of Maoism has made great progress, and where the foundations of the bureaucratic system are submitted to criticism: it is sufficient to think of the fate of Nieh Yuan-Steu, assistant in philosophy at the University of Peking and co-author of the first *dajibao* May 25, 1966, and severely injured March 28, 1968 in the disturbances at the University when she organized a campaign against the Minister of Security, Sie Fou-Che (12). It is among these elements of the extreme left of the Red Guards -- in particular those who opposed the "dosages" of the "Triple Alliance" -- that our future resides, as well as among the radicalized workers who participated in the strike movements and in various mass struggles, in 1967 and 1968. These two different forces, which ought to be joined, have nothing, neither far nor near, to do with the bureaucrats removed from power. These tendencies defend (and have defended in practice) workers' democracy, which implies of course, the right of Liu Shao-Chi to defend him-

self, but which also implies the possibility of accusing him, him and the other members of the bureaucracy, for all the violations of workers' democracy which he committed when he controlled the party and the state apparatus. This defense of the democratic right of expression does not, however, signify either a bloc or a united front, nor even a "critical support" for a tendency of the bureaucracy which was the victim of the bureaucratic centralism after having used the mechanisms of this same bureaucratic centralism against other victims in other periods. It should not be forgotten that principled defense of workers' democracy is only one of the demands, among others, of the platform of political revolution and a return to Leninism in China, alongside the struggle against bureaucratic privileges, and the struggle for a real workers' and poor peasants' power, alongside the struggle for the development of the world revolution, for a line of socialist industrialization in China, etc., etc., all points being equally important.

VII. THE "RAISON D'ETRE" OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Comrade Nishi writes that the question of the "Cultural Revolution" is of vital importance for our existence as an independent current in the world workers' movement, and that, in face of the Maoist currents, the Fourth International risks losing its "raison d'être" if it remains deprived of clear positions with regard to the "Cultural Revolution." In our opinion, the "reason for being" of the Fourth International is not at all based on a denunciation of Maoism or of the "Cultural Revolution," but it is founded on the ability to convince the new revolutionary vanguard of the imperialist countries, of the colonial or semi-colonial countries, and of the workers' states of the correctness of our analysis, our program and our strategy, in order to advance the world revolution in each of its three sectors, starting from the necessity for our organization in order to realize this strategy and this program; this can only be done by means of our activity. If we do not succeed in this, Maoism and the various ultraleftist or other "deviations" will be strengthened, whatever the vigor of our denunciations. If, on the other hand, we succeed, Maoism will soon be nothing more than a small minority in the vanguard, a minority against which, of course, we must polemicize, but we consider this polemic necessary as a secondary and not a principal task, in the present period.

May-June, 1970

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Footnotes:

(1) Kyoji Nishi, "A Criticism of the United Secretariat Majority Draft Resolution on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" International Information Bulletin No. 1, March 1970.

(2) Draft Resolution on the "Cultural Revolution" (presented by the majority of the United Secretariat), Internal Bulletin preparatory to the Ninth World Congress, Fourth International, United Secretariat, No. 11, March 1969. [International Information Bulletin No. 4, June 1970]

(3) Resolution of the Ninth World Congress on the "Cultural Revolution," in Quatrième Internationale, 27th year, May 1969, p. 67 and following; and the report to the Congress by Livio Maitan, Quatrième Internationale, same issue, p. 77 and following.

(4) On the whole, the positions of Peng and Nishi coincide with the exception of one question -- the support for Liu Shao-Chi. For the positions of Comrade Peng see the following texts: "Open Letter to the Members of the CCP" (World Outlook, March 24, 1967; Internal Bulletin Volume 1967, No. 6, July 1967); "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle Inside the CCP" (Internal Bulletin, Volume 1968, No. 1); "Letter of Comrade Peng Shu-Chi to the International Executive Committee" (Internal Bulletin Volume 1968, No. 1); "The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse-Tung and Liu Shao-Chi" (Internal Bulletin Volume 1968 No. 8); "Minority Report to the World Congress" (International Information Bulletin No. 10, July 1969). It is necessary to note that Comrade Nishi himself considers the above-mentioned difference to be of a "secondary" importance.

(5) See "A Criticism of the Various Views Supporting the Chinese Rural People's Communes -- What Our Attitude Should Be," by Peng, (SWP Discussion Bulletin Volume 21 No. 1, January 1960) which defined the communes as "the most apt instrument of the CCP for exploiting the overwork of the peasants" (p. 25). The opposition to the people's communes seems to be for Comrade Peng, one of the major reasons for his support to Liu Shao-Chi (See "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle Inside the CCP" [Internal Bulletin Volume 1968, No. 11, p. 17]).

(6) Comrade Nishi does not mention them. Comrade Peng, in his report to the World Congress, considers them as banalities and abstractions (p. 9).

(7) Wang Ming: "China -- Cultural Revolution or Counterrevolution," Novosti Editions, Moscow, 1969, p. 3. Note: Wang Ming led the CCP, beginning in 1931, on the ultra-

leftist line inspired by the Kremlin until the Tsouni conference (1955) which placed Mao at the head of the Party: Wang Ming was still formally a member of the Central Committee elected at the Eighth Congress of the CCP (1956). He represents the pro-Soviet tendency and can be qualified with certainty -- as distinguished from Peng Teh Huai -- as such.

(8) See on this subject the summaries given in works as varied as those of Livio Maitan, "Partito, esercito e masse nella crisi cinese," Rome, 1969; of Jean Esmein, "La Révolution Culturelle," Paris,

1970; and of Jean Daubier, "Histoire de la Révolution Culturelle prolétarienne en Chine," Paris, 1970.

(9) See J. Esmein, P. 118; L. Maitan, p. 190.

(10) See L. Maitan, pp. 190-191; J. Daubier, p. 220.

(11) Resolution of the Political Bureau of the PKI of August 1966, published in Tirana, then in Peking.

(12) J. Daubier, p. 242.

WHOM SHOULD WE SUPPORT IN THE PRESENT CHINESE REVOLUTION?

— Another Discussion —

by Hajime Osada

I believe that it is still worthwhile to offer another discussion paper on the Chinese Cultural Revolution at this late date more than a year after the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International.

At first sight, it seems that our worldwide discussion on the Chinese Cultural Revolution is divided into two main tendencies called provisionally "the majority" versus "the minority." For the world congress adopted the draft resolution proposed by the majority of the United Secretariat with a few modifications. Tracing back further, as you know well, the adopted draft is in fact not an original document but the product of amendments, which were several and significant, of the original draft presented by the minority of the United Secretariat.¹ Thus the original draft and the major draft resolution adopted are called respectively the minority draft and the majority one.

Comrade Joseph Hansen wrote a paper criticizing the majority draft in favor of the minority one.² Later he offered another report paper in which he surveys the internal debate in the world Trotskyist movement since the 1950s, focusing particularly on the nature of the regime controlled by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and also on the Third Chinese Revolution.³ We may include Comrade Hansen's opinion in the minority view on the Cultural Revolution.

We know of other discussions by Comrade Peng Shu-tse and Comrade Kyoji Nishi opposing the majority draft.⁴ In the beginning of the debate it seemed to me that they were on the side of the minority. But the development of the debate on China showed that they disagree with the position of the minority on some significant issues, although there can still be seen common views between them in many respects. So, I think we had better deal with Comrades Peng and Nishi as a third position on China, and accordingly we can divide our worldwide discussion into three main tendencies, not two. Comrade Peng also made a classification into three tendencies concerning the question of whom we should support,⁵ which problem will be later referred to as the central one of the Cultural Revolution.

From the side of the majority, as far as I know, we are given five papers and one book contributed by Comrades Livio Maitan and Ernest Germain and, with some reservations, Fernand Charlier,⁶ as well as the majority draft.

I. Social Origins of the Cultural Revolution

The following analysis might appear self-contradictory, as though here it supports the majority view and there the other, but the very situation in the degenerated Chinese workers state has developed with a kind of dynamic dialectics. The collapse of the Chinese economy after the Great Leap Forward policy in 1958 gave rise to the first genuine internal split of the ruling machines of the party and governmental bureaucracy in the internal and

external (Sino-Soviet) conflicts. Since then, coupled with the Kremlin's criminal peaceful coexistence policy, those splits had increased in bitterness and sharpness and at last burst out. This was the background of the Cultural Revolution.

