

# International Internal Discussion Bulletin

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# Call For the Formation of an International Tendency

By Letourneau, Nemo, Seldjouk, Ulysse

After a period of strengthening of the international proletariat since the end of the second imperialist war, the year 1968 marked a turning point in the class struggle at an international level: marked by the general strike of May-June in France and by the revolutionary eruption of the Czechoslovak masses, it opened a period of revolutionary and prerevolutionary crises produced by the rise of the masses and thus nourishing the crisis of imperialism and of the bureaucracies.

The mobilization of the African masses; the awakening of the American working class, the most powerful in the world; the proletarian offensive in Europe; the growing mobilization of the allies of the proletariat (women, youth, awakening of the oppressed minorities . . . ); demonstrate the rising course of the class struggle.

We see in Europe today the most advanced forms of this process: the question of the unity of the social and political revolutions are concentrated on the old continent. This makes it a special sector of the class struggle, marked by the profound crisis of the systems of bourgeois political domination and of the parasitic bureaucracies.

The increasing rise of the masses obliges the bourgeoisie to resort to active collaboration with the workers parties which can extend all the way to their association in governmental coalitions. Caught between increased imperialist pressure and the opening of a revolutionary process in Europe (in Portugal and Poland), the international apparatus of the Kremlin finds itself today on the eve of a "dislocation." The most obvious expression of this is the CPs being drawn and quartered between their growing adaptation to their national bourgeoisies, and the necessity for each of them to preserve the international unity of the Stalinist movement against the rising revolution.

It is in these conditions that imperialism and the bureaucracy are trying to establish a new counterrevolutionary apparatus as concretized by the multiplication of popular fronts or similar formulas in France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland. Moreover the military counterrevolutionary intervention of the bureaucracy in Angola and in Ethiopia made up for the absence of a *direct* U.S. military intervention, since the U.S. remains paralyzed by the defeat in Vietnam, a political crisis, and the remobilization of the American workers. Finally, the signing of the Helsinki and Belgrade pacts aims at codifying the status quo: maintenance of the bourgeois order in the West and the domination of the bureaucracy in the East.

This new period gives us the possibility of making big advances in the building of the Fourth International. *The subjective conditions for going beyond the prerevolutionary period* "of agitation, propaganda, and organization" have not changed qualitatively since 1938. No party of the Fourth International has yet gained a majority of the working class or of its vanguard militants. *The Fourth International is still at the stage where the primary task is the accumulation of cadres.*

The appearance—after Portugal—of revolutionary or prerevolutionary situations opens the way for a rapid expansion of the vanguard party, if it develops an orienta-

tion in line with the method of the transitional program and corresponding to the interests of the working class and its allies.

## I. What is the Status of the Crisis of the Fourth International?

1. Over the last decade, the Fourth International has experienced a *very grave crisis of orientation*. After suffering disastrous political and organizational consequences from the crisis, our movement in Latin America underwent new developments which the LTF characterized as follows:

"The turn taken by the majority of delegates at the Ninth World Congress raised a tactic—guerrilla warfare—to a strategy, replacing the Leninist strategy of party building along the method indicated in the Transitional Program. This ultraleft deviation from a Marxist strategy was deepened and extended, and then codified by the IMT in its European perspectives document and other documents adopted by the IMT at the Tenth World Congress.

"The payoff came on November 25. That debacle also constituted a debacle for the IMT's European resolution. This was the verdict of a developing proletarian revolution. In practice, the IMT's ultraleft deviation, which signaled a turn away from the method and strategy of the Transitional Program, led the IMT to adapt to centrism and ultraleftism in Portugal. This in turn meant adapting to the Stalinists, and finally to the MFA itself." [See "The Test of Two Lines in the Portuguese Revolution." International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. XIII, No. 2, April 1976, p. 23.]

IMT supporters in all continents attempted in fact to apply the substitutionist method of orienting toward the "new vanguard," as codified in the so-called European document. The test of the Portuguese revolution, the practical summary of all the errors of the majority, enable us to measure the gravity of the political consequences that flowed from the extension and deepening of the turn of the Ninth World Congress. As the LTF wrote in February, 1976:

"The IMT positions on Portugal deepen the course that began with the turn the majority codified at the Third Congress Since Reunification (Ninth World Congress). . . . The initial balance sheet of the IMT position as reflected in the class struggle in Portugal shows that the IMT has gone further along its ultraleft course, leading to serious sectarian, adventurist and opportunist errors.

*"The Crisis in the Fourth International Deepens*

" . . . Thus the differences became expressed in public as alternative lines." ["The Portuguese Revolution and the New Problems That Face the Fourth International—Statement by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction," Adopted August 31, 1975. IIDB, Vol. XII, No. 6, October 1975, pp. 14-16.]

Pushed to the limit in face of the revolution on the march, this same line of the IMT had its consequences, adventurist as well as opportunist, in most countries of Europe, notably in the form of several ultraleft "initia-

tives" (like June 21, 1973, in France) or through multiple tactics of "unity of the revolutionaries." All of these substitutes turned the European sections away from a method of party building based on the objective interests of the masses and capable of forming a real alternative to the various policies of class collaboration, notably the policy of the popular front at work in several European countries following the case of Chile.

2. In the recent period, noticeable gains have been made in the struggle for the unity and the reorientation of the Fourth International.

If loyally applied, the unanimous decisions of the United Secretariat of October 1976 ought to be sufficient to give full political authority to the decisions of the next world congress by assuring the democratic character of the preparatory discussion. They could also open the way for the development of a fruitful political discussion with the Trotskyist forces that did not join in the reunification of 1963.

Moreover, big steps have been taken to overcome the splits which took place in several national sections of our movement. Convergence of positions is taking place in the process of certain national discussions on various aspects of party building which were particularly controversial in the past: youth movement, women's liberation movement, national question, for instance.

Finally, the most important political element to be sure is the publication by the IMT of a "self-criticism" on Latin America, which Comrade Barnes, in his report to the SWP plenum in January 1977, correctly characterized both as to its extremely positive aspects as well as to its present limits and contradictions. [See "Self-Criticism on Latin America," IIDB, Vol. XIII, No. 8, December 1976 and "The Meaning of the IMT Steering Committee's Self-Criticism on Latin America," by Jack Barnes, IIDB, Vol. XIV, No. 5, May 1977.]

3. All these favorable elements must not, however, be isolated from the overall political trajectory followed by the majority leadership of the international. This trajectory was heavily bent in a negative sense by the methods of discussion and of leadership of these IMT leaders. Following the test of the Portuguese revolution, this current experienced profound internal differentiations that permitted the emergence of elements moving in the direction of placing into question a number of past errors. Rather than politically sanctioning this process (either by dissolving the IMT or by reevaluating the overall course followed since 1969), the IMT leadership moved to limit the "self-criticism" to those issues that appeared inevitable and sought to artificially prolong the unity of their current through several "redefinitions" of its platform. The result of this unprincipled method was to *prolong* the crisis of political orientation of our movement as a whole.

