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Why We Support the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction

By Mona, Hugo, and Guillaume

[The following document is translated from the internal discussion in the Walloon section.]

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The Aim of This Document

We are not going to redraw the balance sheet on the leadership's shortcomings in preparing the Walloon section for the Tenth World Congress. On this point—at least—the criticisms formulated in the document "Against the Stream" are right on target. We are, however, going to emphasize the fact that these shortcomings have not been rectified, even if the debate has now begun. In addition to the delay in the debate and the lack of knowledge as to the real positions of the Leninist-Trotskyist Faction, there is another problem as well. The discussion is going over the heads of the rank-and-file militants. This stems from the fact that the leadership has not sought to overcome the gap that exists between the important role that it plays in the majority tendency and the international debate, and the lack of preparation and participation of rank-and-file militants in this debate. The level of the discussions in the general assemblies is one indication.

For all these reasons, we would like to take up several points in the discussion and go into them more deeply. The aim of this document is not to take a position on all the questions under debate, nor to elaborate them, but rather to participate in the discussion . . .

PART ONE: Two Lines, Two Orientations

FROM LATIN AMERICA . . .

The Turn of the Ninth World Congress

The line passed at the Ninth World Congress—preparing for and initiating guerrilla warfare—was based on a fundamental error: the 1969 resolution did not take into account the concrete situation of the International and its sections on the Latin American continent. Nonetheless, the concrete situation is a key element in elaborating a correct orientation. In its haste for a breakthrough and in its search for a shortcut in building a mass revolutionary party, the majority made an abstraction of the genuine problems that confronted our sections. This abstraction had grave consequences for the POR and the PRT (Combatiente), which carried out this line, and for the International as a whole.

If the 1969 resolution did not take into account the reality of our sections, it was for a reason. The guerrilla warfare line was based on the illusion that a few hundred militants could spark the masses to seize power: "In a situation of prerevolutionary crisis such as Latin America is now experiencing on a continental scale, *guerrilla warfare can in fact stimulate a revolutionary dynamic*, even if at the start the attempt may seem to have come from abroad or to be unilateral (which was the case with Che's Bolivian guerrilla movement)." ("Resolution on Latin America," in *IIDB Reprint Discussion on Latin America* [1968-1972], p. 48. Emphasis added.) This illusion was widely held on the Latin American continent after the Cuban revolution. But it is an illusion condemned to defeat. In seeking a "united front" with the Castroist organizations, *the majority accepted the strategic error of Castroism*; that is, it believed that the Castroist strategy would work! This explains, among other things, the majority's attitude toward the PRT (Combatiente) and toward the actions this group carried out. The PRT (Combatiente), which until quite recently was still the official section of the Fourth International, publicly declared itself Castroist and non-Trotskyist (see "The Only Road" [*IIDB Reprint*, pp. 217-53], which came out before 1969). The majority never engaged in a serious polemic with these comrades or criticized their actions. Nowhere did it say to the PRT (Combatiente) comrades that their strategy, their Castroist concepts, **WOULD NOT LEAD TO A REVOLUTIONARY VICTORY!** Today, this organization has come to realize that Castroism has nothing in common with the Fourth International, even though both of them are situated in the revolutionary camp. Perhaps the time will come when the majority recognizes this too.

In refusing to take into account the reality of our sections, the 1969 resolution projected a line that could not be carried out by our Bolivian comrades; the POR paid a high price for this in terms of the repression they encountered and the comrades that left the ranks of the Fourth International. The *fundamental orientation* of the POR was the line of guerrilla warfare; in their case it was a propagandistic line, given the fact that they didn't have the means for carrying it out any other way (see the Sabado and Enero report). When they did raise a series of transitional demands among the Bolivian workers, it was always considered totally *secondary* and was carried out in an *exclusively propagandistic manner*. Never mind the fact that the mass mobilization without precedent since 1952, the appearance of an embryo of dual power (though clearly deformed by its reformist leadership), the divisions in the army, and the paralysis of the bourgeoisie all posed concretely the question of arming the

masses and offered unprecedented possibilities for forming a revolutionary pole and organizing the Bolivian workers under the banners of the Fourth International. Because of the Castroist concept of how to seize power that the majority voted for in 1969, and because of their refusal to carry out consistent agitation around a transitional program capable of advancing the workers struggle, the POR was bypassed by the mass movement and by the possibility of building a mass revolutionary party. At the time of the October uprising, the POR was outside the mass movements. Lacking a correct political line, lacking a concrete program for arming the masses in the course of their struggles, and lacking organizational capacities, the POR adopted an ultraleft sectarian line. One striking example of this is the POR's attitude toward the Popular Assembly, seeing it as a "forum." Another example concerns the Popular Assembly's passage of a resolution calling for the clandestine organization of workers militias. This sectarian and opportunist resolution was supported by both the reformists and our comrades in the POR. It was sectarian because what was needed at that moment was a big campaign around the necessity of organizing workers militias and organizing the great majority of workers. It was opportunist because what it signified concretely was that the masses would not be armed. The reformists voted for this resolution because they didn't really want to arm the masses, but only to appear to be revolutionaries. The comrades of the POR voted for it because they felt there was no way to arm the vanguard except clandestinely.

The POR's ultraleft sectarianism became transformed into right opportunism when, after the fall of Torres, the POR entered a *programmatic* front (aimed at forming a government) with the traitors of the workers movement, Major Sanchez and Torres himself.

But if the POR's activity never went beyond the stage of propaganda, the actions carried out by the PRT (Combatiente)-ERP went far beyond propaganda . . . in the strict sense of the term. Expropriations, kidnappings, and the distribution of food were seen as setting an example for the Argentine working class on the necessity of armed struggle for seizing power. But insofar as the masses are of necessity spectators, these actions miss the real core of the problem: arming the masses in the course of their struggles.

It's not through examples — at bottom paternalistic — that the working class will be led to take up the decisive question of its self-defense. The embryos of workers militias will be formed in the course of experiences the workers go through in organizing strike pickets and taking responsibility for defending demonstrations and union headquarters. *But the PRT (Combatiente) is totally absent from the trade unions and workers struggles:* "Today, no functioning PRT(C) current exists in the trade unions." (Sabado and Enero report, p. 7, in *Internal Information Bulletin*, No. 5 in 1972)

The belief that arming the masses takes place through the activity of a few armed detachments of militants outside the mass struggle stems from an illusion. For the question of organizing the self-defense of the working class is inseparable from the struggle for the political leadership of the working class. Taking charge of the defense of a strike cannot be dissociated from the question of the

democratic organization of the strike and the political struggle against the trade-union bureaucracy. The experiences with self-defense of the peasants of Chaupimayo under the leadership of Hugo Blanco, and the experiences of the workers of Chocon, Mar del Plata, San Nicolas, and San Francisco under the leadership of the PST, are unequivocal proof that in the face of repression, only a revolutionary political leadership can educate the working class as to its own strength and its own path toward victory.

The question of taking responsibility for self-defense obviously supposes that the party has a network of militants and a certain amount of experience on this question. The militants responsible for defending the party and the actions it carries out must try to get the workers themselves and all the workers organizations — both trade-union and political — to take responsibility for their own self-defense. This effort should always be a function of the working class's experiences in struggle, even if it is the party members who in large part assume the responsibility. Partial defeats will be inevitable. But the party cannot substitute itself for the workers' taking charge of their own self-defense. As long as the working class still has confidence in its reformist leadership, our battle remains fundamentally political. The demands and slogans, the democratic organization and defense of a strike are the political basis of the struggle. In Argentina, even the trade-union bureaucrats occasionally organize strike pickets, while at the same time putting up a fierce struggle against the democratic organization of the strike. In a case like this, our role is to show the workers that as long as these self-defense pickets are not organized by the workers as a whole, they will serve only the interests of the bureaucrats, who will subordinate them to their collaborationist maneuvers, negotiations, and sell-outs.

To illustrate everything we have just said, we quote a passage from "Discussions With Leon Trotsky on the Transitional Program":

Question: How do we go about launching the defense groups practically?

Trotsky: It is very simple. Do you have a picket line in a strike? When the strike is over we say we must defend our union by making this picket line permanent.

Question: Does the party itself create the defense group with its own members?

Trotsky: The slogans of the party must be placed in quarters where we have sympathizers and workers who will defend us. But a party cannot create an independent defense organization. The task is to create such a body in the trade unions." (*The Transitional Program*, Pathfinder Press edition, p. 140.)

The political battle for the leadership of the working class requires a scientific analysis of the form and content of the class struggle in each country in order to work out an intervention in the struggles to be carried out, to help advance them, and to recruit the vanguard to our party. This intervention should be based on the method of an overall program of political leadership offered as an alternative to the reformist leadership. It is precisely this analysis and this orientation that the majority declined to formulate in the 1969 resolution. We will come back to the majority's method.

On Repression and Taking up Arms in Latin America

In its attacks aimed against the faction, the majority has made a particular target of the PST, sympathizing section of the Fourth International in Argentina. We should note, however, that the overwhelming majority of comrades are not familiar with the politics of this organization. Not a single PST document or resolution has ever been made available to us, and how many comrades read this organization's newspaper? How many times over the last four years has *Rouge* published an article or a single piece of information about the PST or the strikes it has led? Not once! Today, in its factional struggle, it seems that the leadership has decided to start saying something about this organization. The comrades, however, are totally incapable of discussing the PST, of judging or ascertaining the facts themselves. These practices show us something about how the majority counted on "winning" at the next world congress. However, since we are discussing the line of the Ninth World Congress and the results of this line, as well as the test it underwent in Argentina and Bolivia, the first task of the majority is to explain to us what has become of the official section of the Fourth International, a section that has been particularly defended by the majority since the Ninth World Congress. Why did it break with the Fourth International, with Trotskyism? We are still waiting for the moment when the majority will draw a real balance sheet of its line in Latin America and give a genuine explanation of the *process* that led the PRT (Combatiente) to break with Trotskyism. Did the majority foresee this process? In what document? What political explanation does it give for the degeneration of the PRT (Combatiente) when, according to the majority's own statements, this section was the model section that (at least until 1971) correctly applied the line of the Ninth World Congress? Or is it the case that the majority has no explanation for the "sudden" political degeneration of the PRT (Combatiente) and simply feels that it's necessary to turn the page and talk about something else?

Anyone who is familiar with the events that have unfolded in Argentina since the Ninth World Congress—the "Cordobazo," the "Rosarioazo," the day-to-day class struggle, the struggle against Peronism—anyone who knows what positions the PRT (Combatiente) and the PST took in the face of these events and the way in which these two groups participated in the class struggle, would acknowledge that the line and the positions of the sympathizing section were without doubt and without comparison more correct than those of the PRT (Combatiente). It was the sympathizing section that foresaw the "Cordobazo," that set forth the methods of struggle that were necessary if the masses were to confront the regime, resist the forces of repression, and coordinate and extend the actions and the struggle. Just before the "Cordobazo," the PRT (Combatiente) was still explaining that there should be "no public meetings, no massive concentrations where we lack military forces capable of resisting the repressive forces of the regime. In the meantime we must strengthen ourselves through thousands of skirmishes and clandestine actions that will weaken them. . . ." What does the majority have to say about which of these two organizations foresaw the "Cordobazo," and which of them was capable of correctly intervening in it. Was it the PRT that had no pro-

gram for leading the masses and helping them advance to higher forms of struggle? Was it the PRT that proposed to the masses that they wait patiently, with their arms folded, until the military problem had been resolved through the slow accumulation of guerrillas? Or was it the PST that foresaw and understood the movement that was going to spread across the country as a semi-insurrection? Or does the majority have a third position? If so, what is it?

In their attacks against the PST in regard to the elections, the majority in reality only attacked two tactical aspects of the PST's participation in the elections (Coral's statement, 80 percent workers candidates . . .). But the majority has nothing to say about the fundamental question. We ask the majority to reply to the following question: *Was it or was it not necessary to participate in the elections?* This is the real question, for if it was wrong to have participated in the elections, then it wasn't merely the tactics used by the PST that were incorrect but their entire political line. Should they have abstained from the elections or should they have participated in them? Or was there a third position? *If so, what was it?* We are not going to draw here the balance sheet of the PST. This balance sheet was drawn in the document "Argentina and Bolivia—The Balance Sheet," along with a comparison of the positions of the PRT (Combatiente) and the PST since the Ninth World Congress. The comrades can refer to them.