I think the objective method of the majority, by which it emphasizes the economic and foreign environments around the CCP leadership, loses its balance and becomes excessive when it comes to explaining the origins of the Cultural Revolution. The first notable feature of the majority document and Comrade Maitan's report to the last world congress seems to be that they look for the sources of the Chinese economic crisis of the early 1960s (which was the fundamental cause of the Cultural Revolution) in the six contradictions between the underdeveloped level of productive forces and the level of wants of the Chinese people.⁷ These contradictions are mainly physical and technological. Though important, they are too general because they prevail not only in all workers states but also in all underdeveloped countries. The majority group seems to me to underestimate the fact that the economic crisis was drastically aggravated by Mao's wrong and adventurous Great Leap Forward policy in 1958, on which in 1960 Comrade Peng made an analysis and criticism with almost complete correctness.⁸

The following argument of the majority document reads:

Some of the exploding social contradictions accumulated in China during the last decade would have manifested themselves, whatever would have been the inner and outer conditions of the country and the nature of the leadership.⁹

Clearly, here we can notice not only something of the super-objectivist view which sees only physical conditions, but also even somewhat of a defence of Mao's bureaucratic leadership. Together with Comrade Hansen, I cannot help asking if anybody, including Lenin and Trotsky, would have adopted the same adventurous policy as Mao's in the face of the same crisis as the Chinese economic one. Comrade Hansen adds five other contradictions between the bureaucracy and the working people, contrasting them with the majority's emphasis on physical contradictions.¹⁰ Comrades Peng and Nishi also criticize correctly the objectivist aspect of the majority's standpoint.

Another feature of the majority view, including Comrade Maitan's report, is that they attribute Mao's adventurous domestic and foreign policies mostly to outside pressures. For example, when they say:

The reversal of the Maoist leadership to a policy of "self-reliance" and large-scale economic autarky and self-sufficiency is only a rationalization of the consequences of the Kremlin's blockade and the tremendous burden imposed on China by the need to develop its own nuclear weapons, given the refusal of the Soviet bureaucracy to assist it in this field.¹¹

they are overstating their case. Of course, I do not intend to reject the right of the Chinese government to make its own policy and develop its own nuclear weapons. But if the preceding statement should be correct, Trotsky would have been mistaken in criticizing Stalin's "socialism in one country," his autarkic super-industrialization and his forced collectivization in agriculture in the late 1920s and after. Mao's autarkic policy is of course related to his foreign policy, on which the majority view may be called an embellishment of Mao, according to Charlier.¹² We shall refer to this again later.

After the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, for which Mao was blamed, though not explicitly, and forced to withdraw from the first leadership, Liu Shao-chi reorganized the People's Communes by lowering the basic accounting unit to the level of the production brigade (old advanced production cooperatives), and by allowing individual farms and free sale of farmers' crops. Ironically, it was this adjustment policy that later produced a newly sharpened antagonism among two main classes—on the one hand, the higher staffs of management in plants, firms and governmental administration and the rich peasant stratum enjoying something of a NEP policy opened by Liu, and on the other hand, urban youths and masses and depressed peasants who could not find jobs after graduation or after their exodus from poor rural villages. As Comrade Charlier indicates very correctly, the latter lower classes comprehend a profound hatred against the bureaucracy represented at that time by Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping and P'eng Chen. I believe that nothing other than this hatred prepared the underlying conditions that led to the Cultural Revolution. And Mao exploited it cleverly in order to mobilize the unsatisfied masses against his rivals in the leadership.

In spite of its correct acknowledgment of the above-mentioned social antagonisms, the majority view has another weakness in addition to its underestimation of Mao's responsibility for stirring up those antagonisms. If I may dare to say so, it, perhaps unconsciously, falls into the trap of identifying the class interest of the lower classes with Mao's own ambitions on the eve of the Cultural Revolution. Mao's intention was the Stalinist policy of cutting off parts of his own bureaucracy in order to divert the hatred and attacks of the lower masses from himself.

Originally it was Mao who prudently prepared this false identification and presented it to the Chinese and the world. Furthermore, the scale of mass mobilization by which Mao practiced his cutting policy during the Cultural Revolution transcended that in all purges carried out by other Stalinists including Stalin himself. He who had been forced to take a step backward during the early 1960s succeeded in altering the structure of power in China and in seizing back the dominant leadership role by destroying the CCP apparatus, especially on the provincial level, the National Federation of Chinese Workers' Unions and some important parts of governmental organizations. At last, after the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, he is now establishing the new Party which leaves exclusive control to himself. He has already expelled the rebelling youth from legal political activity by force of the PLA.

The radical appearance of Mao's measures comes partly

from the fact that he had been in the minority of the CCP since 1959. Our majority speaks ambiguously about this fact. But in the last analysis, in Mao's plans the Cultural Revolution was an indispensable measure to prepare the Chinese youths and working people for the complete achievement of adventurous economic policies such as the dispersion over the countryside of urban industrial plants, working people and graduated youths, and the adoption of the half-worker, half-peasant system, the half-working, half-studying school system, the half-peasant, half-doctor system, and so on. These policies had been adopted only partially under Liu Shao-chi's leadership, though Liu and other cadres showed some resistance against Mao's pressure for them. They are in appearance very radical, and in part they are valuable. But Mao's faction tells us they can solve at a stroke the confrontation between the city and the countryside. Apart from this Maoist gospel, these policies are in fact an unqualified challenge to the urban masses, in view of the enormous disguised unemployment in rural areas. Though they can be said to reflect the extreme economic crisis, they are much more forced, regressive and ruthless measures than the wasteful exploitation of human labor in the gigantic irrigation works and the building of backyard blast-furnaces in villages during the Great Leap Forward. So it is not too much to say that they are unprecedented experimental answers which may even be called "extermination of the working class" as contrasted with Stalin's famous old "extermination of rich peasants" policy in the late 1920s for the problem of imbalance between city and country.

In the first place, these policies are Mao's unique answer to the enormous pressure from surplus population and from underemployment of the huge number of graduates from colleges and high schools due to the mass education which itself is a progressive accomplishment of the new China. Secondly, by means of the above policies Mao's government tries to release itself from the burdensome duty of supplying food for its urban people. Thirdly, by the adoption of the half-peasant, half-workers system it attempts to exempt itself from the obligation of paying a large sum of retirement pensions and other benefits which were to be received by millions of those workers, officials and soldiers who leave their services. And last, it contemplates compensating for the deficiency of capital by curtailing the people's consumption. If Mao's plan to ruralize the whole land of China should be realized completely, contrary to Mao's promise of communism, China would regress back into a purely agricultural country, the type of country which is most apt to be affected by the free market and is the most dangerous hotbed of capitalism.

Thus, Mao's "communism" on which his economic policies are based means the leaping over and arbitrary destruction of the division of labor by administrative measures and the forced downward equalization of various social strata and sectors. It means anti-urbanization, anti-industrialism, and anti-intellectualism. Though of course we aim at the eventual wearing away of the division of labor, the arbitrary rejection of it without consideration of the underdeveloped level of the productive forces in present-day China (that is, pure, national Maoism apart from the "Maoism" seen in the advanced countries) stands for the extreme pole of Stalinist "socialism in one

country" and in direct opposition to Trotskyism.

Therefore, we should never identify the class interest of the Chinese masses with Mao's social aims.¹³ Much less should we consider sufficient the majority's judgment that "the 'cultural revolution' consists objectively of an attempt by the Mao faction to divert the social forces pushing in that direction [that is, a genuine political revolution—H. Osada] from an overthrow of the bureaucracy into a reform of the bureaucracy." (Emphasis added.) Far from "a reform of bureaucracy," the Mao faction intends to further deepen bureaucratic control over China.

Meanwhile, the minority and the third viewpoint adopted by Comrades Peng and Nishi, especially the latter, miss the new serious contradictions that arose towards 1965 after the adoption of the "Economic Adjustment" policy by the Liu leadership, because they are still preoccupied with emphasizing the dissatisfaction of the Chinese masses around 1960 with the adverse consequences of the Great Leap advocated by Mao. In particular, Comrade Peng's support for Liu Shao-chi stems from his, though conditional, support for Liu's adjustment policy, which in the beginning had been a necessary retreat but which later lost its efficacy. Such a dialectic process had already been experienced in the 1920s during the Soviet NEP. Comrade Peng fails to appreciate these dialectics when he continues his support of Liu in the middle of the 1960s.

