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## Contents

	Page
AN AMENDMENT TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION" By Fernand Charlier [Submitted for discussion prior to World Congress]	2
AN UNACCEPTABLE AMENDMENT By E. Germain [Submitted for discussion prior to World Congress]	6
THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE REVOLUTION By Chen Pi-lan [Submitted for discussion at World Congress]	9
PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL THESES By Capa and Andres [Submitted for discussion at World Congress]	11
LETTER FROM JOSE VALDES [Submitted for discussion at World Congress]	14

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**SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY**

AN AMENDMENT TO THE DRAFT RESOLUTION  
ON THE "CULTURAL REVOLUTION"

By Fernand Charlier

The draft resolution presented by the majority of the United Secretariat to the World Congress provides, to the degree this is possible with the available information, a good analysis of the development of the "cultural revolution" and the contradictions of the present Chinese society that have contributed to transforming an interbureaucratic conflict into a vast social struggle, and provides a correct criticism of the arguments developed by the Maoists during the course of the "cultural revolution."

It has the merit of presenting a more sober estimate of the "cultural revolution" than the original draft, which was presented by the minority of the United Secretariat. In our opinion, it avoids attributing to the army the role of "ultimate authority," the "mainstay of the regime," the "chief arbiter," and "principal centralizing force." These formulations, which give the impression that China has been placed under the yoke of a military dictatorship, miss the actual situation -- the utilization of the army and the Red Guards as a "main striking force" has always been subordinated to a political aim: the destruction of the pre-1965 party and the reconstruction of a new ruling party (contrary to a whole series of speculations by Western bourgeois observers as well as certain apologists for Maoism). The "bonapartist" leadership has always paid careful attention to maintaining an unstable equilibrium between the army, the "Red Guards" and "revolutionary rebels," and the old cadres of the party considered to be "remoldable"; first in the "triple alliance" committees, today in the "new" party in process of being restructured. This bonapartist aspect of the regime is not present in the text proposed by the minority.

The draft resolution of the majority of the U.S. nonetheless appears to us to embellish the international policies of Maoism.

Thesis No. 3 begins by affirming that all the contradictions to which the People's Republic of China has had to face have been strongly augmented following the sudden isolation into which China was plunged at the end of the fifties. The blame for this isolation is placed exclusively on the Kremlin bureaucracy, which bears "the historic responsibility for breaking up the Sino-Soviet alliance." To us this judgment appears both summary and unilateral. Summary because it confounds the reprisals of the USSR with the extension of the conflict on a public level and with the rupture of the solidarity among the workers states in

face of imperialism -- the draft resolution still presents as a current element the fact that Peking reaffirmed "its resolution to defend the USSR against imperialism," an allusion to the message sent by Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-chi, Chu Teh and Chou En-lai to Khrushchev on his seventieth anniversary April 16, 1964: "If a world upheaval of major importance ever occurs, our two parties, our two countries, and our two peoples will stand together in battle against the common enemy."\* To present these positions as a current element, at a time when the Soviet leaders are presented as imperialists and new Czars, indicates ignorance, or obstinate refusal to see the changes that have occurred in the past year and a half.

The entire first half of thesis No. 3 places the blame for the rupture exclusively on the Kremlin, and to explain that the theory of "self-reliance" is "only a rationalization" (when it is a consequence of "socialism in one country"\*\*) adapted to the low material and cultural level of backward China) is an out-and-out embellishment of China's policy.

The same holds for the passage following this and which argues for the "more radical line pursued by the Chinese leadership towards world revolutionary developments" which has brought it "nearer to the positions of revolutionary Marxism." Because alongside Peking's attitude with regard to events in France, Mexico, India, one can place the negative examples of its attitude with regard to Angola, Biafra, Bolivia and a whole series of other countries.

Even the imperialist experts no longer hold any illusions with regard to the more progressive positions of the Chinese. Thus the pro-imperialist expert

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\* Pékin Information, No. 16, April 20, 1964.

\*\* We observed in 1964 that if the Chinese ideologists had picked up the themes of the theory of permanent revolution at the time of the "great leap forward," the international aspect of the permanent revolution was the last to be picked up by the Chinese. In "Some Defenders of Neocolonialism," fourth article in reply to the Soviet CC (end of 1963), they criticized those who held that socialism in one or several countries was "an end in itself." However, they did not deny the possibility of constructing socialism in one country. (See F. Charlier: "La Révolution Permanente en Chine," Quatrième Internationale, No. 22, July 1964.)

Ernst Halperin could write, in 1967: "One would thus expect to see a considerable Chinese effort to support the 'revolutionary struggles' in Latin America, particularly in the form of material and organizational assistance of the Leftist extremist guerrilla groups operating in several Latin American countries. In actual fact, however, Chinese support for the guerrillas has so far been largely verbal. The real Chinese effort in Latin America has been directed at a very different and far more modest goal: not against the great imperialist foe, the United States, but against Soviet influence in the area."\*

In an overall appreciation of the Chinese positions this consequence of their sectarianism cannot be omitted, nor the method of economic reprisals used against Cuba that were denounced by Fidel Castro at the beginning of 1966.

As for Peking's attitude toward "the rising revolution" in Czechoslovakia, in which Peking quite simply confounds the revolutionists with the restorers of capitalism, we have here the most complete confusion! Because Peking's attitude in face of the Soviet intervention was never dictated by a position close to revolutionary Marxism in face of the political revolution; but quite the contrary, owing to the very logic of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which led it to oppose the military action of the Kremlin under pretext that the Soviet troops, by maintaining the Kremlin's control, prevented the masses from taking action to overthrow the Dubcek leadership and carry out a social revolution!

We were among those who approved the position taken by the Reunification Congress in 1963 that stated: "Thus on three of the major questions of this period -- the question of the struggle against the war, the question of the nature of the colonial revolution and the orientation of the revolutionary movements in the underdeveloped countries -- the Chinese conceptions [our emphasis] have as a whole proved to be more progressive than the Khrushchevist conceptions and are analogous to certain theses of revolutionary Marxism."