The Latin American question is obviously complex, and the problems posed by the coups in Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay are real. Insofar as the bourgeoisie's recourse to coups in order to halt the development of revolutionary mass movements is concerned, the analysis has been confirmed in blood. But no one in the International has ever denied this analysis. Furthermore the analysis in question is not a new phenomenon or tendency: it is a permanent factor on the Latin American continent and has been so for a long time. However, the LTF comrades' position is that this general analysis is insufficient for determining our immediate tasks. The majority's outlook was schematic and simplistic. Their resolution predicted only repression and minimized the mass movement, the opening of periods (or phases) of relative democracy, and the revolutionary process of the radicalization of the working class. The orientation toward initiating guerrilla warfare meant—de facto—according a secondary place to these things. But it was precisely in the countries mentioned in the 1969 resolution that the mass movement developed the greatest breadth and thus concretely posed the question of power. The developments in Bolivia represented a profound radicalization, a mobilization of the working class, and a period of revolutionary crisis. Under the pressure of this powerful mass movement, the bourgeoisie was compelled to make greater and greater concessions and to open a phase of legality. The way in which the Torres government came to power—through the active intervention of the masses and a mass uprising—the way in which the Popular Assembly emerged from the struggle itself, showed that the revolutionary crisis had reached a critical point. The Torres regime was the product of the terror that the working class instilled in the bourgeoisie. Seizure of power by the proletariat was a realistic possibility. In order to transform this possibility into a

reality, it was necessary to make use of the progress accomplished by the insurrectionary movement in order to arm the masses. In the absence of a revolutionary leadership, however, the masses were unable to resolve the question of power. The movement marked time, the bourgeoisie regained the offensive and unleashed its coup. To see *only* the coup in this entire process is something that stems from total defeatism, a defeatism that in the last analysis denies our own responsibilities in regard to the mass movement and the capacities of such a movement, since it is condemned in advance to defeat. However, the role the party plays in the mass mobilizations has a fundamental importance in this phase of unstable equilibrium in which neither the bourgeoisie nor the proletariat can gain a decisive victory. *The developments of these mobilizations have a direct influence on the bourgeoisie's possibilities of launching a counteroffensive, and on the actual capacities of the working class to respond to it.*

Building a revolutionary leadership recognized by the workers requires a permanent political battle. In 1969, the majority did not realize the importance of this political struggle. In fact, the majority even believed that this political struggle had been resolved, thanks to the influence of the Cuban revolution and its leadership . . . etc. (cf. their contention that the debate between the revolutionary path and the reformist path was a thing of the past in Latin America, or the section of the 1969 resolution that discusses the role of the peasantry and its level of consciousness . . .). This error stems from an overestimation of Castroism. In this regard, Comrade Beauvais's document is the strongest "self-criticism" by a member of the majority. A large part of this self-criticism simply confirms the fact that the criticisms the LTF has developed since the Ninth World Congress are well founded. On the other hand, it is also clear that the majority is not in complete agreement on the points raised in Comrade Beauvais's document. In certain respects, this document unmasks the real orientation of the 1969 resolution, but it refuses to draw the lessons from it.

In 1969, the broad vanguard on the Latin American continent consisted largely of militants who had been radicalized by the Cuban revolution and who were, directly or indirectly, under the ideological or organizational influence of Castroist organizations. In its effort to win hegemony within this vanguard, the majority not only adapted to the Castroist current but accepted the Castroist strategy as one that was realizable and made it their own ("Actually, the problem consisted precisely in *having considered the Cuban strategy a possible strategy, as a strategy capable of leading to victory*, at a time when the Cuban revolution itself had profoundly changed the conditions of struggle.") (IIDB, Vol. 10, No. 25, December 1973, p. 26, "Know Your Own Weaknesses in Order to Better Combat the Minority and Build the International," by Jean-Pierre Beauvais. Emphasis in original.) This is purely and simply a reaffirmation of the LTF's criticisms. Of course, Comrade Beauvais does not draw the same conclusions. Instead, his document treats winning hegemony within the new post-Cuban vanguard as a "new" perspective: "The historic task of the Fourth International in Latin America today is to win over this new generation of vanguard militants who are now beginning to appear everywhere on the continent." (Beauvais, p. 21.) In re-

sponse to the question of *how*, Comrade Beauvais replies: on the basis of a "strategic orientation that replies concretely and effectively to the needs of these new Latin American vanguards." (Beauvais, p. 21.)

As in the European document, this orientation in Latin America is our historical task "because if this new vanguard generation is not won over to revolutionary Marxism, it will once again mean that most of those who make up this generation will be lost—like the generation of the 1960s. And time is of the essence. . . ." (Beauvais, p. 21.)

This is exactly the same doomsday orientation and method elaborated in the European document, and it is just as abstract about the composition of this "new vanguard." It is an orientation that presents the *same dangers of adaptation* as the 1969 resolution, and for the *same* reasons. Once again, we are not orienting ourselves toward the objective needs of the working class, but toward the concerns—oscillating between ultraleftism and opportunism—of the "new vanguard."

. . . TO EUROPE

On the Orientation Toward the Vanguard of a Mass Character

If the example of the 1969 resolution and its application in Bolivia and Argentina remains the clearest example of the political adaptation of the Fourth International (under the leadership of the majority) to the various ultraleft and opportunist currents that exist in the "broad vanguard," the examples of this orientation in Europe represent clear signs that the line of the Ninth World Congress is being extended to other sectors of the world revolution.

Insofar as the political education of the vanguard is concerned, the intervention of several European sections could be better characterized as tail-ending the fluctuations in the contradictory process of the revolutionary upsurge in Europe. Whether they are toward ultraleftism or opportunism, these fluctuations in our line often correspond to an adaptation to the dominant atmosphere within our vanguard. This adaptation represents an obstacle to our work in the mass movement, whether it be in defense of the revolutionary struggles of peoples across the world or in the building of a class-struggle trade-union tendency.

What's necessary is a scientific analysis of the contradictory process of the revolutionary upsurge, of the form and content of the struggles that have emerged in different countries, and above all a thorough analysis of the various radicalized layers that compose this "new vanguard." A balance sheet on the Walloon section since 1969 is necessary, because we cannot continue to progress empirically. The LTF comrades have already drawn this balance sheet for England, Ireland, Spain, and Denmark, as well as for the youth radicalization and the women's liberation movement (cf. IIDB, Vol. 10, Nos. 23, 17, 24, 18, 19, and 22). The majority's refusal to do it inevitably poses another debate. We are not going to draw a complete balance sheet of the Walloon section here. We will be content with citing a few examples intended simply to illustrate the dangers already mentioned—adaptation and tail-endism in our intervention toward the broad vanguard.

(a) *The Legislative Elections*

The orientation toward regrouping the broad vanguard and, in this particular case, educating it about the non-electoral path, led to a simplification of reformist politics in the battle of revolutionary violence versus legalism. For the most part, this battle took place some distance removed from the real problems of an overall political alternative. The important thing about this campaign was not merely the strategic dead end of the reformists, but the form that this politically treasonous strategy took in the Union of the Left. It's true that a denunciation of the reformists' parliamentary strategy should have been one of the axes of our campaign. But this denunciation takes on a concrete character only to the extent that our organization is capable of presenting a political alternative to the class collaboration of the Union of the Left. A concrete governmental formulation was necessary. So long as it fails to understand the *necessity of its independence*, the working class will never emancipate itself. How many times has the proletariat experienced defeats for just this reason? Denouncing the legalism of the reformists is a *fundamental* task in educating the masses. *But the belief that the only dividing line between the reformists and revolutionary Marxists lies in the reformists' inability to take up arms stems from a dangerous simplification of the politics of Stalinism and reformism in general.* The vote by revolutionary Marxists for bourgeois candidates in the second round flows from the fact that we were pre-occupied solely with the debate within the vanguard and with its concerns (revolutionary violence vs. the path of legality). It also stems from the fact that we completely neglected to denounce the class-collaborationist character of the Union of the Left and to present our transitional slogans and a formula calling for a working-class government. The editorial committee acknowledged its error (the vote for the Left Radicals) in its reply to the Political Committee of the SWP, but it didn't examine the reasons for the error . . . *Our adaptation to the concerns of the vanguard prevented us from presenting the working class with an overall political alternative to the Union of the Left.*

(b) *The Campaign in Defense of the Vietnamese Revolution*

Although most of the slogans put forward by our organization were correct (those which dealt with our total support to the Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, the denunciation of the role of U.S. and French imperialism in the war and the counterrevolutionary offensive), the slogan "Victory to the NLF-PRG" represented an adaptation to the vanguard in the student milieu, the militant base of our mobilizations. This slogan called for support to the leadership of the Vietnamese people's struggle and thus excluded participation in the demonstrations by French anti-imperialist militants who did not support this leadership. The objective needs of the Vietnamese masses were for massive solidarity on an international scale. *Who did we seek to mobilize in defense of the Vietnamese people, and toward whom did we direct ourselves?* Obviously it was necessary to distinguish ourselves from the CP. But the CP's line on this question was to hold episodic demonstrations that at bottom did no more than

support their electoralist strategy. The point of demarcation in respect to the CP was precisely the building of a mass movement, of a permanent mobilization, with proletarian methods of struggle. Since our work was oriented toward the concerns of the broad vanguard, when the vanguard no longer believed that Vietnam was still the keystone of the world revolution and withdrew from the scene, we more or less let our Vietnam work drop. Since then, our agitation on Vietnam has become episodic and small-scale (almost nonexistent). To the comrades who counterpose our work in defense of the Vietnamese revolution to that of the SWP and justify our tactics by the decline of mobilizations by the antiwar movement in the United States, we ask: What has become of our FSI [Front Solidarité Indochine]?

(c) *June 21*

The June 21 action represented a substitution of the broad vanguard for consistent mass work and a mass mobilization. This action sought to mobilize certain currents of the vanguard *around their own ultraleft concepts of revolutionary violence.* What this action actually showed was the inability of the ex-Ligue Communiste to mobilize the masses and carry out a consistent campaign against the fascist gangs. Why didn't *Rouge* carry out the same sort of action for the December 19 [1973] fascist meeting? Is it because the government banned both the fascist meeting scheduled for December 19 and the antifascist counter-demonstration? And once this ban was handed down, what did we do? Nothing.

To believe today that the June 21 action was correct and properly carried out because the CP called for a response to the December 19 meeting and because the government banned the fascist meeting, is to fail to see through the CP's opportunistic maneuver, its incapacity to carry out a concrete, consistent struggle against fascism, and its desire to appear as the sole defender of the interests of the working class; by the same token, it signifies a failure to understand why the bourgeois government banned the fascist meeting, and why this government wants to appear as an arbitrator . . .

It was politically incorrect to call on the government to ban the fascist meeting. We do not call on the bourgeoisie to make use of its repressive apparatus. To confer on a bourgeois government the right to ban fascist, racist, or extremist organizations is to permit them to *determine* which organizations *seem to them* to be fascist, racist, or extremist, and to then *ban* them.

It is the vanguard of the workers movement that must call on the working class to outlaw fascist meetings and fascist gangs. Trotsky takes up this question in his statement "Why I Consented to Appear Before the Dies Committee":

"Being an irreconcilable opponent not only of fascism but also of the present-day Comintern, I am at the same time decidedly against the suppression of either of them.

"The outlawing of fascist groups would inevitably have a fictitious character: as reactionary organizations they can easily change color and adapt themselves to any kind of organizational form since the influential sections of the ruling class and of the governmental apparatus sym-

pathize considerably with them and these sympathies inevitably increase during times of political crisis." (In *Writings of Leon Trotsky* [1939-40], p. 132.)

A few lines further, in a paragraph headed "All Suppression Used Against Working Class," Trotsky continues: "Under the conditions of the bourgeois regime, no matter who they are directed against in the beginning, in the end inevitably bear down upon the working class, particularly its most advanced elements. That is a law of history. The workers must learn how to distinguish between their friends and their enemies according to their own judgment and not according to the hints of the police." (*Ibid.*, pp. 132-33)

This is why the government banned not only *Ordre Nouveau* but also the *Ligue Communiste* following the June 21 action. This is also why the government not only banned the December 19 fascist meeting but the counterdemonstration as well. In the eyes of the masses, the CP appeared as their real defender, and did so without having carried out the slightest struggle against the fascists. As for us, we were unable to denounce the CP's opportunism or to present a program for antifascist struggle.

