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The "Tasks and Perspectives of the IMG" was presented to the convention by a minority Tendency. Its general line was rejected by the convention.

We are publishing these documents for the information of our members.

IMG/SL FUSION CONFERENCE



27,28,29 May 1972

for members only

P E R S P E C T I V E S D O C U M E N T

by A. Jones and C. Howard

(General line adopted by National Committee
for presentation to conference)

PRE - CONFERENCE DISCUSSION

Internal Bulletin No. ONE

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A NOTE FROM JONES AND C. HOWARD

Owing to shortage of time the last section of this document dealing with students, blacks and women could not be completed in time for the N.C. to discuss it. Rather than delay the production of this document until another N.C., a separate document will be issued dealing with these subjects.

Cdes will note that as the IMG is part of an International, we have been forced in this document to take an attitude on the international differences existing in our movement. For this reason this document is also a contribution to the international discussion proceeding the tenth World Congress of the Fourth International.

Appendix 3 refers to an assessment of the conjuncture. This is in the introduction to the miners pamphlet.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

We apologise to comrades that this document is so long. However this is made necessary by the profound nature of the problems confronting the organisation, and the nature of the political differences revealed over the past period. Rather than skate over any points it is necessary to bring out in detail the real nature of the existing differences and pursue them to their most fundamental premises. When members of the leadership go so far as to declare that there are sections of the leadership who reject the fundamental positions of the Fourth International, then it is obviously the case that the nature of these differences must be spelt out clearly.

Since the last conference a qualitative change has taken place in the work of the IMG. At the conference last June practically no branch was doing regular work inside the working class. We were only just beginning to make an analysis of the Labour Party, we had no real base outside of about five towns, etc. This whole political situation is beginning to change. Virtually every branch is now engaged in some activity in relation to the working class, the organisation has established itself firmly in whole new areas of the country, we are now a leading force in the student field and on the political question of Ireland, etc. However this change in work has brought us up against tremendous new problems which even now we are only just beginning to deal with. Nevertheless it is possible to draw up a balance sheet, and, for reasons which are dealt with later, it is indeed absolutely necessary to do so. Before doing this however we may note two contingent elements which have affected our work in the last year:

- (a) The inexperience of the organisation. The IMG is an extremely young organisation which recruits primarily people new to politics. If it is considered that in 1968 the organisation had only forty members and that now with the Spartacus League we have well over 300, and that very few of these have come from other organisations, then you can get some idea of the inexperience of the group.
- (b) In the last year we have been faced with the absolute necessity of spreading the organisation geographically. In order to be a serious national organisation and to build the structure necessary for work in the working class we had to try to spread the organisation. This could only be done quickly by having an impact in those areas where it was easiest to recruit students, white-collar workers, etc. This stage is by no means over, there exists a big 'hole' in the North-East for example, but in some areas at least this process is coming to an end. The typical IMG branch is moving towards being 8-12 people in a town.

Nevertheless, if we want to examine some of the short-comings of our work over the last year it is not in these two factors that they are to be found. It is in fact in various theoretical short-comings which have directly affected our work. This is particularly the case with some of the paralysing political disagreements which have existed within the leadership. Some of these differences within the organisation have been resolved. This present document aims to show concretely how certain political positions have, and would in the future, harm our work. The present analysis bases itself on three interrelated theoretical points:

- (1) That the difference between propaganda and agitation is that between presenting many ideas to a small number of people and presenting a small number of ideas to a large number of people, and not between passivity and 'calls to action'.
- (2) That a transitional programme by definition smashes the bourgeois state, i.e. the social relations of capitalist production of the state machine which defends them. There therefore exist no transitional programmes for 'sectors' e.g. women, blacks, students, etc. but only a transitional programme for the whole of society (within such a programme there are of course

demands relating to the position of various social groups, but these are not demands 'for' sections of the population).

- (3) A key theoretical distinction exists between the sector in which we intervene (e.g. students, unemployed) and the political ideas we put forward in these areas. Or, put in other terms, there exists a clear distinction between the political tasks of the organisation and its organisational tasks.

The rest of this document is therefore devoted to spelling out in theoretical terms the implications of these points and the concrete perspectives which flow from them. This can best be done by placing the IMG's activities in the context of the changes in the organisation's work over the last period and the changed nature of the situation in Europe.

PART ONE

The changing international context and the development of the politics of the Fourth International.

The Fourth International's policies after 1945 were greatly marked by two mistaken conjunctural predictions which Trotsky had made: the first was that the Soviet bureaucracy could not survive the Second World War; and the second was that capitalism could not escape from slump. These predictions were separable from the bulk of Trotsky's analyses and in no way invalidated them. All that has occurred is that the crises of both imperialism and Stalinism have proceeded in a different form, but in essence remain determined by the same forces as Trotsky analyses. The first real attempt to come to grips with the changed situation was Michel Pablo's "The Coming War". This was however completely dominated by a 'catastrophist' economic perspective. In particular he held that the USA was about to be plunged into an immense slump at the same time as the colonial revolution was strengthening itself. To protect itself in this situation the US bourgeoisie would have to launch a preventive war against the workers states. The CPs in this situation would be forced to lurch to the left. But in this situation of immense crises the CPs could not possibly control the movement which would soon far outrun both the declared aims and the control of the Stalinist parties. (Incidentally this last point should deal with the Healyite lie that Pablo held that the CPs could destroy capitalism. On the contrary he asserted that the revolutionary wave would destroy the hold of the Stalinist parties). The crisis into which the Stalinist and other workers parties would be plunged would lead to the formation of currents outside the control of the leadership which it was the task of revolutionaries to win to Trotskyism. To achieve this they needed to enter the mass parties. This perspective was of course completely vitiated by the fact that what occurred was not a catastrophic slump, but on the contrary an economic boom. By the mid 1950s this perspective, which was entirely reasonable in the light of the circumstances of the early 1950s, had been rejected.

Built into Pablo's position, although not articulated fully, was an essential point concerning the relation of the mass working class parties to the proletariat. This point was that the mass parties organisationally dominated the working class. Clearly, if one expected any mass upsurge to be reflected primarily in terms of an internal crisis within the working class parties, then for this to occur the workers had actually to be inside those parties. When therefore the perspective of slump was abandoned two essential ideas were carried over. The first was that any revolutionary wave would be led by the working class, and the second that this meant, because of the organisational hold described, that the movement would reflect itself within the working class parties. This point was carried over even to a very late

stage. For example cde. Mandel, writing in 1966, stated that '95% of the workers continue to adhere to the organisation (the L.P.)'. These ideas were so firmly fixed in the minds of a generation of Trotskyist militants that in many cases it posed extreme problems to break with them. In most countries in Europe the present sections of the International were not formed organically out of the old cadres, but in a struggle against them. The development of a new anti-capitalist struggle led in a political sense by students was something many sections of the International could not grasp. A philistine and moralising attitude to the working class had been adopted. Statements such as 'the working class will lead the revolution', which are the ABC of Marxism, were conceived of as being immediate guides to tactics. The struggle of the students could be written off as a 'petit-bourgeois adventure'. Immensely favourable opportunities for Trotskyism were missed by, for example, the failure of the German section to work in the SDS. Only in France was the importance of the student movement really understood.

At this point it is necessary to comment briefly on the historical importance of the student movement to Trotskyism. It meant the ability for the first time for decades to actually lead movements rather than to comment on the sins of others. This previous immersion in commentary politics inevitably produced changes in the emphasis of Trotskyist theory. For example, the quietist 'exposure' theories of the SIL quite clearly correspond to the period of the 1950s and small propaganda group politics. The student movement offered to the International the opportunity to transform its practice, and thereby to transform its theoretical concepts. Fairly obviously however such developments produced acute problems corresponding to the particular social base from which recruitment occurred. The following passage from Besaid and Weber indicated both the problems and the gains. (JCR has been replaced by IMG throughout).

'In its style of work the IMG is weighed down by the twin weights of its student composition and its own past. The dominance of students in the organisation maintains an influence of the modes of work of that milieu. Being outside the productive process the student milieu escapes the discipline created by work in capitalist society. Its political struggles are conducted inside the liberal atmosphere of the University which is infinitely less harsh than the situation in production ... In consequence the student does not feel the need for a firm strongly based organisation ... its organisations are woolly and sloppy ... In its entryist past the IMG acquired other long lasting traits, which result from the fact that creating a fraction inside another organisation requires very different characteristics from building an independent open organisation. Building an entryist fraction is based on propaganda work coupled with a few actions designed to aid the process of political maturation carried on by the propaganda. Such work requires a very thorough political knowledge and great capacity to intervene in polemics. It creates people who are basically propagandists.'

'The activity of an open independent organisation is based upon an ability to intervene in a milieu with clear slogans and to engage in clear cut forms of struggle. Such work requires political grasp and organisational ability. Such work creates basically agitators and organisers. Ever since it gave up entryism the IMG has cruelly lacked this second type of cadre. For a long time a conception of politics which is basically propagandist has prevailed in its ranks.'

(D. Besaid and H. Weber. 'Mai 1968: Une repetition generale, p.83-86).

In the upheaval of the youth/student movement several strands had come together. At the socio-economic level there had been the complete inability of capitalism to solve the problems of social expenditure. This had expressed itself

in a whole series of areas in the United States and in Western Europe, and included among its effects an attempt to expand the education system without the necessary finances. The concrete desert of Nanterre symbolised the results. At the level of long term processes of the development of consciousness, by the end of the 1960s a generation had emerged which did not remember the defeats of the 1930s, and which was not, for reasons dealt with below, integrated into the Social Democratic and Stalinist apparatuses. The conjuncture of these twin processes produced all the preconditions for a molecular, i.e. individual/unstructured, radicalisation. The particular focus which turned this molecular process into a movement was the Vietnam War. The student movement then appeared as the product of the long term social processes, the upsurge in the colonial revolution and the apparent passivity of the working class. The events of May 1968, while at one level the highest expression of the potentiality of the student struggles, at another level dealt a death blow to the student movement. The appearance on the revolutionary scene of the working class knocked away the previous base of the autonomy of the student actions. The entire conception held by revolutionary students of their place in the struggle against capitalism changed. The theories of Marcuse, of the 'countryside and the cities', of the 'new working class', disappeared over night. This process was intensified by the strike wave of 1969 in Italy, in Britain by the large scale strikes of the winter of 1970-71, by the general European strike wave, and by the coming immense explosion of the working class inside the United States. Underlying all these rapid changes in the political situation were the continuation of the Vietnam War and the increasingly rapid decline of stability inside the international capitalist economy. By the autumn of 1971 the United States, Britain and Italy were all suffering recessions, and the United States was desperately trying to solve the contradictions which the Vietnam War had accentuated by economic manoeuvres at the expense of Japan and Western Europe.

From 1968 onwards therefore the chief characteristic of the political situation has been the upsurge of the European working class, and in particular the tendency of the working class to unleash struggles which break down the old attempts of the bourgeoisie to integrate the trade unions into the mechanisms of capitalist economic policy. It is only against this general background that the situation within the working class, the strategy of the bourgeoisie and the development of the Fourth International can be understood.

See Appendix I.

PART TWO

The history of the last two years.

It can therefore quite clearly be seen that the change which took place in 1968, or rather the accumulation of elements of the situation which came to a head in 1968, marked another fundamental change in the political situation, and therefore imposed another shift in the strategy and tactics of the F.I. The period up to 1968 can roughly be described as that of intervening in the youth and student movements in order to collect the forces to replenish the Trotskyist organisations. We can therefore roughly say that in the period since around 1966 two turning points can be seen in the work of the F.I. The first was the break with entry. The political and practical consequences necessary to carry this through were a revolutionisation of the mode of functioning of the organisation. The second was to use the forces accumulated in the youth movement to begin to gain an implantation in the working class. In the case of the IMG these two processes have been telescoped. The practical break with entryism was carried out before a theoretical rationale was given, and the

necessary steps to gain from a youth movement, i.e. the establishment of the S.L., were taken after the objective situation had destroyed the basis of the old movement. In a combined and uneven way we were forced to simultaneously gain our base in the youth, and to begin an implementation in the working class. It is only in terms of the strains imposed by this objective basis that the development of the organisation over the last two years can be understood.

We may take as a starting point the decision to set up the S.L. This step was a key rethinking of its political positions by the IMG, in a sense the most fundamental in its history. Although the full theoretical implications of the decision were not apparent at first, nevertheless they were to lead to a complete rethinking on the nature of the political situation in Britain. This occurred because of a conjuncture of two events. Firstly, it meant a decisive practical break with previous conceptions of work and hence led to new needs being felt in the organisation. Secondly the organisation now possessed sufficient members to be able to undertake large scale open activities. This led to a far quicker feedback from practice to theory than had been possible previously and meant that the organisation was forced to rethink all its political positions. It was only after the new practice had been instituted that the practical problems could be encountered which led to a radical rethinking of previous positions and the working out of a consistent and rigorous new analysis.

The beginning of the theoretical break with the general framework of ideas on which entryism was based came for the IMG with the document 'From a Propaganda Group to a League for Revolutionary Action'. An unequivocal position was taken here that entryism was not the correct tactic for building the IMG in Britain at the present period. This document was based on the analysis of a whole series of structural changes taking place in Western capitalism. The Ninth World Congress had made the point that what was occurring was something much more fundamental than a mere politicisation of students. The participation of young workers, apprentices, school students, etc. showed conclusively that a differential radicalisation of youth and not simply of students was occurring. This was given the name, perhaps rather unhappily, of the 'youth vanguard'. So far so good. It has always been the case that the youth are the most receptive to revolutionary ideas, but this phenomenon was accented by a whole series of factors in the present period. On the structural causes of this radicalisation there were no real disagreements. Nevertheless there was a systematic ambiguity in what the term 'youth vanguard' meant. This became apparent at the Ninth World Congress and in the period afterwards. The document presented to that Congress by the SWP and entitled 'Worldwide Youth Radicalisation and the Tasks of the F.I.' analysed to some extent the structural causes of 'youth radicalisation' and then projected from that the concept of a continuing youth movement. The later document of the Ligue Communiste (based on an analysis by Bensaïd and Scalabrino) was totally different in method in that it analysed the youth radicalisation not as something distinct, but within the context of the fundamental relation of working class and revolutionary organisation. This difference, on the surface slight, is in fact fundamental. It is these two differing methodologies which have in fact guided respectively the SWP and the various European sections in the last period. Implicit in the differences is the distinction between an individual radicalisation and a political movement. In addition it is only by breaking with the methodology of the SWP document that it is possible to understand the impact of May 1968 on the consciousness of the 'radicalised youth'. The reasons why the SWP has not broken with its method are both subjective and objective. The most important has been that the relative passivity of the American working class continued long after the post war calm had definitively disappeared in Europe. This meant that in the United States the mass movements were not affected by the working class upsurge in the way that they were in Europe. We can now say however that this period is coming to an end. The SWP will be forced to rethink its positions or be unable to understand the collapse of its strategy of mass movements.

During the period of the VSC the IMG had been greatly influenced by the ideas being developed by the SWP on mass movements. To the extent that any methodological break had been made with entryism it was along those lines. This influence extended into other fields as well. At the Ninth World Congress for example some of the British delegates originally supported the minority position on Latin America. Happily the discussion at the Congress changed their views. When it came to setting up the Spartacus League therefore the organisation had not clearly thought out the differences between the SWP's and the European's approach. The historical weakness of the IMG, its lack of cadre caused by the fact that the mainstream of British Trotskyism in the 1950s and early '60s passed through the SLL and not the Fourth International, assisted this process. In consequence, when it came to the formation of the Spartacus League although verbally the Tendency's call for a specifically student organisation was rejected, nevertheless the general method of treating the youth radicalisation, and particularly students, as a separate category and not within the relation of working class and the vanguard organisation, was carried over from the previous period and from the SWP's analysis. (We were in fact fighting the Tendency on the Tendency's own ground. Hence the hopelessly confused discussion at that time.) The methodology of empiricism i.e. the breaking down of every subject into separate parts characterises the organisation's approach. In practice there was a tendency for students to be analysed in isolation. This mistake was crucial. The historical importance of the student movement to Trotskyism was the possibility of gaining rapidly a large number of cadres who were on a high enough political level to have broken ideologically with Social Democracy and Stalinism. Around such an initial cadre an organisation could be built with a qualitatively higher political level than that of the old sections. Such an organisation could intervene in a political way in the working class. The setting of the task of recruiting and organising this political vanguard was perfectly correct, and therefore it was necessary to pay the greatest possible attention to the dynamics of such a movement. In addition a cadre youth organisation only made sense in terms of a rapidly expanding political movement in which rapid growth of the organisation would occur. A classic youth organisation for collecting and slowly training youth is not a cadre organisation of the same type. The S.L. type organisation therefore was premised on a major possibility of expansion in the universities from which a cadre could be gained to intervene amongst young workers. The possibility of such a dynamic as we have analysed many times did not exist by 1970 because of the upsurge in the workers movement. (There were in addition one structural and one conjunctural points which also worked in that direction. The structural one was the fact that the fragmentation and therefore low size of British universities meant a student movement did not have the depths to draw on that it had in Europe. The conjunctural one was the defeat of the February/March wave of sit-ins. This change in the situation of the working class and its political impact is not simply a matter of numbers. It is a question of the political impact on the whole of society. After 1968, and in particular in this country after 1969-70, the workers struggles became the key political issue in the whole of society and clearly the attention of all radicalised political elements, including amongst politicised students, became fixed on it. It also meant an entirely different political backcloth. The quiescence of the working class meant the relative lack of weight within the political vanguard of the traditional ideologies of the working class (Social Democracy, Stalinism, etc.). However, the re-emergence of the political activity of the working class meant a simultaneous re-emergence into the centre of the political scene of these traditional ideologies. Hence the disappearance of the ideologies of Marcusism, cities and countryside, etc. and the re-emergence of the old political problems within the vanguard - albeit of course in a different form to that of the 1950s e.g. the main focus being the left wing of the trade bureaucracy and not the left wing of the constituencies, etc. Again the whole process cannot be understood in terms of the methodology of the SWP.).

It is now possible to see how the failure to break theoretically with entryism and with the method of analysis which considered the 'youth vanguard' in isolation from the relation between the working class and the revolutionary organisation led to a compounding of errors. The cadre organisation of the Spartacus League type was premised on a highly politicised student movement, therefore all the attention

of the S.L. leadership was focused on something which was beginning to disappear. The decline of the student movement was seen as something due to subjective reasons. For example in August 1970 the N.C. stated that '... at present the youth radicalisation, especially among students, is in a trough. The failure to react against student victimisation and the downturn in the anti-imperialist movement show this very clearly. This failure is mainly due to subjective factors, especially the impotence of groups such as RSSF. It will be one of the most important functions of the Spartacus League to remedy this lack of leadership.' At the same time as this theory was being proclaimed the practice imposed by the objective situation was leading the S.L. in quite another direction. It is significant for example that the first major activity of the London S.L. was in solidarity with the dock strike. The IMG rapidly found itself at an impasse. It possessed an analysis of the objective structural causes of 'youth radicalisation' which had been worked out in some detail and which was obviously large correct. Using the methodology of the SWP document, i.e. considering the youth in isolation, this should have produced a radicalised movement. This was the analysis of one section of the organisation and it was stuck to. On the other hand the practice of another section of the organisation was leading it to orientate more and more directly to workers struggles. Initially however the clash inherent in all this developed within the theoretical framework and methodology of the SWP document on youth radicalisation and the theoretical basis of entryism.

The era of confusion.

The rapidly changing practice of the organisation was first ratified formally with a decision of the P.C. to adopt a document produced by Oxford comrades on our industrial work. This document contained several valuable points. Firstly, it contained a correct analysis concerning the coming upsurge of the working class and the fact that any organisation with even a tiny base in the working class would expand, but if no base existed an organisation would not benefit. From this it was easy to predict the growth of I.S. and the comparative lack of growth of the IMG. Secondly, in its analysis of the changing consciousness of students it began to make an analysis of what 1968 meant in historical terms. This document coincided with the beginning of some serious industrial work by the organisation and led to a beginning of a change in emphasis in the Red Mole. This began to give increased coverage to industrial struggles and the beginning of the appearance of material, e.g. the labour history series, which would allow our comrades to understand the situation in which they were intervening. However the Oxford document largely ignored the theoretical framework layed down at the 1970 conference and the shift in emphasis was seen by most comrades as occurring within the analysis established with the setting up of the Spartacus League. In other words, the changes were seen as administrative measures. A period of confusion now set in whose first fruits came in the great animosities revealed at the February 1971 Spartacus League conference. The greater involvement of the organisation in the working class led to a realisation that the analysis of 1970 had been incorrect. On the other hand no alternative theoretical framework was at hand. The objective impact of the introduction of the documents on industrial work was therefore relatively traumatic. Worse still the document largely shared the methodology of the positions it was criticising in that it posed the political questions in terms of allocation of forces to different areas of intervention.

One section of the organisation understood the necessity for greater allocation of forces to intervene in the working class but saw this as an administrative question. Another section of the organisation had a theory, 'the youth vanguard' which was actually simultaneously two different theories - one a sociological theory and one a political theory. Under the impact of this extreme methodological confusion highly centrifugal tendencies were set up in the organisation. The politics of intervention were being subordinated to questions of allocation of forces, and the generalised talk of 'priorities' was far from being understood in a political sense.

It must also be pointed out that other secondary manifestations of our incorrect political method were also rife at this period. One was a genuine ultra-left current. This was a direct product of entryist methodology. As we noted entryism had not distinguished between the ideological and the organisational hold of the Labour Party. In consequence, when comrades saw that the organisational hold no longer existed they, operating with this methodology, drew the obvious conclusion that the ideological hold did not exist either. Hence ultra-leftism. Another confusion, far less important at the time but symptomatic, was a failure to understand the difference between social democratic and Bolshevik concepts of the difference between trade unionism and politics. Social democracy makes the distinction by the place in which they occur, Bolshevism by the consciousness of the people involved. However if you take the Bolshevik principle of pursuing the political struggle but apply it to the social democratic distinction you of course get the result of declaring that the struggle in the factory is by definition economic and not political. In its ultra-left guise this appeared in the 'Lenin' issue of the Mole and in its reformist guise it of course underlies the Tendency's contention that a greater allocation of forces to intervention in the working class is 'workerism'. It can thus be seen that the failure to break with empiricism was exacting a tremendous toll.

This period of confusion was probably an inevitable one to go through (only a radical change in practice could bring the new problems to the forefront) and a rapid development in dealing with the problems was being made in the period before the 1971 conference. The framework of a new methodology was found in an analysis of the process of the decay of post-war capitalism (the failure to solve the question of social expenditure) which produced a particular basis for a radicalisation of youth, and its interrelation with the key political process of the period 1945-68 (the continuation of the colonial revolution with the simultaneous political passivity of the European working class.)

This analysis, which constitutes a general historical analysis of the conjuncture both within the vanguard organisations and within the working class was first spelt out in embryonic form in the Oxford document on industrial work. The relevant passages noted that 'IMG's ability to maintain and extend its position in the student field will depend on its ability to extend its base OUTSIDE the student field.' 'If we do not adopt such an orientation the IMG will not only never be a serious force in the revolutionary struggle, but it will not even be able to maintain itself in those areas where it now has some base', and, in relation to the coming (i.e. 1970) struggles of the working class, 'In these conditions revolutionary organisations having toeholds inside the class will be able to grow very rapidly in influence, but it will probably become harder to influence developments from outside. So the IMG must establish these toeholds inside the class NOW or it will be unable to benefit from and contribute to the mobilisation of the class against the anti-union laws' and '... if no small toeholds within the working class are created before this period we will be unable to gain from or to influence the upsurge of the class.' These points, which must be seen against the background of a general 'spilling over' theory of periphery and centre, were highly relevant and have been amply confirmed. It must be admitted however that, as noted earlier, they were posed inside an administrative framework. A more political analysis of the same points was made in a document 'A turn to industrial work, a political and not an administrative question' produced for the 1971 conference. It was around the theoretical basis of this document that a common analysis was worked out. The political points made in this document remain absolutely valid, and are therefore reproduced here in full:

11. The feature of the world situation which has dominated all else since 1945 has been the economic boom in the imperialist states. This has led to a relative political passivity of the industrial working class in these countries. In turn, the boom, and the pattern of investment and exploitation it created, added to the contradictions in the states dominated by imperialism, and also in the workers states. This has led to a great heightening of social tensions and great increase in struggle in all these states, in particular, the colonial and semi-colonial countries. Due to the

nature of the leadership of these struggles only occasional successes have been achieved, but the continual upheavals have transformed the situation in two thirds of the world. In turn, these events have affected the consciousness of sections of the population in the imperialist states themselves.'