According to Comrade Hansen, the majority document and the minority one "both agree that the 'Cultural Revolution' represented an intrabureaucratic struggle."¹⁴ I cannot agree, however. An intrabureaucratic struggle is a struggle by proxy, a substitute for the class struggle. We must analyze how the latter is reflected by the former. The former often constitutes the first phase of class conflicts in the workers states under Stalinist Bonapartism. But the process of the class struggle marching forward breaks through this phase and sooner or later leads to a genuine political revolution or counterrevolution. In early 1967 the Cultural Revolution also clearly passed over the limitations of an inner struggle between agents substituting for conflicting classes and exploded into the stage of a genuine but abortive political revolution from below. Therefore, we should locate more clearly the true heroes of the grand tragic opera of the Cultural Revolution in the various anti-Mao Red Guards and Rebel Groups.

By the way, Mao and Lin falsely describe the Cultural Revolution as a class struggle in which the revolutionary proletarian masses recaptured power from "a handful of bourgeois persons in power" and call themselves the representatives of the masses of people. Their identification of the class struggle with the inner struggle in the bureaucratic leadership and of the class interest of the rebelling youths with their own aims is naturally completely false. Nevertheless, the class struggle version has a much stronger attractiveness to youth than the intrabureaucratic struggle version.¹⁵ From here has stemmed, I believe, the inclination towards Mao among youth in China and in the world. We should not ignore this factor in estimating the influence of Maoism in the world youth movement.

In the first stage, from November 1965 to the end of 1966, the Cultural Revolution proceeded on the course planned by Mao. Beginning with the Mao faction's ac-

cusations against writers and historians such as Wu Han, Teng T'o, Liao Mo-sha, T'ien Han and Chien Po-tsan in June 1966, it took over the Peking City Party Committee and the Jen-min Jih-pao, Peking Broadcasting Bureau and New China News Agency by force, all of which had been ruled by the CCP majority under Liu Shao-chi and P'eng Chen. Then were purged those such as P'eng Chen, mayor of Peking City, Lu T'ing-i and Chou Yang, director and vice-director of the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee, and Lu P'ing, president of Peking University. From June to the Eleventh CCP Central Committee Plenum, after the Mao-Lin faction overcame the resistance by the Liu faction who sent work teams, they recaptured the leadership in the party center. With the first one-million mass meeting of Red Guards in August, the period until the end of 1966 was characterized by radical struggles of Red Guards composed of young students deliberately mobilized by the Mao-Lin faction all over the country, and especially in Peking where they were invited and urged to rebel against rival party cadres such as Liu and T'eng. The struggle by those Red Guards was limited to the so-called superstructure such as streets or squares.

However, as soon as Jen-min Jih-pao called for expansion of the Cultural Revolution into the "sub-structure," for example farms and industrial plants, the control held by Mao faded out. The various kinds of urban youths and workers organized themselves voluntarily into Rebel Groups and attacked the party and government apparatuses on the local level in order to satisfy their own various class interests such as a guaranteed income and other welfare, the solution of temporary employment, work by contract and apprenticeship with sharply differential wages, and the return to the city from the countryside and reinstatement in jobs in the cities, demands which had all been repressed before. They paralysed the apparatuses successfully. Clearly in this second stage there took place explosions of political revolution, though abortive, local and spontaneous, such as the so-called "Shanghai Commune" and other "Communes" in other provinces. But all the "Communes" ended in failure because of repeated internal battles among various Rebel Groups and Red Guards' organizations and because of the sudden shift in the attitude of the Mao faction to the policy of suppression of these "Communes" by means of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). In their place, the Mao faction recommended building "Revolutionary Committees" as local authorities with a "triple alliance" among old party cadres, leaders of the PLA and representatives of the various Rebel and Red Guard groups that were fighting each other.

After the Wuhan incident in August 1967, the Mao faction completely shifted its own position to the side of the PLA, which put down the rebelling youths in favor of "security and order," helping the return to power of the expelled old cadres and managing by itself even production activities in industrial plants and village farms. Mao could not help purging secretly even Wang Li, Kuan Feng, Lin Chieh, Mu Hsin and Ch'i Pen-yu—prominent leaders in the Central Cultural Revolution Groups of the CCP which had been the *de facto* final leadership before. Thus, for a long time until spring 1969, the Mao-Lin faction succeeded in gradually organizing new power organs of Revolutionary Committees in all the provinces, special cities under the direct control of the central gov-

ernment, and autonomous districts. It not only crushed the network of the old bureaucracy connected with Liu and T'eng but also smashed the resistance of anti-Mao young radicals and declared them illegitimate. After that, it opened the Ninth Congress of the CCP in April 1969.

I do not think that the so-called agreement between the majority and minority documents can be treated as simply as Comrade Hansen does. For both documents, in fact, are united not only in considering the Cultural Revolution as an intrabureaucratic struggle but also in perceiving the role of the rebel youth movement as the third character in the grand opera of the Cultural Revolution. Both say, on the one hand,

The "cultural revolution" represented a phase of sharp public conflict in an interbureaucratic struggle between divergent tendencies in the topmost circles of the Chinese Communist party leadership.¹⁶

And, on the other hand they correctly admit that

The factional warfare which burst forth in the upper echelons of the bureaucracy passed beyond the confines of the ruling circles in the middle of 1966 after the showdown in the eleventh Central Committee plenum of early August. . . . It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to view the Red Guard movement as merely a pliant instrument of factional politics in the domestic strife that featured the "cultural revolution." . . . The Red Guard movement acquired a logic of its own.¹⁷

If I am to choose among the debaters on the nature of the Cultural Revolution I would like to agree with the two documents rather than with Comrade Hansen, because he sees only one aspect of the Cultural Revolution. It goes without saying that neither Comrade Peng nor Comrade Nishi finds any significance other than the divergent groups in the bureaucratic leadership; they consider the Red Guards mere puppets of the Mao faction.

Nevertheless, I cannot help insisting that even the two documents are somewhat inconsistent and incomplete, as they both contain a dualistic logic seen in their statements quoted above. However important they consider the various Red Guards and Rebel Groups, they do not seem to go beyond regarding these movements as objects of mobilization by the Mao faction. At most they (especially the majority document) notice that the balance of power shifted between the bureaucratic government and the Chinese masses in favor of the latter in the process of the Cultural Revolution. In the last analysis, both the majority and the minority documents overestimate the degree of dependence of the Chinese young radicals on the Mao faction, though Comrades Peng and Nishi overestimate it even more. Here we might detect a faint shade of Maoist illusion which identifies the Mao faction with the radical people. All these viewpoints are more or less insufficient for a clear and correct perception of the explosive antagonism which lies between any faction of the bureaucracy and the workers and young people, and for a true explanation of the latter's determined, resolute positions at that time.

Comrade Hansen concludes with some pleasure that it has come to the point where "we differ on the degree of mobilization and perhaps the degree to which the bu-

reaucracy was weakened by the mobilization."¹⁸ I consider that the problem in our debate does not come from such a quantitative difference in our views on China but from a qualitative difference in appreciating or failing to appreciate the gulf among the different social strata in the Chinese workers state.

III. Whom Should We Support?

From the above shortcoming appears a mistaken identification of the rebelling masses with either faction in the bureaucracy. On the other hand, some of us make the mistake of separating the inner struggle among the bureaucrats from the social class struggle in China.

The minority document, and particularly Comrade Hansen, support neither Mao-Lin nor Liu Shao-chi. This position is the purest logical result of the "intrabureaucratic struggle" theory referred to in the above section. Though quite correct, it is too abstract, too negative to give any concrete transitional programme of the political revolution to the vast fighting masses in Mainland China.

Comrade Peng gives the most positive support to Liu Shao-chi. It is noteworthy that Comrades Hansen and Charlier criticize Comrade Peng's support of Liu only indirectly in their criticisms of Comrades Tormey and Nishi, respectively. While he has reservations about Comrade Peng's position as far as his support of Liu is concerned, Comrade Nishi supports an anonymous opposition among the CCP in general because of his disagreement with the policy of giving support to nobody. Yet he directs his heaviest fire against the Mao faction.

As Comrade Hansen correctly indicates, Liu Shao-chi did not represent the most radical trend. He did not even organize a faction with a declared programme in opposition to Mao.¹⁹ I cannot believe that it was only because of their semi-imprisonment that Liu and other top officials could not defend themselves nor offer their own thoughts directly in front of the masses, even with illegitimate media. I suppose that it is because they were also enslaved by and unable to resist the cult of Mao. They had already been put into a position of fundamental weakness by the fact that they had been forced to try to eliminate Mao's influence by the promotion of the cult of Mao. After all, even at this time, we cannot tell whether there is any possibility of political independence of so-called progressive and rationalist bureaucrats in the degenerated workers states.

