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by Doug G. and Rosemary S.




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"Where are the Yevtushenkos in China?" By this question Comrade Warde, during his presentation of the IC Draft Resolution on the Sino-Soviet Dispute to the New York branch, sought to symbolize the alleged opposition of the Chinese Communist Party to the process of destalinization.

The asking of the question exposes the PC's incorrect approach to the Sino-Soviet Dispute and to the Chinese Revolution and its leadership.

Apart from the ironic coincidence that the Yevtushenkos were being called on the carpet in Moscow even as Khrushchev was being labelled the "banner-bearer of destalinization" in Warde's series of articles in the Militant, the question overlooks the essence of the differences, of historic standing between Peking and Moscow: there never was a Stalin period in revolutionary China. How then can we call upon the Yevtushenkos to write about a period that never existed?

To make possible the posing of this question the party has trained itself for over a decade in a series of tortured acrobatics performed on a political scaffolding constructed of warped beams, papier maché walls and gaping holes. In short, its false original position on the Chinese leadership and the revolution has led the CP to a faulty analysis of the present dispute and a precarious future for its own role in world revolutionary leadership.

HISTORY AND ORIGINS OF CHINESE REVOLUTION

The Role of the Peasantry

Comrades Swabeck, Liang and Macleod have devoted many pages to setting the record straight on the origins and history of the Chinese Revolution and its leadership.

If comrades have learned nothing from this study perhaps it is because they have refused to begin their re-examination by first wiping the slate clean. This can only be done by acknowledging a hard fact of life for our movement: that Trotsky, who guided our original thinking on the Chinese Revolution, was wrong in his analysis of how it would be won.

Trotsky's position should no more be held sacrosanct today than it was in the late 1920's when some of his views were questioned by Preobrazhensky, a highly regarded theoretician of the Left Opposition. A careful examination of the correspondence between these two (New International, April 1936) reveals that (1) Preobrazhensky took issue with Trotsky for his application of norms and criteria of the October Revolution to China (history has shown numerous errors in this respect by the leading Marxists); and (2) that Preobrazhensky was of the opinion that what was needed was a fundamental study of the Chinese situation. (Trotsky himself acknowledged a lack of sufficient information.)

Mao Tse-tung understood better than Trotsky the revolutionary role of the peasantry of China as the great battering ram of the revolution. He added a new dimension to the theory of the permanent revolution by putting the role of the peasantry in China into the correct perspective. By so doing he carried out the largest revolutionary upheaval in recorded history. His theory on the role of the peasantry and the example of the Chinese Revolution provided a legacy for the Cuban and Algerian revolutions and for future revolutions in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa. Its theoretical applicability will of course vary according to relative strength and social position of the peasantry, including the rural proletariat, and the urban proletariat in respective countries.

Mao represented both in theory and practice a current of world Marxism that was neither Stalinist nor Trotskyist. For our party to persist in its legend that Mao Tse-tung was an instrument of Stalinism, it must prove that the historians and journalists who regard him as a separate current are liars and that the documents cited are forgeries. It can of course do no such thing and the party's theoretical bankruptcy on China is testified to by the fact that no attempt is even made to deal with all the evidence available. We wish the majority on China were guilty of a little of that empiricism of which Comrade Wohlforth complains. The books referred to in this document should be read in their entirety by comrades in order fully to grasp and evaluate the Chinese Revolution. (See bibliography at end.)

Robert C. North in his preface to the 1963 edition of "Moscow and Chinese Communists" (Stanford University Press), says: "A persistent myth has it that basic documents on the development of the Chinese Communist movement are not available. In fact...there resides in the Hoover Institution at Stanford University a vast store of primary documentation...and there are other important repositories elsewhere. In the late 1940's and early 1950's Western scholars wrote a number of general mono-

graphs about the course of Chinese Communist development, and in recent years several books have appeared on the Chinese People's Republic...."

These scholars (not merely "journalists") at research centers in the major universities of the U.S., with mountains of documents at hand, are in basic agreement that Mao Tse-tung represented a separate and distinct tendency from the CP in Shanghai and was in opposition to Stalin from 1927 through the Chinese Revolutionary victory. The present dispute had its roots in 1927 when Mao Tse-tung first elaborated his theory of the revolutionary role of the peasantry. He was denounced by the Comintern, Stalin and the CP headquarters in Shanghai. He was only "acceptable" after he had won military victories with the Peasant Army and had achieved hegemony in China through his leadership in the revolutionary struggle years later.

In "A Documentary History of Chinese Communism" (Russian Research Center, Harvard Univ. Press, 1952), authors Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz and John K. Fairbank quote extensively from Mao Tse-tung's "Report of an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan" written in February 1927. This document is the theoretical cornerstone of the Chinese Revolution. (It is also the precursor for the Cuban and Algerian Revolutions and for coming struggles in particular countries in South America and Africa whose urban proletariat is relatively weak or small in proportion to the strength and militancy of the peasantry and rural proletariat.) In this 1927 Report, Mao criticized the restraints placed on peasant "excesses" by the National government at Wuhan, a coalition of the left Kuomintang and the Communists.

"Mao stood opposed to the Comintern's chosen instruments in China," write the authors of the "Documentary History." "According to his own account, his disagreement with the Party leadership on agrarian policy 'began as early as 1925 but did not come to a climax until 1927.' His report on the Hunan peasantry thus dates from the period of his most intense opposition to the prevailing Party line...."

/"Moscow/sought to obscure the fact that by committing the CCP to full support of the Wuhan government it had...precluded giving a free rein to the peasants, whose rebellion threatened the political and financial existence of that government...."

"The course adopted by the leading organ of the Party was, in actuality, opposed to agrarian revolution. Thus the circular of the propaganda bureau of the CC /Central Committee/ on June 1, 1927 declared that 'we must remember

that the Party's peasant policy is to check firmly any excesses (committed) against the small landlords, revolutionary militarists, and petty bourgeoisie'...."

"...In this manner, the great peasant revolt in Hunan not only frightened the bourgeoisie, landlords, and warlords, but also the leadership of the CP."

Robert C. North in "Moscow and Chinese Communists" corroborates these facts. He describes how the Central Committee of the CP called off peasant forces mobilized to converge on Changsha for an attack against counter-revolutionary troops and landlord militia. In Moscow, North says, "Stalin himself weighed the balance -- and decided upon what he seems to have considered a coldly realistic policy." North quotes Bukharin who interpreted Stalin's reasons for the decision: "If we do not curb the agrarian movement, we will lose our left allies and it will become impossible to win a majority in the KMT." Stalin himself said: "To fail to take a position against the peasant revolts would be to set the left bourgeoisie against us. That would mean civil war."

Mao's "Report on an Investigation into the Peasant movement in Hunan" was the result of an intensive period of observation and research during which he traveled through the five counties of Hunan. Some brief excerpts illustrate that historians have not exaggerated the revolutionary importance he attached to the peasants:

"The vanguard of the revolution are the poor peasants" "The poor peasants comprise 70% of the rural population; the middle peasants, 20%, the rich peasants and landlords, 10%" "the enormous mass of the poor peasants are the backbone of the peasant associations" "being the most revolutionary, the poor peasants have won the leadership" "This leadership of the poor peasants is absolutely necessary. Without the poor peasant there can be no revolution. Their general direction of the revolution has never been wrong."

To reinforce his estimate of the peasantry as a force for revolution Mao cited examples of achievements, many of them revolutionary, which they had already accomplished. Among the agrarian "deeds," which they had already performed as a class were: compelling landlords to "audit accounts;" forcing them to make contributions to the starving; prohibiting usury, grain hoarding, speculation, excessive rents; taking over the offices of police chiefs and electing magistrates; taking command of the landlords' militia and its arms; eliminating banditry -- by bringing bandits into the peasant associations!; overthrowing feudal clan tyranny of rich over poor; fining oppressive

landlords and helping themselves to their provisions; ridiculing superstitious practices; ending male tyranny over women; sponsoring mass education for illiterates; organizing marketing and credit cooperatives, etc., etc.

In his book "Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao" (1951, Harvard Univ. Press), Benjamin I. Schwartz drew on many Chinese, Japanese and Russian materials never before used in any western literature on Chinese communism. "It is the conclusion of this study," wrote Schwartz, "that the political strategy of Mao Tse-tung was not planned in advance in Moscow, and even ran counter to tenets of orthodoxy which were still considered sacrosanct and inviolate in Moscow at the time when this strategy was first crystallized; that it was only the force of circumstance which finally led Moscow to provide a facade of rationalization for this new experience..."

Schwartz too cites Mao Tse-tung's "Report on an Investigation of the Agrarian Movement in Hunan" as "a document so unique in content that it justifies us in treating its author even at this time as the representative of a unique trend within the Chinese Communist movement...."

Following the failure of the "autumn crop uprising" in 1927, Mao Tse-tung was removed from the Politburo and from the Party Front Committee of the CCP and very nearly, according to him, from the party itself. Mao accused the Central Committee of opposing his program "even before the failure had become manifest." Schwartz maintains that one reason for the CC's opposition was Mao's "cavalier adoption of the slogan of 'organizing soviets' before the Comintern authorized this slogan." He cites the slogan as a "rather surprising breach of discipline which the CC could not allow to pass unnoticed."

Robert North describes the autumn crop uprising as having the purpose for Mao of achieving a final severing of the Communist-KMT alliance on local levels; to organize a peasant-worker army; to confiscate the property of small, middle and large landlords; to set up Communist power in Hunan independent of the Kuomintang and to organize soviets. North confirms Schwartz's evidence that the proposal on soviets was opposed by the Comintern at that time and that Mao was disciplined upon the collapse of the uprising.

