



# Discussion Bulletin

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## ON CONFRONTING SDS

By John Barzman

It is now three weeks from the party convention, and the main document, the draft of the Political Resolution hasn't even been announced yet. Unfortunately then, it is impossible to know the exact formulation of our proposed tactical approach to SDS. However, the articles in The Militant and the report on the party plenum indicate that it will be proposed that the party follow the same tactical policy that the YSA approved at its Thanksgiving 1968 convention. This tactical approach was a departure from our previous policy of tactical flexibility towards SDS.

The present document will try to: 1) briefly outline our past policy towards SDS and give some reasons why that policy was correct. 2) Secondly, in particular, it will describe the exceptional situation in Boston. The Boston situation was possible because of the extreme heterogeneity of SDS and because SDS chapters vary enormously from one area to another. And 3) thirdly it will show that SDS is no longer what it used to be. Tactical flexibility would be incorrect presently in dealing with an SDS which has already lost all its best elements. However it remains valid in the case of similar formations which may arise in the future. In such cases, we should be ready to take full advantage of the opportunities to present our line in those formations without any organizational barriers such as not holding formal membership in these formations.

### I. Past Policy

First, it is necessary to understand that only in a few exceptional cases were we forced to hold formal membership in SDS. Hence, the present criticism applies only to a limited, but nonetheless significant area of the party's and YSA's work.

Since 1965, the YSA has worked inside SDS in several exceptional areas, presenting its views on all relevant questions, participating in some SDS projects if they were valid while at the same time, maintaining an independent activity and building the antiwar movement outside SDS. This was the case in the Voice SDS chapter at Ann Arbor, at Harvard, and episodically in a number of other areas.

Due to the exceptional situation in Boston, it was decided to assign about 5 comrades to work inside SDS at Harvard University and Boston University. The Harvard chapter of SDS throughout 1968 had about 300 paid-up, card-carrying national members; attendance at SDS meet-

ings varied between 80 and 200 at business meetings and was frequently at 600 for events or at the beginning of the year. The best elements in SDS considered themselves Marxist and saw the working class as the main agent of social change long before the rest of SDS. The 5 comrades did a minimum of critical work on some worthy but peripheral SDS projects (Labor Committee, grape-pickers' strike support, occasional anti-draft and campus antiwar work). They argued for our antiwar line, tried to get SDS to enter the Boston Area Mobilization Committee, to endorse the national antiwar actions. They argued for our position on black nationalism, on labor, the teachers' strike, etc. At the same time, on both campuses, the YSA organized meetings in its own name, had literature tables and sales (not including the regular Boston area activity -- forums, etc.) and organized people outside SDS to participate in the antiwar actions.

This work was never criticized by the national leadership. In fact, Comrade Doug Jenness, on a tour of Boston about two years ago, advised the comrades to try to be delegates to the SDS National Council, a policy they had previously avoided. One comrade was actually elected as delegate to the Lexington, Kentucky National Council meeting in April 1968. There, the national fraction raised no objections. At the June 1968 conference (the one where SMC split) a special fraction meeting was held for YSAers working in SDS so that Comrade Carol Lipman could report on the SDS convention she had just observed.

While in these exceptional local cases, the YSA did some work in SDS, on a national scale, we unfortunately carried on very little propaganda directed at SDS. We either dismissed it as a right-wing community organizing group or as being outside the organized antiwar movement. We only occasionally polemicized against SDS in our press and certainly not in any consistent way.

### II. The Present Policy

The growth of SDS which has become one of the major obstacles to the YSA's becoming the mass socialist youth organization, as well as the success of Progressive Labor, forced us to deal with SDS. Nonetheless, prior to the actual YSA convention of November 1968, there was little evidence of any new more extensive confrontation with SDS.

The YSA draft resolution on the "New International Youth Radicalization" did not mention SDS by name but only the

new left as a theoretical tendency arising from the break-up of Stalinism. The draft Political Resolution dealt mainly with the presidential campaign and the YSHB. SDS was mentioned only insofar as it oscillated between the Peace and Freedom Party and abstentionism. The antiwar resolution mentioned in passing (p.13) SDS's fear of becoming "over-involved" in the antiwar movement. It could only be assumed from this that our analysis remained the same as previously; i.e., SDS is a hodge-podge, a political zoo, it is not an opponent organization in the same sense as the Communist Party or the Independent Socialist Club.