Thus the "declaration" published by the IMT last June, through its positive reference to the second "European document" (which was nothing more than a repetition of the errors of the first "European document" and the majority position on Portugal) demonstrated in the most explicit way possible that the majority leadership of the international, after having been forced to recognize a number of the worst errors committed at the Ninth World Congress, were going to try to avoid the much more general consequences which it was necessary to draw from this first critical review in order to effectively remedy the disorientation of our movement as a whole, inasmuch as

the political basis of this situation has not been modified by the dissolution of the IMT. This leads to a situation where the road opened by the "self-criticism" on Latin America in the sense of a collective and loyal reevaluation of the errors stemming from the extension of the turn of the Ninth World Congress or of debates of more ancient origin (China, Vietnam, Stalinism . . . ) is obstructed by the desire of the majority leaders of the international to safeguard their orientation on a whole series of questions which are decisive for the construction of the sections of the international in the new rise of the class struggle, especially in Europe.

4. Thus, after some limited rectifications, the IMT maintained the essence of its method and its practice of "orientation toward the new vanguard," and continues to reject making any self-criticism of its errors on the Portuguese revolution (on these two points, we refer to the remarks in the text "After the IMT Declaration: Against Factionalism, For the Correction of the International's Course." [By Melan and Nemo. IIDB, Vol. XV, No. 1, March 1978.] It even continues to justify theoretically and to follow in practice the substitutionist and adaptationist tactic of "unity of revolutionaries." This course has even resulted in more and more serious developments concomitant with the acceleration of the class struggle and the pressure exercised by the class-collaborationist formulas on various centrist and ultraleft currents: after the disastrous experiences of the presidential elections in Portugal in 1976 and "Proletarian Democracy" in Italy (see the declaration of the LTF, August, 1976), we have seen the unfortunate tactics practiced in 1977 with the Spanish FUT, the "power to the workers" campaign in France, and the electoral policy applied in Belgium (see on these points, the document "The Debate on Europe and the Responsibilities of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction," by Carmen, Gabriel, Letourneau, Melan, Nemo, Raul, Seldjouk, Ulysse. [IIDB, Vol. XV, No. 1, March 1978]) as well as dropping the IMG's newspaper in favor of a journal for the unity of the revolutionaries.

5. Nourished by the adaptation to the political backwardness of the centrists and the ultraleftists, which is implied in the tactic of using the "new vanguard as an instrument," and "the unity of the revolutionaries," the disarming of the Fourth International before the diverse policies of class collaboration and its powerlessness to construct a clear political alternative on the basis of class independence and the struggle for a workers government have also been aggravated by the persistence of the majority's errors in the analysis of Stalinism and the popular-front orientation being pursued in various European countries.

This question, posed sharply since the French elections of 1973—which was directly tied with the necessity of characterizing the Union of the Left as a popular front, calling for a working-class vote and a struggle for a political break with the bourgeoisie and for a "CP-SP" government—has not been clearly decided up to now in any of the countries concerned. The analyses of the crisis of European Stalinism proposed by the leaders of the IMT hardly lead in the direction of the necessary clarification. In this respect, although the article of Comrade Mandel entitled "Three Facets of 'Eurocommunism'" [*Inprecor* No. 5, April 1977 or *Intercontinental Press*, May 23, 1977] is not officially a reference document of the IMT, the character of the article as a résumé and the political authority of

its author call for an evaluation of the import of the positions developed therein.

This document does not include the most excessive hypotheses formulated by certain members of the IMT who were tempted to characterize the evolution of the Portuguese CP of 1975 as "bureaucratic centrist" and who today characterize several CPs of western Europe as purely "national communist parties" having completely escaped from the determinations showing them to be Stalinist. But Comrade Mandel reaffirms the theses of the IMT (the process of "gradual social democratization") and has given it a rather surprising interpretation with respect to the acquisitions of our movement. On the one hand he reaffirms that the current policies of the CP constitute a "new significant stage in the *rightist evolution* of these parties," a turn marking an "evolution of the Western European Communist parties *since* the Seventh Congress of the Comintern" and a "*sharper and more open* turn to class betrayal than in the past." On the other hand, without seeing any contradiction, he characterizes this policy as witnessing a "full adherence to bourgeois parliamentary democracy" and finding as the "decisive factor" the "attempt to break out of domestic political ghettos, to break down parliamentary isolation, to seek a link with the Social Democracy and the 'liberal' petty bourgeoisie." [Emphasis added.]

The current policies of the CPs do not in any way constitute a "right turn" with respect to that of the Seventh Congress of the Comintern, which the Fourth International characterized as direct collaboration with imperialism and its parties and not with the "petty bourgeoisie." In particular, how can one assert that it is "the adherence to bourgeois parliamentary democracy" or simple "electoralism" that explains fundamentally the current policies of the CP when this consists of direct support for the artificial survival of the decomposed bonapartism of the Fifth Republic or the Spanish monarchy or on another continent to the dictatorship of Videla in Argentina? Where is any concern shown over seeking "a link with the Social Democracy and the 'liberal' petty bourgeoisie," when it is directly with the parties of *big capital* that the CPs, not only in Italy, but also in France and in Spain, make alliances to defend bourgeois order and the bourgeois state? When this whole policy of collaboration goes entirely against any real unity of the working-class organizations? Such characterizations can only sustain the incomprehension of the current political role of popular-front policies and their international determinations; and disorient the European sections in defining the axes of their struggle for a workers united front. They contribute nothing towards bringing together the current positions in the international on the analysis of Stalinism and do not permit taking the offensive in the debate with the OCRFI on this question, as shown moreover by its blocking the debate in practice, in contradiction with the preceding unanimous commitments of the United Secretariat.

Combined with the line of orienting toward the so-called broad vanguard, the incorrect analysis of the policy of the Stalinists has led to a disorientation of many European sections in face of the developments of the political crisis. This disorientation is particularly serious in the two countries where the class struggle is at present the most advanced and where the international has the largest number of members: France and Spain.

6. *In France:* The recent developments of the political crisis have shown the LCR to be particularly disarmed. For years the CP and the SP sought to divert the masses from their wish to unite the workers ranks, win their demands, and overthrow the present regime, by dangling the shining perspective of an electoral victory of the Union of the Left, a popular-front coalition including various bourgeois "components."

This policy was a direct aid to the survival of the Giscard governments and enabled them to put a harsh austerity policy into effect. In the fall of 1977, the French CP used a debate on the "revival of the Common Program"—a bourgeois program, supported by the CP as well as by the SP, and with which these two parties have no serious differences—as a pretext to launch a campaign against the SP questioning its working-class nature. This campaign was reminiscent of the "third period" and of the policy of the Portuguese CP in the spring of 1975.

Far from constituting a break by the CP from popular frontism, the policy represented a new version of the line of dividing the ranks of the working class, and of collaborating politically with the bourgeoisie, which had previously taken the form of fostering the Union of the Left. Fearing that the aspirations of the masses could not be contained by the counterrevolutionary obstruction of a Union of the Left government, the CP openly tried to prevent the workers from expressing—through a massive vote for the working-class parties—their objective opposition to the policy of the Union of the Left, their desire to overthrow the regime, and their wish to see their parties take the road to a workers government.

Concretely, by designating the SP as the main enemy, including on the electoral level, the CP is attempting to avoid an electoral victory of the workers parties and thus give a new lease on life to the Giscard-Barre regime (or, if this proves impossible, to clear the way for a coalition government in which the CP would not directly participate). Through this new attempt to divide and disorient the masses, the French CP is trying to defer the final phase of the political crisis and do its part in contributing to maintaining the status quo in Europe, following a policy of keeping the present regimes in power, a policy that converges with the current policy of the Italian CP and the Spanish CP<sup>2</sup> as well as the international orientation of the Soviet bureaucracy.