Robert North in "Moscow and Chinese Communists" says that Mao (together with Chu Teh) claimed to have found himself in agreement with decisions of the Sixth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party which met in Moscow in July 1928. "From that time on," Mao wrote later, "the differences between the leaders of the Party and the leaders of the Soviet movement in the agrarian districts

disappeared. Party harmony was reestablished." The decisions of this congress and of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International meeting simultaneously in Moscow "are often cited as proof," says North, "that the subsequent development of Maoism was actually planned in advance by Moscow...we shall find Stalin and his supporters claiming as much, and even Chinese Communist theoreticians have tailored history in this direction, for by 1950 the Maoists had their own reasons for attesting to Stalin's omniscience. But what we can discern from the record looks much more complex -- and far less flattering to Stalin."

Mao's conflict with the CCP over the role of the peasantry is further pointed up by his differences with Ch'en Tu-hsiu who removed Mao from Hunan because of the peasant uprisings there, in the spring of 1927. (When Ch'en was removed from office Mao was sent back, only to be punished again when the autumn crop uprisings failed.)

Schwartz cites an interview of Mao Tse-tung by Edgar Snow in which Mao stressed Ch'en Tu-hsiu's "right opportunist policy," and declared that Ch'en "did not understand the role of the peasantry in the revolution..." Ch'en at that time represented the authority of the Comintern which was insisting that the Chinese CP operate only through the organs of the Kuomintang. "Mao openly demanded that local national government officials not be allowed to interfere with the peasant associations." Schwartz concludes that "Mao's Report, honestly considered, is not merely a protest against Ch'en's 'opportunism,' but is an implicit attack on the whole Comintern line..."

In addition to his disagreement with the Communist party on the role of the peasantry in the 1925-27 Revolution, Mao Tse-tung had this to say many years later in his essay on New Democracy in 1940 on the general role of the party in the 25-27 Revolution:

"The experience of 1924-27 shows how the revolution forged ahead when the bourgeoisie followed the political leadership of the proletariat and now it suffered defeat as soon as the proletariat became politically the tail of the bourgeoisie (for which the Communist party was responsible). History should not be repeated."

Most Trotskyists either had no knowledge of or refused to acknowledge the fact that the deep, profound differences in the present Sino-Soviet Dispute had some of their roots in Stalin's role in the 1924-27 period.

Twenty-three years after the evaluation made by Mao in 1940 and 39 years after the '25-'27 events, the Chinese position, stated in Peking Review of June 21, 1963,

is: "The oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are faced with the urgent task of fighting imperialism and its lackeys....of holding high the banner ...for national independence and people's democracy, of standing in the forefront of the national democratic revolutionary movement and striving for a socialist future."...."If the proletariat becomes the tail of the landlords and bourgeoisie in the revolution, no real or thorough victory in the national democratic revolution is possible, and even if victory of a kind is gained, it will be impossible to consolidate it."

(During those early years when Mao was developing his theories and building the peasant movement, the position of Trotskyists was just as antithetical to Mao in its way as was Stalin's position. Schwartz mentions the bloc of Ch'en Tu-hsiu (after he was pushed out of the CCP by Li Li-san) with some of the Trotskyists and reports that the manifesto they issued in December 1929 "exercised a strong pull on the disaffected elements" still within the CCP. This "Statement of Our Views" was strongly influenced by Trotsky's current line, says Schwartz. Although it opposed Stalin's line of staying within the Kuomintang it held that "the socialist revolution can be consummated only by the proletariat at the head of the non-proletariat masses." It saw the revolution as well in the future and advised the party to bend all efforts to the recapture of proletarian bases. It advocated formation of a national assembly and said all talk of uprisings must be eschewed.)

In early 1930 Li Li-san, who then enjoyed the endorsement of the Central Committee and the support of the Kremlin, was complaining that "forces of the peasantry, particularly of the Red Army, have far outstripped the forces of the workers" and that "all talk of encircling the city with the country or of relying on the Red Army to take the cities is sheer nonsense!" This was the CCP line in Shanghai -- in direct opposition to Mao's theory.

Despite the fact that Li Li-san was removed from the leadership of the CCP with the aid of the Comintern on charges of a "Trotskyite liquidationist" line, Schwartz is of the opinion that still in the fall of 1930 "there is every indication that Moscow intended to keep the reins of power in the hands of a CC of its own choosing to be located in urban, proletarian Shanghai."

He goes on to say that the documents of the Fourth Plenum in late 1930 appeared to indicate that "the Comintern was now willing to contemplate the establishment of a Soviet government without the possession of urban proletariat bases....Does this mean that the Comintern and the Fourth Plenum had sanctioned the total shift

of power to the Soviet areas -- that they had underwritten Maoism?...I would suggest that even at this late date the Kremlin anticipated no such development, that it did not -- and could not -- take the initiative in divorcing the CCP from its supposed urban proletarian bases, and that it did not thrust the mantle of leadership onto the shoulders of the Front Committee leaders in Hunan and Kiangsi.../but/ assumed that any Soviet government which might arise would be controlled by the party.../and/ it would continue to have central organs in the city...and continue the task of recapturing proletarian bases."

After the election of Mao Tse-tung to chairmanship of the CCP at the First All-China Congress of Soviets in November 1931, the question of who held real power -- Mao in Juichin or the CC in Shanghai -- was still in doubt. Robert North quotes Chang Kuo-t'ao, who had returned from Moscow in April 1931 and was designated vice-chairman under Mao, as stating that "the real power was in the hands of Po Ku (Ch'in Tang-hsien), who handled party affairs, and Chou En-lai, who supervised the military." According to Li Ang, says North, Mao had to use subterfuge and threats to "entice the party hierarchy into the mountains." He sent telegrams to the CC in Shanghai urging its transfer to Juichin because of Shanghai's "white terror" and because of the need for calling the Fifth Plenum where his personal supporters might participate. When these dispatches failed to achieve the desired result, Mao wired an implication that because of communication difficulties it might not be possible henceforth for the soviet areas to supply the party hierarchy with funds. Chang Kuo-t'ao claimed that though Chou En-lai had helped elect Mao chairman of the CEC, he (Chou) "squeezed Mao out" and saw to it that the peasant leader, because of his "peasant psychology," was not elected to the party Central Committee. North says (still using Chang Kuo-t'ao as his source) that even after the Secretariat moved from Shanghai to Juichin in September of 1932, Mao, "still under criticism for his 'countryside' interpretations of communism,...continued out of official favor. Power was now in the hands of Po Ku, with Chou En-lai in charge of military affairs.... Chu Teh was considered only a field commander. Contacts with Moscow were irregular and what directives came through were received not by Mao but by Po Ku."

Mao's power appears to have been consolidated concretely in 1935 at the end of the Long March when the vanguard of the First Army connected with the 25th, 26th, and 27th Red Armies which had established a base of soviet power in Shensi in 1933.

Robert North states: "whatever the details of the various struggles for power, the westerner cannot refrain

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from noting how Mao Tse-tung appears to have risen in spite of -- rather than because of Joseph Stalin and other Communist leaders in Moscow."

Benjamin Schwartz draws the following conclusion: "On the basis of the documentation...we cannot but conclude that Mao established his leadership...by dint of the real military, financial and mass power which had been created by his own successful strategy;...we must therefore conclude that Moscow's recognition of Mao Tse-tung's leadership was essentially in the nature of an acquiescence to a fait accompli."

In addition to the books already mentioned, we discovered a book recently published which from a different but important viewpoint reinforces the basic conclusions of the authors already quoted. The book is "Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power," by Chalmers A. Johnson (Stanford Univ. Press, 1962). The author assigns himself two goals: (1) to investigate the link between the Party's wartime popularity and its postwar triumph ("one must confront the fact that, as a result of the CP's leadership of the resistance the Party obtained a mass following that it subsequently used to conquer all of China") and (2) to illuminate certain aspects of the so-called Yen-an period of Chinese communist history... in terms of a general analysis of mass nationalism.

(Johnson's bibliography runs to over 12 pages and is divided into: Japanese Archives (5 pages of bibliography); Other Chinese and Japanese sources; and Western works (including US Government Documents.)

This book, one among a sizeable collection of serious works on the Chinese Revolution, is of special value for its emphasis on the revolutionary nature of peasant nationalism, both generally and in China particularly.

The author considers it significant that through the "rear-area governments, led by local men or partisans of battle-proved integrity" the rural population "came into contact with their governments for the first time in their history....These wartime governments were not democratic (there was virtually no opposition), but the masses did participate on an enormous scale...in 'governmental' activities via the so-called 'mass movement.' The feeling of belonging and of having a stake in government that grew up in this period was entirely novel to the Chinese masses and it brought with it an exhilarating sense of self-determination...."

There has been some skepticism over the role of armies in a successful revolution. In this connection

some remarks of Trotsky in one of the letters to Preobrazhensky are pertinent:

"...If, even at the beginning of the northern expedition, we had begun to build Soviets in the 'emancipated' regions (and the masses were striving for that), we would have obtained the necessary running start, would have disintegrated the armies of the enemies, obtained our own army and we would have assumed power -- if not in the whole of China at once, then in a very considerable section of it. At present, of course, the revolution is on the decline...." (Emphasis in original.)

The party majority's position that the Soviets in North China were bureaucratic Stalinist dictatorships is not supported by any of the studies we have read or by the eye-witness and journalistic accounts. There was bureaucracy, but the documents of Mao and Chu Teh of the period show recognition of bureaucratic practices and tendencies and the recommendation of methods to eradicate them.

Chalmers Johnson also recognizes and documents the role of Mao Tse-tung as one of opposition to Stalin. He quotes Milovan Djilas: "In a report at a closed session of the 20th Congress, Khrushchev revealed that a clash between Stalin and the Chinese government had barely been averted. The case of the clash with Yugoslavia was not an isolated case, but only the most drastic and the first to occur..."

