

# International Internal Discussion Bulletin

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## FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS SINCE REUNIFICATION (Eleventh World Congress) November 1979

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# International Internal Discussion Bulletin

The International Internal Discussion Bulletin is the English-language edition of the internal discussion bulletin of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

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# Fifth World Congress Since Reunification (Eleventh World Congress) of the Fourth International

November 1979

## MINUTES

### I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS by Claudio

The Congress pays tribute to the comrades who have died since the last world congress, including: James P. Cannon, founding leader of the Socialist Workers Party and of the Fourth International; Joseph Hansen, long-time leader of the Fourth International and editor of *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*; Georg Jungclas, a founding leader of the German section and of the Fourth International; Arturo Gomez, member of the International Executive Committee from the PST of Argentina; César Robles, a leader of the Argentine PST and delegate to the 1974 world congress, assassinated by the dictatorship; former Trotskyist Mario Roberto Santucho, murdered by Argentine military forces; PST militants Adolfo Fenon Carrera, Armando Navarro, Cristina Isarregui, Cabello, Juan Carlos Scafide, Oscar Dalmacio Mesa, Mario Sida, Antonio Moses, Rubén Bouzas, Juan Carlos Nievas, Inosencio Fernandez, Adriana Zaldúa, Ana María Lorenzo, Lidia Agostini, Hugo Frigerio, Roberto Loscertales, Oscar Lucatti, Patricia Claverie, and Carlos Enrique Povedano, all murdered by the dictatorship; Rafael Lasala of the Grupo Obrero Revolucionario, murdered by the dictatorship; Mario Rodriguez, Adriana Drangosh, and Tomas Carricaburu of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria, killed by the dictatorship; the many Argentine comrades who have "disappeared" and probably been assassinated by the dictatorship; Alfonso Peralta, assassinated leader of the Mexican Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores and Heriberto Calvo Pineda, peasant militant of the PRT; Fernando Lozano Menéndez, member of the Frente Izquierda Revolucionaria of Peru, murdered by police, as well as Jesus Lojano of Peru; Rafael Awad Garcia, leader of the Colombian PSR; Humberto Valenzuela, a founding leader of the Chilean Trotskyist movement; Kavons Hematianpour, Trotskyist militant killed in the February 1979 Teheran insurrection; Shuji Sugawara, Organization Secretary of the Japan Revolutionary Communist Youth, and Yukio Niiyama, burned to death in a demonstration in defense of the Sanrizuka peasants; Chitta Mitra and Rauchhodlal Dalal of India; Wu Jingru, long-time member of the Revolutionary Communist Party of China; Ted Tripp of Australia; Yannis Vrichonopoulos of Greece; Herman Rodriguez of Euskadi, assassinated by the Francoist police, and Roger Cabri, Carnia, and Tomás Castanos of Spain; Ezio Ferrero of Italy; Jabra Nicola, one of the founders of the Trotskyist movement in Palestine/Israel;

Yigal Schwartz of the Israeli Revolutionary Communist League; Evelyn Reed, long-time leader of the U.S. Socialist Workers Party; Tony Adams, Robert Chester, Duncan Ferguson, Virginia Kiezel, Herman Kirsch, Robert Langston, Ruth Querio, John Shaffer, Dan Styron, and Larry Trainor of the U.S. SWP.

Also saluted were the imprisoned comrades of our movement in Latin America, in Japan, in Iran, and Petr Uhl of Czechoslovakia, as well as the newly liberated Chinese Trotskyists. (See Appendix J.)

### *Procedural motions from the outgoing United Secretariat:*

1. That the Presiding Committee be composed of: Aubin, Brewster, Bala, Felipe, Lachance, Melan, Stateman, and Thérèse.
2. Invited to the Congress are: delegates of sections and sympathizing organizations, members of the outgoing International Executive Committee (IEC), representatives of youth organizations of the Fourth International, and invited observers.
3. On disputed procedural points and points of order, there will be one speaker for and one against for three minutes each, and then the vote.
4. Votes on political resolutions will be taken after a decision by the congress on the recommendations of the Mandates and Recognition Commission.
5. Time limit for contributions to the political discussion will be ten minutes.
6. There will be no second round of speakers until all who want to speak on first round have spoken.
7. The secretaries of the congress will be Bourgueil and Susan.
8. That all delegates present have one vote on procedural questions. No consultative vote will be taken on procedural questions.

### *Motions on organization of congress carried.*

**Motion:** that the following points be closed sessions of the Congress (open to Fourth International members only): Attendance at the Congress, Organization Report, and Election of the IEC.

*Carried.*



## II. ATTENDANCE AT THE CONGRESS

**Motion by Aubin** for the outgoing United Secretariat:

By their actions to split the Fourth International, the members of the steering committee of the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency (LTT) and Bolshevik Faction (BF) have placed themselves outside the Fourth International, with the exception of those who have condemned the split.

No one will be seated as a delegate to this World Congress or can remain a member of the Fourth International who does not:

1. repudiate this *action* by the leadership of the LTT and BF;
2. break all relations with them; and
3. recognize the legitimacy of the World Congress.

Discussion.

**Amendments by Jacobo** were accepted by Aubin.

**Motion as Amended:**

By their act of splitting from the Fourth International, the leading committees of the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency and the Bolshevik Faction have placed themselves outside of the Fourth International, with the exception of those comrades who condemned the split.

We call on the other leaders and all members of the BF and the LTT to reject this split policy.

No one can be seated as a delegate to this World Congress, or remain a member of the Fourth International, who does not:

1. Reject this *act* carried out by the leadership of the LTT and BF;
2. Break all political and organizational relations with them, and accept that all relations with organizations outside of the Fourth International must be under the control of the national and international leadership bodies of the Fourth International;
3. Recognize the legitimacy of the World Congress;
4. Recognize democratic centralism in the framework of the Fourth International and of all its sections.

**Vote on above motion:**

All *in favor* (no written vote taken) except:

*Against:* Pedro (LC of Chile)

*Abstentions:* Jose (October Group, Norway); Lee See (RCP, China); Alberto ("Que Hacer?" group, Dominican Republic); (See Appendix A for statements by Jose, Lee See, and Alberto).

## III. COMMISSIONS AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CONGRESS

**Motion by Outgoing United Secretariat:** To establish the following commissions:

Security Commission: Claudio, Bourgueil, Otto (KAF), Saverio, and Sergio.

Mandates and Recognition Commission: Dunder, Frej, Karl (LMR), Maria, Riel, Roman, Susan.

Iran Commission: Brewster, Duret, Jones, Stateman.

Chile Commission: Karl Anderson, Abel, Maria.

Argentine Commission: Georges, Karl Anderson, Luis, Pedro, Riel.

Greece Commission: Allio, Claudio, Dunder.

China/Hong Kong Commission: Dunder, Dugger, Roman, Sakai.

Bolivia Commission: Alfonso, Claudio, Maria.

Editing Commissions: World Political Resolution—Celso and Walter; European Resolution—Aubin, Duret, Jones, Stateman; Latin America Resolution—Alfonso, Galois, Riel; Women's Liberation Resolution—Allio, Thérèse.

Nominations Commission: Alfonso, Allio, Ellis, Manuel, Otto (KAF), Sakai, Segur, Stateman.

Discussion.

**Motion by Valdez:** To add Heredia and Ricardo to the Editing Commission on the Latin American Resolution.

*Motion defeated.*

Proposals of outgoing United Secretariat *Adopted unanimously.*

**Motion by outgoing United Secretariat:** To approve schedule for the Congress.

**Motion by Karl Anderson:** To refer schedule back to Presiding Committee to make a new proposal that would assure that the Congress ends in ten days as expected.

*Karl Anderson motion carried.*

## IV. SPLIT BY BF AND LTT FROM THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Jones reported for outgoing United Secretariat.

Strawson requests extended time of twenty minutes.

Presiding Committee denies the request.

**Motion by Strawson:** That he be given time for a counterreport for the LTT.

*Strawson motion carried.*

**Counterreport by Strawson.**

Discussion.

**Statement by Howard (IMG, Britain), Hoffmann, Heredia, Joe (LCR, France), Fred (GRM, Austria), Kurt, Joanna (GIM, Germany) Fideli (LCR, Italy)**

The split organized by the BF and the LTT, which began over differences on Nicaragua, has deeper roots in the both opportunist and adventurist policy of the Morenoist current and in the dogmatism of the LTT.

What were the errors committed by the International that facilitated the development of these centrifugal currents?

1. A conception of building the Fourth International or an "international Trotskyist movement" based on a common program (the Transitional Program of 1938) played a key role. Actually there exists no "Trotskyist movement" outside of the Fourth International, only various organizations claiming to be Trotskyist but without this necessarily implying real programmatic agreement with revolutionary Marxism: the program of the Fourth International means the major acquisitions of the past forty years of existence of our movement.



2. By passing over from the error of avoiding all political and theoretical confrontation with the OCRFI and the OCI to the reverse error of minimizing the differences, the International (and in particular the French section) has created or reinforced illusions on the possibilities for a quick unification with the OCRFI, by underestimating the programmatic and organizational differences with this current (democratic centralism, etc.). This error has encouraged the development of crypto-OCRFI currents inside the International.

3. The lack of firmness in face of the factional activities and political opportunism of the Morenoist current. It has been an error that the International leadership has not sufficiently opposed the flagrant violations of democratic centralism by the BF over the past four years (especially the formation of groups in competition with sections or sympathizing organizations recognized by congresses, the IEC, or the United Secretariat), or denounced publicly its opportunist political positions toward the international Social Democracy or bourgeois forces.

4. The factionalism of the BF is to a certain extent a heritage from the factional situation of pre-1976, when many of the methods of the BF were an everyday practice. It was an error, today clearly revealed, that an in-depth discussion never took place after the dissolution of the tendencies on democratic centralism on an international scale.

5. To avoid such errors in the future we propose that, starting with the Eleventh World Congress, there should be a regular and democratic functioning of the IEC, the United Secretariat, and the Control Commission, and that democratic centralism (especially in regard to decisions of the Eleventh World Congress) should be truly applied throughout our world party.

**Motion by Daniel (GIM, Germany), Jerome, Laurent, Matti (LCR, France):**

To maintain an invitation limited to one or two observers from the OCRFI to this World Congress. The reason for such an invitation would be to confirm that we maintain our general policy, even if temporarily it takes on more limited forms.

*Motion defeated.*

Heredia challenges the limitation of the speakers list as proposed by the Presiding Committee.

**Motion by Heredia:** That the selection of the speakers list from the total list of those who ask to speak be made by the Presiding Committee in front of the whole Congress.

**Motion by Stateman:** The speakers list should not depend on who raises their hand first, but should be proposed by the Presiding Committee, after taking a list of all those who want to speak on a point, in order to have the most balanced representation of countries, tendencies, and viewpoints.

**Motion by Hoffmann:** That a speakers list be taken, the list closed, and all who ask to speak should be able to speak.

**Proposal from Chairperson** that the two basic pro-

posals—the one of Stateman, and the one of Heredia-Hoffmann—be voted contradictorily.

*Agreed.*

**Vote on the two proposals:**

For Stateman motion: 45

For Heredia-Hoffmann motion: 21

*Stateman motion carried.*

**Summary by Strawson.**

**Summary by Jones.**

(Discussion and adoption of written resolution on split was referred to later in the agenda.)

## V. INDOCHINA

**Roman reported** for the majority of the United Secretariat.

**Galois reported** for the minority of the United Secretariat.

**Strawson reported** for the LTT.

**Sakai reported** on the resolution submitted by the Japanese delegation, Hoffmann (France), Ana (Mexico), Jaber (Lebanon), Spathas (Greece).

[For all resolutions, see Collection of World Congress Documents published by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, January 1980.]

Discussion.

**Statement by German:** I vote for the general line of the position of the United Secretariat minority on Indochina, with the exception of the positions concerning the policy of the Cuban leadership.

**Motion by Mikado:** That the vote concerning Indochina be decisive, not indicative.

*Defeated.*

**Statement by Mikado:**

I wish to protest the fact that the outgoing United Secretariat did not consider it useful to explain to the World Congress why it was asking for an *indicative* vote on the Indochina resolution.

Such a vote is an unusual procedure, easily justifiable for the resolution on socialist democracy and the dictatorship of the proletariat, the final versions of which did not reach the sections until too late, and on which it is therefore necessary to continue the discussion after the World Congress until a decisive vote has been taken.

But such an argument cannot be made for the Indochina resolution. The Fourth International must have a political position on the situation in this region and the tasks that result from it for our movement. The International as a whole has had more than enough time to discuss the draft resolutions.



To the extent that the outgoing United Secretariat had valid reasons for asking for this particular type of vote, the least it could have done was to explain its position to the Congress.

#### Statement by the RCP (China) on Indochina:

1. It is not sufficient to define a country as a workers state by the mere overthrow of a bourgeois government (on this point we do not agree with the majority resolution). But, a workers state is set up when the new regime that replaces the bourgeois regime sets up state ownership of property. In Indochina and even the whole world, we do not define a state as a workers state by such criteria as whether the leadership carries out correct policies or whether the proletariat has become the ruling class. What determines the nature of a state is not the superstructure but its social and economic foundation.

2. Imperialism's armed intervention has severely weakened the economic foundation of all Indochina and has brought devastating destruction to Cambodia. The even narrower nationalism of Pol Pot's regime as compared to other Stalinist regimes has caused the Cambodian workers state to be extremely deformed. But as deformed states, Vietnam and Cambodia are the same. Therefore, the prospect of political revolution in all of Indochina is directly linked to the continued carrying out of socialist tasks. That is, only by removing the obstacle to revolution can the revolution continue to advance.

3. The reason for the present war between Cambodia and Vietnam lies mainly in the contradiction of interests of the two ruling bureaucracies. Realization of the aims of either party will not strengthen the Cambodian or Vietnamese workers state. It is not true that one of them represents the interests of the revolution and the other represents the interests of the bourgeoisie or of imperialism. They both represent the interests of the bureaucracies.

4. To defend the Indochinese revolution is a major task of the world proletariat and of us Trotskyists. In the last analysis, only the establishment of a real Federation of United Socialist States of Indochina can really get the reconstruction of Indochina started. This is beyond doubt. Lenin taught that the establishment of the Federation must be carried out on the premise of respecting each and every member country's self-determination. It cannot be brought about by coercion, least of all by military coercion. It can only be genuinely achieved through the overall mobilization of the Indochinese toiling people.

Vietnam's military action to overthrow the Pol Pot regime (in this action, Heng Samrin's forces were only a secondary factor) was not motivated by a wish to correct the deformity of the Cambodian workers state. And the outcome of the military action did not arouse or assist Cambodian workers and peasants to mobilize to deepen the Cambodian revolution. Though Hanoi used the pretext of realizing an Indochinese Federation in its invasion of Cambodia, such an act can only push the setting up of a Federation of United Socialist States of Indochina to a more distant future. On Pol Pot's part, he can mobilize the masses on the pretext of opposing Vietnamese chauvinist oppression. Therefore, Trotskyists should not support Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia for the reason of promoting the Federation of United Socialist States of Indochina, or promoting a closer cooperation among workers and

peasants of the entire region. And Trotskyists also should not support Pol Pot's military action that bases itself on extremely narrow nationalism. Therefore, Trotskyists should adopt a defeatist attitude towards both Vietnam and Cambodia.

5. China invaded Vietnam mainly because Vietnam went into an alliance with Moscow. In order to oppose Moscow's chauvinist oppression against it, the Chinese bureaucracy practices chauvinism in the same way toward Vietnam, and goes so far as to attempt to collaborate with imperialist forces. But China's invasion of Vietnam does not signify that it has already formed an alliance with imperialism, that it represents the interests of imperialism in rolling back the Indochinese revolution. China acted this way only out of narrow nationalism and the interests of the bureaucracy. And so it was not a war between one party that is revolutionary and one that is counterrevolutionary. Instead, it was a war between the bureaucracies. On this point this war is similar to the Vietnamese-Cambodia War. We oppose the above wars among workers states. We demand that the respective bureaucracies solve the questions (on which pretexts they wage wars) by political discussion. We also point out that these questions can be radically solved only when these countries go through a political revolution. In the same way, we do not support either side in the Sino-Vietnamese War.

6. Once the war has already broken out, our defeatist attitude toward the war that is waged in the interest of the bureaucracies will—directly in the war situation—rapidly weaken the rule of the bureaucracies and facilitate the advancement of political revolution in these countries. On the other hand, taking a defeatist position on a war waged by the bureaucracies will not in fact eliminate the conditions that lead to war. Flavored by narrow nationalism on both sides, the war crisis will continue, will continuously cause new military clashes, and will over a long period weaken the economic foundations of the workers states. On the other hand, it will objectively strengthen narrow nationalism, and finally provide favorable opportunities to imperialism to continue its sabotage of the Indochinese revolution.

7. Our demand that the Vietnamese troops withdraw from Cambodia will not facilitate a renewed attack by imperialism. On the contrary, Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia will be oppressive to the Cambodian people and will be an obstacle to the rise of the Cambodian people. Vietnam, especially because it is under Soviet pressure, will withdraw its troops when the Soviet Union compromises with imperialism in its policy of detente. We, therefore, cannot hope that the Vietnamese troops will guarantee the continuation of the Cambodian revolution. To say so is only to hold illusions in the Vietnamese Stalinists.

8. The above is the conclusion reached by the Chinese Section of the Fourth International in its pre-Congress discussion. This is the opinion of the majority. There are different opinions, such as the view of a small minority of comrades who consider that we should support the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and support Vietnam against the Chinese invasion. There is also the opinion that we should adopt defeatism towards China and defense of Vietnam in the Sino-Vietnamese War, and adopt defeatism towards Vietnam and defense of Cambodia in the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Due to insufficient discussion,



comrades of the RCP unanimously agreed to continue discussion on the question. The present conclusion is only an initial conclusion. The above opinion only obtained a slight majority in the RCP internal discussion.

#### Statement by Spathas:

Since (1) the very nature of every workers state must be given in a concrete and clarified way; and (2) I do not intend to preoccupy the international discussion going on about the nature of the workers state of Cuba,

My signature and vote for the resolution on Indochina presented to the Eleventh World Congress by the Japanese delegation and other comrades must be considered as a vote for the text as a whole, with the exception of the footnote, "There are workers states under the counterrevolutionary thermidorian bureaucracy and those which are not. . . ."

#### Summary by Jaber (replacing Sakai).

#### Summary by Strawson.

#### Summary by Galois.

#### Summary by Roman.

#### Indicative votes on Indochina:

1. Resolution by Japanese delegation et al.:

**Delegates:** 12 for, 81 against, 2.5 abstentions, 2.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 46 against, 3 abstentions, 2 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

2. Report by LTT:

**Delegates:** 16.5 for, 73 against, 5.5 abstentions, 3 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 48 against, 1 abstention, 2 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

3. United Secretariat minority resolution:

**Delegates:** 15.5 for, 72 against, 7.5 abstentions, 3 not voting.

**Consultative:** 16 for, 34 against, 0 abstentions, 2 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

4. United Secretariat majority resolution:

**Delegates:** 56.5 for, 27.5 against, 11 abstentions, 3 not voting.

**Consultative:** 30 for, 18 against, 3 abstentions, 1 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

(Note: (1) Comrades were recorded as "not voting" when they marked their ballots "not voting," if they left blank places in the ballot, or if they did not vote at all. (2) The category of "fraternal" votes includes the votes of fraternal observers from the U.S. Socialist Workers Party, which is prevented from being the U.S. section because of reactionary legislation. (3) The category of "consultative" votes includes the votes of outgoing IEC members who were not delegates; representatives of sympathizing organizations; the representative of the Puerto Rican Liga Internationalista de los Trabajadores, which is also prevented by U.S. reactionary legislation from being a recog-

nized sympathizing organization of the International; and youth organizations of the Fourth International. (4) All votes on resolutions and reports were on the general line.)

#### VI. INITIAL REPORT FROM MANDATES AND RECOGNITION COMMISSION, by Riel

**Motion** to recognize the following number of mandates of already recognized sections and fraternal organizations of the Fourth International:

Antilles (1), Australia (2), Austria (1), Belgium (3), Bolivia (2), Britain (7), Canada (3), Chile (1), China (1), Denmark (1), France (17), Germany (3), Greece (1), India (0)\*, Israel (1), Italy (2), Japan (4), Lebanon (1), Luxemburg (1), Mexico (5), Netherlands (1), New Zealand (1), Spain (15), Sri Lanka (1), Sweden (5), Switzerland (3).

Fraternal Organizations: USA (15).

(\*No mandates because the section was unable to hold an organized discussion or a congress.)

*Carried.*

**Motion:** To recognize the following organizations as new sections of the Fourth International, with the corresponding number of mandates: PSR of Colombia (6), PRT of Peru (2), PSR of Portugal (2).

*Carried.*

**Motion:** To recognize the following organizations as new sympathizing organizations: GCR (Algeria), "Que Hacer?" group (Dominican Republic), Fylkinging (Iceland), MSR (Panama), GMR (Tunisia), GOR (Senegal), RSL (Greenland), OSR (Venezuela); As fraternal sympathizing organizations: LIT (Puerto Rico).

*Carried*

**Motion:** To withdraw recognition from the Cyprus section, since no organization functioning with the Fourth International exists in that country today.

*Carried.*

**Motion:** In the case of Ireland, members of the Irish section which was recognized at the last World Congress have fused with another organization. The fused organization, People's Democracy, has not yet taken a stand in favor of affiliation to the Fourth International. People's Democracy is planning a congress in the near future, at which it will discuss a proposal to affiliate to the Fourth International. The World Congress mandates the IEC to take a decision on the status of the group in light of the results of the congress. In the meantime, the members of the former Irish section retain their membership as individuals in the Fourth International, as an exceptional measure. The delegate sent by PD who is a former member of the Irish section should have voice and consultative vote.

*Carried.*

**Motion:** In the case of Brazil, a new organization is in the process of being formed including forces of the POC,



which was recognized as a sympathizing organization by the last World Congress. The new organization is scheduled to hold its founding congress in the coming months. The World Congress mandates the IEC to recognize the new organization as a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International if this is appropriate in light of the results of the founding congress.

*Carried.*

**Motion:** That the comrade from the RML of Hong Kong be seated with voice and consultative vote until the China/Hong Kong Commission can finish its work.

*Carried.*

**Motion:** In the case of Iran, a new organization has been formed which is the product of a fusion between the Sattar League (a sympathizing organization recognized by the last World Congress) and the Group of Supporters of the Fourth International in Europe and the Middle East, together with other forces. At the present time the newly fused organization has divided into essentially two public factions. A special commission has been established by the World Congress to deal with this problem and with the status of the organization.

Given this situation, the Congress decides at this point: (1) To postpone the question of recognition until after the Iran Commission is able to finish its work; (2) To grant each side full delegates with voice and vote, corresponding to the number of members each side claims to have, that is, three delegates to the group publishing *Kargar*, and two delegates to the group publishing *What Is To Done*. The status of these votes will be determined retroactively after a decision of the congress on the status of the organization.

*Carried.*

**Statement by Azar and Fari (Iran, "What Is To Be Done" group):**

The recommendation from the Mandates Commission proposing three delegates for the *Kargar* faction of the HKS was based on reports given by comrades representing this faction at this congress about their present size. We think this report was inaccurate and false. But we realize neither the Mandates Commission nor the Congress delegates are at this point in a position to judge this matter. We want to register our protest, however, and refer the matter of investigating the reports given to the Mandates Commission to the Iran Commission.

**Motion:** Delegates of sections have the right to voice and full vote. Delegates of sympathizing organizations and IEC members have consultative vote. Given the shortness of time and the large number of points on the agenda, as well as the large number of full delegates and fraternal observers (108), the speaking time will be essentially reserved for delegates of sections and IEC members. This is essential for the democratic functioning of the congress. To the extent that time remains within the framework of the adopted schedule, delegates of sympathizing organiza-

tions will be allowed to speak. Observers do not have voice or vote.

*Carried.*

### **Statement Submitted by Mandates and Recognition Commission:**

The Mandates Commission wants to draw the attention of the World Congress to the provisions in the statutes regarding financial contributions from national sections to the International center, as one of the criteria for recognition as a section. It is obvious that this World Congress cannot resolve this question, given the long period of irregularities in relation to the statutes and the lack of preparations prior to this congress. The Mandates and Recognition Commission recommends that the incoming leading bodies of the Fourth International should take steps to move toward regularizing the financial contributions from sections to the center.

## **VII. WORLD POLITICAL SITUATION**

**Walter reported** for outgoing United Secretariat.

**Howard given extended time** in the discussion to present his counterline amendments. (See Appendix B for amendments.)

Discussion.

**LTT requests time** for counterreport.

*Presiding Committee proposes* that the LTT be granted extended time of twenty minutes, plus a speaker for the LTT immediately before the summary.

*Carried.*

**Motion by Kurt:** That a counterreport be granted to the grouping of comrades which includes Comrades Howard, Tettadoro, Marston (Britain), Kurt, Joanna (Germany), Hoffmann, Joe (France), Fred (Austria), and Nanne (Holland). (See Appendix B for document of Howard et. al.)

*Defeated.*

Swedish comrades supporting amendments request extended time in the discussion.

*Presiding Committee proposes* instead to group several Swedish comrades together in the discussion period.

*Agreed.*

Discussion.

### **Amendments by Jaber:**

1. Page 3, point 1. To the features of the world relationship of forces, as enumerated in the Celso-Walter first amendment [for Celso-Walter amendment, see minutes of September 29-October 4, 1979, United Secretariat meeting] add the following:

Fundamental also is the evolution of the balance of



nuclear forces between world imperialism and the Soviet Union to the advantage of the latter, whose strategic retaliatory force has become substantially equal to that of the United States for the first time since World War II.

2. Page 10, point 9. Reformulate first sentence as follows:

Because of the repercussions of the American defeat in Indochina and the improvement of its nuclear deterrent force against imperialism, the Soviet bureaucracy . . .

3. Page 10, point 9, Third, fourth, fifth, and sixth paragraphs are replaced by what follows:

One should not be taken in by the periodic negotiations on "disarmament" and the alleged peacefulness of imperialist "doves" whether in the White House or in the State department, and whether Democrats or Republicans. While it is true that some sectors of the American bourgeoisie advocate a certain degree of control over escalation of the arms race, since it imposes bigger and bigger strains on their economy in its present conjuncture, military industries remain a major pillar of the imperialist economy; besides, the fundamental expansionist nature of imperialism and the continuous rise of world revolution are sufficient reasons for the imperialists to accumulate weapons. Thus their basic trend is not toward disarmament but toward the development of even more fiendish weapons, as Carter's brandishing of the "neutron bomb" shows.

The structural and essential role of the military industry in the imperialist profit-making machinery contrast sharply with the heavy strains it imposes on the non-capitalist economy of the workers states. Instead of producing heavy weaponry, it would be much more in the interest of the bureaucracy itself to elevate the standard of living of the working masses, thus helping to repel the spectre of political revolution in the framework of the naive bureaucratic dream of "peaceful coexistence" and "economic competition." The arms industry in the workers states is imposed on them by the imperialist environment; its development is essentially defensive, contrary to the aggressive nature of imperialist armament.

This basic difference explains the different attitude of revolutionary Marxists in each case: while we struggle fiercely for the disarmament of imperialist states and against their nuclear stockpiling, we defend the right of workers states to arm themselves and we consider any shift in the balance of military forces to their advantage as an objective strengthening of the world proletariat. Moreover, it is the duty of revolutionary Marxists to warn the masses against any illusion that a lasting peace can be established through "disarmament" agreements and a policy of "detente." The risk of nuclear annihilation will hang over the world as long as capitalism survives. It can be eliminated only through a victory of the socialist revolution in the United States and in the other capitalist countries possessing nuclear weapons.

Nevertheless, it is also the right of the workers states to try to reach compromises with the imperialists for a limitation of the arms race, provided the compromise does not include "secret political clauses" at the expense of world revolution. This was obviously not the case with the SALT I agreement concluded between the Soviet bureau-

cracy and US imperialism in 1974. It is also not the case with SALT II, despite the fact that the balance of forces has seemingly allowed the Kremlin this time to grant much fewer concessions to the White House than before. Hence the crisis over SALT II in the United States and in all imperialist circles and the spate of anti-Soviet "cold war" propaganda and imperialist blackmail motivated by the general shift in the international relationship of class forces to the detriment of imperialism.

However, the very nature of a nuclear war . . . [continue as in original resolution].

#### Summary by Walter.

**Statement by Jaber:** Given the fact that the problem of nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States has not and could not be discussed earnestly at this congress, and given the confusing character of the arguments raised by the reporter, I withdraw the first two amendments I proposed. However, I ask the comrades to vote for the third amendment dealing with disarmament, which is a completely different matter.

[Note: votes were taken following next point.]

### VIII. THE TURN TO INDUSTRY AND RELATED TASKS OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Celso reported for the outgoing United Secretariat. Extended time granted to Strawson for LTT. Discussion.

#### Summary by Celso.

**Amendment by Claudio** concerning China proposed for a vote.

**Motion by Celso:** That Claudio amendment be referred to the editing commission on the World Political Resolution, since it was only submitted at the last moment and could not be discussed.

*Carried*

#### Votes on World Political Situation and Tasks:

1. Kurt amendment No. 1:

**Delegates:** 12 for, 61 against, 13.5 abstentions, 11.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 3 for, 39 against, 5 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

2. Jaber amendment No. 3:

**Delegates:** 2 for, 61.5 against, 17.5 abstentions, 17 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 41 against, 5 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

3. LTT resolution:

**Delegates:** 3 for, 90 against, 1 abstention, 4 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 49 against, 1 abstention, 1 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.



4. Political sections of United Secretariat majority resolution:

**Delegates:** 77 for, 7 against, 11.5 abstentions, 2.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 42 for, 2 against, 6 abstentions, 2 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

5. Report by Walter:

**Delegates:** 73 for, 9 against, 12.5 abstentions, 3.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 46 for, 1 against, 4 abstentions, 1 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

6. Kurt amendment No. 2:

**Delegates:** 10 for, 61.5 against, 15.5 abstentions, 11 not voting.

**Consultative:** 2 for, 41 against, 6 abstentions, 3 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

7. Tasks section of United Secretariat majority resolution:  
**Delegates:** 80 for, 9 against, 61.5 abstentions, 2.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 45 for, 3 against, 3 abstentions, 1 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

8. Report by Celso:

**Delegates:** 62 for, 17 against, 16.5 abstentions, 2.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 38 for, 7 against, 4 abstentions, 3 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

9. United Secretariat majority resolution as a whole:

**Delegates:** 77 for, 9 against, 8.5 abstentions, 3.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 43 for, 3 against, 4 abstentions, 2 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

## IX. THE STRUGGLE FOR WOMEN'S LIBERATION

Thérèse reported for the outgoing United Secretariat. Discussion.

**Amendment No. 1 by Dupre, Markina, Mireille, and Segur:**

Delete the first paragraph of point 2 in the section "Origin and Nature of Women's Oppression," as well as the last sentence of the first paragraph in point 3 and the second paragraph in this same point.

**Amendment by Anna and Cape:**

In the chapter "Origin and Nature of Women's Oppression," accept the amendment of the French Central Committee which refers to page 4 (English version), point 3, paragraph one of the draft resolution. The amendment reads as follows:

The change in women's status developed along with the growing productivity of human labor based on agriculture and stock raising; *the domestication of live-stock*; the rise of new divisions of labor, craftsmanship, and commerce. The private appropriation of an increasing social surplus, and the development of the possibility for some humans to prosper from the exploitation of the labor of others *definitively consolidated the social status of women as one of oppression.* [Italics indicates changes from original.]

**Amendment No. 2 by Dupre, Markina, Mireille, and Segur:**

On the women's movement, accept the amendment of the French LCR Central Committee, which reads as follows [Italics indicate changes from original.]:

Part 1:

1. Rewriting of points 2 and 3, second column p. 24 and first column p. 25:

2. The oppression of women as a sex constitutes the objective basis for the mobilization of women in struggle and for their organizing in an autonomous way. For that reason the Fourth International supports and helps build the women's liberation movement.

*Our goal is to form an organized, all-female, permanent, and independent movement against women's oppression. An all-female composition enables women to take the leadership of their own organizations in which they can learn and develop and lead without fear of being put down or dictated to by men or having to compete with them from the start.*

To those "Marxists" who claim such all-female organizations and meetings divide the working class along sex lines, we say it is not those fighting against their oppression who are responsible for creating or maintaining divisions. Capitalism divides the working class—by race, by sex, by age, by nationality, by skill levels, and by every other means possible. Our job is to organize and support the battles of the most oppressed and exploited layers who are raising demands that represent the interests of the entire class and who will lead the struggle for socialism. Those who suffer most from the old will fight the most energetically for the new. Before women can lead others they must throw off their feelings of inferiority and self-deprecation. They must learn to lead themselves. *All-female organizations help many women to take the first steps toward discarding their own slave mentality, gaining confidence, pride, and courage to act as political beings. They help many women to realize that their problems do not arise from personal shortcomings, but are socially created and common to other women. They often lay the groundwork for women to break out of their isolation, to gain confidence, and to move into action, on condition that they are understood as an encouragement to the organizing of unified struggles together with men. That is, if the all-female groups remain inward-turned and limit themselves to discussion circles as a substitute for joining with others to act, they can become an obstacle to the further political development of the women involved. The women's movement that we want to help build is an autonomous (or independent) movement. By independent or autonomous we do not mean independent of the needs of the working class.*

*The variety of ways in which the radicalization of women is expressed today, the mass campaigns carried out in a unified way with the working-class organizations (despite the many brakes that the reformist leaderships put on the women's struggle) show clearly that women's fight cannot claim to be above the classes or indifferent to the struggle of the working class. To the contrary, in order to grow stronger it must closely tie its goals and demands to those of the working class in struggle, since the truth is that there can be no women's liberation without socialism and no socialism without women's liberation. We mean that the movement is organized and led by women; that it*



takes the fight for women's rights and needs as its first priority, refusing to subordinate that fight to any other interests; that it is not subordinate to the decisions or policy needs of any political tendency or any other social group; that it is willing to carry through the fight by whatever means and together with whatever forces prove necessary.

However, such a movement has not yet been built anywhere. The desire of women to organize themselves in all-female groups is the opposite of the practice followed by many mass Stalinist parties that organize separate male and female youth organizations for the purpose of repressing sexual activity and reinforcing sex-stereotyped behavior—i.e., the inferiority of women. The independent all-female groups that have emerged today express in part the distrust many radicalizing women feel for the mass reformist organizations of the working class, which have failed so miserably to fight for their needs.