(d) *And furthermore . . .*

On top of these examples, there is a whole series of areas in which our work has been deficient: the total absence of a campaign of agitation *in defense of the struggle of the Irish people*; the absence of permanent agitation around the question of women's liberation; the absence of work directed toward the national minorities; the absence of work directed toward immigrant workers; and the absence of a clear alternative to the Union of the Left. These deficiencies stem *either* from a failure to understand the importance of these struggles in the revolutionary upsurge in Europe and the necessity of promoting them to advance this upsurge, *or* from a purely *propagandistic* approach to millions of potential revolutionaries who are ready to enter into struggle or have already entered into struggle in an isolated and episodic manner. These questions cannot be evaded when it is a question of forming a class-struggle tendency. In a broader sense, these problems involve a dynamic of struggle that is in the interests of the proletariat. Failure to understand the importance of these struggles stems from pseudo-workerist sectarianism. As the vanguard of the workers movement, we must be the first to recognize the importance of promoting these struggles. *But the European document turns its back on them.*

To a certain extent, these few examples illustrate our line, which is aimed at regrouping a very heterogeneous vanguard by adapting to the concerns of certain currents within it. The dangers of this orientation in both the short and long run are clear: a revision of revolutionary Marxism in an organization *vascillating empirically* from right to left, according to the pressures exercised by the contradictory process of the revolutionary upsurge. Our orientation ought to be to seek to recruit and educate the vanguard in the course of the experiences in struggle of different radicalized layers and combative sectors of the working class. *This orientation is aimed at recruiting*

the broad vanguard by educating it as to the need for work in the mass movement to advance the class struggle, work that takes as its starting point the objective needs of the class struggle. It is more than likely that at the beginning we will only regroup the most radicalized elements from various social layers, and that our work of educating and recruiting the various currents in the vanguard will take a long time. But this is no reason for "theorizing" our weaknesses. For the question is not whether or not we want to win over the vanguard, but rather HOW and on what basis. In this sense, the European document confuses the end with the means. Mass work is not a question of numbers but rather a political question. The formulation of correct slogans, intervention around a system of transitional and democratic demands that will advance the class struggle on an international and national scale, cannot be set aside until the day when we have a solid implantation in the working class, a mass audience, and the organizational capacity to mobilize the masses in the struggle for power. We cannot continue to move ahead empirically. These are the immediate, day-to-day problems of building the revolutionary party. Winning hegemony in the broad vanguard requires a permanent battle to politically educate this vanguard. Building the revolutionary party can only take place on the basis of an orientation toward the unification of the working class, unification based on its political independence and democratic organization; this requires work in the mass movement that corresponds concretely to the masses' immediate and historical needs.

PART TWO: On Method

The Latin American resolution and the European document have their roots in the same methodological error. While correctly tracing the broad outlines of the deepening contradictions of capitalism and the unprecedented revolutionary upsurge, the majority falls into the methodological error of *transforming these underlying tendencies into absolute phenomena, of neglecting the intermediate factors, the peaks and the valleys. . .* This is a methodological error, because even if the long-range analysis *is correct, this does not exclude changes that are perhaps temporary and limited but must nonetheless still be taken into account. . .* When confronted with a concrete situation, the revolutionary party must be capable of making use of the most appropriate means of advancing the struggle. The party must therefore not only be capable of rapidly confronting a change in the situation, but of foreseeing this change and having the possibility of intervening correctly in the new situation.

The effort to predetermine the contradictory forms of the revolutionary upsurge in terms of a probable variant and to then outline our tasks on the basis of this *single probable variant*, flows from *schematism*, from a rigid and *simplified* concept of the class struggle that the party may have to pay a high price for. In the 1969 Latin American resolution, this methodological error committed by the majority resulted in the *adoption of a single tactic for an indefinite period and on a continental scale.* This resolution was actually based on a single eventuality — re-

pression—that is, that it was unlikely that a reformist regime or a mass movement would appear. This line disoriented our sections when, *under the pressure of the mass movement*, the national bourgeoisie was gradually compelled to initiate a period of semilegality, then legality—extending concessions, even if only to strike a blow at the workers movement later, at a more propitious moment. To grant no importance to these periods—or phases—which will perhaps turn out to be short but during which the bourgeoisie is retreating before a powerful revolutionary upsurge, is to lose the most favorable moments and the greatest opportunities for a revolutionary party. To see in Latin America, as the 1969 resolution does, no more than the limits to the maneuvers of the national bourgeoisie and its general tendency to resort to coups is precisely what prevented our sections from taking advantage of unparalleled opportunities for building and consolidating a revolutionary party, and for more effectively combatting the repression that struck the workers movement afterward. It is dangerous for us to determine our tasks not in terms of the form and content of the struggles with which our sections are confronted but as a function of a *single*, probable forecast of the future . . . even if this forecast is correct in its broad outlines. The experience with entryism *sui generis* and with Pablo's conclusions based on the possibility of a third world war should serve as lessons in this regard.

The absence of a scientific analysis of the struggles in the different countries on the Latin American continent, the lack of a programmatic orientation *for responding to the objective needs of the masses* expressed in the struggles of workers and peasants, and the understatement of the significance of reformism and the margin for maneuver of the national bourgeoisies *condemned our sections to a marginal role in the social explosions that occurred*.

In Europe, the questions are more complex. But the absence of *elements that are essential* to the correct orientation of our sections, along with the adaptation to the concerns of the vanguard, poses the same sort of

problems as the 1969 Latin American resolution. The formulation of the tasks of all our European sections solely as a function of the decisive battles to come was the basis for choosing our tactic—though it really isn't a tactic—of winning hegemony within the vanguard of a mass character. The problem of building mass revolutionary parties is done away with by assuming that the decisive battles will be lost if the broad vanguard is not won over to revolutionary Marxism in the next four or five years. At the same time, Germain explains to us that this vanguard is a *minority* within the workers movement. *But if the vanguard must be won over, it is all the more important that this be done on the basis of an orientation toward the working class as a whole*.

We state once again that to bind the hands of the European comrades with a single tactic is to make a complete abstraction of the different forms the class struggle takes in Europe. The development of struggles of the national minorities (Ireland, the Basque region), the radicalization of sectors of the working class, the deepening of the youth radicalization (Greece, Spain, England, France, Belgium), the radicalization of women, the struggles of immigrant workers, the growing use of both governmental and extralegal repression, and the prime importance of defending the revolutionary movements in the colonial and semicolonial countries pose an entire series of political responsibilities and require several different tactics for dealing with the various unorganized currents that make up the heterogeneous broad vanguard. The European document does not envision the different phenomena, nor does it envision the various tactics necessary for responding to them. If the majority does not draw the lessons of the Fourth International's experience in Latin America, if the majority persists in its methodological errors, and if these are passed at the Tenth World Congress, the European document will lead to the same disaster for our European sections that the 1969 resolution did in Latin America.

December 20, 1973

Proposed Amendments to the IEC Majority Tendency Resolution 'On the Question of Armed Struggle in Latin America'

By the Leadership of the Majority Tendency of the Walloon Section

Point 1: As is

Points 2 and 3: Rewritten

Point 4: An additional point

Point 5: Former point 4, amended

Point 6: Former point 5, amended

(2) *The orientation incorrectly called "strategy of armed struggle" in Latin America for which the Ninth World Congress declared, expresses the clear consciousness of the correlation (analyzed above) of the social and political forces in all countries of the continent where a powerful rise of the mass movement is taking place. It signifies above all the duty of revolutionary Marxists:*

(a) to continually warn the masses against any illusion that they can escape armed confrontation by extending their democratic or economic struggles. It is precisely the stepping up of the mobilization that makes armed confrontation inevitable in the short run, in the present social, economic, and political conditions in Latin America.

(b) to untiringly popularize the necessity for the general arming of the workers and poor peasants in self-defense bodies that become worker, peasant, and popular militias. "Arm the proletariat and its allies with the desire to arm themselves" becomes the number-one propaganda task when reaction's coup d'etat proves probable if not inevitable in the near future.

Nor is any strategy for the conquest of power possible if the working masses are not also convinced of the necessity for armed struggle, and have not already passed through the necessary experiences and skirmishes in this respect. When the prerevolutionary situation approaches a revolutionary situation, when the sharpening of class contradictions draws near to its culminating point, the incapacity of the proletariat and its vanguard to adopt a concrete orientation for seizing power, based on the arming of the masses, implies the inevitability of a bloody and momentarily triumphant initiative of the Latin American counterrevolution. For considerations of defense as well as offense, the refusal to place the question of arming the masses at the center of political attention thus means, under these circumstances, taking a course toward certain defeat.

(c) to reject any spontaneist illusion that expects the workers to be armed through a sudden, unforeseen, and spontaneous outburst from the rank and file and postpones the political and practical preparations for arming

the masses until other supposedly primary "political" tasks have been accomplished (that is, until the eve of a mythical general insurrection, which will never occur under these conditions).

(d) to not remain content with general and abstract propaganda in this area, but to undertake, in relation to the work of building a mass revolutionary party, initial experiences that *serve to set an example; to enter into initial actions that are carefully calculated for the effect they can have in raising the level of consciousness of the masses, in increasing their combativity and their will and capacity to arm themselves.*

In a situation in which there is a powerful rise in the mass movement, the revolutionary Marxist organization must take this road as soon as it has crossed a minimum threshold of cadre accumulation that allows it to anticipate creating armed detachments of the party without the functioning of these detachments undermining the party's accomplishment of its tasks in the realm of penetrating the working class, doing trade-union work, carrying out propaganda and education, and continuing the consolidation and strengthening of the organization as such.

In this sense, the formation of armed detachments of the party is an aspect of an overall *political* strategy. In strict conjunction with the mass work of the party and in a fashion that compliments this work, it should fulfill the precise function of preparing, facilitating, promoting, and accelerating the arming of broader and broader vanguard sectors of workers and peasants; that is, it should fulfill the function of *promoting the formation of workers, peasants, and popular militias, and then of contributing toward their organization and centralization, which are indispensable in case of confrontations with the repressive apparatus of the bourgeois state (the party as a whole, moreover, must play the role of the political and military vanguard in this phase).*

In a situation in which the social contradictions are less exacerbated, the revolutionary Marxist organization must likewise prepare itself and prepare the masses for the armed confrontation to come—without, however, considering the formation of armed detachments as a central task. On the other hand, the existence of a clandestine apparatus and the practical education of the militants in military problems remains a necessity, whatever the numerical strength of the organization.

In no case should military work be seen as being politically autonomous in relation to the party's mass work.

(3) When the intensification of the class struggle has resulted in a temporary victory of the military dictatorship, and when experience has demonstrated to the masses that effective struggle against this dictatorship by trade-union, semilegal, routine methods is completely insufficient, conditions exist for permitting the start of various forms of armed resistance against the dictatorship.

Such initiatives of military harassment are, however, effective only under the following conditions:

(a) That the masses understand the necessity for these initiatives as a result of their experience, that these initiatives are to some degree a result of that experience, and that they thereby receive growing support, first political, then material, from the masses.

(b) That the period of confrontation between limited groups of partisans and the counterrevolutionary army is not continued too long. That means that guerrilla warfare *as a tactic* has succeeded if it fuses with a mass movement resulting from, among other things, the stimulating effects the former has had on the latter, and from the party's work in the mass movement (and then, through their political prestige and military capacities, the armed detachments can serve as catalysts in the creation of broader armed formations arising from the mass organizations).

The presence of a revolutionary Marxist organization is necessary—an organization capable of judging correctly the evolution of the objective situation and the level of consciousness of the masses, and of subordinating the use of a particular form of struggle to the overall interests of the proletariat and the revolution, of publicizing the guerrilla actions within the factories, universities, etc., and of coordinating the struggles against the bourgeois state. Without the presence of such an organization, guerrilla warfare loses its effectiveness, and there is a very real danger of seeing it transformed from a particular and episodic form of armed struggle into a fetish to which all other forms of struggle of the proletariat and its vanguard are subordinated, if not sacrificed.