Next, concerning the majority document, while it accepts the minority's affirmation that they support neither Mao nor Liu, it makes some amendments which Comrade Hansen criticizes. According to him, though it supports neither Mao nor Liu, it *de facto* implies offering critical support to Mao.²⁰ This point I shall examine later, particularly in regard to Mao's foreign policies.

As for me, I wish to maintain my previous supposition that there was an attempted political revolution in early 1967. Hence I make a claim to support those Rebel Groups and Red Guards who took part in the political revolution. They struggled against both the Mao-Lin leadership and the regional commanders of the PLA. Since then they have been driven into illegal underground activity, and they are now abandoning both their imaginary cult of Mao and their illusions about Chiang Ching, Madam Mao.

In relation to the point about political revolution, the state of our debate is rather poor. In amending the minority document, the majority one reads, "conditions for a genuine political revolution against the ruling bureaucracy matured."²¹ Even this statement is too insufficient to describe the situation in those days when the attempted political revolution had exploded, though it failed. Yet Comrade Hansen welcomes this amendment, interpreting it as a sign of the adoption of the "calling for a political revolution."²² What abstract and lukewarm words for a summons to revolution! In company with the minority document Comrade Hansen considers the rebel youth movement as follows:

. . . it was inspired and fostered by the government, and partly financed by the government . . . they were backed by the army . . . brought to a halt rather rapidly, and retired from the scene as if they were responsive to orders from above. That isn't a characteristic of a real rebel youth movement.²³

Comrade Nishi speaks more bitterly. He thinks it something analogous to the mobilizations by Hitler's fascists of the petty bourgeoisie or to mass mobilizations in the Indonesian counterrevolution of 1965.²⁴ It is in the first stage of the Cultural Revolution that there appeared such Red Guards as Comrades Hansen and Nishi describe. Certainly they were organized and guided by political officers from the PLA.

Nevertheless, as already mentioned, toward January 1967 a new kind of youth movement entered the scene. They were independent and revolutionary, though immature, in reacting to Mao's appeal for a rebellion and in defending themselves from the attacks of some of the Red Guards. Yet as soon as they destroyed the local units of political power, Rebel Groups and Red Guards began fighting each other in the process of seizure of local power in January or February of 1967. And furthermore, they were coerced by the local army units and sooner or later became hostile to Mao's leadership in spite of the illusive cult of Mao. It is certain that they lacked independent political consciousness and their own national leadership with a political programme. This was inevitable in view of the fact that they had been brought up in the fanatic cult of Mao. Thus, it could be said that without a politically consistent programme and independent leadership the political rebellions were destined to be defeated and that there could not occur another political revolution in China. But we should pay attention to the fact that a political revolution started on the above-mentioned path. We must admit that there was no vanguard of this political revolution other than those young rebels.

We know of the existence of various revolutionary vanguards such as the "May Seventeenth Military Group" which said, "Down with Chou En-lai, anti-revolutionist!" and the Sheng Wu Lien (Great Proletarian Revolutionary Federation in Hunan province) which stood for the striking down of the new Revolutionary Committees which were the results of compromises, and was declared illegal by the Mao leadership. We should support them. And we should strive to help them proceed toward the formation of the true political party by achieving national unity among various rebel youth groups fighting today against the Chinese bureaucracy.

By the way, Comrade Nishi thinks, with Comrade Peng, that the new vanguard will come out of the struggle against the purge of the "opposition" in general.²⁵ The tone of this prognosis seems rather weak because it is unable to perceive the severe and complicated developments of the Chinese youths' consciousness. I approve of Comrade Charlier's expectation that the new revolutionary vanguard in China will come from the extreme left of the Red Guards.²⁶

IV. After the Cultural Revolution

One of the important issues in our debate is the question of how we should evaluate the present China since the CCP Ninth Congress (April 1969), which we can consider as marking the end of the Cultural Revolution. According to the minority view, Mao had scored such a crushing victory that he decided to hold the party congress to ratify it.²⁷ The minority document reads:

The "cultural revolution" has ended in . . . the fortification of the positions of one faction of the bureaucracy against its rivals rather than the expansion and deepening of decision-making powers by the masses.²⁸

Given the present situation in China, I think that the minority document goes overboard here. I fear that its view is a somewhat superficial and defeatist one that fails to understand the fundamental and constitutional weaknesses in the "triple alliance," the present form of political power in China. The majority document, on the other hand, correctly writes that this is a "compromise between the Maoist faction and parts of the old majority [Liu Shao-chi] faction."²⁹ Nevertheless, Comrade Charlier goes overboard off the other side when he states that the essential result of the Cultural Revolution was to weaken the bureaucracy and to permit much more independent activity of the masses than before.³⁰

Today, on the surface, the restoration of order is going on. New party committees are reported being formed on the provincial level. Rumor has it that the new National Peoples Congress will be held soon. The Chinese National Federation of Workers Unions was reported to be restored.

In the new Party Constitution, whose draft was decided by the twelfth plenum of the Eighth CCP Central Committee of October 1968 and which was adopted at the Ninth Party Congress in April 1969, party democracy was decreased and centralization of decision-making power was furthered. It watered down the new party membership by providing for broad recommendation by leaders in the place of election. It strengthened the power of the Party chairman and vice-chairman and the Political Bureau at the cost of that of the Central Committee and of the CC secretary. The new Constitution of the Peoples Republic of China, whose draft was adopted at the second plenum of the Ninth CCP Central Committee, also will deprive the Chinese working people of any kind of democracy, even that which had been assured before the Cultural Revolution. In it the systematization of the personality cult reaches a peak by declaring Mao Tse-tung the supreme sovereign of the Chinese state and designating Lin Piao as his successor. The National Peoples Congress, which will still be called the highest decision-making organ, will lose important parts of its former authority

because it will be placed under the control of the CCP and lose even its legislative power. And the position of state chairman, which it was to elect, will be abolished according to the new Constitution.

But in spite of his seeming victory, Mao is more and more forced to rely on the PLA. So, the Central Cultural Revolution Group, which had already been weakened, has retired further from the scene. Even Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-juan have become less and less radical or less prominent. Before the Ninth CCP Congress was opened, all the provincial Revolutionary Committees had been completely dominated by the military regional commanders. And it was the military who convened and dominated the provincial party congresses of late 1968 in order to choose their representatives to the party congresses which were said to have been attended by party members functioning within the framework of the Revolutionary Committees. Army officers formed forty percent of the members of the CCP Central Committee and the candidate members newly elected at the party congress. Of the twenty-five members of the Political Bureau, that is, the top political power of China, twelve are top officers of the PLA.

Clearly the present China is still under the control of the PLA. Prior to the Cultural Revolution, the governmental ministries had been controlled by the CCP. After the Cultural Revolution, final control was transferred to the Military Control Committee, where it remains now. Even Mao's prestige is said to be gradually declining. Instead, Lin's top military officers and regional PLA commanders and Chou's top officials of the State Council advance together to the forefront of political leadership, standing for a return to production and order from the condition of rebellion.

Nevertheless, this does not at all mean that the Chinese leadership is stable. New cooperation among new and old party members and the military commanders had been accompanied by new antagonisms and frictions in the army-party relations on the provincial level and even in the central leadership in Peking. There have been conflicts between military leaders and the Revolutionary Committees of which they are sometimes members. For instance, large open fights took place in Shansi Province in June-July 1969. Owing to these conflicts, the central leadership cannot exercise dominant control over the provinces. Furthermore, we must take notice of a growing tendency towards regionalism among the local military leaders, which makes it more difficult for Peking to establish its control over the extensive provinces.

Thus, the removal of the major opponents—Liu Shao-chi and his fellows—was achieved in more than two years of turmoil only at the cost of creating a new, regionally based and militarily dominated power structure which proved increasingly difficult to manipulate.³¹

The present process of building provincial party committees that is reported should be considered as a reflection of the weakness of the Chinese bureaucracy rather than of its vigor. The reason why the establishment of provincial party committees comes so late might be the persistence of the above-mentioned antagonisms and tensions. Here we can also see signs of the weakened power of Mao's leadership over the Chinese working people.