'2. The economic boom was achieved 'on the cheap'. What increase there was in the standard of living of the working class was confined almost entirely to consumption of 'luxury' consumer goods. In particular, the problems of education, health and housing were relatively untouched. The effects of 25 years of unresolved problems in these fields is now beginning to make itself felt in an acute form. This is occurring at a time when capitalism is less able than at any time in the last 25 years to 'resolve' these problems (i.e. it is now less able to throw sops to the working class).'

'3. These problems affect most acutely groups 'peripheral' to the industrial working class. This is because these groups have not had the 'pay packet reformism' of the working class - i.e. the ability through trade union action to increase earnings sufficiently to alleviate even slightly the effects of capitalism's inability to resolve the problems of social expenditure. These peripheral groups therefore suffer directly and acutely from these failures. This effect is heightened greatly at the present time by conjunctural factors related to the general contradictions of capitalism. E.g. students are affected by the need to expand education to cope with capitalism's need for specialised manpower but simultaneous inability to finance it; blacks are affected by the general racialism of imperialism and by the inability to overcome the problem of social expenditure, but also conjuncturally by capitalism's need to split the working class in order to attack it in a way it has not been forced to since 1945.'

'4. In periods before 1945, the social unrest in these 'peripheral' groups would have found its natural leadership in the political struggles of the industrial working class. However, due to the relative political passivity of the working class, this has not occurred. Although the working class is the only class which is capable of resolving the contradictions of capitalism which affect these other groups, nevertheless it does not automatically gain the leadership of all the oppressed sections of society. It only gains this leadership when it shows in practice that only the proletariat has the physical power, social cohesion, political leadership, etc. to destroy the particular oppressions suffered by these other groups. In just the same way that a revolutionary party gains the leadership of the working class in action and not through abstract propaganda, so the working class will only gain the leadership of these other groups when its level of political activity is greatly raised. The need to unite all these struggles under the leadership of the working class will therefore be resolved in action..

Because the working class has been relatively politically passive it has not drawn behind it in its struggle 'all the oppressed and exploited', i.e. these other groups do not see that their particular oppressions can only be ended by the action of the working class in overthrowing capitalism. Put in different terms, this means that these groups have had a view of their position in the general struggle in society which does not see as the central feature of that social conflict the struggle of the working class. This was made explicit in 'Marcusist' theories, but existed implicitly in most of the ideas dominant in these peripheral groups. Because of this we have had the appearance of a whole series of apparently unconscious 'vanguards', most of which find their political inspiration in the colonial struggles, as these furnish an apparent alternative political focus to that of the struggle of industrial working class of the imperialist states. All these movements lack their natural focus in the struggle of the industrial proletariat.'

'5. The relative political passivity of the working class in no way indicates a decline in the fighting strength of the working class. On the contrary, the working class is now stronger than at any time in its history. In addition, the British working class has not suffered a major defeat in the last 25 years. It is therefore a class marked by confidence in its won strength.'

'6. With the slowing down of the boom, several processes are working to increase the combativity of the working class and to increase its receptivity to revolutionary socialist ideas. In particular, the boom has created expectations which capitalism is now no longer capable of fulfilling. In addition as 'pay packet reformism' becomes less possible the working class becomes more conscious of those areas where the boom had little or no effect. In these circumstances, the struggle of the working class will take a sharp upward turn.'

'7. With an increase in the political struggle and activity of the working class, the groups peripheral to the working class will begin to find their natural leadership - that of the industrial proletariat. Therefore these struggles will take on a complexion more allied to that of the ideology of the working class - i.e. Marxism. These 'vanguards' will be seen, and will increasingly see for themselves, that their problems and struggles can only be resolved through the victory of the proletariat. In other words their conception of their relation to the general struggle inside society will alter.'

'8. These developments will increasingly show the bankruptcy of crude 'sectory' theories which believe that it is possible to build up strength in groups of the population peripheral to the working class in isolation from involvement in the working class struggle itself. On the contrary, it will become increasingly obvious that only by intervention in the struggles of the working class is it possible even to maintain, let alone extend, a position gained in these other areas. As the struggle of the working class increases, those other groups in society which we have discussed, will increasingly look to the working class for leadership, and therefore unless we are implanted in industrial working class our position will become untenable even in these other areas. This is of course quite apart from the fact that a revolutionary organisation which is not implanted in the working class remains an historical irrelevance. This was the political meaning of the Oxford document on industrial work which the N.C. accepted.'

'9. This does not mean that during the coming period we cannot expect to make our greatest gains amongst sections other than the working class. The processes described above are ones which will work over a period of years not of days. In addition, the extremely small size of all the 'revolutionary' groups will enable them all to make gains in those areas for a period to come. Nevertheless, the underlying trends are as described, meaning that it will become progressively harder to maintain and extend our position in these other areas without an implantation in the working class. I therefore repeat that this is the analysis underlying the Oxford document, and in no way is that document simply an administrative statement on how to carry out trade union work. It presupposes the type of political analysis made above and makes no sense outside of that analysis. To express agreement with the concrete proposals but to disagree with the analysis is to miss the point of the document.'

The Tactics of the IMG

'10. Greatly increased opportunities for implanting ourselves in the working class are offered by the situation created by the Tory anti-union proposals. The struggles surrounding these proposals will increase the political struggles of the working class, and will therefore increase the extent to which the social groups already referred to will tend to see the industrial working class as the leaders of the struggle.'

This analysis was then backed up by a document on the economy and social expenditure also produced for the 1971 conference.

The core of the analysis which has now become 'conventional wisdom' in the organisation was that it was the conjuncture of inability of capitalism to solve the problems of social expenditure (in the many ramifications of this), the continuing upsurge of the colonial revolution (including the crisis of bourgeois ideology which this produced) and the relative quiescence of the European working class which produced the relatively autonomous movements of radicalised youth. The upheaval of 1968 changed therefore the entire political framework within which the radicalised layers found themselves operating and hence destroyed the basis for the autonomous movement of youth. By differentiating between a molecular (i.e. individual) radicalisation and a movement we were able to explain simultaneously why we are recruiting differentially from youth (i.e. why the youth radicalisation continued) and why the Spartacus League had not developed in the way expected. From that point onwards (a) the discussion on orientation had the potential to be placed in a political framework (b) it was possible to give a political and not administrative and/or demagogic explanation for the reason why a highly centralised cadre youth organisation such as the S.I. was not the correct organisational form at the present. A new 'conventional wisdom' had been arrived at in the group. In this field a few tidying up operations still remain to be performed. Some are under way. For example, the analysis of why students would now only respond to organisations which intervened in the working class did not appear to explain why on issues such as student fees far bigger student responses were found than on working class issues. Here there was a danger of a false counterposition. The comrades working in the universities knew it was only possible to recruit if the organisation was intervening organisationally in the working class and yet also knew the response obtained on student issues, in terms of the mass, was larger. Here was an opportunity for an apparent counterposition and hence for a dangerous false debate. This question could only be resolved by a deeper analysis of the student milieu in terms of the distinction already made between a movement and an individual radicalisation. Once this was done it was possible to see that the radicalisation, i.e. general 'alienation' of students was deepening but that without a political focus it remained on a localised and low level. It was therefore possible to predict both the continuation of short term upsurges on issues concerned with directly student issues but that (a) for a movement to occur an overtly political issue must arise (b) that the most advanced students would still only be attracted to organisations actually intervening in the working class (c) because (a) did not appear to be on the agenda, and because in order to intervene in the working class it is necessary to be part of a political organisation which extends beyond the university there would be a decline of the socialist society milieu and a more sharp political polarisation between tendencies within the university. From this analysis the main dynamics of the student milieu could be analysed. It was necessary to continue stressing within the university the intervention of the organisation within the working class, and to allocate forces accordingly, but at the same time to expect sharp upsurges on purely student issues to which we needed to react and take the lead. This analysis was confirmed, and understanding of the comrades of it, by our reaction to the student union autonomy issue. As far as I am aware not a single unit of the organisation made either of the parallel mistakes of declaring that this movement was a diversion because the main interest of 'students' (unanalysed) was on working class struggles, nor of believing that this represented the beginning of a new student movement. Both the size and the extremely low level of the movement were predicted. This struggle was in a sense an acid test. If our ideas had remained purely empirical (i.e. at the level of some banality such as 'striking a balance between student and working class intervention) the organisation would undoubtedly have been extremely disorientated by this development over student unions. Some comrades, reacting to the pressure of the student milieu and failing to distinguish between movements and molecular processes would undoubtedly have gone on a 'youth vanguard' binge (the Tendency of course have done so) and the aims of the movement would have been adduced as a justification for this. Other comrades, seeing that the best students could only be won by showing seriousness of intervention in the working class, would have ployed down the struggle or described it as a diversion and led us into a false abstentionist position. It is only an analysis that allowed the organisation to respond in a relatively homogenous way and

with no real disagreement. The practical impact of a correct theoretical analysis was shown. Undoubtedly our intervention was deficient in many ways, but these were for once subordinate to our much clearer understanding of the situation. We were therefore able to make all the running within the LCDSU.

When the IMG began the process of working out the impact of May 1968 and the upsurge of the working class it had (although no-one actually knew it at the time) succeeded in breaking with most of the methodology carried over from the document of youth radicalisation presented to the last World Congress. It meant placing itself within the framework of the Ligue Communiste's analysis. A process of breaking the organisation from its whole past political method had begun. It was however the practical consequences that were most important at first. Once the distinction between movement and molecular process had been made the theoretical justification for the S.L. no longer existed. It was only a period of time before fusion took place. This was recognised by the 1971 conference. The number one priority of a direct orientation to the working class was decided upon. Nevertheless, at this point, like a ghost from the past, the old methodology came creeping up. To make further strides the organisation must break with the old ghosts.

PART THREE

The real nature of our political tasks became clearer when the general analysis of the conjuncture was applied to the problem of the specific stage of development of British capitalism. This was carried out at the September N.C. The analysis made then still remains absolutely relevant so again it is quoted in full:

'In the medium term there is no solution to Britain's economic problems. The only real question facing the bourgeoisie is whether it can stabilise the situation temporarily. Ultimately its ability to do this depends on the state of the world economy. Given that the world capitalist economy does not deteriorate markedly (see editorial in International (vol. 1, no. 6)) the bourgeoisie has to have a strategy based on emasculation, but not as yet a definitive destruction, of the organisations and power of the working class. In the medium its strategies for doing this are (a) entry into the Common Market, (b) the IRB. However, the effects of the Common Market will take time to work themselves out, and the IRB cannot as yet be used against the decisive sections of the working class as it would not as yet be tolerated, and might well produce uncontrollable upheaval which the Tories are not yet prepared to face. The only visible strategy for the IRB is to introduce it gradually, using it first against weak sections, so as to intimidate the rest of the working class. As this will take time the IRB does not constitute a short term solution.'

'For dealing with the short term problems of capitalism three real strategies were open to the government. These were: (a) The decisive defeat of a section of the working class, thus spreading demoralisation. (b) Increased unemployment. (c) An incomes policy.'

'During last winter the Tories aimed to defeat a section of the working class decisively. They did succeed in altering the balance of class forces in their favour but not decisively. The defeats of the power men and postal workers were sufficient to intimidate weak sections such as teachers and others not so weak such as railwaymen. To that extent the Tories have shifted the balance of forces in their favour. On the other hand the power workers was not seen as an absolutely clear cut defeat, and although the UPW was defeated it was a prolonged and costly battle which did not show the working class that it could be defeated with ease by the government. In other words, Heath has not achieved his aim of creating the atmosphere inside the working class where trade unionists are beginning to adopt the attitude that 'it is impossible to win!' It is now seen as harder to win but not impossible. This situation is

increasing bitterness inside the working class without intimidating its more strongly organised and therefore decisive sections. (It is, however, having that effect on the weakly organised.) Worse still for Heath, no real dents were made in the struggle of the well organised workers in private industry. In particular Fords, while no mean victory, was a situation where the individual company was fairly well beaten to its knees. A decisive defeat for the government was only prevented by the intervention of Jones and Scanlon.'

'A situation of extreme complexity therefore exists. In the public sector the government has now established a strong position. However, in private industry, although defeats have been suffered, no real impression has been made on the strongly organised. All that is clear here, however, is that it is no longer easy to win sectional struggles at the level of a single plant - hence the big decline in small unofficial strikes. Given this situation in private industry the employers are looking in two directions simultaneously. One section is looking for a deal with the unions so as to cool the militancy. This is the meaning of the CBI initiative on prices. Another section is looking towards more desperate solutions, hence the carefully prepared EEF plan to destroy DATA which would undoubtedly have been put into effect if it were not for the fact that DATA is now part of the AUEW. The outcome of the struggle within the bourgeoisie will be determined by the attitude adopted by the unions towards suggestions of an incomes policy.'

'The policy of increased unemployment as a solution to militancy in the short term was being much canvassed amongst the bourgeoisie last winter. Now, however, it has run into several internal contradictions. The most important of these is that while a stagnant economy does not harm a bourgeoisie's competitive position if all other economies are stagnant, a severe situation of stagnation does affect competitive position if other economies are still expanding, (even if more slowly than in the 1950s or 1960s). The EEF in particular has decided that the loss in terms of productivity etc. would now be too great if unemployment were raised to the level which now appears necessary to defeat the working class. It must be realised that this represents a marginal victory for the militancy of the working class. Under the old type of Paish, 'Economist' thinking a level of unemployment of 600,000 - 800,000 was considered to be sufficient to destroy the fighting spirit of the working class. The bourgeoisie was prepared to tolerate the degree of stagnation which this would represent. However, although unemployment, in true terms, is now approaching twice this figure, it has made no real impact on working class militancy and all it is doing is creating a great unpopularity for the government. To deal a hammer blow to the working class the bourgeoisie now calculates that a level of unemployment of around $1\frac{1}{2}$ - 2 million would be necessary and the decline in Britain's competitive position which this would represent is not yet acceptable (particularly in a period in which it is necessary to prepare for intensive European competition). Therefore, although the bourgeoisie certainly will keep unemployment at a level significantly higher than in the early 1960s, possibly 700,000 - 800,000, it cannot conceive at present of unemployment as the decisive weapon in its armoury, and is now more interested in restimulating the economy so as to improve its competitiveness, than it is in outfacing the working class in a prolonged war of attrition around the subject of unemployment. This marginal victory for the working class is entirely due to the militancy of last winter, without it the ruling class would undoubtedly be far more concerned with using unemployment as a weapon'.

'Having failed to decisively smash a section of the working class through direct confrontation, and seeing unemployment and stagnation as a two edged weapon, some sections of the bourgeoisie are now looking towards an incomes policy with the necessary corollary of a deal with such union leaders as Jones and Scanlon. It is, however, important to realise what such a policy would mean at present - it would not mean that the government would make concessions to the trade unions, but that it would hope to intimidate the unions into a deal. On the other hand of course blatant vicious attacks would make it impossible for Jones and Scanlon to sell the policy to their members. The bourgeoisie is therefore engaged in an extremely

delicate manoeuvre of trying to be repressive enough to intimidate the bureaucrats, without being so repressive (a) to infuriate the rank and file and provoke explosion. Because of the extreme complexity of this manoeuvre, quite considerable sections of the bourgeoisie are convinced that it cannot be carried out and are therefore opposed to any display of 'weakness' which might be involved in even bothering to consult with the unions. The bourgeoisie is therefore at present split and indecisive. Because of the acuteness of the situation, however, this situation of indecision cannot continue. Which section of the bourgeois line is adopted depends not on developments within the ruling class, but on the balance of forces within the working class.'

'The position of the main union leaders is at present extremely delicate. On the one hand the introduction of the IRB, the level of unemployment, etc., has forced their memberships in the direction of greater militancy. This was clearly shown at the TGWU and AUEW conferences. In order to maintain a left image the leaders are therefore themselves forced to talk more and more 'left'. On the other hand, the leaders, probably better than the rank and file, understand the extent to which the government has upped the stakes in terms of what commitment is necessary to win a major strike. They know, for example, that to win the massive claims that will undoubtedly be submitted this autumn by the dockers, municipal workers and, most important of all, engineering workers, would involve confrontations on a massive scale that would (a) completely alter the political situation - in particular lead to a rapid rightward evolution of the bourgeoisie; (b) destroy all confidence both in foreign and British capital. A massive confrontation such as this would, therefore, precipitate an acute social and political crisis of a type not seen since 1945. This crisis would be made extremely sharp and harsh in that economically the British bourgeoisie cannot wait for the working class to burn itself out, as it is attempting to do in Italy, but would be forced to try to step in and try to defeat the working class in a major confrontation. The trade union leaders are well aware of this and therefore are terrified of such a struggle. On the other hand the 'lefts' are extremely worried by the situation in, for example, the AUEW, where a clear tendency more militant than Scanlon has emerged. Not merely, therefore, is the situation for the bourgeoisie extremely tense but so is it for the leaders of the decisive sections of the working class.'

This basic analysis of the forces at work has so far been completely born out by events and has only needed subsequently to be deepened - see for example the first section of the miners strike pamphlet and Robin Blackburn's article on the Heath government in the Red Mole. It is however necessary to make a modification of the concrete way in which the forces have worked themselves out.

The September N.C. document suggested that given the new strategy of the Heath government the most likely outcome was that the bureaucracy would not launch any new wage offensive. The most likely outcome of events was after a possible last titanic struggle a downturn of struggle, particularly of weakly organised sections, but with a sharp radicalisation of existing militants. Obviously the miners strike modifies this assessment of the relation of forces somewhat, although it does not invalidate the basic analysis of the elements of work in the situation. This point is taken up in section six below. However the basic structure of the analysis remains untouched. Therefore again the conclusions may be still retained intact. The modifications are dealt with in section six.

'If, however, there is a downturn in mass struggle, exactly the opposite will be occurring for individual radicalisation inside the working class. A process of rapid molecular radicalisation has already begun and is increasing in intensity. Some of this new layer of politicised workers will enter the CP, many are unorganised but a significant section i.e. several hundred, will probably enter IS in the coming period. It will, however, be intervention in this layer that will be decisive for us. We did not gain in the 1970-71 upsurge because we had no base in the working class (see the 1970 Oxford document for an analysis of this) and we will not gain in the next upsurge either unless we do not begin to gain footholds now. If we can

do this good possibilities exist as what can be definitely predicted is that the longer the next upsurge is delayed the more violent it will be when it comes. Fortunately objective circumstances for gaining footholds in the working class are extremely favourable, in that the layer of newly radicalised militants is sufficiently large that, although a certain number will join IS, there will still be a real milieu for us to work in. The swing to the right which is taking place inside the white collar unions will lead to a sharp political polarisation here, while in the large manual unions there are already signs of a new layer emerging which will challenge Scanlon and Jones from the point of view of more militancy. We are probably coming to the end of the period of mesmeric hold over militants by the established 'left' leadership. (It should be noted that this will create problems of an extreme nature for the CP which will be forced to make a choice between being outflanked and its relation with the left bureaucracy). Indeed the objective situation has never been better for recruitment. The only real question mark is the ability of the organisation to respond to it.'

'The key feature of the past period has been that although the upsurge of militancy reached unprecedented levels, its organised political reflection was virtually nil. Some of the reasons for this are due to the entire development of capitalism since 1945 (see A. Jones - ON THE TRADE UNIONS, THE LABOUR PARTY AND OTHER QUESTIONS OF STRATEGY, Part 2), and others are due to the particular conjuncture.'

'The period Nov. 1970 - March 1971 represented a great political failure for two organisations. These were the IWC and the CP. Both had the possibility to generate a political movement and both were so tied to the union bureaucracy that they could not.'

'The left wing of the constituency Labour Party could not make an intervention because (a) the ideology of Social Democracy does not allow for political leadership of mass industrial actions (b) the social base of the left constituency parties had been undermined (See Jones, *ibid*) (c) they had been contingently discredited because of their role under the Wilson administration.'

'The IWC and CP could have created a movement as opposed to molecular radicalisation, if they had broken away from the bureaucracy, but given that they did not, no political movement developed and the layer of newly politicised and radicalised militants found no focus for their activities. In the coming period there is little chance of such a focus appearing and it is therefore almost certain that we will remain with the present situation of a molecular, fragmented radicalisation. This will of course determine to some extent the mode, although not the politics, of our work.'

'The key long term factor in determining the course of the upsurge in the working class will be changing attitudes to the Labour Party. A detailed analysis of this is given in Jones *ibid*. In the medium term the analysis still remains correct that there is likely to be no real movement or return to active involvement in the constituency parties without a shift to the left inside these organisations themselves. Given that this shift is unlikely to occur for a number of social reasons and for reasons connected with the ideology of social democracy there is no necessity as yet to consider as a primary tactic that of returning to entryism. Without such a return to the constituency parties on the part of the working class, the analysis that the main structural contradiction within the working class movement will be between the trade unions and the leadership of the Labour Party, and not between the constituency parties and Wilson and co., still remains valid. In the slightly longer term two things need to be kept an eye on:

(a) There is now quite definitely, and has been since approximately 1964 (see Jenkins' document on the LP), a section of the Labour Party which has abandoned the classic Social Democratic role of attempting to base bourgeois politics on a base inside the working class. This group around Roy Jenkins constitutes a tendency which

in no sense, except that of formal leadership of the Labour Party, is a tendency within the workers' movement. It is no longer seeking a base inside the working class but instead seeks to create a base within the bourgeoisie. In this sense the Labour Party can now be characterised as a Popular Front within one party. If it were not for the fact that no social base exists for a party based sociologically in the petit-bourgeoisie (c.f. continental radical and 'socialist' parties) Jenkins et al would not be in the Labour Party at all. However, the L.P. still remains a party of the working class. If a struggle should develop between this extra-working class current and an orthodox Social Democratic wing, interest in the LP might be increased. This would not automatically lead to re-involvement in the constituency parties (again it depends how much struggle occurs there whether a return to activity occurs or not) but the situation needs to be watched. (The debate on the Common Market indicates the potential that exists for a fight here).

(b) One way the left T.U. bureaucracy will almost certainly try to get itself off the hook is by declaring that while they themselves (for various reasons) cannot fight the Tories, it is nevertheless necessary to wage a political fight, and everyone should work for the return of a Labour Government as the highest priority. The constituency 'lefts' will of course encourage this as it is their only chance of regaining a social base. See a whole series of articles in Tribune). For this reason in various areas specific organisations for trade unionists in the L.P. are either being set up or talked about. General developments in this field need watching. It should be noted, however, that even if such a trend develops, (i) it does not invalidate our general orientations as regards the places of structural strain inside the working class movement. (ii) Even if Jones and Scanlon threw all their weight in this direction it is doubtful how successful it would be, and in any case the new more militant layers emerging to their left would almost certainly have nothing to do with it.'

'The only general point that needs making is that in areas of particular political backwardness (e.g. New Towns, small outlying towns, etc.) we can expect to see a revival of life in the L.P. in the coming period, and the question of allocating some forces to short term 'raid' entry work may therefore be placed on the agenda in these areas.'