On the importance of nationalism in the Chinese Revolution, Johnson says: "this...idea of national myth following upon a supplementing social mobilization is useful in understanding the political history of the national Communist states...both states /China and Yugoslavia/ have broken with the USSR in response to different types of Soviet leadership....We observe the emergence in both China and Yugoslavia of indigenous brands of Communism."...."The factor that determined whether or not the Communist efforts succeeded was the social mobilization of the peasantry. Peasant mobilization in response to the Japanese menace, combined with the Communist readiness to lead the nationalistic upsurge in the countryside, was the essential ingredient of the wartime Communist-peasant alliance." (Emphasis added.)

"Indeed, one of the main lessons to be derived from this study is the extent to which nationalism and Communism have become synonymous....('Stalin...brought Communism into conflict with nationalism' -- Hammond)....

Comrade R. Vernon in his document, "The White-Radical Left on Trial" (Vol. 24, No. 26), dwelt at length on the

revolutionary content of nationalism, correctly pointed out that Marxism has failed to deal adequately with this subject. He also points out, however, that "Fidel Castro, Mao, Ho Chi-minh, have not done badly in practice in uniting nationalism and revolutionary action in their respective countries but no generalized inferences of theoretical advances have been crystallized from these struggles." Comrade Vernon is correct in the first part of his statement, but is incorrect in the latter half of his statement when he says no theory came out of it. As comrades can see, having read this far, Mao Tse-tung with respect at least to the role of the peasantry in revolutionary nationalism did indeed provide a theory and the party's problem on China is its failure or refusal to recognize this fundamental fact. These theories and the warfare tactics of surrounding cities were used directly by the Castro leadership in Cuba. Mao's theories are studied throughout Cuba as basic Marxism and indeed throughout all of Latin America. As we shall point out later, it was the tragic failure of the Chinese Trotskyists to understand this very theory being put into action which led them to designate the 1949 Revolution not as a revolution but as a peasant war and to oppose Mao Tse-tung's leadership.

The same kind of "simplistic Marxism" that Comrade Vernon talks about ("Negro-white unity") with respect to white radicals and the Negro movement has its direct parallel in the Chinese Trotskyist and the party's approach to China with respect to the classical role of the proletariat in making the revolution.

New Democracy and the United Front Period

The theory of the revolutionary role of the peasantry was also an integral part of the theory of "New Democracy." In Mao's long document entitled "On the New Democracy" (Jan. 19, 1940), he says:

"It is the common knowledge of every primary schoolboy that 80% of the Chinese population consists of peasants. The percentage is even higher since the occupation of our large cities by the Japanese. Therefore, the peasant question becomes the fundamental question of the Chinese revolution, and the force of the peasantry is the main force of the Chinese revolution. Besides the peasantry, the second largest section of the Chinese population consists of workers. China has several millions of industrial workers....it is they who are the producers in the industrial economy. Without the workers the revolution would not be able to succeed for it is they who are the leaders of the revolution and have the highest revolutionary spirit."

Comrade Macleod in her bulletin, "Red China: Catalyst of world Revolution" (Vol. 23, No. 3), accurately exposed the majority's mechanistic approach to the United Front during the war against the Japanese aggressors. She quoted from statements of Trotsky, reprinted in The Newsletter, London (5/6/61), to remind the comrades that he himself advocated the united front with Chiang Kai-shek in the war against Japanese imperialism. Macleod also quoted from writings of Trotsky in the New International (March and April 1938) in which he envisioned a period for China extremely similar to that of the New Democracy period, also maligned by the party majority.

No member of the majority in support of the PC position has stated that Trotsky was incorrect or even referred to Trotsky's views in connection with the united front and "new democracy."

In a later section of this bulletin we deal with the party's revision of Trotsky's original criteria for a political revolution. One of the by-products of revisionism is the attempt to disguise the process by avoiding reference to the original theoretical positions that are undergoing revision. This is increased when there is a tendency toward cultism.

We openly state that Trotsky was incorrect in his analysis of how the Chinese Revolution would be won with respect to the relative roles of the peasantry and the proletariat. We haven't proved Trotsky and the party incorrect; the Chinese Revolution proved Trotsky and the party incorrect.

In the case of the united front and "new democracy" we state that Trotsky was correct. We haven't proved Trotsky and the Chinese leadership correct; the Chinese Revolution proved Trotsky and the Chinese leadership correct and the party incorrect.

The authors of "A Documentary History of Chinese Communism" assert that it is probable that "On the New Democracy" was written "not simply in order to provide the united front strategy with a theoretical framework, but also to prepare the Party for the possible disintegration of the alliance in the future."

Robert North comments that "during the wartime alliance with non-Communist groups, Chinese Communists often equated Mao Tse-tung's 'new democracy' with the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen -- although in their party councils Communist theoreticians made clear that the differences between the two were far more crucial than the similarities.... We shall observe from Communist sources

how Mao Tse-Tung's 'new democratic' government, theoretically a coalition of various class interests, is actually a weapon for neutralizing or destroying opposition and seizing control of or squeezing out all non-Communist elements within the country." (Emphasis in original.)

In 1942 the "cheng feng" movement (the correction of unorthodox tendencies) was initiated by the Mao leadership. North says: "The Yen-an cheng feng concentrated upon the related problems of elevating the CCP at the expense of other Chinese political groups and elevating Chinese Communism at the expense of the Soviet Communists." It was aimed at two main targets, he says: "(1) vast numbers of new members who had joined the Party ...for patriotic reasons and confused the CCP with other anti-Japanese organizations; and (2) 'Russian formalists' -- those Party members who were well-drilled in Marxist, Leninist, and Stalinist maxims, but who failed to grasp the fact that the Chinese revolution required a new interpretation and application of the basic canon" (Emphasis added.)

"HUNDRED FLOWERS"

The reference to the "quick withering" of the hundred flowers can lead comrades hopelessly astray if it is not put in its historical context of the unfinished Chinese Revolution.

When the Hundred Flowers campaign was initiated the revolution was still in a stage when counter-revolutionary elements of the old capitalist class were numerous, and they bloomed during this period along with genuine leftists and revolutionary critics of bureaucratic practices. In a young revolutionary country, still desperately backward, under attack from American imperialism and infiltrated with its CIA agents, there was still real, not fictional danger from the right, and it manifested itself during the campaign.

To compare this campaign and the abrupt termination of it to the more prolonged and superficially successful destalinization campaign in the Soviet Union is utterly fallacious. The destalinization process in the Soviet Union (which the Kremlin, despite its superficiality, has found it necessary to attempt to suppress) has to be seen in the historical context of the Stalinist counter-revolutionary ice age -- top-to-bottom purges of revolutionary leaders; slave labor camps; etc. -- and the emergence from this period into one of relative liberalization. In the Soviet Union, where the revolution had been consolidated over 40 years, where the planned economy was drawing parallel on many productive levels to

the US level, the pressure of the masses during destalinization for democratization of the super-structure came from the left.

The PC draft charges the Chinese with "obdurate resistance to destalinization," giving no concrete proof of either Stalinism or of obdurate resistance. "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" is a historic document dealing with problems of bureaucracy that is now a basic Marxist text used in Cuba. In any assessment of the Hundred Flowers campaign this document -- the text of a speech made by Mao Tse-tung in February 1957 -- must not be passed over lightly. The document refers to "contradictions among the people" as those between peasants and workers and between working class and intelligentsia and states that: "contradictions do exist between the government and the masses. These include contradictions between the interests of the state, collective interest and individual interests; between democracy and centralism; between those in positions of leadership and the led, and contradictions arising from the bureaucratic practices of certain state functionaries and their relations with the masses." (Emphasis added.) It is significant that Mao Tse-tung and the leadership recognized bureaucratic practices and in fact introduced the Hundred Flowers campaign to seek remedy for these practices and to win the allegiance of intellectuals and that this same leadership had recognized this danger many years ago during the Kiangsi Soviet period and had dealt with it, and again in 1952 in the San Fan movement.

The Mao Tse-tung leadership from the beginning and throughout the revolution showed deep concern for democracy and opposed bureaucratic practices. This is further confirmed in Mao Tse-tung's "Report to the Second All-China Soviet Congress," January 22, 1934. (Source: "A Documentary History of Chinese Communism.") Excerpts follow:

"....Our class line in the agrarian revolution is to depend upon the hired farm hands and poor peasants,.... The village and town Soviets constitute the basic structure of the Soviet system....Congresses of workers', peasants', and soldiers' deputies should be established in places where they do not yet exist....Soviet democracy has progressed far but not far enough. A struggle should be waged against bureaucratism and dictatorialism which create a division between the Soviets and the masses. Persuasion should replace dictatorialism vis a vis the masses....Soviet functionaries should pay close attention to all demands and suggestions of the masses and never neglect them. Soviet functionaries, especially the worker and peasant inspection commissions, should draw in the

broad masses for the critical examination of the work of the Soviet functionaries and lead the struggle in criticizing evil functionaries and even punish them in accordance with Soviet laws, thus maintaining good relations between the Soviets and the masses. In the Soviet elections the significance of the election should be explained to the masses, more electors should be drawn in and alien class elements, corruption, and waste as well as bureaucrats, eliminated. More active workers and peasants should be elected to manage state affairs and more workers inducted into the Soviets in order to strengthen the workers' hegemony in the Soviet regime. In order to get close to the masses the Soviets must establish an intimate connection with the labor unions, the poor peasant unions, representative organs of women workers and peasant women, cooperatives, etc. and mobilize the masses through these organizations to carry out the work of the Soviet...." (Emphasis added.)

Is this a directive that is likely to come out of the mythical Stalinist school that the party has erected to describe the Mao Tse-tung leadership's origins?