In face of this situation, the majority of the leadership of the LCR, after having proved incapable of understanding the popular-frontist nature of the Union of the Left remains blind to the real stakes in the current policies of the French CP. Against the evidence of the facts this leads the LCR to give credit to the thesis that the CP attacked the SP to facilitate winning the March 1978 elections:

"This operation was necessary to justify the function of the vote on the first round and avoid having the division play into the hands of the SP (as the leadership feared in the local and municipal elections); create a relationship of forces, the better to negotiate on the governmental level; finally, solidify the ranks and remobilize. . . ." (Resolution of the CC of the LCR, October 2, 1977. *National Bulletin*, No. 72.)

In terms of agitation, a situation of this kind requires that the French Trotskyists center all their activities around advancing a workers united front against the policy of dividing the working class and practicing class collaborationism, giving top priority to the slogan "CP-SP

government without ministers representing the bourgeois parties," and the concrete demands that flow from it, on the electoral level, in opposition to the policy of the popular front and the offensive of dividing the working class: "A class vote. Against all the bourgeois candidates, a single candidate for the workers parties on the second round, for a majority of the CP and the SP." These demands, of course, must be well connected, with incessant agitation on what should be the first measures of a genuine workers government but without these constituting a precondition for an immediate appeal to the workers parties to break their political links with the bourgeoisie and join together without delay to overturn the regime and form their own government.

At each of its meetings, however, the majority of the Central Committee of the LCR rejected such a move. It preferred the formula of a "CP-SP government pledging to satisfy . . .," a move illustrated by the main leaflet which affirmed:

"Down with Giscard-Barre.

"Enough compromises. Enough division!

"What is needed is unity of the workers.

"What is necessary is a CP-SP government pledged to satisfy the demands:

"A minimum wage of 2,400 francs and the 35-hour week!

"Sliding scale of wages!

"Nationalization of all the key sectors without indemnification or remuneration!

"Control over working conditions by shop councils!"

Such formulations reflect a persistent lack of comprehension of the role of the struggle for a "CP-SP government" in the overall battle against popular-front politics and for the workers united front.

By placing above all else its pretense of "inserting itself" in the pseudo "programmatic debate" between the CP and the SP, the LCR ends by finding itself on the terrain of trying to outbid the common program from the left. Trotskyists above all should not support in any way the project put forward by the unions and by the CP and SP of "shop councils" instituted *through legislative channels* and attempting to confine in advance the movement of the working masses towards the construction of their own democratic and unitary organs into an institutional coffin defined by *the bourgeois state*.

Furthermore, the multiplication of programmatic demands posed as *preconditions* for calling for a CP-SP government reduces this formula to nothing more than a propagandistic and conditional perspective and leads in fact to the refusal to mobilize the masses around immediate political demands addressed to the workers parties in opposition to their policies of division and collaboration. In practice, that leads to powerlessness before the actual policies of the CP and does not pose clearly, in the context of a decisive electoral test, the concrete demands which flow from the struggle for the workers united front, demands whose axis is not to "insert oneself into the debate" but, without preconditions, to obtain the unity of the workers parties for the overthrow of the government and of the regime.

Finally, while it would be correct to support *unconditionally* the *formation* of a CP-SP government as the first act of political rupture with the bourgeoisie demanded in the current situation, it is false to propose political support for this government as such under the cover of "programmatic

conditions." That reinforces the illusion that we not only support such a government *against* capitalist reaction, as it says in the Transitional Program, not only that we support the *measures* that will really lead it along the path of breaking with the bourgeoisie, but the illusion that the realization of the *conditions outlined above would make the CP-SP government a real workers government and that as such we will support it*.

"... the formula of the SP-CP government cannot be advanced by revolutionary Marxists from a principled point of view without meaning a workers government." (Unitary Politics and the Legislative Elections, October 1977, *National Bulletin*, No. 72).

Confusion over the counterrevolutionary character of the popular front, a positive evaluation of the policies of the Stalinist apparatus, lack of understanding of the central place that the struggle for a workers government must occupy, and of the concrete forms that it must take lead naturally today to a search for and the systemization of the orientation for "unity of the revolutionaries."

In its meeting at the beginning of October, 1977, the majority of the Central Committee of the LCR adopted a resolution on the preparations for the coming legislative elections on the basis of the above-mentioned report by Comrade Garcin (*National Bulletin*, No. 72), who stated:

"There exists what we can call in journalistic fashion a 'revolutionary far left,' heterogeneous to be sure, confused, in flux, in crisis, but whose existence cannot be understood without understanding the broader social processes which it reflects, which we have called the 'broad vanguard'."

This report reaffirms the fundamental correctness of the line of the first congress of the LCR which "prioritized the battle with the PSU" by adopting the explicit objective of "building a common revolutionary organization." The stupidity of such an orientation has been cruelly demonstrated, however, as much by the fact that the PSU has clearly oriented toward the Union of the Left as by the fact that, far from winning the left of the PSU, the LCR was itself hit by the departure of several dozen comrades who rejoined that section of the "left" and formed a new group—the CCA [Comité Communiste pour l'Autogestion—Communist Committees for Self-Management].

Refusing, moreover, to take a critical look at the most recent developments in this policy of the "unity of the revolutionaries," reaffirming in particular that the electoral agreement with Lutte Ouvrière [Workers Struggle] and the OCT [Organisation Communiste des Travailleurs—Communist Workers Organization] during the last municipal elections constituted an "acceptable compromise" and that the unitary tactic of May 1, 1977, was "a real step towards a united front" (on these two points, see the text "The Debate on Europe and the Responsibilities of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction"). The majority resolution continues, with "conjunctural variations," a policy on the axis of the "unitary policy LO, OCT, CCA, PSU," excluding the OCI which is characterized as a "centrist organization on the road to degeneration."

On the eve of the upcoming elections, this orientation translates itself into an application of the policy of the unity of the revolutionaries at the expense of a real struggle for the workers united front, and of no serious examination whatsoever of the proposals advanced by the OCI for single candidates of the forces claiming to be Trotskyist.

Even though the voting instructions for the second ballot are correct (“ . . . vote CP-SP with the call not to vote for the Left Radicals”), its political significance is greatly obscured by the continuation of the policy of the “unity of the revolutionaries.” The resolution makes this clear:

“We will not make this point (that is, the call not to vote for bourgeois candidates on the second ballot) a cause for a breakdown in the negotiations . . .”

Which leads in the common statement of the LCR-CCA-OCT announcing the probable realization of an electoral agreement to the following formula:

“On the second ballot, because we want to fight against the right wing, and although we are in total disagreement with the perspectives of the Common Program, we will vote for and we call on others to vote for the best placed candidate of the reformist parties (the LCR and the CCA do not call for voting for the Left Radicals)”. (*Rouge*, November 29, 1977.)

Thus the vote for the CP-SP and its opposite, the vote for the Popular Front, will be the two variants of the same policy—voting for the reformists—the LCR supporting the candidates of the OCT, who will step down without ambiguity in favor of the Union of the Left, and demanding of the PCR-ML (Mao-Stalinist) that it accepts this direction for voting (which in its case can only be translated into a call to step down for the Popular Front) so as to be able to join in the “unity of the revolutionaries.”