PART FOUR A CHANGING PRACTICE AND THE OLD METHODOLOGY CREEPS UP

Although by the September N.C. a very great deal of agreement had been reached on an assessment of the conjuncture, and the main outline of this analysis remains valid, nevertheless the problems of the organisation, and the problems within its leadership, appeared to get little better. This was due to the fact that the first attempts of the IMG. to relate in practical terms to the changing reality were naturally made in terms of the existing methodology of the organisation - that is to say in terms of an implicit acceptance of the empiricist methodology of the SWP document on youth radicalisation (and of the earlier break with entryism). What naturally occurred was that each sector of intervention was treated in a separate sociological sense and not in terms of political co-ordinates. We have already looked at students, so it is now worth looking briefly at some other examples. In fact every cde must be aware of tens of similar examples - even the very structure of most of our conferences with their division into "youth work", "black work", "womens work", "workers work", young workers work" etc indicated the predominant train of thought.

(1) SCHOOL'S WORK (this section is taken from a document of C.Marshall)
The "schools movement" came into being in 1968 after the May-June upsurge in France. It was one of a series of inter-related upsurges of rebellion among young people, other obvious examples being in higher education and the great mass mobilisation for Oct 27th.

Quite correctly, and in the best traditions of the organisation, IMG sought to take part in this movement of school students. Much less correctly, we went into it on an ideological basis of (roughly speaking) being the best fighters for an SAU and for "demands" of an essentially liberal character which SAU and related formations advanced; we conceived that we were the best fighters because we had the theory or organisation ((NB: a-class organisation!)) and also because we had "the program". (See: Schools Work, by New & by Slansky, IMG 1970 Conference, also SL Founding Conf. "PB Resn on Youth") i.e. we went in on the basis of, on the one hand, presentation of liberal ("democratic") ideas and on the other of invocations of "the program", socialism and the proletariat. A related misconception was to present as "transitional demands" democratic demands which the bourgeoisie will (in Britain) never be able to grant, this being done partly in the hope of mobilising "masses" of people, "tens of thousands".

A "good" exposition of this general approach can be found in the text of Murray Smith in Inter 1/8 (Old Series, Dec. '68); the case he discusses is students, but the approach for school-students was the same. As is easily seen, we were far too ready to accept the line propounded by SWP. (NB cde Smith has since changed his position).

The theoretical analysis of schools work remained unchanged from its commencement till July 1971. The worst example is the 1970 statement that because working class school students reject school they are bad material for Schools Unions (a concept never questioned at the time) and by implication for our schools work. Whereas one would have thought that, notwithstanding practical difficulties (on our part: vocabulary, cadre etc; on theirs, unfamiliarity with politics, unreliability) any student who rejects in toto the bourgeois school ought to be ready-made material for our schools work. Should that not be the case the "fault" might well be supposed to lie in our schools work and not the working class rebels. This same thought continues in the April 71 Schools Caucus text, and indeed in those of July-August. The whole method is bourgeois sociology: endless speculation about ideas in people's heads, no analysis. Contradictions are defined as within ideology or between ideology and reality. (All this until very recently).

The discussion on transitional demands - at long last a program of "democratic and transitional demands" for school students is dropped, **HAVING BEEN ISSUED PUBLICLY!** - contains the germ of a new idea. One idea only was of any value:

"I am defining a liberal demand (democratic demand) as a demand which appeals to abstracts or absolutes (such as 'it isn't fair' or 'you've got no right'). I am defining a transitional demand as a demand which is explicitly class oriented, that brings out the class character of a struggle, and therefore sides (A demand 'sides'! - cm) with the working class against the bourgeoisie, posing the question of power and control for the working class....."

Now this was a step forward, but also two steps back....What is immediately obvious is that the definition of a liberal demand is absurd idealism, whereas the definition of a transitional demand is more gibberish, especially in view of the iterated invocation of "the working class" and the final conclusion that a minimum programme was what was needed.

(2) "BRITISH OXYGEN WORK" In May this year A. Jones and R.H. wrote a pamphlet on British Oxygen together with some militants in a depot of that company. This pamphlet was a limited success (about 200 being sold - mainly by militants in British Oxygen). It was very well received and greatly raised our credibility and prestige with the militants with whom we were working. This pamphlet was a strictly agitational pamphlet - that is to say it was designed to explain a few ideas to a relatively large number of people. In this case the ideas were those concerned with a wage negotiation. The slogans worked out were:

*A straight £7 pay increase with no strings or redundancies

*An automatic cost of living increase to cover increases in the cost of living and any government changes in tax.

*All depots to be staffed by union labour

*An individual vote by each depot on accepting any proposals affecting it

*Full involvement of representatives of the depots at all stages of the negotiations.

The slogans were roughly correct for a period immediately before a strike. The main ideas expressed were that productivity deals led to redundancy and that British Oxygen was hoping to use the IRB to weaken the workers organisation. These slogans and ideas were taken up by the stewards in the depot we were in contact with and they pushed for them both amongst the members at Hackney and on the area shop stewards committee. As such they were the only coherent opposition group to the eventual defeat. Although the strike was defeated the stewards still saw the demands as being correct and if anything moved closer towards us. All in all it is possible to say that quite a good beginning to our work was made.

At this point however the mess-up began. The task that was set was defined as being "British Oxygen work", that is to say as getting a base in British Oxygen. As such it became a sub-department of the work of the organisation. What was then pursued was ways of influencing things in British Oxygen. This was completely the wrong question to ask. In fact two questions were involved.

(a) The political question; what political ideas do we put forward to bring the militants we are in contact with closer to the ideas of the IMG? (b)

The organisational question; How do we organise to gain a base in British Oxygen.

As a result of these two points being confused the cdes involved saw their task as primarily trying to link up militants in BOC, produce bulletins etc. All these were perfectly correct things to do but they were in no way adequate. All that would be achieved was for us to make more official trade unionists out of people. Furthermore in practice the organisational resources were not available. If "BOC work" was going to be a separate item, than separate manpower, separate ideas, separate leadership discussion would have to be allocated to it. In practice anyway we are too weak to appear credible to militants by doing this. The moment another larger tendency for example IS had started doing work in the company we would have lost our real relation with the militants. What in fact occurred was that A. Jones had to undertake other work and in consequence the work stagnated for a period. A promising beginning was not

really followed up.

(3) ORGANISATION the organisational consequences produced by this "sectoral" methodology were of necessity disastrous. At the level of leadership it meant a proliferation of bodies and organisations dealing with all our "sectors" of work. At various times we have worked through at least the following bodies. IMG, SL, Red Circles, SWGs, ISCs, VSC, Black DCs; Anti-Int. League, SAUs, TUs, Trade Councils, NUS; student orgs (eg SocSocs), WNCC, WAG(s), B.Desh orgns, defence cttees (Ceylon, Bolivia), Black orgns, tenants orgns; This works out at one organisation per 11 members!

We operated through a system of committees etc on a national level which includes the following: IMG NC, PC & Sect; SL NC & PB; RM & Inter EBs; ISC EC; Indo-C NB; SW EB; Women's Commission; Irish Commission, Education Comm.; Science Comm; Economics Commission; TU Comm; Unemployment Comm; Anti-IMP & FI Comm; SL Stu SCttes; schools caucus of SL. That is approximately one leading body for every 10 members of the organisation, and almost exactly one for each member of the IMG NC.

Furthermore, our invariable response when faced with a problem was either to initiate a "literary discussion" or to ... establish a commission. In this circumstances the leadership found itself at endless internal meetings and nothing was ever achieved. In terms of the rest of the organisation, the worst effects of this incorrect methodology were seen in London. These however are dealt with at length in a separate document by cde Klein, and are therefore not gone into here.

The final crowning absurdity was STUGs (Socialist Trade Union Groups). The significance of these can however be most clearly understood if placed in the context of our developing analysis of the conjuncture and are therefore dealt with there. (See also documents by King & C.Marshall) What was involved in the amazing amount of confusion involved in our work was a systematic confusion between two things; between where we intervene and on what issue we intervene. This distinction is in fact glaringly obvious and indeed was dealt with in a classical form by Lenin in his polemic against the Economists. Lenin states "working class consciousness cannot be genuine political consciousness unless the workers are trained to respond to all cases of tyranny, oppression, violence and abuse, no matter what class is affected - unless they are trained, moreover, to respond from a Social-Democratic point of view and no other. The consciousness of the working masses cannot be genuine class-consciousness, unless the workers learn, from concrete and above all from topical, political facts and events, to observe every other social class in all the manifestations of its intellectual, ethical and political life, unless they learn to apply in practice the materialist analysis and materialist estimate of all aspects of the life and activity of all classes, strata and groups of the population. Those who concentrate the attention, observation, and consciousness of the working class exclusively, or even mainly, upon itself alone, are not Social-Democrats, for the self knowledge of the working class is indissolubly bound up, not solely with a fully clear theoretical understanding - or rather, not so much with the theoretical as with the practical understanding - of the relationship between all the various classes of modern society, acquired through the experience of political life." (S.Vol p155). In short what Lenin is saying is that the issues revolutionaries raise amongst the working class, or any section of the population, must be not simply the issues of that section but those of all political problems of society. For example we may ask the working class to struggle on a political issue affecting, for example students. In short, as noted, there exists a distinction between where we intervene, and on what we intervene.

The absolute simplicity of this idea was obscured at one level by the vocabulary which we used. The terms "women's work", "black work", "student work" etc are systematically ambiguous between "work amongst women" and "work on the issue of women's oppression", "work amongst blacks" and "work on the question of black

oppression". A failure to distinguish the two is disastrous. For example it is highly dubious if the correct way to do work amongst blacks is primarily on the question of black oppression yet we had a "black caucus" in London which at one time moved close to arguing that to raise other political issues other than black oppression amongst blacks was politically incorrect. This was "economism" with a vengeance. Obviously work amongst a section of the population and work on the question of the oppression of a section of the population may be interrelated, but they are in conceptual terms completely distinct. For example we may present anti-racist ideas in the trade unions, we raise the issue of unemployment amongst employed workers, we raise the issue of Ireland amongst students, we raise the issue of women oppression amongst male trade unionists etc. Once this elementary distinction is made, then much becomes at once clear. For example we see that it would have been entirely correct for a black caucus to raise the issue of Ireland, for us to do our school work on issues affecting those who rejected school etc.

It is however necessary to look deeper than these distinctions, although important, for the reasons for the incorrect methodology of work and its practical consequences. At one level it was certainly the concepts of "women's work", "student work", that was responsible for the errors but we must now ask where these concepts came from. It is at this point that the discussion at the NC's become crucial.

Suppose for the moment that it is the case that it is possible to have transitional demands "for" students, women, blacks etc., then how does the organisation act when faced with the necessity of intervening amongst one of these sectors. The job of the organisation is obviously to formulate a transitional programme for this group - hence for example the SWPs transitional programmes for blacks, women, chicano's etc. It is then the organisations task to popularise such a programme. But what are the components of the programme. Obviously, for example, the demand of a sliding scale of wages or hours, or the formation of the workers militia is not a demand "for" students, similarly the demand of free abortion on demand is not a demand "for" male trade unionists. What in fact is the case is that these programmes relate to the specific problems of the particular sector of the population. Hence the "transitional" programme raised relates to the position of that group of the population. Under the guise of "transitional" programmes what is actually occurring is the introduction of a method of work where we speak to blacks on the problem of blacks, to women on the question of women, to students on the questions of students etc. This is the logic behind the "single issue mass campaigns" approach but in a more subtle way behind all the balls ups we have described. Consider for example our intervention in the Jan 23rd student demonstration if we had accepted this methodology. What we would have done would have been to have concocted some "transitional programme" for students. Our political intervention would have been focused around this. In practice we would have capitulated to the CP bureaucrats who wanted to confine the demonstration to student issues, all we would have done was chanted more "radical" slogans. Take also examples such as black work etc. There is however an even deeper level to which one can pursue the question of transitional programmes "for" sectors. Quite clearly it is impossible for a sector e.g. women, students etc. to overthrow capitalism. In short if you hold that it is possible to have a transitional programme for "sectors" then you are also forced to hold that it is possible to have a transitional programme which does not overthrow capitalism. The tendency are of course quite explicit about this in their theory of "democratic and transitional demands".

We can now begin to see how the whole methodology of the SWP begins to fit together. Once the principle is accepted that there exists transitional programmes for sectors, then one is logically bound to admit that there can exist transitional programmes which do not destroy capitalism (and conversely of course if one accepts that transitional programmes do not smash capitalism but fulfill some function such as "mobilising the masses" a raising consciousness etc then there is no reason why there cannot exist transitional

programmes for sectors). Once this principle is accepted then the work of the organisation becomes fragmented into myriad caucuses and sectors. Clearly one must find some reason to defend advancing programmes which accept capitalism and this is found either in the theories of "consciousness raising" (which leads to consciousness being equated with ideas) or to "mobilising the masses" (i.e. to classic Economist positions). In the case of the SWP this method is applied logically and leads to the approach of mass (i.e. mobilising function) single-issue (i.e. considered in isolation with confusion of where intervening and on what intervening economism) campaign on democratic and transitional (i.e. accepting capitalism/reformist) demands. In our case the influence of the Bensaid and Scalabfino methodology prevented us from going the whole hog, and instead we finished up with the miserable eclectic hodge-podge whose results have already been described. What we have to do now is to break this empiricist methodology once and for all. This is what makes the theoretical points outlined at the beginning of this document of immediate practical importance and not a mere nitpicking. What in fact happens with the methodology of the SWP document, (a) Reformist programmes (b) talking to sectors only as the problem of sectors and in short a tendency to adapt to various petty-bourgeois movements.

See Appendix Two

PART FIVE From nothing to a propoganda group

The task which the IMG set itself at the 1970 conference was for going from a propoganda group to a league for revolutionary action. Much has changed in our understanding of what that means but the strategic aim remains the same. In a certain area however, that of the vanguard of the working class, we however have a different task - merely to start work. In order to do that however we have to assess the situation within the working class.

The September N.C. fixed at least a relatively common analysis of the situation, however a great deal of confusion was also caused. A rather confused debate took place on whether the main priority of the organisation should be work on Ireland, or equal weight should be given to work on the question of unemployment. It is now possible to see that this debate was misconceived in its terms of reference. In fact a great deal of argument could have been avoided if only by then we had managed to work out the distinction between where we intervene and on what political issue we intervene. (i.e. the political tasks of the organisation and the organisational tasks). Put in the correct term the point was and is as follows: It is clear that work on the political issue of Ireland must be a priority for British revolutionaries at the present period. However the organisation has set itself the primary organisational task of beginning to gain an implantation in the working class. Will therefore political work on the issue of Ireland allow us to fulfill this organisational task? The answer given by the analysis in the September NC document was no. From this it followed that the organisation must undertake another political task which would allow us to move towards gaining such an implantation. However at that time the old concepts of 'womens work', 'unemployment work' etc. still dominated thought. As a result two confusions occurred of a serious nature. Firstly the way in which the question of whether 'Ireland' or 'Ireland and Unemployment' were the priorities was posed appeared to suggest that the issue was of whether the two issues were of equal importance, instead of saying that we need two main priorities corresponding to different organisational tasks. Secondly, the concept of 'unemployment work' was as usual totally ambiguous between whether what was referred to was 'work on the political issue of unemployment' or 'work amongst the unemployed'. What the author of the main perspectives document intended was 'work on the political issue of unemployment with the organisational task of carrying out such work amongst employed workers'. However this was ambiguous as a result of the lack of adequate concepts. In consequence some people thought the issue at stake was whether organising the unemployed was as important for the organisation as work on the issue of Ireland. Quite correctly they did not think it was. Once however the appropriate ways of formulating the thing were sorted out agreement was de facto reached by most of the leadership. Unfortunately however this was never worked out explicitly and stated - hence the great confusion on the question of 'unemployment work' inside the organisation. Some cdes saw their task as organising the unemployed, and when there appeared to be no real change of this became demoralised, when in fact it could have been predicted from the beginning a mass unemployed movement would not appear, and the real aim was to make contact with trade unionists. Here again the practical importance of theoretical questions is shown. In fact work on the issue of unemployment has in many areas been our most effective method of making contact with trade unionists.

What is notable, is that in two areas in the past period, despite the problem of the organisation, we have quite definitely made great headway, and established ourselves as a credible political force in a living struggle. These are on the political issue of Ireland, and in the student sector. In both those areas we have quite definitely made the transit on from a propoganda group to a league for revolutionary action. Amongst students we are quite definitely the leading force in the LCDSU and even I.S. are forced to concede this. This makes an amazing contrast to say the situation in the old RSSF. On the issue of Ireland, while differences has existed on slogans, how to operate etc. nevertheless we are definitely established, despite our inferior numbers to I.S., as a leading force. What is interesting is that in both these areas practice has forced the participants to come to grips with the theoretical problems of intervention, and

both have come up with precisely the distinction between the area we intervened in and the issue we intervened on, which was discussed earlier. In the analysis made in the Oxford documents on industrial work, and in the Jones document 'A turn to industrial work, a political and not an administrative question', but which a failure at the time to understand explicitly as concept resulted in great confusion, is a sharp distinction between the social group involved in struggle, and the political issue which dominates its consciousness. Or to put it in terms of the intervention of the organisation, a sharp distinction between where we intervene, and on what political issue we intervene on. (or put in other terminology, between the organisational tasks and the political tasks). What is stated is that the political consciousness of radicalised students, became dominated by the political issue of the struggles of the working class. Put in other terms it is merely a re-iteration of Bensaïd and Scalabrino's position that the 'youth vanguard' can only be understood in terms of the relation between the vanguard organisations and the working class. By far the most clear thinking document as regard the key theoretical distinctions made above however was that of McGovern/Reed at the last conference. This clearly distinguished between work on the issue of Ireland and work amongst the Irish community. It considered the relation between the two, but kept them conceptually distinct, hence for example its insistence on the importance of students on the issue of Ireland. Unfortunately the document did not draw out explicitly the theoretical points which were in fact implicit in its analysis.

Being now more able to formulate the questions involved more clearly, we may now ask whether political work on the issue of Ireland, or students, will allow us to fulfill the key organisational task we have set ourselves, that of gaining an implantation in the working class. Here the September analysis is still completely relevant, and the answer is still no, with the qualification that the deepening of the struggle in Ireland does allow us to make certain gains in the building industry. We here again quote the key sections from the September N.C. document.

"It is a completely historical fact that typically the young have been the most open to revolutionary ideas. We can see that in every proletarian uprising from the Commune, through 1917 right up to May 1968. However, no-one ever thought of gracing this fact with the grandiose title of 'Youth Vanguard' and this phenomenon was simply dealt with under a whole lot of other headings concerned with work amongst workers, students, women etc. There were, of course youth organisations but these were not intended to be a specific view of how the revolutionary process was unfolding which related to the role of youth. The F.I., however, meant the 'youth vanguard' to be understood in just this sense so that, for example, the Draft Resolutions on Tactics in Europe talks of 'a new phenomenon of prime importance in the advanced capitalist states, particularly in Europe - the appearance to the left of the old Socialist and Communist parties of a revolutionary vanguard composed by reject the politics and leadership of the old formations." It was the appearance of this relatively autonomous movement which led to the introduction of the concept of the 'youth vanguard'. This concept was useful to the extent that it identified elements of a political process and therefore enabled the F.I. to avoid the trap either of continuing with its dead end orientation of tory struggles of the T.U. militants. However, the concept was originally rather confused and now definitely needs to be deepened and modified."

"Firstly too much emphasis was placed on the autonomy of the movement. Certainly the process of individual radicalisation will continue, and still indeed continue to increase among the youth, but a process of individual radicalisation does not necessarily produce a movement. For a relatively autonomous movement to be produced conjunctural features need to be present as well as simply a long term socio-economic process leading to increased individual development politically. In particular the early emergence of a relatively autonomous movement was due to the conjuncture of a long term socio-economic process leading to increased decay of capitalism "from the edge", the continuation of the colonial revolution, and the political quiescence of the working class in the advanced industrial states. Those features became critical in particular in the period 1965 - 69. By the end of this period one of the elements of the situation, the quiescence of the working class, was beginning to disappear. This deprived the movement,

to a considerable extent of its autonomy and swept the students, in particular, in behind the mass upsurge of the working class. This characterises the period we are now in. It must be characterised as one in which a molecular (i.e. individual) radicalisation proceeds at an accelerated rate, but the autonomy of youth, in particular students, movements has been removed by the working class upsurge. Nevertheless the continuation of the socio-economic processes creating increased individual radicalisation continue and provide fertile ground for agitational propaganda work."

"The low degree of autonomy possessed by radicalised students even at the height of the "movement" in Britain is explained by the fact that a) the British student radicalisation occurred relatively late and was therefore from relatively early on in its development under the pressure of the working class upsurge, b) the small size of British universities (and for reasons cdes have dealt with elsewhere universities tend to be flashpoints of the student milieu) means that the students have relatively little autonomous depths on which they can draw inside their own constituency. This makes less attractive the perspective of an autonomous student struggle. It is for this reason that it has been particularly prey to ouvrierism. The fact that universities are so small also has a determining effect on the way in which struggles occur. It means that in general it needs an external unifying feature, a political issue such as the Vietnam war, to set off a movement, as opposed to molecular radicalisation. The only exception to this is where the issue involved affects the students very directly. Here, however, the mobilisation tends to be on a low political level and lasts only a short period."

"The situation produced by all these elements is that of a potentially mobilisable stratum which is, however, not organised around any particular issue and therefore manifests its existence in the form of spasmodic upheavals rather than in a relatively autonomous movement. This situation is likely to continue as long as the workers' struggles continue at their present level and until a central political issue arises which can provide a focus for a movement."

"When the strategy of "from the periphery to the centre" was first suggested two mistakes were made. Firstly the impact of the upheavals in the workers organisations and struggles on the student milieu were not correctly analysed (or rather they tended not to be analysed at all). This led to a belief that the relatively autonomous youth and student movement would continue and therefore it would be possible to work within it first before making a turn to work in organised working class. This may or may not have been what happened in France, but it was perfectly possible to analyse beforehand that this could not possibly occur in this country in the coming period. The cdes responsible for setting up the Spartacus League made a serious error in their analysis of the situation and in consequence the S.L. was established on a wrong perspective. This led both to bad practice and theory by the SL and incorrect start to the Red Mole. The misassessment of the situation could have been extremely serious if the cdes concerned had tried to formulate some theoretical revision so as to underpin their positions, but fortunately this did not occur (cf. the Mao-sponto tendency of the Ligue). Instead the mistakes made were rectified (at least in theory the practice will be dealt with later), and the last conference youth document has a somewhat clearer grasp of the outlines of the situation. Now, however, it is important to understand that we must not abandon the concept of periphery and centre but must redefine the concept."

"When "periphery and centre" was first used it was meant in a social sense i.e. the organisation should work initially primarily among the layers outside the working class. This idea collapsed with the collapse of the "youth vanguard" concept of a relatively autonomous youth and student movement. It was recognised that it was necessary to work within the working class in order to maintain ourselves even within the petty bourgeois milieus. What, however, does remain valid about the concept of periphery and centre is the idea that the present period demands the utmost concentration of forces where the enemy is weakest. It is however important to remember in that context that what is referred to as concentration of 'forces' in these peripheral, in the sense

just defined, areas, not a type of politics. Our politics at all times must reflect what is at the centre of the political struggle at that time. Thus if we intervene in the student milieu we do not concentrate on the politics of students, although of course we do deal with the questions particularly affecting students, similarly in our intervention amongst women the politics we put forward are not "womens" politics, but just politics.