It was correct at the time to support these conceptions because it was clear that the conflict had been unleashed by the policies of China that were closer to Marxism. The Soviets themselves had just admitted that the conflict went back to the attempt to liberate Formosa in 1958: "This was the aim that was pursued by the noisy demonstration organized by the Maoist leaders, in the fall of 1958,

in the Taiwan Straits. It is not excluded that one of the reasons was of an internal nature....But it was a question in particular of aggravating the international situation. The results of this are known: Taiwan remained occupied, while the American militarists utilized the pretext to reinforce their positions in this part of the Far East, sending new reinforcements there. Only the firm position of the Soviet Union made it possible to overcome the threat of a serious armed conflict."\*

Today, however, it is necessary to take into account (1) the fact that the Chinese positions have been submitted to the test of practice; (2) that the Chinese positions have undergone a marked evolution toward sectarianism since 1965; (3) that the world situation is characterized by a modification of the global strategy of imperialism that demands a new response, likewise global, of the revolutionary forces and that in face of these changes the Chinese positions have not undergone any enrichment.

From these three elements, which must be taken into account, it follows that methodologically we must:

(a) Bring all the aspects of the international policies of Peking within the framework of a global balance sheet -- and not fall into the error of seeing correct positions to which false positions have just been added (thus committing the same methodological error as the leaders who talk about Stalin's "merits" out-weighting his "errors"!).

(b) We must guard against falling into a journalistic fault, of a kind denounced by Trotsky when he weighed Shachtman's evaluation of the leftward development of the resolutions of the party of Norman Thomas, Shachtman having lost sight of the altered context in which they appeared.\*\*

It is necessary to note, however, that we have fallen into these methodological errors; and that under the pressure of the factional struggle against Pablo, we have embellished the Chinese leaders for a whole period. Several examples: two big articles, devoted to the positions of the Chinese CP after the reunification, passed over Indonesia almost in silence;\*\*\* another article (of three

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\* L. Kiouzadjian. "La Crise en Chine: ses causes et sa nature," Moscou (1968), pp. 111-112.

\*\* See In Defense of Marxism, (New Park edition, London 1966), pp. 133-134.

\*\*\* L. Maitan, "Encore sur les positions du PCC et quelques problèmes de l'époque de transition," Quatrième Internationale, novembre 1963; E. Germain, "Le Conflit Sino-Soviétique: un bilan intérimaire," Quatrième Internationale, juillet 1964.

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\* Ernst Halperin. "Peking and the Latin American Communists," The China Quarterly, No. 29, January-March 1967.

pages) concerning a resolution (of a half page) passed by the CC of the Indonesian CP did its utmost to interpret a single line in the resolution as the announcement of a turn to the left at the end of 1963.\*

In 1964, E. Germain wrote: "If [our analysis] is correct, we will see the Chinese obliged, by the logic of their position, to increasingly denounce 'socialism in one country,' 'the peaceful road' and the 'bloc with the national bourgeoisie' (actually under the leadership of the latter); we will see them obliged to increasingly defend in practice the line of 'interrupted revolution,' of supporting the left 'pro-Chinese' Communist parties even in cases where they do not entirely control them (India, Venezuela, Cuba and 'Fidelism' in general in Latin America), of accepting a united front in practice with these parties and even with the Trotskyists in Ceylon, Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, Chile and elsewhere; of exerting pressure on the Indonesian CP to radicalize its political line and begin to struggle seriously for power; of supporting the anti-imperialist revolutionists in the French zone of influence in Africa."\*\*

These criteria do not point to the conclusions in the draft resolution -- to the contrary.

The evaluations tending to reaffirm the "close" to revolutionary Marxism position appear to us to tend to reaffirm, against all the evidence, the old factional position. Why not say, after all, that the Chinese position was closer to Marxism than that of the Cubans with regard to the revolutionary situation in May 1968 in France? Or that the Chinese position with regard to the Indo-Pakistan war in 1965 was still further away from revolutionary Marxism than that of the USSR?

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The text supported by the minority of the United Secretariat takes a much more critical position with regard to the Maoist line in foreign policy. However, we cannot support this text for a number of reasons mentioned at the beginning of this article; in addition, the criticisms of Mao's line are justified among other things by his offer to the Nixon administration of "peaceful coexistence," an objectively minor fact without objective consequences, and criticized in the text

\* "Indonesian CP Adopts 'Four Amulets,'" World Outlook, March 13, 1964, pp. 25-27 (on a resolution that appeared in Pekin Information, February 28, 1964).

\*\* Article in Quatrième Internationale cited above, p. 26.

with an a priori sectarianism.

We do not exclude the possibility that the mass mobilization against the American aggressor and the Soviet revisionists, which put the two adversaries on practically the same plane, and which was organized beginning in 1965, that is, at the most dangerous moment of the escalation in Vietnam, aimed at preventing the threat of war from becoming a reality. Because within the perspective of the approaching war, the widening of the rupture with the objective ally was a factional act difficult to imagine. It is difficult to conceive that the bureaucracy at this point lost awareness of the coincidence of its interests with that of the noncapitalist base of the Eastern states. The argument about Mao's senility does not explain how this opinion could have carried. Thus it is not excluded that the mobilization at that time aimed on the one hand to demonstrate to the imperialists that they could count on an invincible resistance, while on the other hand preparing public opinion for a compromise with imperialism, a compromise making it possible to counter the "diabolical" maneuvers of the revisionists, and to present the rupture of the USA-USSR alliance as a victory.

But we refuse to go along with including this speculation among theses fixing a line based on the most probable hypotheses.

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To conclude, we thus propose:

- (1) To reject the text presented by the minority.
- (2) To replace thesis No. 3 in the text of the majority of the United Secretariat by the new text submitted as an appendix to this article.
- (3) To adopt, with this amendment, the text proposed by the majority of the United Secretariat.

March 22, 1969

APPENDIX: AMENDMENT

New paragraph 3:

(3) The contradictions faced by the People's Republic of China have been greatly sharpened as a whole as a result of the isolation in which the People's Republic of China has been thrust, owing to the withdrawal of Soviet aid, the worsening of this isolation as a consequence of the policies of the Chinese leadership, and a series of grave setbacks suffered by China internationally.

Following the violation of the agreement on exchanging nuclear informa-

tion, the brutal suspension of all Soviet economic aid to China in July 1960 and the sudden withdrawal of all the Soviet specialists and engineers working in China was an extremely grievous blow to China.