Moreover, the CC resolution affirms the following:

“The voting directions on the first ballot will be to vote for the revolutionary candidates. That is to say, to vote for the organizations that denounce the Common Program as a program of class collaboration, and at the same time calling for the vote for the CP and the SP on the second ballot. At the present time, that means the LO, the OCT, the CCA, and, if they run candidates, the OCI. As for the self-management, ecology, and other electoral lists, we will vote for them on the first ballot if they meet the same programmatic criteria.”

Preferentially voting support for the far left substitutes the concept of a vote for the “broad vanguard” for the correct orientation of a class vote (which never implies any such adherence to the program of the workers organizations concerned). That is the result of a policy that continues to deliberately place the imperative of the “unity of the revolutionaries” and the aspirations of the so-called broad vanguard in a privileged position to the detriment of our program and to the detriment of the political struggle against the popular front, for the workers united front.

7. *In the Spanish state:* The Fourth International today has as its central task to base itself on the mobilizations of the working masses and the oppressed nationalities in order to follow the path of the struggle against the Moncloa pact and for the overthrow of the government. This perspective is that of all the Trotskyists in Spain. The most urgent questions of orientation are concentrated, at the current state of the class struggle, around two questions: the attitude toward the current *Cortes* and toward the various “*trade union reforms*” undertaken by the government.

After the elections of last June the Political Bureau of the [Spanish] LCR published a political declaration which raised the following slogans: “No government negotiated with the capitalist parties,” “For a government of the PSOE [Spanish Social Democracy] and the Spanish CP.”

However, these basically correct slogans are part of a political project which undermines essential parts of their political significance: “We must try to convince very large sectors of workers to defend these demands alongside us. But, *in the meantime*, since the *parliament* is going to open its session and since the workers parties which have the confidence of the majority of the class have a significant weight inside parliament, the *central* task of all the workers deputies and senators (together, in a *unified bloc inside the legislature*) and the parties to which they belong must be to demand the implementation of the most urgent democratic principles and demands put forward by those who voted for them, the workers and the masses.” (Our emphasis.)

This line of march contradicts in practice the tasks of a real struggle for the overthrow of the monarchy and for the installation of a government of the workers parties.

In the first place, it constitutes a clear shift in the characterization of the present *Cortes*, which the LCR now calls “parliament.” Whatever the differences in the international on electoral tactics, during the elections there seemed to be agreement on the analysis of the *Cortes* as not being a real bourgeois-democratic parliament. Everyone emphasized the antidemocratic character of the elections and the powerlessness of this institution. Its creation—an attempt to graft *limited and deformed* elements of parliamentarism onto the old state apparatus—was rightly characterized as a maneuver of the decomposing dictatorship that was attempting, with the complicity of the workers leaderships, to confine the masses on the institutional terrain and turn them away from struggling for the overthrow of the monarchy. At that time, electoral participation was presented by its partisans as the best means of *denouncing* this continuation of the *Cortes* and of *counterposing* to it the *immediate* demand of free and constituent elections.

This is no longer the analysis of the LCR, nor its practical orientation. The LCR builds illusions in the real powers of this “parliament” by holding the view that satisfaction for the democratic demands of the masses can be won by an adroit *pressure* tactic: “. . . as always, the workers parties and trade unions must depend on their own struggles to force the government and the legislature itself to recognize the democratic rights of the people.”

Such a line of march objectively substitutes an illusory struggle of *pressure on the Cortes and on the existing government*, the demand for a “bloc” to be formed in the “parliamentary” arena of the *Cortes*, for a real battle for the workers united front, the mobilization of the masses around all their demands; the demand for the “workers parties” (and not just the “deputies”) that they unite . . . to break with the Moncloa pact and overthrow the *Cortes*; the struggle for the overthrow of the monarchy and the formation of a PSOE-PCE government” as the indispensable *political precondition* for the real satisfaction of the main democratic rights. Against this, the tactic proposed by the LCR adapts itself to the institutional framework established by the elections of last June and builds the illusion that the *Cortes* constitutes in a certain sense, a victory or a real base of support for the mass struggle. This leads logically to downgrading the call for *free and constituent elections* and its necessary corollary, the slogan of *dissolution of the Cortes* (and its appendices among the oppressed nationalities); it means not giving an immediate and agitational character to these slogans, a

character which they should have in the context of the overall struggle for the satisfaction of demands against the pact and against the regime.

Thus last June's declaration calls for the "dismissing of Suarez" and calls on the "immediate holding of free elections" for the *municipalities*. On the other hand, the struggle for constituent elections is *subordinated* to the logic of pressuring the current Cortes.

Several months after the elections, the Cortes has satisfied *none* of the demands and has clearly demonstrated its artificial character. The government governs by decree alone, and it is in fact an apparatus other than the Cortes—the Moncloa pact—which has been used to link the workers leaderships directly to support of the regime and its antiworker policies. Nevertheless, a new declaration of the LCR reaffirms the policy of using the supposed "parliament" as a point of support for the workers united front and the struggle against the regime: "It is necessary to form a *workers bloc inside parliament to struggle against* all the political and constitutional projects of the bourgeoisie, to demand a *referendum* on the form of government." Moreover, this last proposition (a referendum demanded *within and by* the present Cortes) substitutes for the call for free and constituent elections an institutional trick located on a terrain which has no relationship with the mobilization of the masses. This means once again turning away from the struggle, which is the immediate agenda, for the *overthrow* of the Cortes granted from above.

This opportunistic adaptation is only superficially opposed to the ultraleft and antiparlamentarism demonstrated by the IMT before the constituent assembly in Portugal. This assembly, and the majority held within it by the workers parties, constituted at the time *the very opposite* of the Cortes granted by Juan Carlos—a *real victory of the revolutionary mobilization of the masses*. It was necessary to demand that the workers parties base themselves on this victory in order to break their political links with the military hierarchy and advance along the path of the workers government; it was equally necessary to defend this victory against all the attempts by the MFA, the PCP and the centrist and ultraleftist groups who wanted to dissolve it in the name of a supposed "people's power" under the guidance of the military.

In the Spanish state the place of the Cortes in the class struggle is totally different. The masses must defend and extend a certain number of elementary democratic victories, in the first place the legal existence of the workers organizations, their parties and unions.

But this is independent of the institutional existence of the "Cortes." From the point of view of their struggle for the defense and extension of democratic rights and their struggle for the workers government, the masses have *nothing to defend* in the existence of the Cortes. Their combat leads on the contrary, without "waiting," to the struggle *against* (and not *inside*) this Cortes, for its dissolution, for immediate and free elections, for the sovereign constituent Cortes.

The symmetrical errors made with respect to the Portuguese constituent assembly and the Spanish Cortes have a *common foundation*, a lack of understanding which unites the current situation in Spain and that in Portugal in 1974-75: the process of *decomposition* which a prerevolutionary mobilization of the masses produces in a dictatorial-type regime. Despite the legal existence of the CP and the SP

and even their place in the governments, the Portuguese regime, far from being "the freest in the world," was a *dictatorship*, dominated by the military hierarchy.