"However, it is also necessary to actually allocate forces to work within the working class. No-one will take you seriously if you claim to be determined to gain an implantation in the working class but are not actually doing anything practical about it. In political terms it is important that edes see the complimentary nature of work in the working class, otherwise edes will counterpose the two types of activities and ouvrierist and studentism currents will develop. There is of course a real contradiction in terms of allocation of manpower. This is taken up in the next section, but first it is necessary to analyse the dialectic of the various processes of the fields within which we work.

The Dialectic of Vanguard Organisation, Radicalised Milieu, and Mass in the Student Field. (This is merely a first approximation to a theory).

"The student milieu is a key one for a whole series of reasons :

- i) It contains a relatively concentrated area of work.
- ii) Students have a relatively easy access to Marxist ideas and can therefore readily develop critiques of society.
- iii) Being outside the area of production the students are not under the same pressure of bourgeois ideology as exists in this area.
- iv) Higher education is subject to a whole series of contradictions which have been analysed elsewhere.
- v) The organisational structure of the student milieu is relatively non-existent or non-influential which means that students can be mobilised by relatively direct appeals from revolutionary organisations, and that they are not to the same extent as workers dominated by Social Democratic, Stalinist or Trade Unionist apparatuses.

When dealing with students it is, however, important to distinguish between various layers inside the milieu.

- a) The mass - these are non-political and non-mobilisable. Unlike workers' struggles a successful action in the student milieu does not rely on universal involvement. If this were not the case no student struggles could ever get off the ground as there is no direct bloc interest which students have which is not completely reformist or even reactionary (when the tendency talk about an interest in (classless) "truth" they just reveal to what abysmal depths their abandonment of Marxism has reached).
- b) The potentially mobilisable - apart from the mass there exists a considerable layer which is mobilisable but only either at the extreme heights of campaigns such as VSC or over issues which directly affect them. This layer is only directly concerned with the sectional interests of students and is therefore relatively unlikely to be involved or interested in workers' struggles. This layer is also not recruitable material.
- c) The semi-mobilised milieu - there is another layer of students who are usually in a vague way 'revolutionary' but not members of any group. For members of a revolutionary organisation they are the most important layer because
 - i) they are the mediating layer between the revolutionary groups and the potentially mobilisable mass of students,
 - ii) they are the potential recruits.It is for hegemony over this layer that the revolutionary groups struggle. This semi-mobilised milieu is, because it is politically aware, very sensitive to changing processes inside society. It is the pressure of the workers struggle on this milieu that has caused the present ouvrierist mood amongst political students.

"Having made those distinctions, which are rough and ready but will do for a preliminary analysis, we can now make an analysis of the student milieu. The structural contradictions within the universities which have been analysed many times of course affect all students. It must, however, be realised that compared to workers, students still remain relatively privileged. This explains the large size of group (a) and also explains why it is so hard to get a "T.U." consciousness among students (there are other factors here of course such as the brief time students remain students, their discontinuous period of attendance at college, etc). What these socio-economic structural contradictions do explain, however, is the growing size of group (b). This second group is, as we have noted, growing really mobilisable around demands that directly affect them (and at the extreme heights of campaigns around issues). This means that at certain other periods they could be mobilised by fascist elements and in any case fall prey relatively easily to budding student bureaucrats. While a struggle is being carried on by the revolutionaries in the universities this group can occasionally be mobilised, but it is almost impossible to mobilise it on any issue which goes outside the immediate problems of students as students.

"This potentially mobilisable milieu can, however, only be mobilised if the main struggle is being carried on inside the universities and colleges. This means that group (c), the semi-mobilised milieu, must also be carrying on their main agitation inside the university. The main subjective factor responsible for the present downturn of struggle inside the student milieu is that group (c) is now mainly interested in turning its attentions away from the university and is trying to make links with the working class. This means that even if the revolutionary groups, such as the IMG, did decide to devote most of their energies to campaigning on student issues they would not have much success because the milieu which acts as a transition bolt between them and the mass of mobilisable students is no longer present in the areas in which they would be concentrating their energies. It is now only possible to win this semi-mobilisable group by showing in practice that the IMG has an orientation towards the industrial working class. We should note, however, that this industrial work is not going to have a big impact on the mass of students. Some comrades may say that this does not matter any way because groups a and b are not recruitable anyway. This position would however, be an extremely serious mistake. Firstly it would be a mistake because of course the size of groups a, b and c are not static. During big upsurges the size of groups b and c increase markedly and therefore the increase in student struggles is likely to bring more recruits, but more importantly it makes a mistake regarding the way in which we are going to have to break the hold of bourgeois ideology over the working class. This point concerns the relation between the student and petty-bourgeois milieu and the working class."

The Relation of Students and Political, Especially Young Workers

"A new revolutionary current which goes against the dominant Historical trend at a given moment first crystallises around men who are more or less cut off from the national life in any country" - Trotsky, April 1939, interview with C.L.R. JAMES"

"In that quotation Trotsky expresses very clearly the situation whereby revolutionaries find themselves concentrated in areas outside the working class. He was dealing with a period of ebb of world revolution. Now we are in a period of upsurge but this does not mean that automatically the revolutionaries will find themselves reintegrated into the working class. It is relatively easy for them to gain a position inside the non-proletarian milieu as the new mood arising from the upsurge of revolution takes effect. Things are however, profoundly different inside the working class. Here the highly structured working class organisations and the pressure of bourgeois ideology combine to ensure that the penetration of revolutionary ideas into the working class proceeds at a far slower rate than in any other section of society. The consequence is the regrettable fact that long after the situation cries out for a revolutionary strategy, the revolutionaries are isolated and on the periphery of the working class. The problem is therefore, always one of how to penetrate the workers milieu. An enormous disparity exists between the size of the class and the size

of the revolutionary organisations."

"One thing that can be decided at once is that it is not going to be possible to establish revolutionaries as a significant force within the working class simply by arithmetical recruitment. Neither is it going to be possible to break the power of bourgeois ideology over the working class simply by concentrating on economic struggles. If anyone wanted a demonstration of this they need only look at the February 21st demonstration against the anti-union legislation. Here there were 140,000 workers and the influence of the revolutionaries over them was nil. It was absolutely clear that it did not matter if you had 4, or 40 or 400 workers members you were still in exactly the same infinitesimal league as far as influence over the working class goes. As one member said 'The revolutionaries hovered around the demonstration like flies around shit.' By giving some idea of the numbers involved in having a decisive influence over a section of the working class, that demonstration was a conclusive rebuff to I.S. or Lutte Ouvriere, conceptions of winning hegemony over the working class simply by a process of arithmetical recruitment.

"Faced with this situation we must continually remember that it will be by work on overtly political issues that we will succeed in breaking hold of bourgeois ideology over decisive sections of the working class. However, we must also remember that we will only be able to capitalise on these campaigns inside the workers movement. We will deal with the question of how to use these nuclei in another section. For now it is necessary to deal with the relation of the student milieu to work amongst the working class and its relation to political campaigns.

"In order to generate a campaign in any section of society more than an issue is necessary. It is also necessary to have a base to mobilize. If an initial base can be mobilised then the movement can pick up steam and draw in wider layers. Without that initial base however, revolutionaries would remain purely at the level of propagandism. It is the student milieu that is the obvious initial base for any political campaign. For this reason even excluding its importance as a field of recruitment the student milieu is still a key area for our work and will have a sufficient base in the working class to directly start campaigns by mobilising sections of the working class movement. The case of the Ligue Communiste and the Burgos trial is an excellent example of how to do this.

"VSC is an excellent example of this type of dialectic. Although at its height it included far wider layers than students nevertheless its initial "lift off point" and what gave it the impetus to draw in wider layers, was its ability to mobilise the students. We will be able in future to use the same sort of tactic, the only difference being that from the beginning we must seek to turn any such movement resolutely in the direction of the working class.

"Through involvement in such campaigns the section we will most come into contact with and be able to recruit are politically radicalised young workers. In the long run it is this section that is the key to everything. Because we can get to young workers on a political basis they can rapidly become the key proletarian cadre of the organisation and in the long run they will be able to assume positions of the leadership amongst the working class in which they can function as political revolutionaries. This is a key point. It can unfortunately be said of many older political militant workers that they are trade unionists first and socialists or revolutionaries second. To be able to build/^areal proletarian communist party we need to have people who are revolutionaries first and trade unionists second.

"Although young workers are the key in the long term, and as noted we can best get to these on political issues, in the short term the process is different and another dialectic is at work. This time one within the working class itself."

Young Political Workers and Old Trade Union Militants

"The economic struggle against capitalism is an extremely serious business. One false strike may lead to men losing their homes, to their being black-listed for

years, to them being involved in huge losses of income through strikers. In addition the economic class struggle, for a militant worker, proceeds at least 12 hours a day 5 days a week and in most cases a great deal more. In addition to the struggle at the workplace, it is not at all uncommon for a militant worker to find practically every night of the week taken up with union business of one sort or another. Even apart from the struggle at work a shop steward is quite frequently personal adviser on everything from the horses to how to deal with marriage problems. All this means that because of the enormous energy, determination and toughness involved in being a militant union lead the working class is only willing to take men who have proved themselves in action over a long period of time as their leaders. At one level this fact shows the absurdity of all the romantic 'we must all go to work in the factories' attitudes but on the other hand it also means that the key leaders of the working class movement tend to be older men who we are unlikely to be able to win in the same way in which we can win younger workers. In order to make gains here we need to adopt a very different approach. Another reason why we cannot group this category of worker together with young workers concerns the question of trade union consciousness.

"Because of its structure nature and enormously time consuming nature trade union activity is the centre of attention of many working class militants to the exclusion of almost everyone else. It is this layer, who have frequently suffered a terrible pounding during years of fighting inside the factory, who provide one of the bases for Stalinism. Given the fact that they are frequently isolated even from the men they represent and given the extremely tough job they perform these men see the advantages of toughness, discipline and organisation. However, also their position breeds feelings for manipulation and bureaucracy. It is this combination of rock solid trade union militant together with petty bourgeois bureaucrats which forms the social base for Stalinist parties. It is extremely unlikely that we will be able to win any section of those militants, either in the C.P. or outside, without having a considerably greater Trade Union base than we have at the present time. We can of course win individual militants either through political interventions or through local trade union work. The key problem will then become of integrating these cdes into the organisation. It has to be admitted that in the case of most of our student cdes they are not capable of doing this. Their conception of politics and style of work is well suited to the petty bourgeois milieu but is totally unsuited to work inside the working class. (For the reasons for this see the quotation from Bonsaid and Weber in the document presented at the last NC on organisation). In this situation the way of integrating older trade union militants into the organisation will depend very greatly on our success in politically educating young workers. Because they can be reached on a directly political level in their recruitment they can provide the necessary 'cement' to integrate older trade union militants into the organisation. However, we will be completely unable either to make any gains inside the working class or to integrate militants we recruit unless we understand what a proletarian orientation means in political terms and how to provide a focus for our intervention."

A Working Class Base

"Having a base inside the working class does not just consist of having a certain number of workers in the organisation. It also means having a number of key workers militants and key in this context actually means workers who are part of the de facto leadership of the working class i.e. shop stewards and convenors in important industries. It is necessary to understand that in the trade union world there is a definite status ladder. For example, the importance of apprentices and labourers is nil in most places. In some industries, e.g. transport, young workers can play a leading role, but in the key manufacturing industries virtually the

entire leadership is men in at least their forties.

There is also a hierarchy in terms of which industries you work in. For example car workers and workers in the engineering industry in general come out for higher than say transport or plastic workers. The reason for this is quite simply that nobody counts for anything in the trade unions unless they have proved themselves in struggle and the level of struggle is highest precisely in the car industry, the docks, etc. We therefore have to realise that if we aim to gain a working class base it has to include representatives in at least some key heavy industries.

These points are all as relevant as when they were first written. Now six months later, and after much theoretical clarification, we can return directly to the problem of dealing with the problems this analysis poses.

PART SIX - The year ahead, consolidation and growth.

The political situation we are now in Britain is defined by two main political themes, the crisis in Ireland and the aftermath of the miners strike. We will deal with them in that order.

Ireland: (N.B. a word of warning the emergence of Soc.Democ ideol. as central in the vanguard since 1968 makes extremely dangerous any comparison of ISC and VSC).

There will be a separate paper on detailed developments in Ireland, and on our work in Britain. In this main perspectives document, therefore all that is outlined is the main guidelines.

As far as the actual situation in Ireland is concerned, it is dominated by two elements of the situation of the highest importance. Firstly the tremendous deepness of the crisis, which has now persisted for three and a half years. Secondly the complete incompetence of any of the existing leaderships of the Republican population. This bankruptcy was shown most clearly in the period after the Derry shootings. An immense upheaval shook the South, but none of the organisations knew in the slightest how to take advantage of it. The Provisionals because of their attitude towards the Southern bourgeoisie, and the Officials because they in fact (as opposed to in words) see the struggle in the south as separated from that in the North. The upheaval therefore came and went. A strategic line on such things as arms to North from the Southern army were never powerfully raised, and in consequence lynx emerged relatively unscathed. It is unlikely that the Southern bourgeoisie will not learn their lessons from that and step up attacks on both wings of the IRA.

This incapacity of the Republican leaderships is an objective element in the situation in the North. It is not possible for the tension to remain at its present level if no way out of the situation can be seen. As long as the Republicans appear to offer a way forward the population will support them. If they are led into a dead end then the old and new bourgeois forces will be given an opportunity try to regain the initiative. The coming manoeuvres of Heath will very much be guided by these considerations.

As regards our work in this country we need to be extremely aware in our propaganda of the changing circumstances. Clearly our main axis of intervention is to explain to the British working class that the defeat of the forces of the British state in Ireland is in their own interests. (Here again we see the importance of the correct propaganda/agitation distinction. We are not guided by some consideration of "mobilising the greatest number of people") This would provide the main axis of our intervention no matter what organisational form was appropriate for our work. Whether, for example, we decided to work in AIL or through a solidarity campaign, is a purely tactical question concerned with how to make the greatest impact with our propaganda. Naturally it is preferable to have a campaign on an explicitly solidarity position if it is viable. There is no reason to suppose that it is not at present. In particular the coming Heath manoeuvres, which inevitably will have to deal with internment, will begin to cut the ground from the AIL. What we must watch for however is the moves of IS. In the student field they have already accepted a United Front with us on a solidarity position. If Internment ceases to be an issue, they may well shift their position to a solidarity one, in particular as they have intense internal problems on the question. This will present organisational questions which cannot be specified in advance. What is clear is that we must now clarify our political positions. This means in particular (a) Undertaking a rigorous critique of the IRA (b) Clarifying our slogans, in particular to withdraw any implications that we believe the IRA to be capable of defeating British Imperialism (i.e. of destroying capitalism in Ireland). There is no reason in basic theory why the IRA cannot defeat the British army, although grave ones in practice, but that is completely different to defeating Imperialism.

So far the main sections of the population drawn into the campaign have been students and Irish exiles. The radicalisation amongst the latter is increasing, and amongst the students, particularly inside the NUS, the issue of Ireland, because of the resolutions we have got through the LCDSU, will be the central focus of political activity. In short we can say that in the coming year, short of some entirely unforeseeable development, the issue of Ireland will continue to be of central importance to us in all our sectors of work. Nevertheless it will also not, unless again completely unforeseen events occur, become the central issue within the British working class. It can give us extremely valuable contact with Irish trade unionists, and with political British trade unionists, but it cannot be our single priority of work if we are to achieve the reorganisational task we have set of achieving a base inside the working class. However because of the central political importance of Ireland within British politics for the ability of the IMG to make a national impact as a political force the issue of Ireland remains central and it must clearly be one of our main priorities of work.

The situation in the working class after the miners strike

The perspectives document presented to the September N.C. noted, as already mentioned, the change in the strategy of the ruling class which the Heath government represented. It meant a change from a policy of trade union integration to one of attempting to weaken all sections of the trade unions, including the bureaucracy. This had already been spelt out earlier. In an editorial in Red Mole appearing on 1st Jan 1971 it was stated, "This attractive state of affairs (of productivity deals and co-operation of bureaucracy with government) was however entirely dependent on employers 'playing the game' and granting wage increases in return for the abandoning of work practices and conditions. When the employers refused to play ball, all hell broke loose. For example in the ETU it was all Les Cannon could do last year to prevent the power men breaking the agreement with the CEEB when they found that the gas and water workers, who had not been involved in as intensive productivity bargaining as the power workers had, were going to get higher increases than the power men.

The Tory government has now decided that it can no longer afford to 'play the game'. When they declare that despite the increase in productivity in the power industry, the workers cannot have large wage increases, 'because other sectors of workers have not shown the same productivity gains', they show three things. Firstly they confirm yet again that the state of the British economy is now such that it allows the ruling class only a tiny amount of room for manoeuvre. Secondly of course it shows that the Tories are up to their old game of trying to turn one group of workers against another. They are trying to convince the power men that the reason they cannot get a rise is not because the government is unwilling, but because other groups of workers are being lazy or uncooperative. The third thing that it shows is that the Tories are being forced to knock the bottom out of the whole productivity game. Previously the employers said, 'If you sell enough working practices and conditions you can have a large wage increase.' What the Tories are now being forced to say is, 'Even if you sell all the work conditions we can think of, you still can't have a big wage increase.'

The implications of this will deal a death blow to the strategy of the T.U. leaders. From now on if they want to maintain their standing in the union they will actually have to fight the employer. This is of course unthinkable to a man like Chapple and will no doubt also give Jack Jones & Co. more than a few sleepless nights. The trade union leaders are only too well aware of the implications of the Tories' new position. The present complaints of Chapple are those of a man who has faithfully served a master for 15 years and now that master has turned round and stabbed him in the back."

This analysis has been entirely confirmed. In addition the pressures this would create inside the unions was also correctly analysed.

"What all this adds up to is that the internal struggle in the unions will be greatly increased. It means that the traditional demands for election of all union officials, for the right of recall of all officials at any time, for officials to receive the average pay of all members, etc., will become more and more relevant.

At the moment only the first signs are appearing of the coming struggles inside the unions. The attempt to force through a higher wage increase for the miners by an unofficial strike met with considerable success, but it wasn't strong enough to shift a right-wing bureaucracy as well entrenched as that of the NUM. In the ETU the attempt to defeat the executive in the union elections was a welcome sign of the revival of the left inside the union, but it revealed also that there is a long way to go before the right-wing leaders can be removed. Nevertheless, there was in these two unions significant resistance to the leadership - a sign that the militants are becoming more conscious of the problems that face them and also that their voices is finding a wider, even if not at the moment decisive, audience. What is happening is that the most active members of the trade union movement are becoming more aware of the role of their union leaderships, but that they have not as yet been able to convince the mass of the rank and file of the need to fight these leaders."

The tempo of events on this front was however misjudged, or rather it proceeded in an uneven way. In the case of the miners, and without wishing to fall into any "Pabloite" formulations, the "mass pressure" from the base forced the bureaucracy to act in an unprecedented way. The September analysis presented the situation in the following way. "Given this state of affairs it is most unlikely that the bureaucracy will launch a major wages offensive this autumn. If they do it will only be because of tremendous pressure from the mass and it would meet with ferocious resistance from the government. In that type of situation, caught between a remorseless government and an infuriated class the bureaucracy would behave as it did in Fords and a major defeat of the working class could well result." This was an entirely correct assessment as far as the bulk of the trade union bureaucracy were concerned. They all avoided struggle either by straightforward capitulation (e.g. Power workers) or by "doing a Fords" e.g. Engineers. The miners leaders however, because of the history of oppression built up in the mines over twenty years, were not able to pull off the same trick. It was a very close run thing, Gormley said that if the government's second offer had been made before the strike it would have been accepted, but nevertheless when it came to a government refusal to budge an inch, which in turn was dictated by their need to re-expand the economy, the bureaucracy was forced to fight. Quite clearly also, as was noted in the same document, by fighting a struggle in the present circumstances the bureaucracy unleashed forces which got outside its control. The picketing, attitude to arrests etc., in fact carried the whole struggle into the realm of complete flouting of bourgeois law. Both the bourgeoisie and the trade union bureaucracy is scared of that.

The outcome of the miners strike has however altered the tempo of events, and the basic political forces in the situation will now work themselves out in a modified form to the original suggestions. The implications of this must now be worked out.

(1) Within the rank and file of the trade unions. The most likely perspective suggested at the Sept. N.C. was of a down turn in the mass struggle although naturally not down to pre 1969 levels but an increase in the bitterness of individual disputes with new forms of struggle emerging. The basic premises of this were that individual unions could not defeat the government without unleashing forces which went outside the control of the bureaucracy. This perspective remains correct, but with important modifications. Firstly the best organised sections of the working class will clearly be encouraged tremendously by the miners struggle. In the car industry and other decisive sections of engineering in particular we can expect a real upturn in demands. Clearly therefore the individual struggle is allowed for in the original outline

will be more frequent. This tendency will be increased by the policy decided upon by the Engineering unions of going in for a policy of local agreements. We can clearly therefore expect some quite large settlements or struggles in the economically decisive sections of industry. What happens to the workers outside these sections however depends on what policy the ruling class decides to adopt.

(2) The situation inside the ruling class - what the miners strike has quite clearly produced is an acute crisis within the ruling class. For the first 18 months of his government Heath and quite clearly succeeded in gaining the acceptance of his policy by the decisive sections of the ruling class. He had achieved this even more clearly than Wilson had in the pre 1964 period. In September the situation was, to repeat, analysed as follows, "One section (of the ruling class) is looking for a deal with the unions so as to cool militancy.....Another section is looking towards a more desperate solution." What Heath would have succeeded in doing if he had smashed the miners would have been in hegemonising the ruling class round the second alternative. Now this aim has received a severe set back. The sections of the ruling class looking for a deal with the trade union bureaucracy have been immensely strengthened.

(For an analysis of Heath's strategy see APPENDIX THREE)

In order to understand what has occurred it is necessary to make a clear distinction at this point between the interests of the ruling class, and the interests of the present dominant sections of the Conservative Party. The past policies of Edward Heath would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for him to actually turn back to the policy of trying to do a deal with the trade union bureaucracy. The only road open for him therefore, and the section of the Conservative Party he represents, is an abrupt switch to the right. But the present situation takes him back to square one. At his election he had more or less four years to completely rally the ruling class behind his policies. If he had achieved this he could have gone into any general election on 1974-75 with great confidence as to the outcome. Now however he has very little time. It will clearly take, even if the hardest line possible is taken, at least many months, probably a year at least, to whip the working class back into the shape it was in before the miners strike. That takes him to 1973 and leaves very little time to re-unite the ruling class in time for a General Election. Nevertheless Heath will probably be forced to try for this option in order to maintain his own position. If he does then he will still be able to stop most sections of workers getting really big increases. In that case the perspective of September remains strictly correct with the modification of a rather higher level of massive high level individual struggles. What would now occur would be few armageddon type struggles with the government invoking the Industrial Relations Bill, attacking social security etc. However a question mark must be placed over whether the ruling class will actually allow Heath to try this, or whether it is too alarmed to permit such a perspective. This refusal could show itself in two forms, either a move to replace Heath within the Conservative party, or a move by sections of the ruling class back to Labour. It is now necessary to consider the implications of this option.