The Fourth International firmly rejects the illusion, and the foquista, Debrayist concept long encouraged by the Cuban leadership, that the action of limited nuclei, determined to take military initiatives, can represent a *sufficient* motor force of the revolutionary struggle and replace not only the action of the Leninist party but the mobilization and organization of the broad masses, which in the last analysis are considered auxiliary elements.

(4) When a revolutionary crisis in a Latin American country does not culminate in a rapid defeat of the proletariat and its allies, this may open up a phase of civil war with broad participation by the masses in armed revolutionary formations (something that should not be confused with an initiative by a small armed group). In the course of such a civil war, the proletariat and its allies run a strong risk of finding themselves confronted with a military intervention that has superior resources at its disposal, from U.S. imperialism or one of its Latin American "stand-ins" (in particular the Brazilian army). The civil war could then take on an immediate aspect of national liberation. The tendency of a civil war to go beyond national borders in the short or medium run, and to transform itself into a struggle on a continental scale may result on the one hand from this foreign interven-

tion, and on the other hand from the repercussions the revolutionary process would have on neighboring countries that have mass movements with a high level of consciousness, and from geographical and military considerations. This underscores the necessity of seeing the class struggle in Latin America, both politically and organizationally, from an internationalist and continental perspective.

But this hypothesis presupposes what is still far from being achieved in any Latin American country: the existence of a revolutionary leadership already enjoying broad support from the masses, and thereby capable of engaging in large-scale and organized armed resistance against the "national" and international counterrevolutionaries.

(5) In the context of its programmatic approach toward the problems of strategy and tactics posed by the rise of the revolutionary process in a succession of Latin American countries, the Fourth International supports a strategy in which armed struggle has a role to play in the fight for the Transitional Program as a whole, inasmuch as the necessary mobilization of the masses for the program's national-democratic and workers demands will itself increasingly lead to violent confrontations with the counterrevolutionary army, that is, to the question of arming the masses and preparing for this politically and organizationally.

This *strategy* is part of the general strategy of permanent revolution in these countries. None of the fundamental problems of Latin American society and its underdevelopment can be resolved without the conquest of power by the proletariat allied with the poor peasantry. Without a systematic preparation for the arming of the proletariat and the masses, any plan of struggle for power directed against the "army-party" of the Latin American bourgeoisie is irresponsible and becomes a deadly trap.

This strategy for Latin America is part of the Fourth International's central effort to resolve the crisis of revolutionary leadership through building new mass revolutionary parties. Unless it provides a concrete answer to the problems posed by the rise of revolutionary struggles, such a party cannot be built. One of the most burning questions raised in the very course of the class struggle in Latin America is what to do, given the succession of military coups and the repeated crushing of the mass movements in one country after another, what to do given the total failure of "foquismo."

The theory that the preparation and launching of armed struggle must be subordinated to the development of propaganda within the bourgeois army, which will allegedly create the political preconditions for armed struggle, has been disproven by the events in Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. These experiences confirm that this theory involves a misunderstanding of the uneven pace of the maturing of revolutionary consciousness among the vanguard workers and peasants on one hand, and within the army on the other, as well as a lack of understanding of the prevailing political, organizational, and psychological difficulties that mark the outbreak of widespread mutinies within the bourgeois armed forces. If important self-defense forces of the masses capable of welcoming and protecting the rebel soldiers do not exist at that moment, the first significant incidents of indiscipline within the army will be put down with particular

savageness and may even be the signal for a coup by the extreme right. The bourgeoisie understands that it cannot, under any circumstances, tolerate the disintegration of the last effective political instrument it possesses. The necessary propaganda in the army must be matched by the strengthening of the armed detachments of the party and growing successes in the formation of armed detachments of the proletariat and the poor peasantry.

In another respect, the case of the majority of the Argentine PRT has also demonstrated the danger of militarist deviations when the turn toward the formation of armed detachments of the party has been carried out successfully. These deviations consist of neglecting tasks that are indispensable under these circumstances, the tasks of political agitation and propaganda, systematic evaluation of the class consciousness of the workers, struggle against the influence of reformist, class-collaborationist, or confused petty-bourgeois nationalist ideologies, as well as the tasks of patient, systematic work in the plants in order to constantly extend the party's roots in the class.

Never assign absolute priority to one aspect of revolutionary activity, but integrate it into an overall strategy of preparing the masses for the formation of organs of dual power and the revolutionary conquest of power: this is the concept of the Fourth International with respect to the creation of armed detachments of the party in the specific conditions where this is shown to be necessary and possible, as in certain countries in Latin America today.

(6) Although it began with a correct analysis of the social contradictions and of the inevitability of confrontations on the Latin American continent, the Ninth World Congress resolution committed errors of analysis and perspective, especially in underestimating the possibility that the reactionary forces could crush the mass movement for a long period (Brazil) or could keep it up for a fairly long time at a controllable level (Peru).

But above all, it went on to dangerous extrapolations: "Thus not only in a historical sense but in a more direct and immediate one, Latin America has entered a period of revolutionary explosions and conflicts, of armed struggle on different levels against the native ruling classes and imperialism, and of prolonged civil war on a continental scale." ["Resolution on Latin America," in *IIDB Reprint, Discussion on Latin America (1968-1972)*, p. 46.]

Formulas like this do not permit making a distinction, fundamental though it is, between a situation of embryonic civil war in which guerrilla actions are carried out, and a situation of revolutionary war in the strict sense of the term. This is a distinction the Argentine PRT never made—it fully believed that war had been declared and made this the framework of its activity, especially in building the ERP. On top of this there is the importance the resolution accords to the notion of the "strategy of armed struggle." This formula can be explained by the necessity of emphasizing the differences between Europe and Latin America from the point of view of building the party. But the notion of a "strategy of armed struggle" is equivocal and in any event does not provide the instruments that are necessary for a precise elaboration for a Latin American section.

In fact, the only explicit indication that emerges from the Ninth World Congress resolution in regard to the

application of this "strategy of armed struggle" is the axis of rural guerrilla warfare, an axis that is given "a geographical-military meaning," which comes down to viewing its development as relatively independent of the social substratum that the agrarian question could provide in certain countries. The political perspective of this uprooted guerrilla warfare can only be understood if one takes seriously the "conjunctural" significance of "prolonged civil war on a continental scale." Or in other words, that the intensity of class confrontations has reached such a degree that the class war poses objectively before the masses a military problem that is directly taken up, that the civil war is already more than an embryo.

And generally speaking, when the resolution defines the specific forms of the armed struggle, it uses some elliptical, one-sided, and simplistic formulations that telescope several successive phases of this struggle, and underestimate the possibility and the necessity of advancing from limited armed detachments to the arming of the worker and peasant masses as the rise of the mass movement reaches a certain level.

(3) The Ninth World Congress orientation stems in part from the Trotskyist movement's unity tactic toward the Castroist current, a current that emerged under the impact of the Cuban revolution and reached its political high point in 1967 with the holding of the OLAS conference. The Ninth World Congress resolution posed as a task: "Integration into the historic revolutionary current represented by the Cuban revolution and the OLAS, which involves, regardless of the forms, integration into the continental revolutionary front which the OLAS constitutes." ["Resolution on Latin America," p. 50.] In the spring of 1969, however, OLAS as an organization hardly existed except on paper. What did exist were bilateral relations between the Cuban state and the Latin American revolutionary movements. The difference is important. For while the direction of the Cuban leadership at that time was not so well sketched out as it might be today, a turn had already clearly begun with the Cuban leadership's positions on Czechoslovakia, France, and Mexico. It was possible to foresee that Cuba's aid to revolutionary movements would become increasingly conditional politically. This meant that unitary relations with the Castroist current, which remained a central question, presupposed a political battle, the only way to harden up the sections of the Fourth International against the inevitable pressures.

● The insufficiencies, the errors in the analysis of the conditions and forms of armed struggle are explained in great part by the weakness of our movement in Latin America, in terms of the socioeconomic reality, during the period of the Ninth World Congress.

● This fact, though essential, is absent from the Ninth World Congress resolution.

Because of this, the resolution does not directly confront one of the crucial problems posed de facto by the proposed strategic orientation: the problem of the transformation of organizations that in the past have been essentially propagandistic into organizations capable of assuming the tasks imposed on them by the period.

All these errors opened the door to sometimes sterile polemics. A current in the International still refuses to draw the necessary lessons from all the costly defeats of the mass movement, disarmed or taken by surprise by the initiatives of the army in Latin America. This current

was able to concentrate its fire on false targets, to blur the essential content of the debate, with negative consequences not only for the internal life of the International but above all for the political and organizational arming of the sections in Latin America. In other words, in light

of the successive experiences of Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile, it is high time to bring the discussion back to the real questions and alternatives. Such is the aim of the present statement.

Proposed Amendments to the IEC Majority Tendency Political Resolution

By the Leadership of the Majority Tendency of the Walloon Section

(Page references are for English translation printed in *International Internal Discussion Bulletin* Vol. X, No. 20.)

Page 3, column 1, line 11. Replace "unions" with "trade-union leaderships."

Page 3, column 1. Replace the second and third paragraphs with the following:

For a period of about twenty years after the second world war, the colonial revolution was practically alone in carrying the world revolution forward; the workers movement in the advanced capitalist countries was going through a period of political stagnation, and the process of political revolution against the bureaucracy made only very slow progress. Beginning in 1967-68, however, massive entry into action by workers in European capitalist countries inaugurated a period marked by a considerable revolutionary tide (see the theses "On Building Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe" [*IIDB* Vol. IX, No. 5]). While adapting its tactics to the various phases that developed from country to country in this period (including phases of stagnation and temporary retreat), the International and its sections should maintain a general orientation based on the fundamental characteristic of this period—the *new rise in world revolution*, with the proletariat and its forms of struggle and organization playing a major role in the world revolutionary process. And this new rise of world revolution can, at given moments, precipitate revolutionary crises that objectively put the question of power on the agenda.

This is the fundamental tendency underlying the evolution of the world situation since the Ninth World Congress.

The reaction it brought about is represented by the American-Soviet and the American-Chinese accords. The desire to maintain an international status quo that is manifest in these accords brings Yalta to mind. They differ from the Yalta accords, however, because of the lessened capacity of the partners to impose such a status quo by force. On the one hand, the setback to imperialism in Vietnam and its economic difficulties make a new direct military intervention of massive proportions more difficult, at least outside the American continent. On the other hand, the Soviet bureaucracy no longer has total control over the mass movements: its parties have begun

to decline, and China has lost all possibility of building an international Maoist movement because of its domestic and international turn to the right. Thus, up until now these accords have had a limited, though not negligible effectiveness. Their direct and joint counterrevolutionary action has come into play only against the isolated uprising in Ceylon; however, their mutual neutrality has made it possible to carry out successful counterrevolutionary actions (Palestine, Sudan . . .). On the other hand, this neutrality has shown itself incapable of halting the Indochinese revolution due to the political autonomy of the leadership of this revolution, which is itself assured by the power of the mass movements. All the accords have done is permit American imperialism to save face by disengaging itself from the ground war without disaster thanks to the workers states' shutting off arms supplies. Moscow's bringing Cuba to heel, which meant a break with the OLAS line, was a step in the same direction as the counterrevolutionary accords, and the costly defeats of the workers movement in Latin America, especially the defeat in Chile, would have been more difficult, if not impossible, if such a capitulationist turn had not taken place.

Such accords, however, are the consequence not of a situation of strength but of weakness and decline on the part of imperialism and the big bureaucracies of the workers states. They are trying with these accords to apply the brakes to this process, and to halt the world rise of revolution. But the Vietnamese revolution clearly demonstrates that their possibilities for direct counterrevolutionary action are limited by their fear of the effects this in turn would have within their very borders and the threat this would pose for their own social equilibrium. *Only grave defeats of the masses in key sectors of the world revolution— notably in the large countries of capitalist Europe, in Japan, Indochina, and in Latin America by adding a defeat in Argentina to that in Chile, would be able to modify the world situation in a decisive manner and permit imperialism to abandon its defensive position and impose its own solutions on the structural crisis of its system: the establishment of reactionary dictatorships; a brutal lowering of the standard of living of the masses; the preparation for and setting into motion of new, far-reaching counterrevolutionary wars.*

Page 3, column 2. The paragraph that begins "For several years . . ." should be qualified by indicating that there may be temporary lulls and partial defeats.