Similarly the Spanish regime constitutes today a dictatorship in a state of decomposition (which the policies of "reform" tried continuously to adjust to the evolution of the relations between the classes). Treating the current Cortes as a "parliament" can only reinforce the false idea that "general elections were only the end of the first stage in the transition from the dictatorship to the strong state." In fact, for the Spanish bourgeoisie, the installation of a new *stable* form of political domination on the ruins of the corporatist and dictatorial structures inherited from Francoism presupposes a significant defeat of the masses. In the current state of relations between the classes, bourgeois "reforms" do not indicate a "transition" controlled by the Spanish bourgeoisie; they are the product of the crisis of decomposition which the state of the dictatorship is undergoing under the pressure of the mobilization of the oppressed nationalities and the working masses, a crisis whose conclusion can only be the defeat of one or the other of the two fundamental classes. In this context, the class struggle forces the bourgeoisie to constantly *remodel* its instruments of political domination insofar as those it inherited from Francoism are dismantled by the mobilization of the masses and by the strengthening of the working-class organizations (parties, unions, committees).

Thus it is that the bourgeoisie held elections to the Cortes in an attempt to turn the masses away from a political offensive against a declining regime, called on their traitorous leaderships, and permitted these leaderships to lead the defense of the formally "parliamentarized" monarchist institutions.

It is in the same way that we must interpret the successive *attempts* of the bourgeoisie to find new means of controlling the mass movement through the bourgeois state, countering the effort of the masses to pit their own organizations against the old CNS. Faced with the collapse of the CNS, the latest initiative in this sense is the creation *by the government* of "committees" as the legal instruments for elections and for negotiations in the factories. Although, in view of the current state of mass mobilization, this governmental project cannot be completely applied any more than the preceding attempts, one must not avoid a clear characterization of the governmental project as such.

With respect to this, the LCR's *Combate* says that the "institutionalization of the councils is a victory beyond compare in the world." The recent brochure on the trade-union conference of the LCR says: "Despite all the *limitations* in the law, it represents an important *concession* won by the workers movement."

That is a grave misunderstanding: the governmental project does not constitute a "victory" whose "limitations" must be fought. In the face of the movement of self-organization of the class, which is growing daily in strength, it is another effort of *state intervention* in the institutions of the working class which goes against not only the *free* right of functioning and of negotiation of the trade-union locals but also goes against the *free* election of workers delegates by *real councils* or committees that the workers form *completely autonomous from the state apparatus*. This must be the central *axis* of the explanation of the Trotskyists, who must link the program of struggle against the Moncloa pact with an intransigent defense of



all the rights of the trade unions and the absolute independence of the workers committees with respect to any regulation or intervention of the bourgeois state.

Above and beyond the differences in circumstances, the grave error of the LCR on this question poses the same fundamental questions that were raised in the debate between the IMT and LTF on the single trade-union law in Portugal and on the "popular power" of the MFA-Copcon. At that time, the LTF espoused the Marxist position of defending the independence of the class against the corporatist project of the MFA (supported by the Portuguese CP), a project which reintroduced state control over the workers movement in a new form. In the same way the projects of the monarchical Suarez government are not "bureaucratic" in the same way as one defines the antidemocratic attitude of a traitorous leadership of the class. When it is the bourgeois state that intervenes in order to referee the internal matters of the workers movement, it is always an attack on the *independence of the class and of its institutions*.

The decision of the LCR to support the option of voting for the "open lists" in the elections aggravates still more the consequences of its analytical error. Today the bourgeoisie depends entirely on the support of the traitorous leaderships and particularly on the trade-union bureaucrats for the application of its austerity policies. Although the bureaucrats are in agreement on supporting the monarchy and its antilabor policies, they disagree on how to do this. Just as the PCP and PSP fought among themselves for the favors of the MFA, so both the Spanish CP and the PSOE consider themselves best able to play this role, which is why in the elections of the factory committees the UGT and the CCOO disagreed.

The UGT wanted elections in which the trade unions could present lists of candidates. This attitude of the leadership of the UGT was a product of its wish to defend its bureaucratic positions and of its hope to capitalize on the electoral progress of the PSOE in the trade unions. For the leadership of the CCOO, the best way to oppose the movement of the masses in the direction of real factory committees was to support the system of "open lists," a system in which there would only be one list for each factory, including both unionized and nonunionized candidates (without mentioning their organizational affiliation). In this way the Stalinists remained true to their demagogy about "assemblies" and to their theses about "trade unionism of a new type" under cover of which they fought against the construction of real structured trade-union organizations. Today they actively support a formula for the elections that conforms outrightly to the attempt of the governmental project to restrict and control trade-union activity.

The LCR says it is in favor of the freedom of the trade unions; it struggles for trade-union unity and for a unification congress of all workers, whether affiliated to the UGT, the CNT, or the CCOO. But because of its false characterization of the governmental project and of the policies of the Stalinists with respect to that, the LCR makes two errors: it believes it can turn the rules of the bourgeois state, which are opposed to free organs of the class (whether trade unions or committees), into a lever to develop such organs; and in the framework of the elections, it supports the formula that most restricts the rights of the trade-union organizations.

8. The totality, described above, of the theoretical and

practical positions taken by the ex-IMT or by sections directly inspired by it constitute a negative evolution with respect to the possibility of a reorientation raised by the "Self-Criticism on Latin America." Taking note of the importance of this document in the reorientation of our movement, Comrade Barnes last January called on the IMT to continue in the same direction to resolve the "remaining contradictions": "... the comrades of the majority are obligated to accept the objective possibility that a turn this deep, this wrong, and this long-held could not have been engaged in without affecting our strategy and method up and down the line.

"The question must be answered: Is it possible that a course consciously built on generalizing the turn of the Ninth World Congress—even if aspects of it were correct—could escape substantial errors that require reviewing?" [See IIDB, Vol. XIV, No. 5, May 1977.]

Comrade Barnes referred in particular to errors around the "new vanguard," in Portugal and the experience with the FUR. In the last few months, the IMT has "resolved" all these points in its own way: by reaffirming the essential aspects of its past orientation; by refusing any "generalization" of its critical rethinking of the Ninth World Congress, and by attempting to artificially limit this process to the Latin American area alone.

From the point of view of political orientation, this situation was not fundamentally changed by the recent dissolution of the IMT, which basically agreed on an explicit reaffirmation of the traditional positions of the international majority on the general method of building the party as well as the lessons to be learned from the recent experience of the class struggle, beginning with Portugal. Thus the French component of the IMT voted on a text calling for the dissolution of the IMT which explicitly refers to "differences with the positions of the LTF on Vietnam, Angola and particularly Portugal" presented in the "Declaration of the IMT" of last June, and emphasizes that "this dissolution does not eliminate the differences expressed up till now in the debate." Far from placing into question the political basis of its positions in the international debate formulated in the Declaration of June 1977, the IMT upon dissolving agreed on a unanimous reaffirmation of the fundamental correctness of the line followed on Portugal, on Vietnam, and on Angola, and in a more general sense the correctness of the analysis of the "broad vanguard," the crisis of Stalinism, and on the orientation of the IMT in Europe.