(3) The Integrationist perspective

The outcome of the miners strike will have greatly strengthened that section of the ruling class whose basic strategy is to do a deal with the trade union bureaucracy. Stokes and his ilk must be cursing and swearing at Heath at the present time because of the trouble he has now made inevitable for them within the motor industry. However any policy of co-operation, in particular to a formal incomes policy, would need a complete change in strategy by the Conservative party. Indeed this change would be so abrupt that it is probably incapable of accomplishing it. In any case the logical party of government if the basic strategy of the ruling class is a deal with the trade union

bureaucracy, is the Labour Party. This opens up completely new perspectives for the Labour leadership, and indeed one of the people to gain most from the miners strike has been Harold Wilson. He has been able to simultaneously offer to the ruling an alternative policy to that of Heath, and in a certain demagogic way, to give verbal support to the miners. His way forward now quite clearly lies round that of an incomes policy. The key to Wilson's strategy all along has been the Special case argument and the urging of the government to negotiate with the TUC. As we noted in the last strike broadsheet produced by the Red Mole: Harold Lever said "that the task of the government was to get round a table with the TUC. In week five of the strike Roy Mason repeated the same idea. Wilson attempted to put the integrative line of Labour into practice. His trip to Fisher-Bendix to have the occupation called off, had a far greater significance than merely the fact that he does not like having occupations around his constituency. What he attempted to show was that while the confrontation policy of Heath produced factory occupations and immense strikes with considerable risk for capitalism, the policy of Labour was a better way of dealing with the trade unions and involved far less risks. These intentions now key in fairly exactly with the motives of the leadership of the trade unions. If the Labour Party wishes to rekindle the policy of integration, then there is nothing that the trade union bureaucracy would like more than to go back to the situation of cosy chats with Labour leaders, rather than open confrontation strife and struggle. This can be seen in the policy which is being put forward that the miners are a "special case" as far as the 7% norm is concerned. What this means is that while the pressure of the rank and file is too great at present to accept openly that the miners must be content with what they are offered, nevertheless they are prepared to accept, in principle, the idea of a norm for wage increases i.e. of an incomes policy. This provides the open door for an agreement between the Labour leadership and the trade union bureaucracy, and for an alternative policy to be presented to the ruling class if Heath fails. This is what explains the bellicose nature of some Wilson's recent statements. In a certain sense he sees that it is in his interest if the miners win a limited victory. If Heath defeats the miners then he will be able to present himself as the man who kept his nerve when others panicked. He will appear as a bourgeois leader of real stature. Wilson will be unable for years to re-convince the ruling class that Labour's policy was the correct one. Labour would be marginalised in terms of the plans of the ruling class. Of course Wilson cannot accept an outright victory for the miners either. In the first place he must dread the thought of an early general election putting him in charge of the present economic, social and political problems of the bourgeoisie. And secondly, he cannot be seen by the ruling class to be actually supporting the trade union fight against the 7% norm."

The correctness of this analysis has been entirely confirmed in the events leading to the ending of the strike. Wilson has lost no time in telling the ruling class that when it came to the real crunch Heath was forced to adopt Labour methods in their entirety - right down to the midnight dash to 10 Downing Street. If Wilson can now only gain the agreement of the Trade Union bureaucracy for an incomes policy, only acceptable under a "humane" Labour government of course, then he would have superficially viable policy to sell to the ruling class. As long as Heath was successful, Labour was being moved towards being marginalised from the main stream of British politics. Now Wilson has the chance to move right back into the centre of the stage. It may be that the ruling class is too actually aware of the seriousness of the economic crisis, and in any case does not trust Wilson and the Trade Union leadership to keep the rank and file under control. In that case Wilson's policies will not win the support of the ruling class. Nevertheless they will define the main line of his strategy in the coming period.

(4) The trade union bureaucracy. The outcome of the strike will place large sections of the trade union leaderships in very difficult positions indeed. For example the leaders of the Power Men look really idiotic accepting £1.80 a few weeks before the miners get £4 to £6. We can confidently therefore expect a crisis within the right wing unions including such groups as the NUR, the

NUT etc. all these have claims in the pipe-line and all the leaderships of these unions will be under severe pressure from the rank and file. These unions would only be too glad to do some sort of deal with the Labour Party. They would roughly speaking like to be able to argue that Heath was too string in the economic field to be challenged and therefore while the trade union struggle could not be pursued, the main aim must be for the return of a Labour government. In a few cases this would even be served up in a little "Leninist" rhetoric about raising the economic struggle to a political level. This move would also suit the left wing of the constituency Labour party who are looking for a way of regaining some credibility. In these circumstances we could get everyone from Harold Wilson and Lord Cooper to Hugh Scanlon to Gory Healy lined up on the slogan of "Labour to Power on a Socialist Programme". The effect of course would be to counterpose the "political" struggle to the "trade union" struggle, thereby effectively ensuring that there would not in fact be any struggle at all. In these circumstances it is precisely the continuation of the trade union struggle which is the political policy for it is this which cuts across the policies of both Heath and Wilson. NO TO ANY FORM OF INCOMES POLICY must become an absolutely central slogan of the coming period.

Whether in fact the whole of the trade union bureaucracy could in fact do a new deal with Wilson is a difficult point to answer. Certainly the TUC will try. However given the resentment building up inside the working class, and given the encouragement to the militants given by the miners strike, it is extremely doubtful if, for example, Scanlon could actually promise an incomes policy. Certainly if he did, there would be the formation of a left current within the AUEW which would break with the general Scanlon machine. Without the support of the engineers of course, any incomes policy means nothing.

It therefore appears that the bourgeoisie is in for a severe crisis of leadership. One section moving extremely rapidly to the right, witness for example some of the suggestions in the Telegraph, and semi-fascist ravings in some of the local papers, and another attempting to come to some understanding with the trade union bureaucracy. Nevertheless we can be sure of one thing, that is that any incomes policy will not work and will not solve the problems of British capitalism. Clearly therefore, no matter what the temporary vacillations are, the bourgeoisie will continue to swing to the right. Its basic medium terms strategy will be to continue to use its great political and organisational strength to defeat the economic strength of the working class. Unless one adopts a naive view that the class struggle will grow linearly until capitalism is overthrown, this means that at some point in the intermediate future the working class will suffer severe setbacks. We must be prepared for this and not build on a cloud of euphoria.

The political development of the working class vanguard.

One of the most important things about the destruction of the organisational hold of the Labour Party over the working class, has been the way it affected the process of working class radicalisation. In the 30's or 50's the working class political radicalisation occurred in around either the L.P. or the C.P. A relatively stable layer of politicised workers existed and a collective memory of previous struggles was created. This did not exist in the radicalisation occurring in the great upheavels of 1969-71. In the period, which constituted the beginning of the recreation of a political layer within the working class after its destruction during the boom, the radicalisation occurred in a fragmented way grouped around none of the traditional working class parties. This has extremely important consequences for the way in which we intervene in the class struggle.

In a period when the working class is radicalising around existing political organisations, the mode of intervention of a revolutionary group is of necessity propagandist, i.e. explaining a large number of ideas to a relatively small number of people. In this type of context "dominated by Social Democratic ideology" means quite specifically to accept as at least a

rudimentary political theory, most of the elements of social-democracy. Hence one would have to argue at great length about the role of Bevan, the nature of the state, Parliamentaryism etc. In a fragmented radicalisation this is not true. In this type of situation it is the ability of the revolutionary organisation to carry out agitational work, i.e. explaining a few ideas to a relatively large number of people that is decisive. Right from the beginning of our intervention in the working class therefore we are forced to learn to agitate. This poses extremely great problems. It means learning to be able to sum up an extremely complicated argument in an extremely brief slogan or demand. To understand concretely what this means we can consider the most likely types of development within the working class vanguard in the present period and how we must intervene in order to try to alter the course of events.

Within the working class vanguard, the outcome of the miners strike will have contradictory effects. On the one hand it will raise their level of confidence and combativity, however the role of the Labour Party and the trade union bureaucracy the strike will tend to spread mystification. In particular they will be keen to spread two main ideas which fit in with their political needs.

(A) The illusions in the Labour Party argument. As we noted, the Labour Party has gained considerably from the strike. Wilson was able simultaneously to appear to offer an alternative strategy to the ruling class, and to make noises in support of the miners. The same was the case with the left wing of the constituency sections. This is of importance. Our basic analysis of the Labour left, (See the two centre spreads in the L.P. and the Jones document at the last conference) is that it is most unlikely, given that there is no complete transformation of the entire socio-economic state of British capitalism, that the constituency left can re-establish itself as a dominant force within the life of the working class. However this in no way rules out temporary fluctuations. While "one swallow does not a summer make" nevertheless we should watch the situation very carefully if any similar situations arise if, as is extremely likely, Heath lurches to the right. What would make this significant is that, for its own reasons, the trade union bureaucracy would also like to divert the struggle into the Labour Party. A tie up between T.U. bureaucracy and Labour left might therefore be on the cards. This would be an extremely delicate situation. A bloc of Labour leadership, Labour left and trade union bureaucracy would be created whose main aim was the calling off of the economic struggle. Such a bloc is probably not achievable in the present circumstances, but nevertheless definitely various elements will be working in that direction within the working class and it constitutes a most serious political threat. We must therefore analyse very carefully how to intervene in this situation.

The first extreme theoretical danger that must be combatted is any Social Democratic conception of the distinction between political and trade union struggle - i.e. a distinction based on where the two occur. If we accepted this position we would see the move of the working class from the trade union struggle back into organisations of the Labour Party as a step forward instead of seeing it for what it would be, a manoeuvre by the bureaucracy and Labour left designed at calling off a real struggle. Naturally if such a movement of workers occurred we would send at least some of our forces into the Labour Party, but we must carefully differentiate this tactic from seeing the whole thing as a step forward by the working class from "economic" to political struggle. The relation between economic struggle and political struggle is far more complicated than that, and has been rendered still more complicated by the developments since 1945. In the circumstances of a bankrupt left wing of the constituency Labour Party and a continuing high level of trade union struggle, the mass exodus of workers from the Labour Party has an entirely different significance to the one it has had in earlier periods. During the 1920's and 1930's for a worker to leave the Labour Party it was undoubtedly a sign of political backwardness (the only exception to this of course is those who joined the CP during the 1920's) To leave the Labour Party then meant to leave an organisation which was at least on paper, incomparably to the left of

the present Labour Party, which actively contained within its organisations a mass of workers, and which had not yet had the chance to really show what it would do when in Office. Now, however, a worker leaving the Labour Party has a totally different significance. In many cases it means that they see the futility of slogging their guts out within a constituency party which is powerless to influence in the slightest the policies of "our" party. Ideologically these people are still dominated by the ideas of the Labour Party as we have discussed, but in no way can leaving the Labour Party be now equated with a retreat into political backwardness (as it could undoubtedly have been done 20's and 30's). On the contrary it is many of these militants who have been responsible for the movement against the Incomes Policy. In Place of Strife, against the Tory anti-union laws etc. What leaving the party means in the present situation is certainly not that the mass of workers are on the verge revolutionary organisations or that they have rejected the ideology of Labourism, what it does frequently mean however is that they have seen the futility of banging their heads against a brick wall inside a constituency Labour Party.

This complex relation can be seen over a shorter time period than this. The 1950's were a period of relative prosperity together with right wing domination of the main trade unions. The main consistent exception to this rule were the dockers who from 1945 onwards were engaged in a whole series of really bitter clashes confrontations with the employers, the state and the trade union bureaucracies. These included a full scale confrontation with the law and the state over the case of seven imprisoned dockers leaders and the attempt to form a breakaway union in 1954. Undoubtedly the appalling working conditions of the dockers, and the particular nature of the docks community, helped to maintain this militancy but against that must be set their relatively high pay, the extreme reactionary nature of the T.G.W.U. docks section leadership, and the general decline in large scale activity of the class. What in fact happened in this period was that the extreme reactionary nature of the official union leadership led to a situation where in their day to day struggles the dockers largely ignored the union structure and formed their own rank and file committees. Because of the peculiar traditions of the docks industry and community these were successful in a way that has not been matched in any other industry. Once in existence these committees gave the dockers a real perspective in that they provided an organisational form via which struggles could be waged without being sabotaged by the union officials. In addition various other conjunctural features were of importance. In particular the role of the Communist Party in defeating the dock strike led to a rejection of the C.P. by a whole layer of dock militants. In itself this was a progressive development as it constituted a break with the Party for its lack of militancy, but it also led amongst certain layers to a rejection of any overt form of politics. This feeling was intensified by the continual clashes between the dockers and the Labour government. At the same time conflict with the bureaucracy of the T.G.W.U. led to a massive development of rank and file organisation. This again, springing as it did from at least some understanding of the role of the union leadership, was an extremely important development. However allied to the revulsion against the CP and the Labour Party this conflict fostered further implicit, and even explicit in the case of a group crystallising around Eric Hoffer, syndicalist trends. On the part of more advanced elements however the rejection of Labour and of the CP led to a turn toward Trotskyism. Unfortunately this section was not decisive in size, nor was it lead to have a really accurate analysis of the situation in which the struggle was taking place. This whole process culminated in the attempted breakaway into the and the serious defeat of the 1954 dock strike.

In this brief period of 9 years 1945-54 it is possible to see in microism the tremendously complicated dialectic of economic struggle and political consciousness. One of the reasons the Northern Dockers joined the NASD was precisely because it was not associated with the Labour Party. This was excellent sign of the development of the understanding of the role of the 1945-51 Labour government, but unfortunately it avoided an apparent opportunity

to solve the dockers problems by economic action alone and any political understanding. However if this struggle had not occurred in a period of relative capitalist stability, and one in which the revolutionary organisations were not extremely weak, the whole struggle would probably have taken an entirely different course, and become the starting point for a national struggle against the trade union bureaucracy. Such a development would have led to a very rapid development of consciousness within the working class. What clearly emerges from this is that there is no predetermined stages through which the working class must pass to arrive at political consciousness. To believe that there is to succumb to the type of empiricist generalising that can be found at its worst in the RSL.

In the present context it is clear what would be the precise significance of a move by the trade union bureaucracy to urge that the main task was to return a Labour government. This is a perfect example of the "counterpositionist" school of reformism i.e. to say that your present struggle is a diversion, and you should in fact be struggling for something else. The aim of the trade union bureaucracy in counterposing the "struggle" for the return of a Labour government to the economic struggle would be to demobilise the working class and in fact ensure that there was no struggle at all. In this situation the precisely political demand political in that it cuts across the policies of both Wilson and the bureaucracy, is for the continuation of the economic struggle. As a conjunctural slogan SMASH THE 7% NORM is therefore of the greatest significance, and in the longer term NO TO ANY FORM OF INCOMES POLICY must become a central slogan in our work.

In the coming period we may see attempts to whip up pro-Labour rhetoric inside the working class. Into this mood will fit precisely the type of rhetoric which the IS and the SLL will be putting out. (Incidentally the bankruptcy of the methodology of "exposure politics" is seen completely in this situation. The SLL's slogan of "Labour to power on a Socialist programme" in particular fits in perfectly with the line of the Labour leadership and the aims of the bureaucracy. The call for a General Election was put up in the Miners strike from precisely two places - Harold Wilson and Gory Hoaly. The SLL's slogan and those of the tendency's which are completely theoretically revisionist at all times, become positively counter-revolutionary in the present period). Undoubtedly these groups will gain from this mood. Ours will be uphill task. In order to operate properly we need the utmost clarity. When the workers raise the slogan of "Down with the Tories" we accept this sentiment. The defeat of an openly ruling class government is clearly in the interests of the working class and we would struggle alongside any worker who had the most incredible illusions in the Labour Party for this end. Nevertheless we do not support the Labour Party. We at all times explain to the working class that a Labour government will not solve their problems. To paraphrase Lenin, we fight with the Labour Party members against Heath, but we do not support the Labour Party, it is a subtle distinction but a vital one.

However refusing to support the Labour Party means nothing if not posed concretely. A policy of anti-government agitation and simultaneous explanations of the role of the Labour Party in general while all part of our propaganda (i.e. the complex set of ideas which only a few people will listen to in their totality) are not essential part of our agitation. This agitation must be directed against the main immediate thing which the Labour Party is doing against the interests of the working class. That quite clearly in the coming period will be the manoeuvres for an incomes policy. We need therefore to fully take up this question and devote time at our meetings, in our press, to explaining the essential political features of an income policy, how it suggests that the working class and not capitalism is responsible for the plight of the low paid, how it is used to build up profits etc. In this way our agitation against the Labour Party become concrete and understandable by the working class, we are not telling them to have no trust in it in abstract, but to have no trust in it because of certain things which they can see with their own eyes it is doing.

(b) The pure economic deviation.

This general way of dealing with things brought up in the previous section is extremely important with regard to our trade union work. There are many misunderstandings about what is meant by political trade unionism in the organisation and in the general left and these need to be stamped out. This is particularly necessary in the coming period when one of our main axes of intervention is to explain the political importance of continuing the economic struggle, and also because of the general political climate that will be created in certain sections of the working class by the outcome of the miners strike.

One great trend within the working class which will be greatly strengthened by the outcome of the miners strike is that of "pure", "militant", trade unionism - i.e. the feeling that all that is required is a willingness to fight, maximum unity, and all is well. This political view, to which the IS in particular is geared in, was beginning to wear a bit thin before the miners strike. In a situation where the government is clearly beating all the unions in sight, "pure" "militant" trade unionism appears a bit unrealistic. Now however it will appear that those who said trade union action alone was sufficient have been proved correct. (For this reason incidentally we must expect the IS to recruit heavily in the coming period). Again in this situation the utmost clarity in ideas is called for. Two key issues, both concerning important theoretical questions must be sorted out to avoid balls-ups in the coming period. The first is the "calls to action" approach to agitation, the other is the social democratic concept of political trade unionism. In practice both are intertwined however and will therefore be dealt with together.

As we have noted many times before, the Social Democracy draws a line between trade unionism and politics on the basis of where they occur. Politics is defined as being concerned with the legislative functions of the state, and trade unionism being defined as what occurs within the factory. This then leads to a social democratic theory of what a political trade unionist is. He is someone who brings issues from outside the factory into the factory. He cannot be defined in any other way, because precisely the affairs within the factory are by definition trade union matters and not political. Hence for the Social Democrat a political trade unionist is one who pursues political activities outside the factory, and brings those issues into the factory, but whose role in the struggle of the factory itself is identical to that of a non political trade union militant. The syndicalist (strictly defined that is to say, not just a pure and simple trade union reformist) is of course just the mirror image of the social democratic political trade unionist. He just refuses to bring the issues from outside the factory i.e. the "political" issues into the factory at all. In his trade union work he too functions like a non-political trade unionist.

Now let us consider how a revolutionary poses the question. The classic starting point is of course "What is to be Done" and the struggle against Economism. But a great danger lurks here if one is not aware that Lenin in fact uses an entirely different distinction between trade unionism and politics than do the Social Democrat. What occurs if this is not understood is roughly the following. The aspiring Bolshevik notes that Lenin criticises the Economists for narrowing the range of their agitation to that of the factory. He therefore draws the lesson that political activity must include things drawn from outside the field of activity of the factory. So far so good. It is at that point that the trouble starts. If he then, ususally consciously, uses a Social Democratic distinction between trade unionism and politics, then he comes to the conclusion that his main role must be to agitate within the factory on issues from outside the factory. Carried to its extreme conclusion, what this means is that he takes no role in the activity of the workers, and may even condemn it as "economism" and becomes generally known as the man who continually puts down union resolutions on the struggle in Afghanistan just when the men are engaged in fighting a bitter battle against redundancy. As such he becomes a complete outcast within the factory and can never emerge as a leader

of the working class. Literally hundreds of good young militants have in the past been ruined in this way. What generally happens is they see a contradiction between their trade union work and their political work. They therefore either, as we said, become outcasts, or, more usually, abandon politics altogether for pure trade unionism. The way the SLL in particular gets round this problem is by saying that the situation of being completely isolated and even despised by the mass of the workers indicates that you are giving "leadership". Hence by a curious shift the greater the vilification the more correct your line must be. Hence the bizarre spectacles of SLL members jumping up in the middle of strike meetings and denouncing the shop stewards for "failing to bring dialectical materialism into the struggle".

The usual way out of this dilemma, most notably adopted by IS is the "striking a balance", "parallel activity" empiricist rubbish. What this means in practice is an eclectic combination of militant trade union activity and political, i.e. outside the factory issues. The net outcome of this is of course economism because it ensures in practice that trade unionism and politics are kept parallel but separate (either that or the Hallas line is adopted of declaring the distinction between trade unionism and political activity to be "out of date" so that the problem, in IS's eyes at least, simply disappears) This separation has four main effects.

- (a) It allows IS members to at least retain a base inside the trade unions, but on an entirely non-political basis.
- (b) It in no way combats Social Democratic consciousness because it accepts, just like social democracy that the distinction between trade unionism and politics is on the basis of where they occur.
- (c) Starts on a justification for printing militant trade unionists who form the backbone of bureaucracy within IS.
- (d) It actually leads to complete cock ups in their trade union work. To understand the latter however it is necessary to pursue the question further.

So far we have pured to some of their conclusions the implications of accepting, whether consciously or unconsciously, the Social Democratic distinction between politics and trade unionism. However at this point an immediate problem arises for the revolutionary. It appears as if being a revolutionary has no effect on trade union activity. This is obviously ridiculous, therefore he searches for some way of differentiating himself from ordinary trade unionists. The answer is found in the Economist definition of the difference between propaganda and agitation. It is clearly the role of the revolutionary, so he thinks, to "call the class to action" while the ordinary trade unionist remains locked in passivity. Hence when the trade unionist calls for go-slow the revolutionary calls for a one day strike. When the trade unionist calls for a one day strike, the revolutionary calls for an unlimited strike. When the trade unionist calls for an indefinite strike, the revolutionary calls for a General Strike. Hence is born the whole "strike happiness" of the papers like Socialist Worker. The answer of IS to everything is to call a strike. Similarly the innumerable calls for a General Strike, on every conceivable issue, which are put out by the SLL. Given the Economist "calls to action" theory it is by these endless strike calss that the revolutionaries show that they are in advance of the rest. What actually occurs in these circumstances is that the revolutionary becomes known as "strike happy" and is either isolated from the men, or is lured into mad acts and destroyed by the management. It is precisely this type of ridiculous attitude to industrial action that allows the CP to characterise the Trotskyists as irresponsible twits with no idea of how to carry on trade union work. Again a theoretical error, the "calls to action" theory can cost very dear.

Just to take a concrete example of how this works, we may take the example of the April 1971 Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions meeting. Here the IS accepted totally the line of the CP because it was a militant trade union line, and then, looking for someway of differentiating themselves, proposed the

"call to action" of a one day strike on the day on which the strike became law. This was completely ridiculous. There had already been four one day strikes, the RUC had capitulated and anyone with any sense would have known that a one day strike would have been unsuccessful. However IS given its approach, was driven into calling the strike in order to find some way of differentiating itself from the CP and fitting into the "militant" syndrome. In consequence the C.P. were able to portray the IS as just a load of idiots with no ear to the mood of the class at all. And every trade unionist in the room knew that the CP was right. A call for a one day strike would have met no response at all. The image of the "ultra-left", "unrealistic" Trots and the "stable", "realistic" C.P. must have been confirmed in the eyes of many tens of trade unionists that day. What is remarkable is that it would have been so easy to have in fact destroyed the C.P.s line. A mere one speaker to some extent did it. He simply stood up and said that the line of the CP in accepting the TUCs decision was completely incorrect, and the reason why there weren't going to be anymore strikes was because how could you simultaneously tell someone to carry out the TUC decision when the TUC had been opposed to the LCDTU all along. If you were logical, and believed the TUC should be followed, then logically you should disband your own Liaison Committee. This simple idea, explained actually by an ex-member of the SLL, had a far greater impact than all the rantings by the IS. The single militant was absolutely impossible to denounce as a mad unrealistic ultra-left yet at the same time completely destroyed the whole of the C.P.s line of trying simultaneously to cuddle up alongside the trade union bureaucracy and retain credibility with the rank and file by organising unofficial movements.

It is of the utmost importance that we learn this lesson. There are going to be quite enough times when we are going to be relatively cut off within the working class anyway because of our politics without getting ourselves into inextricable confusions because of an entirely incorrect methodology. We can see clearly once again how the theoretical question directly affect our work. Once you are locked into the "calls to action"/"social democratic definition of politics" line then you are stuck. You either become an irrelevance ("waging the political struggle"), strike happy ("militancy") or succumb to economism ("keeping a base") or most likely of all, you just adopt an eclectic combination of all three. There is no way out. It is important to note that some banality such as "striking a balance" is hopeless. All it produces is a tendency for the organisation as it gets bigger, to fragment with different people pursuing different lines. The only way such an organisation could be held together is by a superimposed bureaucracy. (Cdas by now will see clearly the course of development of IS). The only way out of this situation is by re-posing the question in a different way.