It goes without saying that the CCP leadership has begun bitterly forcing the Chinese working people, especially the youth, under the pretext of preparation for a

possible war against the USA and USSR, to accept Mao's policies such as the half-worker, half-peasant system, and the self-sufficiency of each province by dispersion of industrial plants, and the "Hsia-Fang" or "sending down" of workers and youth including former Red Guards from the cities to the countryside, and the construction of very small-scale plants self-financed by each Peoples Commune. The number of youths who have been sent down is reported to be twenty million. I have heard from two French scholars who visited Hong Kong that many corpses of young boys and girls were drifting in Hong Kong Bay in late 1970—they were drowned in their flight trying to swim across the bay from the Kwantung coast. I suspect they were a part of those youths who were compelled to come back illegally to the cities from the country villages and frontier regions where they had been sent down in the Hsia Fang movement willingly or by force. They had often been treated as a nuisance in the Peoples Communes because of overpopulation, or else they had not been able to accommodate themselves to the insufficient diet and atlas-like burdensome labor over the sterile lands of the frontier.

Thus, today we can predict that there are ripening new possibilities of great political clashes between the Maoist leadership dominated by the coalition of Lin and Chou on the one hand and ultraleft radical youth movements which express the anger of the Chinese masses on the other hand.

V. On Mao's Radicalism in Foreign Policy

In our views of Mao's radical attitudes we differ among ourselves. Let me examine this problem particularly in relation to Mao's foreign policies.

One kind of amendments made by the majority to the minority document are omissions, complements, and corrections which soften the degree of severity of condemnation and criticism shown by the minority document. For example, the "Stalinist Chinese Communist Party" and the "crystallized bureaucratic caste" are respectively supplanted by the simple terms "Chinese Communist Party" and "bureaucracy." Such words as "narrow national interest" and "ultimatism" of the foreign policy followed by the Mao leadership are omitted. The words "more aggressive diplomatic policy" and "opportunism" are respectively changed into "more militant line" and "bureaucratic centrism."³² These changes made by the majority are terminological ones, consequently the arguments for and against them tend to lack concrete substance.

Conversely, the points on which both agree in their estimates of the nature of Mao's policies are many more than we might expect. Both find "oscillation between opportunism and ultra-leftism" and "collaboration with the colonial bourgeoisie" in Mao's foreign policies. The majority agrees that the Chinese have an "unwillingness or incapacity to promulgate a united front with Moscow" as the minority affirms.³³ Moreover, both agreed at the last world congress that Moscow bears the main responsibility and Peking the secondary responsibility for the Sino-Soviet border conflicts.

By the way, concerning the effects on real culture of Mao-Lin's Cultural Revolution, both estimations are now almost completely consonant. In other words, both find the problem in the "grotesque cult of Mao" and of Stalin.

Furthermore, at our world congress the following ideas of the minority were adopted: "the damage inflicted on cultural life" which the "conformism and regimentation of thought" and the closure of all Chinese universities and high schools produced; and a critique of the Stalinist version of "Proletarian Art."³⁴

Now, the remaining and more important divergences are very delicate. You see, the minority document focuses on the Stalinist core concealed under the radical policies and actions of the Maoist red apple. It says the Peking's basic foreign policy is peaceful coexistence with U.S. imperialism. But it underestimates the objective effects which Mao-Lin's radical line has on the world youth movement. It considers that the material aid to guerrilla forces in anticolonial struggles only helps "to create an image far to the left of Moscow."³⁵ Only an image?! This view tends to be a little too aloof and dogmatic.

The majority document takes note particularly of the objective fact that the Sino-Soviet dispute and the policy of the Chinese government led by Mao has deepened the world class struggle and accelerated the radicalization of youth movements on a worldwide scale, though it also criticizes the "socialism in one country" and "two-stage revolution" theories in the Mao-Lin line.

Thus, the disagreement between the two views on Chinese foreign policy comes from a difference in whether the accent should be placed on the intentions or on the actual effects of Maoist policy. Therefore, I believe that the debate among us on Mao's policies during the Cultural Revolution springs more from the diversity in our estimations of the present worldwide radicalization than from diversity in our understanding of the real intentions of the Chinese leadership. If my inference is correct, the harmonizing of our views of the Cultural Revolution is possible simultaneously with the solution of the debate which we are now carrying on about how to evaluate youth movements and what kind of organizational policies we should offer to the radicalizing youth in today's world.

Let me advance some further ideas, even though provisional, to aid our discussion of Maoist radicalism. My previous argument in Section I might seem to emphasize internal factors too much in explaining the Cultural Revolution, but this was not my intention. I would like to insist that Mao's behavior is determined not only by internal objective difficulties and foreign pressures as the majority tells, but also by Mao's own ideas which are, in turn, formed in his struggles against rival policy-makers and the Chinese masses. In trying to evaluate external factors, we must examine in particular the interaction between the Cultural Revolution and the Vietnam war. After all, it could be mainly the impact of the Vietnam war that has opened the way to radicalization of world youth and changed the world political structure in favor of world revolution.

Since the Cuban Revolution in 1960, the relative peace and stability of the world was broken above all in the underdeveloped, ex-colonial world. The neutral and conciliatory Bonapartist leaderships such as in India, Burma, Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Ghana, and the Congo were largely exhausted or replaced, though events did not uniformly develop to the advantage of revolution. The most intense struggles focused on Southeast Asia, especially South Vietnam where the fall of the puppet government,

taken together with China's new nuclear capability, was feared by Washington as the beginning of a possible chain reaction in the Indochina Peninsula and Far East.

U.S. bombing of North Vietnam and the Indonesian counterrevolution were clearly attempts to counterattack the newly rising world revolution, and to strengthen the military and political containment by Washington of the Chinese workers state, the existence of which, with its nuclear weapons, represents the most important base of the Asian revolution. It is clear that Washington's maneuvers caused the inner antagonisms in the Chinese leadership to explode into the open clashes of the Cultural Revolution. But it would be incorrect to view Mao's foreign policies as genuinely revolutionary and satisfactory help to North Liberation Front (NLF) of South Vietnam.

In February 1965 Premier Kosygin and military leaders of the Soviet Union, who experienced the beginning of the U.S. bombing in the midst of their visit to Hanoi, went to Peking to enter into negotiations with Mao and proposed united action to aid North Vietnam. Even though the Soviet bureaucrats were forced to make this proposal by the pressure of increasing struggles rather than by a reconsideration of their peaceful coexistence policy, the proposed Sino-Soviet joint action was absolutely necessary for the defense of North Vietnam and the victory of the NLF. In spite of this necessity, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai vetoed the proposal. Moreover, there is even some evidence that right before the bombing of North Vietnam they had indicated to Washington their hope of mitigating tensions with the U.S. and their intention to not send Chinese troops to Vietnam. On the other hand, Liu Shao-chi and P'eng Chen representing the majority of the CCP were carrying on a nationwide campaign preparing for a possible state of war and hoping for a tie-up between China and the U.S.S.R.

It is natural that this fundamental disagreement appeared most sharply in the form of antagonisms within the PLA. Lo Jui-ch'ing, one of the majority of the CCP, wrote an article commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory over fascist Germany in *Red Flag* in May 1965, in which he made a tacit denial of the Maoist theory of protracted war, favoring a positive offensive instead, and an implied proposal of restoring the alliance with the Soviet Union. But at last the Mao-Lin faction in the PLA seemed to gain supremacy over the Liu-Lo faction. This was indicated by Lin Piao's notorious article entitled "Long Live the Victory of People's War" in which he recommended applying the Maoist way of struggle, which is to encircle the cities by building struggle bases in the countryside, to the world revolution. Though the theory of "people's war" is not wrong in general, Lin Piao's object in writing this article was that he would avoid a Sino-American war in spite of his harsh attacks against the U.S.A. in principle. Mao and Lin's strategy was to struggle against two giant enemies—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.—with the stress on the anti-Soviet struggle, which was the opposite of the Liu-Lo strategy emphasizing the anti-American struggle through some kind of cooperation with the Soviet Union. This Mao-Lin strategy is based on the Shachtman-type theory that the Soviet Union and East European workers states are all state-capitalist or social-imperialist. Thus, Mao-Lin urged the North Korean government, the Japan Communist Party and other Communist parties in East-

ern Asia to rouse themselves to armed struggles as a substitute for any form of Chinese war with the U. S. A. in order to help North Vietnam and the NLF, even one as limited as the battle in the Formosa Straits where Peking did not increase the number of less than five hundred cannonballs per month shot at Quemoy Island. Of course this hypocritical request alienated those Communist parties from Peking.