And at the end of the same paragraph, in place of "advance along the road of building stronger and stronger revolutionary parties . . .," indicate that this is a key period for overcoming the gap between subjective and objective conditions, and for building revolutionary workers parties having an influence on mass struggles.

Page 4, column 1. In view of recent events, specify the proximity of recessions (in 1974), their extent, and the clearer perspective for their synchronization.

Add a point on the supplementary effects of the oil crisis, and correct the end of the last paragraph in point 1 to indicate that there will be both inflation and unemployment in the future. The phrasing in the resolution may give the impression that unemployment in the future will follow previous inflation.

Page 4, column 2, paragraph 3, line 8. After "within the imperialist alliance" add "without, however, any other power posing itself as a replacement."

Same paragraph, line 13. Replace "contribute to bring the moment nearer . . ." with "contribute to strengthening the tendencies toward first a European nuclear force, and then a Japanese nuclear force, tendencies that could eventually be expressed on a political-military level . . ."

Page 4, column 2, paragraph 4, line 1. Replace "The efforts of American diplomacy . . ." with:

The efforts of American diplomacy tend toward a reorientation away from a "bipolar" strategy (the two "big powers" of the postwar period) and toward a strategy corresponding to a more complex constellation: three "big powers" (the USA, the USSR, and China, the latter not yet being quite so "big"), Japan, and capitalist Europe, the latter lacking political unity. These efforts are aimed at defending America's position within the capitalist world, and not at bringing about a fundamental reversal of alliances.

Pages 4 and 5. In point 2, develop more fully the general tendency of American imperialism to decline (arguing against the line of reasoning in the Lecate theses, which denies this and may back it up by referring to the short-term advantages American imperialism can draw from certain measures — devaluation, the oil crisis).

Pages 3-5. In point 1 or in point 2, add a note on the perspectives of the Common Market in regard to the coming recessions (the immediate centrifugal tendencies; their limits when faced with extremely serious crises fueling revolutionary upsurges; the role of the U.S. in exploiting these difficulties while being unable — as the principal defender of the capitalist system, and in light of the consequences for itself — to create a situation permitting revolutionary victories in Western Europe).

Page 5, column 1, last paragraph, line 8. After "progressively disintegrate it" add:

On the other hand, since the effectiveness of the Israeli army has been called into question by the Yom Kippur war, it is probable that American imperialism will seek if not a substitute at least an auxiliary to that army in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Same paragraph. Add a sentence indicating that this policy presupposes that the regimes in these "stand-in" countries possess a minimum of social stability (the crushing of the workers movement; economic conditions . . .).

Page 5, column 1, next to last paragraph, line 7. After "negotiations with the Moscow and Peking bureaucracies," replace the rest of the paragraph with:

. . . to induce them to stop channeling revolutionary movements into means of exerting pressure, and instead take part in joint counterrevolutionary actions (which correspond to their common concern for assuring their internal social situation), under the guarantee of mutual recognition of their zones of influence.

Page 5, column 2, paragraph 2, line 5. Replace the sentence that begins "The evolution toward professional armies . . ." with:

In the countries of Western Europe in which tensions become extremely sharp, the bourgeoisie's strengthening of the elements of civil war will include preparing national armies for the struggle against "internal subversion." This preparation, which in the short run does not necessarily lead to doing away with conscription, involves accentuating the weight of the professional sector of the army, a sector that is specially prepared, in both the material and ideological realm, for taking responsibility for the struggle against the enemy within. Such preparation of the army for civil war must be vigorously fought by the workers movement.

Page 5, column 2, paragraph 3. Delete the last sentence "That is why . . . to maintain the status quo." See the amendments on the same subject that were proposed for page 3.

Page 6, column 2, line 3. Replace "with a potentially anticapitalist dynamic" with a more precise formulation.

Page 6, column 2, paragraph 3. Replace this paragraph on France with:

The French proletariat went through the exhilarating experience of a general strike and factory occupations involving about ten million workers in May-June 1968, and since that time it has not experienced a lull. Its rise has taken place within the context of the decay of the Gaullist regime. In an effort to channel this rise into a reformist path, the Communist Party and Socialist Party leaderships established the "Union of the Left" with its "Common Program," claiming that a parliamentary victory of this bloc would of necessity inaugurate a "brief stage toward the passage to socialism." Temporarily slowing down prior to the March 1973 elections, this rise regained its vigor immediately afterward, despite the electoral defeat of the Union of the Left. This was manifested not only in sharper struggles but also through demands that called the authority of the bosses into question and

through the appearance of forms of independent organization on the part of the masses in struggle, partially outside the total control of the old leaderships and the traditional organizations. The revolutionary rise extends to the most disparate realms of society (teaching, culture, the family, the army, justice . . .). The new vanguard, which is still largely unorganized, has taken on mass dimensions since May 1968; it includes growing layers of young workers and now constitutes an appreciable factor in the political scene.

Page 7, column 1, paragraph 4. The section on the question of immigrant workers should be more specific (employment, recession . . .).

Page 7, column 1, paragraph 4, line 21. Replace "They allow one to foresee, in the near future, the most important revolutionary wave . . ." with: They allow one to foresee, in the near future, the possibility of the most important revolutionary wave. . . .

Page 7, column 1, paragraph 4. Develop more fully the consequences the recession will have for the working class, the contradictory consequences: the possibilities for growing and sharp struggles, but also the possibilities of differentiation within the working class in terms of categories of workers, of branches of industry that are affected to a greater or lesser degree, etc.; and, consequently, the importance of the subjective factor in unifying and orienting these struggles.

Pages 7-8, points 5 and 6 on Japan and the U.S. See the proposals from the comrades in these countries.

Pages 8-11, points 7 and 8. A general proposal to replace these points with a single point, "Revolution in the colonial and semicolonial countries," with the following subheadings: (a) The struggle of the proletariat for its class independence; (b) Latin America; (c) The Arab revolution.

Begin section (b) Latin America, with the next to last paragraph in column 2 of page 9, that is, the paragraph that begins "The entire evolution in Latin America. . . ."

Integrate into this section additions on the following: the consequences, on a continental scale, of the coup in Chile; Cuba's turn to the right; the consequences of this turn for the Castroist current (including the MIR, the PRT, and the Tupamaros).

Page 10, column 1, paragraph 2, line 3. Beginning with "Of course, the Allende regime . . ." replace the rest of the paragraph with:

Of course the Allende regime possesses certain features of a popular front regime, though less by the composition of the Popular Unity coalition than by its attempts at conciliation with the Christian Democrats and, above all, by its collaboration with the principal Chilean "bourgeois party," the army. It is clear that the formation of cabinets with the military since 1972 is no more than the logical outcome of the reformist and "pacifist" strategy of the Popular Unity leadership, and of its refusal to choose the road of revolutionary mobilization of the masses against the bourgeois state. Nevertheless, from the be-

ginning the Popular Unity distinguished itself from a classic popular front regime by the fact that it openly proclaimed its resolve to enter on the road of socialism, and that it openly based itself on the organized workers movement.

Page 10, column 2, paragraph 2. Replace the first ten lines of this paragraph (down to "All the Latin American . . .") with:

The heroic resistance the Chilean workers and militants launched against the military coup will undoubtedly continue in various forms; among them and perfectly justified is armed resistance.

Same paragraph. At the end of the paragraph (after "bitter fruit") add the following:

Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the defeat of the Chilean workers movement is a harsh blow for workers everywhere in Latin America, reinforcing, in the short run, militarist or fascist tendencies on a continental scale.

Page 10, column 2, paragraphs 3-5. On the Arab revolution, add the following: a balance sheet on the recent Arab-Israeli war, the future of the Palestinian resistance, the chances for a negotiated settlement, and the perspectives for a Palestinian state; and the consequences all this will have in the Arab world. (Preferably to be written by the comrades in the Middle East.)

Page 11, column 1, paragraph 2. (Amendment proposed by the Africa commission.) Replace the entire paragraph beginning "The progress made by the . . ." with the following:

At a moment when the economic crisis of the neocolonial countries is accelerating, and when the development of a revolutionary African vanguard is taking shape in the neocolonial countries, the liberation struggles in the countries dominated by a white minority — and especially those struggles unfolding in the Portuguese colonies — play an important role in the radicalization of all African youth. Despite its historical particularities, the armed struggle being carried out in the Portuguese colonies poses some of the general problems of the revolution in Black Africa, especially the peasant question, the ethnic question, and the nature of the "nationalist" regimes.

This confers particular political importance on these struggles.

But apart from the political lessons these struggles permit us to draw, there is also the strategic and economic importance Southern Africa and the Cape Verde Islands have for imperialism. The diplomatic, economic, and military support imperialism extends to Portugal is in exchange for the latter's growing concessions in regard to participation in the pillage of the colonies. Too weak economically to support a war effort of this sort, Portugal has to accept in particular the intervention of South Africa, the region's strong link in the chain of imperialism. The keystone to this consensus is to be found in such economic-military projects as the Cabora-Bassa dam or the Cumene project.

However, the progress of struggles such as the one launched in Guinea-Bissau with the proclamation of independence confront such liberation movements as MPLA

(Angola) and FRELIMO (Mozambique) with political and strategic problems whose solutions determine the future of these struggles. When push comes to shove, the centrifugal forces may become stronger or weaker, depending on the influence of different, contradictory factors:

— The increasing competition among the imperialist powers over how the question of Portuguese colonialism will be settled, which is taking place within the context of a search for a neocolonial solution.

— The development of new contradictions among the white colonialists is giving rise to various political proposals (the Rhodesian solution, the neocolonial solution, the status quo).

— The development of struggles in South Africa, Rhodesia, and Namibia.

— The objective pressure on the part of the bordering neocolonial countries. The growing exertion of economic and military pressure on Tanzania and Zambia by South Africa and the imperialist powers. Zaire, where Mobutu is working toward a neocolonial solution for Angola that would put the latter within Zaire's orbit.

— The dramatic weaknesses of international support.

— The political heterogeneity of the leaderships of the liberation movements and the absence of a theoretical understanding of the socialist culmination of their struggle.

— The new rise of struggles in neocolonial Africa, with the possibility that revolutionary crises in the period ahead will aid political clarification within the liberation movements.

In the context of the imperialist powers' readjustment of their strategy in Southern Africa, the development of the process of permanent revolution on the basis of the internationalization of the conflict in the entire region can take place only if it is accompanied by a political and organizational transformation of the liberation movements into vanguard anticapitalist organizations. Victories in Angola and Mozambique will thus take place within the broader framework of a revolutionary crisis in all of Southern Africa, and of a general upsurge in the African revolution. Under these conditions, the revolutionary struggles in each of the Portuguese colonies deserve consistent internationalist support from revolutionary Marxists.

Page 9, column 1, paragraph 3, line 9. (Amendment proposed by the African Commission.) After "The discreditment of the Bandaranaike government in Ceylon," add: . . . as well as the difficulties of the Ramanantsoa regime in Madagascar and the "Marxist-Leninist" regime of N'Goubai in the Congo.

Page 9. (Amendment proposed by the Africa Commission.) At the end of point 7, add the following:

In neocolonial Black Africa, thirteen years of neo-colonial independence have led to a deepening of the economic crisis that is exacerbating the social contradictions within these neocolonial societies and states.

Industrialization, though it has been limited and weak, has given rise to a young, stable proletariat that is more and more asserting itself in struggles such as the one at the M'Bao refinery in Senegal, the Donala strikes in Cameroon, and the strikes in Mauritania or the demon-

strations in the Congo. There is also an unprecedented radicalization among the student youth, which is above all a consequence of the pressure from the economic crisis on a significant sector of the urban petty bourgeoisie (Senegal, Madagascar, Ghana, Niger. . .). Finally, the peasant masses have not escaped—even to a lesser degree—from the phenomenon of the radicalization (Madagascar in 1971, Chad, Nigeria. . .).