What the above analysis shows clearly is that the question of what constitutes political trade unionism cannot be answered at the level of bringing other issues into the trade unions. Clearly a revolutionary must do this, but so does a social democrat. What defines the difference between the social democrat conception of trade unionism and the revolutionary conception, is therefore the way in which the trade union struggle is waged. Or more precisely, what ideas concerning the factory struggle the revolutionary puts across whether in agitation (explaining a few ideas to a large number of people) or in propaganda (explaining a large number of ideas to a small number of people). It is the self activity of the working class that is the base of the revolutionaries politics. That is to say not to "call the masses to action" but to rely on the masses to bring themselves into action, and for him to intervene to attempt to explain the significance of the struggle. (SEE APPENDIX TWO) The role of the party is to explain the characteristics of the situation, and present a rounded conception of it so that the working class itself can respond to any changes in that situation which may occur suddenly also to any changes produced by its own activities. For example the main aim of a party in the struggle against the Industrial Relations Bill is not to formulate demands for a strike on such and such a day but to explain why the Bill in being introduced, what are its aims, how it is a product of the

economic crises of capitalism and not of the personal nastiness of the Tories, how a Labour government would introduce a similar act and why etc. Within this context the rank and file workers can show far more ingenuity than any part in deciding upon the precise forms of struggle. Certainly the party is active in organising all and every action of the working class but this is a subordinate function to its main political task. As Lenin notes the view that the role of the party is to issue "calls to action" is sheer nonsense, because the (call, as a single act, either naturally and inevitably supplements the theoretical treatise, propagandist pamphlet and agitational speech, or represents a purely executive function." This is the basis of the famous point that the difference between agitation and propagandist is not the difference between activity and simply explaining ideas, but the difference between explaining a few ideas to a large number of people. Thus when, for example, a revolutionary advances the demand of work or "full maintenance for the unemployed" or "five days work for five days pay" what he is not calling for is simply more money or men out of work. He is attempting to get across in a single slogan the idea that it is capitalism which creates unemployment and not the workers. The idea that men should get less than full wages when unemployed is seen as some sort of admission that in some way the working class is responsible for unemployment. The assertion that men should get full wages is therefore a way of explaining that it is capitalism which creates unemployment and the working class refuses to be responsible for any of the consequences. Similarly in the case of the armaments of the capitalist state. The Marxist slogan here as always been for the refusal of one single penny for the armaments of the capitalist state. This is because the essential idea which revolutionaries wish to convey is that the state is not above classes but is an instrument of the bourgeoisie which the working class must regard as its enemy. Innumerable other examples could be found. For example Marxists do not call for the bourgeois state to attack fascism because they wish the workers to understand that it is the bourgeoisie which produced fascism and the state is a bourgeois state. Marxists always oppose the use of imperialist troops anywhere even if they appear to be "protecting" the population because they wish to explain in the idea that it is imperialism which is the enemy. They oppose all laws on immigration because to accept even the slightest limitation is to accept the argument that it is immigration and not capitalism which creates the problem of the working class. Once the aim of Marxist intervention is understood it is possible to understand what compromise is. If you believe that the reason you demand full maintenance for the unemployed is because they should get more money than to demand a £5 increase instead of whatever is the amount of full maintenance is to make a compromise but not to sacrifice principle. However if the essential point is that you are trying to get across the idea that it is capitalism which creates unemployment than even to accept full maintenance minus one penny is not to compromise but to accept that in some way the unemployed are responsible for their situation. Similarly if you believe that the reason we should oppose armaments is because they are "a waste" than to call for a reduction in armaments is to make a compromise but not to sacrifice principle. However for a revolutionary to call for a reduction in armaments is not to make a compromise but to accept the principle of the right of the capitalist class to possess arms. To call for a reduction in armaments therefore no longer conveys the same idea as to oppose all arms payments for capitalism. It is this type of point which shows how the Communist Party is not "realistic" but has abandoned armaments. Certainly a revolutionary will fight for limited aims, but he will do so on an entirely different platform to that of a reformist. It is from this that the possibility of unity in action and the United Front emerges.

These apparently abstract principles are in fact of extreme importance even in the everyday class struggle. Take an example such as the Fords 1971 wage claim. Here the Transport and General Workers Union presented a wage claim. The demands were taken up by the man. However the union, and the Communist Party and certain "revolutionary" groups, carried on its campaign on the basis that more wages should be obtained because the company was making high profits. This however is a completely class collaborationist concept as it links the

question of pay to the prosperity of the company i.e. it accepts the right of the company to make profits and hence for the general economic system of capitalism which is based on profits to exist. The job of revolutionaries is to explain the idea so that what the working class should demand is for the ending of the capitalist system. Given that this obviously cannot be achieved within one factory then the balance of forces makes the workers fight for the more limited aim of maintaining their standard of living. In those circumstances what is demanded is the wage increase but the argument rests of never linking it to the question of profits but to the question of the right of the working class to improve its standard of living regardless of the state of the company. Hence the revolutionaries and the reformists are fighting for the same limited goal but their arguments are totally different. Furthermore it is not the revolutionaries who are unrealistic. There is a definite logic to the reformists argument. If you should demand higher wages because of high profits, then obviously if the company is not making high profits then you should not demand higher wages. This occurred for example at the British Leyland plant at Bathgate where the company persuaded the men not to demand a pay increase precisely because the firm was not making profits. We can now see why the difference between agitation seen as calls to action, and agitation seen as explaining ideas is a crucial one. If the primary job of revolutionaries was seen as issuing "calls to action" then it obviously a very effective rhetoric for obtaining a struggle to call for strikes by saying the company is making a very large profits therefore we demand a wage increase. As the majority of the working class is dominated by bourgeois ideology this obviously is a more effective argument in obtaining action than is a revolutionary line. The logic however is the Bathgate experience. It is only by seeing agitation as explaining ideas that a really revolutionary approach would be adopted (Another e.g. is the case of the troops in Ireland). The idea of agitation as a "call to action" is both disastrous and a typically Social Democratic administrative conception of the relation between party and class.

If this is not in the slightest a passive approach, what it means however is the most careful possible selection of the slogans which we use so that they do in fact sum up the main characteristics of the period. We have already noted the NC TO ANY FORM OF INCOMES POLICY as a central slogan of the coming period. What others can assume central importance?.

OUR SLOGANS

We have already dealt with some of the conjunctural slogans - in particular NO TO ANY FORM OF INCOMES POLICY - which are going to be important in the coming period. Our slogans on Ireland will be dealt with elsewhere. What it is necessary to deal with here is the main long term slogans which we will use to get across the political ideas on the basis of which we attempt to gain a base inside the working class. This is an immensely practical question. Our intervention in the miners and other strikes have shown that it is now relatively simple to get contacts inside the working class, what we do not have at present however is anything to offer them in terms of a distinctive policy to that of pure militant trade unionism. One of the reasons why most of our trade union work up to present has been fairly fruitless is because we have applied the useless concepts of "mobilising the masses" to it. What this means in practice is that we react to issues which are thrown up in the course of the struggle, instead of intervening in a long term way on slogans which will actually change the way the struggle is occurring. An excellent example of this has been, our intervention in rank and file teacher. It is not insulting the comrades concerned to say that basically we got nothing out of this. The reason was quite simply that we were aiming at "mobilising the masses" and not attempting to explain certain ideas. In short we had basically an identical approach to I.S. It is only since we abandoned this approach and began a theoretical critique of how I.S.'s general politics lead to their particular policies in schools that we have begun to make any headway. This particular problem is going to recur over and over again. In most industries we are going to find ourselves working around united fronts with other tendencies. If we do not work out our ideas clearly we will simply be swallowed up. Therefore clarifying what we want to say, in order to be able to consolidate a stable nucleus, is our first practical task. In short what we need to begin to seriously think about is the elements of a transitional programme for the present situation.

a) The general characteristics of a transitional programme.

As dealt with in appendix two, a transitional programme must smash the social relations of capitalist production and of the state machine which defends them. However clearly it is not the case that any programme which does this is the transitional programme for the present circumstances. For example in Russia this was achieved by the Soviets on a particular programme with high emphasis on the issues of land and peace. In Germany Trotsky was of the opinion that the factory councils could be the organs for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, and the Soviets could only come into existence after the bourgeois state had been destroyed. It is therefore entirely incorrect to fetishise any organisational form, to do so allows an opening for all sorts of varieties of reformism (e.g. Stalin's position that there could be no revolution in 1922 in Germany because there were not Soviets. What constitutes the nature and correctness of a specific transitional programme is the way it interlinked with the present struggles of the working class (and other revolutionary masses if they exist).

The starting point of our present analysis, as outlined on many occasions in the Red Mole, is that the working class is not relating to the struggle against capitalism at the present time through the organisations of the Labour Party. They are still dominated by Social Democracy ideology (still makes the distinction between trade unionism and politics on the basis of where they occur) but we do not call for the workers to enter the Labour Party and fight, because the fact that many at least believe it is impossible to change labour is a step forward and not backward for the working class. This is an essential revolutionary point, because one of the most characteristic features of social democracy and reformism is the fact that they counterpose some imagined "desirable" form of struggle to the actual way in which the working class is struggling. This can be seen classically in the case of Ireland. Here every sort of reformist trend, notably the RSL and SLL, counterpose some alternative struggle to the present fight against the army on the national question. They say "You should not be fighting the army, you should be fighting to nationalise the banks/force the Tories to resign/make the left M.P.s fight/Demand the SDLP seize state power."

or whatever is the fashionable slogan of the moment. What this means in practice of course is to de-escalate the real struggle or even to actively oppose it on the grounds that it is "diversion" from an infallible plan for taking state power. We have always completely rejected this approach. In Ireland what we say is "So you wish to fight the national struggle. Excellent. This struggle is in the interest of the working class. However, you need to understand how this struggle can actually be carried to victory and that this can only be achieved by turning it into a war against the Irish bourgeoisie as well as against the British Army." In other words we do not counterpose an alternative struggle to the present one, we show how the present struggle can be extended into a successful one. Similarly at present the British working class is fighting through forms of struggle such as strikes, trade union activity etc. What the reformists do is to counterpose to this some other struggle e.g. to force a general election, to fight inside the Labour Party constituencies. This again is the politics of reformism. We do not counterpose the present form of struggle to some other struggle, but show how the present way in which the working class is fighting against capitalism can be turned into an effective political struggle. In short what we say is not that the trade union struggle must be abandoned in order to fight inside the Labour Party, or, ultimate horror, to "build the party" but that the aims of the struggle of the trade unions must be changed. We say "It is excellent that you fight inside the T.U.s. It is correct that it is not possible to change the Labour Party. However your present goals are too limited. They must be extended to take up the fundamental questions of the economy and of the state". This point was clearly spelt out in a centre spread which was accepted at the last conference. This stated that:

"As we noted the main struggle in the present period is going to be between the trade union movement and the capitalist class and between the trade unions and the labour leadership. In this situation it is; not the task of revolutionaries to say that workers must first go through the "stage" of engaging in years of impossible struggle inside the Labour Party. On the contrary, the task of revolutionaries is to say, "Yes, we agree that the trade unions are at the moment the only organisations actually fighting the bourgeoisie, and that it is therefore necessary to work steadfastly within the trade unions. But it is impossible to fight capitalism's attacks simply through trade union action. If you believe the trade unions are a weapon of struggle, then you must see that they must also become the core of a political movement against the present leaders of the working class. In short, any anti-capitalist, that is workers government, must base itself on the trade unions and the trade unions must become a key instrument in struggling for such a government. It is this orientation which the slogan "A Workers Government based on the trade unions" sums up (I would not wish to modify the exact formulation now). It indicates a line of advance and not some abstract and immediate call for the dictatorship of the proletariat. Neither is it a slogan to be counterposed to voting Labour at any election. Nor is it a substitute for concrete demands aimed at showing the real nature of the Labour leaders. It simply lays down the main line of argument for a real struggle against the present Labour leaders, and it retains that validity whether that struggle is conducted mainly inside or outside the Labour Party. It can of course in certain circumstances become an agitational demand and one counterposed to the Labour Party. This would be the case if, for example, any future Labour government entered a coalition with the Tories to "save the country", "prevent anarchy" etc. In those circumstances it becomes a direct call to the Trade Unions to break with the Labour Party and organise politically independently of it. In the coming period however its main significance is to define an orientation of making the trade unions into the core of a struggle against the Labour leaders, and making trade unionists conscious of the fact that this is the case."

The particular formula of "A WORKERS GOVERNMENT BASED ON THE TRADE UNIONS" will be dealt with later. For now we will continue the analysis.

What is clear from the analysis of the situation inside the Labour Party is that forms of slogans aimed at getting a mass of workers to break organisationally with the Labour Party to form a Party with the aim of creating a government which would do certain things for the working class is ruled out. That type of

approach is valid in, for example a period of acute crisis within a mass working class Party in which the advanced workers are organisationally involved. Hence for example the demand to break with the Social Democratic Parties to form Communist Parties, and then to offer a united front government to the social democrats, i.e. a classical "workers government" tactic, was an example of how to apply a transitional program in such a situation. Now however such a tactic is ruled out. The demands for a government to do certain things for the working class (nationalise this, ban that etc.) in the present circumstances reduce themselves either to revisionism and reformism, or to sterile sect politics. We may take as a concrete example the demands raised at the end of the third miners broadsheet. This calls on a government to freeze prices, take over the banks etc. The way this is formulated is as a complete abstraction counterposed to the present struggle of the working class. Suppose any workers agreed with these slogans, how would he fight for them? What organisation is capable of pursuing such a policy? I trust no one is advocating that we say he should fight for Labour to accept such a program. If he is, he is merely raising the slogan of "Labour to power with socialist policies" without having at least the virtue of being explicit (incidentally, this is how every other tendency will interpret it - we are calling for a Labour government but don't think it sounded "revolutionary" enough to do so). If everyone is agreed Labour cannot form such a government, who does he believe can? Quite clearly only the IMG can. In short, the formulation in the broadsheet amounts to: "join us in the hope that in the future we can form such a government". This point was also dealt with in the centre spread accepted by the last conference. It states: "In short, the position as regards the LP is as follows: - Organisationally it has suffered a catastrophic decline. This must not however be confused with an ending of its ideological domination of the working class. This hold cannot be broken without a struggle within the labour movement. The task of revolutionaries is to heighten the struggle by increasing at all times the tension between the LP and the T.U.s. Such an orientation is now summed up in the slogan "A Workers Government based on the trade unions" (again we will take up this slogan later). It is only by adopting such an orientation that the socialist demands for workers control, nationalisation etc cease to be mere propaganda and become instruments of struggle. WITHOUT IT, THE ONLY ANSWER YOU CAN GIVE TO THE WORKER WHO SAYS "I AGREE WITH YOUR POLICIES, HOW AM I TO ORGANISE TO IMPLEMENT IT" IS TO SAY "JOIN US" AND THIS IS A FORMULA FOR A SECT, NOT A STRUGGLE. The agitational demands which flow from this orientation say "organise politically inside the T.U.s, use your trade union as a way of organising the fight inside, and if necessary outside the LP. It is only in this way that the demands for nationalisation and workers control move out of the realm of "exposure" politics and into the realm of class struggle". These comments remain absolutely valid as regards any formulation of a government to do certain things for the working class - as opposed to giving the right to workers organisations themselves to do certain things.

A secondary, but conjunctureally extremely important, reason why the formulation of "doing something for" is completely incorrect, is given by the general political co-ordinates of the present situation. As we have noted already, one of the main aims of the labour leadership is to come to a deal with the TU bureaucracy over the question of an incomes policy. As has been explained on many occasions, the advantages of such a deal to the TU bureaucracy is that it enables them to avoid waging a struggle against the government and in defence of the working classes living standards. They will say that the TU struggle is unimportant, and that the real fight is for the return of a Labour government. The aim of this manoeuvre is clear. What is important to notice however is that it is a perfect example of the counterposition school of reformism. What the TU bureaucracy in fact does is to counterpose the struggle for a Labour government to the TU struggle. The effect of this is of course to demobilise the struggle. An essential aim of our intervention is to explain precisely that this is in fact a manoeuvre, that the bureaucracy has not realised the need for political struggle but on the contrary merely wishes to counterpose another form of struggle with the aim of ensuring that there is no struggle at all. This is another, secondary albeit important reason why we insist that the use of the trade unions for struggle against capitalism be extended and not be replaced with another form of struggle.

We do not say "abandon the struggle through the trade unions for the "political struggle", but "turn the struggle through the trade unions into a political struggle". The form of demands that logically express this are demands which the trade unions as organisational forms can struggle for and which would destroy the regulation of the economy by the law of value and replace it with production of use values. The point that this is impossible merely through the trade unions is precisely encapsulated in the demand for "a government which gives the rights....." The broadsheets formulations, by counterposing the "the struggle for an organisation which can form a government which can etc" therefore completely plays into the hands of the bureaucracy. It is no use to say that the trade union struggle can go on simultaneously with "the struggle for an organisation which can form a government which can etc" for it is not co-existence that makes the two struggles interlinked: **IT IS ONLY AN ORGANIC CONNECTION IN TERMS OF AIM, PROGRAM AND ORGANISATIONAL FORM.** That connection is completely broken down in the broadsheets formulation. What we in fact doing when carrying this discussion concerning organisational form and programme, is discussing consciousness of the working class. **NOT CONSCIOUSNESS AS UNDERSTOOD IN THE BOURGEOIS SENSE OF IDEAS IN PEOPLES HEADS, BUT IN THE MARXIST SENSE OF THE ACTIVE RELATION OF TO ITS CIRCUMSTANCES AND THE PROBLEMS WHICH CONFRONT IT.** (see appendix two). It is this and not to "ideas" that the formula "leading from the present consciousness of the working class" leads. Taking the point that a transitional programme must destroy the social relations of capitalist production, and of the state machine which defends them, what the organisational aspect of this means is "leading from the present organisations of the working class to organisations capable of smashing the bourgeois state." In short our essential task is not simply to explain that the trade unions are not adequate instruments for taking state power, which of course they are not, but how the present organisation of the working class could be transformed into revolutionary instruments, and therefore how should any new organisations thrown up in the course of struggle be constructed. In short we require an organisational programme which can be applied either to any existing organisations, or to any new organisations. Let us take a concrete example of this.

The most fundamental principle of any workers organisation, and of any revolutionary one, is that it is completely independent of the bourgeois state. This is the general idea we wish to convey to the working class. The concrete application of it can vary, of course. Hence for example in Russia in 1917 the way it was concretely posed was the ending of the "Co-ordination Committee" between the Soviets and the Provisional Government. In the present situation, given the existing organisations of the working class (and the relation to circumstances which this implies) the concrete form of this is for the complete independence of the trade union from the bourgeois state. Our concrete slogans would therefore run something along the lines of **NO TO CO-OPERATION WITH THE CAPITALIST STATE, NO LAWS AGAINST THE TRADE UNIONS, NO REGISTRATION, etc..** The essential idea we wish to get across is the necessity for the complete independence of all working class organisations from the bourgeois state. This general idea can then be applied to any future conjuncture and any future forms of organisations - soviets, factory councils etc. thrown up by the struggle of the working class. In other words we do not arbitrarily select some organisational form from which we insist the working class movement must pass through on its way to power, but describe the characteristics which any such organisations must have. This is an extremely important point as any revolution will undoubtedly throw up forms of organisation which it is quite impossible to predict at the present time.

Exactly the same principle applies when we come to explaining the "internal structure" of any revolutionary workers organisations. Again it is quite useless to try to predict what will be the exact organisational form through which the working class will seize power. We have already noted the examples of Russia, Germany and China. It should further be noted that the Soviets in Russian actually grew out of organisations set up by the Czarist Government (which should settle any organisational fetishism). In this country of course one can speculate as to form. For example, while it seems clear that the official trade union structures would be hopeless in any revolution, there seems little reason why factory

committees could not grow quite organically out of the present shop stewards system. Nevertheless it is not the aim of revolutionaries to crystal ball gaze. What we can do is to begin to spell out the general characteristics of any organisation of real workers power. These must include quite clearly the right of full election and recall. Quite clearly the workers in the unit of production must be organised (factory committees), as must other sections of the working class, including the unemployed, on, for example, housing estates (local committees). The army and police must also be broken up and the bourgeois chain of command replaced with an alternative structure of the workers. Finally all those units must be linked up on a geographical basis (soviets). If we apply these principles to the existing workers organisations we get a series of demands something like the following:

THE RIGHT OF ELECTION AND IMMEDIATE RECALL OF ALL SHOP STEWARDS

THE FORMATION IN ALL AREAS OF TENANTS COMMITTEES BASED ON FULL ELECTION AND THE RIGHT OF IMMEDIATE RECALL.

THE RIGHT OF TRADE UNION ORGANISATION, INCLUDING THE ELECTION WITH RIGHT OF RECALL OF SHOP STEWARDS WITHIN THE POLICE AND ARMY.

THE FORMATION OF COMMITTEES OF UNEMPLOYED WITH FULL ELECTION AND RIGHT OF RECALL OF REPRESENTATIVES

THE EXTENSION OF TRADES COUNCILS TO INCLUDE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF SOLDIERS, THE POLICE, THE UNEMPLOYED AND TENANTS COMMITTEES. ALL DELEGATES TO BE ELECTED AND SUBJECT TO INSTANT RECALL.

The main thing which needs to be added to that is THE FORMATION OF WORKERS DEFENCE SQUADS IN EVERY AREA.

Such a programme, if carried out, would quite clearly amount in practice (if, as discussed later, the central trade union links were snapped) to a system of factory councils and soviets. Presumably on one is going to claim that they could not seize power. They quite clearly would be completely transitional if power were transformed to them, in that they would by their organisation form, smash the social relations of the bourgeois state machine. Of course it is unlikely that things would develop straight forwardly in this fashion. For example, trade councils are almost certainly too bureaucratised to be transformed, even in the most revolutionary upheaval, into organisation of the type described. In these circumstances we would change our call to one for local Councils of Action.

This would be however a very minor alteration, as obviously the Council of Action would be established on the same organisational base as we were campaigning for the trade council to adopt. Indeed, in a revolutionary situation what would probably occur is that some trades councils could be transformed and some could not. This would not pose us with the slightest problem. All that would be important would be the basis of any local organisation, its origin is a purely tactical question which can only be solved concretely in every instance.

The above series of demands constitute a concrete, if not necessarily completely satisfactory or comprehensive, application of a transitional programme, i.e. they take as their starting point the need to smash the social relations of the capitalist state, and then show how this can be done taking the present way in which the working class is relating to its circumstances, and the organisations through which it is doing it, as a starting point. It shows how these organisations could be transformed. Almost certainly new organisations of workers power will be thrown up in the course of the struggle. This however poses no real problems as we can simply apply the end, destruction of social relations, to the new consciousness (and organisation) without in the slightest altering the content of what we are saying to the working class. So far the question of organisation form has been dealt with. However, far more important than that is the question of the content of the programme of any workers organisations.

If we take the central demands of any revolutionary workers organisations in the field of the economic struggle, then clearly the central complex of demands are those related to workers control. As was pointed out on innumerable occasions in the Third International, the central demand for agitation within the trade unions must be for workers control of production. However the ideas of workers control are by no means unambiguous. All that is dealt with here therefore is the concept of workers control as a transitional demand.