It is difficult to estimate the opportunities that a Sino-American confrontation in those days would have brought to the world revolution. But it is obvious that, however much more radical than Soviet Stalinists the Mao-Lin faction might have seemed, they deepened the danger to the Vietnamese revolution by giving preference to their confrontation with the Soviet bureaucracy at the sacrifice of military and political defense of the Vietnamese struggle which should have had priority over all other diplomatic policies, as Comrade Yoshichi Sakai wrote in 1968.³⁶ They left the Vietnamese revolution isolated, and even advised the Vietnamese militants to be self-reliant (that is, to reject Soviet aid) and to reduce the scale of their struggle by withdrawing to base districts. Clearly these Chinese attitudes could be called sectarian.

Returning to our debate, Comrade Germain in criticizing Comrade Charlier, and in return Comrade Charlier in criticizing Comrade Nishi, both overlook the serious difficulties suffered by North Vietnam and the NLF in 1965 as a result of Mao's refusal of Sino-Soviet united action, though the Vietnamese bravely fought on in spite of these difficulties and largely overcame them. Whether Comrade Nishi is correct or not in making an analogy between Mao's refusal and Stalin-Thaelman ultimatism, I believe that the real intention of his analogy is to correctly emphasize the overwhelming necessity of united action. Comrade Charlier overlooks this point in his 1970 paper, and for this reason I prefer his other paper presented in 1969, according to which the majority underestimates the imperative necessity of united action and the harm done by the Mao faction's refusal of it. Back in June 1967, in calling for a united front of the Sino-Soviet and other workers states in Asia to aid the Vietnamese revolution, Japanese Trotskyists said that we should demand of the Soviet Union unconditional arms aid to North Vietnam, while we simultaneously opposed the peaceful coexistence policy followed by the Kremlin.³⁷ And of course, the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International has requested united action of the Sino-Soviet and other workers states on the Vietnamese war.³⁸

Nevertheless, the majority document, together with Comrades Germain (1969) and Charlier (1970), fails to emphasize Mao's counterrevolutionary refusal of united action, however revisionist the Kremlin or Liu Shao-chi might have been. While it puts emphasis on Mao's objective role rather than his real intentions, as far as the Sino-Soviet dispute is concerned, it stresses the revisionist nature of the Kremlin's intentions when it comes to the Soviet proposal of united action to aid Vietnam. This latter stress is very similar to the reasons the Mao leadership gave for its refusal. Particularly Comrade Germain's arguments in replying to Comrade Charlier sound to me as if he mistakes for satisfactory aid the quality and quantity of the separate aid which was offered by China and the Soviet Union at last in 1967, mainly under the

impulse of the rising Vietnamese revolution.

Anyhow, by shutting themselves up in domestic struggles with an antiforeign spirit and by weakening the Chinese military potential by many suspensions of traffic and inner military troubles, the Maoists harmed the Vietnamese revolution during the Cultural Revolution. And they lost their international influence not only in diplomatic relations with other governments but also in political relations with other more or less militant nationalist or socialist parties for about three years since 1966. Even Hanoi was disillusioned with the domestic struggles of the Chinese Cultural Revolution and viewed it very coolly. We can see the clearest example of the loss of Chinese influence in the fact that in the spring of 1968 Hanoi began peace talks in Paris with the U. S. A. in spite of the objections of Peking. (Of course, the peace talks of North Vietnam might be admitted to be one effective means made use of in carrying through the war and revolution, especially by giving them an independent voice on the international diplomatic and political stage.)

As it apparently secured its own control after the Cultural Revolution, the Mao leadership returned its foreign policy line to the *de facto* "San-Ho-I-Shao" line (which means making peace with "imperialists," with reactionaries, and with "modern revisionists" and reducing aid to other peoples in their revolts either to replace a government with another sympathetic to communism or to gain independence) followed under Liu Shao-chi's leadership before the Cultural Revolution. In the Second Plenum of the Ninth Central Committee of the CCP in August-September 1970, the policy of peaceful coexistence was adopted in accordance with the adoption for the first time of a resolution requesting membership for the People's Republic of China and expulsion of the Nationalist government from the United Nations. And they now emphasize a broad united front against U. S. imperialism and Japanese militarism and have moved back their denunciation of Moscow to second place, although they maintain their definition of the U. S. S. R. and Eastern European workers states as "social imperialist." Liu Shao-chi's theory of "the middle area," which calls for helping neutral and peaceful nationalist governments in underdeveloped countries and even in developed countries, was restored in practice. These new foreign policies may be called "the Liu Shao-chi line without Liu Shao-chi."

I believe this turn of foreign policy came about primarily because of the Sino-Soviet border battles in 1969 which almost reached the brink of full-scale war. Mao-Lin's wrong emphasis on the anti-Soviet struggle based on a Shachtman-type theory had developed its own logic until it faced a wall over which it threatened to nullify the very existence of not only People's China but also of other workers states. Moreover, Mao and Lin were forced to acknowledge the overwhelming predominance in military power of the Soviet Union over China. But another motive of the turn to a more moderate foreign policy was the apparent victory of the Mao-Lin faction over the Liu Shao-chi group.

From the above analysis we may arrive at some conclusions. Particularly when we evaluate Chinese foreign policies, we must apply the common rule that, as war is a continuation of politics in a different form, so foreign policy is a continuation of internal politics. Mao's radical changes in foreign policy, which respectively ac-

corded with the adoption of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966, should be seen as means of creating foreign tensions which were used in order to win himself a domestic victory against other bureaucrats as well as against the revolution from below. The international effects of these foreign policies were secondary to Mao. (In 1969 Comrade Charlier thought so too.³⁹) We must note that the Chinese Maoists have never aimed at fighting a real war with either of the two superpowers of U.S. imperialism and the Soviet Union, whatever radical and militant words they have spoken against both of them. Their radicalism has mainly taken the form of gigantic mass mobilizations and demonstrations, of speeches to mass meetings, of international propaganda urging people around the world to fight, of moral aid to pro-Peking parties in former colonial countries (sometimes with a little material aid thrown in), and of diplomatic pressures on foreign nationalist or bourgeois missions. On the other hand, they have stopped acting radical in diplomatic relations with foreign governments after the Cultural Revolution ended. They have not organized any international revolutionary organization either, not even an organization like the OLAS which Castro sponsored. They lack an international strategy in which various revolutionary forces are combined, led and united organically and systematically. This is because the "socialism in one country" policy lies behind their radicalism, leading them to adhere to cold authoritarian realism and to embrace extraordinary cynicism toward genuine internationalism. In the Vietnam war the criminal nature of their policy is most obvious.

On account of these characteristics, Chinese Maoist radicalism tends to be propagated to other countries in the form of external shock rather than leadership. It is this shock that our majority notes as objective consequences for radicalized youth movements in the world. Though we must not and do not ignore the powerful influence of this shock and propagation, we must also be aware that imported Maoist radicalism has its own motive and its own logic resulting from the revolutionary upsurge in the importing countries. For instance, in India, when the Indian Communist Party, pro-Moscow, united with the Gandhi Bonapartist government, and even the left ICP, the ICP(M), repressed the peasants' armed land occupation which it led at first, the Naxalites with an underground organization began terrorist activities, advocating people's war in Indian villages. Accordingly, we should separate Chinese Maoism, the original Maoism, from imported Maoist tendencies which borrow Mao's words and theories but arise spontaneously and follow their own course.

We may divide Maoist tendencies into the ones in underdeveloped countries and the ones in advanced capitalist countries. Maoist radicalism in the highest stage of capitalism stems from the productive relations which lag behind the overripe productive forces. Here we may admit that some things called utopian by Karl Marx, things which could be realized only after building a socialist society, are becoming less and less utopian, at least for the upper classes. Thus, the radical Maoist demand for immediate removal of division of labor, which is not a popular demand in underdeveloped China, has a certain appeal in highly industrialized countries. We cannot ignore this contrast. To such a degree there are disproportions in

our world. Therefore, we can say that Maoism in advanced industrial societies may be more appropriate than Maoism in China. But even the Maoists in advanced industrial societies are trying to jump over the necessary historical stage of building a socialist political power with economic planning, and thus they often appear to be close to anarchists.

Probably Maoists in other countries than China, if they were in China, would belong to the rebelling youth groups. No doubt some of them would find themselves contending with Mao and his bureaucratic leadership. However, in China or in any country, since they have not mastered Marxism-Leninism-Trotskyism, most of them are poorly armed, lacking consistent programs and systematic party organizations. They fail to perceive the necessity of an international revolutionary organization to struggle against the world imperialist system and against the bureaucracies in the workers states.