However, at the convention itself, the reporter on the Political Resolution, Comrade Larry Seigle, added a lengthy analysis of SDS and outlined an orientation toward SDS which constituted a tactical change from our previous policy. The reporter correctly assessed the importance of SDS as an obstacle in the way of recruiting newly radicalizing youth to the YSA and correctly called for a major political confrontation with ultra-leftism. "Now in this process of expanding the YSA, of building the revolutionary socialist youth movement, the main organization among radical youth we're going to have to deal with is the Students for a Democratic Society." (p.10) The report then listed a series of mistakes of SDS and proposed a tactic to deal with SDS. "While we want to work closely with SDSers, we are absolutely opposed to the tactic of YSAers working inside SDS as SDS members." (My emphasis - J.B.) The only exception was to be the case of "some areas where there are only one or two comrades" under certain conditions.

### III. Objections

A number of YSA delegates from Boston were surprised by this turn and tried to show how at least in the perhaps exceptional case of Boston, it made sense to work in SDS. The guidelines for the 5 comrades assigned to SDS were to avoid responsibility for the mistakes of SDS, to avoid work on incorrect or irrelevant projects, and to intervene as YSAers on all relevant political questions in order to force a political confrontation with our ideas on the antiwar movement, black nationalism, labor, Stalinism, etc. These 5 comrades also maintained independent YSA activity and organized for the antiwar actions outside SDS. This was possible because the Boston local was strong enough to spare 5 comrades without letting down the major assignment: building the antiwar movement and the YSA independently. In the case of weak locals, the tactic would be debatable.

The main idea was to force the

PLers to confront us politically. If SDSers refuse to read our press and our literature, do not come to our forums and demonstrations, then we had to use other methods to force them to deal with us. It was pointed out that PL, which entered SDS in December 1966-January 1967 at Harvard (after dissolving the May Second Movement), had managed to make enormous progress already then. It is true that they had a basis of agreement with the SDSers in that both SDS and PL had a community organizing perspective which the party and YSA rejected. But PL very rapidly came out in the open, organized its own march on Washington against HUAC and the war, put forward its own resolutions and attacked the New Lefters. PL's success was not based on hiding their politics; this initially played a part in becoming accepted within SDS, but rapidly political differences were being discussed and theoretical discussion was almost continuous in SDS. This could have been, at least in Boston, a fertile ground to make our positions heard. If it was only possible to do so by joining SDS, then that was the correct course in this particular case.

### IV. Policy in the Future

The majority of the YSA convention implicitly supported the YSA NEC position, and since then, Boston has carried it out. The party position now is that YSAers attend SDS meetings only 1) to propose a united front; 2) in cases where SDS meetings take the character of mass meetings; 3) in the exceptional cases of isolated comrades.

At the Chicago convention of SDS, PL took the best elements who were committed to SDS. Whether they will retain them is doubtful. It is also very unlikely that SDS will continue to serve as a channel for radicalizing youth as it has in the past. However, the contradictory nature of the youth radicalization will probably continue to throw up similar formations. These will be episodic and temporary steps in the development of new layers of radical youth. It will nonetheless be necessary to take up each case separately and in some cases to consider holding formal membership. This will allow the YSA to draw in these new layers of radical youth, to weaken potential opponents and to grow as the mass socialist youth organization in the U.S.

The reporter at the YSA convention admitted that membership or non-membership in SDS was a tactical question, but stressed that it was a very important tactical question. To say, however, that: "We are absolutely opposed to the tactic of YSAers working inside SDS as SDS members" is to treat the question as a

question of principles.

The above criticism should be understood as dealing with a secondary aspect of our work. In the great majority of cases the YSA has been and will be able to recruit politically virgin members from its independent socialist work, from the antiwar movement, etc., by posing itself as an alternative to SDS. In the few cases where SDS members do not know of the YSA as an alternative, do not read our press and feel strong organizational loyalty to SDS, the YSA and party

should attempt to confront them with our politics without the organizational barrier. This is especially true when there is evidence of intense political and theoretical discussion, when an opponent tendency is making rapid gains, when there are no requirements on membership and when it does not cut across the independent activity of the YSA as was the case in Boston.

August 6, 1969  
Boston

### THE CHICANO MOVEMENT IN LOS ANGELES

By Della Rossa

Chicanos (Mexican-Americans) are the second largest minority in the U.S. and have the largest population concentration in the Los Angeles area, around 500,000. Unemployment of blacks in this country is twice that of whites and the unemployment of Chicanos equals that of blacks. The housing of Chicanos is as bad as that of blacks and their drop-out rate from high school is greater than that of blacks.