Part 2: Add before the conclusion of point 3 on page 25:

*We fight to build an autonomous, permanent women's movement, as a necessary element in forming the collective memory of women in struggle against their oppression. The permanent organization of women is an essential condition for transforming spontaneous rebellion into effective collective strength. The stable organization of such a women's movement will not take place overnight. It will necessitate different phases of struggles and experimentation. This is especially true inasmuch as women, most of whom are saddled with a double workday, encounter additional problems in organizing themselves.*

Today, the different kinds of groups that have come forward around the world to struggle at one level or another against society's oppression of women are steps toward the building of such a movement: consciousness-raising groups, neighborhood groups, student groups, high-school groups, groups organized at workplaces, trade-union women's caucuses, organizations of women of oppressed nationalities, lesbian-feminist groups, action coalitions around specific demands, feminist journal publishing collectives, women's shelters, the National Organization for Women in the United States, the National Abortion Campaign in Britain, or the Movement for Freedom of Abortion and Contraception in France (MLAC). While many are the women's groups that have been formed completely outside the mass working-class organizations, this does not mean that the rank-and-file structures or the coordinating bodies of the women's movement will all be external to or separate from the mass working-class and democratic organizations already formed: in Bolivia, for example, miners wives have formed housewives committees affiliated to the COB (Bolivian Workers Federation). In Italy, the Turin interprofessional federation has brought together women trade-unionists in the FSM and unemployed women to collectively put forward demands against their specific oppression. Among other things, they have exposed the poor working conditions that cause miscarriages among working women. In 1975 in Portugal, women began to join tenants (moradores) committees or workers commissions. In Spain, women joined neighborhood committees or workers commissions in massive numbers. In France, thousands of women have joined not only women's groups, but also trade-union

women's commissions, Family Planning, associations to improve the quality of life, etc. It is the duty of male and female revolutionists to encourage women to organize wherever they are active, and to promote coordination of all these organizations in order to make them into a collective, conscious force capable of establishing a relationship of forces against the bourgeois state, a force that plays a decisive role in getting the entire labor movement to take up the specific struggle against women's oppression. (Next comes the conclusion; no change.)

#### **Amendment by Harlow (Britain):**

(This is the general line for rewriting the section defining the women's movement in addition to what is already contained in that section.)

The women's movement at the present time consists of many different forms of organization of women in struggle against their own oppression, e.g., women's groups, women's caucuses in trade unions, etc.

A specific component exists within this broad movement that can be broadly characterized as that initially formed through the radicalization of the 1960s. This layer has initiated many of the actions that have characterized the women's movement over the last decade.

Particularly notable is the role of this section of women in initiating campaigns on the questions of abortion and contraception which are increasingly penetrating and winning support in the workers movement.

The demands and actions of this current have identified and challenged the crucial aspects of women's oppression at home and at work. These demands will be a central part of the basis on which we wish to build the mass women's movement.

We have begun to see the beginnings of a radicalization among women workers against their oppression as a sex. In order to extend this, it will be necessary for the present period to continue our participation in the specific component of the women's movement outlined above. We will, as our central task, direct their attention towards raising and popularizing their demands and actions among working-class women at work and in the community. In certain instances we will find opposition among this layer towards our orientation and will not be able to work with them to initiate or extend actions directed at working-class women. At the present time this layer in many countries is in crisis and uncertain of its orientation in face of the radicalization of the working class. If this current is not won to a class orientation it will be a setback in the building of a mass women's movement.

#### **Amendments from IMG Leadership on Child Care:**

b) Child care: (keep paragraphs 2, 3, and 5 on page 29, second column) and add:

As the Fourth International recruits more women members to its ranks, particularly proletarian women, it will find that the problem of child care becomes raised more often in its ranks.

Obviously the party should not take care of children in the place of society and it must stimulate mass struggle for the necessary social services.

But each section will have to confront the problem of child care if it is to take seriously the possibility of integrating working men and women into its ranks and its



leadership. The approach that should be used will vary in different sections but if as Trotsky said the leading bodies are to be "closely connected with the rank and file and organically representative of them" steps will have to be taken to ensure that male and female workers who have children are able to participate in external and internal activities and leadership bodies. This will be a vital feature in the process of proletarianizing the International. An insensitive approach on this question will lose us valuable class leaders.

**Amendment on Internal Women's Meetings by Markina and Mireille (France), Harlow (Britain), Luz and Maria (Colombia), and An (Belgium):**

(Keep paragraph 1, page 30, and add):

When any comrade thinks that a contradiction exists between the program of the revolutionary organization and the needs of the oppressed then it is the right and duty of comrades to wage a political struggle to change the program. This is how our movement attempts to overcome its shortcomings and learn from the class struggle. It is why we see internal democracy as a vital feature of our movement.

But the Fourth International has been forced to confront another problem that the Third International failed to tackle. Under the impact of the modern women's movement it has been forced to look at the special needs of its women comrades.

(Keep paragraph 4, column 1, page 29)

The women's movement has shown us not only the way in which women internalize notions of "femininity" but also how men internalize notions of masculinity. Rape, wife beating, and sexual intimidation are all extreme manifestations of the depth of this conditioning, which is a product of the structural position of women in class society and particularly the sexual division of labor within the family. A woman's view of her role in life, and men's view, is very important in understanding why despite formal equality with men in advanced capitalist society women still remain the inferior, oppressed sex.

Thus despite formal equality existing in the party between men and women special problems are still faced. Nor is it simply a problem of changing women comrades. Male workers internalize the view of women as inferior because of reformist notions about society. Men who are revolutionaries know that this view is incorrect and divides the class. But because men have dominated women for centuries and male comrades' personalities are socially constructed, the ideology of male superiority and female inferiority lags on. Thus although our program stresses the struggle for the liberation of women sexism does exist within our ranks and must be confronted.

This does not most often manifest itself in an easily identifiable way, in terms of male comrades treating women comrades simply as sex objects. It is often much more subtle—a dismissiveness, ignoring women comrades' remarks, assuming women comrades will not be able to carry out a particular job, patronizing behavior, competitiveness and arrogance among male comrades that is intimidating and unnecessary. It can and does hamper the development of our women comrades. It places an addi-

tional burden on a group of comrades who are trying to fight back against the idea that they are inferior, lesser members of the party.

It is only by male and female comrades consciously confronting sexism in all its forms that we can even begin to overcome these problems. We will never completely eradicate sexism from our ranks until after the socialist revolution but our struggle can start now and the leadership has the responsibility to take the initiative on this question and show the ranks of the organization, by example, how seriously it takes its women comrades.

(Add last 2 paragraphs, page 29, column 1, and add:)

We have to particularly encourage, not push, women comrades into areas of party work that have been male dominated in the past—leading trade-union work, leading international work, leading educational work, writing national and international documents, doing national and international speaking tours. We have to look carefully at our style of leadership in each section. Are we emphasizing team work, collective skills, the pooling of knowledge? The more democratic and comradely our organization is, the more women comrades will develop inside it.

Many sections have been slow to act on their women comrades' needs. In an atmosphere of factionalism and hectic work many women comrades have turned to the women's movement for solace. Other women comrades have decided that they should take the initiative, in the absence of it coming from leaders (a large number of which are male). Women have led tendencies, called for women's caucuses, met informally to alert the International to their special needs and the need for a change in attitude to these questions. Special measures have been taken in some sections to deal with a problem of special significance. Sometimes the issue has been confused with a discussion about the attitude of the revolutionary organization to the women's movement in terms of political line. But in most sections this also often reflected a 'ghettoization' of women comrades, a feeling that their experiences are not integrated into the organization's politics.

The women's movement has trained many of our women comrades. It has taught them not to accept the view society gives to us of women as inferior beings. We will hopefully recruit more women comrades as our party grows. Women doing things together as women, women being proud of their sex, women having a sense of their own power—these are the strengths that many of our women comrades have gained from the women's movement. Identifying where our oppression sprang from was crucial to that process—that we were not genetically inferior to men but we were as women oppressed by the society we lived in. That male attitudes endorsed our inferiority.

In the absence of action these women comrades have called for women's caucuses in some sections to be set up as advisory bodies to identify their common, as opposed to individual, problems within the organization in order to suggest ways of overcoming sexism within the party.

These meetings are neither good nor normal! But neither is the situation of women in the organization. Meetings that do not have decision-making power can play a useful role in drawing the attention of the organization and its leadership to the inequalities that exist between men and women in our ranks.



In this sense, it is important to allow women comrades to have the opportunity to meet among themselves. While these meetings give women a recourse, they cannot solve all the problems women encounter in the sections. It goes without saying, moreover, that they are in no case a place for political discussion. In the past, illusions and sometimes deviations may have arisen with regard to these meetings. But it is fundamentally the failure to respond to the questions raised by women, as well as our own political weaknesses, that are the sources of these illusions, and not the possibility of holding occasional meetings. These meetings can, in fact, enable women to assert themselves by objecting to displays of sexism in our organizations, on condition that the problems raised in the meetings are brought to the knowledge of the entire organization, and that systematic reports on them are given to the leadership bodies. Our goal is to see to it that the organization as a whole—and not just women—feel that they are involved.

#### **Statement by Sakai for Japanese delegation:**

1. The Japanese section has founded an independent socialist women's organization, the Socialist Women's Association. It was founded last summer, and its basic aim is to build a working-class women's movement which is independent from the reformist leaderships, as an integral part of the working-class movement as a whole.

2. The comrades who are working in the Socialist Women's Association have the opinion that the proposed text is acceptable as an initial draft for discussion and that the vote should not be taken at this congress.

#### **Summary by Thérèse**

**Motion by Bala:** Not to take a vote on the section on caucuses and to continue discussion on this point.

*Defeated.*

#### **Votes on Women's Liberation:**

1. Dupre et al. amendment No. 1:

**Delegates:** 18.5 for, 65 against, 8 abstentions, 6.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 4 for, 39 against, 5 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

2. Anna and Cape amendment:

**Delegates:** 12.5 for, 66 against, 7 abstentions, 12.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 3 for, 41 against, 2 abstentions, 7 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

3. Dupre et al. amendment No. 2, part 1:

**Delegates:** 24 for, 47.5 against, 16 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 8 for, 35 against, 4 abstentions, 6 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

4. Dupre et al. amendment No. 2, part 2:

**Delegates:** 23.5 for, 48.5 against, 15.5 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 8 for, 36 against, 3 abstentions, 6 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

5. Harlow amendment:

**Delegates:** 24 for, 45.5 against, 18 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 11 for, 31 against, 6 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

6. Child-care amendment:

**Delegates:** 26 for, 37.5 against, 24 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 9 for, 33 against, 6 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

7. United Secretariat resolution, excluding section on caucuses:

**Delegates:** 85 for, 0.5 against, 6 abstentions, 6.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 46 for, 0 against, 3 abstentions, 4 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

8. Markina et al. amendment on caucuses:

**Delegates:** 33.5 for, 50 against, 8 abstentions, 6.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 17 for, 32 against, 1 abstention, 3 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

9. Section of resolution on caucuses:

**Delegates:** 48 for, 36.5 against, 3 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 28 for, 18 against, 4 abstentions, 3 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

10. Report by Thérèse:

**Delegates:** 46 for, 18.5 against, 25.5 abstentions, 8 not voting.

**Consultative:** 37 for, 5 against, 7 abstentions, 4 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

## **X. SOCIALIST DEMOCRACY AND THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT**

Walter reported for United Secretariat majority.

Stamman reported for United Secretariat minority.

Claudio reported.

Discussion

**Motion by Claudio:** The World Congress recommends that in the draft document on the dictatorship of the proletariat and socialist democracy, the idea should be introduced that the problem of the existence of bourgeois parties in a workers state is not a question of principle but



must be dealt with on the basis of concrete political judgements.

**Motion by Aubin and Thérèse:** To table Claudio's motion, since it was introduced only after the discussion has been concluded.

*Above motion Carried.*

**Statement by Claudio:** I consider it inadmissible to prevent a delegate from proposing an amendment through a procedural maneuver. This is all the more true in the case in question, since my amendment summarizes an idea that I have defended for three years and raised again during the discussion at the Congress.

**Summary by Claudio**

**Summary by Stateman**

**Summary by Walter**

**Statement by Sakai:** The Japanese delegation is not taking part in the vote because we were unable to read the documents.

#### **Indicative votes on Socialist Democracy and Dictatorship of the Proletariat:**

1. United Secretariat majority resolution:

**Delegates:** 66.5 for, 11.5 against, 2.5 abstentions, 17.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 29 for, 14 against, 2 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.

2. United Secretariat minority resolution:

**Delegates:** 25.5 for, 40 against, 15 abstentions, 17.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 13 for, 26 against, 6 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.

## **XI. EUROPE**

**Duret reported for the outgoing United Secretariat.**

**Arpo reported for the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency.**

Discussion

**Amendments by Howard (Britain) on Bourgeois Democracy:**

1. On page 4 of the text delete section 2.8. Replace it with the following:

All the political setbacks suffered by the workers movements over the last decade have been the result of two interrelated phenomena which were absent in Petrograd in 1917, in Peking in 1949, in Hanoi in 1945, in Havana in 1959 and Saigon in 1975: these are the combination of bourgeois representative democracy and mass reformism.

In France in May 1968, Portugal in 1975 or Spain in

1976 there was no counterrevolution in the real sense of the word, i.e., a qualitative change in the correlation of social forces. All three situations were defused by the ability of reformism to channel the struggles towards bourgeois-democratic institutions.

Since the Second World War the working masses in Western Europe have identified their *democratic freedoms*—which we defend and will deepen and extend under a workers state—with the bourgeois-democratic, parliamentary, state institutions. This is the result not merely of the policies of Stalinist and Social Democratic parties, but a direct outcome of two specific historical circumstances: the experience of fascism and the repulsive example of the regimes in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Social Democratic reformism seeks to utilise this to keep workers loyal to bourgeois democracy, which offers them more freedoms than the post-capitalist states.

The working class was fundamentally blocked from storming the capitalist state in 1968 and 1975 because of the mechanisms of bourgeois democracy, exploited to the full by the PCP and Soares.

The only solution to this circle lies in the ability of revolutionaries to stimulate the *mass entry* of the proletariat into political activity in its places of work. The Russian Revolution was made by a minority of the population. The revolution in the West will either be the free work of the majority of working people or it will be nothing.

The strengths of the capitalist state in the West lie not just in its bourgeois-democratic base, but because of its technically superior apparatus of coercion. Thus mass political activity on a decisively greater scale than October 1917 is the only way to overthrow capitalism in the West. Socialist democracy must be concretely demonstrated in proletarian institutions of struggle for millions of men and women before bourgeois democracy can be overcome. This is the one and only form of democracy which can be more 'advanced' than bourgeois parliamentarism. It is the only experience which will shatter the belief in it and pave the way for the *violent* seizure and destruction of the bourgeois state machine by the exploited masses in the West.

One of the conditions for a revolutionary crisis is that there must be a crisis of legitimacy of the state institutions in the eyes of the great majority of the working class. Unless this majority identifies with a new, rising, legitimacy, then a revolutionary development of the crisis is virtually excluded.

The experience of Stalinism and bureaucracy means that all the sections of the Fourth International have to integrate these aspects before they will be able to develop a coherent revolutionary strategy for their respective countries.

2. Delete point 20 on page 14 as it is both banal and redundant. Though clearly a factual correction will become necessary in point 21 in relation to the 'reduced electoral strength . . . of the Conservative Party in Britain.'

**Amendment by Howard on Regroupment:**

On page 45, delete 49, 49.1, 49.2, and replace with the following:

49. A revolutionary party cannot be built on the basis of



a simple linear growth of its forces. A *mass* revolutionary party will only see the light of day when there is a sharp change in working-class consciousness which leads to a political breach in the traditional Social Democratic and Stalinist apparatuses which presently hegemonize the working class in Europe. Thus regroupments and fusions will play a vital role in building revolutionary parties on a world scale.

At the present time unification of all revolutionary forces can enormously strengthen our prestige in the workers movement by helping to build a pole of attraction for socialist workers, who are today alienated by the inability of the far left to offer a unified and coherent alternative to reformism. Unified revolutionary organizations can exercise a powerful impact also on national politics in the respective countries.

49.1 The events of the last twelve years have proved to be the acid test for a wide range of organizations which grew out of 1968 and established a position on the left of the Communist or Social Democratic parties. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal the far left was dominated by this variety of ultraleft centrism. The crisis of these currents is not a reason for celebration. It reflects (in Italy and Portugal) the inability of the Fourth International to offer a serious alternative for a whole period, a situation which is being slowly reversed at the present time.

The crisis of ultraleft centrism and the political evolution of a number of currents may call for mounting regroupment offensives towards them. A condition for the success of such operations is a clear definition of intent from the outset. In the case of the centrists, a clear statement of our programmatic positions and a discussion around these will be a central feature of regroupment.

42.2 Apart from the centrists there are two other categories of far-left organizations. First those that declare their allegiance to Trotskyism and claim they want to 'reconstruct the Fourth International' and secondly those who are non-Trotskyists, but remain loyal to the revolutionary program. In the first category there are the OCI and Lutte Ouvrière in France. The French section of the Fourth International is currently engaged in discussions with both these organizations on the general program, overall tasks of the period and the functioning of democratic centralism on a national and international level. The WRP in Britain is the only other major organization which would come under this category, but the process of degeneration and gangsterization has developed to such an extent that despite its stated loyalty to Trotskyism, it can no longer be treated as an organization with which a fusion could be considered.

As far as the second category is concerned there is one major grouping which has to be considered. This is the British SWP, which despite its zig-zags and blocs with the ultraleft centrists in Portugal and Italy, has itself avoided travelling on the same path. Its evolution over the past decade has been towards consistently revolutionary positions in the class struggle. It stands on the basis of the First Four Congresses of the Communist International, but has important disagreements with the Transitional Program. A unified organization consisting of the SWP and the British section of the Fourth International would create a powerful pole of attraction for militants in Britain. We are therefore in favor of bringing the SWP into the Fourth International.

#### **Amendment by Segur on "world Trotskyist movement":**

[This is an amendment to an amendment by Duret to the European resolution, presented at the Sept. 29-Oct. 4, 1979, United Secretariat meeting; the text of the Duret amendment is available in the minutes of that meeting.]

Paragraph 1, line 3: replace "pursue the policy . . . world Trotskyist movement" by: ". . . fight for a fusion within the Fourth International according to the method of 1963."

Paragraph 5, line 3: replace "organizations of the Trotskyist movement" by "organizations claiming to be Trotskyist."

Paragraph 8, line 1: delete "of reunification of the world Trotskyist movement."

#### **Amendment on OCRFI by Delegates of Tendency 3 in France:**

[This is an amendment to Duret amendment—see note above.]

Paragraph 5, line 3, after "claiming to be Trotskyist," add:

We think that for twenty-five years major events in the class struggle have deepened the differences between the Fourth International and the current that the OCRFI grew out of. This current failed to recognize revolution on the march in the colonial countries; did not understand the scope and form of the crisis of Stalinism and its consequences in the bureaucratized workers states and in the Communist parties; was incapable of integrating new factors—generated by the crisis of capitalist societies—into the Trotskyist program; and built its own organizations in defiance of democratic centralism. The discussion that has begun is, of course, an opportunity for all to sharpen and reevaluate their own positions on all the questions at issue. However, our intention in this fight is to change the positions of the OCRFI on points that are now acquisitions of revolutionary Marxism and that the OCRFI has not yet accepted.

#### **Amendment by Spanish Delegation on the Conjuncture:**

It seems to us fundamental to base ourselves wholly and completely on the basic analysis of the European document, in such a way that our sections do not allow their analysis and perspectives to fluctuate exclusively on the basis of conjunctural features, or even on the specific features that have appeared within this period beginning in 1975. As long as the bourgeoisie has not been able to sufficiently wear down the energies of the working class or defeat it in a head-on confrontation—as long as one of those two variants has not occurred—it will continue to be unable to impose a capitalist solution to the economic crisis, the fundamental features of the crisis of social relations will persist, the crisis of bourgeois political leadership will continue to appear—with greater or lesser virulence, and at a faster or slower pace—and, finally, the conditions will be created for a unified, broad, and organized fightback by the working class to materialize and lay the basis for a large-scale political crisis.

However while this is true, it is not true that beginning in 1975 the situation could be characterized as determined



by the "mass upsurge," "the development of openly anti-capitalist demands and forms of struggle," "the growth of the workers parties and their electoral support," "the shift to the left of the middle layers." We insist that there has been no change of a qualitative nature in the class relationship of forces that can enable the bourgeoisie to impose its "solution" to the crisis. It is of fundamental importance, therefore, that that reality be taken into account in determining the policy of the sections. But to define this policy based on a situation of "mass upsurge" with features like those of 1968-75, which no longer exist, is an error that, if implemented, will lead to major tactical errors by the different European sections.

The combination of the effects of the longlasting crisis in the workers movement itself (layoffs, elements of structural weakening), the attacks and partial victories achieved by the bourgeoisie (wages, restructuring, emigration and its consequences in terms of internal strife within the workers movement, the toughening of labor laws, etc.), the damaging collaborationist policy of the trade-union leaderships and mass workers parties (and its consequences in terms of division of the trade unions, the lack of alternatives to the bourgeoisie, the decline in membership in the trade-union federations, the isolation of many struggles, etc.)—the combination of this set of elements (together with others, such as bourgeois electoral victories; crisis of the alliance between the workers movement and the youth, women, petty bourgeoisie, etc.)—has put an end to the linear rise of aggressive, militant, and highly organized struggles by the working class that developed between 1968 and 1975; incapable of imposing its solution to the crisis at one blow, the bourgeoisie is striving to continue its line of attacks and partial social victories against the workers movement, in order to weaken its internal forces; for its part, the workers movement has not even suffered major defeats, nor can it be said that there has been a qualitative disintegration of its organized forces, but it has suffered a considerable erosion of its positions, putting it in a defensive posture today in the economic sphere; and, finally, *that the essential task consists of organizing that defensive struggle, uniting therein the forces of the working class and reconstructing its internal unity, to hold off the attack by the bourgeoisie, and, on that basis, create the conditions for a renewal of the offensive capacity of the class, including the perspective of a struggle for a thoroughgoing political change.*

#### **Amendment by Spanish Delegation on Democratic Demands:**

The thesis that we think should be defended is that under present conditions in capitalist Europe, democratic demands should constitute the *central slogans of political mobilization* that we defend as revolutionary Marxists. It should be clear that we say "under present conditions," that is, in the period of time in which a resolution of the World Congress should guide the activity of the sections, a period in which—as we have already said—the orientation should not be based on the perspective of hypothetical prerevolutionary or revolutionary situations (although to prepare for these situations, and in the course of them, democratic slogans play an essential role also in Europe).

It is certain that democratic slogans do not play the same role in all countries or at all times. But there is a series of considerations that should be pointed out:

In the current social and political conditions in capitalist Europe, the bourgeoisie needs to maintain a *permanent* line of restricting the democratic rights of the population; this is a structural component of bourgeois policy in the present conditions in capitalist Europe, even if these restrictions do not appear the same way everywhere. These attacks, together with those that are aimed at trade-union rights, refer to the so-called fundamental freedoms (of association, speech, opinion, demonstration) and to everything that has to do with the political decentralization of states (nationalities and regions). For the working class, it is impossible to ensure adequate political conditions in which to defend itself in the social and economic spheres, and it is also impossible to move toward a confrontation with the bourgeois state, if democratic slogans around all these questions are not part of its daily programs of action.

Under certain conditions, *a correct attitude toward questions of democratic freedoms can be transformed into the very center*—if not into one of the essential problems—*in ensuring the unity of the workers ranks*; that is, at least in the case of the Spanish state, the problem of the *nationalities* (see the corresponding point of these amendments in this respect).

Together with the above, a correct and aggressive attitude on the part of the workers movement around democratic demands now constitutes a precondition for the working class to *obtain the confidence of other sectors of the population* and ensure its alliance with them.

We agree with the criticisms that the document makes of the reformist or centrist conceptions that subordinate the struggle for democratic freedoms to parliamentary maneuvers, that relegate mass action to a secondary role. But it is wrong that the text—carried away by its emphasis on this criticism—leaves aside revolutionary activity within the bourgeois institutions (the document talks only about work in the army).

We criticized the analysis and must state the conclusions. *The European document must state the necessity for revolutionary work within the bourgeois institutions, demanding the recognition of all democratic freedoms and rights within these institutions, trying to bring the class struggle into them as well, and creating the conditions for undermining their permanent action in the service of capitalism.* We think that with experience, and with the weight of the state apparatus and its institutions, revolutionary mass action at the time of the decisive showdowns will require the presence and activity of revolutionists, even within the bourgeois institutions. On the other hand, we think that it is necessary to distinguish between different institutions, and that the presence and activity of revolutionists, for example, within the municipal governments, can be a valuable lever for broadening the hearing that our program gets and for promoting the development of the mass organizations themselves.

**Amendment by Jerome, Laurent, Matti, Ollivier, Robert (France), Melan (Spain), Rivière (Canada), Daniel (Germany), Raul (Bolivia), and Andres (Peru):**

In Point 31.2, page 22 at the end of first paragraph add: "There has been no qualitative change of nature of these parties: we continue characterizing them as being Stalinists."



### Amendment on the West European CPs by Delegates of Tendency 3 in France:

To replace paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of point 31:

In the historic context of the spread of world revolution the crisis of the Stalinist system is growing in three independent areas: the deterioration of the Kremlin bureaucracy's relations with the bureaucracies of the Communist parties in power; the slackening of the bureaucracies control over society in the degenerated or deformed workers states; and the growing independence of the Communist parties in the capitalist countries from the CPSU.

The policy of "socialism in one country" that was imposed on the entire Communist International by the victory of the Stalinist bureaucracy in the USSR transformed the CPs into instruments of the Kremlin's worldwide policy. It destroyed the basic traditions of proletarian internationalism in their ranks. By doing so, it stimulated the development of chauvinist tendencies that are inevitably aroused by the influence of the dominant institutions and ideology within the workers movement.

In this context, the CPs in the advanced capitalist countries, since the period of popular fronts, have continually placed themselves in the cogs of the state apparatus. Their electoralism has led them to concentrate on winning city governments and regional council posts, holding seats in parliament, and to governmental prospects. But this electoralism does not lead them to pin all their hopes on getting elected under any and all circumstances. The necessity of maintaining their influence and positions of strength within the labor movement, and their rivalry with the Social Democracy, may lead these CPs toward a sectarian policy, like the one carried out in March 1978, and to postponing their entry into the government. But this does not prevent close ties from being formed between the CPs and the bourgeois national society in which each of them develops.

The CPs' integration into the trade-union bureaucracies, the leadership (in the case of the Italian CP) of a vast network of cooperatives, and their penetration into official layers, have further strengthened these ties.

The CPs in all the advanced capitalist countries—and to some extent, all the CPs acting within the framework of parliamentary democracy—have undergone this type of development. But it is in Europe, in the countries where the CPs have broad mass influence (Italy, France, more recently Spain) that their integration into bourgeois society has known its greatest magnitude. Centrifugal nationalist tendencies with respect to the international Communist movement have found a material base in these countries. This explains the distances taken by several CPs from the Kremlin, the conflicts between their leaderships and that of the CPSU, as well as the differences between them on important questions.

The contradiction between being subordinated to the needs of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the necessities of a policy of growing adaptation to the national bourgeoisies, has always been the main characteristic of the European CPs. Up to the 1950s, the influence of the Kremlin's world policy proved decisive. The international crisis of Stalinism, which entered a decisive phase with the death of Stalin and the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, strengthened the desire for autonomy on the part of the CPs. By

1956, the Italian CP opened the way, with Togliatti's statements about polycentrism. In the course of the last ten years, this desire has been expressed with growing sharpness. The emergence of "Eurocommunism" at the Berlin conference in June 1976 (when the Italian, Spanish, and French CPs, backed by the Romanian and Yugoslav CPs, questioned the very usefulness of such international meetings, the last remaining collective leadership bodies after the dissolution of the Comintern) is a new stage in the process of political estrangement from the Kremlin. It represents a decisive step in the breakup of the "international Communist movement."

Eurocommunism represents neither a theory nor a new strategy relative to the counterrevolutionary theories and strategies of Social Democracy and of Stalinism. It is the ideological reflection of the bureaucracies' reaction to the world crisis of Stalinism and the transformation of class relations in Europe. It means that in order to maintain their position in the labor movement, the leaderships of most of the CPs are compelled to separate themselves more and more from Soviet policy, and to systematize their national reformist outlook (in the framework of the institutions of capitalist Europe).

Although it is primarily a feature of the most influential CPs (Italy, France, Spain), Eurocommunism affects most of the European CPs (except for the Portuguese CP, the CP of West Germany, which acts as an agent of the GDR, and the Austrian CP), and the CPs of several large countries (Japan, Mexico). This generalization of the Eurocommunist phenomenon must be taken into consideration. It means that a threshold has been crossed in the relations between the Eurocommunist CPs and the USSR: the determining factor in the orientation of these parties is no longer the Kremlin's international policy, but reformist adaptation to the framework of bourgeois society.

Such an observation in no way implies that these CPs have broken with Moscow, which continues to influence their policy by various means. It does not mean that they have shed their characteristics as bureaucratic parties formed in the Stalinist mold, or, consequently, that they have stopped playing a counterrevolutionary role. The Eurocommunist CPs, each in their own sphere, now constitute a national reformist force tied to the USSR.

This process of social-democratization, while it crossed a threshold with the emergence of Eurocommunism, has not reached its end. Only major events in the class struggle could lead to a definitive break with the USSR and complete integration into bourgeois society. But such events would merely reveal and hasten tendencies that have been expressed since 1968, as a result of the development of struggles in Europe, which acquired a qualitatively new breadth in the last five years. It is decisive for revolutionists to assess the limitations, scope, and contradictions of this new stage in the crisis of Stalinism, for the intervention of the European CPs in the class struggle is and will be profoundly changed by it in form.

To replace point 31.1, fourth paragraph through end:

These changes make the mixture between the reference to the party's historic traditions, the October revolution, the USSR, and the new positions in the political education of members a highly unstable one. There exists in the ranks a new generation of activists who joined on the basis of the nationalist, reformist orientation, which



deeply permeates their reactions. But they also, in their majority, participated in the European working-class struggles since 1968, which tends to modify their conduct in practice. For many of them, the USSR has ceased to be a model, and Stalinist methods seem unacceptable. These contradictions give rise to a profound political instability, which makes the CPs' internal ideological cohesiveness difficult.

Point 31.2, first paragraph:

The leaderships of the Eurocommunist CPs claim to be breaking with Stalinism. However, they refuse to question the decisive elements in their affiliation to the bureaucracy and "theoretical" heritage of Stalinism. This refusal is shown particularly by their opposition to any serious analysis of the social and political causes of the rise of Stalinism in the USSR and in the Communist movement.

Page 12, point 31.2, third paragraph:

However, the antagonisms between the Kremlin's international aims and the choices made by the CPs of capitalist Europe in matters of national policy will create conflicts, including on international questions. Berlinguer's official statements about NATO, and even more the openly proclaimed solidarity with the Andreotti government's policy in the Horn of Africa; Georges Marchais's remarks about the priority of the Eurocommunist leaderships' class collaboration and the necessities of a class fightback against the bourgeois counteroffensive.

On that basis a growing number of activists, based on the political experience of struggles, will be led to question the CPs outlook. This maturation of the ranks will take place through different channels (particularly in the form of trade-union opposition groupings led by CP activists). It will not develop in a linear way and will be spread out over several years; the control of the bureaucratic leaderships is still sufficiently strong, and the activists' lag in consciousness sufficiently great, so that for a fairly long time, partial setbacks may follow periods of political gains. The very great majority of CP members remain attached to their party and will attempt to fight to the very end to reform it. The leaderships will not fail to use this party patriotism to their own benefit.

The political conditions proper to the Eurocommunist CPs do not facilitate a rapid crystalization of numerically large currents within them moving in the direction of revolutionary positions. The political impotence of the opposition groupings may sustain confusion in a lasting way. A positive outcome of the crisis of the CPs will largely depend on the activity of revolutionary Marxists—only systematic activity directed at these parties can give rise to the activist forces that will participate in the forming of revolutionary parties rooted in the working class.

The sections of the Fourth International in Europe must set a goal of aiding the development of revolutionary currents in the CPs. What is needed is to create revolutionary poles within these parties that can offer the membership a strategic orientation opposed to the Eurocommunist policy and to all the centrist currents that are influenced by it (PdUP, Claudin, and some varieties of left Eurocommunism).

Based on the experience of Communist activists, and in terms corresponding to their political education, the battle will be fought against the CP leaderships' policy of consenting to austerity, around the basic axis of the revolutionary program:

1. A class-struggle strategy, Marxist analysis of the state, united-front tactic.
2. An analysis of Stalinism in the USSR and in the international workers movement. Struggle against repression in Eastern Europe.
3. The struggle for the self-organization of the masses.
4. The struggle against the oppression of women, for an autonomous movement.
5. The struggle for workers democracy within the party (the right of tendencies) and in the mass organizations.
6. The defense of genuine internationalism.

It is on this basis that, after a number of experiences and struggles, the necessity for new parties and a new international can be posed.

This work must be carried out through the independent action of the sections of the Fourth International and through fraction work within the CPs. It must be considered, mainly in the countries where the CPs have a mass following, as one of the methods for building our sections.

**Statement by Duran, Ricardo, Anna, Maixu, Sergio, Diosdado**

1. The members of the LCR (Spain) delegation who voted for the European document wish to make it clear that this does not signify a general agreement with the document. We voted in favor because of:

(a) Our agreement with the characterization of the period opened after 1968.

(b) Our agreement with the general framework of the long-term tasks outlined by the document, which imply a substantial correction of the errors of the resolutions adopted at the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses.

(c) Our own responsibility for the maintenance of errors, misunderstandings, and confusion in the text because of the delay in presenting amendments and our distance from the day-to-day work of the Fourth International.

2. However, our real disagreements are major and significant, and in another situation would justify voting otherwise than in favor:

(a) The analysis of the period opened in 1974-75, whose features we will have to confront in the next three or four years, that is, in the period for which this resolution is supposed to arm us.

(b) The role of democratic demands, as a central axis of political mobilization, without preconditions of any kind and without cautions.

(c) The ambiguities present in the characterization of trade-union work and the role of the struggle for nationalist demands.

3. We think that because of the specific weight and degree of organization of our party, publication of this explanation of our vote should serve the political advancement and organization of the International in capitalist Europe.