At the root of the conflict were divergent attitudes as to the status quo internationally. The Soviets were responsible for having extended this conflict to a governmental level; but by refusing to see that the fundamental antagonism between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on a social plane provided not only the objective possibility but also the imperative necessity of united action, Maoism weakened the Chinese position by refusing to propose a united anti-imperialist front and coordinated actions with the Soviets to support Vietnam, and it assumed the responsibility for transforming the conflict between governments into a rupture between states.

Since 1963, when the Chinese documents as well as certain projected actions presented a more progressive character than the policies of the Kremlin bureaucracy, Peking's international policies have undergone the acid test of practice.

The policies of the Chinese leaders have led to disastrous defeats and in various countries their record has proved hardly more brilliant than that of the Kremlin bureaucracy: Algeria, where they supported the June 19 coup d'état of Boumédiène; Indonesia, where the policy of the largest Communist party in the capitalist world led to a tragic defeat; Bolivia, where the pro-Chinese Communist party of Oscar Zamora took a wait-and-see position with regard to Guevara's guerrilla struggle which Fidel Castro denounced as cowardly, etc.

It is not excluded that on a whole series of points involving foreign policy, Mao's position of rejecting any united front, became the object of criticism from the left among his opponents. It is not excluded that Mao's critics (without thereby adopting the positions of Soviet revisionism) demanded that discussions be reopened with Moscow and demanded a call for a united anti-imperialist front.

Because of its radical verbalism (statements on the events in France, Mexico), Maoism attracts a certain sympathy among revolutionary circles of the youth. However, on the level of building independent movements, Maoism has suffered crushing setbacks everywhere, and the movements which it does influence are far from corresponding to the prestige (although this, too, has diminished) which the People's Republic of China enjoys in the world. In a series of countries, China has followed a policy of collaborating with the national bourgeoisie, and even with feudalists and progressive princes. Pakistan, where the Maoist movement has taken positions opposing the mass movement, is a real betrayal of the interests of the revolution.

On the other hand, the sectarianism of the Maoists with regard to all the other tendencies in the working-class movement (including even Maoist tendencies themselves) has grown strongly since 1967, leading them to consider most of the workers states as capitalist countries. The position of the Chinese leadership with regard to the occupation of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact troops, must be viewed as a consequence of the deterioration in relations between China and the USSR and the ultraleft sectarianism of the Chinese leadership rather than as a position coming closer to revolutionary Marxism with respect to the rising political revolution in Czechoslovakia. This position led Albania to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact on the grounds that it is an imperialist pact, and it led the Chinese leadership to define the Soviet Union as a new type of imperialist state.

The setbacks in foreign affairs have heightened the stresses and strains created by the sharpened tensions within Chinese society between the different layers of the peasantry, as well as between the peasantry and the state, and between the working class, the student youth, the intellectuals, and the bureaucracy in the urban centers. These multiple pressures generated deep differences on domestic and foreign policy in the leadership of the party, the government, and the armed forces. The wisdom of Mao's past decisions and his omniscience came under increasing questioning.

AN UNACCEPTABLE AMENDMENT

By E. Germain

Comrade Charlier's amendment is unacceptable for three main reasons:

(1) Because he states that the Chinese positions represent only radical verbalism, while the resolution of the majority of the United Secretariat correctly states that the Chinese CP has "also objectively favored anti-imperialist struggles in various parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, the Arab countries and Africa."

We do not state that the Chinese favor revolutionary developments everywhere. To tell us about this with regard to Indonesia before October 1965, Pakistan, Bolivia, is to break open an open door, because point No. 3 of the resolution of the majority of the U.S. says exactly the same thing.

But to stimulate armed revolutionary struggle and a turn to the left of the CPs of Indonesia, Burma, Thailand, Laos, the Philippines, Malaysia, is not "verbal" radicalism. It is a radicalism that has objective and positive repercussions in the revolutionary struggle in these countries.

(2) Because he states that Maoism was responsible for transforming the Sino-Soviet conflict from a governmental level "into a rupture between states."

We frankly admit that the distinction between "government" and "state" in this case appears too subtle.

There was an ideological conflict between the leaders of the Soviet bureaucracy and the Maoist leaders. In this ideological conflict, the Kremlin leaders replied with a conflict between governments and states. How can one otherwise interpret the stopping of economic and military aid, the withdrawal of the specialists, the refusal to furnish the promised contribution to the manufacture of Chinese nuclear arms? For Comrade Charlier, after these two stages, there exists a third one, the "rupture between states," for which Mao bears the responsibility because he...refused to propose a united anti-imperialist front and coordinated actions with the Soviets to support Vietnam. We will return later to the Vietnam business. But how the refusal to propose a united front -- that is, refusal to conduct propaganda on a certain point! -- represents a rupture between states, appears to us completely mysterious. Comrade Charlier takes us from political, economic and military relations to the field of ideology, in order to mask the rupture between governments and states

provoked by the Kremlin.

(3) Because he implies -- without saying so clearly -- that if in 1963 the Chinese documents or certain actions which they projected presented a more progressive character than the policy of the Kremlin bureaucracy, this is no longer the case today. Yet, as point No. 3 of the resolution of the majority of the U.S. observes, both with regard to the revolution of May 1968 in France and the events in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the two main revolutionary explosions of the past year, both the Chinese CP and the Maoist groups manifested a position closer to that of the revolutionary Marxists than that of the Kremlin and the CPs adhering to it. In fact, they were fighting on the same side of the barricades as our comrades most of the time, while the Khrushchevists were on the other side.

Comrade Charlier states that the Maoists were on the right side for bad reasons -- ultraleft and sectarian. We believe that is too great a simplification. But even if he were right, the fact remains that to fight on the side of the socialist revolution in France, of the political revolution in Czechoslovakia, even with bad motives and a detestable ideology, is obviously more progressive than the fact of combating the revolutionary mass movements in these countries, as the Kremlin and its agents did. To deny this difference is to deny the evidence.