The central concept of workers control in its transitional sense is quite clearly the destruction of the social relations of capitalist production i.e. the destruction of the law of value. This however at once raises a problem. The social relations of capitalist production are by no means simply the relation of the factory. They consist of a generalised series of relations including relations between factories. For this reason positive control i.e. alteration of what is produced etc. can only be carried out if the working classes power extends outside the individual factory. After the conquest of state power there are a variety of ways in which this can be done. In the USSR for example it was initially done via the trade unions. (see the programme of the Bolshevik party and its first regulations on workers control). Even without the conquest of power such positive control can be put forward in situations where large groups of industry are under the control of the workers. An example of this was at Nantes in 1968. However the far more usual way in which the question is posed is where consciousness within individual factories is very high, but where the rest of the working class is still passive. Here it is clear that the factory is going to continue running for a period within capitalism and under those circumstances it is elementary principle that the workers must take no responsibility whatever for the running of the plant. The way in which the question of control can be posed in this situation is in terms of the veto demands. Agitation on this theme makes the point that under capitalism the workers can take no responsibility for the running of an enterprise, but at the same time asserts the principle that there is an alternative social regulating mechanism to that of the law of value. The conditions of the workers can be seen to be improved if these demands were achieved and simultaneously no concessions are made to theories of participation. Amongst the essential demands here are:

- 1) THE RIGHT OF VETO OF MOVEMENT OF WORKERS WITHIN THE PLANT
- 2) THE RIGHT OF VETO ON SHIFT WORKING AND OVERTIME
- 3) THE RIGHT OF VETO ON PAYMENTS SYSTEMS
- 4) THE RIGHT OF VETO DANGEROUS WORKING
- 5) THE RIGHT TO VETO SPEED UP
- 6) THE RIGHT TO VETO THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW PLANT
- 7) THE RIGHT TO VETO THE CONTENT OF THE PRESS AND OTHER PUBLICITY MEDIA
- 8) THE RIGHT TO VETO JOB LOSS.

In the coming period we should take these slogans as the central ones in our work in the trade unions, they should form our platform in United Fronts etc. What this means of course is that the demands must be concretely applied to each industry. Obviously in any particular industry other demands of the same type should be found. In addition we need to specify what particular dangerous practices, new plant, speed up etc. we want to veto. Nevertheless it is relatively easy to apply the general schema of the demands to various industries. If we adopted this scheme we would also have a coherent position to put forward in each industry and union which would give a coherence to our trade union work. In addition the demands are completely political in that to understand them fully it is necessary to also to understand the structure of capitalism, commodity production etc. We should be clear however what is meant by "campaigning" for such demands, it is not "calling the workers to action", what it means is clearly announcing that these demands form a long term aim, and then making the agitation around concrete struggles related to these central slogans.

Naturally it would be the task of the newspaper and other publications to explain the nature, justification etc for these demands.

Once the content of our agitation in the trade unions is clarified, then the question of our governmental propaganda also becomes relatively clear. We need to explain that the state is far stronger than the working class organised in trade unions and that a government is necessary which will give to the workers organisations the right to carry out such measures of control. Quite whether this is the demand for "A Workers government based on the trade unions" or not is relatively immaterial. I personally favour the slogan "A WORKERS GOVERNMENT BASED ON TRADE UNION ACTION", but that again is not absolutely precise, because the organisations involved to form the base of a government would not simply be trade unions. The essential content however must remain the same no matter what the precise slogan is. The essential point is that we are demanding a government which gives certain rights to the workers organisations. Why this form is extremely important, is that it is the only one which gives an organic connection between the struggle for a government, and the present struggles of the working class (i.e. the way in which it is relating to its circumstances = its consciousness). Quite clearly a government based on organisations changed in the way already described with a programme containing the elements just outlined would be a government completely incompatible with the existence of capitalism, however such a government can be arrived at from many points of departure. In the unlikely event of the IMG becoming a mass party within the next year, then clearly what we would ask to workers to do would be to vote for us as a government to implement such a programme. Given that no party exists capable of forming such a government, then we can still continue to campaign within the unions for such demands while also explaining the necessity for a government with such a programme. Our attitude to the Labour Party is also then clearly defined. We fight alongside Labour workers against the Tories, but we give no support to any party which does not accept a programme of the type outlined. In short such a programme links completely in a political way with our work inside the trade unions.

The third point which becomes of central importance in such a policy is the question of the democratisation of the trade unions. The organisations which we call for the control production are the shop floor organisations of the working class. These organisations at present however are subject to the control of the bureaucratised trade union apparatus. In the type of policy just described therefore the question of who controls production cannot be separated from the question of who controls the trade unions. Quite clearly as long as the bureaucratised trade union structures exist, then the workers organisations would not in fact defend the interests of the working class. The key sections of our programme must therefore relate to the question of trade union bureaucracy. Here however the transitional demand take on a new meaning in the context just described. The essential demands are:

- 1) All officials to be elected and subject to instant recall
- 2) No bans and proscriptions
- 3) No secret negotiations
- 4) All decisions to be taken by mass meetings, or, where this is impossible, by meetings of directly elected representatives of the men. All union officials to be bound by such decisions.

These sets of demands concerning organisational forms, workers control, and democracy of the trade union could form the core of a transitional programme forth present situation. Which demands we would place which stress on at which time is of course a practical question, at present their main function is on a political base for United Front within the Trade Unions. In the present circumstances of questioning concerning the role of the Labour Party, it seems to me that the demands which we stress are those relating to a workers government and to workers control. The essential political work of the organisation over the next year should therefore be that of explaining our ideas concerning workers

control and a workers government. Our aim should be to attempt to draw industrial workers around us who accept these slogans.

In order to achieve this target the nature of the newspaper must be radically changed. So far our newspaper has been aimed at organising a group who have either never been influenced by Social Democracy or who have broken from that influence. The demands raised above are demands for breaking people from Social Democracy. This means that the entire political character of the newspaper must be changed so that it too becomes part of the new political task we have set ourselves.

Work amongst women

The demands mentioned above would be the main content of our intervention in all sections of the population, or to be more precise they would be the main backdrop to our work - obviously they are nuanced by the sector of intervention and by other conjunctural events which may take precedence at any point in time. Obviously therefore in our intervention amongst women we would try to explain the main ideas raised and why only the implementation of these ideas can form the bases for a society capable of solving the problems which women face. Nevertheless, like black and other oppressed groups, even the destruction of capitalism would not automatically stop the oppression of women, and women suffer forms of oppression not dealt with in the above demands. The precise nature of the demands we raise are defined by the conjuncture. They will be dealt with more fully in a separate document. The main feeling of women ~~odes~~ seems to be that they should attempt to gain industrial contacts through a low pay equal pay campaign. The success of this should be reviewed after, say, six months. In order to gain the maximum gain for the Fourth International from this, "Socialist Woman" must be clearly indentified as a Fourth International paper.

Students

There will be a separate paper on work amongst students. The general political line should be that of the Marshall/Clynes Red Mole centrespread.

Work amongst blacks

Our work amongst blacks is still on a very small propaganda scale. Given the suspicions created by white racism it is likely to remain so for a long period. To clarify our intervention however two theoretical points must be spelt out,

- a) Racism is an entirely different phenomena to the super exploitation of, for example, immigrant European workers;
- b) Racism has a different social base to anti-semitism;
- c) While we support separate black organisations, a democratic centralist sectoral organisation, including a democratic centralist black organisations, is a contradiction in terms.

Other anti-imperialist and international work

Ireland is clearly the centre of our anti-imperialist work in the coming period. Various other issues come up however as pressing - in particular S.Asia work and the need for solidarity with the NLF. These will be dealt with in another paper.

APPENDIX ONE

As noted the chief political characteristic of the period since 1968 has been the tendency of the working class to unleash struggles which break down the old attempts of the bourgeoisie to integrate the trade unions into the mechanisms of capitalist economic policy. This has occurred both in states which have attempted this integration "by stealth", for example Sweden and Germany, and in those such as Belgium or Spain where such integration took place in the course of severe, or in the case of Spain, decisive, defeats for the working class. Under the economic conditions now prevailing in Western Europe, this is a development of the highest significance. Only the background to this can be sketched here however.

In the case of Spain the integration of trade unions and state took place following the victory of Fascism in the Civil War. However, the rapid capitalist development of Spain in the late 1950s and 1960s dictated a loosening of the old state structure which had made impossible any rational operation of the economy. The first fruits of this were a rapid development of illegal trade union organisations, a series of trade union struggles in 1956-8, and the 1962 strike wave. In an attempt to canalise this and prevent it from assuming revolutionary overtones, a section of the more farsighted Spanish capitalists pushed for an extension of the liberalisation of collective bargaining allowed by the state in the late 1950s. However, this attempt failed, and from 1962 onwards the so-called "Workers Commissions" began to spread from Asturias. In 1964 the Madrid metal workers set up the first provincial workers commission based on the formation of factory committees. From then on the Workers Commissions grew in importance and actions included the large scale demonstrations of October 1967 and in many cases the arrangement of the struggles at the time of the Burgos trials. The development of this movement, and the general decline and crisis of the Franco regime has developed to the point where in the 1971 elections to the Fascist unions the left wing groups, excluding the C.P., felt able to call for a total boycott of the Fascist union elections. The success of the boycott was immense, with total boycott achieved in some factories around Barcelona, and abstention rates of over 80% in the Basque areas and most of Catalonia. This was despite tremendous intimidation by the government and the Communist Party.

Spain is of course exceptional in that the very existence of real workers trade unions becomes a political act against the regime, and of course in no other West European country does the integration of unions and state exist in anything like the same degree. Nevertheless, the same basic processes can be seen in other countries in which the trade unions have come to play a particularly class collaborative role, and in all these states a break-up of the old order is under way. This is even the case in the two countries where proletarian passivity has been most marked, and where attempts to integrate the unions have been most successful - e.g. W. Germany and Sweden.

The attempt of the bourgeoisie to integrate the trade unions into the apparatus of the state is of course a tendency which has been at work for the whole of this century at least. Trotsky noted that: "There is one common feature in the development or more correctly the degeneration, of the modern trade union organisations in the entire world: it is their drawing closely to and growing together with the state power. This process is equally characteristic of the neutral, the Social Democratic, the Communist and the "anarchist" trade unions. This fact alone shows that the tendency towards "growing together" is intrinsic not in this or that doctrine as such but derives from the social conditions common for all unions." It must be borne in mind that there is also a contradictory aspect of this tendency, which is that it is in fact impossible to incorporate the unions peacefully. Only Fascism can secure this particular task. In consequence, in virtually every country the state seeks simultaneously to weaken the trade unions and to utilise them in the defence of the position of the ruling class, but in practically every single case from the attempt of the Belgian government to introduce the "loi unique" right up to the February and May 1969, December 1970 and January 12th and March 1st and 18th strikes in Britain, clash after clash with the working class has been provoked by this attempt. It is only the dire economic need of the bourgeoisie which propels them to continue the attempt.

The various attempts by the bourgeoisie to utilize the trade unions are a response to the general features of the imperialist epoch as intensified by the particular features of the post war boom. In particular it represents an attempt to find, under conditions of relatively full employment, a replacement for the reserve army of labour. The ways of attempting to integrate the unions are innumerable. Guy Desolre in a survey of the unions in the Common Market countries for example, finds at least six widely used methods. These are:

Direct involvement of union leaders in state economic decisions, as in for example France and Belgium.

The intervention of representatives of the government in the settlement of wage disputes.

The participation of representatives of the trade unions in the implementing of the laws regulating industrial relations.

The involvement of the trade unions in the central planning of wage agreements.

The use of trade unions in the running of social security systems.

The participation of workers representatives in the management of nationalised industries (France) or in industries such as gas and electricity (Belgium).

The use of these methods has increased in virtually every West European state as they virtually all attempt to take up some sort of economic "programming". In practice, of course, it is impossible to plan the anarchic commodity production of capitalism, particularly given the increasing degree of interdependence of nations economies and the increasingly large "basic unit" of investment, and in fact the only thing which the state can really attempt to "palm" is labour costs. This too in the last analysis cannot be achieved without the working class, but it is at least temporarily more effective than other forms of programming, and gets to the root of the problem in attempting to increase the rate of surplus value. In certain countries for short periods such attempts can in fact be quite effective from the point of view of the bourgeoisie. For example, in Germany in 1966-7 and in Italy in 1964 various overt attempts by the state at increasing the competitive position of their respective capitalisms were successful. In Britain however the Labour governments "prices and incomes policy" was a total failure. In Holland centrally planned wages policies operated by the state have been in existence for a long period, and in Austria such a machinery was created in 1957. However, attempts of this sort have not generally lasted long in the important capitalist states as the internal contradictions inside these countries are too intense in the face of each other's (and American and Japanese) competition, and the strength of the labour movements are too great for periods of the necessary order to reign. More typically, such policies run into immediate fierce confrontation with the unions (Belgium) or merely not temporarily to build up tensions towards flashpoint (France, Britain, Italy).

Under certain very favourable circumstances, the bourgeoisie can succeed in emasculating the trade unions for a whole period. Nevertheless, even in these cases the present upsurge of class struggle in Europe is breaking the precarious calm. For example, in W. Germany the need to rebuild the trade unions completely after 1945, and a situation where the flower of the German working class had been annihilated by Hitler, provided the bourgeoisie with a perfect opportunity to restructure the trade unions in its own interest. For instance, although article 9 (3) of the Basic Law provides for the formation of trade unions, the whole Law is so phrased as to render illegal strikes over political aims. Another element of the ruling class's policy in Germany was the setting up of the explicitly class collaborationist Enterprise Committee. Despite early trouble with the trade unions over the question of co-determination; the boom, the structure of the D.G.B., the organs of class collaboration within the firm, and the elaborate series of "informal" discussions between trade union leaders and the government did succeed in securing relative industrial peace for a period of 20 years. The wildcat strikes in the Ruhr in 1969 were therefore a profound occurrence for the German working class. The unions stepped in rapidly to control the situation, but the mere occurrence of the existence of large scale strikes if a radical change from the preceding period which has forced on the unions as shown for example in the chemical industry strikes of 1971

developments within the CFDT which, as a union, is actually nominally to the right of the CGT. In Italy, however, although the PCI is of course immeasurably stronger than any revolutionary grouping, the Stalinists do not possess the same organisational strength as they do in France. They are therefore reduced to more subtle bureaucratic manoeuvres. For example, in one instance they have tried to win over leading militants of the Fourth International by offering them full time posts in the unions, on the basis of allowing the Trotskyists to continue to organize freely in the factories where they already have a base, provided that they leave the "CPI factories" alone. In addition, it has been possible for revolutionaries to stand openly in unions in industries such as steel and auto. In the first case they have received as much as 20% of the vote, and in the latter of representative was elected to the central committee of the union. In contrast, in France militants have to work clandestinely within the CGT and l'Humanite has specialised in printing the names of revolutionary trade union militants in order to allow the bosses to carry out victimisation. While it is possible for revolutionaries to work openly inside the CFDT, only inside the teachers' union has it been possible to create a real current. Here the tendency "Ecole Emancipee" received 14% of the votes, compared to the 54% received by the tendency of the PCF. Given the weaker grip of the PCI over the CGT than of the PCF over the CP, dissatisfaction has shown itself more in rank and file regroupment in Italy, rather than attempts to leave the C.P. controlled unions.

If however the strength of the apparatus varies between the two currents, the tactics of the bureaucrats do not. In particular, there is the continual aim to break down the movement of the workers to manageable proportions by confining it either to protest strikes or to localise the struggles. In some cases this policy has been so far at variance with the needs of the working class for united action that revolutionaries have been able to gain important victories in outflanking the bureaucrats. This has happened in, for example, the Italian steel industry. In most cases in France however the PCF has managed to control the movement despite temporary setbacks. However, the strength of the Stalinist grip is weakened by such events as the Renault strike, which broke out in April 1971 when workers at Le Mans occupied their factories. This was followed by sympath occupations at Cleon, Billancourt and Flins. The PCF, which was at that time under severe attack for its terror tactics in dealing with the left initially panicked when faced with this upsurge. It declared that there was no strike, and that the factories had been occupied to "protect the property of the people of France". At Le Mans itself they forced a secret ballot on whether to continue the strike. These measures were too crude however, and 1,500 workers left the factory meeting in disgust. After a series of confused votes at Cleon the Party declared there was "a vast plot against the nationalised industries". At Billancourt a CGT leader was shouted down and the strike continued. In the end, the CGT brought the struggle back under its control, but its prestige had progressed to the point of electing a rank and file strike committee. As France has no tradition of such organisations, this was a real step forward in the struggle.

Given the relative impossibility of removing the entrenched trade union bureaucrats in anything short of a revolutionary situation, the question of rank and file organisations obviously becomes of great importance in all European states. In France, as noted, there is no real tradition of such rank and file organisations, and this partly accounts for the relative ease with which the PCF was able to bring the May-June events under control. In addition, the antics of the various Maoist groups, who have refused to work inside the unions and have instead tried to set up separate organisations, have increased the suspicion of rank and file organisation. In Italy however there has been a massive development of such organisations, created in the course of the struggle itself. In some cases, these rank and file committees have put forward advanced demands. For example, at Fiat the workers' representatives demanded:

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a more militant policy. In addition, an important apprentice's movement has developed, which is considerably influenced by revolutionaries.

In Sweden the first real outbreak of fierce class struggle came with the miner's strike in December 1969. This was particularly important in that it was the first major industrial conflict to occur for 25 years in a country which had been dominated by Social Democracy since the 1930s. Furthermore, right from the beginning this upsurge was characterised by the emergence of organisations, such as elected strike committees, which are characteristic of advanced levels of struggle. In addition at the first meeting held by the strikers a thousand workers attended that called by the strike leaders and less than a hundred that called by the official union. The reasons for this were in no way accidental, but flowed from the structure of capital/labour bargaining in Sweden. Since 1928 all strikes during the periods which collectively signed contracts cover, are illegal. This means in effect that the vast majority of strikes are illegal, except for those used to strengthen the position of the union bureaucrats during wage negotiations. These laws are backed up by a whole range of sanctions. If a local trade union body calls an illegal strike its funds can be seized to pay any loss suffered by the employer, the local organisations can be expelled from the national union, and the local officials can be dismissed. In this way the union virtually ceased to become a weapon of struggle for the working class. Its main function becomes that of telling strikers to return to work. However, even in Sweden the trade unions can be forced into action in extremes, and during 1971 the government found itself forced into implementing a law temporarily declaring all strikes illegal. In addition, this new upsurge of struggle produced the emergence of a politically motivated current within the trade unions, the "Trade Union Opposition". This went into a state of decline due to its confused spontaneist conceptions, but in a working class dominated almost totally by Social Democratic ideology, such a development is of extreme significance. The forms of integration utilised in W. Germany and Sweden are based on an economy capable of making considerable concessions to the working class. Under these circumstances, as noted, the ruling class can have considerable success in its attacks. In other economies this is less possible, but even here the ingenuity of the bourgeoisie, and its allies in the trade union bureaucracy, knows no bounds. For example, in the Belgian cement industry a bonus is paid to unionised workers by the employers. This apparently curious situation allows the bureaucrats to carry on a policy of collaboration with the employers without fear that the union members will become so disillusioned that they leave and thus deprive the unions of income. However, such manoeuvres cannot easily be extended to the whole economy without an extremely favourable economic conjuncture, and therefore in most European states the end of the book has led very rapidly to an increase in class conflict.

The European states in which, in different ways, the class struggle has reached its highest point, are France and Italy. Here all the old traditional problems of working class organisations and strategy have been posed. In particular, in terms of (a) how revolutionaries are to operate in and orientate towards a union, and (b) how to raise transitional demands. Many of the issues involved here have not, as yet, been completely theoretically clarified, but it is necessary here to sketch out an outline of the problems that are involved. What differentiates for example the Italian and French situation very markedly is the degree to which the trade union bureaucracy is capable of maintaining control of the situation, and the relation of forces within the various unions. In France the hold of the PCF, as mediated particularly via the CGT, is immensely strong. The PCF is quite capable of organising armed squads to physically beat or even kill revolutionaries. It has done this in the past, and in May 1971 attacked members of various left groups in La Courneuve, a suburb of Paris, and outside the various Renault plants, with razors, clubs and flick knives. The strength of the P.C.F.'s apparatus was shown in 1968 when it could mobilize a force of 20,000 stewards to keep the students away from the workers on the May 13th demonstration in Paris. The Party has no qualms about expelling from the CGT even leading militants who will not toe the party line. Under such conditions revolutionary currents within the trade union frequently find their expression in

- (i) The right of veto over movement of workers within the plant.
- (ii) All questions of shift working and overtime to be subject to veto by the elected representatives until decided upon by a mass meeting of workers.
- (iii) All questions of bonuses and work categories to be subject to veto by the workers delegates until decided upon by a mass meeting of workers.
- (iv) Workers assemblies to have complete control with regard to all questions affecting the danger of working. This to include not merely safety regulations, the payment of danger money, etc., but also the speed of work.
- (v) All questions referring to the introduction of new plant to be subject to veto until brought before the assembly of workers. This assembly to decide whether the introduction of the new equipment and method of working is in the interests of the workers or not, and if they decide it is not, to have the right to veto its introduction.

The emergence of rank and file organisations on relatively advanced bases is perhaps the most important aspect of present developments in Italy in light of the fact that the great weakness of the French May events was the virtual complete failure of autonomous and representative workers' organisations to emerge outside of a few towns such as Nantes.

Nevertheless, despite the relatively high level of struggle reached in France and Italy - 10 million strikers in France in May 1968 and possibly as many as 15 million at various times in Italy - it would nevertheless be totally incorrect to see only the bright side of this situation. In various countries, and in particular in Italy, the strength of spontaneist and anarchist concepts means that much of the energy of the workers is wasted in spasmodic outbursts. This is the danger of the Italian situation, where sections of the bourgeoisie have turned from reformist attempts towards "strong" solutions.

Inside the working class Italy provides a strange spectacle indeed. Millions of workers struggle for control of the pace of work, for the control of piecework, have held prisoner managers and foremen, yet never even speak of the term "workers' control". Under these conditions, the movement can be canalised by the bourgeoisie and the trade union bureaucracy. They have even taken up the strategy of setting up their own workers' councils. The secretary of the F.I.M.-C.S.I.L. indeed claims that in Italy there are 1,500 councils set up by the unions as compared to only 100 set up spontaneously by the workers. Under those circumstances the unity of the workers, which was one of the main aims of the spontaneously created councils, is split up by the bureaucrats with manoeuvres such as running union approved lists in the election for delegates.

APPENDIX 2

Once again on the question of the revolutionary party and of transitional demands.

(A note on terminology. In previous discussions of this question a systematic ambiguity has existed in loose formulations of the terms transitional programme and transitional demands. Quite clearly a programme of an organisation will contain many points. This is inevitable for a programme must present a coherent analysis of society. In particular it must indicate the nature of the main social relations of that society. Quite clearly an organisation in practice never assigns equal importance in agitation to all parts of its programme. However this poses a logical problem for, as was pointed out in the document 'The problem of transitional demands, a clarification,' the whole determines the parts.' In other words any single or few demands, singled out in isolation, are neither transitional nor reformist, nor anything in particular. As the document just quoted noted 'one of the demands on which the Bolsheviks most campaigned in Russia in 1917 was for an end to the war. This constituted part of a transitional programme. Taken in isolation however, this demand was in no way transitional. It could be taken up by pacifists, religious mainics, etc. In no case would we say that these elements had 'accepted some of our transitional demands.' What made the demands transitional was that the Bolsheviks explained that it could only be achieved through the seizure of state power. Although therefore in an extremely strict sense the concept of transitional demands is incorrect (but then so is that of a transitional programme which does not contain an infinity of demands), nevertheless the term is characteristically used to refer to 'that part of the transitional programme which is made the essential content in agitation.' As such it is used synonymously with an extremely limited (condensed) transitional programme. For example in his "The Impending Catastrophe and how to combat it" Lenin advanced demands for the compulsory amalgamation and nationalisation of the banks, for the nationalisation of the syndicates, for workers control of production and consumption etc. the whole to be achieved by the transfer of power to the Soviets. These demands were of course merely the key ones of the Bolsheviks programme. (The 1917 programme of the Bolsheviks contained no less than 38 demands with many subdivisions). It is to this limited "programme" that we would refer when we use the term "the transitional demands of the Bolsheviks". When therefore the terms "transitional demand(s)" is used in this paper and in previous documents it is to this limited set of demands drawn from the full programme which is referred to.

