

SWP

discussion
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RESOLUTION ON THE CUBAN REVOLUTION

Submitted by Shane Mage

The Cuban revolution marks the beginning of a new stage in the history of the Western Hemisphere. For the first time a small Latin-American country has carried out a thorough expropriation of U.S.-owned properties. Cuba has called into question not merely the continued domination of Latin America by U.S. imperialism, but the very existence of the capitalist system itself. The Cuban revolution is potentially the commencement of the American socialist revolution; and U.S. imperialism is morally and irrevocably determined to choke off this promise.

The Cuban revolution is, in many respects, a unique and unprecedented historic event. Nevertheless, in its broad lines, it strikingly confirms the Theory of Permanent Revolution which condemns every attempt to restrain the colonial revolution within national-capitalist bounds. Though the future of the Cuban revolution is not yet assured, there are no a priori limits to it; this is a developing revolution, whose dynamics are determined by its internal contradictions and the international context in which those contradictions work themselves out. Among these essential contradictions are the following:

1. The contradiction between the original aims of the Cuban revolution and its immanent tendencies as a permanent revolution. The entire program of the Cuban revolution up through 1959 was a purely bourgeois-democratic one. Its goal was to destroy the Batista dictatorship, to give the land to the rural population, and to free Cuba from its colonial dependence on U.S. imperialism. However the latter two measures could not be undertaken without incurring the fiercest opposition of U.S. imperialism and of its client, the Cuban bourgeoisie, and on the other hand, without the immediate mobilization of the workers and peasants in support of the revolution. Hence from the outset the class struggle tended to break through the formal bourgeois-democratic program, forcing the government, under pressure from the workers, to "intervene" one industrial or agricultural establishment after another. In this process of continual interaction it is the counterrevolution that has played the initiating role, forcing government and masses to make ever deeper inroads into private property as the first necessity of revolutionary self-defense.

2. The contradiction between the middle-class nature of the revolutionary leadership and the role of the workers and peasants in determining the immediate goals of the revolution.

The July 26 Movement began as a middle-class revolutionary tendency. It was defined as such not merely by the uniformly petty-bourgeois social origin of its leaders and their bourgeois-democratic program but above all by their ideology, their relation to the working class, and their organizational conceptions; concretely, by their empiricism, their independence from the working class, and their preference for military forms of political organization.

In the course of the revolution the July 26 leadership, losing the support of the bourgeois and middle-class layers that originally were its primary base, has found that the only internal force on which it could count was the militant worker and peasant masses. Through the organization of the militias, factory advisory councils, and rural co-operatives, the masses have gained a powerful lever of democratic control over their daily existence. Correspondingly, the Castro leadership itself has taken great strides toward a proletarian position.

Nevertheless, in decisive respects that leadership has yet to transcend its middle-class nature. Ideologically it remains empiricist, and such Marxist ideas as it has adopted have been generally introduced in a perverted Stalinist form. The leadership has so far guarded its independence from the workers by refusing to institute forms whereby the working-class base can exercise direct control over the leaders. This is particularly evident in Castro's failure to develop the July 26 Movement into a genuine party, in which the leadership would be directly responsible to the proletarian rank and file. The command attitude toward the workers is also shown by the bureaucratic way in which changes in the trade-union leadership have been carried through.

3. The contradiction between the economic backwardness of Cuba and the socialist aspirations of the revolution.

Despite its vast potential agricultural wealth, Cuba remains a backward country, not yet self-sufficient in any major product of mass consumption. The possibilities for a speedy and substantial increase in the standard of living of the Cuban peasant or worker depend on the maintenance and expansion of free international trade. For Cuba isolation means, if not death, at best dire poverty.

One of the aspects of backwardness in Cuba is the economic predominance of agriculture. The notable feature of the agrarian reform in Cuba was the deliberate choice of the large-scale co-operative as a basic form of rural property: this fact shows that the agrarian revolution in Cuba has started from a higher level than in any other country, including China and the USSR. Nevertheless the co-operative, which produces for sale on the market (the world market in the case of Cuba) and in which the income of the co-operators depends on the market price, is not a socialist property form. Under conditions of protracted isolation and poverty, the co-operatives could very well develop in a capitalist way, in antagonism to the city workers and exerting enormous pressure for submission to U.S. capitalism as the price for return to the U.S. market.