**Summary by Arpo  
Summary by Duret**



## Votes on Europe:

1. Howard amendment on bourgeois democracy:  
**Delegates:** 21.5 for, 54 against, 20 abstentions, 2.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 9 for, 29 against, 7 abstentions, 9 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
2. Howard amendment on regroupment, minus last paragraph on SWP(GB):  
**Delegates:** 17.5 for, 56.5 against, 20.5 abstentions, 3.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 6 for, 31 against, 6 abstentions, 11 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
3. Howard paragraph on SWP(GB):  
**Delegates:** 38.5 for, 24.5 against, 30.5 abstentions, 4.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 13 for, 23 against, 8 abstentions, 10 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
4. Segur amendment on "world Trotskyist movement":  
**Delegates:** 25.5 for, 50 against, 20 abstentions, 2.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 9 for, 30 against, 8 abstentions, 7 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
5. T3 amendment on OCRFI:  
**Delegates:** 4 for, 67.5 against, 21 abstentions, 5.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 1 for, 35 against, 7 abstentions, 11 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
6. Spanish delegation amendment on conjuncture:  
**Delegates:** 18 for, 52.5 against, 18.5 abstentions, 9 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 6 for, 30 against, 6 abstentions, 12 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
7. Spanish delegation amendment on democratic demands:  
**Delegates:** 17 for, 56 against, 15 abstentions, 10 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 4 for, 34 against, 6 abstentions, 10 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.
8. Jerome et al. amendment on nature of CPs:  
**Delegates:** 29 for, 47.5 against, 15.5 abstentions, 6 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 12 for, 22 against, 5 abstentions, 15 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 13 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 2 not voting.
9. T3 amendment on European CPs:  
**Delegates:** 5.5 for, 76.5 against, 12.5 abstentions, 3.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 2 for, 35 against, 7 abstentions, 10 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

## 10. United Secretariat resolution:

**Delegates:** 75 for, 12.5 against, 7.5 abstentions, 3 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 44 for, 1 against, 2 abstentions, 7 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 14 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

## 11. LTT resolution:

**Delegates:** 2 for, 91 against, 1 abstention, 4 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 0 for, 45 against, 1 abstention, 8 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

## 12. Report by Duret:

**Delegates:** 74.5 for, 4 against, 15 abstentions, 4.5 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 42 for, 0 against, 3 abstentions, 9 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 14 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

## 13. Report by Arpo:

**Delegates:** 3 for, 82 against, 2 abstentions, 11 not voting.  
**Consultative:** 0 for, 44 against, 1 abstention, 9 not voting.  
**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstention, 1 not voting.

## XII. LATIN AMERICA

**Alfonso reported** for the outgoing United Secretariat.

**Heredia granted extended time** in discussion to present his counterline amendments. (See Appendix C.)

### Discussion.

**Amendments by Sergio (Spain), Raul (Bolivia), Montes (Chile), Hoffmann and Joe (France), Varlet (Belgium), Andres (Peru), Erik (Norway), Alberto (Dominican Republic), Fideli (Italy), and Valdes (Chile):**

On the Strategy for Taking Power: add to point 35:

As opposed to reformists (Stalinists, Social Democrats, and others) revolutionary Marxists reject the illusion of a "peaceful and parliamentary road" to socialism. As Marx and Lenin always insisted, the proletarian revolution means the destruction of the *bourgeois state apparatus*, and in particular its repressive military and police institutions. This cannot be the work of a heroic minority or an elite of specialists, but is the job of masses of workers democratically organized in "dual power" structures (workers committees, factory councils, neighborhood committees, *cordones industriales*, etc.) which will be able to ensure *the arming of the workers* on a wide scale and will be able to coordinate the armed workers, self-defense groups, and workers and peasants militias with the soldiers committees that will form in the bourgeois armed forces. Revolutionary Marxists will be in the vanguard in performing the strategically decisive dual task: political work among the draftees, soldiers, and lower officers in the army and encouraging self-arming of the workers. Of course such a process of dual power only becomes possible in a situation of revolutionary crisis, but the task of revolutionary Marxists is to prepare for it and educate the vanguard and the masses on this.



The dialectics of guerrilla warfare and urban movements is more developed than simplified versions of focoist theories would have it. The unfolding of the Nicaraguan revolution has once more illustrated this point with its combination of guerrilla actions and urban insurrectionalist movements.

#### On the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses:

Chapter 24 states that “. . . the Fourth International rescinds the erroneous line on Latin America adopted at the 1969 and 1974 World Congresses.” We believe that, as the Peruvian PRT has said, no contributions or lessons are drawn, nor is it defined which concrete proposals should be self-criticized and bypassed. We thus propose to vote on amendment 30 as adopted by the LCR of Spain, in place of Chapter 24 of the draft resolution. Amendment 30 reads:

The Fourth International has promoted an incorrect political orientation for many years in Latin America. The FI was not immune to the errors made both by the Cuban leadership and by many centrist groups. In spite of its theoretical gains and years-long experience in the international workers movement, it could not correctly understand the process which opened up in Latin America starting with the Cuban Revolution. On the one hand it generalized the situation in Latin America as a single entity, on the other hand it underestimated the CP's role and overestimated the emerging Castroist currents and the degree of independence of Cuba. It relativized the importance of party building as well as the complex and distinctive realities the Latin American comrades were to be faced with. Thus it defended the nefarious analysis that Latin America as a whole was living in the context of continental civil war and that therefore, military-type tasks were central for revolutionary Marxists. In cases like Argentina, the FI recognized as an official section the PRT (“El Combatiente”), which already, at the time of its very adherence to the International, was manifesting big differences as well as big dangers of deviation; no responsibility was taken to carry out a serious debate with it in order to reinforce the position of those currents inside it which had a more progressive stand, at a time when they had just begun to define and structure themselves as an organization. This is of special importance if we take into account that at a later stage and for a while period the PRT would be transformed into the numerically strongest and politically most significant organization of the revolutionary left. The Tenth World Congress rectified to a great extent the conceptions of the Ninth World Congress, without, however, self-criticizing explicitly and without voting anything but a resolution exclusively dedicated to the question of armed struggle; this left revolutionary Marxists completely disarmed for their daily intervention in the movement as well as for the building of the party. One of the central tasks for the education of revolutionary Marxist forces in Latin America is to make a critical assessment of this whole experience, to draw an exhaustive balance sheet of that period and the one that followed in order to avoid new errors, whether similar or not, apart from a Bolivan and Argentinian resolution. (After passage on self-criticism.)

#### On the Mass Workers Party:

Point 34, second paragraph: replace “But except for Chile . . . in creating mass workers' parties” with:

In other countries, the unions are the only mass organizations recognized by the workers. In certain cases progress towards class political independence can go forward through the creation of a mass workers party by the trade unions. But this does not mean that any political organization created by the trade-union bureaucracy necessarily represents a step forward, especially if this new party appears from the beginning as a Social Democratic organization tied to the Second International, or worse, as a form of support by the union bureaucrats for bourgeois populism (nor is a combination of the two variants excluded).

Point 34, seventh paragraph: delete sentences from “But any step in this direction . . . (until the end of the paragraph). Incorporate the following text:

In Latin America, contradictory experiences have developed in the past years in relation to the question of mass workers parties. On the one hand, there's the negative experience of Latin American Eurocommunism as expressed in the MAS of Venezuela; currents which were able to totally absorb, on a populist-reformist program, left-wing currents stemming from the rural guerrilla as well as Trotskyist organizations. On the other hand, the extremely positive initiative shown by the Brazilian Workers Party, which includes the participation of trade-union leaders, as well as of various groups of the revolutionary left (among them the sympathizers of the FI), all this on a clear program for class independence. Between all the extreme and antagonistic examples, many intermediate variants can exist. Revolutionary Marxists should discuss in every concrete case which position they should adopt. Decisions should be made taking into account basically whether these variants can represent any concrete advance in the workers movement's fight for its class independence.

On the PST: In Part VIII on tasks, page 22, 1st column, delete the reference to the PST presented as an example of the construction of a proletarian party.

#### Amendment by Montes:

Delete all references in the draft resolution which characterize the Allende regime in Chile as a bourgeois government.

#### Amendments by Segur:

Introduction: These are a series of amendments about the role of Cuba's policies in Latin America. These amendments do not open the debate on the nature of Cuba or on its current policies. They only repeat things we have already written a hundred times, particularly in the self-criticism on Latin America, in which an understanding of Cuban policies played an important role.

We note that there is broad agreement on the defense of the Cuban workers state, on the specificity of the Cuban CP in relation to the CPs of Stalinist origin, and on not calling for a political revolution in Cuba. But there are two points on which the resolution can and must be more precise, without, however, opening up the fundamental debate:



First, the discussion on Cuban policies in Latin America. This is all the more necessary because the turn in Cuban policy after the failure of the *zafra* in 1968 and Che's failure in Bolivia, was one of the axes of the self-criticism of the Ninth World Congress. Thus we must stress the effects of the isolation of the Cuban revolution on the international policy of its leadership in the mid-1970s. Also, it is necessary to see the evolution of the centrist organizations not only in relation to their own programmatic deficiencies, but also in the context of the evolution of Cuban policy.

#### Amendments:

1. Point 31, replace fifth paragraph with: However, these interventions still have an ambivalent character in that their support to the development of the African revolution has remained until today within limits compatible with the diplomatic interests of the Soviet bureaucracy.

2. At the end of Point 30: At the same time that revolutionary Marxists act as the first and best defenders of the Cuban revolution, they defend the right to sovereign self-organization of the Cuban masses and the need for a really internationalist policy in face of the Soviet bureaucracy.

3. Point 27, end of paragraph 2: . . . The PRT-ERP has likewise made a pro-Moscow turn. These turns must be seen not as strictly national developments, but in relationship to the course of the foreign policy of Cuba.

4. Point 31, in place of first two sentences of paragraph 3: "The failure of OLAS and Che's project in Bolivia caused an isolation of the Cuban revolution on the continent, beginning in 1968. This isolation makes the Cuban leadership more vulnerable to economic and diplomatic pressures from the Soviet bureaucracy. This is reflected in the development of the foreign policy carried out by the Cuban leadership since 1968 which has been contrary to proletarian internationalism: support for the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia; support to bourgeois regimes such as those of Díaz Ordaz and Echeverría in Mexico, Velasco in Peru, and Torrijos in Panama; and ignoring the possibilities for development of the class struggle in the advanced capitalist countries."

**Motion by Presiding Committee:** To refer all amendments concerning Cuba to the post-Congress discussion on Cuba.

*Carried.*

**Statement by Segur, Dominique, Fourier, Claudio, Georges, Walter, Rudi, Karl Anderson, Jaber, Mikado, Howard, Sandro:**

In the discussion on Latin America, a delegate from the French section asked that two amendments concerning the Cuban policy in Latin America after 1969, which had been adopted by a majority vote of the congress of the French section, be submitted for a vote.

The Presiding Committee counterposed to this vote a preliminary motion to rule it out of consideration, referring these questions to the upcoming discussions in the leadership bodies of the Fourth International, and thus refusing any vote on the political content of these amendments, including an indicative vote separate from the resolution.

While the Presiding Committee had the formal right to resort to such a procedure, given the circumstances it amounts to a *measure of political obstruction* that sets a *dangerous precedent* for any group of comrades wishing to submit for a vote a different point of view on a line question on the agenda.

#### Summary by Alfonso

##### Votes on Latin America:

1. Point XII of Heredia counterresolution:

**Delegates:** 13 for, 74.5 against, 9 abstentions, 1.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 40 against, 2 abstentions, 7 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

2. Heredia counterresolution as a whole:

**Delegates:** 14 for, 69.5 against, 11 abstentions, 3.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 4 for, 36 against, 5 abstentions, 9 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

3. Sergio et al. amendment on strategy for power:

**Delegates:** 31.5 for, 50 against, 9.5 abstentions, 7 not voting.

**Consultative:** 18 for, 29 against, 0 abstentions, 7 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

4. Sergio et al. amendment on self-criticism:

**Delegates:** 24 for, 56.5 against, 7 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 12 for, 34 against, 1 abstention, 7 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

5. Sergio et al. amendment on mass workers parties:

**Delegates:** 22 for, 50.5 against, 15 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 13 for, 31 against, 3 abstentions, 7 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

6. Sergio et al. amendment on deleting references to PST:

**Delegates:** 18 for, 53 against, 17.5 abstentions, 9.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 30 against, 9 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

7. Montes amendment on Allende government:

**Delegates:** 10.5 for, 68 against, 6.5 abstentions, 13 not voting.

**Consultative:** 3 for, 35 against, 7 abstentions, 9 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

8. United Secretariat resolution:

**Delegates:** 79 for, 11 against, 3.5 abstentions, 4.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 39 for, 5 against, 4 abstentions, 6 not voting.



**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

9. Report by Alfonso:

**Delegates:** 51.5 for, 16.5 against, 20.5 abstentions, 9.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 26 for, 5 against, 11 abstentions, 12 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

**Statement by Segur, Markina, Dupre, Mireille, Dominique:**

1. In the framework of the discussion on Cuba that has been opened in the International, we agreed not to submit for a vote at the Eleventh World Congress two of the four amendments adopted by a large majority at the congress of the French section.

2. We have, however, maintained the two other amendments, concerning the Cuban policy in Latin America and its influence on the centrist organizations, for a vote.

3. These did not involve *novelties*, encroaching upon the upcoming discussions, but elements of analysis that had already been widely pointed out in the press of the International and that were *central* to the self-criticism document on Latin America.

4. The comrades who contended that the congress could not take a position on these amendments should logically have concluded that it was necessary to withdraw *any part* of the Latin America resolution concerning Cuba, however general it might be. For by refusing to consider amendments on the subject, they were not refusing to take any position, they were in fact counterposing the initial version to the amendments by means of a procedural device.

5. Therefore, we request, in order to have the greatest possible clarity on this incident, that the four amendments adopted by the French congress, and the introduction thereto, be published in the United Secretariat minutes.

**Statement by Segur, Dupre, Dominique, Markina:**

Explanation of Vote on Latin America by French Delegates and IEC Members:

We are voting for the Latin American Resolution because we do not want ambiguity to remain as to our rejection of the line adopted at the Ninth World Congress and our agreement with the general direction of this shift.

However, we have strong reservations about the draft theses for three basic reasons:

1. They have more the character of an *immediate resolution on tasks* than that of general line theses for the continent, and our organizations could be miseducated as a result.

2. The draft resolution did not enable us to foresee the developments in the Nicaraguan revolution or to orient ourselves correctly in its initial phase.

The final version of the resolution is still very insufficient from the standpoint of the lessons that should be drawn from Nicaragua—which does not mean that we think that the specific conditions in Central America should be extrapolated to all of Latin America.

3. On the eve of the opening of a discussion on Cuba in the International, the draft theses do not include the elements of analysis that were, however, a part of the International's earlier documents.

The analysis of Cuban policy in a world document that in theory ought to draw the lessons of the last few years is thus greatly impoverished, hence onesided.

**Statement by Karl A., Nina, Jenny, and Kaj (Sweden), Mikado (Israel), and Varlet (Belgium):**

We who sign this declaration voted for the "Rossi amendments" [this refers to the amendments by Sergio et al.] on "a strategy for power" and "self-criticism on the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses." Despite the fact that these amendments failed, we voted in favor of the Latin American resolution. We see this resolution as an important step forward for the Fourth International and its sections in Latin America. Nevertheless, we find it essential to let the members of the Fourth International know in what respect we find the resolution weak.

The resolution from the Ninth World Congress advocated a wrong line. It was in our opinion politically corrected at the Tenth World Congress in the Resolution on Armed Struggle in Latin America. The weakness of the Tenth World Congress was that it did not adopt a clear line on trade-union work, the necessity to root ourselves inside the masses, and the necessity to build/create strong working-class parties. But in any case you cannot "throw out the baby with the bath water," that is, you cannot just revoke one line and put another in its place. That will only make it harder to educate our cadres on the most important questions. And a necessary element in a revolutionary strategy for Latin America is a clear and correct position on the question of armed struggle. You cannot adopt a conjunctural view on the political development on a continent like Latin America. Not even for the coming three years.

The effects of miseducation on these questions in Latin America will be very serious.

We *do* nevertheless support the resolution on Latin America adopted at the Eleventh World Congress of the Fourth International.

### XIII. GREETINGS TO THE CONGRESS

Greetings were heard from Lutte Ouvrière, France.

Greetings were heard from the Socialist Workers Party, Britain.

(See Appendix I for text of these and other greetings.)

### XIV. CHINA/HONG KONG COMMISSION

Roman reported for the Commission.

(See Appendix D for text of Commission's report and motions.)

**Report by Lee See of RCP**

**Counter-motion by Lee See:** (a) The Congress should condemn the split actions led by Wu and Yip, etc., as the Congress condemned the split action of the BF and LTT; (b) the Congress should vote against the proposals of the Hong Kong Commission.

To facilitate the solution of questions, we propose our counter-motion: That the Congress: (a) condemn the split actions of Wu, Yip, and others; (b) reaffirm the RCP as the Chinese section and reiterate the non-partition of the



section; (c) authorize the incoming IEC to examine the RML's acts and to correct their mistakes of breaking democratic centralism; and on the precondition and the RML corrects its mistakes, recognize it as a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International; (d) instruct the incoming IEC to handle the fusion question in Hong Kong with strict adherence to the criteria set in the World Political Resolution.

#### **Votes on China/Hong Kong Commission:**

1. Motion from China/Hong Kong Commission:

**Delegates:** 75.5 for, 4 against, 8 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 39 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 13 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

2. Motion by Lee See:

**Delegates:** 10 for, 66 against, 13.5 abstentions, 8.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 0 for, 39 against, 2 abstentions, 13 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 10 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

#### **Statement by Lee See:**

1. The Congress has adopted a resolution concerning the Chinese section. We think this resolution is wrong. But we will respect the authority of the Congress and comply with democratic centralism. We also have to point out that when the Hong Kong Commission made the judgement, it degraded the RCP by saying it had not convened a congress for a long time. This is a fact. But it entirely ignored the fact that China was under the rule of a Stalinist bureaucracy. It also ignored the fact that it is difficult to maintain a section in a workers state. But the Chinese section managed to exist. The Commission not only has not shown its sympathy for this, but instead condemned us for it.

2. The Commission judged that the two organizations had a common political basis. But why did it not condemn those who split in an unprincipled way?

3. The Fourth International, in recognizing a section or sympathizing organization, must base itself on the criterion of whether democratic centralism is practiced. But the Commission evaded this point. So, its whole judgement was based on an incorrect premise. Therefore it is wrong for the Congress to accept its proposal. Painful experience shows that the majority may not be correct. The experience of the Ninth and Tenth Congresses shows this. We think the present incorrect decision will lead to losses. In the coming period, we will pay a heavy cost because of this. We shall request a review of whether this decision is correct or wrong at the next world congress.

### **XV. ORGANIZATIONAL SITUATION OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL**

**Frej reported** for the outgoing United Secretariat. (See Appendix E for Text of Organization Report.)

#### **Motions from outgoing United Secretariat:**

1. The World Congress empowers the IEC to empower the United Secretariat to elect a resident Bureau and to

delegate to it whatever powers are necessary for the efficient functioning of the daily leadership of the International within the statutory limits of the United Secretariat's authority.

2. The World Congress empowers the IEC and the United Secretariat to set up working committees for the expansion and strengthening of the Fourth International in those areas of the world where the Fourth International is very weak. These committees will operate under the leadership of Bureau members who will be responsible to the United Secretariat for their activity. They will have no decision-making power on political questions, which remains with the United Secretariat and the IEC, nor the right to intervene in existing organizations of the Fourth International.

3. The World Congress empowers the IEC and the United Secretariat to regularly (around twice a year) call European Political Bureaus meetings to help the international coordination of the sections' activities on specific issues. These meetings will have no policy decision-making powers.

Discussion.

#### **Summary by Frej.**

#### **Votes on Organization:**

1. Organizational motions from United Secretariat:

**Delegates:** 87.5 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 10.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 39 for, 0 against, 1 abstention, 14 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

2. Report by Frej.:

**Delegates:** 83.5 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 12.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 37 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 15 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

### **XVI. NICARAGUA**

**Duret reported** for majority of outgoing United Secretariate.

**Celso reported** for minority of outgoing United Secretariat.

**Jones reported** for minority of outgoing United Secretariate. (For counterline amendments by Jones see Appendix F.)

**Arpo reported** for Leninist Trotskyist Tendency. (For part of counterresolution by LTT see Appendix G; the other part of the LTT resolution was printed in the compilation of World Congress documents published by *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*.)

Discussion.

**Amendments by Valdez** to United Secretariat Majority draft:

I generally support the majority document, and am submitting the following *additions and amendments* which reflect nuances of differences between the majority



document and those of the minorities with respect to the character of the government and the dual power situation.

On the Process of Permanent Revolution: Point 10, paragraph 12: Replace this paragraph with:

The process can lead to three variants: 1. triumph of the socialist revolution; 2. counterrevolutionary coup d'état or war; 3. a reformist government that permits reconstruction of the bourgeois state and ensures capitalist accumulation.

On the Government: Point 10, paragraph 10: Replace the paragraph beginning "The position . . . up to the transition" with:

We are faced with a coalition government that shows signs of *class collaboration* between the FSLN and the majority of bourgeois sectors. In this coalition, political hegemony is exercised by the FSLN. It is not yet a workers and peasants government, but the dynamic of the process of permanent revolution in Nicaragua points in that direction. Any sectarianism or purely ideological approach regarding the outcome of the process which puts forward dogmatic political schemas can distort an objective analysis of the reality.

Dual Power: Point 10, paragraph 2:

Dual power resulted not only from the defeat of the dictatorship (as the report claims under point 10, paragraph 2), but was being generated by the end of 1978, especially in the cities of the northern front (León and others), where the bourgeois power of Somoza and people's power confronted one another.

With the fall of Somoza and the establishment of a government supported by the masses, dual power acquired special characteristics. It did not take the classical form of the Russian Revolution. There is no clear duality of power between the institutions representing the classes, as there was between the soviets and the Kerensky government, but a dual power "from below," of the kind described by Trotsky after the July days of 1917. That is, a duality of power in the factories, fields, and other enterprises making up the nerve center of the productive apparatus, wherein workers, peasants, and radicalized middle layers continually challenge capitalist private ownership. This *sui generis* dual power is sometimes manifest at the level of the political superstructure, in some institutions such as the ministries, especially the ministry of the economy, which is controlled by a major representative of the bourgeois political front.

Tendencies Within the FSLN: Point 10, end of paragraph 8:

Three tendencies have been maintained de facto within the FSLN ("terceristas," Prolonged People's War, Proletarian Tendency), although some militants have transferred from one to the other.

This survival of the tendencies, despite the agreement within the leadership body of the FSLN, is expressed in the distribution of zones of influence. The Proletarian Tendency controls the process of agrarian reform. The rest of the tendencies control other sectors, although the rank-

and-file militants of the three tendencies mutually influence one another.

This tendency struggle will be expressed sooner or later in the advances and setbacks of the revolution, and in the political decisions of the FSLN. The course of the process will be determined in large measure by the triumph of the revolutionary sector (which up to now has been in the majority) over the Social Democratic sector of Pastora, and other petty-bourgeois nationalist sectors.

Trade-Union Movement: Addition to point 8, paragraph 3:

However, the authoritarian attitude of the FSLN to the old trade unions, formed by the workers themselves in the resistance struggle against Somoza, has caused major tensions which it will be necessary to overcome through the actual exercise of proletarian and trade-union democracy.

Indian Movement: Addition to point 8, end of paragraph 8:

The Indian communities, especially those in Monimbó, which played an important role in the popular armed insurrection, must be supported in their demands for self-determination, for recovery of their lands stolen by the white conquerors, and for the right to speak and learn in their own language.

On the Party: Point 16: Replace this point with:

We support the reorganization and development of a section of the FI, which will seek to be integrated into the party that the FSLN is organizing, doing entry work within it. As of now, militants who are able to should join the FSLN. If this section succeeds in being integrated into the party that will be formed by the FSLN, it should not act like a separate party. It should try at the same time to put forward the positions of the FI, while seeing to it that the militants who carry out this activity are not expelled from the FSLN. As long as our comrades have not succeeded in being integrated into the FSLN, they will maintain an independent organization, avoiding sectarian attitudes that could put them on the margin of the process.

*Note:* I maintain this amendment for a vote to the end. I will not withdraw it for any reason. This vote is unchangeable and shall be voted as it is.

**Amendments by Brewster to United Secretariat majority draft:**

1. Page 11. Delete second full paragraph beginning "Any new advances in the revolution . . ." and replace with:

At this stage we cannot but characterize the GRNN as a bourgeois government. We do not support the existence of bourgeois ministers in this government which can only aid the bourgeoisie in its attempts to turn back the gains of the revolution. Any advance of the revolution must lead to a confrontation between the bourgeoisie and its allies and the working masses who fight under the leadership of the FSLN; and an *inevitable split* inside the coalition government between the contradictory social forces which make



it up. In this sense events have not yet reached a situation similar to that of the Cuban revolution of June-July 1959.

Page 11. Add additional sentence at end of third full paragraph which ends: ". . . and develop proletarian positions":

Revolutionary Marxists will strengthen this process by fighting for the outcome of the confrontation with the bourgeoisie including inside the GRNN to be the formation of a workers and peasants government which bases itself on the centralized power of the organized masses.

2. Page 14. Add at end of text, end of paragraph ". . . to replace paragraph in the October USec statement on Nicaragua":

Loyalty to the FSLN is based on defense of the gains of the revolution and defense of our revolutionary program. It is the duty of Trotskyists both through practical activity and through discussion to try to win this party to the program of the Fourth International.

#### Motions by Jones

1. That there should be a public discussion by the Fourth International on Nicaragua following the World Congress.

2. That if any of the minority positions on Nicaragua are published publicly, all will be.

3. In order to implement the line of the resolution just adopted it is necessary to build a section of the Fourth International in Nicaragua. The United Secretariat is instructed to take practical steps to organize this.

#### Summary by Strawson

#### Summary by Jones

#### Summary by Celso

#### Summary by Duret

#### Votes on Nicaragua:

1. Valdez amendments:

**Delegates:** 0 for, 40 against, 11 abstentions, 47 not voting.

**Consultative:** 0 for, 21 against, 5 abstentions, 26 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

2. Brewster amendment No. 1:

**Delegates:** 21.5 for, 41 against, 12 abstentions, 23.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 21 against, 4 abstentions, 22 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

3. Brewster amendment No. 2:

**Delegates:** 17 for, 32.5 against, 23.5 abstentions, 25 not voting.

**Consultative:** 4 for, 19 against, 5 abstentions, 24 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

4. Jones amendments on government:

**Delegates:** 16 for, 45 against, 13.5 abstentions, 23.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 25 against, 2 abstentions, 20 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

5. Jones amendments on section:

**Delegates:** 14 for, 48 against, 11.5 abstentions, 24.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 3 for, 26 against, 2 abstentions, 21 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

6. Jones amendments on economy:

**Delegates:** 22 for, 31.5 against, 19.5 abstentions, 25 not voting.

**Consultative:** 8 for, 18 against, 3 abstentions, 23 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

7. Jones amendments on Cuba:

**Delegates:** 16 for, 33 against, 19.5 abstentions, 29.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 7 for, 21 against, 2 abstentions, 22 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 15 not voting.

8. LTT report and resolution:

**Delegates:** 5 for, 89.5 against, 1 abstention, 2.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 44 against, 0 abstentions, 7 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 13 against, 0 abstentions, 2 not voting.

9. Jones report and counterline amendments:

**Delegates:** 7 for, 68 against, 17.5 abstentions, 5.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 6 for, 38 against, 2 abstentions, 6 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

10. Celso report and United Secretariat minority resolution:

**Delegates:** 20 for, 71.5 against, 5 abstentions, 1.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 15 for, 29 against, 3 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

11. Duret report and United Secretariat majority resolution:

**Delegates:** 66.5 for, 20 against, 10 abstentions, 1.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 26 for, 16 against, 5 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

12. Jones motion on public discussion:

**Delegates:** 25 for, 51.5 against, 11.5 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 35 against, 4 abstentions, 8 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.



13. Jones motion on publication of resolutions:

**Delegates:** 63.5 for, 9.5 against, 8 abstentions, 17 not voting.

**Consultative:** 22 for, 16 against, 5 abstentions, 9 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 1 for, 12 against, 1 abstention, 1 not voting.

14. Jones motion on section:

**Delegates:** 9 for, 48 against, 5 abstentions, 36 not voting.

**Consultative:** 4 for, 29 against, 3 abstentions, 16 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

#### **Statement by Jones:**

The decision to reject a public discussion on Nicaragua, voted for by leaders of the United Secretariat majority and the SWP has a very clear meaning. The SWP is already writing its position in public in international organs. The United Secretariat majority will, of course, express its opinion in public. Therefore whether it is carried on explicitly or not, a public discussion between the supporters of the United Secretariat majority and the SWP is already taking place and will develop. The sole meaning of rejecting this resolution is to ensure that public discussion on Nicaragua is carried on only between two currents and all other views are prevented from being expressed in the international organs.

This is a serious erosion of rights of minorities—abrogating the right to express themselves to solely one minority—and thereby seriously erodes confidence in the democratic functioning of the International.

I appeal to the United Secretariat, when it is meeting in a calmer atmosphere, to reconsider this decision and understand it will gain confidence of members of the International, and deepen and clarify such discussion, by allowing *all* seriously formulated minority positions to be expressed.

**Statement by Sakai:** I vote for the majority resolution and against the minority only in order to express my opposition to the minority's underestimation of the political meaning of the coalition government under the present situation in Nicaragua. Therefore I do not necessarily support the whole resolution.

### **XVII. RESOLUTION ON SPLIT BY BF AND LTT**

**Resolution presented by outgoing United Secretariat.** (For text of resolution see *Intercontinental Press/Inprecor*, Vol. 17, No. 47, December 24, 1979.)

#### **Discussion**

**Amendment by Melan:** Add the following: The Bolshevik Faction demagogically took advantage of errors committed by the Fourth International to strengthen its faction.

#### **Counterresolution on the split by Strawson:**

I. The split of the BF and LTT from the FI is a severe blow to the fight for the construction of the world party of socialist revolution. The split, carried out in concert with a maneuver of the OCRFI, is unprincipled. The leaderships of the LTT and BF denounced the Eleventh World Con-

gress as splitist and anti-democratic; have characterized the SWP as revisionist and as having adopted Castroist policies; and have charged that these positions have been covered up by the United Secretariat as, for example, on the Nicaraguan revolution. The Eleventh World Congress has taken place in a calm atmosphere of democratic debate within the framework of a Leninist combat organization. Minority positions on all questions have been reflected in counterreports and interventions. The claim that the SWP has become revisionist and Castroist (by which the splitters mean adopting the policies of a bureaucratic caste) would imply that the SWP has abandoned the program of revolutionary Marxism. In no case has the SWP taken the side of the class enemy in any class confrontations. We defend the rightful place of the SWP in the Fourth International, as a Trotskyist party. The charges of the splitters must, therefore, be rejected. The leaderships of the LTT and BF must take the political responsibility for initiating the split on the eve of a world congress, where they could have fought for their political positions, as have those LTT members who rejected the split.

II. The LTT and BF and the OCRFI have organized a "parity commission" and called for an "open world conference" of the Trotskyist movement to discuss the Nicaraguan revolution and "associated problems." Nowhere in their statements do they say that they stand for building a democratic-centralist world party. In fact, they counterpose the parity commission and the open conference to the Fourth International, its leadership structures and World Congress. This project, therefore, becomes no more than a talking shop which retards the struggle for the kind of International Trotsky founded. Not only is such a "talking shop" inappropriate given the stage of the world revolution, where revolutionaries are called upon to act, but nothing solid can come out of a shortsighted unprincipled maneuver.

III. The fight to unify all Trotskyist and revolutionary forces within the Fourth International has been set back by this split. Nevertheless, the Fourth International maintains its positions that it will fight to unify these forces.

In the concrete circumstances, the FI appeals to all those who have left the FI to return on one basis: that they will implement the decisions of the World Congress and act as loyal members of the FI and its national sections. The political positions of the BF and LTT are in no way incompatible with the program of revolutionary Marxism, which means that those views can be put forward within the Fourth International.

At the same time it is necessary for the FI to reach out to those sectors of the Trotskyist movement outside the International. *And to fight to win them to the building of the Fourth International.* Thus, even in this situation, we must propose the reopening of political discussions on an agreed-upon agenda with the OCRFI, the LTT, the BF, as well as Lutte Ouvrière, providing that each party regard each other as revolutionaries and *act towards each as such.* In addition we propose that joint work on key questions of the class struggle (the continuation of the defense work for the HKS comrades, in solidarity with the Nicaraguan revolution, etc.) is appropriate and necessary.

Through such discussions and common effort in the class struggle, it will be possible to create the conditions to overcome the present factionalism which harms not *only* our own movement, but the basic interests of the working



class. However, whatever the attitude of the splitters, the Fourth International pledges to continue the battle to build mass revolutionary parties in every country, as the necessary prerequisite for the conquest of power. We remain unshakably confident that we will carry through this task. Against the Split!

For the Unification of Trotskyists and Revolutionaries!  
Build the Fourth International!

**Motion by Strawson, Moreno (LCR, Spain), and Arpo (LCR, Spain):**

The Eleventh World Congress mandates the International Executive Committee (IEC) to take the appropriate steps to make contact as soon as possible with the forces claiming to be Trotskyist—the Bolshevik Faction, the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency, the OCRFI, Lutte Ourvière, etc.

The aim of these contacts will be to arrive at a plan of discussions on tasks, such as, for example, the Nicaraguan revolution or the liberation of political prisoners in the bureaucratized workers states.

It is also recommended that the national sections take the same steps.

The objective of these discussions, contacts, and common actions, in the best tradition of the reunification of 1963, is to clear the road leading to unity of the Trotskyist movement on a correct basis.

Therefore the Eleventh World Congress recommends to the IEC to set as the goal of these relations a reunification congress to take place in an appropriate period of time.

#### **Votes on split:**

##### **1. Melan amendment:**

**Delegates:** 21 for, 40.5 against, 10 abstentions, 26.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 30 against, 2 abstentions, 13 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 1 abstention, 0 not voting.

##### **2. United Secretariat resolution:**

**Delegates:** 80.5 for, 7.5 against, 5 abstentions, 5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 36 for, 2 against, 2 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

##### **3. Strawson resolution:**

**Delegates:** 7 for, 71 against, 7.5 abstentions, 12.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 33 against, 1 abstention, 15 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

##### **4. Motion by Strawson et al.:**

**Delegates:** 7 for, 76 against, 7 abstentions, 8 not voting.

**Consultative:** 1 for, 39 against, 0 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

**Statement by Marston and Tettadoro (Britain) and Kurt (Germany):**

The statement on the split of the LTT and BF proposed

by the United Secretariat mixes together two distinct questions: (a) the programmatic framework of the International, which is the basis for our condemnation of the split as unprincipled; (b) the political differences with the LTT and BF on events in Nicaragua.