The party's false description of the Stalinist dictatorship that is alleged to have ruled over the Soviets in Yen-an later has been completely demolished by all the masses of documents, historical research and reports, etc. referred to by Hilde Mackod. We cited this particular document from 1934 as concrete evidence of the non-Stalinist "schooling" of the Mao Tse-tung leadership and of its concern over democratic practices revealed here as well as in the document on "Contradictions."

We want to bring to the comrades' attention a press clipping from The New York Times by Harrison Salisbury which appeared at the time of the publication of "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People." Salisbury said that Mao "is at pains to reduce embarrassment to his Soviet comrades who have long held that there can be no 'contradiction' between rulers and because their interests are alleged to be identical in a Communist state..

"Mr. Khrushchev said in response to a question that no contradictions existed in the Soviet Union. The question and his answer were deleted from the version of the interview circulated in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries.

"The second area of discrepancies is disclosed by a comparison of the official Peiping version with textual excerpts recently reported from Warsaw.

"According to these excerpts, Mr. Mao criticized Stalin's mistaken views on 'contradictions' as leading

to the Soviet purges and execution of thousands of Communists."

The foregoing observations should serve to expose the fact that the Hundred Flowers branch of the rickety hatrack on which the majority hangs its positional hat is no sturdier than the other branches.

The PC in its two drafts and Comrade Warde in his Militant articles are viewing the present dispute and the destalinization process in terms of superficialities. Has the majority stopped to consider that there is undoubtedly a connection between the attempted suppression of the freedom of writers and artists in the Eastern Soviet bloc and the dispute with China? That literary attempts to explain the evils of the Stalinist epoch lead logically back to the original dispute with the Left Opposition? That practices of peaceful coexistence based on the theory of socialism in one country might be exposed as counter-revolutionary? That freedom for writers could lead to one of them taking up pen in favor of the Chinese revolutionary position internationally? That some writers might eventually voice favor for the communes and other aspects of the Chinese Revolution opposed by the Kremlin? That the attempts to suppress artists and writers are motivated by the same fear that compels the Khrushchev regime to suppress the revolutionary manifestoes coming out of China on the Great Dispute?

COMMUNES

In Comrade Warde's Militant series and in the PC drafts, the experiments in Yugoslavia with decentralization and agrarian policy are mentioned favorably -- by way of contrasting these processes with Chinese developments. But the Chinese communes are not mentioned at all by Warde or in the Sino-Soviet Draft, and only three times in passing critical reference in the Chinese draft. Yet this "experiment" (even to use this term is a gross understatement) makes Yugoslavia's experiments look like spit in the ocean by comparison. Since the communes were a continuous march of the revolution and an upheaval of social relations on an unprecedented scale (involving the largest population on earth), it is fair to say that omission of an evaluation of the communes in these documents is distortion by omission on an unprecedented scale.

The Sino-Soviet draft and Comrade Warde's articles contrast Yugoslavia to the supercentralization and monolithism of the Chinese CP -- overlooking the essential fact that the communes were an example of decentralizing and of extending and deepening the socialist and democratic

content of the Chinese Revolution far surpassing the changes in the superstructure in Yugoslavia.

We refer comrades to an ISR article (Summer, 1962) by Theo Schulze. Among other devastating criticisms and exposures of the Yugoslav "experiments" he says: "the management of some concerns seems more imbued with the spirit of 19th century capitalism than with the socialist consciousness so often appealed to by the communist regime."

BIASED AUTHORITIES OR BIASED COMRADES?

We mentioned earlier that we wished the majority on China were guilty of a little empiricism in their method of approach. The grossest example of the tendency of the sectarian majority (on China) and the sectarian minority to reject facts is provided by Comrade Evelyn Reed in her bulletin, "Biased 'Authorities' on the Chinese Revolution." (Vol. 23, No. 8) Her statement that "a quick glance at the list indicates that some are liberals, some Stalinists, one existentialist, etc. -- but not a single Trotskyist" is an affront to any serious Trotskyist. It is a lesson in how to remain ignorant of facts by means of a blanket denunciation of their sources. As if it were enough merely to "glance at the list" of titles of books and their authors in order to make judgments of the contents and sweep them aside.

The fact is that the attack on the authors en toto listed in Hilde Madeod's bibliography is a crude ploy to discredit the vast research done by Swabeck, Liang and Madeod and to throw up a smokescreen to cover up the fact that there is voluminous material on the Chinese Revolution and its leadership, accumulated by various scholars in research centers at Harvard, Stanford, Princeton, etc., and that the bulk of it completely refutes the evidence on which the party's position is based. These scholars whose studies are contained in books mentioned in Comrade Madeod's bibliography (and in our own) and extensively quoted from were described as "journalists" (and other false and misleading labels) by Comrade Reed with the conclusion that they in all probability would turn out as allegedly biased as she presumes Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley to be -- guilt by association!

During the McCarthy period the bourgeoisie produced all kinds of people and organizations who went about their witch-hunting task of book-burning in the same manner as Comrade Reed. These people and organizations didn't have to read the books to condemn them but pinned a label on the authors and they became tabu. Comrade Reed went guilt by association one better since her blanket condemnation of

Macleod's bibliography is only of names that appear in conjunction with each other on a piece of paper.

We would remind the comrades that the party did not ignore the writings of "non-Marxists, non-Trotskyists, journalists, liberals and existentialists" in examining the facts about the Cuban Revolution (such as C. Wright Mills, I.F. Stone, Warren Miller, Dave Dellinger, Jean Paul-Sartre, etc.).

Edgar Snow is one of those dismissed by Comrade Reed. It happened that we had not read any of his books until after having arrived at our present position (which we first presented in the New York branch discussion this Spring). We were therefore considerably surprised when we recently read "The Other Side of the River" at the amount of information supplied by this "journalist" (we will skip the other labels used by Comrade Reed) on the problems of bureaucracy in China and considerably impressed with the penetrating analysis presented of the Sino-Soviet Dispute -- more basic in many respects from a Marxist viewpoint than the PC draft.

Comrade Reed would evidently have us reject all sources that are non-Marxist and non-Trotskyist. This of course would eliminate Marxism and the Marxist method of study and analysis. It would also leave us with very little in the English language from which to derive our information -- leaving us free from the clutter of "facts." However, we would remind Comrade Reed that if by any chance she has in mind as "priority" sources the works of Comrade Trotsky and Harold Isaacs (which we too have read and studied), these were written before the Chinese Revolution and while little was known of Mao Tse-tung. (Isaacs added a few pages to his book in a later edition after he had become a virulent anti-Communist -- which compelled him to drop the introduction by Trotsky.)

So much for Reed of the Alvin-Reed school.

What of the methodology of Milt Alvin?-- one of the few comrades of the majority who have even bothered to make a written contribution in support of their position.

One of Comrade Alvin's difficulties is that he, like so many others, suffers so acutely from Stalinophobia that he is unable to deal with simple ordinary facts. He is motivated by factionalism instead of by factualism. This is not calculated to produce a high theoretical analysis. He is obviously not up to dealing with or even refuting the mass of evidence presented by Swabeck and Macleod -- and so he does not attempt it.

Peng has been the most prolific of the spokesmen for

the majority. What can be said for his method of approach to the Revolution and its development? How much weight should be given to his judgments?

Comrade Peng and other Chinese Trotskyists in the past several years have merely continued a tradition of sectarianism and dogmatism. The excesses in this direction have produced some interesting political bedfellows. The characterization of the communes as "concentration or forced labor camps" (Peng in letter to J.) is the same as the bourgeoisie's.

"Mao's non-Marxist and non-socialist policy in plunging 600 million Chinese people into slave conditions which are worse than any that could have existed in ancient Rome. Owing to the CP's tight military and police control, the Spartacus of our time has not appeared from among the Chinese masses....etc." (From "On the Chinese Situation" by Mei Lei Tar.) Both Peng's and Mei Lei Tar's remarks appeared in "The Chinese Peasant Communes" (bulletin Vol. 20, No. 8).

This is nothing but aping the slander of the bourgeoisie. Comrade Peng in his bulletin, "On the Nature of the Chinese Communist Party and Its Regime -- Political Revolution or Democratic Reform?" (Vol. 22, No. 4), relies heavily on the writings of Chow Ching-wen, quoting from his book, "Ten Years of Storm."

The following are relevant quotes from reviewers dealing with Chow Ching-wen's efforts:

From a review of Feng Pao Shih Nien ("Stormy Decade") by Chow Ching-wen which appeared in the China Quarterly (July-Sept. 1960) under the byline of Michael Lindsay:

"The book is rather disappointing considering the author's opportunities. A great deal of it only gives the author's opinions without the evidence on which they are based. Hundreds of pages really tell us little more than that the author dislikes communists and to anyone looking for evidence rather than opinions are less satisfactory than some of the analyses produced by people working outside China on the basis of published material"

From a review of Criticism on People's Communes by Chow Ching-wen which appeared in China Quarterly (July-Sept. 1962) under the byline of Roy Hofheinz:

"Chow Ching-wen...has done us a positive disservice in his 'research' work on the communes. After summing up in a simple-minded way the economic problems faced by the regime prior to 1958, he leaps to the conclusion that

the communes were 'built on the mere fancy of the Communist maniacs.'

(China Quarterly is an anti-Communist periodical identified with Congress for Cultural Freedom. Michael Lindsay -- Lord Lindsay of Birker -- is currently a professor in the School of International Service of the American University, Washington, D.C., which trains foreign service personnel. Roy Hofheinz, a frequent contributor to China Quarterly, is working on his dissertation at Harvard University.)

Peng's authority, Chow Ching-wen, author of "Ten Years of Storm," turns out to be a Chinese Miro Cardona!