The petty bourgeoisie involved in managing the imperialists' holdings has experienced an accelerated differentiation over the last thirteen years. A certain strata among them has been able to realize an initial accumulation, thus differentiating themselves from the purely bureaucratic sector by means of patronage from the state apparatus. Although the economic sectors in which this African capital is developing remain marginal and secondary, this differentiation within the ruling class produces political conflicts that aggravate the chronic instability of the regime. A growing number of patchwork solutions have been offered in order to cope with the radicalization of the masses: reformist military regimes (Madagascar, Dahomey, the Congo); taking a hard look at the cooperative accords (the former French colonies); and even a hardening of right-wing trends (Tanzania, Zambia). The African bourgeoisie remains economically and politically incapable of throttling the revolutionary upsurge. Violent repression and the growing number of military regimes constitute a trend in imperialist policy that confirms this. In this context, the birth of a new revolutionary generation is becoming more and more evident, a generation that is drawing lessons from the defeats of the nationalist movements and taking up the task of building revolutionary parties.

Page 11. In section II, "The Worsening of the Crisis of Bureaucratic Power in the Bureaucratized Workers States," insert a point on the more general social crisis in the workers states (the USSR and Central Europe) dealing with, among other things, the youth and the intelligentsia. This should precede point 9, "The economic crisis in the USSR."

Page 11, first paragraph under point 9, line 14. Replace "in the event of a military conflict" with "in the unlikely event of a military conflict."

Page 13, column 1, paragraph 2, lines 8-9. Replace "the Laval-Stalin military pact" with "the Laval-Stalin declaration."

Add a section detailing the consequences for the different continents (Europe, Asia, Africa) of the right turn in Chinese foreign policy.

Page 13, column 1, last two lines. (Amendment proposed by Verla.) Delete "began to openly undermine," and replace with "undermines more and more openly."

Page 13, column 2, paragraph 4. (Amendment proposed by Verla.) Delete the last two sentences in this paragraph ("The increase in social inequality . . . first success") and replace with the following:

But while it has stimulated real development across the entire country by means of a vast campaign against corruption and the millionaires, and by denouncing the

existence of concealed technocratic and financial forces, the Titoist regime has not, for the moment, taken any specific measure calling into question the "socialist market" economy. The preparatory documents for the upcoming Tenth Congress of the Yugoslav CP show all the ambiguity of the policy still being followed at present: like the new amendments to the constitution, they formally take into account a certain number of demands of the Yugoslav left, demands that tend toward democratic planning based on self-management and toward increased political support for self-management. One indication that this is the case can be seen in the projected efforts toward "integrated self-management" by region or sector of industry, and in the projected establishment of delegated assemblies representing "labor organizations" at the level of the Communes or Republics. Another indication is the explicit denunciation of the major illusions that have dominated the orientation toward a market economy since the 1965 reform, and of the socially damaging consequences that accompanied this orientation. Nonetheless, since the forms this "integrated self-management" will take have not been specified, they (as well as the delegations to the assemblies) will undoubtedly be dominated by an increase in the political weight of the Yugoslav CP, either openly or by means of the trade unions and the factory managers. Similarly, no measure has been advanced at present against the decentralization of the banking system — a measure that increased the influence of the financial forces — apart from vague formulas about increasing self-management in these sectors and doing away with private finance capital.

Thus without having radically modified the axes of the reform, the Titoist bureaucracy applied the brakes to it and initiated a turn. Although the bureaucracy has not yet completely ended the decentralization that stimulated the development of bourgeois and bourgeois-aspiring layers, its measures have had the immediate effect — apart from the many trials of denounced millionaires — of discouraging a certain number of small proprietors who have preferred to shut down their shops. At the same time, some factories (in Croatia, in particular) have momentarily found themselves without managers (due to the lack of job security), and foreign capitalists have become increasingly wary about making highly insecure investments in a climate marked by a return to egalitarian ideology and by a struggle against the millionaires and the enemies of self-management. The prodigious encouragements the Titoist regime has extended to foreign capital have not yet had any substantial results; in the present period they run the risk of appearing even less satisfying in the eyes of foreign investors.

Despite all their ambiguities, these measures as a whole have had the immediate effect of quieting workers' discontent with the regime by giving them the feeling that their efforts have been crowned with success. However, none of the social problems (inequities, unemployment, cost of living) affecting them have been resolved. The million Yugoslav workers employed in foreign countries — directly threatened by the economic situation in the European capitalist countries — remain an additional factor promising future aggravation of an economic and social situation already marked by crises.

In this context, political repression represents for the Titoist bureaucracy a second important means for pre-

venting political opposition to its policies from merging with the discontent of the workers.

Page 14, column 1, paragraph 1, lines 2-6. (Amendment proposed by Verla.) Delete the sentence that begins, "Political power is not in the hands . . ." and replace it with the following:

Political power is not in the hands of some bourgeoisie or other, charged with the responsibility for strengthening, stabilizing, and legalizing the development of the capitalist accumulation sector. To the contrary, this sector is only tolerated from time to time, developing for the most part through fraudulent operations; when it asserts itself, it is denounced and repressed. Power is actually held by a workers bureaucracy, certain leaders of which still retain the prestige of the revolutionary struggle they led against capitalism. This bureaucracy's links to the working class are all the more important in view of the fact that they were forged during the break with Stalin. Their privileges have been directly threatened by the development of capitalist restorationist social forces. They have only one solution for maintaining their privileges of power: a combination of repression and partial support from the working class against the restorationist forces, while reaffirming the gains the working class has retained since the revolution (egalitarianism; the Yugoslav federation, the struggle against regional inequalities, the sources of nationalist conflicts; all of which require conscious organization of the economy).

Page 14. In the heading for point 12, replace "and the rise of the political revolution" with "and the awakening of the political revolution."

Page 15, column 2, line 2. After "crimes not committed," add "condemnation, including posthumously, of those responsible for every sort of crime committed against socialist democracy."

Page 16, column 1, lines 2-7. Replace "while remaining principally determined . . . needs of the Kremlin bureaucracy," with:

. . . while remaining organically linked to the Kremlin's political line (which serves them as a guarantee of their socialist aims), are carried out, compared to the past, more as a function of the electoral needs of these parties and the need they feel to "stay close to" their mass base.

Page 16, column 1, paragraph 4, line 10. After "reformist orientation" add "having in part the goal of counteracting the progress of the revolutionary Marxist current among the masses."

Page 16, column 1, paragraph 4. Add, at the end of this paragraph, that this adaptation has its limits and will become an openly counterrevolutionary intervention at the moment the existence of the capitalist order is called into question.

Pages 16-17, Point 15. This point should be modified to take into account the amendments on the same point in the European document, regarding the characteristics

of the new vanguard and the evolution of the various political currents. This should be done by adding a passage on the centrist currents that are being formed in the wake of the radicalization of the broader masses, on the social roots of the ultraleft currents, and on the tactic of unity in action — outflanking.

Page 17-18, Point 16. (Amendment proposed by Gabriel.) This section should be revised on certain points by placing the following after the paragraph that ends "ETA VI in the Basque country" (page 17, column 2, paragraph 1), in order to stress the responsibility of the Fourth International and its sections to make use of the impasse the nationalist and Maoist formations find themselves in and not restrict ourselves to an exclusively propagandistic role:

In a number of countries, the impasse of nationalist and Maoist leaderships — provoked to a large degree by the hostility of broad sectors to Chinese foreign policy — confers new possibilities for the development of our sections. The fact that in a number of countries revolutionary Marxists — whatever their quantitative strength — constitute the only political pole with a clear program, will accelerate the effect of the polarization of the new broad vanguard. This situation can only be exploited if our sections prove capable of taking adequate political initiatives and do not restrict themselves to a propagandistic role. If we do not take such initiatives, we shall bear a heavy responsibility for the possible future resurgence of nationalist, spontaneous, or neo-Stalinist currents.

In a number of countries the Fourth International can play a role qualitatively superior to the one it was able to play at the time of the Ninth World Congress, a role that is out of proportion with its numerical forces. In this context, our sections' assertion of their affiliation with the Fourth International will remain a decisive propaganda factor.

Page 18, column 2, paragraph 2. In point a), replace "the revolutionary movements in the Portuguese colonies" with "the national liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies (MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO)," in order to both designate these movements and to specify these tasks in the face of sectarian tendencies on this question in the sympathizing Portuguese organization.

Pages 18-19. Two opposing theses were presented on Cuba, and no decision on them has been taken. We are printing below the two texts. The first, the draft theses by Rossi, is to be inserted in the section on Latin America in the colonial revolution. It reads as follows:

There can be no doubt that Cuba's economic and military dependence on the USSR has grave consequences for the Cuban leadership's foreign policy. The unconditional support of the USSR on the part of Cuban diplomacy, beginning with the invasion of Czechoslovakia and the apology for the Eastern European countries, is a very serious phenomenon.

Two important points should be added to the first paragraph in point 17. They are the following:

(a) It should begin by recalling the meaning of the Ninth World Congress turn.

(b) It should end with an indication that new conditions have the (dangerous) consequence of strengthening tendencies with a national outlook, which signifies the necessity of strengthening the international center, a problem that also requires carrying out the turn of the Ninth World Congress (the final section of the document "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International" should be used for this).

Revise and rewrite the tasks in order to either specify certain tasks and formulations or to emphasize the character of the intervention, the initiative and, if possible, the leadership of the International in accomplishing these tasks.

In Latin America, the policy of the Cuban leadership tends toward abandoning the gains of the OLAS congress (the socialist character of the revolution on the Latin American continent, the necessity of armed struggle, etc.). While it is true that the Cuban leadership continues to support a certain number of movements of the revolutionary left (MIR, Tupamaros, PRT, the Colombian FLN, etc.), it also systematically sustains illusions in a series of military regimes (Peru, Panama), and populist regimes of a so-called "nationalist" character (Peron in Argentina). The lack of criticism of the "peaceful road" strategy of the Chilean Popular Unity and the "rehabilitation" of the Latin American Stalinist parties also belongs in this context.

Furthermore, the fact that on the domestic level the country's evolution has not led to the establishment of workers democracy (far from it, in fact), that long-time Stalinists have regained numerous levers of power, and that the party has not held a single congress since its formation, can only confirm the uneasiness produced by the turn of the Cuban leadership since Che's death.

Draft theses by Hofmann, to be inserted in the section on the workers state:

The Cuban workers state, which since its inception has suffered from the concepts of the military leadership of the July 26 movement — manifested in particular by substituting democratic forms for the formation of soviet organs of power — has entered a process of degeneration. This degeneration runs parallel with the Cuban leadership's political capitulation to the dictates of the Kremlin — the precondition for economic support from the USSR, and for the guarantee of Soviet backing against American threats. Domestically, this turn was marked by the break with Che Guevara, by the reintroduction into the leadership of people around Escalante, and by a regime that is increasingly making its weight felt and eliminating the revolutionary freedom of expression of the early years. Up to now, however, the most important effects of the turn have involved the foreign policy of the Castroist regime: not only the total approval of Kremlin policy (in particular the approval and justification for the invasion of Czechoslovakia) but a clear break with the line of the Second Declaration of Havana and with the OLAS line, substituting uncritical support for reformist leaderships (Chile), "liberal" military leaderships (Peru), and "national" leaderships (Peron in Argentina). Its links to and support for guerrillaist organizations (Tupamaros, MIR, PRT) tend to be subordinated in action to governments it characterizes as "progressive." Because of this, Castroism has

become transformed from the principal revolutionary force on the Latin American subcontinent into a centrist leadership that bears a heavy responsibility—both by default

and by the support it has given to reformism—for the defeats suffered by the revolutionary masses in Latin America over the last few years.

Proposed Amendments to the IEC Majority Tendency Resolution 'The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe'

By the Leadership of the Majority Tendency of the Walloon Section

[All page numbers refer to English translation printed in *International Internal Discussion Bulletin* Vol. IX, No. 5, November 1972.]

Section 1, page 9, paragraph 5: Replace "reversal" with "this modification."

Section 1, page 9, paragraph 6: Add this paragraph (see Appendix A).

Section 2, page 10, paragraph 3: After the parentheses (. . . retirement, etc.), add:

. . . the development, both in number and in quality, of daycare centers and free services permitting a socialization of domestic tasks, as well as. . . .

Section 2, page 10, paragraphs 5-6: Replace with a section from the Compass Tendency's amendments (*IIDB* Vol. X, No. 25, pp. 7-8) beginning with "The scope and importance of the workers' struggles . . ." and continuing to the end of this section (except the last paragraph, which we will take up later). Reprinted in Appendix B.