It also wrongly relates our capacity to overcome the effects of the split not to the living verification of the Trotskyist program in the class struggle but to "the decision of this World Congress to implement a radical turn to industry to deepen our proletarian orientation."

We are therefore voting for the Strawson resolution despite disagreement with some of its formulations because the framework which it advances is essentially correct.

## **XVIII. REPORT FROM ARGENTINA COMMISSION**

**Karl Anderson reported.**

**Motions from the Commission:**

#### **No. 1:**

(a) At the Tenth World Congress the "Bolshevik Faction" and the "Red Faction" were recognized as sympathizing organizations in Argentina (the PST was already recognized at the Ninth World Congress).

(b) Considering that there have been splits in these organizations; that they have been hit very hard by repression; and that it has not been possible to regroup their forces nor those of the other groups which claim allegiance to the Fourth International; no group can be recognized as an official organization of the Fourth International.

(c) The Congress mandates the United Secretariat to constitute a commission with the task of establishing—in collaboration with revolutionary Marxists from Argentina—the political and organizational basis for a regroupment.

(d) The World Congress authorizes the IEC to grant to this unified organization the status of sympathizing organization on the basis of the criteria used at this World Congress.

#### **No. 2:**

The Eleventh World Congress mandates the United Secretariat to organize and lead the activities of Latin American comrades in exile, who must be integrated and disciplined members of the sections where they live, in order to develop an important political activity toward the large colonies of exiles from Latin America and also to organize solidarity with the struggles of the people of Latin America in which the Nicaraguan revolution today has a central place.

#### **Discussion**

**Vote on motions from Argentina Commission:**

**Delegates:** 84 for, 0 against, 1 abstention, 13 not voting.

**Consultative:** 38 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 14 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.



## XIX. REPORT FROM GREECE COMMISSION

Otto (Sweden) reported.

**Motion from the Commission:**

To send the following appeal to the comrades of the LCI:

The Fifth World Congress Since Reunification of the Fourth International appeals to the LCI to immediately join the OCDE, the Greek section of the Fourth International.

The World Congress condemns the setting up of an organization outside of the Fourth International and its section in Greece.

Only by joining the Greek section can you again become members of the Fourth International and thereby regain all the rights granted to all members of the Fourth International.

The World Congress is deeply convinced that your place is inside the Fourth International, and therefore urges you to act in accordance with the content of this appeal.

Discussion

**Vote on motion from Greece Commission:**

**Delegates:** 74 for, 0 against, 7.5 abstentions, 16.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 36 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 16 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

## XX. REPORT FROM IRAN COMMISSION

Jones reported.

**Motion from the Commission,** which was unanimously agreed to by the Iranian comrades present at the Congress:

1. The Iranian section of the Fourth International is presently divided into two public factions. Neither speaks for the section as a whole.

2. The World Congress affirms that there is no principled basis for a split in the section. It urges both sides to work toward healing the division.

3. The World Congress urges both sides, in the meantime, to refrain from public attacks upon each other, and to use restraint in expressing any necessary political differentiations with each other.

4. The World Congress empowers the IEC to review the matter and make any indicated decisions on unification, including on recognition.

Discussion

**Vote on motion from Iran Commission:**

**Delegates:** 84 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 14 not voting.

**Consultative:** 38 for, 0 against, 1 abstention, 15 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

## XXI. REPORT FROM CHILE COMMISSION

Abel reported.

**Motion from the Commission:**

The PSR, Chilean section of the Fourth International, has had major difficulties in maintaining regular functioning since 1973, the date of the coup d'etat. According to the Chilean comrades, their activity has been basically reduced to internal tasks related to the education and survival of the group. They now report to us that this situation has begun to change and they are beginning to undertake outward-directed activities.

On the other hand, the relationship of the sympathizing organization, the Liga Comunista, with the Fourth International remains to be clarified following the split that has occurred. Other militants and currents inside Chile are evolving toward Trotskyism. There are real possibilities to win them to the Fourth International. In addition, numerous sections of the International do work among Chilean exiles.

For these reasons the World Congress recommends that the new leadership of the International should make all possible efforts to:

- aid the comrades of the PSR in developing their work;
- work also with other militants and currents to help win them to the Fourth International, both inside and outside of Chile;
- aid the process of unification of all Trotskyists in Chile into a single organization.

Discussion

**Vote on motion from Chile Commission:**

**Delegates:** 84.5 for, 0 against, 1 abstention, 12.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 38 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 14 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 10 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 5 not voting.

Discussion

**Motion by Presiding Committee:** To refer to the IEC to issue public statements concerning Iran and Puerto Rico.

Carried.

## XXII. FINAL REPORT FROM MANDATES AND RECOGNITION COMMISSION

Riel reported.

The Commission reported that the following organizations were represented at the Congress as observers: (1) a sector of Socialist Convergence of Brazil which recently split from that organization; (2) the Socialist Workers Party of Britain; (3) Lutte Ouvrière of France; (4) Vanguardia Obrera and Vanguardia Comunista del POR from Bolivia; (5) a minority of the French OCT. At the request of the delegation of the French LCR, a representative of a group of LCR members who support the positions of the LTT but who also agree with the motion adopted at the beginning of the Congress was admitted as an observer.



The number of these comrades was too small to merit their having a delegate as part of the French delegation.

#### **Motions from the Commission:**

**No. 1:** To accept the written statements of delegates from the RCP of China, the October Group of Norway, and the *Que Hacer* group of the Dominican Republic explaining their abstentions on the preliminary motion at the beginning of the Congress defining the basis for attendance (see Appendix A for statements).

**No. 2:** (a) to grant one-half a full vote each to the delegates of the RCL and RML of China/Hong Kong, in line with the motion from the China/Hong Kong Commission that was adopted by the Congress; and (b) to grant five full votes to the five delegates from the two sections of the Iranian HKS, in line with the adopted recommendations of the Iran Commission.

*Carried.*

**No. 3:** In Ecuador there are two organizations that have requested to be recognized as sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International—the MRT and the MST. The two groups are in favor of a fusion, and are presently conducting discussions which could lead to a unification. Only one of the two groups, the MRT, is represented at this congress, but the delegate was sent as a representative of both organizations. The proposal of the Mandates and Recognition Commission is that: (a) Both the MST and MRT are recognized as sympathizing organizations of the FI, with a recommendation from the Congress that the two groups make every effort to carry through the proposed fusion; (b) That the representative of the MRT be seated with voice and one consultative vote.

*Carried.*

**No. 4:** The following organizations of the Fourth International are not represented at this Congress: PST of Argentina, PST of Venezuela, PST of Uruguay, Convergencia Socialista of Brazil, PSTs of Peru, and the Liga Comunista of Chile. The OST of Costa Rica, which voted at its last national congress to apply for recognition as the Costa Rican section, is also not present. The leaderships of most of these organizations include leaders of the Bolshevik Faction and the LTT, some of whom directly participated in organizing the recent split from the Fourth International. Some of these organizations are listed in the "Declaration of the Bolshevik Faction" as supporting the Bolshevik Faction *as organizations*.

The current status of these organizations is as follows: the PSTs of Argentina and Uruguay are sympathizing organizations recognized by the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses, respectively; the Venezuelan PST was recognized as the section at the Tenth World Congress; the PST of Peru and Convergencia Socialista have a partial continuity with the FIR and Punto da Partido, which were recognized as a section and sympathizing group, respectively, by the Tenth World Congress. The Liga Comunista of Chile was also recognized by the Tenth World Congress as a sympathizing organization.

In this situation, the World Congress decides:

(a) To appeal to all members of these organizations and the organizations as a whole to reject, as members and as organizations, the split by leaders of the BF and the LTT by declaring their support for the content of the motion

adopted at the beginning of the Fifth World Congress Since Reunification (11th World Congress), which defined who could participate in the congress and implicitly, therefore, the organizational boundaries of the Fourth International. The text of this motion is as follows: [see point II. of minutes.]

(b) The United Secretariat is mandated to contact these groups to find out whether they want to remain loyally inside the Fourth International, as indicated by support to the above motion.

(c) To give full power to the IEC to decide upon the future status of these organizations and/or their members.

(d) To empower the IEC to coopt an appropriate number of comrades from these organizations to the IEC if this is merited.

*Carried Unanimously.*

**No. 5:** Comrades in the United States are not able to be members of the Fourth International because of reactionary legislation. The World Congress confirms that the category of fraternal supporters of the Fourth International in the United States is defined, as in all other countries, by membership in the organization that would be the section if it were not for this reactionary legislation—that is, the SWP.

#### **Amendment by Howard to motion No. 5:**

The World Congress reaffirms the right of all comrades excluded from the Fourth International to appeal to the International Control Commission. This includes Comrade Hedda Garza, the only member of the former Internationalist Tendency who wishes to be reintegrated and is today outside the SWP.

**Amendment by Karl Anderson:** This motion in no way rejects the right of Hedda Garza to protest to the International Control Commission or other bodies of the FI.

#### **Vote on Howard amendment to motion No. 5:**

**Delegates:** 28 for, 42 against, 7 abstentions, 21 not voting.

**Consultative:** 5 for, 27 against, 2 abstentions, 16 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

*Defeated.*

#### **Karl A. withdraws amendment**

#### **Statement by Karl A.:**

I am withdrawing my motion since I refuse to have it put in opposition to the motion by the Mandates Commission on the status of the SWP in the USA.

I place this declaration together with my motion in the minutes of the World Congress under this point.

#### **Statement by Roman for the Mandates Commission:**

A split occurred recently in the Greenland organization that the Eleventh World Congress recognized as a sympathizing organization. A member of the Mandates Commis-



sion met with a representative of this split and reported to the commission. The Commission could not attempt to form an opinion of the general framework in which this split took place because of its inability to discuss at length and gather all the documentation on a split that occurred after the departure for the World Congress of the delegate from this organization. But it appears that the *immediate decision* about the split was made by the (minority) militants who split. Under these conditions, the Mandates Commission felt that it was impossible for it to invite to the Congress the group that had split. The United Secretariat should follow the situation of the Greenland Trotskyist movement and do its best to aid in the necessary regroupment of our forces.

**Motion by Fourier:** The World Congress affirms that Fausto Amador belongs to an organization that is today not part of the Fourth International. If at some future date recognition of the organization to which he belongs is posed, his status will be considered by the IEC, in particular, in line with the motion adopted by the October 1979 United Secretariat meeting.

#### Discussion

#### Vote on Fourier motion:

**Delegates:** 42 for, 24.5 against, 10 abstentions, 21.5 not voting.

**Consultative:** 15 for, 15 against, 5 abstentions, 15 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

#### Vote on motions 1-5 from Mandates Commission:

**Delegates:** 78.5 for, 1 against, 8.5 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Consultative:** 40 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 10 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

### XXIII. REPORT FROM NOMINATIONS COMMISSION

**Allio reported.** (See Appendix H for text of report.)

**Proposals from Nominations Commission** for full members of the International Executive Committee:

#### Asia

Ahmad, Hormoz (Iran)

Iwaberi, Miamoto, Sakai (Japan)

Bala (Sri Lanka)

Dundee, Dunder (Australia)

#### Europe

Rudi, Walter (Belgium)

Brewster, Ellis, Howard, Jones (Britain)

Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Dominique, Hoffmann, Matti,

Riel, Roman, Segur (France)

Kurt, Mecki (Germany)

Claudio, Massimo (Italy)

Jorge (Portugal)

Anna, Duran, Martis, Melan, Manuel, Troglo, Unai (Spanish state)

Frej, Karl A., Nina (Sweden)

Duret, Karl (Switzerland)

#### Latin America

Serrano (Bolivia)

Two Members from Brazil

David, Maria, Ricardo (Colombia)

Alfonso, Felipe, Jacobo (Mexico)

Martinez (Peru)

#### Middle East

Jaber (Lebanon)

#### North America

Abel, Samuels (Canada/Quebec)

#### Fraternal Members

Antonio, Celso, Dugger, Galois, Jake, Pedro, Stateman, Susan, Thérèse (USA)

**Proposals from Nominations Commission** for consultative members of the IEC:

#### Asia

Desai (India)

Cyrus, Fahri (Iran)

Muraki (Japan)

One Member from Hong Kong

Key (New Zealand)

#### Europe

Fred (Austria)

Marcel (Belgium)

Adair, Cannon (Britain)

Mogens (Denmark)

Lourson, Thinville (France)

Karl (Germany)

Spathas (Greece)

Paul (Holland)

One Member from Ireland

Robert (Luxemburg)

Amilcar (Portugal)

Jaime, Felipe, Mireilla (Spanish state)

Kaj (Sweden)

Rivière (Switzerland)

#### Latin America

Anatole (Antilles)

Zaianski (Colombia)

One Member from Ecuador

German (Mexico)

#### Middle East

Mikado (Israel)



*North America*

Corbière, Lachance (Canada/Quebec)

*Fraternal Members*

Kent, Ryan (USA)

**Proposals from Nominations Commission** for members of the International Control Commission:

Bundy (fraternal member, USA), Georges (France), Gormley (Canada/Quebec), Otto (Sweden), Pecho (Spain), Williams (Britain)

Discussion

**Statement by Ellis for British delegation.**

**Nominations by Karl** (Switzerland): That Pia be added as a seventh member of the International Control Commission, and Karl (Germany) be made a full IEC member instead of alternate, so that both the IEC and ICC will have an odd number of members.

**Motion by Dunder:** To refer to the IEC the adding of a comrade from Hong Kong to the IEC.

**Amendment to the list by Brewster:** to remove Adair from list.

**Request from SWP delegation** for a break so that it can meet.

*Agreed.*

Recess.

Session reconvenes.

**Motions by Celso** for SWP delegation:

1. That Comrade Stateman should be given time to respond to the charges made against him by Comrade Ellis.

*Carried.*

2. The charges leveled by Comrades Ellis and Jones against Comrade Stateman and the Socialist Workers Party of the United States, and all matters surrounding these charges, should be referred to the International Control Commission. The ICC should meet immediately on this question.

3. All discussion concerning this matter be ruled out of order under this point on the agenda.

Discussion.

**Request by Ghulam** for a recess so that British delegation can meet.

*Agreed.*

Recess.

Session reconvenes.

**Brewster reports** that British delegation does not propose adoption of Ellis statement, and agrees on referral of matter to the ICC.

**Amendment by Walter** to Celso motion: Change to

“charges levelled . . . against Comrade Stateman and other leaders of the SWP . . .” instead of “charges levelled . . . against Stateman and the SWP . . .”

*Carried.*

**Amendment by Brewster** to Celso motion: Replace “charges” with “matters.”

*Carried.*

**Vote on Celso motion as amended:**

*Carried.*

**Vote on original Celso motion:**

*Carried.*

**Presiding Committee proposes** voting original motion against amended motion.

*Agreed.*

**Vote:**

For motion as amended: 46

For original motion: 35

*Amended motion carried.*

**Karl Anderson nominates** Klein.

**Motion by Spathas:** Because in my opinion all delegates to the Eleventh World Congress have the proper qualifications to be members of the IEC, I propose that all of them be nominated and then to proceed to a secret vote. The first sixty-one will be the full members and the latter twenty-nine will be alternates.

**Motion by Sakai:** That one consultative IEC member be allotted to Hong Kong after the fusion of the two organizations.

**Motion by Strawson:** To add an LTT member to the list.

**Brewster withdraws proposal** to remove Adair from list of nominations.

**Motion by Cannon:** That this congress refers the grave charges made by Comrades Stateman and Celso against IMG leaders to the Control Commission, in particular the charges of being liars and of engaging in factionalism over ten years.

**Motion by Celso:** That the congress request that Comrade Ellis give a copy of her statement to Comrade Stateman.

**Presiding Committee rules** both motions out of order.

**Summary by Allio.** Motion by Dunder accepted.

**Vote on Spathas motion:**

*Defeated.*



### Votes on IEC and Control Commission:

1. Karl (Switzerland) motion to enlarge IEC to 61 members:

**Delegates:** 63 for, 9.5 against, 5.5 abstentions, 20 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

2. Karl (Switzerland) motion to add Karl (Germany) to full IEC:

**Delegates:** 9.5 for, 43.5 against, 20.5 abstentions, 24.5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

3. Karl A. motion to add Klein to full IEC:

**Delegates:** 38 for, 12.5 against, 25 abstentions, 22.5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

4. Strawson motion to reserve place for LTT:

**Delegates:** 27 for, 39.5 against, 11 abstentions, 20.5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

5. Sakai motion on Hong Kong:

**Delegates:** 27 for, 21.5 against, 26.5 abstentions, 23 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 14 against, 0 abstentions, 1 not voting.

6. Karl (Switzerland) motion to enlarge ICC by one:

**Delegates:** 24 for, 39 against, 13.5 abstentions, 21.5 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 0 for, 15 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

7. IEC list as amended:

**Delegates:** 79 for, 0 against, 2 abstentions, 17 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

8. List of IEC alternates:

**Delegates:** 75 for, 0 against, 5 abstentions, 18 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

9. ICC list:

**Delegates:** 74 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 24 not voting.

**Fraternal:** 15 for, 0 against, 0 abstentions, 0 not voting.

**Motion by Cannon:** That this congress refers the grave charges made by Comrades Stateman and Celso against IMG leaders to the Control Commission, in particular the charges of being liars and of engaging in factionalism over ten years.

*Carried.*

**Motion by Jones:** That a place be allocated on the IEC for the LTT. That this be filled following the January 1980 international meeting of the LTT, when it is clear that all problems of drawing a clear line on membership in the International will have been completed.

*Defeated.*

**Motion by Arpo and Moreno (Spain):** In the event that the motion from the Nominations Commission regarding our loyalty motion should be adopted, we request that the Control Commission be convened and that it

investigate our case. We do not want to be second-class militants, seeing that our loyalty has been placed in doubt solely because of what we consider to be political positions.

*Defeated.*

**Statement by Jones:** I note that the SWP leadership, supposedly the great defenders of the representation of international currents being on the IEC, voted consistently against even unequivocally loyal members of the LTT being represented on the IEC.

### Statement by Majority of Delegation from Spanish State:

The members of the majority of the delegation from the Spanish state who remain at the congress wish to publicly express their stupefaction at the climate and language used by several delegates in view of the incidents prior to the election of the IEC.

We are convinced that this style of work and discussion is profoundly miseducative for our entire International, and we declare our desire to fight for a radical change in the latter.

**Statement by Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Fourier, Frej, Karl (Germany), Kurt, Manuel, Melan, Maria, Marline, Otto (Sweden), Roman, Riel, Rudi, Georges, Walter:**

We note that the Nominations Commission has proposed a comrade as member of the IEC on his individual merits, against the advice and decision of this section's delegation.

The decision to have the IEC elected on the basis of a slate of individuals proposed represents a step in the right direction as against its election on a purely federalist basis, exclusively by proposals of national delegations. But this would only be true if it became a general principle, able to be applied to *all* national delegations; as it is done this time in the case of the IMG. It in no way implies any derogatory judgement on the national delegations which happen to disagree with the proposals of the Nominations Commission or the vote of the World Congress.

**Statement by Mireille (France):** The election of the French delegation to the IEC was made under scandalous conditions: no balance sheet was given for those comrades already involved in international work; no serious discussions were held on the division of work inside the Political Bureau and Central Committee; no collective discussion was held on a project for a leadership for the French section in the short and medium term; the French congress was not asked to ratify the proposal.

The proposals are therefore totally arbitrary, related *only* to the relationship of forces, to pressure from individuals and tendencies. This method of leadership selection is not new in the French section; nor is it totally unrelated to the leadership crisis which has affected the French section for many years.

This is why I did not take part in the vote for the French delegation to the IEC, the dice having been totally loaded. P.S. I was not a candidate for the IEC.

**Motion by Duret:** To refer to the IEC the question of publication of documents from the World Congress, given



the large volume of materials and the technical problems that this poses.

*Carried.*

**Motion by Walter:** Given the number and length of the World Congress documents which makes their assimilation by broader layers of the toiling masses difficult, the Congress empowers the IEC to issue in its name a Manifesto which can summarize in a popular way the main line of the main political documents adopted by the Congress and which could be widely distributed by our sections and sympathizing organizations.

*Carried.*

**Motion by Celso** for the outgoing United Secretariat:

1. That Comrades Peng Shu-tse and Pierre Frank be made consultative members of the IEC. This means they will be sent United Secretariat minutes and communications and will have voice at IEC meetings.

2. That a message be sent to Comrade Peng congratulating him on his fiftieth year in the revolutionary Marxist movement.

*Carried.*

**World Congress adjourned.**

## Appendix A

### Statement by Jose:

I, Jose, delegate from the Norwegian sympathizing organization, have abstained in this afternoon's vote due to some doubts about the wording. Nevertheless, I and the October Group fully support the motion adopted this afternoon condemning the split by the BF and the LTT. We fully support the International and its United Secretariat.

### Statement by Lee See of the RCP:

1. We first state: We condemn the split actions of the BF and the LTT. We agree that all relations any person has with any political organization outside the Fourth International must be subordinated to the leadership and supervision of the International and national leaderships of the FI. We also recognize the legitimacy of this World Congress, and we guarantee that we will comply with democratic centralism in carrying out all obligations of a section of the Fourth International.

2. We think that the attendance of delegates at this Congress already shows in action that they recognize the legitimacy of this Congress. Therefore, it is only necessary for the Congress to first ask all delegates to guarantee strict compliance with democratic centralism. This is sufficient for the Congress to proceed with discussion according to the agenda.

We also think that the motion put forward on the first day at the very beginning of the Congress, if we look at the entire structure and content of its *original version*, has the function of pushing the split that has occurred to a stalemate and may even lead to an unnecessary enlargement of the split: obviously, the phrase that anyone "who does not break all relations with them" has the implication that not even the FI leadership can maintain any relations with them. And this will inevitably place the split that has already occurred into a stalemate.

3. The amendment to this motion made by some delegates aims at breaking the present stalemate by "calling upon the other leaders and all members of the BF and LTT

to repudiate this split-oriented policy." In fact, it is this amendment that gives the above spirit to the motion, enabling the motion to be adopted by a majority vote. We fully agree with the above spirit.

But since the amended motion still is not free of the shortcoming (contained in point 2 of the motion) that we pointed out above—the addition only correctly rules that "all relations [by anyone] with any organization outside the Fourth International be subordinated to the decisions of the international and national leaderships of the FI," but one cannot deduce from this amendment the conclusion that the international or national leadership can maintain relations with the BF and LTT—we think that point 2 of the amended motion is ambiguous in its meaning and still has shortcomings. Therefore, we abstain in the vote on it.

4. Finally, we reiterate that we guarantee our strict compliance with democratic centralism and we will carry out in action this motion adopted by the Congress.

### Statement by Alberto, "Que Hacer?" Group, Dominican Republic

The undersigned delegate of "Que Hacer?" in the Dominican Republic, which has been recognized as a sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, declares the following with respect to the first motion voted by this Eleventh World Congress:

1. He recognizes the legitimacy of this congress and accepts its decisions passed by majority vote.

2. He profoundly deplors the split that has taken place in the ranks of the International, in which the leaderships of the Bolshevik Faction and the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency were implicated.

3. He considers that there were political and organizational factors on the part of the United Secretariat in this crisis that could have been avoided, preventing the split or at least making sure that it occurred on a clear political basis.

4. He urges that the congress should not limit itself to condemning the split, but should adopt whatever measures



are necessary to restore lost unity or prevent a greater deterioration of the International.

5. He pledges to continue educating himself about the crisis in the time remaining of the congress and after it, with the aim of having as objective and exact an opinion as possible about this problem and transmitting it to his organization "Que Hacer?"

Finally, he declares that he has honestly made all the efforts he was capable of to reach a definitive judgment on the crisis in the shortest possible time. However, these efforts have been limited by his unfamiliarity with the concrete facts, the political content of the positions involved, and, in general, by the newness of his organization to the International.

## Appendix B

### Counterposition by Howard (IMG Britain)

*New Preamble to World Political Resolution*, replacing Points 1-8, (Kurt Amendment #1):

The situation facing the Fourth International on a world scale at the present time can be summarized as follows:

1. The present period remains one of the continuing development of the international relation of class forces in favor of the proletariat. A series of phenomena bear witness to the fact that we are in a period of the rise of world revolution: the first internationally-coordinated recession since the thirties; the defeats and setbacks for imperialism in Indochina, southern Africa, Iran, and Central America; the disintegration of the dictatorships of southern Europe; the undiminished capacity of the working class of Western Europe to resist the capitalist offensive against its historically established living standards and rights; the reemergence of militant class struggle in the USA; the reappearance of antibureaucratic currents of an overt and increasingly mass character in Eastern Europe.

2. But this indisputable reality at the general historical level must not blind us to the fact that the tempo and pattern of the world revolution in particular sectors and countries remains a complex one characterized by uneven development and the possibility of severe setbacks as well as great victories. In order to analyze this complex reality and elaborate a line of effective political intervention into this situation, we must base ourselves upon the concept of the dialectic of the sectors of world revolution. That is, we must combine an understanding of the specificity and concreteness of the problems and tasks which we face in each sector of struggle with a clear appreciation of the ways in which the class struggle in these sectors interact to determine the global relation of forces.

3. Within this framework we can say that the most important new factor in world politics is the deepening political crisis inside the imperialist countries. This partial crisis of bourgeois dominance in the central bastions of world capitalism has dramatically narrowed imperialism's room for maneuver on the international terrain, limiting its capacity to intervene against mass struggles which have broken out at the weakest points of imperialist domination: in the semicolonial countries.

At the same time the economic crisis of the world imperialist system is deepening the social crisis in the semicolonial countries and narrowing imperialism's material capacity to support credible reformist alternatives in this sector. Thus imperialism and proimperialist regimes are being forced to rely increasingly upon naked repression to hold back the mass movement at exactly that point in time when a centralized organization of that repression is most difficult.

We can thus say that the political situation in the imperialist countries is today the most important determinant of the world relation of class forces. But the class struggle inside the imperialist countries themselves will, for the immediate future, continue to stay short of actual proletarian seizures of power in those countries, due to the continued political reserves of the bourgeoisie, in particular the ability to depend upon the reformist and Stalinist bureaucracies.

Thus in the immediate period the most deepgoing political breakthrough made possible by the favorable relation of class forces will take place in the semicolonial countries. The greatest prospects for the emergence of new workers states, with its immense importance for the world revolutionary struggle, lie in this area.

The growing need for imperialism to sabotage or intervene directly against such advances of the mass movement will rapidly become a further constitutive factor in this crisis of bourgeois domination in the imperialist countries. The effects of major proletarian victories in the semicolonial countries will be to greatly deepen the political consciousness of the mass of workers in the imperialist countries, expose the political bankruptcy of reformism and Stalinism, and stimulate the unity and political clarity of the vanguard. In this way the mass defensive struggles of the workers in the advanced capitalist countries can rapidly be given an offensive character which poses the question of proletarian demands in the imperialist heartlands.

Eurocommunism, while an attempt to resolve the crisis of Stalinism within a bureaucratic framework, reflects the close interrelationship that exists between developments in Eastern Europe and the evolution of the workers movement in Western Europe.

Further evolution of the world relationship of class forces can only deepen the political crisis in the workers states, open up the possibilities for the antibureaucratic movements to create (or extend) a mass proletarian base, and multiply their impact upon the Stalinist parties in the capitalist countries.

4. The principle obstacle to the steady interlinked and forward movement of the class struggle in this situation of continuing capitalist economic and political crisis is the unresolved crisis of proletarian leadership. This makes it possible for imperialism to exploit the uneven development of mass consciousness and combativity in order to isolate the most advanced developments in the class struggle in alliance with the workers bureaucracies.

In recent years this contributed to a more contradictory development of the world revolution: victories in the fight against imperialism were combined with setbacks for the workers or the creation of new obstacles on the road to the emancipation of the toiling masses. This was very clearly



the case in Indochina—where the defeat of U.S. imperialism was combined with an escalation of interbureaucratic conflicts to wars—and in Africa, where the victory of the liberation forces led to the establishment of petty-bourgeois nationalist regimes which remain in the framework of neocolonialism and with the political support of the Soviet Union and the Cuban governments.

These developments were not without effects on the vanguard that had radicalized in the post '68 period.

The Fourth International in its continuing fight to overcome the crisis of proletarian leadership must ensure that the most advanced conquests of the world proletariat become acquisitions of the workers movement as a whole and new starting points for the class struggle on an international level.

We must strive to contrast an international organization that is constantly involved in the most important events of the world class struggle—able to assimilate and disseminate its lessons for the vanguard of the workers movement; ready and able to channel political resources to reinforce the work of the revolutionary vanguard in the most crucial political situations; and capable of waging mass international campaigns which can prevent the isolation of the most advanced detachments of the world workers movement and facilitate the integration of their experience into the political consciousness of the international working class.

Such an International must be comprised of national sections whose cadres have deep roots in their respective working classes and of international structures with the political authority and political resources necessary to ensure that the Fourth International is really able to act as the world party of socialist revolution. The simultaneous construction of such sections worldwide and such an International is both necessary and possible in the coming period of proletarian revolutionary upsurge.

The world political situation as a whole thus indicates an increase in opportunities for the growth of the Fourth International centering on winning cadres in the decisive layers of the working class, the labor movement, and the anti-imperialist masses.

*Amendment to World Political Resolution, Chapter V, Delete Points 23 and 24 (a) and replace as follows (Kurt Amendment #2):*

23. The Fourth International has its forces in about sixty countries. These sections and sympathizing groups differ in size and implantation in the workers and peasants vanguard. Moreover, they are established throughout the three sectors of the world revolution: in the advanced capitalist countries, the semicolonial countries, and the bureaucratized workers states. This implies, on the one hand, that the tasks of the FI as a whole must be general in character and, on the other hand, that they must be concretized for each of the three sectors of the world revolution (and by the sections themselves for each country).

This starting point by no means implies that it is impossible to formulate tasks for our movement as a whole, or that a world political resolution should restrict itself to an analysis of the perspectives in each of the three sectors of world revolution and their dialectic. But it does underline the differentiated and complex framework within which these tasks have to be formulated.

Despite its divisions into nations and states, one of capitalism's most important features is its international structure. This first took the form of the world market and led subsequently to an international division of labor and an internationalization of capital that clearly transcends national boundaries. Thus world capitalism, with its generalized system of exploitation governed by the rate of profit and its world market characterized by unequal exchange, is the objective force that links together the advanced imperialist and semicolonial countries.

The bureaucratized workers states, which to a significant degree are also linked into the capitalist world market, are also divided into nations and states. Moreover, they are split into two blocs controlled by the Kremlin and Peking bureaucracies. These divisions, which have even resulted in military conflict between workers states, arise from the narrow self-interest of the bureaucracies. The objective chain that binds these societies together is their common non-capitalist character; at the same time, the fate of the working class in these countries is linked to that of workers in the capitalist world by the fact that only socialist revolutions in the advanced capitalist countries can provide the material basis for a real socialist transformation which can meet the social needs of the toiling masses on a global scale.

The internationalization of the productive forces in the capitalist world stands in basic contradiction to capital's national and continental basis of organization, which is rooted in private property and competition. Meanwhile, the bureaucracies of the workers states are incapable of taking full advantage of the potentialities of the planned non-capitalist economies. Although great efforts have been made to coordinate these economies, especially in the framework of COMECON, these have generally been contradictory and limited in character as a result of the narrow-minded national interests of the bureaucracy. As a result the existing divisions have been strengthened and the confrontations between Peking and Moscow, and Peking and Hanoi, have sharpened.

But for the working class these contradictions are historically unnecessary. The historical interests of the working class lie in the interrelated struggle for the abolition of capitalist ownership, exploitation, and oppression through socialist revolution in the capitalist countries, and the struggle for the abolition of bureaucratic privilege and oppression through political revolution in the workers states. The historic interest of the working class in the building of a classless society is one that can only be realized on a coordinated international scale.

The capitalists are all agreed on the need—regardless of the intensity of competition between various national sectors—to fight tooth and nail against the socialist challenge of the working class. The bureaucracy in the workers states equally has a common interest: to prevent the rise of an anti-bureaucratic struggle whose dynamic would lead in the direction of a socialist society and act as an attraction to workers and peasants all over the world.

The working class, however, has lagged behind in pursuing an international struggle against its common enemies to any corresponding degree. The reformist and Stalinist leaderships in the capitalist countries have instead backed "their own" bourgeoisies and often led the working class in protectionist and narrow chauvinist directions. Instead of coordinating the struggle against world capitalism, their internationals have backed their



sister-organizations in these efforts. In the bureaucratized workers states, the Communist parties and official trade unions, act as transmission belts of bureaucratic interests. Any socialist or even purely "democratic" organization, any trade union which really defends the workers interests, is illegal or constantly threatened with illegality.

Hence the imperative necessity to build the world party of socialist revolution. But up until now the FI has not been able to utilize its forces in a systematic way so as to link together various groups of struggling workers in different countries, or to build up international solidarity. This relates, among other things, to the time lag in building the International's international organs, as well as its method of functioning, even in relation to the limited resources at hand.

The FI's programmatic standpoint—that it is necessary to build the International simultaneously on the national and international level—has not been reflected in concrete discussions about taking advantage of the opportunities that have existed in the international arena. The building of the world party has to a great degree been isolated in the different countries, with rather undeveloped discussion between the sections about experiences and problems, let alone coordination of their work.

During the last ten-year period, but especially between 1968 and 1976, the FI has had a substantial growth rate. But at the same time the International's center and mode of functioning have changed very little, especially in the last three-four years. Information about the various sections' work is either confined to the United Secretariat/Bureau or is exchanged at random on a bilateral basis.

The long period of hard faction fights has left clear marks on the International's mode of functioning. Democratic centralism as expressed in the statutes of the FI was undermined by this factionalism and has not really been applied after the factional situation to a great extent ceased. Although the former provisional statutes were adopted by the Tenth World Congress, they have not been followed.

The world congress has been postponed several times. Consequently the International as a whole has not had the opportunity of taking a stand on several important occasions. Nor has it had the chance to decide on important aspects of the building of its international bodies. The IEC has not been able to assemble and the United Secretariat has not been renewable in the normal way. This situation has contributed to the fact that it has not been possible to mobilize the FI as a whole in concrete tasks in the building of the world party.

There are great empty spots on the world map of the FI today. There are only a handful of sections and/or sympathizing organizations throughout Africa, the Middle East and Asia. It must be made possible to effectively engage all the sections in a discussion on what can and should be done about this situation. At present the international commissions have no functioning regular routines, and most of the time the sections are not integrated in commissions that function tolerably.