We are deeply disturbed by what is either the refusal or the inability of leading members of the party and supporters of the majority to refute in the last few years the mass of documentary evidence and theoretical analysis brought to bear in support of the Swabeck-Liang position. This is indeed mute testimony to the bankruptcy of the party's position on China.

In the New York branch the reporter for the majority branded the Swabeck-Liang tendency Stalinist. Since no member of the leadership of the SWP or supporter of the majority position has attempted in any serious manner to refute -- by dealing directly with it -- the enormous amount of evidence brought to bear in support of the Swabeck-Liang position, they have not earned the right to brand that tendency as anything. To label comrades Stalinist only points up the majority's hopelessness in the face of mounting evidence of their incorrect position. The use of this label is clearly for the purpose of keeping the ranks in line on the China question. We ourselves did several months of intensive research on China before reaching our conclusions. The silence of the leadership in these polemics is politically significant. And so is their apparent notion that they can rely on the rank and file to support their line automatically. It is not a complimentary reflection on the comrades supporting the majority position.

ANALYSIS OF MAJORITY POSITION AND METHODS

1955 Resolution -- Root of the Trouble

The fault of the present majority position on China, reflected both in the Sino-Soviet draft and the Chinese draft, is that it is based on the 1955 Resolution.

By presuming to analyze the Dispute before making a thorough re-examination of the origins and development

of the Chinese regime, the PC was putting the cart before the horse. Aside from this methodological error, the publication of the main content of the Sino-Soviet draft in the Militant prior to party discussion and convention vote was a violation of internal democratic procedure. The PC, by authorizing the publication of the articles on the Sino-Soviet Dispute in the Militant, was using the party press during pre-convention discussion as a propaganda instrument for its own position on the Dispute and on the Chinese regime. The comrades are asked to vote on the line after articles appeared publicly in the Militant and in pamphlet form putting forward the PC line -- a neat fait accompli.

Putting the cart before the horse has been the pattern of the party's approach to the Chinese Revolution and its leadership. From the very beginning, the party has mechanically superimposed a theory onto the reality. But since the theory didn't fit, it had to misrepresent the realities of the revolution. The theory, in the process of being applied to a false situation, became as twisted as the facts. The errors of the past, instead of being corrected, are thus deepened and extended. A Bolshevik party can do itself no greater damage.

Historical developments have already proven the falseness of the prognostications in the 1955 Resolution. This was inevitable since the 1955 draft was based on the mistaken historical analysis of the CCP as Stalinist. The following excerpts from the Draft are glaring examples of the historically disproved prognostications which stemmed from this original incorrect analysis:

"The Maoist policy at home finds its extension in the foreign policy.

"The Stalinist chieftains in China are animated by a twofold fear: the fear of imperialist assault and the fear of the permanent revolution.

"Mao & Co. are now continuing an already well-established line of status quo, 'peaceful co-existence,' etc., for the next fifty years."

"This nationalist policy is bound to have the most reactionary consequences in foreign policy...."

"World imperialism which could never come to any lasting agreements with the Soviet Union is even less capable today of coming to any lasting agreements with the Soviet Union and China who have been thrown together into an alliance which neither Peking nor Moscow dares upset...."

"One thing is certain, there is no solution along the course of the Peking and Kremlin bureaucracies. Their narrow nationalist course, their co-existence line, brings them into conflict with the needs of the world socialist revolution, but it will not save them from imperialist assault...."

A reading of the majority bulletins, the Militant and party resolutions on China provide a truly remarkable collection of false prognostications. Has the majority and its supporters never stopped to think that such a collection of false prophecies on one single revolution and its leadership constitutes evidence of the incorrectness of the party's basic position?

A Superficial View of Destalinization

The PC draft on the Sino-Soviet Dispute fails to get at the root causes of the dispute, fails in "clarifying controversial issues with methods of Marxism-Leninism" and is far from telling "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth." The voice of Trotskyism by not using the methods of Marxism-Leninism is obscuring the fundamental issues.

In a nutshell, what is "the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?" The Chinese Revolution under the leadership of the CCP -- against Stalin's orders -- smashed counter-revolutionary Stalinism and led a successful revolution. This is fundamental, and basic to the present Sino-Soviet Dispute. The present dispute is the logical extension of the original break with Stalinism, no more no less -- a continuation of a revolutionary dispute going on for years both in theory and practice.

The PC's piece de resistance, therefore -- the charge of obdurate resistance by the CCP to destalinization -- falls flat on its historical face before it gets off the ground.

The charge against the Chinese of obdurate resistance to destalinization is based on a fallacious and superficial concept that has nothing in common with Trotsky's analysis of Stalinism.

There is a Marxist (i.e. Trotskyist) explanation for the alleged "resistance" of the CCP to Khrushchev's destalinization!

The Chinese under Mao's leadership have recorded both in their theoretical writing and revolutionary practice their resistance to the Kremlin's sabotaging interference

in the Chinese Revolution. This dates from Mao's criticism of the ^{Comintern} line on the peasantry and the policy of the proletariat tail-ending the bourgeoisie in the 1925-27 Revolution; through Mao's theory of the revolutionary role of the peasantry (condemned by the Kremlin and the CCP in Shanghai); through Stalin's bloc with Chiang Kai-shek to suppress and sabotage the Chinese Revolution; through the carrying out of that Revolution in the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek by Mao (against Stalin's orders); through the counter-revolutionary sabotage of the communes by the Kremlin; through the ideological and military support by the Kremlin of capitalist India against revolutionary China; through the present great historical struggle against the revisionism of the Kremlin and its counter-revolutionary detente with the West.

The Chinese thus derive from their own revolutionary history and conflict with the Kremlin their profound understanding -- irrespective of the tactics and arguments they use -- that the Kremlin's line which purports to destroy the evil remnants of the past is in essence nothing more than a Stalinist destalinization.

Our party majority, by describing the one regime as more correct on the matter of destalinization and democratization and the other regime as more correct on the international class struggle and then taking the "rounded view" that both are essentially non-Marxist and must be replaced, entirely misses the essential nature of the Dispute.

This "balanced" or "rounded" view is precisely the methodology used by the sectarian minority in their approach to Cuba: a bureaucracy is a bureaucracy is a bureaucracy and they all equal Stalinism.

Criteria for Political Revolution

The current PC Draft on the Chinese regime as well as the draft on the Sino-Soviet Dispute hedges on the question of calling for a political revolution. (Wohlforth's amendment seeks to 'correct' this.) However, the content of the resolutions and the logic of the approach implicitly retains this line which was an explicit conclusion of the 1955 Resolution.

This line was then and is now a revision of Trotskyist theory. The party has set up new criteria -- not Trotsky's or the original position of world Trotskyism -- for judging the necessity for political revolution in workers' states.

We must go back to some ABC's of Trotskyism.

In Trotsky's original analysis of Stalinism, the rise of the bureaucracy and Stalin's assumption of power -- with the Thermidorean reaction, resulting in destruction of workers' democracy, soviets, internal party democracy, bloody and violent extermination of opposition, total replacement of the original leadership, etc. -- were absolutely necessary ingredients for the establishment of the theory of socialism in one country and the crystallization of its counter-revolutionary character both nationally and internationally. The Fourth International was formed because of the counter-revolutionary character of Stalinism, in the Comintern and domestically.

In the introduction to Trotsky's "The Stalin School of Falsification," Max Schachtman capsulized Trotsky's thinking in this manner: "The Stalin bureaucracy which has concentrated all power in its hands is, for the time being, the triumphant bearer of a political counter-revolution....The political counter-revolution has thus far mainly affected the political super-structure of the state. If its retrogressive force is not to affect fundamentally the economic sub-structure...the new super-structure must be changed. In a word, the political power must be restored to the proletarian masses by overthrowing the bureaucratic machine.... The revolution will not be led by or against the Bolshevik Party; it no longer exists as a political party or a living organism.... The revolution will be directed against the new political party that took form in the period of the Soviet reaction, the party of the Stalinist bureaucratic machine...." (Emphasis added.)

In his foreword to the American Edition of the same book, Trotsky wrote: "The death agony of Stalinism signifies the death agony of the Comintern. This international organization is now the main internal obstacle in the path of the emancipation of the working class....The functionaries of the Comintern represent in all relations -- theoretical, political and moral --- a type which is the polar opposite of the revolutionist. They hang on to Stalin, who in turn needs them for the maintenance of his tyranny in the USSR....After an initial period of bewilderment and vacillation, its swift disintegration is inevitable....At the cost of terrible defeats and sacrifices, the main responsibility for which falls upon the Soviet bureaucracy, the proletarian vanguard will find its historic road. Ever more confidently will it rally its ranks under the banner of the Fourth International which is already rising today on the shoulders of its predecessors." (Emphasis added.)

In the "Manifesto of the Fourth International to the Workers, the Exploited and the Oppressed Colonial Peoples of the Entire World" (April 1946), Trotsky reminds us that his slogan, from the beginnings of the development of the Fourth International in 1923, was: Back to Lenin! "That was the original battle-cry of the Trotskyist Left Opposition against Stalin and the whole clique that then began its counter-revolutionary course by revising the internationalist, class-struggle theory of Lenin and Marx." (Emphasis in original.)

Trotsky never separated the internal deformations of the Stalinist bureaucracy from its international counter-revolutionary effects when he talked of the necessity for a political overturn and the formation of a new International.

In their revisionism the party majority, in dealing with the Chinese Revolution, has abstracted separate, subsidiary and secondary issues from the original theory and program of the Fourth International and raised them to the point of principle. In place of the original criteria --- the national and international counter-revolutionary nature of Stalinism -- the party separates and puts forward as criteria, as if they were of equal weight, issues of the internal structure (workers' democracy, inequities in living standards between some of the bureaucracy and the masses, absence of opposition socialist parties, etc.). This obscures the integral connection between lack of socialist democracy and the international counter-revolutionary character of Stalinism. At the same time the concrete history of the Chinese Revolution is slighted (the "phantom revolution") and the role of its leadership is either falsely branded Stalinist or is negated (the "leaderless revolution").