In short, Mao's radicalism, as well as the people's war theory, has its appeal in its challenge to the existing state of the world in which the White House and the Kremlin are trying to freeze the present arrangement by which each of them enjoys economic and military predominance over other capitalist or workers states. Mao's centrifugal influence threatens to decompose this status quo. But Mao's radicalism ends here. He cannot give any leadership to the rising disturbances in the world which he helps to provoke. Because the Mao-Lin theory of people's war is in practice not a war of the people, by the people, and for the people, but a war of Mao, by the people, for Mao, who embodies the national interest of China.

In speaking and acting for the Chinese national interest rather than for the interests of the world revolution, Mao and Lin are following the theory, popular among bourgeois political scientists in international relations, of the three-person game. According to the theory, international politics can be likened to a game in which three players (Washington, Moscow, and Peking) compete with each other, each trying to win as much as possible for himself. In such a game, once two of the three players act in concert they can expect to make huge gains at the expense of the third player. So, each player rationally tries to make a coalition with another player, and above all, to prevent the other players from uniting against him. There are many ramifications of this type of game theory, depending on the assumptions made about the resources of each player, the rules of the game, and the amount of information they have about each others' plans, but all of the ramifications of this popular bourgeois theory ignore completely the difference in social systems among the USA, USSR, and China. In fact, it is a postulate of the theory that all the players in the international game play basically the same way regardless of their domestic systems.

In the present game the first player, the USA, is the strongest. Now, a theorem derived from game theory says that neither of the other players especially wants to ally with the strongest player because he will find himself the junior partner and will get a bad break when it comes to division of the spoils of victory. So there is a tendency for the two weaker players to unite against the strongest player, and here we have a nifty explanation for the fact that the USSR and China tend to be most strongly against the USA. But the theory also says that

if the strongest player is willing to offer a good enough deal to one of the other players, he can lure him over to his side, since all players are acting only for themselves and there is nothing sacred about any particular coalition. Thus, China must constantly be alert to the possibility that the USSR will be bought off by the USA, and vice-versa. This is why China is constantly accusing Moscow of collaboration with Washington, and Moscow counters with similar accusations against Peking. The three-person game is more complicated and tricky than the two-person game played in the 1950s, requiring the most cynical and rational calculation of self interest and strategies. Mao and Lin, like the bureaucrats in the Kremlin, have been guilty of playing this game instead of acting in the spirit of communist internationalism, and have thus provided verification for the theories of bourgeois political scientists.

However, we Marxists know that such bourgeois theories are not the last word on international politics. Behind the Machiavellian game among three persons lies a fundamental and irreconcilable struggle, the class struggle, which manifests itself in the form of socialist and nationalist revolutions against the world imperialist system and in the form of political revolutions in the degenerated workers states. Furthermore, all these revolutions take the form of a permanent revolution in both the dimensions of time and space. The strongest player in the present three-person game bears a commitment to protect the world capitalist system. The other two players represent the working class, even if not very accurately at times, and the workers are objectively hostile to the imperialist system. The fact that two of the three players in this game are workers states gives a significant advantage to the forces of revolution, if only this advantage is made use of. We cannot and must not presuppose that the Sino-Soviet confrontation is permanent. Nor that the revolutionary forces in the world are so weak and so much controlled by the superpowers that the international system of the three-person game will always prevail arbitrarily. The Vietnamese people are successfully fighting, mostly by themselves, against U.S. imperialism, and they are pressing not only the other two superpowers but also other revolutionary movements to join together against this common enemy. Meanwhile, revolutionary forces in Eastern Europe and Western Europe threaten to blow the lid off the Kremlin's pet plan for an all-European security which would ratify the present division of Europe into two spheres of influence belonging to Washington and Moscow. If a revolution such as the May revolution of France, or the Czechoslovakian revolution of 1968, or the Chinese political revolution of 1967, would gain a victory, it would strike down one of the supporting columns of the existing framework on which the international game of three superpowers is based.

Clearly the bourgeois theory of the international political game, which the Mao leadership has been playing, forgets that the more the international class struggle intensifies and the more desperate the American response becomes, the stronger the pressure for cooperation between Moscow and Peking. In this connection, it is noteworthy that as soon as U.S. forces and their South Vietnamese puppet troops invaded Laos and extended the war over the whole land of Indochina, Moscow and Pe-

king increased their economic and military aid to revolutionary Vietnam. Chinese leadership went as far as mobilizing troops to the Sino-Indochinese border, and Hanoi even indicated the possibility that Chinese troops might enter the Indochina war. According to an AFP-Jiji correspondent reporting from Moscow on March 1, a certain important Indochinese person said that lately Moscow and Peking have begun to gradually fall into step with each other on account of the Indochina war, which has up until now been used as a football in a game between Moscow and Peking. Here we can find at least a sign that the present foreign policy of Mao, Lin, and Chou is becoming nearer to Liu and Lo's strategy. At the same time, China seems to be trying to take measures to neutralize advanced capitalist countries such as Japan and to cause a rift between them and the U.S. government. This is another side of the Liu line. Probably the Chinese leaders still hope to avoid sending their own regular army into Indochina and will exhaust all other alternatives before doing this.

We should now call for united Sino-Soviet actions against U.S. imperialism and its South Vietnam government troops, including a limited field war and a counterattack against U.S. bombing planes by anti-aircraft and missiles. Since South Vietnam government troops under U.S. air support invaded Laos, the Indochina war has changed from a guerrilla war to a regular war, in which North Vietnam's army has been successfully using heavy weapons such as anti-aircraft guns and missiles, heavy artillery, and tank corps. With proper support from the workers states, they could be even more successful.

Before we must fear the push of the button which brings the annihilation of nuclear war, there are many stages of revolutionary war to be fought. We have to try as many stages of revolutionary struggle as necessary, because only the world socialist revolution can provide the final guarantee against the nuclear threat. Our duty is that "we struggle for establishing by force our new world order against the present world anarchy without any dominant hegemony"⁴⁰ and replace the present game played by the superpowers with a socialist world order that does not play games with the lives of the world's people.

VI. Conclusion

The majority's approach is in some places vague and theoretically inconsistent, though it reflects in a sophisticated way the complexities of the facts about China. The strength of their position comes from their friendly approach to and eager readiness to find the sources of radicalization of Chinese youth. The majority as well as the other comrades all have a common slogan of calling for a political revolution in the present China, but only as a very general and abstract aim, lacking in concrete programme and tactics. Thus, I cannot but conclude that the resolution on the Chinese Cultural Revolution, the majority draft adopted at the last world congress, is only temporary.

I think the approach to the developments of the Cultural Revolution taken by the minority document (including Comrade Hansen's papers) and Comrades Peng and Nishi in their third viewpoint are too static. Comrade Hansen takes the Mao-Lin leadership to be "Stalin-

ist Bonapartism" which should be the object of a political revolution, and makes this point more clearly than the majority document. It seems to me that this wholly correct judgment is unfortunately less the result of concrete historical analysis of the complex facts of China which dynamically interact with each other than it is the result of documented analysis of Trotsky's terminology about Soviet Stalinism and of historical analogy likening modern China to the Soviet Union under Stalin's rule.

Comrade Hansen asks whether the Chinese leadership is (a) "bureaucratic centrism" or (b) "bureaucratic Bonapartism" and whether it should be called merely (c) "bureaucratic" or (d) "a crystallized bureaucratic caste."⁴¹ The majority prefers to call the present CCP leadership (a) bureaucratic centrism and (c) bureaucratic. Conversely, the other comrades including Hansen and Nishi prefer terms (b) and (d). According to Comrades Hansen and Peng, when Trotsky used the term (a) bureaucratic centrism in his letter entitled "What Next?" written in 1928 and added as an appendix to *The Third International After Lenin*, he intended to expose not only Stalin's zigzag policy between opportunist and adventurist lines (which aspect our majority takes notice of) but also the political system which might still be improved and in which we need not yet undertake a political revolution. And in 1935 Trotsky is said to have applied the term (b) bureaucratic Bonapartism to the Stalin leadership in his well-known paper "The Soviet Union Today" to indicate that it should be overthrown by a political revolution. Term (d) can be understood as one which indicates even more clearly the necessity of a political revolution. And term (a) is the one which does not call for a political revolution.