Nor is there any plan for discussion about how the sections should contribute to building up the FI's center and other central bodies. This is also why it has been impossible to carry out financial campaigns on the international level. For long periods the resources of the center have fallen short of those of some medium-sized sections. Western Europe, North America, and Latin America

present large unexploited resources we should use. Equally the international system of press has not been developed since the introduction of *Inprecor*.

There is no reason why a critical scrutiny of the FI's present situation should lead to pessimism concerning the possibilities of building the world party. On the contrary, a self-critical evaluation of the situation is a prerequisite to enable the sections to take up their tasks. It is not that we lack the resources to carry out a qualitative change in the International's mode of functioning. What we do lack is knowledge and a political consciousness of how to formulate and solve the tasks.

During the coming period until the Twelfth World Congress, the FI must carry out an evaluation preceded by reports about the sections' work and change in social composition, i.e., proletarianization. This balance sheet should serve as an introduction to a discussion about the building of the party, although some elementary measures must be taken immediately to put an end to the present situation.

24. The specific tasks facing the Fourth International in the immediate period ahead include the following:

(a) *Continuing and strengthening the proletarian orientation.* Since its foundation, the FI has followed a proletarian orientation without overlooking opportunities to recruit in allied layers of the population. The essence of this orientation consists of advancing the Marxist program and utilizing the method of the Transitional Program to intervene as much as possible in the politics of the country and developments in the working class and its organizations. It includes recognition of the fact that only a party that is proletarian in composition as well as program, and has earned growing respect by the workers for its leadership role in the class struggle, can win a majority of the toiling masses to its banner and lead them in the struggle for power.

As we have analyzed, the period of world revolution that opened up at the end of the 1960s is qualitatively different from the previous period. The process of world revolution has markedly deepened, to be expressed in major struggles in all three sectors. Important gains in proletarian and anticapitalist and antibureaucratic consciousness have been registered inside the working class, despite the counter-offensive of the bourgeoisie and Stalinist bureaucracy. In this new situation we have growing possibilities of implanting our movement in the working class as a political current and genuine political vanguard.

But as we have explained above, this will be concretized in different ways in the different sectors of world revolution.

In the *bureaucratized workers states*, or at least some of them, this new situation has created for the first time in many years a potential audience in an elemental workers vanguard for the revolutionary Marxist program. This can be reached by working in, building up, and strengthening democratic structures as revolutionary Marxists. These represent the first platform for opening up political discussion, and should be oriented—as the Polish KOR was in an exemplary fashion—towards narrowing the gap that has traditionally existed in these countries between the predominantly "intellectual" political opposition and basic working class demands.

In the *colonial and semicolonial countries*, the proletarian orientation will mean the constant involvement of the cadres of the revolutionary organization in the struggles of



those sectors of the masses in the forefront of the anti-imperialist struggle. Revolutionaries will work towards ensuring the leading role of independent organs of the working class in the mass struggle, but interventions in the industrial working class and through existing mass organizations will only be immediately applicable in a limited number of semicolonial countries—primarily in Latin America. In some the main task of revolutionaries will be to fight to create the first embryonic forms of working class organization. In others the most politically dynamic layers may be on the fringes of the working class properly speaking, comprising diverse layers of the impoverished urban and rural masses organized through such bodies as urban slum dwellers associations and poor peasant leagues.

A clear political line of independent mass action against imperialism and its national collaborators must be accompanied by a flexible approach towards the forms of mass organization and instruments of struggle appropriate at particular stages.

In the *advanced capitalist countries*, the majority of our comrades are in many cases already members of unions. But the task of building solid union fractions in industry remains to be done. The sections must centralize and plan their work in order to make a qualitative advance in rooting themselves in these key sectors of the working class. This also requires sending into industry members recruited in the previous period.

To avoid any workerist deviation such an orientation must be carried out on a clear political basis—especially with regard to the reformist and Stalinist parties—and integrated with the campaigns and general political profile of our sections. This orientation cannot be carried out at the same rate or by the same means in all the sections. Its implementation will depend on the social and political situation and on the level we have attained in the accumulation of forces. However, what has been said above means that we must begin now to do the work of conscious political and organizational preparation. A centralized and determined effort will be necessary to redirect our resources and our members in accordance with this perspective.

Then follow with point 24 (b) as in draft world political resolution (p. 26) but delete last sentence of this point and replace as follows:

Furthermore, during the coming period the FI should pursue a few well-prepared and coordinated campaigns in which the *whole* International should take part—not on the basis simply of the individual sections' needs, but arising out of an allotment of tasks through decisions on participation in a particular campaign by the United Secretariat.

Follow with point 24 (c) as in draft world political resolution (p. 26) but add new point 24 (d) as follows:

(d) *Taking up tasks in relation to the political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states.* Our sections will not be able to root themselves firmly in the working class without integrating the tasks of the political revolution in the bureaucratized workers states into their ongoing political work. In a situation where the bourgeoisie denounces the bureaucratic dictatorships as "true socialism,"

while the bureaucracy itself and Communist parties throughout the world describe these societies as "real socialism" and make a "globally positive" balance sheet of them, it will only be possible to win the mass of workers for revolutionary Marxism if the historical deformation of Stalinism is destroyed.

The tasks of the FI in this respect will include organizing the defense of the antibureaucratic opposition in the workers states, and especially taking this into the mass organizations of the proletariat. Such defense campaigns will give us the best opportunities to introduce the program of political revolution and of socialist democracy into the working class. Moreover, by organizing and building such campaigns we will attain another important goal: the oppositional currents in the workers states will understand that their only natural allies are the workers of the capitalist countries, and not Carter and Co. And at the same time we will win credibility inside the opposition, thus creating better opportunities to build and enlarge our contacts and influence here on the road to establishing nuclei of our own sections in these countries.

Concrete tasks here will involve:

The organization of national solidarity campaigns and their international coordination.

Working in or initiating defense committees (if possible with their own bulletin or paper) which fight for the defense of all political prisoners against bureaucratic repression and seek to center this work on the mass workers organizations through such means as declarations of solidarity, delegations of inquiry by trade unions or parties, visits to oppositional activists in their own countries, etc.

Spreading our conception of political revolution; explaining the necessity of mobilizing the mass of workers for this revolution; defending our conception of socialist democracy.

Making contacts, working together and discussing politically with emigrant dissidents in the capitalist countries.

**Draft for a Statement of the Supporters of the Howard Position** on the World Political Resolution, submitted by Howard, Tettodoro, Marston (Britain); Kurt, Johanna (Germany); Hoffmann, Joe (France); Fred (Austria); Nanne (Holland):

The undersigned delegates, consultative delegates and IEC members consider the world political resolution should have been considerably redrafted to eradicate serious problems with its method and structure.

We agree with the authors of the draft WPR that we are still in the *period*, whose beginning was signalled by the upsurge of May 1968 and whose most outstanding feature is the rise of mass working-class struggles in the imperialist countries. But we think that the analysis of the *conjuncture* put forward in the document is seriously deficient because in place of the dialectical conception of the dynamic interrelationship of the three sectors of the world revolution, it advances a two-dimensional idea of "preponderance." This is reflected not just in the use of this word in the original point 2 of the Preamble, but in the structure of the document. As a consequence, the document does not explain the uneven and contradictory developments which constitute the present totality of the world relationship of class forces. In particular it



underestimates the political reserves and the economic reserves at the disposal of the bourgeoisie through the weight of reformism in the imperialist sector, and the general and relative economic strength of this sector, built up during the post-boom period.

We reiterate the point made in the resolution adopted by the Reunification Congress of 1963: ". . . in possible outcome of the struggle, a big difference is evident between inadequate leadership in an imperialist country and similar leadership in a backward country: the enemy facing the working population is measurably stronger in the first one." It is the failure to resolve the crisis of proletarian leadership that explains the contradictory character of world developments today. The failure to incorporate this understanding meant that the document was unable to anticipate the importance of the new upsurge of struggle in the colonial and semicolonial sector (Iran, Nicaragua, etc.) which continues today. The significance of these events is not that they demonstrate a different "preponderance," but that it is here that the growing inability of imperialism to inflict defeats *at any point* in the globe is being most immediately expressed.

The method of analysis whereby the WPR essentially juxtaposes a catalogue of developments in the different sectors of world revolution cannot advance our understanding of these processes and their implications for our practical activity.

Because we cannot for reasons of time and lack of previous coordination submit an alternative to Chapters I-IV, we are simply putting forward here for vote: (1) this motivation, and (2) an alternative preamble. This should provide the framework for redrafting the existing Chapters I-IV by the newly-elected United Secretariat, and put it to a vote at the first IEC meeting.

On the question of tasks, we agree with the following assessment in relation to the three sectors of world revolution:

"When we speak about the three sectors of the world revolution, what we are talking about are the different *strategic* [tasks?—not clear in original—bulletin editors] faced by the proletariat (. . .) These differentiations of strategic tasks go back not to 1963, but to the Transitional Program itself (. . .) This specificity of tasks in the three sectors can be denied only if one rejects either the theory of permanent revolution, or the Trotskyist analysis of the nature of the USSR and the other bureaucratized workers states, or both. Only at the level of the greatest abstraction can it be seriously maintained that the workers face substantially identical tasks and will accomplish those tasks in substantially the same manner in the United States, India, and the Soviet Union."

We think that the present Chapter V of the draft world political resolution fails this test. For instance, we are emphatically in favor of ensuring the rapid proletarian composition of our sections and continuing and strengthening a "proletarian line." But this will mean very different things in the different sectors of the world revolution, and cannot at all be reduced simply to a question of colonization. Furthermore, it is necessary to establish clearer criteria on how our sections take up such a turn, in relation to the stage of development of our cadres, the level of trade-union organization in the country, the class consciousness, etc. It is also inadequate in facing up to the problems of building the FI as a means of seeking to overcome the continuing unevenness of the world revolutionary process and our implantation within it. For these reasons we are also submitting an alternative draft of Chapter V for vote.

## Appendix C

### Counterresolution by Heredia on Latin America

#### I. Introduction

Two big events have preceded the World Congress which make necessary a deepgoing revision of the draft theses on Latin America and which make it impossible to correct its great insufficiencies—not to speak of a series of programmatic deviations—through partial amendments.

On the other hand, the repeated statements by representative members of the Latin America [editing] commission that they will not accept any amendment that changes the general conception of the proposed document has led us to present this alternative motion. The two big events are:

a. The objective course of the class struggle in Latin America, the highest expression of which today is the revolutionary victory of the FSLN in Nicaragua and the destruction of the "Somozist state."

b. Flowing from the preceding point, the acceleration of the crisis of organizational structures—basically Latin American—claiming adherence to the organizational framework of the Fourth International and belonging to the LTT and BF, which split on the eve of this congress.

This crisis must be profoundly discussed, because it is the third time that our Latin American movement has faced a similar phenomenon.

The extent of this crisis can be even better appreciated if it is considered in the present exceptional political context,

in which our party can play the role of an organizing center for cadres emerging from the crisis of Castroism, of centrism in general, and of populism, given that the Latin American CPs have been compromised by their alliances with the native bourgeoisies and do not appear as serious alternatives.

Faced with such a situation, the Social Democracy has come forward with unprecedented dynamism to fill the void left by this crisis. It is the task of our International to fight this maneuver of European imperialist capital, and to adopt theses that are not simply a more or less interesting compilation of assertions, but rather an instrument of struggle.

II. The resolution adopted by the United Secretariat on the Nicaraguan revolution implies—without explicitly saying so—a substantial modification of the draft theses on two decisive points: (a) strategy for power; and (b) strategy for party-building.

This resolution (on Nicaragua) cannot be simply tacked on as an annex to the Latin American theses, with which it is contradictory; it calls for a rewriting of the theses.

III. Many aspects of the draft theses can be preserved, but they must be clearly related to the following principles, which are developed more fully in the document criticizing



the draft that was published in the French bulletin No. 32 dated April of this year:

a. In the context of the generalized recession in the capitalist world, the crisis of the system in Latin America in the coming period will be expressed through an attempt by the ruling classes of world imperialism to increase the exploitation of the masses and the extraction of surplus value, to protect their profit rates. This means a general tendency toward cutting back on the political and social gains of the masses, and a tendency toward authoritarian governments (civilian or military) in a context of big struggles and violent social conflicts.

b. For this reason we should exclude the possibility of the existence of stable bourgeois parliamentary regimes as well as the possibility that the policy of "institutionalization" proposed by the "Carter plan" can succeed in establishing stable regimes.

c. A general tendency toward bourgeois armies playing a leading role, not only as a praetorian guard, but as castes associated with the regimes in power and in the administration of nationalized property.

d. In their struggle against the policies of the ruling classes the working class and the masses will turn to the forms of self-organization that have gained authority and tradition in the mass movement: the *cordones industriales* (industrial belts) or *comandos comunales* (community teams) in Chile; the Workers and Peoples Assembly and workers and peasants militias in Bolivia; the *coordinadoras* (coordinating committees) in Argentina; the workers commissions, trade unions, and peasant leagues in Brazil, combined with the struggle for trade unionization, with partial and general strikes, with the use of every legal opening for the resistance (from the church, to bourgeois "democratic opposition" parties), together with guerrilla struggles, sabotage, and popular insurrections.

#### IV. Strategy for Power:

Given the uneven and combined development of Latin America, and the diversity of its development, it is impossible to establish "a priori" the particular characteristics that the struggle for power will take in each country, or to predict a "model"—classical or any other kind—of insurrection.

However, one can affirm the following general principles, which are omitted from the theses:

a. The struggle for power will take on an explosive and violent character, requiring the previous arming of the proletariat or of its vanguard detachments.

b. The struggle for power implies the combination of union struggles, partial strikes, general strikes around trade-union and political questions, together with armed struggles, urban or rural depending on the situation. Such struggles can and must lead up to an insurrection or some other form of active participation of the urban and peasant masses in which women and youth will play a decisive role.

c. The organization of open or underground resistance—according to the situation—in the workers and peasants movement, in the student movement, in the women's movement, and among all oppressed and exploited layers, together with the preparation and organization of self-defense leading toward the launching of the generalized offensive as the armed instrument of the insurrection—are indispensable.

d. It should be stated that because of the position of these countries in the back yard of the greatest imperialist power in history, all processes of this kind imply a test of force not only with the native ruling classes and their armies, but also with those of imperialism, which will seek out opportunities for aggression. Also, by putting into question the international status quo, such struggles will run up against sabotage and betrayal by the bureaucracy.

#### V. The Building of the Party

The struggle of the masses against the existing regimes and against imperialism will not stop because of the absence of a mass revolutionary party; rather, the mass revolutionary party—the condition for a harmonious and effective development toward the building of socialism—is built and will be built to the degree that revolutionary Marxists are able to intervene in the actual struggle of the masses explained previously.

The Nicaraguan revolution, among others, is eloquent in this respect, and the resolution of the United Secretariat on the tasks for construction of the party in Nicaragua contains a modification of the dogmatic orientation proposed by the theses on Latin America.

We propose, therefore, that the theses should clearly affirm that the construction of the party in Latin America—as everywhere—will not take place through an organic growth of our section or through a linear and gradual process, but through the integration of trade-union fractions, radicalized tendencies of the workers movement, of the youth, and of the women's movement, and of armed detachments into the resistance struggle and the general offensive.

#### VI. Worker and Peasant Alliance

It is necessary to develop an agrarian program for the Latin American peasantry, drawing together the experiences in struggle of the peasants of Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, etc., and especially the experience of the Mexican agrarian reform and the agrarian policies in effect in Cuba and Nicaragua.

Thus it is necessary to systematize the conclusions that can be drawn from the agrarian question in the bourgeois states and in the planned systems in the transitional states.

#### VII. Labor Party Based on the Unions

The independent organization of the workers in places where mass workers parties do not exist can result in a positive step forward, and this slogan cannot be discarded in an abstract way. But neither should the door be left open to a dangerous generalization of this slogan, above all in situations in which a long reformist period for the organization of the masses must be excluded. As was done at the Third World Congress, this slogan should only be put forward in specific countries under precise conditions.

#### VIII. The Constituent Assembly

This slogan should be explained both in relation to the existing power and in relation to the degree of, and prospects for, development of the organs of power, or of dual power, of the class. To generalize this slogan in an abstract way—as would be the case today in Nicaragua and was the case in Cuba in 1960 and 1961—could result in helping to reestablish bourgeois power more than affirming workers power.



IX. I propose that the reference to the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses should be concrete, based on a self-criticism of the fochoist deviation of the United Secretariat and of the confusion in converting the tactic of guerrilla warfare into a strategy for power and for building the party. Similarly, for the affirmation of the preponderance of rural guerrilla warfare for highly developed countries such as Argentina. This would avoid a general reference which could imply the revision of correct positions, such as the exclusion of parliamentary perspectives for that part of the continent and the affirmation of the need to organize revolutionary violence.

X. *Stop Using Academic Formulas and Propose Instruments of Struggle*

The theses fall into the error of placing the whole continent in the same period and the same conjuncture, failing to recognize the concrete social and political phenomena that have taken place there. In this way the theses become a series of academic prescriptions that are very difficult to apply and of questionable value. The same tasks cannot be prescribed for revolutionary Marxists both in a place where the workers movement is on the offensive and in an upsurge, and in places such as Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay where the working class has suffered the biggest defeat in its history and where the main task is the recomposition of the working class and its vanguard. In these countries the slow work of reorganization and recomposition is strictly clandestine, aimed at reforming the vanguard in specific structures, as the Spanish working class did through its *comisiones obreras* (workers commissions) under Francoism.

XI. *On the Role of the Unions*

We base ourselves on Trotsky's work on "Trade Unions in the Epoch of Imperialist Decay," but as we stand more than forty years after this work was written, with more than forty years of experience of Trotskyism in the struggle for unionization of the class, it is necessary that the theses should bring together and codify these experiences. In summary, we need to reiterate our understanding of the dialectic of masses-unions-bureaucracy. At times of revolutionary upsurge when workers parties are either absent or weak, the unions—even if bureaucratized—can serve as a means of centralization of the class, and the bureaucracy, while trying to contain the mass movement within the framework of bourgeois institutions, serves as a

transmission belt of the workers movement into these institutions. We have also seen, however, that in periods of retreat, or even of upsurge, when the bureaucracy feels a threat to the stability of its privileges, it still serves as a transmission belt for bourgeois institutions inside the workers movement, and ends up throwing itself into the arms of the bourgeoisie rather than letting itself be defeated by the upsurge of the masses.

The task of regaining control of the unions from the bureaucracy poses different tasks in countries where the workers movement enjoys legality and in those where it is illegal. In the latter countries clandestine parallel fractions and units are indispensable.

TASKS

XII. The Eleventh World Congress mandates the IEC to write a new draft resolution along these lines, taking into account the original draft theses, the resolution on Nicaragua, and the amendments and contributions presented to this document. This should be done at an enlarged meeting with the official sections and sympathizing organizations from Latin America present.

XIII. Given the instability of the regimes in power in Latin America, the IEC will have to orient our sections—whatever their legal situation—so that they do not neglect the organization of a strong underground apparatus to guarantee the continuity of our activity and our press in face of the predictable repressive offensives of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism, generalizing the experiences of clandestine operations already achieved under conditions of modern methods of repression.

XIV. In view of the insufficiency of coordination of activities and information among Latin American sections, the Congress recommends the establishment of a Latin American Commission composed above all—but not exclusively—of Latin American comrades from various regions of America to organize the coordination of information and guarantee an effective relationship with the center.

XV. The congress mandates the IEC to study the possibility of regularly publishing an internal information bulletin for the Latin American sections and a theoretical review for Latin America.

Appendix D

Report of the Hong Kong/China Commission, by Roman

1. There exist in Hong Kong two adult Trotskyist organizations, the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP), the Chinese section of the Fourth International, and the Revolutionary Marxist League (RML), which also identifies itself with our movement and program.

The division of the Trotskyist forces can only be extremely damaging to our development, especially at a crucial time for the broadening of our activities. This division, if it continues, can only lead to public confrontations and attacks between the two organizations, which would have particularly grave consequences in a city like

Hong Kong, which is ruled by a colonial administration and where the influence of the Chinese bureaucracy is very great. A few years ago the bureaucracy carried out a real mass anti-Trotskyist campaign in Hong Kong.

Above all, we now have the opportunity to begin effective contact work and discussions with the antibureaucratic opposition in the People's Republic of China. Since 1976 this opposition has gained a new breadth. However, the two groups can only direct their work at the same elements, the same currents of the so-called Chinese "democratic movement." Therefore, they will inevitably enter into competition and will be driven to fight each other. In any case, it will be impossible to explain to contacts in China the existence in Hong Kong of two



organizations, both claiming to represent Trotskyism and the Fourth International, its program and organization, and in addition both agree with most of the texts adopted by a majority of this World Congress!

Maintenance of the current divisions would undermine our capacity to consolidate our Trotskyist nucleus in Hong Kong and to launch on a firm basis the indispensable work directed at the antibureaucratic opposition in China, which is a decisive field of activity for the entire international. *Everything possible must be done to overcome the division of Trotskyist forces in Hong Kong.*

2. The Hong Kong/China Commission of the Eleventh World Congress is convinced that the division of our forces is politically unjustified and that a fusion is politically possible.

The RCP leadership cites the existence of principled, programmatic differences between the two organizations. But both the RCP and the RML claim allegiance to the Fourth International's program and to it as an organization. Both fight for the antibureaucratic political revolution in China (as it is defined in the founding documents of our movement). Differences have, of course, emerged on important questions, like the Sino-Indochinese conflicts, which are particularly important for Chinese organizations. But they do not seem to be principled differences, and, in particular, have been expressed within each of the groups themselves, and would benefit from being discussed within a single organization!

Past organizational disputes are a heavy obstacle. The Commission cannot review and pass judgment on the many charges that exist in this area. But in the case at hand, it seems false to us to try to make a judgment of past splits and organizational disputes prior to a fusion that is politically possible. The fusion of our forces seems to be the best way to establish the *basis* for real democratic-centralist functioning—which both the RCP and the RML defend.

The roots of the conflicts and splits that have followed in succession since 1973 lie essentially in the very special situation of our movement in Hong Kong, which has been marked by a very long period of isolation and inactivity lasting *several decades*.

The RCP, the Chinese section of the Fourth International, did not hold a congress between 1948 and 1977 (even limiting ourselves to our organization in Hong Kong for the period following 1949-52). This gives an idea of the problems of functioning and activity that existed at that time, and that could not be quickly and easily overcome. In these conditions, the integration into the section and *into its leadership* of new, young Trotskyist forces (who emerged beginning in 1973) proved extremely difficult and eventually failed. One of the main disagreements that arose during these last years, moreover, had to do with the public or strictly clandestine character of the RCP's activities and those of its Trotskyist youth organization.

The most alarming feature of the situation was the successive departure from the RCP of most of the young cadres who had joined. The big majority of the young generation of Trotskyists in Hong Kong are now in the RML. That above all convinced the various members of the United Secretariat and IEC who went to Hong Kong of the gravity of the situation.

A fusion, based on more lively activity and drawing in greater forces, could raise the problem—in healthier terms

than in the past—of the real implementation of democratic centralism in the Hong Kong Trotskyist organization.

3. The Commission proposes that the World Congress recognize the RCP and RML as *two separate, divided wings* of the Chinese section of the Fourth International in Hong Kong, based on the following considerations:

(a) The history of the RCP and RML in the 1970s is inextricably tied together. The RML did, of course, recruit independently. But, as the RCP admits, this organization is above all the product of a regroupment of activists whose membership in the Fourth International went unchallenged for years, of two members of the former Chinese minority in the 1940s (the Internationalist Workers Party), of some former members of the RCP, and of the big majority of young militants who joined the RCP and the FI after 1973. We should note, moreover, that it is precisely around the question of a fusion between the RCP and RML that the last split took place in September 1978, with the majority of the RCP's youth sector and youth organization leaving it at that time to join the RML.

(b) The two organizations have often conducted themselves in practice as two separate wings of one section of the International, each agreeing that the United Secretariat should maintain direct relations with the other, avoiding public attacks, supporting each other's campaigns, using the same publications to carry out work directed at the Chinese antibureaucratic opposition, and characterizing each other as Trotskyist (as the RCP did with regard to the RML at its congress in 1977).

(c) In particular, by recognizing the RCP and RML as two separate, divided wings of the same section of the FI in Hong Kong, the Congress can establish the best framework for encouraging a process of fusion of our forces. It takes into account the irregular functioning of democratic centralism which has marked the history of our Chinese section in Hong Kong for a very long time, and the complexity of the statutory situation resulting from this history. It recognizes that the history of the RCP and RML reflects and represents (together with that of the comrades of the Internationalist Workers Party) the history of our movement in Hong Kong. It emphasizes the political importance that we place on bringing about a real fusion of these two organizations and on the regroupment of all Chinese Trotskyist forces, in the framework of the overall measures taken by the Eleventh World Congress to strengthen the functioning of the FI, and in view of the special considerations relating to Hong Kong and to China work mentioned in the first part of this report.

Efforts to achieve a fusion have been going on for several years now. Up to the present, they have not resulted in a general regroupment of our forces. The decision of the Eleventh World Congress should help to remove the obstacles to this process of fusion.

4. Recognition of the existence of the RCP and RML as two separate, divided wings of one Chinese section of the FI in Hong Kong cannot, of course, be a permanent measure. Such an exceptional situation cannot continue for too long. It can only be justified by taking into consideration the very special situation of our movement and its history in China and Hong Kong, with the prospect of a real fusion of our forces within a reasonable period, as soon as possible. It is not a question of excluding from our movement any component of the Chinese Trotskyist



movement; on the contrary, it is a question of a new effort to establish a single organization, with the help of a general process of regroupment, capable of integrating all these components into the practical building of the Fourth International.

The United Secretariat must do its best to help relaunch

the process of fusion of Trotskyist forces in Hong Kong, a process that should be concluded before the next meeting of the International Executive Committee. A report will be presented to that IEC, which will evaluate the way in which this World Congress resolution was implemented in Hong Kong.

## Appendix E

### Organizational Report to the World Congress, by Frej.

#### *I. The Role of this Report*

Earlier in this congress we adopted a number of reports and documents, including a report on the turn and its practical consequences, as well as reached a series of practical conclusions as to the Nicaragua solidarity campaign and—on another level—the Indochina solidarity activity. We have discussed the split and will adopt a special resolution on this question. We have, furthermore, taken a series of important organizational decisions on the recognition of sections and sympathizing organizations after having heard a report from the Mandates and Recognition Commission, which gave a clear picture of our real forces today.

The present report must be put in the framework of all these decisions and discussions. Its purpose is to add another dimension to them and introduce a series of proposals on the structure and functioning of the leadership that now has to ensure that they are put into practice.

We will leave this congress convinced of the immense possibilities that exist today for the building of the Fourth International as a real world party linking together the experience of comrades in six continents, giving them a framework for joint international initiatives and, more and more, expanding from its traditional geographical base. We go back to our sections to implement the historic decisions taken here on the turn to industry, hoping that the next world congress will be able to express a radically changed composition of the International as a whole. We will close the congress in the firm conviction that we not only can heal the wounds we suffered through the split, but that we are perfectly able to win new forces to the International.

*But nothing of this will be automatic! It presupposes a firm and authoritative international leadership!*

After the split and after many years of faction struggle it's now an important task to educate and reeducate our forces on the historic role of the Fourth International and its special characteristics. After this world congress we will also be able to give an impetus to a new wave of internationalism and a sound international organizational patriotism.

One-and-a-half decades ago—at the time of the reunification and the elaboration of the present statutes for the Fourth International—the character of the FI was expressed with great clarity. The documents from that time ought to be read, reread, rediscussed and further developed today. The Fourth International is:

Not a loose federation of independent national parties, but an international world party led by a centralized international leadership (of course including leaderships of national sections).

Not a place for discussions for the sake of discussing, but to clear the way for centralized political actions.

Not based on democracy in the abstract, but centralized democracy, hammering out political and organizational guidelines.

These are some of the ideas expressed so clearly in those documents. They are based on a concrete analysis of how the question of the International is posed today.

All capitalists, regardless of the intensity of competition between various national sectors of the capitalist class, agree on the necessity to fight tooth and nail against the socialist challenge of the working class. The working class on the other hand is forced to extend and strengthen its international ties because of the need of joint defense and the promotion of its historical interests. Hence the imperative necessity to build the world party of socialist revolution. But the international bourgeoisie is today far ahead of the working class when it comes to international coordination. The multinational corporations place the workers in one country against those in another. But even the various national sectors of the bourgeoisie have, in spite of mutual contradictions, been able to unite in defense of the capitalist system.

The working class, its unions, and its political organizations, have not managed to pursue a joint struggle against the common enemy to a corresponding degree. The reformist and Stalinist leaderships have backed their "own" bourgeoisie and often led the working class in protectionist and narrow chauvinist directions. Instead of coordinating the struggle against world capitalism they have hampered and put brakes on it.

Our sections must utilize every opportunity to create an international coordination based on class actions against imperialism's exploitation and oppression, against the multinational corporations, against imperialist attempts to strengthen their efforts through organs like the world bank, the IDB, the trilateral, the Common Market, etc.

Up till now the Fourth International hasn't been able to utilize its forces systematically enough, so as to link together various groups of struggling workers in different countries and to really organize its international solidarity activity. This results from, among other things, the lag that exists in the building of its international organs as well as of its way of functioning until today, even in relation to the limited resources at hand.

The Fourth International's programmatic standpoint—that it's necessary to simultaneously build the International on the national and the international levels—has not corresponded to a concrete enough discussion on how we best could take advantage of opportunities that have arisen in the international arena. The efforts to build the world party have too often been isolated to various countries and sections—we haven't seen a discussion as developed as it ought to and could have been about



experiences and existing problems between them.

It goes without saying that the deep political disagreements that existed for a whole period in the Fourth International made it much more difficult to implement our ideas on the structure and functioning of the International. This political struggle has enriched the FI, given many comrades new experiences, led to more developed political positions, created a new and better framework to discuss the political differences that still exist or develop. Nevertheless we must understand that the FI as a centralized international organization for political action suffered a lot during those years.

## II. Possibilities and Limits

So how do we proceed from where we are now in the direction we have outlined? If we are to avoid falling into the trap of abstract reasoning and idealist solutions we have to make clear where we are now.

*First*, we must see the relative weakness of our overall forces. In spite of the substantial growth over the last ten years—a growth which, however, has stopped during the past couple of years—we still have limited human and material resources unevenly distributed with big regions where the International is almost nonexistent.

*Secondly*, we must be aware of the relative weakness of our overall implantation in industry and the primary necessity to continue to change the composition of our sections as a precondition for a real leap in coordination and centralization, especially on the trade-union level.

*Thirdly*, although the decisions at this congress mark an important political convergence and homogenization compared to the earlier period, it's still a fact that the International today incorporates very different traditions, experiences, and methods of functioning. On the other hand serious differences still exist.

These three factors set certain limits on what can be achieved in the coming years, but they are not eternal and they must not be used as a pretext to block the coordination and centralization which is quite possible to achieve. Nobody can deny that the level of coordination today of, for example, our trade-union activity is far behind what could be achieved even with the relatively weak implantation and limited resources at present. Or to take other examples: No objective factors prevent us from making clearer priorities of how our existing resources could be used maximally and increased, to defend and support one or another section or international initiative. And there is no reason why we couldn't today correct many of the abnormalities which were a result of the period of hard faction fight, now that the objective situation is changing.

On this last point.

It was necessary to make special efforts, even statutory concessions, at the time of the Tenth World Congress to keep the International united, to avoid a full split—but at the same time as saying this we mustn't hide the negative side of those decisions. We also mustn't underestimate the negative consequences of many years of non-Bolshevik factional activity by the Bolshevik Faction.

## III. Structure and Function of Leading Organs

In the present circumstances it's necessary to consciously return to our statutory norms on a whole series of leadership questions.

i) The postponement of the world congress—which was a

result of the necessity to overcome the worst effects of the factional struggle and probe the political convergence that was under way, produced a certain political vacuum in the International. The membership as a whole didn't have the opportunity to take a stand on several important political questions where it normally should have been able to. It's both necessary and possible to return to the statutory provision that world congresses should be held every third year.

ii) the huge size of the IEC—which first and foremost was a product of organizational splits in many countries and the need to uphold the unity of the International—has shown itself to be counterproductive. The size of the IEC has in practice hindered it from meeting and functioning normally; its size has to be drastically cut. The category of consultative members, introduced at the time of the last world congress, must and can be dropped in a situation where the status of sections and sympathizing organizations is regularized. The IEC meetings must be frequent enough—that is, at least once a year—to make it possible for the IEC to engage in real and regular decision-making on key political issues, as well as giving a framework for the United Secretariat and various coordinating bodies.

iii) With a non-functioning IEC, the United Secretariat and its Bureau have had to take on all the tasks of the international leadership, which has led to imbalance and overloading of these bodies. In the case of the Bureau, it wasn't even clear what political decision-making power it had. Through normalizing the rhythm and functioning of world congresses and the IEC, it will also be easier to reverse the situation for the United Secretariat. Although the perspective is to move towards a more and more resident United Secretariat which can meet on call, this is not easy to bring about rapidly and isn't posed here as an immediate task. What can be changed though, is the rhythm and preparations for United Secretariat meetings. A rhythm of one United Secretariat meeting every second month seems preferable. It would give the United Secretariat the necessary continuity and increase its possibilities of political decision-making and launching political initiatives, as well as better integrating leaderships of sections into its work.

iv) The present situation with a nonelected but coopted Bureau should be changed. The Bureau should consist of those comrades in the United Secretariat, permanently residing at the Center, who are responsible for leading the International on a day-to-day basis. To be able to function, take initiatives, help sections, coordinate activity and prepare political discussions in a thorough enough way, it goes without saying that the Bureau must be strengthened. It should include leading and really representative comrades from all those sections which constitute the strongest pillars for the International today. Compared to what is needed the situation has been very unsatisfactory, to say the least until now.

So much for the statutory regulations. In fact they are not only formal. They are conditions for a real centralized democracy in the International. Taken together they are conditions for integrating leaders and members of sections in improved political decision-making and are also means for building up the necessary responsibilities for the International and its decisions among the membership.

## IV. Coordination and Working Committees

We just said that the level of coordination, although



there are objective limits, doesn't match up to what seems already realistic in the present situation, not to speak of the growing possibilities over the coming years.

The first thing that has to be done here is to ratify the very existence of special working committees. What we propose at this stage is that the world congress ratifies the setting up of working committees to help prepare the building of sections in those areas where the International is weak. Such committees do not hold decision-making power over and above that of national organizations. They are preparatory and coordinating bodies responsible to the normal leading organs, the IEC and the United Secretariat.