Nowhere in all of Trotsky's writings or in the original documents of the Fourth International is there a call for political revolution on the basis of bureaucratic tendencies alone and lack of full workers' democracy per se. Nowhere. The concept has something in common with the utopian Socialist Labor Party and the Schachtmanites but not with Trotskyism.

The party majority has so distorted Trotsky's theories relating to the question of political revolutions that we now have people in the party who believe that bureaucratic formations, inequities between the bureaucracy and the masses and violations of workers' democracy in and of themselves constitute the criteria for a call for political revolution and the existence of the Fourth International.

On the one hand we have party members supporting the majority by totally evading the basic criteria (whether the Chinese regime is counter-revolutionary) and concentrating on bureaucratic features; while on the other hand the more bold Stalinophobic sectarians go through the most incredibly tortured, sublime nonsense to prove the counter--revolutionary nature of the revolutionary regime. Sectarianism in its extreme form becomes not only unhinged from dialectical materialism but departs from formal logic as well. It has produced what we can only describe as the Trotskyist School of Falsification of the Chinese Revolution.

What About Bureaucracy?

The state at any stage is a form of bureaucracy; it can have democracy in varying degree depending on circumstances. But

bureaucracy per se can only be eliminated by the elimination of the state, not possible until the completion of the world socialist revolution.

China has bureaucracy and bureaucratic practices. Its forms of socialist democracy are not what we would like them to be. But judging from all the information we are able to gather, there is considerably more basic socialist democracy than the majority sees.

Trotsky first examined the problem of bureaucracy in The New Course in 1923 and dealt with it as an inescapable phenomenon. It was only some ten years later on the basis not of bureaucracy but of the qualitative change -- that is, of the degeneration of the bureaucracy into national and international counter-revolutionary obstacle in actions and theory -- that Trotsky called for political overthrow of the regime.

In 1921-22 in Russia, Trotsky and Lenin had to combat a tendency known as the "Workers' Opposition", which challenged the foundations of Soviet power with its anarcho-syndicalist demands. A reference to some of the remarks leveled against them should help to put into perspective the "anarcho-syndicalist" demands upon the Chinese leadership being made by our own sectarian comrades.

In the pamphlet, "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," Lenin had written in 1918: "It must be said that large-scale machine industry...calls for absolute and strict unity of will, which directs the joint labors of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. The technical, economic and historical necessity of this is obvious, and all those who have thought about socialism have always regarded it as one of the conditions of socialism. But how can strict unity of will be ensured? By thousands subordinating their will to the will of one. Given ideal class consciousness and discipline on the part of those taking part in the common work, this subordination would rather remind one of the mild leadership of a conductor of an orchestra. It may assume the sharp forms of a dictatorship if ideal discipline and class consciousness are lacking. Be that as it may, unquestioning subordination to a single will is absolutely necessary for the success of processes organized on the pattern of large-scale machine industry." (Emphasis in original.)

In 1920 Lenin had to fight hard to get acceptance of the principle of one-man management in industry, against people who considered, on grounds of alleged principle, that every decision must be taken by a committee. (Brian Pearce in Labour Review, Oct.-Nov. 1960)

Trotsky commented in 1921 that the Workers' Opposition "places the workers' right to choose their representatives above the Party, as it were, as if the Party were not entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship temporarily clashed with the passing moods of the workers' democracy." (Emphasis added.)

Preobrazhensky (who later became the chief economist of the Left Opposition) accused the whole tendency which the Workers' Opposition represented of favoring a "headless" economy. To their preoccupation with the idea that the function of the state after the revolution was to wither away, Trotsky replied that until this ideal stage could be achieved, "the road to socialism lies through a period of the highest possible intensification of the principle of the state."

The SWP is in fact applying the workers' opposition, anarcho-syndicalist demands to the Chinese Revolution. The party draws closer to the SLP each day it entrenches itself deeper into its sectarian position on China.

Misrepresentations of Chinese Ideological Position

The 1955 PC Resolution failed to apply theory in the correct historical context and failed to accept certain undisputed real facts of the history of the revolution and its leadership; thus it arrived at a false analysis of the Revolution and made prognostications that have been disproved by history. It is therefore not surprising that the Sino-Soviet draft, based as it is on the 1955 Resolution, has distorted and fabricated many of the essentials of the present ideological position of the Chinese in the Sino-Soviet Dispute in an attempt to make it fit conclusions of the 1955 Resolution, including the prognosis of political revolution.

The Sino-Soviet Draft states that the CCP does not acknowledge the necessity of extending the socialist revolution to the advanced capitalist countries. This is false, as the writings of Mao Tse-tung and other CCP leaders testify. They not only urge the independent struggle of the proletariat in the imperialist strongholds, but went to great lengths to attack the CP in the U.S. for its failure to break with the party of Kennedy and conduct a militant class-struggle. (Our press published this document.) How can they demonstrate more clearly their recognition of the need for revolutionary class struggle in the advanced capitalist countries?

Another example of a falsification of the CCP's ideological position appears on page 9 of the Sino-Soviet Draft: the Chinese, it says, "imply that the achievement of military preponderance by the 'socialist camp,' plus the 'peoples' revolutionary struggle' can pull the nuclear teeth of imperialism."

The CCP position is the very antithesis of this. In the Peking Review of March 15, 1963 a long article, "More on Our Differences with Togliatti," appears. It goes to great lengths to point out that, on the contrary, it is the peoples' revolutionary struggle and not the achievement of military preponderance that can stop imperialism. Repeatedly it insists that the contra-

dictions of the capitalist world will not disappear as a result of the change in the world balance of forces. To quote just one sentence from an entire section: "How can it be said that the ruling forces in the capitalist countries will voluntarily quit the stage of history as a result of this change in the world balance of forces?" They berate the Italian CP because "those very views are to be found in the program of Togliatti and other comrades."

The PC's stating of the Chinese position on this question is completely false.

SECTARIANISM

Two Parallels: Cuba Minority and China Majority

In Comrade Joe Hansen's document, "Cuba, the Acid Test" (Vol. 24, No. 2), with which we are in agreement, he cites China as an example of the party's ability to come to a decision on Cuba. There's the rub!

The party has not met the acid test of the Chinese Revolution -- and it is precisely in its faulty approach to China that the seeds for the minority position on Cuba were nurtured. To make Cuba the acid test is in fact testimony to the fact that the party has not met the acid test of the Chinese Revolution in all these years. In this lies the clue to the theoretical confusion that currently abounds in the party and in the world Trotskyist movement.

Comrade Rosemary Stone (co-author of this document) in a bulletin on the Cuban discussion, "On Viewing Contradictions in the Cuban State" (Vol. 22, No. 13), attempted to dissect and expose the methodology of Shane Mage and the minority. Ironically, many of the points made are equally applicable to the majority's methodology on China. So are the points made by Joe Hansen in "Cuba, the Acid Test." Try it, comrades -- leaf through and for minority, read majority; for Cuba, read China.

In short, the PC, in order to reach the prejudicial conclusions on China contained in the Sino-Soviet Draft and the Chinese Draft has had to resort to the methodology of the sectarian minority on Cuba. The similarity is most glaringly seen in the artificial device of separating workers' democracy and bureaucracy from the primary basic criterion of whether the regime is or is not counter-revolutionary in relation to the world revolutionary class struggle. Thus the cry of "no workers' democracy" has been raised out of the context of present reality as well as out of the context of history. It stems from failure to understand and accept the revolutionary role of the peasantry and the subjective role of the respective developing leaderships in both countries.

The party majority has reached a correct position on Cuba, through its dialectical understanding of the relationship between the subjective factor of leadership and the objective factor of the masses. On China it has had to junk completely this consistent Marxist methodology. Otherwise the parallels in the revolutions would become apparent, upsetting and exposing its original mistakes.

We are not alone in seeing the basic contradiction in method by the party leadership on Cuba and China. It has been pointed out by both the Swabeck-Liang tendency and the Mage-Robertson-Wohlforth-Phillips tendencies.

The fact that the party's sectarian minority does not declare its solidarity with the majority on China should not obscure the fact that fundamentally they are in agreement with the majority on this question. The minority only want to make the call for political revolution louder and clearer, but on the general characterization of the Chinese regime and on the key issue confronting revolutionary parties throughout the world -- the meaning of China's role in the Great Debate and in the world revolutionary struggle -- they are in essential agreement.

Chinese Sectarrians: How Not to See a Revolution

Comrades Swabeck and Liang have already dealt with the tragic abstentionism and eventual opposition, the result of sectarian dogmatism, on the part of the Chinese sector of the Fourth International (the sector on which the PC has based much of its position).

One aspect we wish to emphasize which is revealed in the 1952 documents was the attack on Comrade Maki, who had examined and exposed the sectarian errors of his fellow Chinese Trotskyists and called for a different course in his historic document. It was with incredulity that we read the attack on Maki contained in the International Informational Bulletin, April 1952. The basis of the attack on Maki was that the revolution of 1949 was not a revolution. Since the revolution was allegedly led by a Stalinist party (they described it as a Bonapartist military dictatorship that did "not represent the interests of workers and peasants but those of the bourgeoisie") and since the main revolutionary armies consisted largely of peasantry, the revolution was referred to as a peasant war.

The 1952 bulletins (with the exception of Maki's) remain high-water marks, or more accurately low-water marks, in the Trotskyist movement with respect to Stalinophobic sectarianism and the inability or refusal to understand the role of the peasantry as the revolutionary battering ram developed in Mao's theories for a successful revolution.