## II. For the Political Reorientation of the International, For the Continuation of the Struggle of the LTF, A New International Tendency

1. The signers of this document reaffirm their complete support for the principles underlying the constitution and the struggle of the LTF. The LTF had as its sole goal the struggle against the grave errors in orientation committed by the majority of the leadership of the international beginning with the disastrous political turn of the Ninth World Congress, and for returning to the functioning of the different bodies of the international according to the Bolshevik norms of democratic centralism.

During its years of struggle, the LTF placed the general interests of the international and the defense of the unity of the international over and above its own interests and always subordinated its tactical and organizational choi-

ces to the goal of gaining the greatest clarity on the political questions.

In harmony with these principles, the signers of this text are pleased with the progress made in the recent period as the first fruits of the struggle for the reorientation and the unity of the Fourth International. But stemming from the same principles, we note that the differences of orientation that continue to exist inside the international on a whole series of fundamental questions (particularly the balance sheet and the lessons of the *Portuguese revolution*, the *method of orienting toward the "broad vanguard"* with all its consequences for the building of the party and mass work, the tactic of the *unity of the revolutionaries*, the concrete analysis of *Stalinist policies*, of *popular fronts* and their implication for the struggle for a workers government)—all show that *at the current stage of the debate, the fundamental tasks which the LTF assigned itself, i.e., to correct the political consequences of the turn of the Ninth World Congress and its methodological and political extension, are not yet accomplished.*

It is this understanding that leads us to say that the objective of political clarification at the beginning of the debate preparatory to the next world congress makes necessary an *ideological regroupment*. Our struggle for the reorientation of our movement can only be that of *following the political course charted by the international minority at the Ninth World Congress, at the Tenth World Congress, and in face of the decisive test posed by the Portuguese revolution.*

This position is radically different from that of the Bolshevik Tendency, whose principal leaders were once members of the LTF but who, at the time of the test of the Portuguese revolution, took their distance from the program and the political orientation of the LTF. Today this current has a balance sheet on Portugal and on Angola very close in practice to the positions of the IMT at the same time as it continues to hold certain criticisms of the IMT similar to those of the LTF. The supersectarian methods of debate used by this current toward both the SWP and the IMT and their extremely factional practices present new risks to the unity of our movement.

2. The signers of this text call for the formation of an International Tendency in conformity with the right recognized by the statutes of our movement. We call on the United Secretariat to define the mode of functioning and of expression compatible with the normal functioning of the bodies of the international and of its sections.

As a simple ideological current not taking the form of a faction, the tendency is open to any militant of the international who agrees with the general line of its basic documents and with the orientation of its present political struggle. Such agreement does not impose any kind of factional discipline in the discussions in the international. The tendency will not organize any internal political debate distinct from those undertaken by our movement as a whole. Concretely, the functioning of the tendency will be explicitly limited to the elaboration of documents to be submitted to the international discussion with the goal of gaining political clarity on those questions related to the platform constituting the tendency and on which the general positions that the tendency intends to defend can be made available.

A mandatory condition of adherence to the tendency is that the members agree to respect the discipline of the international, its sections, and sympathizing organiza-

tions, in a scrupulous manner and to conduct themselves in a loyal way, particularly by an exemplary fulfillment of their financial and activist obligations. The tendency will not solidarize with any act going against this principle of adherence.

3. The tendency sees its struggle for *the reorientation of the international as the continuation of the struggle of the LTT, then the LTF, whose programmatic and political acquisitions it defends.* The platform of the tendency includes the documents of the LTF (see the appendix). In effect, the tendency believes that these documents provide the principal elements of analysis and of orientation necessary to reorient the international as a whole and guide the task of building its sections in this new period of the rise of the class struggle. It calls on all the militants of the international to study the principal contributions of the international minority, contributions whose validity and currency have been strongly confirmed by the recent evolution of the class struggle as well as by the internal debate in our movement. Besides the texts on Latin America, which concern differences we are in the process of overcoming, we refer in particular to the text of Comrade Hansen on "The Underlying Differences in Method," the criticism made by Comrade Mary-Alice Waters on the first "European perspectives document," the 1973 letter of the SWP to the French LCR characterizing the Union of the Left as a popular front and the electoral stand flowing from that, the minority's resolution on the "World Political Situation" for the Tenth World Congress, the texts of the LTF on the Portuguese revolution and on Angola, and the declarations adopted by the LTF in August 1976 on the elections in Portugal, Italy, and Mexico. The method and the general orientation of these documents are those which the tendency intends to defend in the course of the preparatory debate for the Eleventh World Congress.

4. Despite the continuity of the tendency with respect to the *program* of the LTT and the LTF, the tendency constitutes a *new ideological regroupment* corresponding to a new stage in the international debate. In effect, during its meeting of August 1977 a large majority of the directing committee of the LTF decided to dissolve this formation immediately and without conditions, and to relegate its platform to the status of "historical material." This decision was based on the position that at the current stage of the international debate, the LTF had "basically achieved the original goals" of the LTT and LTF, and that "Enough progress has been made so that we no longer need a tendency or faction to press this discussion. ["For the Immediate Dissolution of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction," by Barry Sheppard. Report adopted by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction Steering Committee, August 17, 1977. IIDB, Vol. XIV, No. 8, September 1977.]

Disagreeing with this decision and its political considerations, and believing it can only increase the confusion in our debates and consequently aggravate the disorientation in our movement, this document appeals to all members of the international, whether members of the LTF or not, who are today in agreement with the following:

- The understanding of *the current state and stakes of the international debate* presented in this call.
- The *programmatic basis* indicated above.
- The current necessity of an *ideological regroupment* to lead this debate along these axes.

We call on these comrades to join us in building the tendency and in its struggle for the political reorientation

of the international.

5. The basic tasks of the tendency at the current stage flow from the objectives reaffirmed by the LTF in August 1976: "to attain clarity on the main political questions facing the Fourth International, that is, the questions that have the most immediate implications for the current practice of the national sections." ["Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction." IIDB, Vol. XIV, No. 2, April 1977, p. 29.] Recent developments confirm the timeliness of the political objectives defined above, objectives that the tendency takes as its own:

(a) The tendency "will continue to press for drawing a balance sheet on the IMT line in Latin America," [Ibid.] a balance sheet which, taking into account the important step represented by the recent "Self-Criticism on Latin America" by the IMT, must become *generalized* throughout our movement and concretized in an *official rejection* of the erroneous resolutions of the ninth and tenth world congresses.

(b) The tendency likewise assumes the goal of continuing "to press for *discussion of the consequences of the IMT line in Portugal*, the key test so far of the IMT line in Europe" [Ibid., emphasis added] as well as the position of the LTF on this question: "Here, too, the IMT line proved to be disastrous.

"Rectification of the errors made in Latin America and Portugal is the top priority." [Ibid.]

(c) The tendency believes that it is necessary to correct the European perspectives of the IMT and to present an alternative to the "results of the error of orienting to the 'new mass vanguard,' including errors made in election policy, such as adaptation towards popular frontism and confusion about the character of Stalinism, and errors in mass work in areas such as the trade-union movement, the women's liberation movement, the student movement, and national liberation movements." [Ibid.] The text entitled "The Coming Revolution in Europe" [Contribution to the Discussion Preparatory to the Fifth World Congress Since Reunification (11th World Congress), by Letourneau, Nemo, Seldjouk, and Ulysse. IIDB, Vol. XV, No. 3, May 1978] constitutes a first contribution toward this goal, a contribution that tries to base itself on the main lessons of the past debates on the "European perspective documents" of the IMT and on the balance sheet this orientation faced in particular under the test of the Portuguese revolution. The tendency will contribute in the future to the debate on the balance sheet of the application of the orientation of the European document in several European countries.