The World Congress should empower the United Secretariat to set up or reorganize such committees for Eastern Europe, Africa, South and Southeast Asia and for the Arab countries, on the basis of an evaluation of earlier experiences and a broader division of labor among IEC and United Secretariat members.

In certain regions where there already exist relatively strong sections the natural thing is to institutionalize regular meetings with representatives of the respective political bureaus. Such meetings might take place every six months. They should have restricted agendas very much linked to key problems in party building and regional initiatives. Given all our experience in the past we must stress the importance of regular meetings, practical-political aims, and written preparations based on organized reports and proposals made well in advance. Otherwise these meetings will lose much of their function and only tend to duplicate other meetings and other discussions.

In Europe such political bureau meetings seem absolutely indispensable, but also in Latin America the holding of regular meetings should be discussed concretely, not least from the financial point of view.

The first of these meetings should preferably deal with the question of proletarianization, and after that meetings might be prepared on issues such as the nuclear question, trade-union work, fraction work inside the SPs and CPs, electoral campaigns, immigrant work, the international youth work, etc. To prepare the discussion on proletarianization the United Secretariat should ask for written reports on the basis of a concrete set of questions. The experience of this first meeting could well serve as a basis for projecting further concrete plans.

Several positive and negative experiences in the past have shown what can be done to coordinate the activity of our sections in the trade-union field, in the women's movement, in the nuclear movement, in international solidarity campaigns, in the work among Latin American refugees in Europe, etc., either on an international or on a regional scale.

The example of the international abortion campaign shows the positive influence that even a limited coordinated initiative can have. The broad international solidarity campaign for the imprisoned Iranian comrades, and the ongoing Nicaragua solidarity show the potential power that we can mobilize through joint international activities.

The special campaigns for Hugo Blanco, the Czechoslovakian dissidents, the FIAT/SEAT coordination, and the initiatives at the time of the American miners strike, all point the way to similar and broadened activities in the future.

On the other hand, the limited response from the FI to the European trade-union campaign for a reduction of the work week, the lack of real initiatives at the time of the German steel strike, and other examples both in Europe and elsewhere, show the need to engage in more conscious efforts, increasing resources for the International center, and a more structured coordination.

A strengthening of the Bureau, a clearer division of labor among the IEC and United Secretariat members, regular information circulars, special regional meetings prepared through written material by the United Secretariat and Bureau to coordinate ongoing work (in different industrial branches and social movements) are means to achieve that.

## V. *The Turn and the International*

Now on the turn and some related questions.

The turn is as much a key question for the incoming international leadership as it is for the national sections. Not only that the international leadership—if it is capable of putting its decisions into practice—will strengthen its authority in the International. But first and foremost: only a qualitatively strengthened implantation will really enable us to put the campaigns and political initiatives that we have decided these past days, into practice. Only through growing national fractions will we be able to go forward towards real international coordination of trade-union work on specific issues and in specific branches. The next step we should take here is to extend the FIAT/SEAT type of coordination, that is, to broaden international collaboration, for example in the car industry, and to expand the coordination between comrades in the international unions in North America and Puerto Rico.

But the turn implies other things as well. The international turn must and will set its imprint on our international way of functioning as it is already beginning to do on a national scale. It will necessarily influence our discussions by making them more concrete, the way we organize our international activity, information, press, finances, etc.

The proletarian orientation demands also a change in the planning and pace of pre-congress discussions so that worker-militants are given the opportunity of full participation. Among other things this must mean that the length of resolutions to be voted on, and contributions to the debate, etc., should be reduced, and focused on a more limited number of issues of key importance for the whole International. Resolutions should be prepared through reports from the United Secretariat and the IEC. The discussion period shouldn't be opened until the leading bodies have succeeded in clarifying the main features or points of discrepancy in the issues up for decision.

Last but not least: making the international turn will enable us to integrate a growing number of proletarian leaders in the leading bodies of the International in the years to come, which will strengthen them, but this also presupposes methods of functioning in those bodies that can make it possible for worker militants engaged in international work to play a full role in them; it demands an adjustment of planning, preparation, discipline, and seriousness in organizational matters. Otherwise such leading worker-militants will tend to be more and more marginalized.



## VI. Special Initiatives

We want further to name a couple of concrete international initiatives in addition to those external activities that were already spelled out in the discussions on the political resolution and on the turn and related tasks the other day. These are initiatives that have to be taken up by the incoming leadership—initiatives aimed at strengthening our organization on the international level as well as some of its sections.

i) There is a need to expand *Inprecor*, among other ways, through making the Spanish version fortnightly and through the establishment in the coming period of a new Portuguese edition for circulation in Portugal and Brazil.

ii) We note the statement of the Mandates Commission on the need to normalize *international finances*—both the organization of them in the center (which includes such things as United Secretariat responsibilities, regular reports, the setting up of regular budgets, etc.) and a regularization of the contributions coming from the national sections, including a more thorough political motivation for international projects.

iii) We recommend that the incoming United Secretariat immediately discuss concrete plans to *help sections hardest hit by the split*, as well as special efforts to help, materially and politically, organizations that urgently need the help of the International.

We want especially to name the *Peruvian* section—which is engaged in an emergency effort to prepare the coming election campaign, and which should be given all types of support, including financial and personnel help, through a well-planned centralized initiative led by the incoming leadership—and the *Brazilian* organizations linked to the Fourth International, which will face an immense political challenge in the period to come.

### Counterline Amendments to the United Secretariat Redrafted Resolution on Nicaragua, by Alan Jones

Owing to the great delay in the appearance of the redrafted United Secretariat majority resolution on Nicaragua, and the long period of time it spent in the drafting commission, it was not possible to draw up a complete alternative draft text. This, however, is not disastrous as in any case there is not any significant dispute over many facts concerning the actual internal situation in Nicaragua, and therefore, many sections of the United Secretariat majority draft of a descriptive character are acceptable.

The following four points, however—on the economy, on the government, on the role of Cuba, and on building a section of the Fourth International—are major points of difference. Two of them, on the government and the section, are clearly a counterline. The other two, on the economy and on Cuba, would not be decisive in themselves but are included here for clarity. Therefore, although put forward in the form of amendments, because of lack of time, the parts included here in fact constitute a counterline—that counterline being the United Secretariat draft document plus the following additions and deletions. This means that if the two decisive amendments, on the

## To Sum Up

The ideas and proposals that have been expressed in this report presuppose that we *can* go forward and increase international coordination and centralization. But obviously many of these options and proposals will come to *nothing* if this World Congress and the national sections don't make all possible efforts to strengthen the day-to-day leadership of the International. In that case a lot of what has been said here will stay on paper and will lead to frustration within our ranks. If concrete measures in this regard are not implied or not spelled out in the different proposals that are going to be made in the coming discussion, we will just be wasting our time.

This World Congress, its delegates and observers, will have an important task to express this idea, together with the incoming leadership, to give the full political motivation to it, and thereby increase the human and material resources available to the international center.

The United Secretariat strongly appeals to the national delegations and sections here to discuss and rediscuss their contribution to the center, and urges the strongest sections to commit themselves to aid in the reinforcement of the day-to-day leadership of the International.

Concerning the *vote and motions*, we propose the following:

We propose that the general line of this report should be voted on and we ask that the report be published for the ranks of the International;

We present in addition three motions: one on the status of the Bureau, one on the naming of special working committees, and one on regular coordination meetings with representatives of political bureaus.

The structure and function of the IEC, which has been discussed in this report, will be decided after the report of the Nominations Commission.

## Appendix F

government and on the section, are not passed, the author calls for a vote *against* the United Secretariat majority resolution. If the amendments on the government and the section are passed but those on Cuba and the economy are defeated, however, the document could be voted for as these latter questions are of a more secondary character.

In order to facilitate these I am asking that the amendments be voted in the following order: (1) Government; (2) Section; (3) Economy; (4) Cuba.

### 1. The Economic Situation and Its Political Consequences

(There is no objection if, for purposes of editing, the various points in this amendment are broken up and are integrated at appropriate points of paragraphs 7-9 of the redrafted United Secretariat text. It is printed here in its totality, however, in order to make clear the general point of the amendment and where it differs from the evaluation of the United Secretariat text.)

Add the following at the end of point 7:

The basic choice faced by the toilers in Nicaragua, and by the FSLN is clear. There is nothing wrong in principle with limited tactical economic concessions to the capitalists. However, it is absolutely illusory to believe that any



serious relaunching of the capitalist economy can take place with purely cosmetic concessions to the bourgeoisie. Any serious increase in production on a capitalist basis would only be undertaken if accompanied by really significant moves of austerity against the working class—moves which would disorient and demobilize sections of the toilers, slow down mass mobilizations, and give greater room for capitalist political maneuvers.

Above all, however, what the bourgeoisie would demand for a significant increase in production on a capitalist basis would be guarantees against its own expropriation—guarantees which could not be purely verbal but which would have to involve placing a brake on the mass mobilizations and organizations. This crucial condition is not today fulfilled in Nicaragua nor could it be without a process which would seriously endanger the revolution. For this reason no serious relaunching of production on a capitalist basis will in fact take place in Nicaragua.

Any illusion that, by “clever” concessions, a prolonged period of coexistence with bourgeois economy can be maintained in the present political relation of forces is, therefore, extremely dangerous. The FSLN will not be able to avoid the basic choice of moving to expropriate the capitalist class or of blocking the mobilizations of the masses in order to maintain an alliance with sections of the bourgeoisie. This latter course would inevitably result in a significant move in the political relation of forces in favor of capitalism.

This choice will be made even more stark by the policy which imperialism will adopt. It is quite false to believe that the policy of economic concessions and of incessant military pressure are counterposed ones for imperialism. On the contrary, the two complement each other. The aim will be to provide the Nicaraguan masses with the apparent choice of bloody intervention by imperialism if they move towards a “Cuban” solution and the establishment of a workers state, or economic aid and relief if they make concessions to capitalism. This twin interlinked approach will undoubtedly be increasingly applied in the coming months as the economic situation continues to deteriorate and, particularly as next year is entered, as real conditions of economic dislocation, mass unemployment, and literal mass hunger develop further.

It is by these means also that the capitalist class in Nicaragua, which is today greatly weakened, can have the weight of imperialism put behind it. The capitalist forces in Nicaragua, including those in the GRNN, will attempt to appear before the masses as promising real economic relief and aid to immediate problems if their solutions are adopted. This combination of external military threats and simultaneously of promised economic concessions, the policy of “Marshall aid,” is a classic one of imperialism.

In this interplay of economic and political developments it is the latter which is decisive. Any limited economic concessions to the capitalists which are found useful today must be placed firmly in the context that it is only increasing the scope of mobilization and organization of the masses that can develop the existing relation of class forces. Any blocking of this process of mass mobilization and organization is far more dangerous in Nicaragua today than any failure to make tactical economic concessions to capitalist sectors.

## 2. On the Government

i. Section 10, paragraph 8, add at end after “this transitional phase”:

Although at present gravely weakened, the presence of representatives of sectors of the bourgeoisie within this government gives to the capitalist class a potential point of leverage for slowing down, and at a later stage challenging, the progress of the revolution. This will be particularly the case as they are intertwined with international imperialist and capitalist interests—a policy which will be consciously fostered by imperialism. Any serious development of the revolution will inevitably involve a confrontation with these bourgeois forces and a split in the government. The social and political transformation to a workers state in Nicaragua therefore cannot be executed without a split of the GRNN. It is in the final analysis, despite its radical measures, a bourgeois government.

ii. Page 11 of the English, paragraph 2; alter “It can give way either to the course followed by the Algerian revolution or that followed by the Cuban revolution.” to:

Either the bourgeois forces in the country, intertwined with imperialism, will slow down and stall the revolution and thereby permit the rebuilding of bourgeois power, or the government will split—inaugurating a workers and peasants government and a clash between the classes which can only culminate in the creation of a workers state or the defeat of the workers and peasants government (i.e., a Cuban or an Algerian development).

iii. Add a new paragraph at the end of the majority draft after “within the governmental structure.”:

A workers and peasants government based on the popular mass organizations can lead the revolution in the final confrontation with the bourgeoisie and the creation of the second workers state in Latin America.

A political line for state power and resolving the question of government in Nicaragua today must concentrate on the construction, consolidation and centralization of the mass organizations which grew up during and following the civil war. The coordination of defense committees (CDSs) and militias shows the necessary way forward.

The goal is to build up the necessary base for a national structure of mass organizations with the aim of creating a workers and peasants government independent of the bourgeoisie.

## 3. On the Role of Cuba

Add a new sixth paragraph on page 10 after “in the framework of this transitional role.”:

A major element in attempting to [one word illegible] these problems is the role played by the Cuban leadership. Wide sectors of the FSLN leadership were given their political and military training on a Cuban line. Cuba has put major material resources into Nicaragua, and the prestige and links of the Cuban leadership with the top cadre of the FSLN and with the masses in Nicaragua is immense.

In relation to the material aid given by the Cuban workers state, this is exemplary. If the bureaucratic



leaderships of the other workers states, and in the first place the USSR, put even a tiny part of the resources available to them, compared to Cuba, into aid to Nicaragua, the political and material situation would be transformed. The imperialist and bourgeois offensive to present the only alternative to following their line of imperialist aid and capitalist economy as being that of mass economic dislocation and poverty would lose a considerable amount of its effect. The fact that the USSR refuses to do this in the interests of "detente" with the United States once again demonstrates the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. The fact that the Cuban state is prepared to put major material aid into Nicaragua is hailed by all revolutionaries.

When it comes to the political advice and proposals put forward by the Cuban leadership, however, such unequivocal enthusiastic support cannot be given. The Cuban masses unequivocally wish to see the destruction of capitalism in Nicaragua and the creation of the second free territory of the Americas. But in the international relation of forces which exists today in Central America, such a goal will require not only honest and earnest intentions, but also a clear political orientation to the creation of a workers state and the steps and dynamic necessary to achieve this.

On the political level, however, the orientation of the Cuban leadership today does not give such a clear orientation of the type which is needed—particularly in relation to alliance with bourgeois forces. In Ethiopia, Angola, and Jamaica a policy of long-term alliance with sections of the bourgeoisie has been put forward. Such an orientation for Latin America was explicitly reaffirmed at the 1975 Havana conference of Communist parties. In relation to Nicaragua, Fidel Castro has unequivocally raised the slogan of "Long live the Government of National Reconstruction of Nicaragua"<sup>1</sup>—that is, a government of coalition with sections of the bourgeoisie, and paid tribute to ". . . something new in Latin American relations, something that sets an example for other regions of the world; namely, the way in which the governments of Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico, as well as the member countries of the subregional Andean Pact—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—acted in consort and solidarity to achieve a just solution of the Nicaraguan problem . . ."<sup>2</sup> Fidel has talked of "a great democratic, pro-independence, and anti-interventionist front developed tacitly in Latin America, something of historic significance and enormous importance," and stated that "In the creation of this democratic anti-interventionist front which has formed, we must mention the names of people as well as countries: the names of Torrijos, Carazo, López Portillo, Manley, and Bishop. And it is also only fair to recall the name of a person who, though he is no longer president of his country, contributed a great deal to the development of this solidarity with the Sandinista struggle: the former president of Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez."<sup>3</sup>

We must state openly that we do not agree with these views at all; these statements are not those of the real road taken by the Cuban revolution, but by the leaders of the USSR and the Communist Party which have served the people of Latin America so badly for so long.

If Torrijos, or Portillo, or Pérez aided the struggle in Nicaragua, it was because of the pressure of the masses of their country who felt solidarity with the struggle of the

Nicaraguan people and not because they are part of "democratic anti-interventionist fronts" seeking a "just solution in Nicaragua." Torrijos, Portillo, or Pérez, and those like them, are implacably opposed to the creation of a workers state in Nicaragua—the only road which can truly gain national liberation and meet the just needs of the Nicaraguan people. They would prefer Nicaragua to be brought under the heel of imperialism than to see a second Cuba in Latin America. To take and ask for material aid from Panama, Venezuela, or any other country is correct. But to place any political confidence in the present leaders of these countries or to believe that they would seriously defend it against imperialist attacks, would be a grave error.

Also in Nicaragua itself we do not say with Fidel "Long live the Government of Reconstruction." On the contrary, the bourgeoisie in this government will attempt to slow down and destroy the revolution. Any progress to socialism, the only solution for national liberation in Nicaragua will lead to a clash and split with the bourgeoisie in this government, and not to its long life. To attempt to slow down the revolution, to attempt to have a long-term alliance with sectors of the capitalist class would be disastrous.

We believe the only road forward for Nicaragua is not the one which Fidel puts forward now, but the one which the Cuban people themselves undertook in actions in 1959 and 1960. To remember that the only choice is either socialist revolution or a caricature of a revolution. The capitalist members of the GRNN are not part of "democratic anti-interventionist fronts" but the Urrutia's Pazos' and Fresquet's of Nicaragua. To honor the Cuban revolution is not to follow some of the words of its leaders now, but to remember its great deeds when it overthrew capitalism and created the first state really free of imperialism in Latin America.

We welcome the undying friendship of the Nicaraguan and Cuban people. We hail the aid given by the Cuban government and people to Nicaragua. We welcome every call made by Fidel and the other leaders of Cuba to follow the real road taken by that revolution when it was born. But we call for struggle against all views, even when they come from Cuba, which tie the Nicaraguan workers to the capitalist class in the government, in the economy, or internationally. The great lesson that Fidel Castro and the Cuban people taught to Latin America was not of a "democratic anti-interventionist front" but that the only choice is either socialist revolution or no revolution at all.

#### 4. On the Section of the Fourth International

(This would form the final paragraphs of the text replacing the redraft proposed by the United Secretariat majority.)

In order to carry out the line of this resolution it is necessary to build a section of the Fourth International in Nicaragua. Given the concrete situation in that country the correct way to do this is to work as an organized current in the FSLN and the mass organizations it controls or has built.

Given the character of this organization, its leadership in the revolutionary overthrow of Somoza and the heroic and revolutionary role of its militants, this activity is not at all of the type of entryism in the mass reformist parties.



We do not today place any limits on any section of the FSLN, including its leadership, to develop to revolutionary Marxist positions, and our approach is on this basis. As long as the FSLN defends the revolutionary interests of the working class, we operate as organized, loyal, militants of this organization seeking to win it to the positions we consider correct by means of democratic discussion. We argue for the FSLN to establish a mass working-class party in Nicaragua and not to delay this process. If it moves to establish a party of a different type, we should argue for it to become such a workers party. We should argue and act in any party set up by the FSLN in the same way.

In the event that the FSLN will not agree to our participating as an organized current in this way, or fails to establish a party, and that we are, therefore, forced to set up an independent group, we nevertheless should continue to operate towards the FSLN with the same attitude outlined above. We should show by our action that there is no contradiction whatever between our program and the aspirations of revolutionary militants of the

FSLN—on the contrary, we aim to show by honest comradesly debate and struggle that our ideas best express the revolutionary ideals the Sandinista fighters are struggling for. We are not maneuvering but honest in expressing our positions that we will be exemplary loyal militants of an FSLN which defends the revolutionary interests of the working class. All our militants must conduct themselves with this spirit even if today we are outside the FSLN, and must seek to show by their activity in Nicaragua itself, and by the international campaign of the FI, the right of Trotskyists to take their place as an organized current within the mass Leninist party which must be built.

#### Footnotes

1. Speech "The Triumph of Nicaraguan Independence," July 26, 1979.
2. Speech to the United Nations, October 12, 1979.
3. Speech "The Triumph of Nicaraguan Independence," July 26, 1979.

## Appendix G

### LTT Resolution on Nicaragua (Originally a Statement by the French LTT)

The LTT members who have remained members of the LCR consider that the victory of the worker and peasant masses and the fall of Somoza open up prospects for revolution in Nicaragua, constituting a decisive test of the validity of the Fourth International's orientation and its capacities to aid the socialist revolution in Nicaragua.

Therefore, we place the greatest importance on the World Congress's assessment of the intervention by the outgoing United Secretariat, on the resolution that will be passed concerning the analysis of the political forces involved, and, consequently, on the political orientation and organizational measures that will be taken to reinforce the activity of the Nicaraguan comrades.

While not failing to recognize the responsibility of the Bolshevik Faction in the process that led to a split in the French section, the LTT members condemn the United Secretariat delegation's course of action in Nicaragua, which resulted in isolating the members of the Simon Bolivar Brigade and helped to expel them. We also condemn the pressures put on the Nicaraguan Trotskyists to get them to dissolve their organizations and enter the FSLN individually, without guidelines, as "loyal members."

We demand the formation of a commission of inquiry made up of representatives of each tendency, assigned to elucidate the role of the Simon Bolivar Brigade and to report to the next IEC.

We declare that these steps, taken in accordance with the logic of the SWP's political orientation, and approved by the last United Secretariat meeting, have greatly contributed to arousing the indignation of many members of the French section, and have literally thrown the majority of the LTT in that section into a split operation, for lack of the possibility of seeing a reorientation of the international.

Concerning the situation in Nicaragua, the members of

the French LTT restate our fundamental agreement with the theses outlined in the document entitled "The Nicaraguan Revolution on the March and the Tasks of the Fourth International," published in September 1979.

In reaffirming these theses, we particularly wish to stress the bourgeois nature of the Government of National Reconstruction. This bourgeois nature is shown by the presence of significant sectors of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie, the limited measures concerning nationalization of the banks and credit institutions, the limited scope of the agrarian reform, and the very limited measures of control over foreign trade, which free the hands of the multinationals. Its determination—despite its weakness—to rebuild a state at the service of the ruling class is reflected in the disarming of the militias, the aid being sought from the Panamanian police, the attempts to restrict freedom of the press, the arrest at one point of the anti-Somoza fighter Melvin Wallace, and the anti-Trotskyist statements of the Minister of Agrarian Reform, Jaime Wheelock, and the Minister of the Interior, Borge, and the expulsion of the non-Nicaraguan members of the Simon Bolivar Brigade. This reactionary course is also expressed by the Labor Minister's attempt to refuse to recognize some blue-collar unions and to try to set up a single trade-union federation, using the Somozaist labor code.

At a time when the energy of the radicalized masses is still intact, trade-union freedom and independence, as well as freedom of the press, are essential and vital gains for the development of working-class organizations, and for their consciousness of the historic tasks that befall them.

With regard to freedom of the press, it is well to recall what Trotsky wrote about a campaign launched in Mexico by the trade-union leader Lombardo Toledano, which demanded that the press be placed under democratic censorship to fight against the reactionary press:

"But only the blind or feeble-minded could think that as the result of the ban on the reactionary press the workers and peasants can free themselves from the influence of reactionary ideas. In reality, only the greatest freedom of



speech, of the press, and of assembly can create favorable conditions for the advance of the revolutionary movement of the working class.

"It is essential to wage a relentless struggle against the reactionary press. But workers cannot let the repressive fist of the bourgeois state substitute for the struggle that they must wage through their own organizations and their own press. Today the state may appear to be 'kindly' disposed to the workers organizations; tomorrow the government may fall, will inevitably fall, into the hands of the most reactionary elements of the bourgeoisie. In that case, whatever restrictive legislation that exists will be thrown at the workers. Only adventurers with no thought other than for the needs of the moment would fail to heed such a danger."

This extract from the Mexican journal *Clave* of August 1938 applies perfectly to the present situation in Nicaragua—as it applied not long ago in Portugal to the banning of *República*.

The sum total of measures taken by the government of national reconstruction is the product of the collaboration of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie and pro-Castro representatives of the FSLN. The attempts to place the press and trade unions under the government's tutelage can be compared to a transplant of Stalinist degeneration onto the decayed body of the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie. These attempts threaten the "development of the revolutionary movement of the working class."

In face of this evolution, which is dangerous for the workers historic interests, it is of the highest importance that the Fourth International should make its voice heard, freely publish its newspapers, publicly defend its program, directly warn the working masses about the dangers that threaten them, and freely build its organizations in Nicaragua.

The Fourth International must fight, in particular, for the convening of a constituent assembly based on the existing forms of self-organization, the trade-union organizations, Sandinist defense committees, worker and peasant militias, and the women's organizations (AMPRONAC).

Therefore, the members of the French LTT call for the strengthening of the Trotskyist movement in Nicaragua.

We demand that the new international secretariat elected by the Eleventh World Congress actively intervene to try to unify the existing Trotskyist organizations, and give them all the political and material help that the situation requires.

We condemn the dissolution of the Trotskyist organizations recommended by the last United Secretariat meeting. We think that the Fourth International should fight to build a party and should organize conscious revolutionary Marxists today. This does not rule out the Fourth International having discussions with the FSLN leadership; on the contrary, this should facilitate the process. However, unless it is aimed at building an organization, discussion about the Nicaraguan revolution becomes purely academic. In our movement, discussions are held only in order to *act*. In the case of Nicaragua, this means acting in a revolutionary situation.

If our comrades were to join the FSLN, then they should do so publicly, collectively, on the basis of a statement affirming their loyalty not to the program of the FSLN—whose democratic functioning remains to be seen—but to the internationalist revolutionary struggle for the establishment of socialism free of any bureaucratic vise. Any other attitude would bind the hands of Trotskyism in Nicaragua and lead to its liquidation.

The development of the situation in Nicaragua, the intervention of our sections in Latin America, depends to a not inconsiderable extent on the decision to be taken by the congress. The unity of several of our sections, and in the final analysis, of the International, depends on it as well.

For all of these reasons stemming from the revolutionary situation created in Nicaragua and the serious revisions that the United Secretariat and the SWP seem to be trying to apply there, the French LTT expects to take part in the international LTT. But in a broader sense, we intend to continue the LTT's fight to reorient the Fourth International, for the errors committed in Nicaragua derive from an orientation which has its roots in the serious disorientation that resulted from the Ninth and Tenth World Congresses, and in the various unprincipled blocs and so-called recomposition that helped prevent critical balance sheets, which alone could have put a stop to it.

## Appendix H

### Report of the Nominating Commission, by Alilo

The Statutes of the Fourth International define the International Executive Committee as "the highest body of the Fourth International between world congresses. It is charged with the responsibility of applying the decisions of the World Congress and its held accountable to the next World Congress for its stewardship."

For reasons connected with the tendency and faction struggle and the differences dividing the International, the last World Congress decided to elect a very large IEC (127 members). In five years this IEC met only two times, in 1975 and 1976, largely for financial reasons given the burden that convocation of such a large body would mean for the budget of the International.

The proposal made in the Organizational Report from the outgoing United Secretariat and adopted by this

Congress was to reduce the next IEC to some sixty members. This proposal was based both on the need for a body flexible enough to meet once a year, and on consideration of the financial implications such a yearly meeting has for the budget of the International. Any other proposal might lead us into a situation where the United Secretariat would be unable to apply the Statutes and regularly convene the IEC.

However, since such a decision would mean that many small sections would not have a full member of the IEC, the Nominating Commission proposes to also elect a slate of alternate members, which I will return to later.

What are the criteria we used in coming up with the proposed slate?

a) As was said in the Organizational Report, the IEC should be composed of leaders of *sections* of the International, in order to regularize the situation of the highest



leadership body of our movement. This is why the proposed list does not include any members of sympathizing organizations of the International.

b) The IEC must be composed of comrades who are part of the real leadership of the sections of the International in order to reflect the living forces of our movement. In this regard we gave priority to the recommendations made by the delegations present at this congress. But we must also stress that this is an election of *individuals* and it would be wrong to have a federalist conception of the election of the IEC. We have also taken into account the fact that the Organizational Report emphasized the need to have a daily leadership (United Secretariat and Bureau) that corresponds to the elected leadership, so as to avoid the practice of cooptation that has prevailed over the past years, with comrades voting in the United Secretariat Bureau while not members of the IEC.

c) We took into account the *numerical weight* of the different sections, trying to give comparable numerical representation to sections of similar size according to the figures given to the Mandates Commission, while adopting the general rule of overrepresentation for small sections.

d) We took into account the question of the specific assignments of certain comrades in international work, their presence in the center, etc.

e) We tried to take into account the need for a *geographical balance*, so as not to include too many European comrades at the expense of other areas of the world, even if the size of some organizations on other continents might not automatically merit a full IEC member on the numerical criterion alone (for example, Lebanon).

f) We also took into consideration the existence of *ideological currents* inside the International and the need to represent on the IEC the votes taken at this Congress. This was one of the criteria behind the proposal for giving a stronger representation of fraternal observers from the SWP (USA) than from the Spanish LCR, even though their numerical weight is the same. The same consideration held for the IMG, which we had thought should have four full members and one alternate member, but the majority of the Commission finally proposed to add one alternate member to represent a particular current—in this case, Comrade Adair—so as not to alter the proposals of the majority of the delegation for the five members initially proposed.

In accord with the conclusions of the women's resolution adopted by this Congress, we tried to include the largest possible number of *women* leaders in the list of nominations, but it should be noted that the result is not very satisfying (nine out of sixty-five proposed full members).

g) Finally, we took into account the factor of *continuity* of leadership, by proposing to reelect comrades who have a long history of participation in the International leadership and whose presence on the IEC seemed to us important for this reason. This goes not only for Comrade Adair, who was already mentioned, but also for Comrade Bala, and for Comrade Desai, who is proposed as an alternate member from the Indian section. Specific proposals will be made concerning Comrades Pierre Frank and Peng Shu-tse.

#### Concerning the LTT

The Commission discussed the proposal that a comrade of the Leninist Trotskyist Tendency be elected to the IEC

as a representative of this tendency *as an international tendency*, since they represent an ideological current. The Commission rejected this proposal. Not so much because of the small degree of homogeneity and numerical weakness of this tendency—although it should be noted that on an international scale the LTT received no more than one percent of the votes that were cast for the documents proposed for a vote at this congress—but because we think that the *organizational framework* in which these comrades place themselves is not at all clear at the present time. The comrades of the Spanish LTT, in their explanation of vote submitted two days after the preparatory congress for the World Congress, made a de facto justification of the split policy of the leadership of the international LTT by stating that, "the participation of the LTT in the meeting of the Parity Committee in Paris constituted a *factional* act, which could not, however, justify splitting from the Fourth International." They labeled the motion proposed by the leadership of the Spanish LCR regarding the Bolshevik Faction and the LTT as "administrative measures constituting in and of themselves the consummation of a political split that is historically irresponsible." This amounts to making the leadership of the International responsible for the split that we have just experienced. By stating that the leadership of the international LTT made errors in the *forms* and *timing* of its decisions but that in the last analysis the class struggle will settle the matter, the comrades of the Spanish LTT place themselves *outside* the framework of the motion on the split adopted at the beginning of this Congress. The same goes for the comrades of the French LTT when they state in their declaration of November 11 that, "the unity of several of our sections and, in the final analysis, of the International" will depend on the resolution on Nicaragua adopted by the 11th World Congress and on the development of the class struggle in Nicaragua.

Such statements certainly contradict the report made here by Comrade Strawson, as well as the declaration on the split adopted only a short while ago, but they show clearly that these comrades remain completely ambiguous in regard to the Fourth International and its organizational framework.

In their statements these comrades speak of the "political and organizational decomposition of the present framework of the United Secretariat, resulting in an increased sectarianization and disintegration of the Trotskyist movement, which constitutes a *qualitative* step backward in the construction of the Fourth International as an international revolutionary workers party." But they refer in positive terms to the proposal of the Parity Committee for an extraordinary reunification congress of all Trotskyist forces. This shows clearly that the comrades do not recognize the organizational boundaries of the Fourth International. For us, such statements are in total contradiction with the loyalty that we expect from *all* our comrades toward the Fourth International and its sections and which we reaffirmed in the motion adopted several days ago.

If in the coming period the comrades demonstrate that they loyally accept the terms of this motion, and if in their statements as well as their practice they abandon any perspective of political ties with those who have broken with the Fourth International, it will be the duty of the sections of the International to do their utmost to integrate



comrades of the LTT into the national leadership where this is appropriate. But at this stage, for the reasons cited above, we are against giving representation to the comrades of the LTT as a current in the highest body of the Fourth International.

#### *Concerning the List*

The proposal is for sixty-two full members and thirty-three alternates, for the following reasons:

As mentioned in the first part of this report, the body must be capable of meeting and functioning, without financial difficulties becoming an obstacle to the convening of the IEC (even with the present proposal it will cost \$20,000 for each IEC, only counting the cost of travel).

However, we wanted to assure that a series of comrades, particularly from small sections, would have the right to attend IEC meetings, speak, and register their point of view by a consultative vote, without, however, the International having to assume the financial burden that this would mean for its regular budget.

We do not exclude the possibility of the International leadership or the sections organizing special financial campaigns when IEC meetings are called, to provide aid to sections that cannot assume the costs of the trip for their alternate members. But it must be clear that the leadership of the International will only take financial responsibility for full IEC members.

Concerning *representation of countries*, comrades will note that a number of European sections with around one hundred members or a bit more, (Austria, Holland, and Denmark) only have an alternate member, the same as groups of a much smaller size in Asia or the Middle East. This was done because of a concern not to have an absolute preponderance of Europe in the IEC, as well as for financial considerations, since these are not the sections that will have the greatest difficulties in gathering the necessary funds to pay for the trip by their alternate member.

You will also note that in the total number proposed for full and alternate members we reserved slots for organizations whose status is not yet clear and must be decided by the next IEC, in accord with the decisions adopted by this Congress following the reports from the various commissions. This is the case for Brazil (two full members), Ireland (one alternate), Ecuador (one alternate), and Hong Kong (one alternate). These slots are included in the figures of sixty-two and thirty-three that I mentioned. At the present time, the list of named comrades who would meet following this Congress is therefore sixty and twenty-nine, respectively.

It should be noted that in at least two cases—those of Greece and India—the names given in the slate are not

necessarily definitive because, on the request of the comrades and in conformity with the Statutes of the International, we agreed that they should be able to rediscuss the nomination with their sections, which had not been able to discuss nominations prior to the Congress.

In addition, we propose that Comrade Key of New Zealand should be an alternate member, leaving open the possibility for the next IEC to elect him a full member if the New Zealand section is able to send a comrade to the center in the coming months as they have projected.

Finally, we propose—as was previously the case—that the non-European sections should have the right to replace one or more of their full members by one or more alternates at an IEC meeting, given the much greater problems that these sections have in assuring the presence of their full members.

#### *Control Commission*

According to the Statutes of the International, the Control Commission should be composed of members “each belonging to a different section, who have a reputation in the International for objectivity and political maturity.” The task of the Commission is to investigate “cases involving violations of discipline or proletarian morality in the International.”