There are many objective conditions, including segregation, humiliations and police brutalities, for an explosion such as the Watts uprising to occur here. The incidences of whole families and neighborhoods turning out to resist police arrests and brutalities took place in the vast East Los Angeles barrio and still take place. Two differences between the ghetto and the barrio are the close family ties and the subduing influence of the Catholic Church. Similar conditions have not yet produced the angry outpourings on the streets which have occurred in ghettos across the country.

It was two years after the Watts explosion that a militant, nationalist Chicano movement began here, around October 1967, when young Chicanos started the newspaper La Raza.

In the background of the movement was the pacifist but nationalist-conscious Delano Farm Workers Union led by Cesar Chávez, Corky Gonzales' Crusade for Justice in Denver and Tijerina's land grant movement in New Mexico. The Alianza Federal de Pueblos Libres had led an armed "citizen's arrest" at the Tierra Amarilla, N.M. courthouse the previous June. Both Gonzales and Tijerina spoke here in October at an antiwar rally where they emphasized Chicano rights.

It was evident that La Raza, which began in the basement of an Episcopalian Church, had outside funding, possibly from the Ford Foundation, but it was the first voice of the barrio. It started hitting hard at welfare abuses, police brutalities, and bad school conditions.

The Educational Issues Coordinating Committee (EICC) was formed to coordinate the activities of about a dozen organizations interested in educational reform and to counteract the barrio drop-out rate of about 45%. It was also a liaison between students, teachers and parents.

The barrio explosion here took place in March, 1968 when from 5,000 to 10,000 high school students walked out with signs saying "Viva La Raza," "Viva La Revolution," and "Education, No Contempt!" Parents and whole families came out in support of the students.

The newly organized defense organization, the Brown Berets, as young as 14 and mostly in their teens, supported the students and were on hand to observe the over-policed picket lines and protect the students "by getting between the students and the police."

The first mass demonstration in the traditionally passive barrio had come on with strong militant and nationalist tones. This frightened the establishment and on May 31 a Grand Jury indictment brought the arrest of 13 Chicanos on the charge of "conspiracy to create a disturbance at the schools," a felony. The editor and three staff members of La Raza, the four leaders of the Brown Berets and a high school teacher were among those arrested.

The night of the arrests, La Raza appealed to the entire movement for support. We were included on the basis of our previous contact and articles supporting the Chicano movement.

In the next months, the Militant Labor Forum arranged two forums for the students and the Chicano 13.

We immediately tried to enlist the support of a predominantly Chicano steelworkers local with a Chicano president, but to no avail.

Between the Friday night arrests and Sunday morning, a picket line of

2,000, 90% of them Chicanos, was organized to surround the police building. It was an unprecedented action of mass, militant Chicano community support.

Shortly thereafter, we began a Chicano Work Fraction with two Chicanos and myself. A college student recruited by the YSA in Santa Monica was added later.

We decided to form an ad hoc committee to picket the Mexican Consulate on Oct. 12, to protest the Oct. 2 student massacre in Mexico City. At least 100 people were there, and out of this grew the Committee of Solidarity with Mexican Students with strong representation from Chicano leaders, including a leader of the United Mexican-American Students.

This committee then took charge of Eduardo Ojeda's speaking tour here. Ojeda was a leader of the Mexican student strikers brought to the U.S. by the U.S. Committee for Justice to Latin-American Political Prisoners.

Ojeda spoke before the EICC, LUCHA (League of United Citizens to Help Addicts) the Black Panthers, and a number of college campuses.

Then we organized "Chicanos for Halstead and Boutelle" in support of our 1968 presidential campaign. This committee, and the two affairs it organized, were very limited.

While Boutelle was campaigning in Los Angeles, the Board of Education was taken over by the Chicano movement and occupied night and day for eight days. We took Boutelle to speak to the supporters in the patio and he spoke briefly. Boutelle's appearance there was later strongly objected to by the editor of Chicano Student Movement. "We want no outside politics," he and other objectors said, but when we asked what if the candidate had been Eldridge Cleaver of the Peace and Freedom Party or Calderon of the Democratic Party, they just shrugged.

The Board of Education occupation was instrumental in getting Sal Castro, the Chicano 13 high school teacher, reinstated to his job. The Chicano movement had become militant and effective. At the same time it was narrow in its political thinking.