Comrade Charlier's mistaken position arises from an essentially ideological and strongly formalist approach to the problem. Instead of seeing the objective roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict, which reside in the difference between the relations imperialism-Kremlin and imperialism-Peking, as well as in the differences between the relations world-revolution-Kremlin and the relations world-revolution-Peking (differences which one can reduce in the final analysis to the differences between the stages of bureaucratization of the USSR and China), Comrade Charlier attempts to discover the secret of Maoist policy in an overall view of the Maoist ideology, going so far as to affirm implicitly that Mao is able to reverse his attitude with regard to imperialism since he considers the USSR to be an "imperialist and fascist" country. The experience of Stalinism should have taught Comrade Charlier that the ideology of the bureaucracy is by definition pragmatic, unstable, fluctuating, that it can change from one day to the next, making the most brusque and unforeseen turns, and that it is certainly not in the internal logic of this ideology

"globally" that the secrets of Maoist policy are to be found.

Several examples will suffice to illustrate Comrade Charlier's methodological error.

"At the root of the conflict were divergent attitudes as to the status quo internationally," Comrade Charlier states in his amendment. We do not agree. "The root of the conflict" was the objectively different situation of imperialism with respect to the People's Republic of China and the Soviet bureaucracy. The ideological difference over "peaceful coexistence" was only the product of this difference in the objective situation. As long as imperialism does not modify its attitude fundamentally with regard to Peking it is vain to await a "turn by Mao toward peaceful coexistence." If imperialism should modify this attitude, many "turns" will become possible (without thereby becoming inevitable, because there is still the other factor -- the attraction of the world revolution on the Chinese masses, and their own revolutionary ardor, above all among the youth, which singularly limit the possibilities for Mao-Lin Piao to maneuver in this respect).

"This position [ultraleft sectarianism] led Albania to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact on the grounds that it is an imperialist pact," writes Comrade Charlier. Once again, he reverses the relation between cause and effect. Albania withdrew from the Warsaw Pact because the latter was utilized as an instrument to overturn the leaderships of workers states opposed to the policies of the Kremlin, as the example of Czechoslovakia tragically demonstrated. Does Comrade Charlier believe that the Albanians would have done better to act like Dubcek with respect to this? The ideological justification for the withdrawal was obviously stupid, ultra-left and sectarian. But to believe that the withdrawal flowed from this ideology, and to "forget" the Kremlin's responsibility for the discredit cast on the Warsaw Pact in the whole revolutionary vanguard in the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, signifies forgetting the essential social and political reality for its ideological shadow.

On the "coordinated actions with the Soviets to support Vietnam" Comrade Charlier's information -- drawn from Khrushchev sources -- does not correspond with that coming from the Chinese and the Vietnamese. The latter in particular have contested the story spread by the Kremlin in this regard. They just repeated the denial once again several weeks ago.

As for the common action to support Vietnam, it is necessary to be concrete with respect to this. The Vietnamese don't

want any kind of common armed action on Vietnamese territory, and they are right! Outside of this, any common action can have only two forms: either the joint provision of military aid -- and this is being done -- or common action at other points on the globe, to cut the noose around the Vietnamese revolution. And with regard to this, it is necessary to pose the following question to Comrade Charlier: what is the main obstacle on the road to such "common actions" -- the ideological characterization of the USSR as "capitalist" by Mao, or instead the obvious refusal of the Kremlin to break with its policy of "peaceful coexistence" with Washington?

Does Comrade Charlier believe that it would suffice for Mao to moderate his language with regard to the Kremlin for the latter to agree to common revolutionary action, let us say in Indonesia, India, Iran, Western Europe? Does Comrade Charlier believe that if Mao had abstained from denouncing the Soviet government as a bourgeois government that the fundamental line of the Soviet bureaucracy would have changed? But it is this fundamental line of the Kremlin that makes impossible realizing "two, three, many Vietnams," and not Mao's sectarianism. Hence Mao should be blamed not for having blocked common anti-imperialist action (a blame hypocritically placed on Mao by the Kremlin and its agents); he should be blamed simply for not making the policy of betrayal by the Kremlin more difficult by intelligent propaganda for a united front. In other words, we blame Mao not for having blocked a united front, but for having fought in a clumsy and sectarian way the policies of the Kremlin that made this united front impossible. *Does Mao want a united front*

*both?*

In regard to this, it is necessary to remember an essential aspect of the problem. China is closer to Vietnam than the USSR. It has no reasons for fearing a "conventional war"; but it has every reason to fear a nuclear attack by American imperialism, which, moreover, does not hesitate to make public threats of precisely this nature. Yet, despite repeated appeals from many revolutionary movements, including our own, Moscow has refused to issue a nuclear guarantee against such an attack. Doesn't Comrade Charlier believe that this fact alone has had a thousand times worse effect on the possibility of reconstituting a united Sino-Soviet front than all the ultraleft propaganda and all the sectarian ideology of the Chinese?

Comrade Charlier's archivist talents are well-known. This time, however, he seems to have been caught short. Because the reconfirmation of the Chinese determination to defend the Soviet people against imperialism did not occur in 1964 and was not signed by Liu Shao-chi. The date was March 22, 1966, that is, after

the beginning of the cultural revolution. ("The Soviet people can remain assured that if the Soviet Union is made victim of an imperialist aggression and resists it resolutely, China will be at their side in the common struggle against the enemy." Pékin Information, March 28, 1966.) We do not know if that position remains the position of the Maoist team. We simply say that seven years after the rupture between states provoked by the Kremlin, the Chinese reaffirmed their determination to defend the Soviet people against imperialism, while one waited in vain during that time for a single Soviet declaration of the same kind, which would have been much more to the point in view of the development of the conflict in Southeast Asia.

We cannot reply to all the arguments raised by Comrade Charlier in his article. His accusation that it is because of the logic of the factional struggle against Pablo that we have defended a no longer tenable 1963 position is unfounded. It has been solid facts that convinced us that on several essential questions, the position of the Chinese remains closer to that of the revolutionary Marxists and more progressive as a whole than that of the Kremlin. It requires facts -- and not an ideological evolution -- to convince us otherwise.

His accusation that we underestimated or even passed over in silence the opportunist position of the Indonesian CP is particularly misplaced, because it is precisely Comrade Livio Maitan and I who were the first to call attention to this problem, beginning in 1961-63. But as we foresaw in our article of July 1964, the Indonesian CP was obliged to turn to the left, as the Maoists did likewise in Pakistan. To cite that article turns instead against the thesis of Comrade Charlier, because it shows that we grasped the fundamental dynamics of the Sino-Soviet conflict, as it has continued to unfold up to now.