Clearly, this is an election of specific comrades who, *as individuals*, are respected by the membership of the International as a whole as persons deserving of the highest political and moral confidence. Thus in composing the list proposed to you we did not attempt to provide representation in the Control Commission of the various ideological currents apparent at this Congress.

However, given the factional struggle that prevailed in our ranks for many years, followed by the dissolution of the IMT and LTF, we did try to achieve a balance that could assure the Control Commission would have political and moral authority.

We also took account of geographical factors and of the difficulties of being able to rapidly hold meetings of the entire Commission each time. This is why we propose that it be composed of six members, with a nucleus of four based in Europe and the two other comrades living in North America.

For the Control Commission, as for the IEC, we sought to include a significant number of women comrades (for obvious reasons, given the type of problems it will have to deal with), but here again we ran into big difficulties stemming from objective factors (the small number of leading women comrades who are knowledgeable about the International as a whole and who could participate effectively in such a commission).

## Appendix I

### Greetings to the Eleventh World Congress

#### *Greetings from Brazil*

November 10, 1979

To Comrades of the Fourth International, Delegates and Guests at the Eleventh World Congress:

Our presence here occurs as a consequence of the

necessity for our new organization to acquire a serious and deep vision of the worldwide revolution and of Trotskyism, in order to really participate in this process.

On the other hand, our organization has a great weakness—nationalism. It is a terrible inheritance from Socialist Convergence, which we left in October.

Although the purpose of this letter is not to discuss our break with Socialist Convergence, it is important to make



clear that nationalism was one of the greatest causes and consequences of the crisis that Socialist Convergence has gone through in the last year.

The high point of this crisis was our rupture immediately after our congress. We left Socialist Convergence as a minority group including nine comrades from the national leadership.

Our recent rupture obliged us to make a hasty trip, in an empirical way, without money or confirmation of this congress.

Although we think our presence here is fundamental for the life of our new organization, which has been isolated from the world Trotskyist movement, it is important to make clear to everyone that we have sent our representative as an observer, as the lack of information impedes us from now having a firm position on the international party's split. We know a bit through reports from the Bolshevik Faction. That is one side of the reality. We must know about all that is happening with world Trotskyism.

Given these facts we have a plan for taking some trips, which we hope you will help us implement after the congress.

We think that in order to have a serious and profound position on the world revolution and construction of the world party, we must be able to characterize what is occurring, which necessitates our having in our hands all the elements of reality.

To accomplish this, we hope to meet in Europe with the most fraternal and effective collaboration on your part.

We salute you. Long Live Trotskyism!

*Greetings from Comrade Peng Shu-tse*

Dear Comrades,

I very much regret that I cannot attend the Congress because I cannot obtain a visa. I would like to put forward three opinions that I think are important for comrades attending the Congress to consider:

1. First, I have to point out that it has been fifty whole years, i.e., half a century, since 1929 when Trotsky called for the formation of the International Left Opposition. Even if we count from 1938 when the Fourth International was formally established, it has been forty-one years.

In such a long period our movement has not yet developed a mass party, in any country, that can intervene in the events, lead the masses on the road to revolution, and overcome the "crisis of revolutionary leadership."

What are the reasons for this? Of course, the main reason is that the combination of many objective conditions caused our movement to develop extremely slowly. But the mistakes we have committed subjectively, are also a main reason for the slow development.

For example, the split in the International over the question of whether or not the Stalinist bureaucracies can "self-reform" lasted ten years (1954-1963!). This not only destroyed a large number of cadres and weakened our movement, it also caused disorientation among the masses; in this way we missed many opportunities that were objectively favorable to the development of our movement.

Although the International was reunified in 1963 (a part still remained outside the International, such as the OCI), not long afterwards, at the 1969 World Congress, differences over the question of guerrilla warfare in Latin America

caused opposition between the majority and minority tendencies which later developed into the IMT and LTF.

Though on the surface it was not a complete break, in actual fact it was a split, and it also caused splits in many sections of the International. This then greatly affected our movement, particularly in Argentina and Bolivia in Latin America, where we lost a large number of cadres, and where the movement suffered very severe blows.

Since fall 1977, when the IMT and LTF dissolved themselves, the International has regained unification and cooperation, and a number of resolutions have been drafted in preparation for this World Congress. This will very probably push our movement forward to meet new developments in the world situation.

But when I read the various documents related to the Congress, I discovered a tendency that may lead to a new split. This is the tendency represented by the Bolshevik Faction.

This faction has severe differences with the United Secretariat majority on many theoretical, political, and organizational questions, as shown in the opinion it expressed in its documents such as "Revolutionary Dictatorship of the Proletariat," by Nahuel Moreno; "Declaration of the Bolshevik Faction"; and "The Program of the Bolshevik Faction."

If it insists on the differences, a split will very probably result. This will cause the most severe damage to our movement and, in particular, to the movement in Latin America, since the Bolshevik Faction holds the majority of the sections in Latin America, has a large number of militant cadres, and has certain influence among the masses (such as in Argentina). Therefore, I hope delegates to the Congress will adopt a most serious and careful attitude towards the Bolshevik Faction.

I particularly hope that leaders of the Bolshevik Faction (such as Comrade Moreno) will handle their different opinions most seriously and carefully. When their opinion cannot obtain majority support, they can retain their opinion for future discussion, but they must *absolutely maintain the unity of the International*.

In other words, they must *absolutely avoid a split in the organization*. Because a split in the organization will lead to great disorientation in the Latin American movement, and will be a disaster to the revolutionary movement that may take place in the immediate future!

2. We all agree that to overcome the crisis of the revolutionary leadership we must build a mass revolutionary party. A party that has only several hundred or even several thousand members cannot intervene in the events and lead the masses on the road to victory of the revolution. Therefore, the Congress must consider at the present time which of the countries have the "possibility," i.e., have a considerable number of party members as a base for beginning to seriously build a mass party.

From my point of view, the possibility of building a mass party at present exists only in France, because there are already four Trotskyist organizations there. If they unite, they will be ten thousand members (this is my estimation and I do not know if it is correct); moreover, they have a large number of sympathizers outside the party, and they also influence a large number of trade-union members.

To set up a unified party on this basis, to use our revolutionary program to influence leftist elements in the



Socialist Party and the Communist Party and the workers under their leadership, under a favorable objective situation, that is, in the period of upsurge of the mass movement, it is possible that a mass party can develop within a short period.

The problem is: in the near future will the situation in France undergo great changes, will the mass movement rise? On this point the draft resolution put forward by the United Secretariat has given a concise answer in its analysis of the world situation: "Sharpened class struggles will continue in the immediate future, especially in Southwest Europe but also in Britain and other imperialist countries." (P. 6.)

France is, of course, included as one of the "other imperialist countries." That is to say, "sharpened class struggles will continue in the immediate future" in France, gradually going towards the rise of the mass movement.

Such a rise in the mass movement will provide a very good opportunity for the unified French Trotskyist party to approach the masses and to influence leftist members of the CP and SP, because, while the mass movement is on the rise, these two class-collaborationist parties will definitely expose their opportunistic betrayal in front of the masses and cause the latter's discontent. Such discontent will be reflected in the masses of CP and SP members, and will inevitably cause differentiations and lead to the formation of a revolutionary left wing which will seek a revolutionary program. Only the Trotskyist party can provide a revolutionary program.

Under such circumstances, the revolutionary program of the Trotskyist party will join with the revolutionary factions and masses that have differentiated themselves from the reformist parties. And so, the French Trotskyist party can form into a mass party or cooperate with left wings that have split away from the CP and SP in leading the French revolution to the road of victory. The victory of the French revolution will, of course, influence the whole of Europe and the world.

But on the contrary, if the Trotskyist organizations in France continue to maintain their opposition and hostility as they did in the past, then, when the mass movement is on the rise not one of them can, by itself, develop into a mass party. And so, when the revolution comes, because each of them by itself is too weak, and they are different from each other, it is absolutely impossible for them to attract leftist CP and SP members, not to mention influencing the broad working masses.

When the CP and SP leaderships betray the revolution, they can only stand on the side making passive criticisms, but cannot play an active intervening role (such as forming a revolutionary united front with left wings that have split from the CP and SP) to save the revolution in crisis from a tragic defeat.

The result will be that the various Trotskyist organizations will meet the same fate of destruction as the CP, the SP, and all the workers organizations. The reason is that a tragic defeat of the revolution in an imperialist country such as France will result either in a Mussolini/Hitler-type fascist dictatorship, or in a Chiang Kai-shek/Sohato-type military dictatorship. In short, all Trotskyist organizations in France and Europe must draw the lesson from Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany.

3. The central task of the Congress is, of course, to define the International's political line and political orien-

tation in the coming period. In this respect, the majority of the United Secretariat has drawn up four drafts as the basis for discussion and vote.

"The World Political Situation and the Tasks of the Fourth International," is particularly important because it represents the general political line, the basic ideas of the other three resolutions are all included in this resolution. Therefore, I will particularly take up this resolution to express my opinion.

I think this draft resolution has made quite a detailed analysis of the social, economic, and political situation of the three sectors of the world—imperialist countries, colonial and semicolonial countries, and the degenerated and deformed workers states. And so, it has set the tactical line for the three sectors of the world revolution—socialist revolution in imperialist countries, national-democratic revolutions in backward countries, and political revolution in the degenerated and deformed workers states. Of course, this is not an invention, but is a development of the ideas in the Transitional Program.

However, the resolutions of several Congresses in the past not only did not correctly develop the traditional ideas in the Transition Program, but even went contrary to them.

For example, the resolution of the Third World Congress did not give a clear and definite analysis and evaluation of the Stalinist forces that grew after World War II. Instead, it made some ambiguous, obscure formulations, leading to the later development of the revisionist idea of "the Soviet Stalinist bureaucracy can self-reform," (that is, denying the program of political revolution).

The resolution adopted by the 1969 World Congress on the one hand placed hope in guerrilla wars in Latin America, and on the other hand, denied the Chinese Communist Party's Stalinist nature by defining it as "bureaucratic centralism," thus in effect cancelling a political revolution in China.

The resolution of this Congress does not hold any illusion for the "self-reformation" of the "Stalinist bureaucracies in the Soviet Union" and, in addition, it makes a more concise and accurate analysis. It also totally abandons guerrilla war in Latin America, and bureaucratic centralism of the Chinese Communist Party. Therefore, I think the draft resolution for this Congress is basically correct. So, I think it should be accepted as the basis for discussion and vote.

Of course, the draft resolution is unsatisfactory in its analysis in certain aspects, or it has shortcomings, or it is wrong in its judgment of some individual questions. But these can be supplemented or revised through serious discussion. Also, events that have taken place since the beginning of this year, such as the February revolution in Iran, the July revolution in Nicaragua, and the rise of many young leftist opposition organizations in China, should be added in the general resolution.

Finally I would like to suggest to the Congress that we concentrate on the discussion of this general political resolution "The World Political Situation and the Tasks of the Fourth International," and from the discussion arrive at common, satisfactory, political lines as the orientation for the struggle of the entire International from now on. A healthy International leadership is also to be elected to fully execute the resolutions of the Congress.

In order that a healthy International leadership is set up, I



must point out an unhealthy fact in the present International leadership: Comrade J.P., who is a member of the United Secretariat Bureau told me that at present the General Secretary of the United Secretariat Bureau has been cancelled. If the General Secretary of the International United Secretariat Bureau is cancelled, then it should also be cancelled in all sections of the International. But this is a reflection of an anarchist tendency. I hope the Congress will correct this.

It has been almost sixty years since I joined the Communist movement in 1920. As an old soldier who has been a member of the Communist movement for sixty years I send a Trotskyist revolutionary salute to the comrades attending this Congress, and I wish the Congress every success.

s/Peng Shu-tse

*Greetings from 'Combate' (Sweden) Editorial Board*

Stockholm, November 7, 1979

To the World Congress of the Fourth International Comrades:

The Editorial Board of *Combate* (Sweden), the Combate Group of Sweden, the Editorial Board of *Revolucion Socialista*, and the Uruguayan Nucleus, Chilean Nucleus, and Argentinian cells of the Combate Group, wish to send warm revolutionary greetings to the World Congress, to all the delegates, and through them to the national sections and sympathizing groups in each country.

This Eleventh World Congress of the Fourth International is taking place at a key moment for the world revolution since the end of World War II. Between this congress and the previous one, even though very few years have transpired, the face of the world has undergone some very significant alterations.

We do not want to digress, but it is worthwhile pointing out that at the time of the Tenth World Congress, the military coup in Chile, which meant a blow to the worldwide workers and revolutionary movement, had just been consummated. Since then, we have witnessed the heroic triumph of the Indochinese masses, the freeing of the former Portuguese colonies in Africa, the struggles in Europe, notably in Portugal, Spain, and Italy, the growth of the antibureaucratic opposition in the workers states, and the beginning of a reversal of the situation in Latin America. Hundreds of struggles have marked this period, several military dictatorships have fallen around the world, and prerevolutionary situations have arisen and exist in some places. Most outstandingly, in the course of this year, two mass insurrections have triumphed: in Iran and Nicaragua.

Millions of exploited have gone into struggle in these nearly six years in all parts of the globe. And even though defeats have been suffered, in any case it can be pointed out that there is growing progress of the World Revolution in all its sectors, and that the exploited have won important victories. The period can be defined as a period of upsurge, and as victorious in general terms, if we look at the entire struggle on a world scale.

In this context we sense, each day more powerfully, the significant presence of the mass movement, mobilized and struggling, as the originator of these big changes, and, increasingly, how the working class in all countries is

playing—in a clearer and clearer way—a vanguard role in these mobilizations, and is taking the leadership of struggles, from Poland to Nicaragua, from Iran to Spain.

The Fourth International has been immersed in this process, at a level, with a depth, and with an influence that it has never had before. In the course of these struggles, and in these few years, the Fourth International's forces have increased, and here and there it can be seen, intervening in the most far-reaching struggles that are being fought. Even though it has no mass parties and is not a mass revolutionary communist international, it is getting there, faster and faster. We are not false optimists; we seek to base ourselves on the same facts. And if evidence is required, we can look at the situation of the Fourth International at the time of the Tenth World Congress, and the situation at the present time, as the Eleventh World Congress takes place.

We can appreciate this with special emphasis on the situation in Latin America, both with respect to the development of struggles and revolutionary advances in the last period—even today, with the struggles in El Salvador, Bolivia, and Brazil—and to the growth of the influence and organized forces of the Fourth International throughout the continent.

We are neither schematic nor idealists, and for that very reason, we do not think that the differences that have divided the elemental forces of the International in the past are going to disappear from one day to the next. But we can state that significant steps have been taken in that direction, and that therefore, the elemental forces, which is what the groupings were in the past that had solid bases and seriousness of purpose, have done much in the last few years for the growth of the International and its unity in the struggle and for the struggle. And if an example were necessary, we can point out that the unity achieved around the characterization of the revolutionary process in Nicaragua shows not only that the International has a leadership, but furthermore, that on the major questions, such as the position to take on a triumphant revolution, there exists ideological and political solidity, as well as an admirable political acumen, qualities that are more than necessary for a revolutionary leadership.

We are convinced that this Eleventh World Congress will strengthen the International and unify it even further, so it can take up the tasks of the next period, which will undoubtedly be gigantic and a big responsibility for the Fourth International throughout the world, in view of the course that the revolutionary process is taking on a world scale, and the implantation achieved by the International in many places.

We hope this Congress will bring greater political unity to the Fourth International and enable it to be better prepared in every sphere to face the struggles ahead.

For all these reasons that we have so far enumerated, we condemn in the strongest terms the divisive, unprincipled, and clearly opportunist and demagogic maneuver that the international Bolshevik Faction and the LTT have just carried out, with the support of the OCRFI-OCI, by setting up their so-called "parity committee," and their proclaimed efforts to "reconstruct the Fourth International," calling for an international meeting in the next few months. We condemn and reject this attempt, which appears to us to be the culmination of a long series of activities that have injured revolutionary Marxism and the Fourth Interna-



tional, and the culmination of a bureaucratic and opportunist conception that moves farther away from revolutionary Marxism every day, as represented especially by the international Bolshevik Faction and its positions and political moves through the world, most particularly in Latin America.

We reaffirm our loyalty to the Eleventh World Congress and the Fourth International, and to the leadership that will be elected by this World Congress. We stand shoulder to shoulder in the struggle to defend the Fourth International and revolutionary Marxism, here in Sweden together with the Swedish section and the KAF, which has also strongly condemned this divisive maneuver.

We Latin Americans know full well the consequences and implications of this orientation of the BF. We exiles in Sweden who work together in *Combate*, know a lot about the methods—alien to revolutionary Marxism—that are applied by the BF, and that is why we have had so many problems, which were poorly known or treated in a superficial way in the past. Fortunately, there are many documents of long date wherein all of this is set forth, and we hope that now that these conceptions and methods have taken a step that no one can ignore and that no one can turn away from, justice shall be done. That justice shall be done, in this case, by objectively analyzing the situation of the victims of these methods, such as ourselves in this instance, who in addition to enduring them and suffering them directly and in the flesh, have paid doubly when the general incomprehension turned deaf ears to just and valid demands.

We have worked for long years for the revolution in Latin America. We have lived through the defeats and their consequences. We did not lower our banners, and decided to go against the stream in reactionary periods, like the past one and that which still exists in our countries. Therefore, we define ourselves in terms of revolutionary Marxism and the Fourth International, and therefore we join together in exile to continue the work of reorganizing the forces inside and outside our countries, for a balance sheet of the past period, and for a definition of the tasks for the coming period that can permit us to bring together a large number of militants in exile and inside those countries, to move forward toward the strengthening of the forces of the Fourth International in each one of our countries in the coming period.

We think the Eleventh World Congress will be a step forward for the Fourth International, and, certain of it, we continue in this work of regrouping forces and preparing for the organized reentry in the next period into the class struggle in our respective countries of origin.

Long Live the Eleventh World Congress! Long Live the Fourth International!

*Greetings from the FBK of Iceland*

Comrades,

With this letter we want to send greetings to the World Congress. We sincerely believe that the Fourth International is going to grow and become stronger, and that it will become the world party of the socialist revolution that will take place in the not too distant future. We think that it is very unfortunate that we cannot participate in this important World Congress with a delegate directly from Iceland. We cannot do so because we cannot release any of

our leading comrades right now due to an important election campaign. We think that we can do more to strengthen the Fourth International by putting forward a revolutionary program in the elections and campaigning for a class-struggle line in the general negotiations on wages that will start in December.

Make the Eleventh World Congress a Big Step Forward!  
Long Live the Fourth International!  
Long Live the World Socialist Revolution!

s/Political Bureau, FBK

*Greetings from the SWP (Britain) Observers at the Eleventh World Congress of the Fourth International*

Comrades,

Let me begin by bringing you fraternal greetings from the Socialist Workers Party of Britain. Unfortunately, the coincidence of our National Conference with your World Congress has meant that some of our leading comrades, including the authors of our submission to your debate which has been circulated to you, were unable to attend this meeting. I will do my best to speak on their behalf.

In an earlier session you discussed your attitude to our party and it seemed to me from conversations with your militants that there was some confusion about the political positions of the SWP. Let me therefore state publicly that the SWP stands firmly on the first four Congresses of the Third International but that we have substantial disagreements with the *Transitional Program* of the Fourth International.

We view the current situation of the revolutionary left, at least in Europe, as being one of substantial crisis. In our opinion, the fact that we and you have survived better than many other tendencies is not a matter for celebration. For example, the collapse or weakening of a number of the large far-left organizations in Italy represents a substantial weakening of the revolutionary movement. It has resulted in the loss or demoralization of many militants with whom it is necessary to discuss in a fraternal fashion.

In this situation, we welcome the opportunity to discuss with comrades of your tendency. We think that the way in which the comrades of the United Secretariat who replied to our submission proposed the continuation of the discussion—that is that it should take place on the basis of “obstacles to our joining the Fourth International”—is mistaken. We see any discussions as part of a long-term clarification on the revolutionary left, and this will, of necessity, involve militants from traditions and organizations quite different from ours and yours.

With regard to discussions between our two tendencies, we make only one condition: such discussions must be public. In other words, they must be published in the press of the respective organizations and reach all of the members of both tendencies and, indeed, the masses outside of our organizations—or perhaps I should say, those tiny sections of the masses who are readers of our press. For our part, we have no time whatsoever for discussions restricted to the leaders of organizations. This form of “revolutionary secret diplomacy” is of no value to the movement. As an example of our determination in this direction, we have already published, in our theoretical journal *International Socialism*, the entirety of the discussion between you and us on the *Theses* of this Congress.



After the Congress, we will publish a report on its proceedings.

We make no prior conditions concerning the subjects for discussion. We are prepared to consider the most abstract theoretical questions as well as the most concrete practical tasks. But, obviously, with reference to the positions adopted by this Congress, we think that the problems of

revolutionary work in the working class and the trade-union movement would provide a good starting point for future exchanges.

Lastly, let me end by saying that it is more than thirty years since our tendency was present at a Congress of the Fourth International. I hope that it will not be another thirty years before we attend another one.

## Appendix J

### Statement of Eleventh World Congress on the Release of the Chinese Trotskyists

The Eleventh World Congress of the Fourth International hails the release of twelve Trotskyists imprisoned for twenty-seven years in the People's Republic of China. It salutes the memory of the revolutionary militant Wu Jing-ru who died recently at the age of seventy-two. She was freed on June 5, 1979, together with her husband, Zheng Chao-lin, aged seventy-eight. A member of the first generation of Chinese communists, he was imprisoned for seven years by the Kuomintang regime and rearrested in 1952, in spite of having dedicated his entire life to the revolution.

The Eleventh World Congress demands a full clarification of the situation of the many Trotskyists who were

arrested in the early 1950s, and who have not been heard from for a long time. Many of them have surely died in prison. The Chinese bureaucracy continues to keep silent about their fate. All information concerning them must be made public.

The Eleventh World Congress demands the lifting of the slanderous charges of "counterrevolutionary" that were used to justify the arbitrary arrest of the Trotskyists. All restrictions on the activities of those who have just been freed must also be lifted. This twofold battle for the political rehabilitation of revolutionary Marxists and for their right to be active and to defend their political ideas and program is part of the overall fight of the Chinese working masses to regain possession of the real history of the Communist movement and the revolution in China, and to establish genuine socialist democracy.



# VOTING RECORD

		Indochina															
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	C		3				3			3					3		
Austria	D		1				1				1			1			
Belgium	D		2	1			3				3			3			
	C		2				2				2			2			
Bolivia	D		1		1		1		1		1		1	1			1
Canada	D		3				3			1	2			1	1	1	
	C		2				2			2				2	2		
Chile	D		1				1				1			1			
Colombia	D		6				6			4	1		1	1	4		1
	C		1	1			2			1	1		1	1	1		
Denmark	D		1				1			1					1		
France	D	3	14			13		4			14	3		10	2	5	
	C		7				7				7			7			
Germany	D		3				3				2	1		2		1	
	C		2				2			1	1			1	1		
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	C		4	1			5			2	3			1	2	2	
Greece	D	1					1				1				1		
Hong Kong	D		1			.5	.5			.5	.5				.5	.5	
Holland	D		1				1				1			1			
	C		1				1				1			1			
India	C		1				1			1					1		
Iran	D		4		1		4		1	3	1		1	1	3		1
Ireland	C		1				1				1					1	
Israel	D		1				1				1			1			
Italy	D		1.5		.5		1		1		2			2			
	C		1				1				1			1			
Japan	D	4					4				4				4		
Lebanon	D	1					1					1			1		
	C	1					1				1				1		
Luxembourg	D		1				1				1			1			
	C		1					1					1	1			
Mexico	D	3	2				5			1	4			1	4		
	C		2				2			1	1			1	1		
New Zealand	D		1				1			1					1		
	C		1				1			1					1		
Peru	D		2				2				2			2			
Portugal	D		2				2				2			2			
Spain	D		13.5	1.5		2	11.5	1.5		1	13.5	1.5		13.5	1	1.5	
	C		1		1		1		1	1			1				1
Sri Lanka	D		1				1				1			1			
Sweden	D		5				5			1	3	1		3	1	1	
	C		3				3				3			3			
Switzerland	D		3				3				3			3			
	C		2				2				2			2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		15				15			15					15		
	C		2				2			2				2			

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



World Political Situation and Tasks																	
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	C		2				2				2			2			
Bolivia	D		1		1		1		1		1		1	1			1
Canada	D		3				2		1		2		1	2		1	
	C		2				2				2			2			
Chile	D				1				1		1			1			
Colombia	D	1	5				6				6			6			
	C		2				1		1		2			2			
Denmark	D		1				1				1			1			
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	C	1	1				1	1	1		2			2		2	
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	C	1	4				4	1			5			3	1	1	
Greece	D			1				1			1				1		
Hong Kong	D		.5	.5			.5		.5		.5		.5	1			
Holland	D			1			1				1			1			
	C	1					1				1			1			
India	C		1				1				1			1			
Iran	D		3		2		4		1		4		1	3		1	1
Ireland	C			1		1					1			1			
Israel	D	1						1			1			1			
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	C		1				1				1			1			1
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Luxembourg	D		1				1				1			1			
	C		1				1				1			1			
Mexico	D		5				5				5			5			
	C		2				2				2			2			
New Zealand	D		1				1				1			1			
	C		1				1				1			1			
Peru	D		2				2				2			2			
Portugal	D		2				2				2			2			
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Sweden	D	1	3	1			4		1		5			4		1	
	C		2	1			3				3			3			
Switzerland	D		3				3				3			3			
	C		2				2				2			2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		15				15				15			15			
	C		2				2				2			2			



World Political Situation and Tasks																			
#5				#6				#7				#8				#9			
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1					1			1				1			1	1			
5					5			5				5				5			
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2					2			2				2				2			
2					2			2				2				2			
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3					3			3				3				3			
2					2			2				2				2			
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D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Women's Liberation															
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Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
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	C		3				3				3				3		
Austria	D	.5	.5				.5		.5	.5	.5			.5	.5		
Belgium	D	1	2				3			1		2		2	1		
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Bolivia	D		2				2					2				2	
Canada	D		3				3				2	1			2	1	
	C		2				2				2				2		
Chile	D	1							1				1				1
Colombia	D		6				6			2	3		1	2	3		1
	C		2				2				2				2		
Denmark	D		1				1					1			1		
France	D	7.5	9.5			6	11			9	8			7.5	8	1.5	
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	C	1	1				1	1		1	1			1	1		
Great Britain	D	2	4	1			5		2		3	3	1		2	4	1
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Greece	D		1				1				1				1		
Hong Kong	D		1				1				1				1		
Holland	D		1				1				1				1		
	C		1				1				1				1		
India	C				1				1				1				1
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Ireland	C		1				1				1				1		
Israel	D		1				1					1			1		
Italy	D			2				.5	1.5	2				2			
	C		1				1					1			1		
Japan	D			1	3				4				4				4
Lebanon	D		1				1				1				1		
	C	1							1			1				1	
Luxembourg	D		1				1				1				1		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Mexico	D		4		1		4		1		4		1		4		1
	C		2				2				2				2		
New Zealand	D		1				1				1				1		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Peru	D		2					2				2				2	
Portugal	D		2				2			1	1				1	1	
Spain	D	6.5	5	2	1.5	6.5	3.5	3.5	1.5	8.5	5		1.5	8.5	4	1	1.5
	C		2				2				2				2		
Sri Lanka	D			1				1				1				1	
Sweden	D		5				5				4	1		1	4		
	C		2		1		2		1		2		1	1	1		1
Switzerland	D		3				3				3				3		
	C		2				2				2				2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		15				15				15				15		
	C		2				2				2				2		



		Women's Liberation															
		#5				#6				#7				#8			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D			1				1		1						1	
Australia	D		2				2			2					2		
	C		3				3			3					3		
Austria	D	1				1				.5	.5			.5	.5		
Belgium	D	3						3		1		2		2		1	
	C	2				1	1			1		1		2			
Bolivia	D		2				1	1		2					1	1	
Canada	D	1	2			1	1	1		3				1	2		
	C		2				2			2					2		
Chile	D				1				1	1				1			
Colombia	D		4	1	1	4	2			6				3	3		
	C		2				1	1		2					2		
Denmark	D		1				1			1					1		
France	D	2	9.5	5.5		6.5	6.5	4		14		3		8.5	8.5		
	C		6		1	1	4	1	1	6			1	2	4		1
Germany	D	1	2			1	2			3				1	2		
	C	1	1			1	1			1		1		1	1		
Great Britain	D	6	1			4	2	1		7				5	2		
	C	2	2		1	1	3		1	4			1	2	2		1
Greece	D		1					1		1					1		
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5		1			1					1		
Holland	D		1				1			1					1		
	C	1					1			1						1	
India	C			1			1			1					1		
Iran	D		3	1	1		4		1	4			1		4		1
Ireland	C	1				1				1					1		
Israel	D		1					1		1					1		
Italy	D			1.5	.5	1.5			.5	2				2			
	C			1		1				1				1			
Japan	D				4				4				4			1	3
Lebanon	D			1		1				1				1	1		
	C				1	1						1		1			
Luxembourg	D		1					1		1					1		
	C		1					1		1					1		
Mexico	D		4		1		4		1	4		1			4		1
	C		2				2			2					2		
New Zealand	D		1				1			1					1		
	C		1				1			1					1		
Peru	D		2					2		2						2	
Portugal	D	1	1				1	1		2					2		
Spain	D	7	1.5	5	1.5	6		6	3	13.5			1.5	8.5	3	2	1.5
	C		2				2			2					2		
Sri Lanka	D			1				1		1				1			
Sweden	D	2	2	1			5			5				1	5		
	C	1	1		1		1		2	2			1	1	1		1
Switzerland	D		3				3			3					3		
	C		2				2			2					2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		15				15			15					15		
	C		2				2			2					2		

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Women's Liberation								Socialist Democracy							
		#9				#10				#1				#2			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D	1						1		1						1	
Australia	D	2				2					2			2			
	C	3				3					3			3			
Austria	D	.5	.5				.5	.5		1					1		
Belgium	D		2		1	1		2		3					3		
	C		1	1	1	1		1		2					2		
Bolivia	D	2						2		2					2		
Canada	D	1	2			2		1		2	1			1	2		
	C	2				2				2	2			2			
Chile	D				1			1		1					1		
Colombia	D	3	3			3	3			1			5		1	1	5
	C	2				2				1	1				1	1	
Denmark	D	1				1					1			1			
France	D	8.5	8.5			7	8.5	1.5		15.5			1.5	13.5		2	1.5
	C	1	4	1	1	5		1	1	6			1		3	3	1
Germany	D	2	1			2	1			2	1				2		1
	C	1	1			1	1			1			1		1		1
Great Britain	D	1	6			1	1	5		5		1	1		4	2	1
	C	2	2		1	3	1		1	1	3		1	2	2		1
Greece	D			1				1					1		1		
Hong Kong	D	1				1					.5		.5	.5			.5
Holland	D		1			1				1					1		
	C		1					1		1					1		
India	C	1				1				1					1		
Iran	D	4			1	4			1	2	3			3	2		
Ireland	C			1			1			1					1		
Israel	D	1						1		1					1		
Italy	D		2				1.5		.5	1.5			.5			1.5	.5
	C		1			1							1			1	1
Japan	D				4			1	3				4				4
Lebanon	D	1				1							1				1
	C		1				1						1				1
Luxembourg	D	1				1				1					1		
	C	1				1				1					1		
Mexico	D	4			1	4			1	4			1		1	3	1
	C	2				2				1		1			1	1	
New Zealand	D	1				1					1			1			
	C	1				1					1			1			
Peru	D			2		2				2					2		
Portugal	D	2				2				2					2		
Spain	D	3	10.5		1.5	3	6	4.5	1.5	11.5		1.5	2	1.5	8	3.5	2
	C	2				2					1		1				1
Sri Lanka	D				1				1	1						1	
Sweden	D	5				4		1		3	2			2	3		
	C	1		1	1	1		1	1	3				2	2	1	
Switzerland	D	3				3				3					3		
	C	2				2				2				2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D	15				15					14	1		14		1	
	C	2				2					2			2			

D=Delegats, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Europe															
		#1				#2				#3				#4			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D		1				1			1					1		
Australia	D		2				2				2				2		
	C		3				3				3				3		
Austria	D	1				.5		.5		1				1			
Belgium	D	1		2			1	2				3			3		
	C	1		1				2		1	1				1	1	
Bolivia	D		2				2					2			1	1	
Canada	D	1	2				2		1	2	1				3		
	C		2				2				2				2		
Chile	D		1				1				1				1		
Colombia	D		6				6				5	1				6	
	C		1		1		1		1		1	1				2	
Denmark	D		1				1				1					1	
France	D	3	10	4	2	3	14			8.5	2.5	5	1	7	10		
	C		4	1	2		5		2		3	2	2	1	4		2
Germany	D	1	2			1	2			1	1	1		1	2		
	C	1			1	1			1	1			1	1		1	
Great Britain	D	2	5			3	2	2		5	1	1		3	3	1	
	C	1	3		1	1	3		1	2	2		1	1	3	1	1
Greece	D		1					1				1				1	
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5
Holland	D			1		1				1					1		
	C	1				1				1						1	
India	C		1				1				1				1		
Iran	D		3	1	1		3	1	1	1	3		1		3		2
Ireland	C				1				1				1				1
Israel	D			1				1		1				1			
Italy	D		1.5	.5		.5	1.5			.5	.5	1		.5	.5	1	
	C		1				1				1			1			
Japan	D			4				4				4		2		2	
Lebanon	D				1				1				1	1			
	C			1					1				1	1			
Luxembourg	D		1				1			1					1		
	C		1				1			1				1			
Mexico	D		5				5				2	3			5		
	C		2				2				2		1	1			
New Zealand	D		1				1				1				1		
	C		1				1				1			1			
Peru	D			2			2			2						2	
Portugal	D		2				2				2			1	1		
Spain	D	9.5	2	3.5		6.5	1.5	7		6.5		7.5	1	8	7		
	C			1	1			1	1			1	1		1		1
Sri Lanka	D			1				1				1				1	
Sweden	D	3	2			2	2	1		5					1	4	
	C	1	2			1	1	1		1	1	1		1	2		
Switzerland	D		3				3			2	1				3		
	C		2				2			1	1				2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		14		1		14		1		14		1		14		1
	C		2				2				2				2		