The Trotskyists subsequently took an oppositionist position

to the leadership of the revolution. They were sent to jail. The deeply moving and eloquent but hopeless plea of Comrade Maki to the Chinese comrades to abandon their sectarian and dogmatic abstentionism and to take part in the revolution as Trotskyists is a historic document. (International Information Bulletin, March 1952)

"After the revolution broke out, we did not try to enlarge it, and to raise it to a higher level, but dreamed that another independent revolution would rise up under our own leadership. As a result, our party not only lost a good opportunity for development, but afterwards the confidence of the masses was greatly diminished and the faith of a part of the comrades was also shaken. Moreover, the rise of the workers' movement at that time was more or less hindered. All these mistakes derive from the wrong appreciation of the situation which, however, is not a mistake in principle. But we must admit this was a very serious mistake, or we might even say that it is the greatest political mistake ever committed in the history of the Chinese Trotskyist movement."

Three Revolutions: Two Delayed Hits and One Error

To the limited degree that their inadequate theories were put into practice or counterposed against the theories and practice of the viable revolutionary leaderships, Trotskyists in China, and Cuba and less directly in Algeria (via the party's position on the MNA as cultivated by Shane Mage) fell into the historic category of oppositionists. (In such situations harsh labels and harsh reprisals are inevitable. This happened as we know in China, with tragic results. To a lesser degree it happened in Cuba.)

The Cuban Revolution did not happen according to established Trotskyist norms; neither has the Algerian Revolution proceeded according to norms. Neither did the Chinese Revolution.

The party's position on Cuba in the early stages of the Castro Revolution was mechanical Marxism. We did not understand the role of the peasantry or the leadership -- or the interactions between the two. Like many a radical tendency we had spokesmen (i.e. Myra Tanner Weiss) at public functions referring to Castro as adventurist (nor do the authors of this document claim for themselves any deeper an insight at that time). In branch educationals and at public forums the stress was always in those days on the urban proletariat in Havana.

Neither the Trotskyist movement nor the PSP played any role in the Cuban Revolution. Both were incorrect and the Castro leadership correct. Only after the Cuban Revolution had been stabilized and through an honest and objective effort to understand and explain it was the Party able to acknowledge the revolutionary role of the peasantry and the leadership's class-

conscious development.

In Algeria, had there been Trotskyists among the MNA many would today not be alive.

There are striking parallels with the Chinese Revolution and the Algerian Revolution with respect to clashes of armed revolutionaries supporting different theories of how the revolution can be won. In China, those pursuing a mechanical Marxist theory of the role of the proletariat came into direct clash with Mao Tse-tung who based himself on the theory of the peasantry as the battering ram of the revolution. The MNA, basing itself upon a particular sectarian theory with respect to the necessity of revolution in France, came into direct conflict with the FLN which was pursuing a different course and people were killed. Mao Tse-tung was correct; the FLN was correct.

In Algeria the CP was obstructionist -- in the concrete. The SWP, while it followed the position of Shane Mage and the IC in support of the MNA was obstructionist -- in theory.

The facts finally demonstrated to the party that Comrade Mage's analysis was incorrect, but that was late in the game. (When the revolution was well underway and the FLN clearly leading it, we were still selling pamphlets on Mesali Hadj, a now totally discredited politician.) The role of the peasantry in Algeria was not clearly understood. (In criticizing the methodology of the minority during the Cuba discussion some time ago, Comrade Doug (a co-author of this document) cited the literary exchange between Comrades Shane Mage and Patrick O'Daniel on Algeria in order to expose Mage's errors on both revolutions. History has now vindicated O'Daniel in the essentials of his position on Algeria.)

The party has arrived haltingly at the acceptance of the revolutionary role of the peasantry in Cuba and Algeria and has not accepted it in China. The minority has been consistent in the application of its sectarian orthodoxy to the Chinese, the Cuban and the Algerian Revolutions. It has not accepted the revolutionary role of the peasantry in any of them.

It is instructive to review the pattern of thinking over the years of minority comrade Tim Wohlforth who in the essentials shares the position of the Mage-Robertson tendency. Comrade Tim in 1959 held what in our opinion was the correct line on the Chinese communes, and followed the party's correct turn on Algeria, away from Mage. Later he reversed himself on both positions.

He could only make this shift by reversing his methodological approach. Once he reversed himself on China (i.e. adopted the party majority's position), he had logically by following the same method the party applied to China to arrive at a conclusion on Cuba like that held by the minority. The party majority with

its particular axe to grind on China has been unable to see or unwilling to admit the parallels.

Had the party and the Chinese Trotskyists properly understood the Chinese Revolution, they might not have been misled in the early phases of Cuba and Algeria -- or have misled and confused young comrades trying to understand and apply Marxist theory to revolutionary practice, many of whom are now in the camp of the sectarian minority on Cuba.

THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL -- A SEPARATE TENDENCY?

A clue to the fundamental error in the party majority's thinking is found in the second paragraph on page 29 of the Sino-Soviet Draft Resolution: "Five distinct political and ideological tendencies have ... been drawn into the (debate): Khrushchev's, Mao's, the Yugoslavs', the Fidelista Cubans' and the Trotskyists'."

On first reading this appears correct and unassailable. But in fact it is the key to the historically undialectical premise on which the resolution is based, deriving from the false conclusions of the 1955 Resolution.

First, the Yugoslavs are not a distinct political and ideological tendency separate from the Kremlin. They represent the most extreme form of revisionism and have in fact been acting recently as the agitational spearhead of the Kremlin's revisionist tendency. Although the Kremlin of course has historic hegemony, there is considerable significance in this relationship. Here again the party's confusion leads to startling errors.

The Trotskyist movement was created out of the necessity to struggle for revolutionary victories against the counter-revolutionary policies of the Comintern under Stalin. The Fourth International was formed as a party vehicle to achieve workers' state powers. Since its formation, state power has been won in China, Cuba and Yugoslavia.

We have designated China, Cuba and Yugoslavia workers' states. How then can the tendency of the Fourth International, or Trotskyism, be posed as a distinct and different political and ideological tendency from that of the Chinese when they, unlike the Khrushchev tendency (remnants of the Stalinist counter-revolutionary bureaucracy), broke through the barriers of Stalinist counter-revolution and, unlike Tito, are pushing forward against the class-collaborationist, peaceful coexistence Stalinist line toward the achievement of world revolution through class struggle?

The failure of the Yugoslav regime to develop a world revolutionary outlook, its past and present conciliation with imperialism, and its revisionist alliance with Khrushchev lies precisely

in the fact that the Yugoslav leadership never built, in years of struggle as the Chinese did, a distinct Marxist revolutionary tendency with theories and practices separate and independent from Stalin and the Comintern. As a small nation, after it split from the Kremlin it was thereby forced into a detente with the West.

The logical extension of the party's revisionist position on China is to do what it is now doing: to pose the tendency of Trotskyism either against or separate from the leadership of a tendency which has broken with Stalinism through revolution and now holds state power and is promulgating the international proletarian revolution, thus achieving the elementary task for which the Fourth International was formed. Only self-deception can blind us to the recognition that Stalinist counter-revolution was broken and the struggle for power won -- though not by Trotskyists -- and a Marxist-Leninist international revolutionary program is being advocated.

What has taken place over the last decade is a revision by our party of the original theoretical basis of the Fourth International under Trotsky's leadership. Though Trotsky himself was far from the mark in his understanding and prognosis of the course of the Chinese revolution, he would not have countenanced the revision of his main theories in order to justify any error of prognosis or evaluation he made. At any rate the party cannot maintain its present position on China and presume to call it a Trotskyist position.

Should the regime in China degenerate to the point of qualitative change -- i.e. to a national and international counter-revolutionary caste, then the call for political revolution will be the correct Trotskyist position to take.

CONCLUSIONS

The PC Sino-Soviet Resolution and Warde's Militant articles stress the failure of the Chinese Communist Party to delve into the root causes of its dispute with Moscow and to uncover the fundamentals of the struggle between Stalin and the Left Opposition. We are correct in criticizing Peking for this.

However, this constitutes only a criticism of the Chinese regime's understanding of a phase of history -- not of the concrete processes and actions which they themselves went through and carried out in history.

Trotskyists must be willing to admit their errors and the errors of the Chinese Trotskyists in opposing Mao's theories and leadership at the very time the Kremlin was attacking Trotsky. If we do not seek out and tell the truth about the Chinese Revolution, how can Trotskyists expect the Chinese to seek out and

tell the truth about Trotskyism and its origins? The party becomes an obstacle to the very thing it advocates. By identifying Mao and the CCP leadership with Stalinism -- lumping the Khrushchev and the Mao bureaucracies together as being Stalinist in origin -- we make impossible the task of educating, which the PC sees our role to be. We only succeed in sowing added confusion about Trotskyism. The real nature of Stalinism and the circumstances that gave rise to it are further obscured.

There is an understandable but not excusable tendency to separate Trotsky from Marxists who make errors and to separate Trotsky's theories and Trotsky himself from the main body of Marxism, which borders on cultism. It blocks the capacity to re-examine history when history demands re-examination. We do no honor to Trotskyism in this, and Trotsky as a Marxist would be the first to let us know it.

The historical root cause of the Sino-Soviet Dispute is the Chinese Revolution itself. China, by breaking through the counter-revolutionary barrier of Stalinism, shifted the revolutionary center of gravity to itself. A colossal world struggle between the two great powers -- one counter-revolutionary, the other revolutionary -- became inevitable.

To acknowledge the Chinese Revolution as the root cause of the Dispute would of course demolish the PC's theory that the present ideological differences represent a confrontation between two counter-revolutionary, Stalinist-type bureaucracies. But this is precisely what history requires our party leadership to do. The core of the present dispute is the Chinese Revolution.