Add the section on immigrant workers that has been integrated into the Compass Tendency amendment on this point. Printed in italics in Appendix B.

Section 2, page 10, paragraph 7: Delete the word "family" between parentheses.

Add after the parentheses (. . . mass media, etc.) "and of patriarchal institutions and values integrated into the bourgeois moral and social order (the crisis of the family, the radicalization of women against their oppression)."

Section 3, page 11, paragraphs 7-8: Delete. Replace with Appendix C.

Section 4, pages 11-13, throughout: Replace "Communist parties" with "Stalinist parties."

Section 4, page 12, paragraph 2: A section of comrades on the Commission propose that the term "process of Social Democratization of the Communist parties" be replaced by "an accentuated and irreversible turn to the right by the Stalinist parties."

Section 4, page 12, paragraph 4: The same comrades propose replacing the end of this paragraph with: "ushering in an evolution on the part of these national Stalinist parties toward a relative lessening of their vassalage to the Soviet bureaucracy. This evolution still takes place, however, in the context of the Soviet bureaucracy's capitulationist policy toward imperialism, a policy that takes the form of 'international detente.'"

Section 4, page 13, paragraph 10: Add the following paragraphs at the end of this section:

Finally, the global loss of influence on the part of the reformist parties should not lead us to forget that on occasion these parties remain capable of breaking a workers' initiative confronted with a full-scale attack by the bosses or government; thus indicating a path toward stabilization—of a highly provisional character—of bourgeois regimes in crisis.

These characteristics as a whole indicate that it is thus necessary to prepare for years of intense social struggles with ups and downs, but with a rapid, crushing defeat of the working class practically excluded. Openings for the revolutionary rise continue in proportion to the progress made in raising the level of class consciousness and strengthening the revolutionary vanguard.

Section 5, page 13, throughout: Replace "traditional workers organizations" with "traditional workers parties."

Replace "vanguard of mass proportions" and "mass vanguard" with "broad vanguard." Do this in the rest of the document as well.

Section 5, page 13, paragraphs 1-4: See Appendix D.

Section 6, page 13, paragraph 1: "To win hegemony within the broad vanguard" (within the new mass vanguard), and add afterward, "particularly the broad workers vanguard."

After "beginning to sink roots into the proletariat," add: Political hegemony presupposes that the revolutionary Marxist organization appears—through its propaganda, campaigns, and initiatives—as a pole of reference for this broad vanguard, even if a large part of the vanguard is not yet directly organized by the former.

Section 6, page 14, paragraph 4: Delete this paragraph and its subparagraphs a), b), and c).

Section 6, page 14, paragraph 5: Delete the last sentence in this paragraph ("Achieving this goal requires . . . organized workers movement.") and replace with Appendix E.

Section 8, page 15, paragraph 2: In place of "the repressive apparatus can be almost totally paralyzed at the outset," write "the repressive apparatus can be partially paralyzed at the outset."

Section 9, page 16, paragraph 2: Add at the end of this paragraph:

This gap in workers' consciousness is due in large part to the reformist parties' abandonment of all antimilitarist propaganda and of all education on the question of the necessity of arming the proletariat.

Section 10, page 17, paragraph a): After "the general approach outlined in the transitional program" add "especially by supporting a series of demands centered around the slogans for workers control."

Section 10, page 17, paragraph b): Delete "and 'reformist' ones."

Section 10, page 17, paragraph c): Delete "so-called 'qualitative.'"

Section 10, page 17, paragraph e): After "by getting these demands," write "especially those for workers control and workers self-defense."

Section 10, page 17, paragraph f): Delete subparagraph f) and add:

f) Organize a systematic internationalist intervention, focused around the unity of the working class; that is, around solidarity with the struggles of immigrant workers and against the specific forms of exploitation that affect them. This struggle for equal social, trade-union, and political rights with the native working classes forms a part of a broader battle for the right of all to work, the battle against unemployment.

This international propaganda must also aim at undercutting all forms of racism and xenophobia, a divisive weapon in the hands of the capitalists.

It is important to support, on a European scale, all forms of independent organization on the part of communities that are superexploited by European imperialism.

f') Organize international propaganda around solidarity with the anti-imperialist struggles on the "underdeveloped" continents, around solidarity with struggles in other European countries, and around solidarity with the anti-bureaucratic struggles of workers, students, and intellectuals in the bureaucratized workers states.

f'') Develop a systematic intervention against all discrimination in regard to women (in particular against all forms of "male chauvinism" in our ranks and within the workers organizations); participate in the struggles against the oppression of women, along the lines of drawing out the class divisions and accentuating the clearly anticapitalist consciousness of these women, starting with

the very themes they themselves have become sensitized to; stress the independent organization of direct action and the unity of the working class, while making every effort to demonstrate through these struggles the weakness and defects of the reformist and Stalinist leaderships.

Section 10, page 17, paragraph h): Add at the end of this paragraph:

Promote vigorous antimilitary activity that includes the development of permanent propaganda against the bourgeois army among the working class and civilian youth; promote as well as spread revolutionary propaganda and the organization of communist work within the army itself, especially in countries where a system of conscription exists.

Section 10, page 18, paragraph i): After "(police, riot squads, and armies)," add:

To defend within the mass organizations the necessity of workers combat detachments and workers militias.

Section 10, page 18, paragraph j): After "by both gradual means and abrupt leaps forward," read:

. . . of the pursuit of a conscious struggle after the seizure of power for the radical transformation of human relations in all domains of daily life, in particular a struggle against the patriarchal values and institutions that persist.

Section 11, pages 18-19, paragraph 1: Replace the heading "Three Tactics" with "The Tactic for Building the Party." Then delete the first four paragraphs, down to the one that begins, "The tactic for building the revolutionary party which underlies. . . ."

Section 12, page 19, paragraph a): The entire section on student youth is to be revised, but the revision is not yet completed.

Section 12, page 19, paragraph a): Delete "above all in periods of ebb in workers struggles."

Section 12, pages 19-20, paragraphs b)-c): Replace with Appendix F.

Section 12, page 20, paragraph d): Rewritten as follows:

d) The periphery of the working class is the site of the most massive and intense process of social mutation: the *proletarianization* of the middle strata. The crisis of the bourgeois system hurtles the petty bourgeoisie, indeed even the bourgeoisie, and above all their children (the main source of the radicalized youth) into the proletariat en masse; that is, it transforms them into workers who have nothing but their labor power to sell. This process—a delayed but complete fulfillment of the Marxist prediction—tends to culminate with the ideological mutation of these strata which, during periods of social upheaval, reject their self-mystification and become more and more conscious of the identity of their interests with the historic interests of the proletariat. Such a mutation does not take place without a transitory strengthening of reformism, centrism, and ultraleftism, which shows the extent to which our intervention is decisive. From this point of view the

strategy for building our parties—from the periphery to the center—appears as not just a simple obligation to begin with small organizations composed essentially of young intellectuals, but as a permanent necessity which, at another stage, will become a strategy of going from the center to the periphery, since the revolution requires that the revolutionary party be implanted in all layers of the proletariat.

Section 12, page 20, paragraph c):

c) The radical character of the social crisis also profoundly shakes the traditional petty bourgeoisie, and especially the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the scientific and artistic circles. . .). Without shifting their principal focuses of activity (return to the end of former point d).

Section 13, pages 20-21, paragraph 1: Delete the first paragraph. Leave in the second paragraph. Delete everything else down to the part of the last paragraph that begins "In a general sense. . ." and replace the deleted material with Appendix G.

Section 14, page 21, title: Replace "Centrism" with "Centrist Organizations."

Section 14, page 21, end: Add "initiatives of" before "unity in action plus outflanking the bureaucrats."

Section 15, pages 21-22: Delete point 15 entirely.

Section 16, page 22, paragraph 1: Delete the second sentence ("Since its sections had undergone. . .") and rewrite the end of the first sentence as follows:

. . . vanguard, a shift the sections generally went about making in too slow and stiff a way.

Section 16, page 23, paragraph 3 (end): Delete the reference to the Italian section: "The only case where this integration . . . older Trotskyist cadres."

Section 17, page 24, paragraph b) (end): After "correspond to the concerns of the vanguard," write "obtain a response in the struggles of the masses" in place of "do not run against the current of mass struggles."

Section 20, page 27, last paragraph: Replace "the distinguishing mark of the Trotskyists" with "a distinguishing mark of the Trotskyists."

Appendix A

Although the countries of capitalist Europe have to date registered more defeats than successes insofar as monetary and political unification is concerned, the alternative between unification and fragmentation remains posed in the face of future tests. If disorganization and fragmentation predominate, this will mean that American imperialism, despite its relative economic weakening, will increase its political and military weight vis-a-vis each European capitalist country thus isolated, and vis-a-vis a new rise of Atlanticism.

Appendix B

The scope and importance of the workers' struggles that have been on the increase since 1968 is indicated by the fact that the workers are becoming increasingly conscious of these problems and are attempting to respond to them through direct struggle, and that they are putting up enormous resistance to the attempt to substantially raise the rate of surplus value. For this reason these struggles are not directly limited by the shifting economic conjuncture and often last for extended periods of time. A central point that underlines the importance of this upsurge is the fact that the tendencies outlined here are characteristic of *capitalist Europe as a whole*.

Of course, these struggles do not occur in every country in the same forms, with the same intensity. And above all they do not occur everywhere at the same time. This unevenness has contradictory consequences: it moderates the explosive character of a deepening crisis in a single country if this situation coincides with relative stability in other countries. But at the same time it prolongs the period of instability and concrete crisis on a European scale because new countries enter into a phase of acute crisis in the class struggle while others are entering into a period of partial downturn. The crises fuel each other and make it more difficult for the bourgeoisie to reestablish equilibrium in the individual countries.

The following variants, which appear either separately or in combination, are characteristic for the upsurge of the class struggle in Europe:

a) Explosions on a national scale that bring about a prerevolutionary situation and once again place the socialist revolution on the agenda not just in the historical sense (the revolution has been on the historical agenda since 1914) but in the conjunctural sense (May 1968 in France).

b) Massive, prolonged mobilizations of the working class with regional and national strike waves, mobilizations that lead to an extremely sharp social and political crisis or even to a prerevolutionary situation (Italy 1969-73).

c) Tests of strength of decisive importance at a national level (Great Britain 1972).

d) Militant mobilizations of decisive sectors of the working class on a social and political plane. (Spain, France, West Germany on a lower level)

e) Limited experiences in struggle by the worker vanguard, which nonetheless contain the salient characteristic elements of the period (Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands).

On the basis of the experiences of the post-1968 upsurge the thrust of these struggles can be summarized as follows:

a) Wage demands, whose major importance lies in the rejection of wage controls.

b) Struggle against the generalized rise in prices and demands directed against the effects of inflation on the workers.

c) Demands for defending the location and availability of work, struggles against factory shut-downs, lay-offs, industrial and regional restructuring.

d) Demands championing the principle of equality and aiming at reducing differentiation within the working class and between factory and office workers.

e) Reduction of hours with no cut in pay, longer paid vacations.

f) Defense of collective bargaining, the right to strike, and other trade-union rights and prerogatives.

In addition there has been the development of objectives in the struggle that have a profound importance because they are directed—at least in embryonic form—against the capitalist relations of production themselves. These include: revolts against the speed-up and piecework fundamentally challenging the bosses' authority; attempts to raise the question of workers' control and dispute the notion of profit as the ultimate goal of production; attempts to enlarge considerably the scope and quality of public services (right to free, quality health care and education, the right to housing, retirement at 60 on 75 percent pay, etc.). These goals of the workers' struggle are all the more important inasmuch as they run counter to the efforts of the capitalists to increase the rate of surplus value, above all through an increase in the intensity of labor, in order to counteract the decline in the average rate of profit.

This general crisis of class relations had already begun to manifest itself before the turning point in the world economic situation, but this turn has deepened it considerably. This social and political crisis, which began in 1968, continues and, seen as a whole, will deepen. Increasingly this confrontation will tend to be played out directly between the two major classes. Now more than ever, the bourgeoisie is forced to attack the working class, to control wages and close down work places.

But today they must attempt to do this within the framework of a relationship of forces that has changed in favor of the working class both on a world scale and concretely in the countries of capitalist Europe. They must confront a European proletariat that (with the exception of Greece) has not suffered any serious or lasting defeat in the whole past period, that, as a result of the fifteen-year-long decline of the reserve army of labor, enters into this phase with strong forces, a higher level of trade-union organization, and increased confidence in its own strength.