In this context arises the problem of bureaucratization, which is a very real one in Cuba, and against which Castro and Guevara have spoken out. The material base of bureaucratization is the division between those who administer and those who work, a division reflecting the general cultural underdevelopment existing even in the most advanced capitalist economy. The separate

administrative apparatus in the Cuban state and economy is today a functional group without special economic privileges. However in the absence of full democratic control over the apparatus by the workers and peasants its special interests will inevitably lead to the growth of material privileges.

The dimensions of bureaucratism in Cuba at the end of last year were described by the Cuban Trotskyists in these terms (Voz Proletaria, November-December 1960):

" . . . On the theory, which seems apparently reasonable, that bureaucratic excesses in the leadership of unions will thus be dissolved, organizations are regrouped into larger organizations. But doing this keeps concentrating the leadership in ever fewer hands, often designated through the maneuvers of bureaucratic control. Thus to cure a bureaucratic evil a greater bureaucratism is applied, directed against the democratic expressions of the masses. In the same way there are attempts, sometimes successful, to overthrow through bureaucratic maneuvers union leaders, in many cases tied to conservatism and even counterrevolution (though the charges are not very clear) and in reality, in many cases, because they have not submitted to state administrators or to the official line of 'unity' (bureaucratic unity imposed from above).

"In spite of the Technical Advisory Councils having been set up by the Minister of Labor himself, and in spite of Che Guevara's having publicly announced their importance and promised their rapid activation, the fact is that the CTA's of workshops and industries have been ignored by the administrators of industry and by the greater part of the official union bureaucracy. So even this timid attempt at democracy and workers' control has not been made effective.

"Also in the farm co-ops the will of the 'responsables' reigns exclusively, evoking the disgust and censure of the farmers who see their democratic rights as co-operators ignored."

4. The contradiction between the physical situation of Cuba and the anti-U.S. essence of the revolution.

The facts of geography indicate the necessity for a close tie between Cuba and the U.S. A half century of U.S. colonial domination virtually integrated Cuba in the U.S. market. Cuba's efforts to free itself economically inherently constituted a direct attack on U.S. imperialism and the U.S. responded to them as such. In the space of a few months nearly all the established trade relationships between the two countries were destroyed by the unilateral action of the U.S. government.

The economic boycott, together with the effects of the intense military pressure, sabotage, and terrorism are a crushing economic burden for the Cuban revolution, as they are indeed meant to be. Cuba cannot resist this pressure alone -- it requires outside assistance in the form of economic aid from the Soviet bloc and political support from revolutionary forces in the Americas.

5. The contradiction between the dependence of the Cuban revolution on Soviet aid and the entirely counterrevolutionary nature of the Stalinist bureaucracy.

The Soviet Union came to the aid of Cuba by taking its sugar crop in return for oil, munitions, and essential industrial products. This aid was indispensable to the survival of the revolution. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Soviet foreign policy is based not on international proletarian solidarity, but on the specific interests of the parasitic caste of privileged bureaucrats which holds totalitarian power in the Soviet Union, China, and other self-styled "socialist" countries.

The essential interests of the Stalinist bureaucrats are expressed in the policy of peaceful coexistence -- that is, in the perspective of a deal with U.S. imperialism in which the world would be divided into spheres of influence. In preparing for such a deal the Kremlin naturally seeks to strengthen its own power position, to cause disruption within the U.S. camp, and to acquire as much bargaining room as possible.

Cuba figures in this strategy as a passive object of negotiation, as a bargaining point. To the extent that the dynamism of the Cuban revolution tends to transcend this status and place obstacles in the way of the entire peaceful coexistence line, Cuba is a source of embarrassment and irritation to the Kremlin. Thus the policy of the Stalinist bureaucracy is aimed not at furthering the development of the Cuban revolution but at using Cuba to extract concessions from the U.S.

Soviet aid was a lifeline to the Cuban revolution. But at the same time the economic dependence of Cuba on the Soviet Union is a powerful instrument of pressure on the Cubans to submit to a policy contrary to the essential interests of the revolution. The influence of the Cuban CP within the Castro government is of no consequence in itself, but can have decisive importance as a channel through which Stalinist political pressure can be exerted within the revolutionary leadership itself.