The same attitude was evident when we brought the Militants on the exciting events in May and June in France to La Raza. The editor of La Raza just smiled and said "Nothing is happening in France, so far as we are concerned. We have to concentrate on organizing in the community."

La Raza, the Brown Berets, UMAS and the EICC are indications of the growing radicalization in the Chicano community here.

(The term Chicano itself, a slang term meaning Mexican, and long used among young Chicanos, has become part of the nation's language just since the growth of the movement. Now it means not only Mexican but one who is consciously and proudly Mexican. When I spoke before a meeting of high school administrators during my campaign for Board of Education I was hissed everytime I said "Chicano"!)

La Raza is part of the Chicano Press Association, with 24 papers in the Southwest, and in Chicago, Wisconsin and Florida. They are valuable instruments in organizing and in raising consciousness.

The Brown Berets is made up of street kids, some as young as 14. It was organized and is still headed by David Sanchez, who was once on Mayor Yorty's Advisory Committee on Youth but became thoroughly disillusioned about the system after an unprovoked beating by a cop.

The Brown Berets is without an effective leadership, program, or organization and is reluctant to relate to non-Chicano organizations. They refused to appear at the Militant Labor Forums on the high school walkouts and defense of the Chicano 13. However, they also refused to support Thomas Bradley, the Democrat who had been a cop for 20 years, for mayor. The Brown Berets have now started a newspaper, La Causa, and have opened a free medical clinic, funded by the Ford Foundation.

Limited as it is, there is a need for a militant Chicano defense organization such as the Brown Berets and there are now chapters in eight southwest cities.

UMAS is primarily an organization of college students which is trying to spread out to high schools. Its function is to foster ethnic identity and try to get more Chicano students into college. The percentage now is about 2% of the college population.

UMAS has grown to 27 chapters in the Los Angeles area, but their thinking is limited by the attitude "We have to organize ourselves; we don't want anyone else to take credit for what we do." Unfortunately, this sometimes leads to a refusal to work with organizations such as the Black Student Union or, for instance, participating in a Third World Liberation Front rally in support of San Francisco State -- because they were afraid the blacks would dominate.

La Junta is a break-off from the Brown Berets and is a loosely organized group of semi-demoralized street kids. The very fact that this type of Chicano youth is being organized is a good indication of the general radicalization. More than this, they are the only Chicano

group I know of which doesn't say they have to confine themselves to "organizing in the community" and are willing to deal with left-wing political ideas, which at this stage are around Maoism. They take part in demonstrations against police brutality and were in a sleep-in at Cal State L.A. demanding Chicano student rights.

LUCHA not only recognizes the large percentage of addicts among Chicanos and the need to help them but they are clear in saying that "the only way we can stop drug addiction among Chicanos is by changing the society that causes that addiction." Four leaders of LUCHA endorsed our Board of Education campaign and two of these spoke at our election rally. When Bradley influence and Bradley money moved into LUCHA there was a breakup of the leadership. One of our supporters, a co-chairman of LUCHA, left the organization.

Even before the Bradley campaign, Chicano militants were being bought off with federal funds, much like many of the militant blacks after the Watts uprising.

The "Asociacion Bronce Colectiva" is one of these federally funded agencies. One of the Chicano militants, "Fernando," the head of the Committee for Solidarity with Mexican Students, commented six months ago: "The whole thing (Chicano movement) is falling apart. There is just dirty, opportunist politics because of agencies such as ABC."

A revolutionary political approach to the Chicano movement as a whole is very difficult. They are unwilling to deal with ideas or even to present a program in their own organizations.

What is lacking in the Chicano movement is revolutionary spokesmen who will relate "community organization" to the need for class struggle.

The Chicano movement is divided on this question. About ten activists in the EICC, the organizer of "Teatro Chicano," an editor of Chicano Student and a high school UMAS member became sponsors of our election campaign. Four of these spoke in our election campaign rally. It was a very impressive list of Chicano sponsors, and it shook up the more conservative elements in the Chicano movement. These elements attacked the sponsors and the candidate in an "anonymous letter" in La Raza.

The majority of the steelworkers in the southwestern states are Chicanos,

and there are attempts to organize a Chicano trade union caucus. So far as I know, this has not yet been accomplished.