(d) In the debates preparatory to the Eleventh World Congress, the tendency will also defend the positions of the LTF on Angola as well as the analysis of the Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions contained in the minority's "World Political Situation" resolution at the last world

congress, which have been developed further, particularly in the text on Vietnam by Comrade Feldman. ["The 'Draft Resolution on the Indochinese Revolution for the Eleventh World Congress'—Where It Goes Wrong" by Fred Feldman. IIDB, Vol. XIV, No. 6, July 1977.]

(e) Finally, the tendency takes as one of its principal objectives to defend and to strengthen the unity of our movement. It defends intransigently the norms of democratic centralism. In the immediate future, this defense involves, among other things, a struggle for the speedy publication of the documents submitted for international discussion. The delay in publishing in French texts like the 1976 documents of the LTF, and the text of the LTF's statement of dissolution; the failure to this day to publish the IMT's statement of dissolution, as well as the documents of the minority formerly in the LTF, constitute breaches of previous unanimous decisions of the United Secretariat. The tendency is in favor of political reunification on the basis of democratic and public debates of all the national sections which split over the course of the crisis in the Fourth International. It supports the continuation and the deepening of the debate with the forces in the Trotskyist movement which did not participate in the 1963 reunification, beginning with the Organizing Committee and Lutte Ouvrière.

6. The tendency considers that on several important questions of debate inside the international the dividing lines are capable of undergoing big changes and crossing over the alignments hitherto existing between the IMT and the LTF. At the present time new differences have appeared inside the IMT with respect to its orientation to particular areas of party building (for instance, the women's liberation movement and the national question). Although such partial evolutions are far from resolving the more general disagreements concerning the overall method of party building, they do allow us to foresee the possibility of a significant reorientation going in the direction of the proposals made by the LTF for several years.

The tendency believes that on these questions, as well as all the new questions that might emerge in the debate, the discussion must take place without prejudgments or preconditions within the bodies of the international, and allowing the greatest possible expression of individual positions. In this context, we say that the only criteria for possible ideological regroupments on one side or the other must in every circumstance be the reality of the positions presented, independent of existing alignments on other problems.

7. On a temporary basis, the tendency has set up an International Secretariat composed of the first four signers of this text.

Letourneau, Nemo, Seldjouk, Ulysse  
December, 1977

## Appendix

List of documents constituting the platform of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction

1. The declaration constituting the LTF (August 17, 1973) refers explicitly to the following documents:

- "Argentina and Bolivia—the Balance Sheet." IIDB, Vol. X, No. 1, January 1973.
- "The Underlying Differences in Method," by Joseph Hansen. IIDB, Vol. X, No. 12, July 1973.

2. At the time of the Tenth World Congress, the LTF submitted the following documents:

- "The World Political Situation and the Immediate

Tasks of the Fourth International." *Intercontinental Press*, Vol. 12, No. 46, December 23, 1974.

- "Counterreport on Armed Struggle in Latin America." *Ibid.*, p. 1814.

- "A Criticism of the United Secretariat Majority Draft Resolution on 'The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe'—An Initial Contribution to the Discussion," by Mary-Alice Waters. IIDB, Vol. X, No. 3, March 1973.

- "Two Assessments of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Balance Sheet." IIDB, Vol. X, No. 13, July 1973.

- "Motion on Vietnam Submitted by Adair, Hans, Juan, Pedro, Stateman, and Thérèse." IIDB, Vol. X, No. 6, April 1973.

3. At the International Executive Committee meeting of January 27-30 1975, the LTF submitted for a vote the document concerning Argentina:

- "In Reply to the IMT's Open Letter Number Two." IIDB, Vol. XII, No. 4, October 1975.

4. In August 1975, the LTF adopted the following resolutions:

- "The Key Issues in the Portuguese Revolution." IIDB, Vol. XII, No. 6, October 1975.

- "The Portuguese Revolution and the New Problems

That Face the Fourth International." *Ibid.*

5. At the IEC meeting of February 1976, the LTF submitted the following motions for a vote:

- "Resolution on Angola." (This document was adopted by the LTF in August 1976.) IIDB, Vol. XIII, No. 8, December 1976. (Not available in French.)

- "The Test of Lines in the Portuguese Revolution." IIDB, Vol. XIII, No. 2, April 1976.

6. In August 1976, the LTF adopted the following resolutions:

- "Statement by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the 1976 Portuguese Presidential Elections." IIDB, Vol. XIV, No. 2, April 1977. (Not available in French.)

- "Statement by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the 1976 Italian Elections." *Ibid.* (Not available in French.)

- "Statement by the Leninist Trotskyist Faction on the 1976 Mexican Presidential Elections." *Ibid.* (Not available in French.)

- "Statement by the Steering Committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Faction." *Ibid.* (Not available in French.)

- "Socialist Revolution and The Struggle for Women's Liberation," by Mary-Alice Waters. IIDB Vol. XIII, No. 9, December 1976.

## For a Change in the Fourth International's Position On Cuba: An Introduction to the Discussion

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December 18, 1977

### Introduction

It is seventeen years since capitalism was overthrown in Cuba. The Cuban Revolution is a new experience for the Trotskyist movement. In spite of the resemblances which it has to the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions, it also presents important differences in that the Castroist leadership was not a Stalinist leadership from the beginning.

Today after the holding of the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party and the adoption of the new constitution, it is time to pause to reevaluate the positions of the Fourth International on Cuba. Our aim should be to establish a broad agreement in our movement on what Cuba is today and on what we should do now. Differences on the interpretation of the history of the Cuban Revolution should not be an obstacle to such agreement.

The comrades who are submitting this document are doing so in order to reopen discussion on Cuba in the ranks of the Fourth International. We think that the line of these theses should be adopted by the sections of the Fourth International and approved at the next world congress.

### Theses

1. The Cuban Revolution resulted in the abolition of capitalism and the creation of a workers state in late 1960 with the nationalization of capitalist property and the institution of a state monopoly of foreign trade and a planned economy. A central task of the Fourth International is to defend this revolution and the social gains it has won.

2. Today, a privileged bureaucratic caste exists in Cuba. It is to be found in the state apparatus, the army, the party, the unions, and in the factories. It defends its own interests and holds power in Cuban society. The masses are excluded from all control of the activity of the government and the state. Cuba is therefore a bureaucratized workers state.

3. Among the evidence that a privileged caste exists are the existence of ranks in the army, the privilege of exemption from national rationing for middle and upper ranks in the army, and the possibility beginning in 1974 for technicians, engineers, and party cadres to acquire private automobiles and other goods. These party cadres and technicians have acquired considerable importance in the state apparatus. Livio Maitan, in an article published in *Intercontinental Press*, March 15, 1976, explains quite well the existence of this privileged layer:

"It is precisely these cadres who have been taking on

more and more actual administrative functions and have largely adopted paternalistic and authoritarian attitudes.