The Cuban CP, despite the influx of new and revolutionary elements to its ranks, remains dominated by a bureaucratic apparatus which has always been and remains today completely Stalinist. This fact is clearly evident in the Moscow Trials type attack on the Trotskyists issued by the PSP Central Committee in March, 1960:

"The Plenary denounces the efforts of the imperialists to revive in our country the Trotskyist groups in order to use them as provocateurs, spies, and confusionists against the Cuban revolution. Destroying these elements is our task and that of all revolutionaries. It is a necessary task to destroy the work of traitors who under protection of revisionist or extremist theories, or without any theory, pretend to return to the activity they abandoned like cowards in the face of the bloody terror of the tyranny, to now sow confusion, to create centers of provocation

and sabotage of the revolution. The revolution needs a purge of all those unhealthy elements, of all traitors actual or potential."

6. The contradiction between the extension of the revolution and the need for diplomatic support from bourgeois governments.

The primary reason why U.S. imperialism has been restrained from a full-scale military attack on Cuba thus far is the enormous revolutionary potential throughout Latin America and the vigorous sympathy of the masses everywhere for the Cuban revolution. This situation is reflected in the opposition of certain Latin-American governments (most notably Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Argentina) to the efforts of the State Department to isolate Cuba diplomatically. The Cuban revolution properly welcomes this political aid.

Nevertheless it represents primarily efforts of capitalist regimes to deceive the masses by adopting a "leftist" position in foreign affairs to compensate for reactionary domestic policies. To allow this strategem to succeed would be a setback for the Latin-American revolution, and thus in the end weaken the defense of the Cuban revolution.

The necessity for diplomatic relations with capitalist states is imposed on every revolutionary regime in a capitalist world. The Bolshevik revolution had the same necessity in its early years. Before the rise of Stalinism the Bolsheviks were scrupulously careful to maintain a rigid separation between the policy of the Russian state and that of the Communist International. But in Cuba the absolute confusion between the government apparatus and the July 26 Movement renders the problem of relations to bourgeois regimes considerably more difficult.

7. All the above contradictions are interrelated, and all are linked to the general contradiction of the revolution at its current stage: The contradiction between the anticapitalist nature of the Cuban revolution as expressed at every point of its development and the fact that the proletariat has thus far failed to take leadership of the revolution through the establishment of workers councils as institutions of state power and the formation of a mass revolutionary-Marxist political party.

This is the general contradiction because a progressive resolution of all the others hinges upon it. The formation of soviets and the emergence of a Marxist leadership are necessary to endow the Cuban revolution with a program conforming to its essential nature; to assure democratic control over the nationalized economy and resist bureaucratization; to maintain unity between workers and peasants while mobilizing the full energies of the masses for the tasks of economic development; to resist the conjoined pressures of U.S. imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy for submission to the U.S.; and to promote the rapid extension of the revolution.

The unfolding of these contradictions can lead either back toward capitalism or forward toward socialism. With the smashing

of the Batista army and police, the execution of a major part of its cadre and imprisonment or exile of the rest, the old capitalist repressive state apparatus was violently smashed. The evolution of the subsequent two years has swept away the foundation of capitalist rule, large-scale capitalist private property whether Cuban or American. Nevertheless the new Cuban state has thus far failed to establish itself as a proletarian democracy in which all officials, without exception, are democratically elected and subject to recall at any time by the workers and peasants. An armed people, enjoying substantial rights to free expression (the test is the legality of the Trotskyist POR and its right to publish its paper, "Voz Proletaria") totally lacks formal means of control over state and government. This contradiction contains grave menaces as well as bright promise.

The smashing of the repressive state apparatus, the arming of the masses, opens the way to a workers state. But the absence of proletarian democracy shows that the progress toward that goal remains incomplete. The state created by the revolution is in transition toward a workers state, but completion of the transition is not yet assured.

The imperialist threat to the Cuban revolution is not simply a military one. The crushing of the April 17 invasion proved the obvious: that the revolutionary government is invulnerable to anything short of a full-scale U.S. invasion. It is not inconceivable that U.S. imperialism will eventually take this course, but it would be a frightfully costly one. A U.S. attempt to occupy Cuba would produce resistance of unimaginable ferocity, a long war dwarfing the Algerian conflict; and meanwhile the entire U.S. economic stake in Latin America would be placed in the greatest peril.