What Is Ahead?

The pivotal question for all radical parties today and for the world Trotskyist movement is the revolutionary regroupment based on break-up of the Stalinist monolith centered around the Sino-Soviet dispute -- and the possible formation of a new International under hegemony of the Chinese. The position the party takes on this will determine our attitude toward this revolutionary regroupment. The party's position as advocated in the PC drafts on the Sino-Soviet Dispute and the Chinese regime not only obscures what is at stake but are obstacles to the Trotskyist movement playing a role.

What is at stake? There is a colossal struggle between the Chinese CCP coming down on the side of a Marxist-Leninist program for international proletarian revolution and in defense of its own revolution against the counter-revolutionary acts of the Kremlin in their peaceful coexistence detente with imperialism.

This is a world-wide struggle for ideological hegemony within the world revolutionary movement, and the fate of mankind does

indeed rest in the balance. The Swabeck-Liang tendency takes the position that the present dispute is a continuation of the Chinese leadership's historic dispute with the Kremlin culminating in the 1949 Revolution against Stalin's orders, through the communes, sabotaged by the Kremlin, and to its present historic stage of a world-wide ideological struggle amounting to virtual civil war between China and the Kremlin.

The sectarian majority and minority, blinded by stalino-phobia, says a plague on both your houses, thus abstaining from a clear-cut position.

All revolutionists recognize that historic junctures occur in the global class struggle which resolve themselves down to the question of, "which side are you on?" And in the final analysis, "if you aren't with me you're against me."

The abstentionist position of the Trotskyist movement on the Sino-Soviet Dispute, coupled with the position of support for a political overthrow of the Chinese leadership that is leading the historic dispute for international proletarian revolution against the counter-revolutionary class-collaborationist Kremlin will be considered (and rightly so) by the revolutionary movements supporting China throughout the world, mainly in Southeast Asia, South America and Africa, as an obstructionist position.

The Kremlin's suppression of the Chinese revolutionary manifestoes is an absolutely necessary act to protect the interests of the counter-revolutionary bureaucracy in the Soviet Union. When the consciousness of the Soviet workers in the Soviet bloc countries becomes lit by the Chinese revolutionary torch, a process of ideological dispute will probably begin between those sections supporting the revolutionary position of China and the counter-revolutionary bureaucracy in the Kremlin and those who support it for their own interests.

The revolutionary manifestoes of the Chinese Revolution thus become a probable ideological weapon and catalyst agent for the beginning development of a process leading toward a political revolution in the Soviet Union and the eventual achievement of the world revolutionary program advocated by the Chinese. Thus a process is in all likelihood being set in motion that leads towards the eventual goal of the Fourth International. To support the political overthrow of the source of this revolutionary process is contrary to the aims of the Fourth International.

CHINA -- A "COLORED REVOLUTION"

Note: The ideas in this section are offered for consideration, not as a fully developed and final point of view.

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The permanent revolution in its present unfolding has an added dimension never dealt with by Trotsky (except in the internal situation in the U.S. with respect to the special role of the Negro movement in the socialist revolution). In his time it had not fully manifested itself. That is the role of color in the struggles of the colonial and semi-colonial sectors of the world against white imperialism. This phenomenon has a place in the theory of the permanent revolution. Trotsky's contribution will be extended and deepened by further study and analysis of this aspect of it. Comrade R. Vernon has already made an historical contribution in his bulletin which puts the "colored revolution" into the national context of the permanent revolution.

For reasons of geography, soil, climate, etc. and the resulting peculiarities (combined and uneven) of productive and economic development, capitalist relations developed first among societies composed of white races. In a certain sense this can be said to have been an accident of history. As capitalism proceeded through its stages of expansion, however, its exploitation of colored races was not an accident. As the mercenaries and missionaries of the "new" culture moved into other areas of the world they found these occupied by Indians, Asiatics, Melanesians, Negroes, etc., each race pigmented differently from themselves. Conquerors long before the capitalist epoch had claimed for themselves attributes of superiority to justify their subjugation of defeated peoples. Never before in history, however, had a social philosophy of superiority been built up solely and consistently on color. Capitalism thus branded itself from infancy and stamped its future with racism. By establishing a pattern of race relationships it doomed itself to a social war of color just as surely as its productive relationships doomed it to an economic war of classes. The two struggles, color and class, are not coincidental and they are not merely parallel but are inextricably meshed together. The conflict between the white and the colored races can no more be resolved while capitalism exists on the globe than can the conflict between capital and labor.

It is not enough for Marxists to say that class supersedes color -- that the class struggle must be placed over and above considerations of color. That becomes abstract dogmatism extracted

from the concrete reality. Capitalism and imperialism have ground the two struggles together. The sharper the global class struggle becomes, the sharper will be the conflicts of color. Marxists must deepen their understanding of the roots and dimensions of the color divisions. For in the general and global sense the colored revolutions cannot but be, in essence, revolutions against capitalism.

The Chinese Revolution should be viewed in this context as well as in the context of class.

We must never forget that the nationalist revolutionary aspirations of the Chinese people (colored) symbolize the revolutionary thrust of the vast majority of mankind (colored). In the context of the Sino-Soviet Debate against the Kremlin (white) and the Kremlin's detente with imperialism (white), this has enormous significance. There will be an eventual development of consciousness on the part of masses of Negroes in the U.S. to this aspect of the Debate. (Malcolm X refers to the Soviet Union as white.) Alongside the developing consciousness of the colonialist nature of the internal exploitation of Negroes by whites, is the increasing awareness of the racist nature of the external international colonialism of the U.S.

An error in the evaluation of the Chinese leadership and of the Chinese revolution will ultimately destroy any bid Trotskyists make for revolutionary leadership in this country, and in most others.

In the eyes of masses of colored peoples of the world who look to the Chinese for hegemony, white radicals who stand opposed to the leadership of the Chinese Revolution are standing opposed to their own (the colored peoples') aspirations. The colored peoples of Asia, Africa and South America align themselves with China in the dispute with Moscow in part because the USSR and its European satellites are white and China is colored, but more basically because the class-collaborationist Communist Parties in the imperialist countries are white and because Moscow collaborates with white imperialism against the African revolution, against the Asian revolution and against the South American revolution. The profoundly revolutionary nature of nationalism both internally in the U.S. and externally in the colonial revolution where racism was indigenous to capitalist exploitation is significant. While they may share white radicals' rejection of the revisionist Khrushchev regime, might it not appear to them that opposition to the Peking regime is slipping onto the other side in alignment against the colored masses of the earth?

We repeat, at this historic juncture the Trotskyist movement cannot afford to misjudge the Chinese Revolution.

In the United States the Muslim movement cannot be understood by schematic Marxists, because their methodology prevents them from recognizing the unusual and varied forms which social protest takes on -- and its revolutionary potential. Comrade Carmen in the New York branch discussion penetrated to the roots of this failure of the minority tendency when she pointed out in the discussion on the Negro Resolution, "Freedom Now," that there is a dialectical relationship between the hopeless disorientation of the minority on the complexities of the Negro movement and the racism in the social structure of our society.

The disorientation of the SLL in England on the Negro struggle has its roots in a material base: privileged white workers in a white society built up on centuries of colonialist exploitation of colored races.

To masses of exploited workers and peasants throughout the world China represents the first colored nation to have lifted its population out of starvation and misery and provided living standards proportionately above those of any other former colonial country. In eradicating white imperialism and a legacy of famine, disease, exploitation and murder, they placed themselves among the privileged of the world and attained prestige among nations. We doubt that colored peoples will understand white radicals who call for the overthrow of a leadership that has not only done all this but is now engaged in a great revolutionary struggle against a white revisionist 'Socialist' leadership which collaborates with white imperialist countries and against the tail-ending

CP lackeys in the same white countries (France, Italy, England, U.S.), a struggle which is also a struggle against capitalism.

If our party tends to underestimate the significance of the color question in the Sino-Soviet Dispute, the two protagonists do not. A New York Times story by Harry Schwartz and an article in the May 1963 "Liberation" magazine by Irving L. Horowitz report the anxiety voiced by the Kremlin "over the tendency in parts of Asia and Africa to see the basic world struggle as that between whites and nonwhites, rather than in Marxist terms, as that between workers and employers." (Schwartz) "Khrushchev, in a special memorandum, has indicated that the Chinese Communists are moving toward a Rassenkampf (race struggle) in place of a Klassenkampf (class struggle) attitude. This is expressed in the Russian reference to 'Yellow Communism' of an All-Asian type. It is reinforced by the publication of a memorandum dated April 30, 1963, reiterating the danger. The memorandum is by Boris Ponomarev, a secretary of the Soviet Communist Party." (Horowitz) The Soviet magazine International Affairs "bluntly criticized the racist tendencies exhibited at last February's African-Asian Solidarity Conference in Tanganyika. Western correspondents reported at the time that the meeting was controlled by the

Chinese Communists and that Soviet representatives suffered defeats there.....V. Kudryavtsev, an Isvestia commentator,... declares these chauvinistic leaders 'pretend that the liberation of Asia, Africa and Latin America is possible even without the participation of progressive organizations throughout the world, without those white people who because of their views actively fight against imperialism and its colonial attributes.' "(Schwartz)

Note the parallel in these charges by the Kremlin against the Chinese to the charges by the white bourgeoisie, white liberals, the white CPUSA and sections of the white Trotskyist minority that the Muslims in the US represent "racism in reverse!"

In the area of the Negro movement, Trotsky laid down a general line with profound perception and gave a warning to the party, the result of which is that the party has a correct position, But in the area of China, where Trotsky has been proven incorrect (although he himself admitted he didn't have adequate information, especially on the peasantry), there have been years of hopeless confusion in the party and mechanical Marxism has replaced independent dialectical investigation and thought.

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