"Inevitably they have tended to consolidate their positions of power, at the same time gaining privileged social status. . . . Thus, privileges in consumption, housing, means of transport (in addition to advantages associated with positions of leadership, such as trips abroad), have had a significance beyond their intrinsic value." (P. 413.)

But Comrade Maitan does not acknowledge that these privileges are held by a crystallized caste which holds power.

At the First Congress of the CCP, Castro recognized that 40% of the members of the party had positions in the administration and in political life.

The wage policy followed by the CCP only reinforces the social inequalities and widens the wage differential. 48% of Cuban workers have their wages tied to meeting quotas; that is, workers who fail to meet quotas are paid less. 20% have their wage tied directly to the amount they produce (piecework).

4. This bureaucracy has been integrated into the international Moscow-dominated apparatus. It subordinates the needs of the proletariat to defense of its own interests and the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.

Castro said, in his speech to the First Congress of the CCP, "Our confidence in Lenin's homeland is unbounded because, in the course of more than half a century, the Soviet Revolution has proved its adherence to the principles and consistent line of behavior in its international policy. It has shown this not only in Cuba but also in Vietnam, in the Middle East, in the Portuguese colonies fighting for their independence, in Chile, Cyprus, Yemen, Angola and every other part of the world where the national liberation movement confronts colonialism and imperialism, as it once did in an exemplary manner with the heroic Spanish people." (*Granma*, December 28, 1975, p. 5.)

5. Additional evidence is the Stalinist policy of the Cuban Communist Party: peaceful coexistence, socialism in one country, advocacy of class collaborationism, support for the theory of revolution by stages. The bureaucracy's political instrument is the Cuban Communist Party, a Stalinist party.

Clear indications of this Stalinist policy are contained in Castro's speech at the First Congress of the CCP.

He supported the theory of peaceful coexistence and socialism in one country: "We cannot but take into account the fact that this process of détente includes a growing awareness among important political and economic sectors in the United States that it is only through peaceful

coexistence, which provides a means for averting a third world war and the use of nuclear weapons, that their own social system can long survive." (*Granma*, January 4, 1976, p. 10.)

He advocated class collaboration: "The growing influence of the Communists in Japan and the probable unity among the Communists, Socialists and other democratic forces there offer hopeful prospects." He also said, "While the masses of Latin America's workers and peasants continue their struggle, governments are appearing which in some cases are inspired by political concepts that lead to socialist aspirations and in other cases are guided by a clear anti-imperialist idea and by the defense of their countries' natural resources and economies in a purely nationalistic context. As a whole, these concepts and policies are the groundwork for widespread Latin-American unity to resist and defeat imperialist policy . . ." [Ibid.] It is clear that Castro's advocacy of class collaboration is related to the theory of revolution by stages.

The Cuban Communist Party functions bureaucratically, to the exclusion of all internal democracy and all control of the leadership by the ranks.

6. (a) The Cuban CP gave full support to the capitalist popular-front Allende government in Chile. The disastrous military coup in Chile in 1973 showed the bankruptcy of the Cuban Communist Party's foreign policy.

(b) The Cuban leadership has supported the capitalist military government in Peru, calling it a "fraternal revolutionary government." It calls upon the Peruvian masses to have confidence in their government, which it says is carrying out its "own process," which is different from the Cuban one but which is nonetheless revolutionary. During a mass rebellion in Lima in 1975, Radio Havana spoke of "the counterrevolutionaries who were trying to overthrow the fraternal revolutionary government in Peru," supposedly with the aim of opposing the "revolutionary" process which the Peruvian military was carrying forward.

(c) The Cuban leadership has likewise given full support to the neocolonial Torrijos government in Panama, urging the Panamanian people to have confidence in it. For example, during Torrijos's trip to Cuba in 1976, Fidel Castro said that while Panama was not a socialist country, "Now the National Guard of Panama is in the vanguard in the struggle for the country's sovereignty. . . . Now, for the first time, the people of Panama have a government that is truly defending their country's sovereignty. . ." (*Granma*, January 25, 1976.)

(d) In Angola, the line of the Cuban leadership had a dual character. On the one hand, with the aid of the USSR, Cuba succeeded in defeating the South African imperialist aggression. The Fourth International was quite correct in noting the positive aspect of this Cuban intervention.

On the other hand, the Cuban leadership's line has been to give political support to the procapitalist policy of the petty-bourgeois Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). This Stalinist line has led to the use of Cuban troops in training the repressive forces of the neocolonial MPLA government (which were used against the masses) when it came to power. Their role in remaining in Angola today is to stabilize the capitalist MPLA government.

(e) The Cuban leadership has also followed a criminal policy in Ethiopia, where the Mengistu regime has killed

leftist dissidents in the streets of Addis Ababa and waged a murderous campaign against the Eritrean national liberation movement. Castro has supported the Mengistu regime, which he presents as leading a "revolutionary process."

7. The foreign policy of the Cuban Communist Party corresponds to its internal policy. This domestic policy is contrary to the interests of the workers and contrary to workers' democracy.

The new Cuban constitution, which replaced the bourgeois constitution of 1940, is based on the 1936 constitution of the USSR. Its principles are the same: the officially-decreed leading role of the party in the state—a single-party system, the prohibition of all opposition, the subordination of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and the unions to the CCP's line, and the bourgeois mode of election. The latter system, as applied in the USSR, Trotsky denounced in *The Revolution Betrayed*, saying that ". . . the distinction of the new constitution from the old is its return from the Soviet system of election according to class and industrial groups, to the system of bourgeois democracy based upon the so-called 'universal, equal and direct' vote of an atomized population." Trotsky continued, "This is a matter, to put it briefly, of juridically liquidating the dictatorship of the proletariat." [Leon Trotsky, *The Revolution Betrayed*, (Pathfinder Press, 1972), pp. 260-261.] Although soviet forms never existed in Cuba, the institutionalization of the electoral system ("so-called 'universal, equal and direct' vote of an atomized population") clearly represents the institutionalization of a preventive measure directed against the formation of soviets, and a calculated obstacle to the independent and autonomous organization of the class.

The Matanzas elections in Cuba did not go even so far as the forms of a bourgeois democracy. The formation of parties and tendencies was forbidden.

The same is true of the institutionalization of Matanzas-type "People's Power" structures throughout Cuba. The "directing" role of the Communist Party is officially written into the "Constitution of the Organs of People's Power."

The general tendency is not the disappearance of the state but on the contrary its reinforcement.

8. The Castroist bureaucracy has removed all possibility for the masses to legally reform the Cuban state. The struggle against the bureaucracy necessarily becomes a struggle for a political revolution. This political revolution will keep the conquests of the social revolution of 1959-60.

9. The Fourth International should immediately begin the task of building a section in Cuba. In opposition to the Stalinist-Castroist leadership, a real Leninist, Trotskyist leadership is necessary to lead the political revolution and create a genuine soviet state in Cuba. The Cuban section of the Fourth International will demand an end to bureaucratic privilege and mismanagement; it will demand the free election, with the right of immediate recall, of workers' representatives to organs of proletarian rule; the legalization of all parties and tendencies which agree not to overthrow by arms the social bases of the Cuban workers' state established in 1960; and justice for those who have been imprisoned or persecuted for their ideas by the Stalinist bureaucracy. The Cuban section of the Fourth International will defend the conquests of the working class against all the attacks of imperialism and reaction.