The weight of Chicanos in southern California industry is not to be overlooked in our evaluation of the movement. Our resolution on black liberation, for instance, suggested that blacks be given priority in construction work. It would be more correct to call for black and brown priority, given the fact that Chicano unemployment is equally as severe as that of blacks.

"Machismo," Latin male chauvinism, has long been a severe handicap toward liberation. Articles counteracting this have appeared in the latest issues of El Grito of New Mexico and La Raza. An article based on Enriqueta Vasquez' book Women in Revolt appears in both papers and says in part: "We must strive for the fulfillment of all as equals with the full capability and right to develop as humans....When we talk about equality in the Mexican-American movement, we better be talking about total equality."

It has been very difficult to raise the political consciousness of the Chicano movement or to recruit. For all its activities and organizations, it is still in the nationalist phase that the blacks were in three years ago. A Black Panther remarked, "But they don't have time to go through all that we went through."

Our continued contact and support in relation to the Chicano movement is important. We have recruited two Chicanos here in the last year and two others are very close. One of the recruits is a high school student we contacted during the election campaign.

It is also important to contact Chicanos through the YSA on the campuses, where our ideas can percolate among Chicanos who are dealing with ideas. The financial cutbacks in California colleges will mean there will be even fewer minority students, but will tend to make these few, and those who can't get in, more radical. This is a period of radicalization on the campuses and special attention should be given to Third World students. For all the working class weight of Chicanos, the most likely way to reach them with our revolutionary working-class program in the next period will be through college and even high school students, who can assimilate our ideas and then take them back to the barrios.

August 7, 1969  
Los Angeles

ON THE "TRANSITIONAL PROGRAM FOR BLACK LIBERATION"

By Morris Chertov

Before stating my criticism of the draft resolution, I wish to make clear that I am in general agreement with it. In fact, I think that the document is a great achievement, and is destined to play a key role in the progressive development of the black struggle -- if properly corrected.

To get down to specifics: There are references to the black people as a "nationality," which is a term that can only be drawn from a concept that the black people are now a nation. "Nationality" cannot derive from a nation coming into being, or a view that a process now developing will some day produce a nation. It has to refer to an existing nation.

If my memory serves me right, this is the first time that such a concept of the black people has been proposed in a party document issuing from the Political Committee, or given serious consideration in a convention discussion or proceeding. Furthermore, what is questionable procedure is the way this important change is blandly referred to, in a few words, in a few places, as if it was so settled a question, that it required no deeper elaboration than a casual reference. But that is exactly what it is not! It is far from a settled question.

I said that this is the first time such a formulation has appeared in a party document. But there have been uses of the term "black nation," and "black nationality" in The Militant in signed articles, and with no comment by the editors. In the YSA publications this concept and terminology has been used repeatedly. However, since this is party pre-convention discussion, I'll confine myself to that area.

The question of whether the black people are a national as well as a racial minority has a long history in the movement. In fact the Trotsky discussions, of 1933, began with Swabeck posing that very question. And it has come up time and time again. And our decision all through the years has always been that the black people were a racial minority; true, with national tendencies showing to a greater or lesser degree, during the decades involved.

In 1963 we adopted in convention, after intense and thoroughgoing discussion, the "Freedom Now" resolution. That document stands as our definitive analysis and statement on the black struggle. It has not been altered by any succeeding convention, and will remain our basic document, unless fundamentally changed by the forthcoming convention.

I am not a devotee of old resolutions for the sake of their age, but the fact remains that the "Freedom Now" resolution had been so well conceived that it has been able to stand up to the experiences over these 6 years with no need for basic changes. There have been implementations of its concepts, yes, but no changes fundamentally.

Now, what does the 1963 resolution have to say on the point under discussion? In Part IV, headed "Separatism and a Separate Nation," it states: "In 1939, we foresaw the possibility that the Negro people, as part of their struggle to end centuries of oppression and exploitation, might some day decide that they want a separate nation, controlled and administrated by themselves. We said that if this happened, it would settle the long theoretical dispute about whether or not Negroes are a national minority as well as a racial minority, and that we, as supporters of the right of self-determination, would support the Negro demand for a separate nation, and do everything in our power to help them obtain it." (My emphasis - M.C.)

In order that any possible confusion be eliminated from the start, please note:

1) In 1963 we continued to hold the 1939 view.

2) The position is clear that we leave it to the black people to make the decision for or against a separate nation, but, as a consequence of making that decision, they will also settle the question as to whether black people have been a national minority, as well as a racial minority.