Consequently the attempt to restore capitalist rule in Cuba is most likely to take the alternative form; that of economic and diplomatic pressure. The U.S. imperialists are attempting to isolate Cuba, to force it into the grip of the Kremlin, and to bring its people to their knees by economic blockade and the threat of starvation.

The ultimate objective of this line would be to solve the Cuba question through a deal between Khrushchev and Kennedy. Whatever the pretext and external pretenses of such a deal, whatever quid pro quo would be given to the Kremlin, its essential points would include payment of full compensation on U.S. terms for all property expropriated by the revolution and recognition in some form that Cuba is within the "hemispheric" (i.e., U.S.) sphere of influence, not the Soviet sphere.

This is not Wall Street's "optimum" program -- that is represented by the military counterrevolution. But it is nonetheless a program for the restoration of capitalism in Cuba. Even if not a single peso of state property was denationalized, in a Cuba economically backward and exhausted, dependent on the U.S. market and obliged to make large annual dollar payments for "compensa-

tion," "interest" and "debt amortization," state property would in essence constitute a means for the extraction of surplus value from the Cuban proletariat and peasantry and its transfer to U.S. capitalists. A state that played this role would be a capitalist state and would be forced to resort to harsh suppression of the workers and peasants.

It is by no means excluded that, under the all-out pressure of Stalinism, such a program could be imposed on the Cuban people despite their present possession of arms. As long as the armed masses merely constitute an armed mass, without their own elected leadership, their own democratic institutions of political rule, as long as their struggle is not animated and led by a mass Trotskyist party, the ability of the armed masses to intervene consciously and autonomously at the decisive moment is subject to grave doubt.

The promises for the future of Cuba, however, are to the measure of the perils confronting it. The Cuban workers and peasants do not need the violent overthrow of an entrenched absolutist bureaucracy or capitalist class to establish complete democratic control over the Cuban economy and state. The natural fertility and riches of their island could guarantee to the Cubans a rapid and accelerating increase in their standard of life, making Cuba a model of the socialist future of mankind. The extension of the revolution to the advanced countries is, of course, essential to the future healthy development of Cuba as the Cuban workers will need the help of the workers in the advanced countries in order to industrialize the country.

To realize this promise, as to avert these menaces, the Cuban people face two crucial needs: the establishment of workers democracy and the formation of a mass revolutionary Marxist party. These are absolutely crucial to the development of Cuba into a workers state and its continued revolutionary advance.

Workers democracy, for us, signifies that state officials are elected by and responsible to the working people of city and country through representative institutions of democratic rule. The best historical models for such institutions were the Soviets of the Russian Revolution of 1917 and the Workers Councils of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. The Cuban workers and peasants will, no doubt, develop their own original variants of these forms. There is only one essential attribute without which any democratic form is but pretense and mockery: there must be full freedom of organization and expression for all political groups and tendencies that support the revolution, without any concession to the Stalinist monolithism of the one-party system.

The transformation of Cuba into a republic of workers' and peasants' councils is not one that can be imposed from on top, proclaimed as a "gift" to the people in a constitutional text. It must be advocated, shaped, and struggled for from below. Authentic democracy must be the creation of the workers and peasants of revolutionary Cuba.

Even the most democratic of political forms will inevitably undergo bureaucratic degeneration if the class consciousness of the proletariat is inadequate. The highest expression of this consciousness is the ideology of Marxism which today can be fully manifested only in the program and organization of the Fourth International. Consequently the development of a mass Trotskyist party is an urgent necessity for the healthy development of the Cuban revolution.

The forms in which such a party may emerge cannot be foreseen, but one thing is certain: it will require an uncompromising struggle against all the ideological and organizational forms of Stalinism. The small Cuban Trotskyist party, despite the effects of Pabloism on other aspects of its program, has taken a clear line on this quintessential point.

The existing Cuban revolutionary leadership of the July 26 Movement has a central place in this process. Castro and his companions have proven themselves to be great revolutionaries of action and politically have moved toward the left. Trotskyists support this leadership insofar as it defends and carries forward the revolution, while making clear that our support is not at all uncritical.

A large section of the July 26 Movement has indicated an ability to resist the political pressures of Stalinism. The successful building of a revolutionary party in Cuba depends on the confluence of this cadre with the existing Trotskyist forces in Cuba and internationally.