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Europe															
		#5				#6				#7				#8			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D		1				1				1			1			
Australia	D		2				2				2			2			
	C		3				3				3			3			
Austria	D				1		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5	.5	
Belgium	D		3					3			3				3		
	C		2					2			2				2		
Bolivia	D		2			2						2		2			
Canada	D		3				3			1	2			2	1		
	C		2				2				2			2			
Chile	D		1				1				1				1		
Colombia	D		6				6	1			6	1			3	3	
	C		2			1		1		1		1		1	1	1	
Denmark	D		1				1				1			1			
France	D	3	10	4			14	3		1	14	2		7	8.5	1.5	
	C		5		2		5		2		5		2	1	3		3
Germany	D	1	2				1	2			2	1		2	1		
	C			1	1			1	1			1	1		1		1
Great Britain	D		7				4	2	1		5	1	1	3	3	1	
	C		3	1	1	1	3		1	1	3		1	1	1		3
Greece	D			1			1					1			1		
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5	.5		.5	
Holland	D		1						1				1		1		
	C		1						1				1		1		
India	C		1				1				1			1			
Iran	D		3		2		3		2		3		2	3	1		1
Ireland	C				1				1				1				1
Israel	D		1				1				1				1		
Italy	D		1.5	.5			1.5	.5			2				2		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Japan	D			3	1			3	1			3	1			3	1
Lebanon	D				1				1				1		1		
	C			1				1			1				1		
Luxembourg	D		1				1				1				1		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Mexico	D		5			1		4		2		3			2	1	2
	C		2				2				2				1	1	
New Zealand	D		1				1				1						1
	C		1				1				1						1
Peru	D		2			2					2			2			
Portugal	D		2				2				2				2		
Spain	D		3.5	11.5		13	1		1	13	1		1	3.5	9.5	2	
	C		1		1	1			1	1			1	1			1
Sri Lanka	D			1				1				1				1	
Sweden	D		5				4		1		2	1	2		3	1	1
	C		3				2		1		1	1	1		3		
Switzerland	D		3				3				3				3		
	C		2				2				2				2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		14		1		14		1		14		1	13			2
	C		2				2				2			1			1



Europe																			
#9				#10				#11				#12				#13			
f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
	1			1					1			1					1		
	2			2					2			2					2		
	3			3					3			3					3		
	1			1					1			1					1		
1	2	1		3					3			3					3		
	1			2					2			2					2		
	2			2					2			2					1	1	
	3			3					3			3					3		
	2			2					2			2					2		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	6			6					6			6					6		
	2	2		2					2			2					2		
	1			1					1			1					1		
3	12.5	1.5		14	3				17			11.5	2	1	2.5		12.5	1	4.5
	5		2	5			2		5		2	5			2		5		2
	2	1		2		1			3			3					3		
	1	1	1	1	1				2			2					2		
1	7			4	6	1		1	6			6			1		6		
	3		1	4			1		4		1	2		1	2		4		1
1					1				1					1			1		
	.5		.5	1					.5		.5	1					.5		.5
	1			1					1			1					1		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	4		1	4			1		4		1	4			1		4		1
			1				1				1				1				1
	1			1					1			1					1		
	1.5	.5		2					2			2					2		
	1			1					1			1					1		
		2	2			4			4			3		1					4
	1						1		1						1		1		
		1				1			1					1			1		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	4	1		5					5			5					5		
	2			2					2			2					2		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	1			1					1			1					1		
	2			2					2			2					2		
	2			2					2			2					2		
1.5	10	3.5		10	2.5	1.5	1	1	11.5	1	1.5	2	2	11	1	2	13		1
	1		1			1	1		1		1			1	1		1		
		1		1					1			1					1		
	4	1		5					4		1	5					4		1
	3			3					3			3					3		
	2			2					2			2					2		
	14		1	14			1		14		1	14			1		14		1
	2			2					2			2					2		

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Latin America															
		#1				#2				#3				#4			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D		1				1				1				1		
Australia	D		2				2				2				2		
	C		3				3				3				3		
Austria	D		1				1				1				1		
Belgium	D		2	1			2	1		1	2			1	2		
	C		2				2			1	1			2	2		
Bolivia	D		1	1				2		2				2			
Canada	D		3				3				3				3		
	C		2				2				2				2		
Chile	D		1				1			1				1			
Colombia	D		6				6				6				6		
	C		2				2				2				2		
Denmark	D		1				1				1				1		
France	D	4.5	12.5			4.5	12.5			4.5	10	2.5		3	12.5		1.5
	C		4		3		4		3		4		3		4		3
Germany	D		2	1			2	1		1	2			1	2		
	C		1		1				2	1			1	1			1
Great Britain	D		6	1			5	2		2	2	1	2	2	3	1	1
	C	1	3		1	1	3		1	1	3		1	1	3		1
Greece	D	1				1				1						1	
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5	.5	.5		
Holland	D		1				1					1			1		
	C		1				1			1					1		
India	C		1				1				1				1		
Iran	D		3	1	1		3		2		3		2		3		2
Ireland	C		1					1		1				1			
Israel	D		1				1			1					1		
Italy	D	.5	1.5				1.5	.5		1.5	.5			.5	.5		1
	C		1				1			1				1			
Japan	D	4				4				4				1			3
Lebanon	D	1				1				1				1		1	
	C	1				1				1				1			
Luxembourg	D		1				1			1				1	1		
	C		1				1			1				1			
Mexico	D		5				5				5				5		
	C		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
New Zealand	D		1				1				1				1		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Peru	D		2					2		1			1			1	1
Portugal	D		2				2				2				2		
Spain	D	2	10	3		3.5	10	1.5		6.5	3	4	1.5	9	3	2	1
	C		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
Sri Lanka	D		1				1					1				1	
Sweden	D		4	1			3	1	1	3	2			3	2		
	C		3				2	1		1	2			1	2		
Switzerland	D		3				3				3				3		
	C		2				2				2				2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		15				15				15				15		
	C		2				2				2				2		



Latin America																			
#5				#6				#7				#8				#9			
f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
	1				1				1				1				1		
	2				2				2				2				2		
	3				3				3				3				3		
	.5	.5			1				1				1				1		
1	2			1	2			1	2				3				2		3
2				2				2							2				2
	3				3						3		3				3		
	2				2						2		2				2		
1				1				1					1					1	
	6			1	6			3	3				6				5		1
	2				1				1	1			2				2		
	1				1				1				1				1		
5.5	5.5	6		3	11	3		1	15	1		13.5			3.5	9.5	2	1.5	4
	4		3		3	2	2		5		2		5		2	2			5
1	3			1	2	1			2	1			3			2			1
			1				1			1	1		1		1			1	1
1	5	1	1		6	1		1	7				6	1		5		1	1
	3		1		3		2		3				3		1	3	1	1	1
1						1							1					1	
	.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		1			.5			.5
1			1				1		1				1			1			
	1				1				1				1					1	
	3		2		3		2		3		2		4			1	4		1
1							1		1						1				1
		1		1					1				1						1
.5	.5		1	.5	.5	1		1	.5	1	.5	1.5	.5		.5	.5			1
	1				1							1				1		1	
1			3			1	3			1	3		4				4		
1				1									1				1		
	1						1						1				1		
	1												1						
	1	1		1		1			1				1						1
	5		1		5		1		5		1		5		1	5			1
	1				1				1				1			1			
	1				1				1				1			1			
1			1			1	1	1			1		2			2			
	2			1	1				1	1			2			2			
7	3.5	3.5	1	7.5	3	3.5	1	1.5	12	1.5		12.5	2	1.5			5	10	1
	1		1		1				1		1		1					1	
1	2	2			1	3	1		1		4		5			2	2		1
	1	1			2	1			3				3			1	1		1
	3				3				3				3					1	
	2				2				2				2						
	15				15				15				15			15			
	2				2				2				2			2			

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		China/Hong Kong								Organization							
		#1				#2				#1				#2			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D	1					1			1				1			
Australia	D	2					2			2				2			
	C	3					3			3				3			
Austria	D	1					1			1				1			
Belgium	D	2		1			3			3				3			
	C	2					2			2				2			
Bolivia	D			2				2		2				2			
Canada	D	3					3			3				3			
	C	2					2			2				2			
Chile	D	1					1			1				1			
Colombia	D	3		2	1		3	2	1	5			1	5			1
	C	2					2			2				2			
Denmark	D	1					1			1				1			
France	D	15.5			1.5		15.5		1.5	15.5			1.5	14.5			2.5
	C	4			3		4		3	3			4	3			4
Germany	D	2			1		2	1		3				3			
	C			1	1			1	1			1	1	1			1
Great Britain	D	5			2		5		2	3			4	3			4
	C	3			2		3		2	2			3	2			3
Greece	D				1		1			1				1			
Hong Kong	D	.5			.5		.5		.5	.5			.5	.5			.5
Holland	D	1					1			1				1			
	C	1					1			1				1			
India	C				1				1				1				1
Iran	D	3			2		3		2	4			1	3			2
Ireland	C	1					1			1				1			
Israel	D	1					1			1				1			
Italy	D	1.5		.5			2			2				2			
	C	1					1			1				1			
Japan	D	4					4			3			1	3			1
Lebanon	D	1					1			1				1			
	C	1					1			1						1	
Luxembourg	D	1					1			1				1			
	C	1					1			1				1			
Mexico	D	5					4	1		5				5			
	C				2				2				2				2
New Zealand	D	1					1			1				1			
	C	1					1			1				1			
Peru	D	2						2		2				2			
Portugal	D	1		1			1	1		2				2			
Spain	D	10	2	1.5	1.5	10		3.5	1.5	13.5			1.5	11.5		2	1.5
	C	1			1		1		1	1			1	1			1
Sri Lanka	D		1					1		1				1			
Sweden	D	4	1				5			5				5			
	C	2			1		2		1	2			1	2			1
Switzerland	D	3					3			3				3			
	C	2					2			2				2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D	10			5		10		5	10			5	10			5
	C	2					2			2				2			



		Nicaragua															
		#1				#2				#3				#4			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D			1				1				1				1	
Australia	D				2				2				2				2
	C				3				3				3				3
Austria	D		1				1						1		1		
Belgium	D		3				3				2	1			3		
	C		1		1	1			1		1		1		2		
Bolivia	D			2				2			2				2		
Canada	D		1		2	1	1		1	1		1	1	1	1		1
	C				2				2				2				2
Chile	D			1			1				1				1		
Colombia	D				6				6				6				6
	C		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
Denmark	D				1				1				1				1
France	D		8	1	8	5	12			3	7	7		4	13		
	C		7				7				7				7		
Germany	D		1	1	1		1	2		1	1	1		2	1		
	C			1	1		1		1		1		1		2		
Great Britain	D		2		5	5		1	1	5		1	1	6			1
	C		1	1	3	2		1	2	2		1	2	3			2
Greece	D				1		1					1			1		
Hong Kong	D				1				1				1				1
Holland	D		1				1			1					1		
	C				1				1				1				1
India	C		1					1					1				1
Iran	D				5			1	4			1	4			1	4
Ireland	C				1				1				1				1
Israel	D				1			1				1			1		
Italy	D		1.5		.5		2				1.5		.5		2		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Japan	D				4				4				4				4
Lebanon	D				1		1					1			1		
	C				1		1				1		1		1		
Luxembourg	D		1				1				1				1		
	C				1			1					1				1
Mexico	D		4		1	1	4			1	4				4	1	
	C		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
New Zealand	D				1				1				1				1
	C				1				1				1				1
Peru	D		2				2				2				2		
Portugal	D		1		1		2				2				2		
Spain	D		8.5	5	1.5	8.5	3	2	1.5	2	4	7.5	1.5	2	3	8.5	1.5
	C		1		1	1			1		1	1	1		1	1	1
Sri Lanka	D		1				1				1				1		
Sweden	D		1		4	1	1	2	1	3	1		1	1	1	2	1
	C		2	1			2	1		1	2				2	1	
Switzerland	D		3				3				3				3		
	C		1		1		2				1	1			2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D				15				15				15				15
	C				2				2				2				2

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Nicaragua															
		#5				#6				#7				#8			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D			1				1			1				1		
Australia	D				2				2				2		2		
	C				3				3				3		3		
Austria	D				1	1							1		1		
Belgium	D		3			2		1			3				3		
	C		2			1	1				2				1		1
Bolivia	D		2				1	1			1	1			2		
Canada	D	1	1		1	1		1	1	1	1		1		3		
	C				2				2				2		2		
Chile	D		1				1				1				1		
Colombia	D				6				6				6		6		
	C		1		1		1		1		1		1		2		
Denmark	D				1				1				1		1		
France	D	4	13			4	7	4.5	1.5	4	9	2.5	1.5		17		
	C		7				6		1		6		1		7		
Germany	D	1	2			2	1			2	1			1	1	1	
	C		2			2				1		1			1		1
Great Britain	D	6			1	6			1	6			1	1	5		1
	C	1	1	1	2	1	1		3	3			2		4		1
Greece	D			1			1					1			1		
Hong Kong	D				1				1				1		.5		.5
Holland	D		1					1				1			1		
	C				1				1				1				1
India	C				1				1				1		1		
Iran	D			1	4	1			4				5	1	3		1
Ireland	C				1				1				1				1
Israel	D		1				1						1		1		
Italy	D		2				1.5	.5			1.5	.5			2		
	C		1				1				1				1		
Japan	D				4				4		1		3		4		
Lebanon	D			1			1					1			1		
	C		1						1		1				1		
Luxembourg	D		1		1		1		1		1		1		1		1
	C																
Mexico	D		4	1			4	1			4	1			5		
	C		1		1		1		1		1		1		2		
New Zealand	D				1				1				1		1		
	C				1				1				1		1		
Peru	D		2				2					2			2		
Portugal	D		2				2				1	1			2		
Spain	D	2	8	3.5	1.5	2	3	8.5	1.5	2	3.5	6.5	3	2	13		
	C		1		1			1	1		1		1		1		1
Sri Lanka	D		1				1			1					1		
Sweden	D		1	3	1	3	1		1		1	2	2		5		
	C		2	1		1	2				2	1			3		
Switzerland	D		3				3				3				3		
	C		2				2				2				2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D				15				15				15		13		2
	C				2				2				2		2		



		Nicaragua															
		#9				#10				#11				#12			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D		1				1			1							1
Australia	D		2			2					2				2		
	C		3			3					3				3		
Austria	D		1			1				1					.5		.5
Belgium	D		3				3			3					3		
	C		2				2			2					1		1
Bolivia	D		2				2			2					2		
Canada	D	1	2			1	2			1	1	1		1	2		
	C		2			2				2				2			
Chile	D		1				1			1					1		
Colombia	D		6			6					6				6		
	C		2			1	1				2				2		
Denmark	D		1			1					1					1	
France	D	4	13				16	1		13		4		5	5	4	3
	C		7				7			7				1	6		
Germany	D		3		1	1	1	1		3		1		3	1		1
	C	1				1				1							
Great Britain	D	1	1	5		1	6			3	2	2	1	6	2	1	1
	C	3	1		1	1	3		1	2	2			2			
Greece	D		1				1			1					1		
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5	.5			.5		.5		.5		.5		.5
Holland	D		1				1			1				1			
	C				1				1				1				1
India	C		1			1					1				1		
Iran	D		3	1	1	3	1		1	3		1	1	3			1
Ireland	C				1				1				1				1
Israel	D		1				1			1					1		
Italy	D		2				2			2					2		
	C		1				1			1					1		
Japan	D				4		3	1		3		1		3			1
Lebanon	D		1					1		1				1			
	C		1				1	1		1						1	
Luxembourg	D		1				1			1					1		
	C				1				1				1				1
Mexico	D		4	1			4	1		5					5		
	C		2			1	1			1	1				2		
New Zealand	D		1			1					1				1		
	C		1			1					1				1		
Peru	D		2				2			2						2	
Portugal	D		2				2			2					2		
Spain	D	1	6.5	7.5		1.5	13.5			10.5	2.5	2		4	9.5	1.5	
	C		1		1		1		1	1		1			1		1
Sri Lanka	D		1				1			1					1		
Sweden	D		2	3		1	4			4	1					2	3
	C		2	1			2	1		3					3		
Switzerland	D		3				3			3					3		
	C		2				2			2					2		
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		14		1	15					15				14	1	
	C		2			2				2				2			

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		Nicaragua							
		#13				#14			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D				1				1
Australia	D		2				2		
	C		3				3		
Austria	D				2		1		1
Belgium	D	1	1		1	1			2
	C		1		1			1	1
Bolivia	D	1			1		2		
Canada	D	2	1				1		2
	C	1	1				2		
Chile	D	1						1	
Colombia	D	6					6		
	C	1	1				2		
Denmark	D			1			1		
France	D	14			3	1	11		5
	C	3	3	1			7		
Germany	D	2		1			2		1
	C			1	1				2
Great Britain	D	6		1		6			1
	C	3	1		1	1	2		2
Greece	D	1							1
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5		.5		.5
Holland	D	1					1		
	C				1				1
India	C	1					1		
Iran	D	1	2		2		3		2
Ireland	C				1				1
Israel	D				1				1
Italy	D			.5	1.5		1		1
	C		1				1		
Japan	D	3			1		1		3
Lebanon	D	1							1
	C			1			1		
Luxembourg	D	1					1		
	C				1				1
Mexico	D	4	1				2	2	1
	C	2				1	1		
New Zealand	D		1				1		
	C		1				1		
Peru	D	2							2
Portugal	D	1			1		2		
Spain	D	11.5		3.5		1	5	2	7
	C	1			1	1	1		
Sri Lanka	D		1				1		
Sweden	D	1		1	3		1		4
	C		3				2		1
Switzerland	D	3					3		
	C	2					1	1	
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>									
U.S.A.	D	1	12	1	1		14		1
	C	1		1			2		



		Spltt															
		#1				#2				#3				#4			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D	1				1					1					1	
Australia	D		2			2					2				2		
	C		3			3					3				3		
Austria	D				1	1						.5	.5		1		
Belgium	D		3			3					3				3		
	C		1		1	1			1		1		1		1		1
Bolivia	D		2			2					2				2		
Canada	D	1	2			3				1	2			1	2		
	C		2			2					2				2		
Chile	D		1			1					1				1		
Colombia	D		6			6					6				6		
	C	1	1			1	1				2				2		
Denmark	D		1			1					1				1		
France	D	4	9		4	11.5	3	1	1.5	1	10.5	4	1.5	1	10.5	4	1.5
	C		5		2	5			2		5		2		5		2
Germany	D		1	1	1	2			1	1	1	1			2	1	
	C	1		1		1		1		1			1		1		1
Great Britain	D			3	4	3	1	3		3	1	2	1	2	4	1	
	C		2	1	2	2		1	2		2	1	2		3		2
Greece	D	1					1						1				1
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5	.5			.5		.5		.5		.5		.5
Holland	D			1		1					1				1		
	C				1				1				1				1
India	C		1			1					1				1		
Iran	D		3		2	5					4		1		5		
Ireland	C				1				1				1				
Israel	D		1			1					1				1		
Italy	D				2	1.5	.5				2				2		
	C		1			1							1		1		
Japan	D				4	4					4				4		
Lebanon	D				1	1				1					1		
	C				1				1				1		1		
Luxembourg	D		1			1					1				1		
	C				1				1				1		1		1
Mexico	D	1	4			4		1			4	1		1	4		
	C		1		1	2					2			1	2		
New Zealand	D		1			1					1				1		
	C		1			1					1				1		
Peru	D			2		2					2				2		
Portugal	D		2			2					2				2		
Spain	D	13			2	13	2			13		2	2	13			
	C	1			1	1		1		1		1	2	1			1
Sri Lanka	D			1		1					1				1		
Sweden	D		1	1	3	5					2		3	2			3
	C		2		1	3					2		1	3			
Switzerland	D				3	1			2		1		2		1		2
	C		2			2					2			2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D		14	1		15					15				15		
	C		2			2					2				2		

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



Section	Argentina				Greece				Iran				Chile			
	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D 1				1				1				1			
Australia	D 2				2				2				2			
	C 3				3				3				3			
Austria	D 1				.5			.5	1							1
Belgium	D 3				3				3				2		1	
	C 2				1		1		2				2			
Bolivia	D 2				2				2				2			
Canada	D 2			1	1			2				2	3			
	C 2				2				2				2			
Chile	D 1				1				1				1			
Colombia	D 5			1	5			1	5			1	5			1
	C 2				2				2				2			
Denmark	D 1							1	1				1			
France	D 14			3	13		1	3	14			3	15.5			1.5
	C 2			5	3			4	2			5	2			5
Germany	D 2			1	2			1	2			1	2			1
	C 1			1			1	1	1			1	1			1
Great Britain	D 4			3	3			4	4			3	3			4
	C 3			2	3			2	3			2	2			3
Greece	D 1				1				1				1			
Hong Kong	D .5			.5	.5			.5	.5			.5	.5			.5
Holland	D 1				1				1				1			
	C 1				1				1				1			
India	C			1				1				1				1
Iran	D 4			1	3			2	4			1	4			1
Ireland	C 1				1				1				1			
Israel	D 1				1				1				1			
Italy	D 2				2				2				2			
	C 1				1				1				1			
Japan	D 3			1	4				3			1	3			1
Lebanon	D 1				1				1				1			
	C 1				1				1				1			
Luxembourg	D 1				1				1				1			
	C 1				1				1				1			
Mexico	D 5				3		2	2	5			2	5			2
	C			2				2				2				2
New Zealand	D 1				1				1				1			
	C 1				1				1				1			
Peru	D 2				2				2				2			
Portugal	D 2						2		2				2			
Spain	D 12.5		1	1.5	12		1.5	1.5	13.5			1.5	13.5			1.5
	C 1			1	1			1	1			1	1			1
Sri Lanka	D 1				1				1				1			
Sweden	D 5			1	5				5				5			
	C 1		1	1	2			1	2		1	1	1		1	1
Switzerland	D 3			1	2		1		3				3			
	C		1	1	1			1	1		1	1	2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																
U.S.A.	D 10			5	10			5	10			5	10			5
	C 2				2				2				2			



Section		Howard				Fourier				Mandates			
		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D		1					1		1			
Australia	D		2				2			2			
	C		3				3			3			
Austria	D	.5	.5			1				1			
Belgium	D		1	1	1	3				3			
	C		1		1	1			1	1			1
Bolivia	D	2						1	1	2			
Canada	D		1	1	1	1	1	1		3			
	C		2				1		1	2			
Chile	D	1							1	1			
Colombia	D		6			5			1	6			
	C		2			2				2			
Denmark	D		1				1			1			
France	D	5	7		5	11.5	4		1.5	12.5	1	3.5	
	C		3		4	4			3	5			2
Germany	D	1	2				2	1		3			
	C	1	1			1		1		2			
Great Britain	D	5	1	1			5	1	1	5		2	
	C	2	1		2	2	1		2	3			2
Greece	D				1	1				1			
Hong Kong	D		.5		.5		.5		.5	.5			.5
Holland	D			1				1		1			
	C				1				1				1
India	C				1		1			1			
Iran	D		3		2	1	3	1		5			
Ireland	C				1				1				1
Israel	D	1				1				1			
Italy	D	1			1	2				1			1
	C		1						1	1			
Japan	D	4				3			1	4			
Lebanon	D	1							1	1			
	C				1				1	1			
Luxembourg	D			1					1	1			
	C				1				1				1
Mexico	D		4	1		2	2	1		4		1	
	C		2			2				2			
New Zealand	D		1				1			1			
	C		1				1			1			
Peru	D		2			2						2	
Portugal	D		1		1	1	1			2			
Spain	D	6.5	5		3.5	4.5	2		8.5	11.5	1	2.5	
	C			1	1			1	1	1			1
Sri Lanka	D			1				1		1			
Sweden	D		2		3	2			3	3		1	1
	C		1		2	1	1		1	3			
Switzerland	D		1		2				3	1			2
	C		2					1	1	2			
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>													
U.S.A.	D		15				15			15			
	C		2				2			2			

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



		IEC & Control Commission															
		#1				#2				#3				#4			
Section		f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
Antilles	D	1						1		1				1			
Australia	D	2				2					2				2		
	C				3				3				3				3
Austria	D	1				.5			.5	.5			.5		.5		.5
Belgium	D	2			1		2		1	2			1		2		1
	C				2				2				2				2
Bolivia	D	2						2		2				2			
Canada	D	1	2			1	2			2	1			1	2		
	C				2				2				2				2
Chile	D	1						1				1		1			
Colombia	D	6					6			6					6		
	C				2				2				2				2
Denmark	D	1					1				1				1		
France	D	14.5	2.5				12	5		9		8		9.5		7.5	
	C	1			6		1	6		1		6		1		6	
Germany	D	2			1	1		1	1		2		1		1	1	1
	C				2				2				2				2
Great Britain	D	3	1	1	2	1	4		2	1	3	1	2	5	1		1
	C				5				5				5				5
Greece	D	1					1					1			1		
Hong Kong	D	.5			.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5		.5
Holland	D	1					1			1					1		
	C				1				1				1				1
India	C				1				1				1				1
Iran	D	5				1	3	1		2	1	2			5		
Ireland	C				1				1				1				1
Israel	D	1					1			1					1		
Italy	D	1.5			.5		1.5		.5	1		.5	.5			1.5	.5
	C				1				1				1				1
Japan	D		3	1			3		1		1	1	2		4		
Lebanon	D				1	1							1	1			
	C				1				1				1				1
Luxembourg	D				1				1				1				1
	C				1				1				1				1
Mexico	D				5				5				5				5
	C				2				2				2				2
New Zealand	D	1				1					1				1		
	C				1				1				1				1
Peru	D	2						2		2				2			
Portugal	D		1		1		2			1		1		1	1		
Spain	D	6.5		3.5	5	2	1.5	6.5	5	1.5		8.5	5	3.5	6.5		5
	C				2			2	2			2	2				2
Sri Lanka	D	1						1		1						1	
Sweden	D	5					2		3	3		1	1		2		3
	C				3				3				3				3
Switzerland	D	1			2	1			2	1			2		1		2
	C				2				2				2				2
<b>Fraternal Organization</b>																	
U.S.A.	D	15				15					15				15		
	C				2				2				2				2



IEC & Control Commission																			
#5				#6				#7				#8				#9			
f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv	f	ag	ab	nv
		1				1		1				1			1				
	2		3		2		3	2			3	2			2			3	
	.5		.5	.5			.5	1				1			1				
1		1	1	2			1	2			1	2			1			2	
			2				2				2				2			2	
2				1	1			2				2			2				
1	1		1	1	2			3			2	3			2			2	
		1		1				1				1							
6			2		6			6				6			6				
	1				2			2				2			2				
					1			1				1			1				
3	5	9	6	5.5	9	2.5	6	16		1	6	16		1	6	17		6	
	1				1			1				1			1				
2			1	2			1	2			1	2			1	2		1	
			2				2				2				2			2	
	3	3	1	2	2	2	1	5			2	3		3	1	5		2	
			5				5	5			5				5			5	
1				1				1				1			1			1	
	.5		.5		.5		.5	.5			.5	.5			.5	.5		.5	
	1			1				1				1			1			1	
			1				1				1				1			1	
			1				1				1				1			1	
	3	1	1		3	1	1	5				5			5			5	
			1				1				1				1			1	
1				1				1				1			1			1	
		1	1	.5		1	.5	1.5			.5	1.5			.5	1.5		.5	
		1	1				1				1				1			1	
4					3	1		4				4			4			4	
		1				1					1				1			1	
			1				1				1				1			1	
			1				1				1				1			1	
			1				1				1				1			1	
			5				5	3			2				5			5	
			2				2				2				2			2	
1				1			1	1			1	1			1			1	
			1				1				1				1			1	
2						2		2			2				2			2	
2						2		2			2				2			2	
1	1.5	7.5	5	4.5	4.5	1	5	8		1	6	8		1	6	10		5	
			2				2				2				2			2	
1						1		1			1	1			1			1	
	2		3		2		3	5			3	5			3	2		3	
			3				3				3				3			3	
		1	2	1			2	1			2	1			2	1		2	
			2				2				2				2			2	
	14		1		15		2	15			2	15			2	15		2	

D=Delegate, C=Consultative, F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



<b>Sympathizing</b>													
<b>Organization</b>	<b>Indochina</b>				<b>World Political Situation and Tasks</b>								
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9
Algeria	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Nv	Ag	Ag	F	F	Nv	F	F	F
Dominican Rep.	Nv	F	Ag	Ag	Nv	Nv	F	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ag	Ag
Ecuador	Ab	Ab	Ag	F	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	Ag	F
Finland	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	Ab	F
Greenland	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ab	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	F	F
Iceland	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Norway	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ab
Panama	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Nv	Ag	Ag	F	F	Nv	F	Ab	F
Puerto Rico*	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	F	F
Senegal	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	F	F
Tunisia	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ab	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ab	Ab	Ab	Ag	Ab
Venezuela C (IEC)	Ag Nv	Ag Nv	Ag Nv	F Nv	Ag Nv	Nv Nv	Ag Nv	F Nv	F Nv	Ag Nv	F Nv	Nv Nv	F Nv
<b>Youth Organization</b>													
Australia	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv

	<b>Women's Liberation</b>										<b>Socialist Democracy</b>		
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10	#1	#2	
Algeria	Ab	Ab	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	F	F	Nv	Nv	
Dominican Rep.	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	F	Ag	Ab	Nv	Nv	
Ecuador	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	Ag	
Finland	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	F	Ag	
Greenland	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ab	F	F	Ag	F	F	F	Ag	
Iceland	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	F	Ag	Ab	F	Ag	
Norway	Ab	F	F	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	
Panama	Ag	F	F	Ab	Ag	Ag	F	F	Ag	F	F	Ag	
Puerto Rico*	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	F	Nv	F	
Senegal	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	F	F	Ag	
Tunisia	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	F	Ag	Ab	Ab	Ag	
Venezuela C (IEC)	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	F F	F F	Ag F	Nv F	Nv F	Nv Nv	
<b>Youth Organization</b>													
Australia	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Ag	F

	<b>Europe</b>												
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10	#11	#12	#13
Algeria	Ab	Ab	Ab	F	Ab	Ab	Ab	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	Nv
Dominican Rep.	Nv	Nv	Nv	Ag	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Ecuador	Ab	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ab	F	Ab	Ab	Ab	F	Ab	F	Ab
Finland	F	F	F	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag
Greenland	F	Nv	F	Ab	Nv	Nv	Ag	Ag	Nv	F	Ag	F	Ag
Iceland	F	F	F	Ag	Nv	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag
Norway	F	Ab	F	F	Ab	F	Ab	F	Ab	F	Ag	F	Ag
Panama	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ab	F	F	Ab	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag
Puerto Rico*	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Senegal	Ag	Ag	Ag	Nv	Nv	Nv	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag
Tunisia	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	F	Ag
Venezuela C (IEC)	Ag Nv	Ag Nv	Nv Nv	Ab Nv	Ag Nv	Ag Nv	Ag Nv	Nv Nv	Nv Nv	F Nv	Nv Nv	Nv Nv	Nv Nv
<b>Youth Organization</b>													
Australia	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag



Latin America										China/Hong Kong Commission		Organization	
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#1	#2	#1	#2
Algeria	Ag	Nv	F	Ag	F	Ab	Ab	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	F	F
Dominican Rep.	F	F	F	F	F	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Ecuador	Ab	Ab	F	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	F	F	Ag	F	F
Finland	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Greenland	Ag	Ab	F	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	Ab	Ab	Ab	F	F
Iceland	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	Ab	F	Ag	F	F
Norway	Ab	Ag	F	F	F	F	F	Ag	Ab	F	Ag	F	F
Panama	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ag	Ab	F	F	F	Ag	F	F
Puerto Rico*	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	Ag	F	F
Senegal	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Nv	Ag	F	F	F	Ag	F	F
Tunisia	F	Ab	F	F	Ab	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ab	F	Ag	F	Ab
Venezuela C (IEC)	F	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ab	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	Nv
	Ag	F	F	F	F	F	Nv	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	F
<b>Youth Organization</b>													
Australia	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	Ag	F	F

Nicaragua														
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10	#11	#12	#13	#14
Algeria	Nv	Ag	Nv	Ag	Nv	Ab	F	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ab	Nv
Dominican Rep.	Ab	Ab	Ab	F	F	F	F	F	F	Ag	Ag	F	F	F
Ecuador	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	F	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	Ab	F	Ab
Finland	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Greenland	Nv	Nv	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	Nv
Iceland	Ag	F	F	F	F	F	Nv	Ag	F	Ag	Ab	Ab	F	Nv
Norway	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Panama	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	Ag
Puerto Rico*	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ab	Ab	F	Nv
Senegal	Ag	Ag	Nv	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Nv	Nv
Tunisia	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ab	Ag	F	Nv
Venezuela C (IEC)	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Ag	Ag	F	Ab	Nv	Nv	Nv
	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
<b>Youth Organization</b>														
Australia	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag

C(IEC)=Consultative Vote of IEC Member  
 F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting



	Split				Argentina Commission	Greece Commission	Iran Commission	Chile Commission	Howard Amendment	Fourier Motion	Mandates Commission
	#1	#2	#3	#4							
Algeria	Ag	F	Nv	Ag	F	F	F	F	Ag	F	F
Dominican Rep.	Ag	Ag	Nv	F	F	Nv	Nv	F	F	Ag	Nv
Ecuador	F	F	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	F	F	F	F
Finland	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Greenland	F	F	Ag	Ag	F	Nv	Ab	Nv	Nv	F	F
Iceland	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	F	Ab	Ab	F
Norway	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	F	F	Ab	Nv	Nv	Nv
Panama	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	F	Ag	F	F
Puerto Rico*	Nv	F	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	F	Ag	Ag	F
Senegal	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	Nv	F	F	Nv	Nv	Nv
Tunisia	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	F	F	F	Nv	Nv	Nv
Venezuela C (IEC)	Ag Nv	F Nv	Ag Nv	Ag Nv	F F	F F	F F	F F	Ag Nv	Ab Nv	F Nv
<b>Youth Organization</b>											
Australia	Ag	F	Ag	Ag	F	F	F	F	Ag	Ag	F

	IEC and Control Commission								
	#1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9
Algeria	Ab	Ab	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	Ag	F
Dominican Rep.	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	F	F	Ag
Ecuador	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv
Finland	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ag
Greenland	Ag	Ag	Ab	Ag	Ab	F	F	Ag	F
Iceland	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F	F	Ag
Norway	Ab	F	F	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	Ag
Panama	Ag	F	F	Ab	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F
Puerto Rico*	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F
Senegal	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	Ag	F	Ag	F
Tunisia	Ab	Ag	F	F	Ab	Ab	F	F	Ag
Venezuela C (IEC)	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	Ag F	F F	F F	Ag Ag
<b>Youth Organization</b>									
Australia	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv	Nv

\*The Puerto Rican Liga Internacionalista de los Trabajadores is prevented by U.S. reactionary legislation from being a recognized sympathizing organization of the International.

C(IEC)=Consultative Vote of IEC Member  
F=For, Ag=Against, Ab=Abstain, Nv=Not Voting