Appendix C

It would be erroneous, however, to see the strong state—which the strengthening of the repressive arsenal and the adaptation of the political apparatus to monopoly capitalism tend toward—as the historical solution of parliamentary democracy. It is only a transitional solution on the part of the bourgeoisie, and it will vary according to the relationship of forces in each country and according to the degree to which the workers movement is organized in each country. On the other hand, while the conditions for a fascist solution have hardly materialized, this should not lead us to believe that the bourgeoisie is without any means for fighting back against the new revolutionary rise: the strengthening of the executive; the preparation of the army for civil war; the development of a judicial and police arsenal paving the way for the installation of a military-police dictatorship directly backed by imperialism, a dictatorship that can only be imposed through a profound defeat of the workers movement, if not its physical destruction. Within this perspective, the fascist groups and the fascist-led trade unions could play an auxiliary role, while the major part of the bourgeoisie's

combat forces would be found within the state apparatus itself and among the present bourgeois political personnel. The continuation of the crisis of leadership in the workers movement, which would lead to a successive wave of struggles focused around the question of power, would end up tiring out the working masses, reducing their capacity for mobilization, and creating the conditions for a stunning blow from the bourgeoisie.

If a decisive revolutionary breakthrough does not occur, the bourgeoisie will finally impose its solution. But the fact that we are only at the beginning of the deepening social crisis, that neither the extent of unemployment nor the political level of the workers' struggles yet confront the bourgeoisie with an immediate question of life or death, tends to lead to a delay of a few years before the decisive battles open up. Nonetheless, in certain countries the appearance of a political crisis within this situation of instability can precipitate tests of strength between the classes that would have important consequences on a continental scale.

Appendix D

First paragraph. Replace the first five lines with the following:

The deepening of social contradictions and the crisis of the mass workers' parties on the one hand, the profound internal changes within the proletariat over the last fifteen or twenty years on the other, and, finally, the numerical and organizational weakness of the revolutionary Marxists, coincided with a change in the process of radicalization of the proletariat.

While traditionally the advanced workers and militants—that is, the militants conscious of the necessity of an overall and permanent political struggle against the bourgeoisie—were politically organized within the mass reformist parties, a more and more significant section of them no longer seek their orientation within reformist political perspectives, without, however, agreeing right away with revolutionary Marxist perspectives. A broad vanguard has thus appeared, by and large eluding. . . .

Return to the original text, up to "qualitative leap."

Replace the rest of the paragraph with the following:

Usually, it arose first among the student youth and around the question of solidarity and identification with the colonial revolution. But as the domestic social crisis within the capitalist countries of Europe worsened, especially with the May 1968 revolutionary crisis in France, this phenomenon gradually affected the proletariat as a whole.

Second paragraph remains unchanged.

Insert the following lines between the second and third paragraph:

This broad vanguard must be differentiated from the strong combative current that manifests itself as much within the proletariat as among the student youth. While it is true that among the student youth this current appears frequently—but not solely—around directly political struggles, and while it is also true that the reformist parties are losing their mass base in this sector, this current as a whole does not adhere to the perspective of an overall political struggle against the bourgeoisie. Within the

proletariat as well, the broad vanguard is not identical with the combative workers as a whole, that is, with those workers who are often found in the first ranks of struggles, but whose break with reformist tactics of struggle is—however important the tactical implications—only conjunctural.

Conversely, the broad vanguard cannot be reduced to simply the far-left political groups that assume for themselves the role of political vanguard of the working class, although it is quite true that these groups recruit largely within the broad vanguard. The existence and development of these groups testify to the scope of this phenomenon—the emergence of a broad vanguard. In part, we should consider these groups as the transitional organizational forms of the broad vanguard's confused break with the strategy of reformism. Consequently, these groups pose a series of specific tactical problems for us (unity policy).

Return to the third paragraph, replacing "new mass vanguard" with "broad vanguard."

Make the same change at the beginning of the fourth paragraph.

Paragraph 4. After "the workers' movement to it," insert the following passage:

This spontaneous revolt can appear around extremely disparate questions. Struggles over work conditions—or the bureaucratic betrayal of them—play a role that is important but not unique; the crisis of bourgeois relations in general constitutes a powerful factor in the radicalization and emergence of the broad vanguard, including within the working class. The diverse forms taken by these empirical breaks with the strategy of reformism make any overall political characterization of the broad vanguard one-sided. It oscillates spontaneously between ultraleftism and centrism, and this oscillation is as much due to the structure of the national workers' movement itself as to the vanguard's social composition.

Return to the rest of paragraph 4 and paragraph 5.

Appendix E

Achieving this goal requires:

a) *Permanent education of this vanguard* by means of polemics with the various far-left groups on revolutionary strategy, the Transitional Program, the unity of the working class, and building the revolutionary party—none of which can be considered as having been clearly grasped by this broad vanguard.

b) *The capacity of the revolutionary Marxist organizations to take political initiatives that outflank the reformists in practice.*

— These initiatives should be aimed at mobilizing not only the broad vanguard but along with it a section of the combative militants or even a section of the masses.

— They should also permit educating the broad vanguard with the perspective of a major confrontation with the bourgeois state, as well as freeing combative militants from reformist control.

c) *The capacity of the revolutionary Marxist organizations to offer this broad workers vanguard a lasting framework of mass work* where it can both establish a national relationship of forces vis-a-vis the reformists by undertaking major campaigns, such as support to workers struggles, anti-imperialist mobilizations (Indo-

china, Chile), antimilitarist mobilizations, etc.; and challenge the hegemony of the reformists in struggles around demands within the factories, through permanent trade-union work under the perspective of forming class-struggle trade-union tendencies, and through the capacity to take independent initiatives in mobilization within the factories themselves.

This takes into account the new organizational forms inside the factories themselves, forms whose nature varies both as to their purpose and as to the degree of implantation in the trade-union organizations and to greater or lesser reformist hegemony over the trade-union apparatus.

In any event, however, our goal is:

1) To work toward authentic structures of workers democracy emerging from the struggle (sovereign strike assemblies, elected strike committees, shop delegates).

2) To make progress toward the permanent formation of class-struggle trade-union tendencies. This in no way means forming permanent struggle committees of either the small, sectarian, red union sort, or the syndicalist, centrist, political group variety.

3) To organize sympathizing groups of the party in the factory, with the aim of integrating the best militants into the revolutionary Marxist party.

d) *The capacity to master the dialectic of the sectors of intervention* both as a function of the degree of development of the revolutionary Marxist far left and of the relationship of forces between it and the traditional parties, and as a function of the relative size of the broad workers vanguard, especially the youth vanguard.

That is, to master the dialectical links and thus the assignment of forces:

— between major political events and various local political events;

— between youth work and working-class work;

— between the periphery of the workers movement and the core of the workers movement;

— between neighborhood work and factory work.

The problem thus poses itself in different terms, depending on the country and the stage of construction of the organization.

e) *This activity as a whole is aimed at transforming the vanguard in order to make it an adequate instrument for the recomposition of the organized workers movement.* It thus presupposes a specific unity tactic toward the traditional workers parties. If our sections are as a general rule still too small to make use of the united-front tactic in a major way, there is, on the other hand, this broad vanguard which, through campaigns and initiatives we propose to it, is capable of mobilizing itself and mobilizing along with it a section of the combative workers; and due to the relationship of forces thus created, it is capable of imposing unity in action on the traditional workers party. Through such conjunctural unity in action we attempt to involve the masses and, if possible, outflank the reformist apparatuses. In the course of this process of "initiative—unity-in-action—outflanking," our aim is to educate the broad vanguard on the strategic necessity of unity in the working class, as opposed to any sectarian deviation; and to remove the combative workers from reformist control, either winning them over permanently to revolutionary Marxism or at least assuring that they make a permanent political break with reformism.

Insofar as the workers movement is concerned, this unity tactic must be completed with a specific tactic for the far-left organizations in order to permit—given the latter's occasional unity—initiatives of a mass character, and in order to combat their sectarian and especially their ultra-left deviations in practice, that is, in the forms of action and the slogans.

Insofar as the other far-left organizations are concerned, this unity tactic can thus still vary according to the relationship of forces between the revolutionary Marxist organizations and the far-left organizations, the far left and the workers parties, and the far left and the broad vanguard. Thus it necessarily varies according to the country and according to the stage of construction of the revolutionary party.

Appendix F

Chapter 12, subsections b) and c). The most important phenomenon is the radicalization of the working class. This phenomenon, however, is uneven. The growing combativity of the working class has not been accompanied by a corresponding politicalization. It is important to recognize that while the combative workers are capable of outflanking the reformist apparatuses during a struggle, the majority will not engage in a protracted revolutionary and anticapitalist battle. Many of these combative workers remain under the influence of the reformist apparatuses. A small section, frequently composed of recently proletarianized young workers, express a strong sentiment of revolt more than anticapitalist class consciousness. Only a minority will in the course of struggles take a lasting step toward the new broad vanguard. And the broad workers vanguard itself is—for the reasons already mentioned—highly differentiated between:

a) the recognized trade-union cadres in the factory, the leaders of the mass struggles, the small minority that has eluded the control of the reformists but remains deeply marked by decades of reformist hegemony and treason and is not prepared, at the present stage at least, to engage in building a predominantly youthful revolutionary Marxist party;

b) the natural cadres of the struggles produced by the five-year-long rise in workers struggles, younger militants who are beginning to assert themselves in the factories as replacement cadres contesting the hegemony of the trade-union bureaucrats and challenging them for leadership of the mass struggles;

c) finally, the young workers and apprentices whose consciousness emerged, above all, in connection with the global social crisis, and who are attracted to the far left groups, by radical forms of action, and by interventions around such themes as sexual repression, women's liberation, the army, school. . . .

At the present stage of the construction of our organizations, it is mainly the last two categories of worker militants we can anticipate bringing into and around the party. In order to accomplish this we must be capable of responding in our political campaigns to the different themes posed by the overall social crisis; that is, first of all (but not solely), our campaigns must be capable of mobilizing the broad vanguard (particularly the workers in

the social and public sectors; the women workers particularly sensitive to themes linked to the oppression of women may initially radicalize around these issues). We must also be capable of responding through our intervention in the factories to the problems and demands that are capable of mobilizing broad masses.

We must combine these two axes of intervention by fixing as our goal the formation of young workers into genuine worker cadres capable of carrying out mass struggles in their plants and of challenging the reformists for the leadership of the trade-union organizations.

Appendix G

Section 13.

a) The new far left, the organized part of the broad vanguard, has in most countries passed through three stages of development. Initially, when the radicalization took place essentially within the student movement, it was able to take the form of a mass political movement. After 1968 and under the impact of the Cultural Revolution, it experienced an initial political clarification marked by the proliferation and the influence of ultraleft spontaneous currents. Finally, as the first waves of the empirical radicalization were broken by repression without achieving a link-up with the workers' movement by providing the strategic responses the workers' vanguard was waiting for, and as the Chinese bureaucracy began to take a right-wing course, the necessity for a political organization became necessary. This happened at the same time the relationship of forces within the far left were changing, generally in favor of the Trotskyist organizations.

b) Apart from the sections of the International, the principal currents of the far left are today divided along the following lines:

1) The change in the international situation, along with the general modification of the relationship of forces between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie and between the revolutionaries and the reformist bureaucracy, has qualitatively transformed the possibilities of the Trotskyist movement for the first time in its history. However, in the face of these new possibilities, the Trotskyist movement is tending to become more and more deeply divided between a fighting current present within the Fourth International and a rightist current that is retreating before the new tasks and sinking into an increasingly more evident tail-endism in regard to the masses and the reformist bureaucracies.

2) Following the denouement of the Cultural Revolution, the Maoist-spontaneists within the Maoist current have fallen apart and become fragmented, occasionally giving rise to libertarian groups, whereas the orthodox Maoist-Stalinist current has experienced a certain revival.

3) National and local centrist groups that frequently draw their general ideological references from a superficial version of Maoism.

4) A traditional ultraleft current of the councilist variety. This current is still small, but it could experience a certain development to the extent that the control of the reformist organizations continues to weaken.