However the 26th of July Movement will not be converted to Trotskyism by any automatic process of reacting to the pressure of the masses. What is necessary is the conscious intervention of the Trotskyists with our program to initiate a process of political differentiation within the ranks of the supporters of the Cuban revolution. Failure to put forward our fundamental Trotskyist criticisms of the Castro leadership will hinder rather than help the process of winning over the best of those who support the Castro leadership to our banner.

In this process of revolutionary regroupment the central question is the question of program. We are opposed to any attempt to submerge the program of the Fourth International in a "single party" with a pro-Stalinist program or a party which suppresses the right of minority tendencies to full freedom of public expression. The essential points on which the Trotskyist and Stalinist program clash, in Cuba and throughout the world, are workers democracy versus bureaucratic dictatorship and proletarian revolution versus Popular Front. This must be the cornerstone of the program of a genuine mass party of the Cuban revolution.

We must never lose sight of our goal which is to build a mass party of the Leninist type around the program of the Fourth International. Only such a party can establish workers' rule in Cuba and carry forward the revolution on a world scale.

In its relationship to the Cuban revolution the SWP, like every other Trotskyist party, has two principal tasks:

1. It is necessary to exert the utmost effort to defend the Cuban revolution, not only against the military attacks of U.S. imperialism, but also against the political attacks of the social-democratic agents of imperialism.

2. It is necessary to struggle for the development and extension of the Cuban revolution, and against the attempts of counterrevolutionary Stalinism to corrupt the revolution from within. Trotskyists seek to intervene to further this development and extension both by supporting revolutionary actions of the existing leadership and by constructively criticizing, openly and frankly, the mistakes and inadequacies of that leadership. Both to develop the Cuban revolution and to extend it throughout the hemisphere we base ourselves on the imperative necessity for the establishment of workers democracy and the formation of the mass party of the Fourth International.

May 29, 1961.

AMENDMENTS TO PC WORLD RESOLUTION

Submitted by Tim Wohlforth

I. ON THE NATURE OF THE POSTWAR PERIOD

1. Page 2, section d, substitute the following for section:

"(d) 1943-1961. This has been a highly contradictory period containing elements of both the 1917-23 and the 1923-43 periods. It would be false to stress only one side of this contradictory picture and see only victorious revolution or only defeat and retrogression. Beginning with the Soviet victory at Stalingrad in 1943 and the victories scored by the partisan groups in such countries as Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy, and France soon thereafter, Europe entered into a revolutionary period. The end of the war left capitalism shaken to its very roots in Europe. The Soviet army controlled all of Eastern Europe and the armed workers partisan groups were the only real power in much of Western Europe. It was only the counterrevolutionary role of Stalinism which saved European capitalism at this time and permitted the stabilization of capitalism for a whole extended period. The Stalinists compromised with discredited native capitalists in Eastern Europe and propped up capitalism in Western Europe through entering "National Front" governments and allowing the partisans to be disarmed and their revolutionary energies dissipated. The Stalinists did all this in the illusory hope that the capitalist world would be willing to come to terms with it. It was only after the capitalists, regaining their strength, moved against the USSR and instituted the cold war that the Stalinists, by bureaucratic military means, established deformed workers states in Eastern Europe. Thus, in order to save their own skins they removed a section of Europe from capitalist exploitation but they did this in such manner that it had no revolutionary impact on the workers of Western Europe.

"The period of the 1950's was a period of genuine boom in Western Europe and in North America. This led to a slowing down of the tempo of class struggle and to the temporary strengthening of the hold of the traditional leaderships over the working classes of the advanced countries. However, the workers struggle continued if on a less effective plane and the working class suffered no defeats comparable to those endured during the 1923-43 period.

"In contrast to the stabilization of capitalism in the advanced countries, the colonial revolution scored significant successes throughout this whole period. This reached its greatest height in the Chinese Revolution and the closely connected Korean and Vietnamese revolutions. These revolutions, under Stalinist leadership, were forced to go beyond capitalism and removed an immense section of the world's population from capitalist exploitation. However the revolutions, due to lack of proper Marxist leadership, had from the very beginning a deformed character giving them bureaucratic regimes and limiting their further expansion to other sections of the colonial world. The colonial revolution produced

in a number of places politically independent countries ruled by native bourgeois governments. However, the stability of capitalism in the advanced countries and the lack of proper revolutionary leadership prevented the colonial revolution, outside China, North Vietnam and North Korea, from breaking outside capitalist bounds and thus even completing its democratic tasks."