No one has ever wanted to minimize the baneful effect of Maoist opportunism

in these precise cases. But here, too, the difference with the Kremlin obviously leaps out. After the Indonesian disaster, for which the Kremlin completely shared responsibility with Peking, the Indonesian CP, supported by Peking, made a turn toward revolutionary armed struggle, while Moscow continued to aid the fascist Indonesian counterrevolution militarily, including training its cadres militarily. Does Comrade Charlier dare to affirm that these two positions are equivalent?

Let us summarize our position. It is not a matter of embellishing the position of the Chinese, their foreign policy or the line they dictate to the Maoist groups throughout the world, nor of underestimating the baneful consequences, from the standpoint of the world revolution, of the opportunist and ultraleft errors of the Maoist leaders. On this level there are no differences with Comrade Charlier nor with the comrades who support the minority resolution of the United Secretariat.

We do not believe, and we have never said, that the leadership of the Chinese CP is revolutionary. It is a question of a bureaucratic centralist leadership. The fact which we have never ceased to stress is that it is impossible to identify this leadership with that of the Soviet bureaucracy or with Stalinism. It is indispensable to distinguish between them, because this corresponds to the objective reality and because otherwise an effective struggle against Maoism becomes more difficult.

It is because Comrade Charlier's amendment begins to slip toward such positions of identifying them, and places in question the fundamental responsibility of the Kremlin in all the negative aspects of the Sino-Soviet conflict at the state level -- even the ultraleftism of the Chinese must be included as a reaction, unjustified certainly, of people who have been outrageously ridiculed, cheated, betrayed and hit with a policy of the worst kind -- that we consider it unacceptable.

April 3, 1969



THE NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CHINESE SITUATION

By Chen Pi-lan

Before discussing the draft resolution on China, I should like to provide the comrades with certain materials which should help them to understand the present situation. I will limit myself to the period between April and July, 1968, during which huge clashes took place throughout China and to the important events since last September. (We have dealt with the important previous events in a series of interviews. See especially the interview "The Relationship and Differences Between Mao Tse-tung and Liu Shao-chi," Internal Bulletin of the United Secretariat, No. 8, Vol. 1968; or International Information Bulletin published by the SWP, January 1969, Part 2.)

Since Mao organized the Red Guards to seize power in early January 1967, no part of China has been spared the spectacle of huge and brutal clashes between the different factions and tendencies. It is specifically these clashes which characterize the dramatic and new stage in the so-called cultural revolution. The high point of these sanguinary events took place between April and July, 1968, mainly in the provinces of Kwangsi, Kwangtung, Yunnan, Tibet, Sinkiang, and Fukien. The scale of these clashes could in reality be considered as a local civil war. For example, in Kwangsi, the Red Guards were divided into two different groups. One called itself "The 22nd of April Rebel Army," the cadres of which were composed of students, a few workers and some army units, and was under the direct leadership of the Cultural Revolutionary Group in Peking. The other referred to itself as the "Kwangsi United Rebel Headquarters," the cadres of which were composed mainly of workers and peasants, army units, party functionaries, and students. This latter group was organized and controlled behind the scenes by the first Kwangsi provincial secretary, Wie Hue-ting, as well as by a top army commander. The struggle between these two groups reached the crucial state in a clash during May in Wo Chuo. The most modern weapons were used -- from modern rifles and machine guns to heavy artillery and tanks -- by both sides, which left thousands of dead and wounded from each group. According to reports published in the Angry West River Tide (Si Kiang Lu Chow) put out by "The 22nd of April Rebel Army" group, their side suffered several thousands killed and wounded, more than 3,000 captured, of whom 317 were executed. They also reported that over 2,000 homes were destroyed. Similar battles also took place in other Kwangsi cities, such as Lanlin, Liuchow, and Kweilin, as well as in those provinces I noted earlier. For example in the province of Yunnan, the Kunming (capital of

the province) army commander Tang Fu-chen said on July 3, 1968, in his personal report to Mao in Peking that over 30,000 had been killed throughout the province of Yunnan. Mao replied that he estimated the number to be closer to 80,000. "According to the local papers," Mao said, "160,000 were killed. This is perhaps exaggerated. I would judge that at least 80,000 have been killed." (People's Daily.)

As a result of the serious situation I have just described, Mao was forced to take certain measures to alleviate his precarious position. First, on July 3, 1968, an emergency order was published, and then on July 24, an emergency appeal was issued. These demanded immediate cessation of all struggles between the different Red Guard and workers' groups. At the same time, army detachments from Peking were sent to such areas as Kwangsi, Yunnan, Fukien, and Sinkiang in order to intervene in the struggle. It was only in this way that Mao was able to put a stop to the local civil-war situation. Mao also demanded that the revolutionary committees be established in the five remaining provinces of Kwangsi, Yunnan, Tibet, Fukien, and Sinkiang, as well as in their principal cities.

Here we should point out first that the so-called revolutionary committees were either directly controlled or dominated by army officials, and secondly that the leaders of the different participating groups included many of Mao's opposition, to whom Mao was forced to make concessions. Formally, then, the struggle between the opposing groups, under the signpost of the so-called cultural revolution, was thus terminated. The activities of all Red Guard and workers' groups ceased; the students returned to the schools and the workers and peasants to their jobs.

Due to the above serious struggles, Mao saw that not only were the student Red Guards no longer useful to him, but that they actually threatened his own position. Therefore, last September he began to take certain measures to purge the dissident elements among the students. First he demanded that the revolutionary committees throughout the country establish "workers' Mao Tse-tung's thought propaganda teams" with those worker elements who were loyal to Mao. These teams were then sent into the schools and colleges along with army units in order to carry out "the tasks of struggle-criticism-transformation" and a "revolution in education" (Peking Review, No. 44, 1968, p. 12). Whereas Mao began by purging the party with the students, he now used cer-

tain worker elements to purge the students. These so-called worker propaganda teams entered the schools and colleges under the protection of the army and replaced the normal curriculum and instructors. The classrooms were transformed into discussions of the students' own history, ideas, and experiences -- especially those during the so-called cultural revolution -- self-criticism and criticism of others. At the same time the members of the "workers' propaganda teams" gave lectures on Mao's thought and led the teachers and students in discussions of Mao's thought. This is what the Maoist propaganda refers to as the "educational revolution." Such a situation has created much discontent and aroused much resentment on the part of many teachers and students who, nevertheless, are powerless in face of the army which protects the propaganda teams. The atmosphere and position of many of the teachers and students are intolerable.