But the present draft resolution contradicts this. It proposes that the party, not the black people, settle this question, now. If the convention passes this resolution as it is, then the party will have taken a stand on a question that, up to now, we held only the black people could and should settle.

What further disturbs me is that, with every right to believe that the contents of the 1963 resolution is known to the authors of the current draft resolution, this important change is made without motivation.

If I'm answered that the draft was fashioned for mass distribution to the Afro-American community, my reply is that the responsibility of the authors to have sent the branches a separate statement giving the new view's motiva-

tion, remained. The motivation would have to show how and why the change from a racial minority, to a racial and national minority, took place.

It is part of a long and well-grounded tradition with us, that while anyone, or body, has the right to propose changes in our analysis or policy, that right carries with it a responsibility to show, and prove what it is that is wrong with the previous conception, and why the new view is justified. We have never considered mere assertions sufficient for consideration.

My motivation in voicing the above thought is to help in making sure that such a situation never occurs again.

Unless facts and arguments are forthcoming of a weight to change my mind, I intend to propose an amendment to the draft that all references to "black nationalities," "black national minorities," or black oppression stated as "national oppression," be deleted.

The view of the black people as a "nation" can have disorienting effects on our continuing assessment of developments in the black struggle. It could lead us to expectations of consciousness and solidarity that have not yet been attained. The draft deals with this adequately for now, except for a very inconsistent paragraph, the third one, in the first section: "More recently, it has propelled black nationalism from deeply felt resentment against injustice and inequality into a powerful and ascending force in the Afro-American communities." The question occurs as to what form this "powerful and ascending force" has taken? How can it be that kind of a force, without form? This paragraph flatly contradicts the summary analysis of the state that the black struggle is in now, described in the succeeding paragraphs.

While I would like to expand my own position, I don't have the time now. I will therefore have to simply summarize it.

Except for leadership groups, I don't think there exists, among the mass of Afro-Americans a consciousness of nationhood. No leadership group has yet won the kind of following, either in size or permanency, that the unprecedented capacity for militant action could provide. The content of the various vanguards' definitions of black nationalism has varied from one end of the rainbow to the other, the confusion reflecting a confusion as to goals. Yet only a minority of the vanguard groups openly claim nationhood as the state of the black people now. They constitute a minority of a minority, in that the vanguards are divorced from the black people, constituting a minority of the black people themselves.

The only ones who have the right to call themselves "black nationalists" are the separatists. I don't support their view, but am trying to show that a separatist has the possibility for a consistency of policy, beginning with the name "black nationalist." The other "black nationalists" adopt the name but don't give it a content consistent with it. I have and do support the party's position in supporting their efforts to organize the black people, for the reasons I have understood we had, i.e., that their experiences in their attempts would enlighten them, with our aid, to more fully understand what they have undertaken.

Finally -- for the 35 years I have been in the movement, I have always been involved with the black struggle, although the last few years have forced me into a lower level of activity. In fact, I started in the Harlem branch of the Workers Party, in 1935. I know how close I can become with black people, which is stated simply as background for the following: Very few white comrades have been allowed by blacks to see the searing hurt in their very souls, and to understand the damage done to the black psyche by the numbing hell of slavery and Jim Crow, but also in the cutting off of their heritage from Africa. This is felt most keenly by the better educated black, one of whom expressed himself, "Nationhood makes me feel whole." I am not presenting this as a prevalent view. For, another black fellow worker, college educated, stated, "We have so many national mixtures among black people, beginning with Africa, -- how can we be a nation? We are an oppressed racial minority."

I feel that this very question of nationhood arises today, because of the quiescence of the class struggle. When it rises, the proletarian side of the black will find his expression in the class struggle, and he will not have to, or think it that important, to ask himself, "Who am I?" The class struggle will clear his mind as to the more important side of himself, not wiping out the racial side, but in the solidarity the coming struggles will breed, he will know himself as proletarian. Black proletarian. Many white workers, who now ask themselves, "Am I a worker, or middle class?" will also find their question answered. This is not dream stuff. It happened not that long ago. May I warn comrades who relegate the rise of the class struggle to the mists of the far future, that to hold such a view is to prepare fertile grounds for reformist ideology. Basic to revolutionary Marxism is the incompatibility of the interests of the two basic classes, capital and labor. Clashes must erupt, and they will, with a fierceness greater than ever before, and with a swiftness of development, that has surprised us many times already.

August 7, 1969  
Philadelphia