2. Page 5, paragraph 3, add at end:

"However, the weakness of the subjective factor, the conscious Marxist leadership of the working class, is what has permitted capitalism to maintain its rule in this period. The net effect of this lack is that capitalism remains, despite revolutionary gains, the dominant force in the world today. It would be foolhardy to underestimate the strength of our enemy or to fall for illusions, popular in centrist circles these days, that capitalism will some how collapse automatically because of the objective on-rushing tide of revolution. Only the building of the Fourth International with mass parties in the major countries of the world will tip the scales definitively to the advantage of the world working class."

II. ON STALINISM

1. Strike title "THE. . . CAMP."

2. Page 3, paragraph 3, insert at end of paragraph:

"In order to carry through this political revolution the workers in the Soviet countries must create revolutionary Marxist parties. The failure of the Hungarian and Polish Revolutions was due to our inability during the previous period to build sections of the Fourth International in these countries."

3. Page 4, bottom paragraph, line 3: add "counterrevolutionary" between "direct" and "role."

4. Page 15, top paragraph, delete at end of paragraph "Historic. . . well aware."

5. Page 15, paragraph 2, line 9: add "completely" between "longer" and "isolated."

6. Page 15, paragraph 2, line 11: strike "broke the. . . bureaucracy." Replace with: "while not decisively breaking the capitalist ring of containment it did widen significantly the sector of the world free from capitalist domination and thus one of the main conditions for the growth and power of the bureaucracy was weakened."

7. Page 16, paragraph 4, line 3, strike "breakup" and replace with "weakening."

8. Page 17, add the following section at end of page:

"While noting these important conjunctural changes since the death of Stalin, we must reject out of hand the conception of a "New World Reality" today as we did in 1953 when most of these changes were already quite apparent. This concept essentially is a proposition that Stalinism no longer plays a counterrevolutionary role in the world; that if it has not itself changed in nature then "objective conditions" have so changed as to make it impossible for Stalinism to play such a role. This is a concept of Stalinist conciliationism and as such is alien to orthodox Trotskyism.

"It is clear that, despite important changes, the following remains as true today as it was in 1953:

"(a) Stalinism represents a counterrevolutionary trend within the working class and as such is the most important obstacle in the way of the creation of a genuine Marxist leadership of the working class. The power of the Stalinist countries and the influence of the Stalinist parties throughout the world is being exerted as clearly today as ever to prevent the spread of world revolution, to contain the working-class struggle within capitalist limits, and to come to terms with imperialism. The fact that Stalinism is not always successful in achieving these aims in no way detracts from the fact that it still seeks these counterrevolutionary objectives and that in numerous countries, due to lack of a strong Marxist opposition, it has been successful in achieving these aims. We cite Indonesia and Iraq as two current examples.

"(b) We rule out the false concept that Stalinist parties can be transformed into revolutionary parties by mass pressure or that Stalinism can be transformed into an ally of revolution by such mass pressure or world objective forces. No Stalinist party has yet been turned into its opposite by the pressure of its ranks, and we see no signs of this happening today -- especially in Cuba with the discredited Stalinist party that exists there. Further we feel it is false to present the onesided view of Stalinism as an ally of the colonial revolution. It is forced to give aid to these revolutions under certain conditions and this aid should be welcomed. But it does so in the hopes of containing the revolution wherever possible and continues to exert its political and economic power to so contain it. This is just as true in Cuba as it is elsewhere.

"(c) We oppose any centrist notions that the political revolution in the Stalinist countries is any sort of automatic process or that the concept of political revolution is identical with Sweezy and Huberman's notion that the bureaucracy will liquidate itself by adopting a series of reforms under mass pressure. The political revolution can only be accomplished by a revolutionary Marxist leadership which leads the working class in smashing the bureaucratic apparatus and replacing it with a representative proletarian system based on workers and peasants councils like those in Russia in 1917 or in Hungary in 1956."

9. Page 20, last paragraph, line 6: strike "and take the path blazed by China and Cuba" and replace with "and take the path blazed by the Russian Bolsheviks and carried through in a distorted and incomplete fashion in China and Cuba -- distortions brought about by the absence of a real Marxist leadership."