This "struggle-criticism-transformation" movement is in reality a mass purge in the schools and colleges. Thousands of students and teachers have been sent to work in the countryside, factories, mines, and even to desolate frontier regions. The Chinese specialists in Hong Kong estimate that at least two million students and teachers have been subjected to this fate.

The purge in the schools, however, only reflects the purge being carried out by Mao in Chinese society as a whole. These same "workers' propaganda teams"

have been sent into "all spheres of the superstructure." That is, Mao's loyal followers have gone into all the cultural organizations, government, and administrative offices, etc., in order to carry out the so-called struggle-criticism-transformation movement, i.e., to purge those elements who were against Mao's so-called cultural revolution and even those who did not actively participate in it. Most of these people made up the cadres of the old party or youth. Their fate has been the same as the students and teachers I described earlier. The estimation in Hong Kong is that around six million of the old party cadres have been dismissed and sent to the countryside, frontier regions, etc.

The purges being carried out by Mao have two essential purposes. One is to drive out the student and teacher oppositions in the schools and colleges in order to obviate struggles both inside and outside the schools and colleges. The second is to purge all those who are now loyal Maoists in the different organizations, the administrative offices, the government offices, etc., not only to obviate struggles, but also to open the way for the Ninth Congress, that is, reestablishing the Chinese Communist party under Mao's absolute control. In the long run, of course, such policies as Mao is carrying out in China's educational institutions cannot be successful, because they destroy education itself. There also exists a very good possibility of those banned elements organizing the masses, with whom they have been ordered to work, against Mao and his faction.

PROPOSED ADDITIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL THESES

By Capa and Andres

In our opinion the international Theses arm us perfectly for the stage now opening. We believe that its detailed analyses are essentially correct. Hence we have practically no amendments to offer. On the other hand, we believe that it fails to single out and to analyze a series of happenings of fundamental importance, such as, for example, the inner class and military processes of the Tet offensive, the great Mexican student mobilization and the political revolution in Czechoslovakia. We are afraid that these oversights indicate a need to go into greater depth to comprehend the "relations among the three sectors of the world revolution."

1.

Relations among the Three Sectors of the World Revolution

(A) The normal and the abnormal in the current stage. One of the richest definitions in the document is the one indicating the tendency toward classical norms in the proletarian revolution. (Page 7 of the English edition.) This expression risks, because of the way it is developed throughout the section, being narrowed in two ways:

First, that it is not understood that we have entered a new stage that will be characterized by a new combination of the "normal" and the "abnormal"; that is, of what characterized the mass movement before and after the second world war. In the current stage all the forms of struggle and organization known to the mass movement will appear on the world political scene in new and richer combinations. This signifies, for example, that there will be more trade-union and guerrilla struggles than in the previous stage; more urban and rural struggles than before; insurrectional processes in the cities and more struggles over ordinary economic issues. All this within the context of the theses.

Second, that a too rigid linkage can be made between the three sectors: the "normal" can be taken to refer preferentially, and almost exclusively, to the metropolitan sector. We believe that we must indicate that what characterizes the present stage is that the general world relation among the three sectors of the revolution becomes reflected within each of the sectors so that the urban population and the proletariat (along with the students, or some sectors of it, acting as a ferment or detonator) will acquire growing importance.

We say this because the danger ex-

ists that the theses can be understood to mean that in the colonial world there will only be a quantitative increase in the struggles and not a qualitative change. In other words: the danger exists that it can be taken that the "abnormal" will continue to reign in the colonial world and that the "normal" will become exemplified only in the metropolitan world. The oversights we have indicated could bolster this false interpretation even more.

2.

The Problem of Reanimating the Colonial Revolution

(A) The Tet offensive. We believe that there should be an analysis of the Tet offensive in its internal dynamics and not only of its influence on the political scene abroad. This offensive has features and characteristics both social and military that make it qualitatively different from all the guerrilla processes seen up to now so that it transcends the theory and practice of the Maoist concept of guerrilla war. The essence is the following: the rural guerrilla struggle, blocked off and in relative decline, had to appeal to the urban population and to insurrectional methods in the cities in order to defeat imperialism tactically.

(B) The struggle of the students, mainly the Mexicans and Uruguayans, like that of the Chileans, Brazilians, and Bolivians, must be singled out and studied as one of the principal factors in the change in the situation in Latin America, relating this with the OLAS and the guerrilla movements (making clear that these have been becoming weaker). All this reacts in turn on the world revolutionary movement.

(C) In the same way the intervention of the students and the urban population in Pakistan should be dealt with along with the semiproletarian, semi-urban social character of the Fatah guerrillas.

(D) Amplify the concept on page 2 of the English edition on the colonial revolution, in which it is stated that the colonial revolution can progress only by passing over into a socialist revolution, making clear that this signifies not only the subjective factor but also has a social character: the intervention of the urban and proletarian masses in the revolutionary process.

3.

The New Phase of the Crisis of the Bureaucratic Regimes

In this section, the Czechoslovakia

process should be developed exhaustively, indicating:

(A) That the main enemy of the workers and countries of Eastern Europe continues to be the Kremlin bureaucracy.

(B) That as a consequence the process of the political revolution in Eastern Europe involves a common struggle against the main enemy, this bureaucracy.

(C) That the form of confronting the Soviet occupation in Czechoslovakia should be posed concretely.

(D) That in Czechoslovakia embryonic worker-student councils have begun to appear, along with the intervention of the workers movement (indicated in the theses as a perspective) and the embryonic tendency to formation of a revolutionary Marxist party.

(E) That the theoretical problem of the stages and forms of the political revolution is posed. It is an old opinion of ours, held since the Hungarian revolution, that possibly the political revolution will occur in two stages -- a February and an October. The first would open a stage of independence with regard to the Kremlin and of democratization; the second would directly inaugurate the power of workers councils. The two stages would be combined in an almost immediate or directly immediate form.

4.

The Problem of the Youth

(A) Although the theses indicate it in passing, it is necessary to stress as an essential characteristic of the current stage the fact that the eruption of youth is a universal phenomenon and that it should not be held in an exaggerated way to be confined to the metropolitan countries.