I do not intend to disagree with these distinctions between definitions, but I must say that this method of interpreting Trotsky's terminology is too rigid. For I question the retrospective judgment that it was not necessary to call for a political revolution in the Soviet Union in 1928 because Trotsky did not call for one until 1935. After all, Trotsky himself admitted in 1935 that the Thermidorian reaction had started already in 1924. I believe that Trotsky's reflections suggest that it would have been better to have called for a political revolution in 1928, calling for unconditional defense of the Soviet workers state at the same time. Nor do I think that this conclusion rejects the correctness of the program and policies which Trotsky and the Left Opposition fought for. And I must add that I disagree with the Shachtman-type left-centrists who have treated their state capitalism theory and the Trotskyist view of political revolution without discrimination.

I do not want to rehash history all over again; I only hope to draw the historical lessons which Trotsky gave us from the struggles that finally cost him his life. We are getting to the point when we may form this kind of historical reexamination with a background of transitional workers states existing for more than fifty years. It might not be necessary to repeat all of Trotsky's footsteps which included some roundabout ones such as his changes of ideas about the Soviet Thermidor, because history does not simply repeat itself. Rather, we should respect the direction of the development of Trotsky's thought and not be afraid to emphasize historical events that happened after his death. The process of history

shows us that the centrist path tends to be so firmly rooted in the workers states that it has excluded both the counterrevolution which Trotsky greatly feared and the reforms without revolution that Trotsky once thought possible. Centrism and its zigzag course are the fundamental nature of the bureaucracy in the degenerated workers states up to now, and the means by which the bureaucracy holds firmly the nationalized industries and economic planning functions which are the sources of its ruling power. History also shows that there is little possibility either for the bureaucracy to reform itself or for it to be reformed without another revolution, so the prognoses of various former Trotskyists, including some in our own organization like Michel Pablo and Arne Swabeck, can be put to rest. Thus, we should not be so dogmatic about definitions like (a) but should form clearer judgments about present historical cases. For example, we should clarify our analysis of the nature of the present Cuban workers state and our tasks in regard to it, although this may be difficult.

Turning to the Chinese Cultural Revolution, we should recognize the fact that Mao and the Maoists (of course they are not necessarily homogenous) did partially destroy their bureaucratic system, even though only temporarily, and that this fact has radical influence on the world's youth. Nevertheless, the minority comrades and Comrades Peng and Nishi fix their gaze only on Mao's ultimate intentions, more precisely on his Stalinist characteristics. But since we have no very reliable information about Mao, we don't know whether his real intention was to undermine the bureaucracy or strengthen it.

The static approach to the Cultural Revolution taken by the minority comrades, and by Comrades Peng and Nishi, more or less pervades their evaluation of the Third Chinese Revolution as a whole, though it seems to me that Comrade Hansen later changed slightly his former views of the Third Chinese Revolution and the role of Mao's CCP leadership of it in his paper "The Origins of the Differences on China." There he clearly acknowledged a disparity between the facts of history and the following theoretical postulates of orthodox Trotskyism:

1. The peasantry as a class cannot lead a revolutionary struggle through to a successful conclusion.
2. This can be achieved only by the proletariat.
3. The proletariat cannot do it except by organizing a revolutionary Marxist party.
4. Stalinism does not represent revolutionary Marxism; in essence it is counterrevolutionary.
5. Stalinism represents a temporary retrogression in the first workers' state; the advance of the revolution will doom it and it will not reappear.⁴²

Comrade Hansen himself correctly explains this disparity by referring to the four main results of the Second World War: (1) the victory of the Soviet Union; (2) the weakening of world capitalism as a whole; (3) the resulting temporary strengthening of Stalinism; and (4) an upsurge of revolutionary struggles in both the imperialist centers and the colonial areas.⁴³ In short, according to him the victory won by the Chinese peasant armies led by the CCP was made possible by the international context. Of course I go along with his explanation although I hope to discuss this issue further in the future.

Anyhow, I believe that Comrade Hansen is quite correct in saying that we are at the starting point of fruitful international discussions on China and that we must study the origin of the Third Chinese Revolution and the role played by the CCP Maoists. And in concluding this paper, I would like to agree with Comrade Hansen that "the establishment of a series of workers states as the consequence of successful revolutions has greatly strengthened the world revolution and its perspectives. This means a growing tendency internationally toward a revolutionary

pattern that comes much closer to the classic norm in which the proletariat moves into the foreground. Evidence of this is to be seen in the shifting of the axis of revolutionary struggles in the backward countries from the countryside to the cities. The events in France in May-June 1968 showed what explosive potential now exists in the imperialist centers of the West. The ghetto uprisings in the United States and the upsurge among the student youth internationally have offered further corroboration of the trend."⁴⁴

NOTES

1. Both the majority and minority draft resolutions were published in *SWP Discussion Bulletin*, Vol. 27, No. 4, July 1969, arranged in parallel columns to facilitate following the suggested changes.

2. J. Hansen, "The Differences between the Two Documents on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" in *Ibid.*

3. J. Hansen, "The Origin of the Differences on China," *International Information Bulletin*, No. 5, June 1970.

4. If I may be allowed to choose one paper from the many texts by Peng, see S. Peng, "What Our Position Should Be on the Factional Struggle inside the CCP," *Internal Bulletin*, Vol. 1968, No. 1; K. Nishi, "A Criticism of the United Secretariat Majority Draft Resolution on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" *I. I. B.*, No. 1, March 1970.

5. Peng, *op. cit.*

6. L. Maitan, "The Report to the Congress on the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution'"; L. Maitan, *Partito Esercito e masse nella crisi cinese*, Rome, 1969; E. Germain, "The Cultural Revolution," *International Socialist Review*, July-Aug. 1968; E. Germain, "An Unacceptable Amendment," *I. I. B.* No. 8, May 1969; F. Charlier, "An Amendment to the Draft Resolution on the 'Cultural Revolution,'" *Ibid.*; F. Charlier, "Criticism of a Criticism," *I. I. B.* No. 7, Sept. 1970.

7. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.* pp. 2-3

8. S. Peng, "A Criticism of the Various Views Supporting the Chinese Rural People's Communes—What Our Attitude Should Be," *Discussion Bulletin*, Jan. 1960.

9. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, p. 3

10. *Ibid.*, p. 20

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4

12. Charlier, *I. I. B.*, May 1969, p. 2

13. Cf. H. Osada, "The Chinese Cultural Revolution—Its Results and Perspectives," (in Japanese) in *On the Chinese Cultural Revolution—Criticisms and Analyses* (edited by the members of the Japanese section of the Fourth International, 1969)

14. Hansen, *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, p. 37. See also Hansen, *I. I. B.*, June 1970, p. 20.

15. But at last the Mao leadership finished off the Red Guards and Rebel Youths by sending "Worker-Peasant Mao Tse-tung Thought Propagation Teams" to all schools and colleges, and these teams suppressed youths and students.

16. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, p. 1

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 6 and 9

18. *Ibid.*, p. 37

19. Hansen, *I. I. B.*, June 1970, p. 24

20. *SWP D. B.*, *loc. cit.*

21. *Ibid.*, p. 3

22. *Ibid.*, p. 21

23. *Ibid.*, p. 27

24. Nishi, *op. cit.*, p. 3
25. *Ibid.*, p. 9
26. Charlier, *I. I. B.*, No. 7, Sept. 1970, p. 17
27. *SWP D. B.*, p. 29
28. *Ibid.*, p. 14
29. *Loc. cit.*
30. Charlier, *op. cit.*, p. 16
31. Chien Yu-shen, *China's Fading Revolution, 1970* (Center of Contemporary Chinese Studies, Hong Kong), pp. 223-226.
32. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 2 and 5
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 4
34. *Ibid.*, p. 12 and see also the Resolution on the Chinese Cultural Revolution of the Ninth World Congress.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 15
36. Yoshichi Sakai, in Nos. 3 and 5 (March and May 1968) of *Fourth International* (the Japanese language theoretical organ of the Japanese section of the Fourth International)
37. Cf. National Committee of the Internationalist Group of the Socialist Youth League, *The Bulletin of the Secretariat*, No. 8 (in Japanese)
38. For instance, see its announcements in February 1968.
39. Cf. *I. I. B.*, May 1969, p. 2
40. Sakai, in the *Fourth International* (in Japanese), No. 4, April 1968.
41. *SWP D. B.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-32
42. *I. I. B.*, June 1970, p. 27
43. *Ibid.*, p. 29
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35