III. ON THE COLONIAL REVOLUTION

1. Page 3, paragraph 4: strike phrase "as in China and Cuba" at end of paragraph and insert: "The carrying through of the tasks of the bourgeois revolution and the beginning of carrying out socialist tasks can only be done by the working class of the colonial country under the leadership of the revolutionary Marxist party. This makes it essential that the present small Trotskyist nuclei in the colonial countries be assisted in their growth into mass parties of the working class in every possible way."

2. Page 5, line 15: strike "by their. . . tendencies" and replace with "by their collaboration with the imperialists and Soviet bureaucracy in crushing the movement of the working masses beneath them."

3. Page 5, paragraph 1, fifth line from bottom: after "extreme radical steps" insert: "However, such petty-bourgeois nationalist formations cannot be transformed into revolutionary working-class parties and are no substitute for the independent organization of the working class by the revolutionary Marxists."

4. Page 5, paragraph 1: add after paragraph: "While all three sectors of the world have an interacting effect on each other the relative weight in the process of interaction of the working classes of different sectors is not at all equal. The key to the whole process of interaction is the working class of the advanced countries. This can be seen most clearly in relation to the colonial sector. The strategy of permanent revolution clearly links the struggle of the colonial areas with that in the metropolitan countries. Even if the breakthrough should occur first in a colonial country, this country could not survive for long without the spread of the revolution to the advanced countries. In fact the major task of the Marxist leadership of such a country is precisely to utilize his country as a basis for the spread of revolution to the advanced countries."

5. Page 13, paragraph 4: add after paragraph: "While the growth of the national bourgeoisie thus is a sign of the weakness of imperialism it is also a sign of the weakness of the Marxist vanguard in these countries. While, in the tradition of Lenin, we defend the national bourgeoisie insofar as it fights imperialism we do so by our own methods and through our own independent working-class organizations. Further, we struggle against the national bourgeoisie insofar as it opposes the interests of the workers and peasants within the colonial countries. We recognize that the completion of the bourgeois revolution and its going over into the socialist revolution necessitates that the working class

replace the national bourgeoisie as the vanguard of the colonial revolutionary struggle and that this can only be accomplished if the working class is under revolutionary Marxist leadership."

IV. ON THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY

1. Page 1, paragraph 2: add at end: "Only the world cadres of the Fourth International can provide this leadership."

2. Page 1, paragraph 5: add after first sentence: "In this period it was definitively established that the workers could come to power and establish their own state rule only through the leadership of a Marxist party and that they exercise their rule through representative organs of the soviet type."

3. Page 3, paragraph 5: insert at end: "It is in the advanced countries that construction of sections of the Fourth International to carry out the socialist revolution is most important of all."

4. Page 13, insert at end of fifth line from top: "Trotskyist parties must be built in every country of the world for only through Trotskyist parties can the workers come to power in the two-thirds of the world that remains under capitalist domination and only through Trotskyist parties can workers democracy be re-established in the Soviet countries."

5. Page 18, paragraph 2: insert after paragraph: "These elements unfortunately will not automatically create the cadres which will establish workers states throughout the world. These cadres must be carefully assembled in the tens, hundreds, and thousands prior to the successful revolution. They must assimilate the great lessons of the Marxist movement of the past and they must be seasoned through actual participation in working-class struggle. We must begin work now in every country of the world to assemble these precious cadres for if we wait until the revolution is upon us we may find, as the German Spartacus movement did, that we started too late in building the party and the revolutionary opportunity may slip through our hands."

6. Page 19, paragraph 1: strike last two sentences and substitute: "As the only genuine Marxist current in the world today the job of bringing revolutionary Marxism to the working class falls solely on our shoulders and demands of us that we allow no formal barriers to bar us from reaching the workers with the ideas they need so desperately."

V. ON PABLOISM

1. Strike last paragraph on page 19 and continuation on page 20 and insert following whole section after paragraph:

"The world Trotskyist movement is presently undergoing a severe ideological crisis which has led to the split of the international movement into two world bodies: the International

Secretariat and the International Committee plus several groups which remain independent of both. Our organization has a sterling record of upholding the principles and program of orthodox Trotskyism against all revisionists since 1928. For this reason we are in ideological solidarity with the International Committee of the Fourth International.

"We recognize that the present split in the International movement is no mere accidental or episodic occurrence. What is involved is more than mere differences over organizational questions. It is essentially a political split between the upholders of orthodox Trotskyism and a liquidationist tendency breaking from Trotskyism which has coalesced around Pablo and his close associates.