(B) It is necessary to specify the relations between the university youth and the rest of the youth, pointing out the enormous importance of the former. To do this, it is indispensable to reaffirm the classic explanation of Marxism that the student youth do not reflect in a direct way the class they belong to, but society as a whole. The current student mobilization reflects and announces the crisis of the regime, hence its characteristics, strengths, and weaknesses.

5.

The Construction of a New Revolutionary Leadership

(A) We believe that the final part of the document constitutes a rich and valuable arming of our movement. It ap-

pears that in the explanation on the need for unity of action and the building of a mass revolutionary Marxist international a vacuum exists which this fills by indicating we are for mass national Marxist parties. At the same time we believe that we should indicate that between united actions and the mass national Marxist party, more solid and durable organizational forms can appear -- student or revolutionary trade-union tendencies, guerrilla groups, etc. We appeal to these formations to form a united revolutionary front. They can call themselves what they will, but we should indicate their existence.

(B) In the same section, we should give a reply to the problem of greatest preoccupation to the colonial vanguard and to some sectors of the black movement in the United States -- armed struggle. This reply ought to take the form of a dialogue based on agreement in principle on the necessity for armed struggle. With regard to this we should point out the following:

It is just as grave to believe that the "abnormal" will continue to be predominant throughout the next stage as it is to believe that only the "normal" will occur in the colonial revolution (including up to a certain point metropolitan countries), i.e., urban and proletarian insurrections. The fact that armed committees of struggle, both urban and rural, have been proposed for a country like India, has this profound meaning.

That the current stage and the Tet offensive have already superseded the Maoist concept of a gradual, evolutionary advance of the armed struggle from the country to the city, so that we are faced with combined forms of urban and rural struggle, corresponding to the level of consciousness and of struggle of the mass movement.

That this phenomenon is shown in the negative by the lack of important victories in rural guerrilla wars that have been launched to take power in the past ten years. This is because rural guerrillas no longer confront national regimes in a complete crisis, with imperialism also in crisis, but face imperialism directly, thus compelling the armed struggle to be shifted to the working class and the urban population with their methods.

That one of the conquests of the past thirty years of the movement of the colonial masses is the demonstration that armed struggle and guerrilla war are not a slogan and a method that is applicable only at the culmination of the rise of the mass movement to take power, but are applicable at any particular moment of class struggle, mainly when the exploiters themselves open a stage of civil war against the mass movement.

That in many countries, mainly the metropolitan countries, the real road toward armed struggle will pass via armed pickets of the workers, students and peasants in confronting the forces of the regime, as well as through propaganda work in the army in order to accelerate its crisis. Although, for obvious reasons, we cannot go into this, we should single out the work of the SWP along these lines as a model.

That the imperialist governments will seek to resort to mercenary armies in order to counteract the development of crises in their armed forces.

That Europe will not be an exception to this perspective of armed struggle. This signifies more concretely the follow-

ing: First, that in Spain the problem is posed of preparing to open the road to the mobilization and organization of the workers and student movement with the support of the peasants in a future armed confrontation with the regime. Second, that in the rest of Europe, as the mobilization of the workers and students continues to develop, the confrontation with the forces of the regime will broaden and possibilities will open for working on the army.

That we should avoid like the plague any dissolving of concrete situations of class struggle and our very limited forces in mere analyses of perspectives and the objective situation. The main task of our sections is defined in the theses and in the youth document -- to develop our sections by participating in the actions of the youth movement and the workers.

LETTER FROM JOSE VALDES

Santiago de Chile  
March 29, 1969

To the Delegates --

Dear Comrades:

Our comrades of Chile send fraternal and Fourth Internationalist greetings to the comrade delegates. Because of the impossibility of traveling, we are sending some notes for your consideration.

José Valdés

On LATIN AMERICA

(1) We have resolved to support in general the Draft Resolution presented by Comrade L.

(2) We reject the document of Comrade J.H.

\* \* \*

(1) We approve in general the document of Comrade L. because we hold that it contains not only a correct political analysis of the L.A. situation and its perspectives and provides a clear line of orientation for the construction of the revolutionary vanguard, but also because it constitutes a step forward in our F.I. movement with regard to the decision that the Trotskyists of Latin America and other parts of the world prepare politically and technically to integrate themselves into the armed struggle or to accelerate the beginning of the insurrection.

We Trotskyists have represented the continuity of the revolutionary Marxist tradition, betrayed by Stalinism and the Social Democracy, we have made programmatic, theoretical and political contributions, many of them accepted at the present time by other revolutionary currents, and we represent historically the interests of the proletariat. But the absence of a decision to prepare ourselves militarily in specific favorable political conjunctures to organize a plan for the insurrection of which Trotsky spoke to us about in the "Russian Revolution" and in his "Military Writings" caused our movement to lose incomparable opportunities in various countries to convert ourselves into the real vanguard of the revolution. It is time to ask ourselves: What would have happened if the Trotskyist movement had resolutely decided to prepare itself, and to prepare the worker and peasant vanguard, in order to initiate an armed insurrection in Bolivia and Ceylon, countries in which the Trotskyist movement had gained an appreciable mass influence?

The document of L. contains not only this important strategic decision (which for some is of a technical character but which for us is fundamentally political because it is intimately linked to the construction of the party and the triumph of the Socialist Revolution), but also correctly characterizes the present situation as prerevolutionary, reaffirms the continental character of the Revolution, gives a correct long and prolonged perspective to the armed struggle fundamentally because of the imperialist reaction and intervention (case of Santo Domingo). The document of L. clearly defines the Cuban Revolution and the Castroist current, delimiting itself from some of its positions and foquista guerrilla deviations, correctly indicating the basic orientation for integration into the Castroist movement in order to construct the revolutionary Marxist party. The document warns about impatience and spontaneism and is careful to indicate that the transitional program must be adapted by each section to the specific situation of each country.

In other pages included herewith, we propose some additions and corrections to the document of L.

(2) We reject the document of Comrade J.H. for the following reasons:

(a) It leaves our L.A. movement disarmed, or at least paralyzed, since the L.A. sections of the F.I. are already carrying out a policy that coincides in general lines with the Draft Resolution presented by Comrade L. In this sense, the criticisms of Comrade J.H. indirectly constitute a criticism of the present orientation of the L.A. sections of the F.I. Comrade L. in this case would be the "Albania" of the polemic.

(b) He does not make any concrete analysis of the present political conjuncture in L.A. nor indicate either perspectives or precise tasks that would help us to carry out a policy and strategy for constructing the party.

(c) He does not indicate a clear policy with regard to Castroism and the rest of the revolutionary left concerning the continental nature of the L.A. revolution. His criticisms of Castroism and its revolutionary tactics leads to political confusion, lamentable in the case of Comrade J.H. who contributed so much in his articles in recent years to clarifying a correct position on the Cuban Revolution. Now Comrade J.H. has come to place in doubt whether the Cuban leadership has

contributed in a decisive manner to the maturing of a new revolutionary left (see page 13 of the J.H. document, French edition). The Castro-Guevarist leadership has committed errors, but no one can place in doubt that its orientation and influence have provoked a crisis among the traditional parties of the left and have contributed to liberate new revolutionary forces which today constitute the most viable and real alternative for accelerating the L.A. Socialist Revolution.

(d) The position of Comrade J.H. with regard to armed struggle and guerrilla war is frankly traditionalist and, in some cases, hardly serious when he ridicules the action of the guerrilla groups, approximating in his criticisms, made from a rightist angle, the pamphlets against Debray written by the theoreticians of reformism and Stalinism. It would have been more fruitful if Comrade J.H. had drawn a balance sheet of the errors committed by the Guatemalan, Venezuelan, Colombian, Peruvian, and Bolivian guerrillas in place of opening a discussion in the abstract on guerrilla war.

(e) He does not indicate a clear orientation for constructing the revolutionary Marxist party, limiting himself to posing generalities on which we are all in agreement, such as the necessity for carrying on work in the fronts of the masses, based on the transition program.

Comrade J.H. says that the crucial question for the F.I. is to link itself to the Youth. We agree. But to win the vanguard of the Latin-American worker, peasant, student youth, which is Castro-Guevarist in its great majority, it is necessary to have a clear policy to facilitate the integration, something that Comrade J.H. does not do; just the contrary, all his arguments could block us from this integration and lead us to isolate ourselves from the Youth. Comrade J.H. says that the document of Comrade L. distracts attention from this key problem for the F.I. To the contrary, the document of Comrade L. is precisely an effort to give a policy that expresses the concerns of the Castroist Latin-American youth.

Comrade J.H.'s entire policy reduces to proposing the possibility of a united front with OLAS. In some L.A. countries it could be suitable for the sections of the F.I. to pose a united front with the Castroist organization. (We should not speak of the OLAS in the abstract because this organism has not been constituted in hardly any country; it is more concrete to refer to the revolutionary group that is closest to and linked with Castroism.) In other countries, there are incomparable conditions for becoming integrated into the new revolutionary left. The precise position of J.H. of

opposing integration into the Castroist current would close the possibility of applying this line, which would lead in some countries to our isolating ourselves from the vanguard.

Integration into the Castroist current must not be understood as an application of the old tactic of entryism, since we would not be integrating ourselves into a reformist grouping but into a revolutionary nucleus which in fact, although not in words, accepts the theory of the Permanent Revolution and the propositions of the Second Declaration of Havana, the March 13, 1967 speech of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara's letter to OLAS on "creating two, three, and many Vietnams," documents in which the socialist character of the Revolution is specified. We integrate ourselves in order to apply this program in revolutionary action and insofar as is possible to win the leadership of this movement with our best cadres in order to guarantee the application of this program.

(f) Comrade J.H. says that the document of Comrade L. is in contradiction with the document on the world situation presented to the W.C. in which it is indicated that the present revolutionary process tends to approach the "classical" model or norm. This estimate, which is debatable and which ought to be specified, would in any case be a tendency of the process that does not automatically cancel the present concrete armed struggles and guerrilla wars of Asia, Africa and L.A.

(g) The document of Comrade J.H. could be of interest in opening a polemic on another level on problems of revolutionary strategy, but it contributes very little towards a W.C. bringing out a positive resolution that would effectively help the possible work of the sections of the F.I.

Although the document of Comrade J.H. is rejected, we propose that it be included as discussion material for a debate which the sections of the F.I. should resolve to initiate now on questions of strategy in the armed struggle.

(h) He distorts the document of Comrade L. when he says that the Draft Resolution on L.A. "simply proposes a continental tactic or strategy of technical preparation in a rural guerrilla war for a prolonged period." On page 1, we have pointed out the political contributions of this document, with which we believe that we have demonstrated the unilateral criticism of Comrade J.H. He also distorts when he says that the document of Comrade L. is a "faithful reflection of the publicly expressed views of the Cuban leadership on this question" (of guerrilla war). In reality, Comrade

L. tries to indicate his differences with the Castro-Guevarist theory of the "foco" and polemicizes with the thesis of Debray, without naming it. We propose that the W.C. agree to incorporate into the discussion on insurrectional strategy (which we proposed in the previous paragraph should be opened after the W.C.) a document criticizing the theory of the "guerrilla foco." A documented debate, conducted without haste on the subject, would be of great benefit to the sections of the F.I. and would avoid the superficialities of Comrade J.H. in demanding that Comrade L. ought to pose the tactic of guerrilla war for all continents (page 24 of the J.H. document, French edition).

(i) Comrade J.H. criticizes Comrade L. because he supposedly suggested in a different article, "An Insufficient Document," that the resources of the F.I. should be concentrated so that one of its sections could place itself at the head of an insurrection. No one can deny that

the Trotskyist movement would qualitatively increase its prestige if it contributed decisively to the triumph of a Socialist Revolution. But this cannot come from an act of will with the objective and subjective conditions to carry it out in practice. If these conditions were to obtain in some country we do not have the least doubt that a genuine praxis of proletarian internationalism would concentrate forces -- not only economic ones -- for such an aim. International aid and solidarity are not only empirical and pragmatic objectives, in face of accomplished facts, such as taking up collections for sections suffering repression or propaganda for freeing political prisoners. If it were only for this, that kind of proletarian internationalism would be an internationalism for the stage of defense and defeat. There can and must be also a proletarian internationalism to prepare the offensive and victory of the armed insurrection, the only road for the triumph of the Socialist Revolution.