"By Pabloism we mean a tendency to underplay the importance of the vanguard to historical processes substituting for the vanguard the unrolling, panoramic objective wave of leaderless revolutions. The theory in essence contends that the objective conditions of the collapse of capitalism and the growth of the workers state propel the masses into action. These masses then force the reformists, the bureaucrats, the Stalinists, the centrists (in fact anybody but ourselves) further and further along the path of revolution. The role of the Trotskyist vanguard is relegated to that of a pressure group to exert pressure on the existing leaderships of the workers' organizations.

"This necessitates organizationally a 'deep entry' of the revolutionary forces into the mass organizations and once inside these organizations the minimization of their independent role. The Trotskyist is not inside the alien party (it begins to look less and less 'alien' to him) to build the vanguard party but rather to pressure the leadership or the centrists who in turn pressure the leadership. Floating in the stratosphere far above the pressure groups in the existing mass parties is the INTERNATIONAL CENTER which produces magazines in several languages which more or less brilliantly speculate on the constantly advancing world revolution and develop pretty theoretical constructions to explain these developments.

"It is not surprising that Pabloism, as expressed by Pablo himself, combines with the above approach a high handed cavalier attitude towards the historically-formed cadres of Trotskyism. The size of these forces is relatively unimportant to him as he looks elsewhere than to the revolutionary vanguard for the real motive force of history. Thus to split and destroy cadres is no organizational idiosyncrasy of Pablo's but rather the logical outcome of a theoretical approach which places little value in the subjective factor in the revolutionary process.

"It is absolutely essential to the Trotskyist movement that the nature of Pabloism be fully recognized and that all ideas which underplay the importance of the Trotskyist vanguard be rooted out of our movement. We cannot proceed one step forward in building our world movement until this is done. Once we have

clarified our essential principled views and definitively broken from revisionism then we can proceed aggressively to build our world movement in the most flexible manner possible reaching out to every healthy leftward tendency within the working class and attempting to bring these tendencies to a full understanding of our Trotskyist program and organizational methods. The rich experience of our movement in principled entry work, in fusions on the basis of a sound program, in mass work of all kinds, can then be brought to effective use. But it is a gross error which could be compounded into a historic blunder of our whole movement if we neglect the task of first combatting revisionism in our own ranks before we then proceed to the question of approaching leftward moving elements. If we gloss over the present challenge to the very essentials of Trotskyism which Pabloism represents, and proceed with world-wide regroupment schemes of one sort or another we will end up only with losing the precious cadres we have now -- we will end up with liquidating our international movement and liquidating it precisely at a time when there are so many possibilities for building it.

"This means that we cannot jump over the stage of coming to terms with the existent split in the international movement. We must begin at once with a positive political approach to the existent world Trotskyist forces aiming at the regroupment into one international organization on the basis of a firm program all the healthy cadres of the Trotskyist movement regardless of present organizational affiliations. However our approach must be a political approach, not an organizational one because the problem is a political one. We must first proceed to clarify the principles of orthodox Trotskyism within the ranks of the IC and then urge the IC to approach the I.S. for a political discussion to ascertain the nature of agreement and disagreement. Such an approach must be based both on a solid political understanding of the revisionist nature of Pabloism and on an understanding of the heterogeneous nature of the Pabloite world organization. Membership in the Pabloite international, while it means greater exposure to revisionism and a certain organizational compromise with revisionism, does not necessarily mean that the members of the national sections have definitively taken their stand with Pablo on all important questions. This can be seen most clearly in Latin America where important new forces have come into the Pabloite organizations. These sections opposed the Pabloite deep-entry line at the recent Sixth World Congress and thus expressed a certain resistance to the liquidationist pressures of the Pabloite Center.

"Above all we must insist that the rebuilding of the Fourth International start with the existent world cadres of the Fourth International and seek to resolve the political crisis in this cadre expressed by Pabloite revisionism."

2. Page 20, paragraph 2, line 6: add "and organizational" between "ideological" and "plane."

VI. ON CUBA

A series of small amendments to this resolution will be necessary should the minority resolution on Cuba pass at the convention. As the question of Cuba will be discussed separately at the convention there is no need to spell out these amendments here at this time. It goes without saying that I am in opposition to all statements in this Resolution which refer to Cuba as a workers state.

May 29, 1961.