A second point is that many comrades seem to misunderstand the terms Minimum/Maximum in relation to the nature of programmes. The maximum programme of social democracy was not a programme for the seizure of power i.e. the destruction of the capitalist state. It was a programme for implementation after the seizure of power. What precisely characterised the essentially reformist nature of this approach was that it had a programme for implementation within capitalism, a programme for implementation after the seizure of state power but precisely no programme for the seizure of power i.e. for the actual destruction of capitalism. This is what enabled social democracy to always avoid any real discussion of how to take power and hence allowed reformists and revolutionaries to co-exist within the same organisation.

As in many similar cases the answer to the theoretical problems involved in the problem of transitional demands programme can only be found by a return to basic principles and a "reconstruction" of the problem from there. In the case of transitional programme this obviously involves a consideration of the fundamental need for such a programme. Once the function of the programme is understood then we are in a position to clarify its essential features.

THE ACTUALITY OF THE REVOLUTION

The fundamental theoretical feature which divides communism from social democracy, and which unites all the classic theoretical differences, is a conception of the epoch. Communism holds that capitalism has finished its work of the development of the productive forces, and consequently the bourgeoisie had no progressive role to play. It is from this that the theory of permanent revolution, the rejection of the popular front, the theory of fascism etc. flow. The social democrat (and now the Stalinist) hold implicitly that the bourgeoisie still has a progressive role to play. Hence, for example, while the communist sees the present epoch as one of the undermining of even bourgeois democracy, the social democrat hold to the ridiculous theory that bourgeois democracy is actually being extended, that we are "moving forward gradually" etc. From this flows the belief of the alliance with the bourgeoisie in the colonial states, the possibility of uniting with the bourgeoisie to fight fascism etc. The communist conception of the epoch is usually summed up in Lukacs famous phrase "The Actuality of the Revolution".

The concrete social content of the epoch is the inability of capitalism to solve even the immediate needs of the masses. This was stated in its classic form in the first thesis on aims and tactics of the Communist International. "The present epoch is the epoch of the disintegration and collapse of the entire capitalism world system, which will drag the whole of European civilisation down with it if capitalism with its insoluble contradictions is not destroyed". It is clear of course that this formulation must be understood in a epochal and historical sense i.e. it does not mean for example that an absolute impoverishment of the proletariat is going on, or that we are in a linear descent into barbarism. What it means is that taken on a historical and global scale capitalism cannot solve even the immediate needs of the masses. This fact has the profoundest effect on the dynamics of the mass struggle in the epoch of imperialism. If mass struggles are launched on the perspective of reforms, then they are based on the premise that the immediate problems of the working class can be solved within the framework of capitalism which is thereject the Marxist conception of the epoch. When the masses struggle for these ends, then what they realise at some point in the struggle is either that the aims of the struggle would not solve their problems even if achieved, or still worse, these aims are achieved and do not solve the problems. The result of this realisation is demoralisation, apathy, despair, the seeking of individual solutions to social problems, decline of the workers organisations etc. with a consequent rapid growth of counter-revolution. Innumerable examples could be found of this. For example the failure of the Italian Socialist Party to take power after three years of factory occupations following the First World War. The classical case is that of the French Popular Front. Here millions were mobilised only to find that reforms would not solve their problems. The result was a mass collapse of the workers militancy and the collapse of the entire French society into inertia and despair. The conclusion is that communists must fight for those objectives which solve the immediate problems of the masses, and that this can only be done by the destruction of capitalism. As Trotsky put it "The present epoch is distinguished not for the fact that it frees the revolutionary party from day-to-day work but because it permits this work to be carried on indissolubly with the actual tasks of the revolution". It is also in this sense that Luxembourgs famous remark that "Socialism is the minimum we must demand" must be understood. It is not a moral statement that it would somehow be morally incorrect or not revolutionary sounding enough to demand a minimum programme but in the literal sense that the advance demands which were within capitalism would only lead to massive despair and demoralisation of the masses. Hence we see the real nature of the communist objection to reformism, it is not that the reformists will never destroy capitalism, it is that the reformists will actually destroy the militancy and organisation of the working class. Once this essential point is understood that it can be clearly grasped why a transitional programme must involve the destruction of capitalism and why the reformist variants of "transitional" programmes must be rejected. It therefore becomes quite clear why the concept of transitional programmes for sections of the population is entirely incorrect in conception. It completely misunderstands the fact that

the nature of programme is determined, at the most fundamental level, by the fact that capitalism cannot even solve the immediate problems of the masses. A programme which does not destroy capitalism, as a programme for sectors cannot do, is therefore a programme which goes against the very essence of communism, that is to say against its conception of the epoch.

However once it is understood that a transitional programme would destroy capitalism, then an immediate problem arises. A situation in which the masses were struggling on a programme which would destroy capitalism is by definition, a revolutionary situation. This is the type of idea which is held by some sections of the organisation that you can only have a transitional programme in a revolutionary situation. However this line of approach is extremely dangerous. It immediately raises the question of "What programme do we advance outside a revolutionary situation". If one holds that a transitional programme is only advancable in a revolutionary situation, then it appears outside that situation we must advance demands which do not destroy capitalism. But this is merely to open up a minimum/transitional dichotomy and you are back to square one, because you are asking the masses to struggle on demands which cannot solve their problems.

At this point apparent impasse is reached. A transitional programme must destroy capitalism, but we cannot "mobilise the masses" to destroy capitalism outside a revolutionary situation. Only two ways appear to lie clearly open. One is a bordigist "build the party and wait for the situation". The other is the Tendencies of mobilising the masses on reforms but dignifying that be called it a "transitional and democratic" approach. This however breaks with the entire theoretical basis of communism by rejecting its characterisation of the epoch. However the only reason this impasse appears to exist is because the relation of party and class is understood wrongly, it is understood in the administrative sense of the Party "mobilising the masses" or "calling them to action". This however is a profoundly non Leninist conception of the party. Lenin specifically, and at great length, rejects the idea that it is the task of the party to call the masses to action. Lenin declares that he agrees completely with Plekhanov's formulation that the task of the party is to explain ideas to people. In terms of the fundamental tasks of propaganda and agitation Plekhanov defines that "A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons, an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a mass of people" (What is to be done S.Vol 1 p152, C Vol 5 p409). Martynov, the chief spokesman of the Economists counterposes the following "By propaganda we would understand the revolutionary explanation of the present social system entire or in its partial manifestations, whether that be done in a form intelligible to individuals or to broad masses. By agitation....we would understand the call upon the masses to undertake definite concrete actions and the promotion of the direct revolutionary intervention in political life" (Ibid my emphasis - how many times have we heard from the tendency that the underlined section of the last sentence) Lenin replies, in a statement which encapsulates a complete conception of the relation of party and class, that "To single out a third sphere, or third function, of practical activity and to include in this function "the call upon the masses to undertake definite concrete actions" is sheer nonsense, because the "call", as a single act, either naturally and inevitably supplements the theoretical treatise, propagandist pamphlet, and agitational speech, or represents a purely executive function." Once this point of Lenin's is understood, i.e. that the party does not "call the masses to action" or "mobilise" them then of course the problem we posed about the transitional programme disappears. It is perfectly possible to present a programme which destroys capitalism at any time, it is only if you conceive the party as calling to masses to action or the function of the party as mobilising the masses that you land yourself in either a bordigist or tendency position.

We may now summarise. The fundamental basis of communism as opposed to reformism is a conception of the epoch. From this it flows that the programme of the party even in relation to the immediate needs of the masses must be a programme of the destruction of capitalism. Therefore not transitional

programmes for sectors. If however you conceive of the relation of the party to class as "mobilising" the class or "calling it to action" then you are in an inextricable dilemma, because obviously you cannot mobilise the masses for struggle on a programme which destroys capitalism outside a revolutionary situation. This however is a false dilemma, because it accepts a non-Leninist conception of the relation of party and class. Once the Leninist conception is returned to the apparent dilemma disappears. However if one does not accept Lenin's theory one is back in a mess with no way out. It was for this reason that cdes were very emphatic at the last N.C. about rejecting any formulations of mobilising the masses or promoting "their direct revolutionary intervention in political life". At this point however it is necessary to stop and deal with a source of confusion.

PASSIVITY?

One thing which cdes appeared to be extremely concerned about was that the Leninist formulation of propaganda and agitation appeared to imply a purely passive type of activity - reciting holy scriptures from books, reading learned lectures to the working class etc. This however is due to confusion on the concept of "idea" and what therefore "presenting of ideas" means. (It should be noted that this confusion is in fact built into the bourgeois vocabulary of ideas and into theories such as that of "reflection" - a theory incidentally it is doubtful if Lenin ever held in the sense generally attributed to him). The point is the following. The fundamental distinction which bourgeois thought makes is between mind and matter, idea and reality etc. In this vocabulary "explaining ideas" quite clearly means altering the way people are thinking and can be completely divorced from activity. In this framework quite clearly "explaining ideas" would mean something like the activity of the SPGP. This however is only the case if the bourgeois concept of ideas, or more specifically of consciousness, is accepted. Marx however, being a consistent materialist entirely rejects the mind/matter distinction and instead defined consciousness in terms of the relation of individual (not mind) and circumstances. As such the relation is entirely an active one. Innumerable quotations could be used to show this. The following, taken from the very end of Marx's life should illustrate the point. "Men never start 'to be in that theoretical relationship to the objects of the external world'. They start, like any other animal, by eating, drinking etc, i.e. not 'to be' in a relationship, but to be active" (Notebook on Wagner) Hence in Marxist terms the concept of consciousness or idea is a relational active one. In applying this concept to the Party and class Lenin therefore has the concept of the relation of party not to "mobilise the masses" but to relate to the already active mass.

It is this which means that Lenin's theory has not the slightest aspect of passivity or contemplation about it. This is the base of Lenin's endless statements that the party lags behind the class, and it is what makes entirely superfluous for him the concept of the party as calling the masses to action. This is the logic behind the following formulation of Lenin. "As for calling the masses to action, that will come of itself as soon as energetic political agitation, live and striking exposures come into play. To catch some criminal red-handed and immediately to brand him publicly in all places is of itself far more effective than any number of "calls"; the effect very often is such as will make it impossible to tell exactly who it was that "called" upon the masses and who suggested this or that plan of demonstration etc" (Lenin op cit). It was precisely this point that was made in a passage in an earlier document on transitional demands. This passage stated that "(the role of the party) is to explain the characteristics of the situation and present a rounded conception so that the working class itself can respond to any changes in that situation which may occur suddenly and also to any changes produced by its own actions." This formulation was precisely extremely Leninist, because it emphasised the political relation of the party to the already active mass. It is this fundamental point which leads to the rejection of the "Calls to action"

and makes them entirely superfluous in the context of the Leninist theory of the party. It is also what makes superbly Leninist statements such as "The proletariat sensed sooner than its leaders the change in the objective struggle and the need for a transition to an uprising. As always practice marched ahead of theory" (S.Vol 1 p579) and the famous thesis, which is the heart of Lenin's insistence on the need for revolutionary theory "Practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality" (.vol 38 p213). Once the fundamental distinction between the bourgeois and the Marxist concepts of consciousness are grasped then any formulation of "mobilising", "calling to action" is at best redundant and more usually represents an administrative concept of the party. Far from being "passive" or "scholastic" the question of the relation of party and class as not being based on calls to action is precisely the least "contemplative" of all theories because its fundamental premise is the (self activity of the masses. It is precisely because we hold that "History as a whole, and the history of revolution in particular, is always richer in content, more multiform more lively and in genius than is imagined by even the best parties, the most class conscious vanguard of the most advanced classes.....because even the finest of vanguards express the class consciousness, will passion and imagination of tens of thousands, where as at moments of great upsurge and the exertion of all human capacities, revolution are made by the class consciousness, will passion and imagination of tens of millions" (S.Vol 1 p401) and because we reject completely any passive conception of the party that we reject absolutely any conception of the parties relation to the class being in terms of calls to action or mobilising the masses.

One of the immediate consequence of the above analysis

Once the fundamental bases of analysis are clarified, then many of the problems which have proved confusing and baffling immediately become clear.

To take just one example it is now possible to formulate a sensible theory of the Labour Party. If you formulate the question "is or is not the working class dominated by social democracy" in terms of a bourgeois theory of consciousness, then the question becomes a ridiculous one of trying to work out what people are thinking about. Presumably to do this one conducts a Gallup pole, sees how they vote etc. A trivial debate on whether voting is a more significant indicator than attendance at branch meetings is entered into, the realm of the tendency's ridiculous "I know ten shop stewards who...." is entered. It leads to no sensible method of analysis whatever except trying to investigate what people are thinking. If however the problem is formulated in terms of how people are relating to their circumstances then immediately the correct line of analysis is suggested. If posed in terms of the Labour Party it becomes clear that the question must be how people are relating to the various organisations of the Labour party. It is this that leads to the analysis of the fundamental structural differences between the way a social democratic party is limited to the working class and the way in which a stalinist party is. The way in which the Labour Party functions immediately becomes apparent. If one conceives consciousness in terms of "mind" then to say the workers are dominated by social democracy leads to no conclusions regarding the structure of a social democratic party. If however the concept of consciousness is posed in terms of "relation" then quite clearly to say that someone has a social democratic consciousness means to say that he relates to his circumstances in a particular way, and hence the organisations of the Labour Party must embody that relation. Similarly a person who is a stalinist related to his circumstances in a different way and in consequence the organisational relation of stalinist party and working class is different to that of social democratic party and working class. The analysis of the fact that social-democracy has two links to the working class - via the constituencies and through the trade unions, but no direct link at the point of production, which is what underlies our analysis of the Labour Party, the decline of the Labour Left, the political role of the trade union bureaucracy etc - therefore flows directly from an essential feature of Social-Democratic consciousness, i.e. that the division

between politics and trade unionism is made in terms of where they occur.

Given this analysis, it also becomes clear what is methodologically wrong with the rubbish that the SLL, the RSL, the tendency etc., keep turning out on the Labour Party.

When they talk about Social Democratic consciousness, they quite clearly are referring to ideas in peoples heads about the Labour Party. When they therefore formulate slogans they take as their starting point not the consciousness of the class i.e. the way it is actually relating to its problems, the struggle against capitalism etc., but in terms of (supposed) ideas they have in their heads. This is what leads to their continual habit of counterposing some other struggle to the actual struggle of the masses.

Once the real meaning of the concept consciousness is outlined, then the meaning of the term "relating to consciousness" becomes apparent. It means basing itself of the way which the working class is relating to its circumstances, to the problems that confront it and to its existing organisation, and showing how that struggle can be extended into a struggle directed against the social relations of capitalist production and of the state machine which defends them - see section Six.

Footnote: (N.B. just in case anyone claims that we never equate propaganda with passivity and agitation with activity (i.e. have an Economist definition) just let them think about some of the general ways of talking in the organisation. It is incredibly frequent, for example, that if someone talks simply of putting an article in a newspaper (commenting) or issuing a leaflet instead of intervening we say that this is a "propagandist" approach by which we mean passive. Similarly when the difference between propaganda group and league for revolutionary action was formulated many, or even the majority, of votes say it not in terms of making a transition from explaining a large number of ideas to a small number of people, to explaining a few ideas to a relatively large number of people. Instead they saw it as a transition from sitting around (passivity) to activity. Hence the politics of "lan", the hyperactivity of demonstration activity, the ultra-left actions etc.

The second point is that the correct Marxist analysis renders meaningless the counterposition frequently made in the organisation between theory and practice. If consciousness and all its related concepts, e.g. ideas, theory, are relations then theory is an essentially active question and in consequence why every theoretical position has practical consequences. This is not true in a merely contingent sense, but is true in a logical sense. Similarly what it means is that any systematic way of relating to circumstances constitutes a theory even if the person is incapable of stating it. Hence it is perfectly consistent to talk of people having a "Labourist" consciousness who are opposed to the Labour Party, or who (theoretically) have never even heard of it).

IMG/SL FUSION CONFERENCE



27,28,29 May 1972

for members only

TASKS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE IMG

Submitted by the Tendency
April 2nd, 1972

PRE - CONFERENCE DISCUSSION

Internal Bulletin No. 5

67

Price

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Introduction

The purpose of this resolution is to outline answers to the key conjunctural questions facing our relatively small Trotskyist organisation. That is, what should the British Section of the Fourth International be saying and doing today to take advantage of the unparalleled opportunities before us, and to meet the responsibilities inherent in them? How can we win and develop the cadres that can take the leadership of the revolutionary left?

This tasks and perspectives resolution by the Tendency does not repeat the fundamental analyses of several key subjects which the Tendency submitted to the 1970 and 1971 national conferences of the IMG.

The Case for an Independent Revolutionary Socialist Youth Organisation in Britain (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin, No. 5, January 27, 1970)

Rebuilding the Anti-Vietnam War Movement -- An IMG Priority (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin, No. 7, February 15, 1970)

An Alternative View on Key Aspects of the Political Resolution (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin, No. 10, March 3, 1970)

The Way Forward for the IMG (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin No. 9, April, 1971)

On Our Orientation Towards the Trade Unions (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin No. 10, April 1971)

Ireland -- A Priority for the IMG (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin No. 29, June, 1971)

Revolutionary Analysis, Strategy and Tactics for Women's Liberation Today (Pre-conference Discussion Bulletin No. 3, 1971)

For the May 1972 national conference, in addition to this resolution, we are submitting a document on the new rise of the Irish struggle and the responsibilities of Trotskyists in Britain to build a mass solidarity campaign in defence of the unconditional right of the Irish people to self-determination. Contributions drawing a critical balance sheet of our experiences in specific sectors of the class struggle are being submitted to the pre-conference discussion by Tendency members. Another contribution will deal with the majority political line adopted by the last world congress and a balance sheet of the results of the application of this line in Britain.

A critique is also being prepared dealing with the method, political line, and perspectives of the programme submitted by the majority of the National Committee (discussion bulletin Vol. one, No. one).

International Framework

The willingness and ability of the American ruling class to police the world for imperialism has been dealt a heavy blow by the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese people, the massive American antiwar movement, and the deepening economic difficulties created by increased inter-imperialist competition. The response of the American ruling class has been: 1) to withdraw the bulk of their ground combat troops from Vietnam in the hopes of defusing the domestic antiwar opposition while at the same time leaving behind the material and military structure capable of supporting a capitalist regime in Saigon. 2) to try and buy the cooperation of the Stalinist bureaucracies in Peking and Moscow in order to abort the victory of the Vietnamese revolution, the necessary precondition for the "success" of Vietnamisation. 3) to force the other major capitalist powers to carry a bigger share of the military, moral and especially the economic burden involved in holding back the world revolution.

The long expansionary boom of the 1950's and early 1960's is over. Nixon's August 15th speech marks a clearly defined stage in the U. S. recognition of, and attempt to resolve, the deepening contradictions between inflation-fuelled expansionist domestic policies and the need for a minimally stable international monetary framework. This attempt reinforces the trend towards fiercer international capitalist competition, necessitating further and more intense attacks on the living standards of the masses. There is a real threat of concurrent recessions, which could result in a level of unemployment unacceptable to a working class accustomed to the relative prosperity of the boom period, and could spark a revolutionary response from the workers. This threat has become real for the imperialist rulers.

The Tory Offensive

In the immediate post-war era British capitalism was living on the remains of its imperialist past. But the advantages of "imperial preference", the "special relationship" with America, the role of Britain as a shipping and financial power, were undermined by competition from the U. S., Europe, and Japan, which has eroded the previous monopoly of commonwealth trade. Now the rise of Japanese and European industry forces Britain to adjust and find a place for itself in the new international alignments. The dominant sectors of British capitalism see their best option in entry into the European Economic Community to establish themselves in the protected markets of Europe. Entry into the Common Market means an acceleration in the closure of the least productive plants, an increase in the number of domestic and international mergers and rationalisations and an accelerated drive for "productivity deals."

The British ruling class knows that this solution to its problems can only succeed if the British workers can be disciplined to produce more and to receive a smaller share of the fruits of their labour. The Tory government has thus adopted a long-term strategy of chipping away at the living standards, social services and democratic rights won over decades through struggle by the working class. They have accelerated the rationalisation and "phasing out" of declining industries. Unemployment has risen to the highest

level since the depression. The highest rate of inflation in Europe has steadily eaten away at the workers standard of living and in spite of the inflation, the government has attempted to impose a low ceiling on wage increases. In addition, it has already abolished free school milk, raised school meal prices, almost doubled the cost of public transport, increased the price of health services and introduced a bill which will mean a massive increase in rents for millions of tenants. They have passed anti-trade union legislation in an attempt on the one hand to curb rank and file militancy, prevent solidarity actions in strikes, and on the other hand to draw the union bureaucrats into further class-collaboration.

The Tories have embarked on this course with full knowledge that a major confrontation is involved. The ruthless pursuit of this policy by the Tory government has not, however, produced the hoped-for intimidation of the working class. The work-ins and sit-ins initiated by the UCS workers showed clearly, even before the miners victory, that the working class was not prepared to renounce without a struggle the gains it has won. Faced with a rate of unemployment unequalled since the great depression and a wage packet being eaten away by soaring prices, the working class is beginning to launch a defensive struggle often initiating, as with the UCS work-in and the miners flying pickets, new tactics of industrial struggle.

CENTRAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

The most important new political developments since our June 1971 national conference have been:

- 1) the explosive new rise of the Irish struggle for self-determination, focused in the North, with the change in political consciousness it has produced in the South and Britain.
- 2) the increased combativity of important sectors of the working class, as described above.
- 3) the scope of the student demonstrations -- the largest in British history, sparked off primarily by the open Tory offensive against the autonomy of the Student Unions -- and the response of important numbers of students to the miners struggle.

In this situation there is an increasing possibility of a political explosion which can bring down the Tory government and force a new general election.

These objective developments are the latest expressions of the crisis of the ruling class and the deepening radicalisation taking place in Britain. We face the most favourable opportunities for Trotskyism anywhere in Europe. Today the possibilities of increasing the Trotskyist cadres in Britain, deeply involved in and playing a significant political role in mass struggles, are more favourable than at any time since the formation of the Fourth International.

We, like the rest of the British left, are being put to the test by the responsibilities inherent in this situation. The period immediately before us will test both our political line

and organisational ability. It will be decisive in determining whether we can recruit and assimilate the cadres, tested in action and educated in the method of the transitional programme, who can win the leadership of the revolutionary left.

Ireland

The Tory government, in order to maintain imperialist rule in the six counties is trying to smash the mass civil rights movement and the Republican vanguard. The harassment and persecution, imprisonment, and torture of the vanguard is aimed at terrorising the entire Catholic community. The Derry massacre, carried out by British occupation troops, showed to the entire world the lengths to which British imperialism will go to keep the six counties under its rule.

But this policy of repression, initiated by the previous Labour government and escalated by the Tories, far from demoralising the Catholic population, and destroying the Republican movement, has exploded in the faces of Stormont and Westminster. It has resulted in larger and larger mass mobilisations to win the most elementary democratic rights. It has increased the determination and resistance of the Catholic population. It has produced even broader mass support for the organised Republican vanguard, Sinn Fein and the IRA.

The profound social crisis created by imperialist policies in the six counties has also had deep political repercussions in the Republic and Britain.

The burning of the British embassy in Dublin symbolised the growing identification of a section of the Southern masses with the struggle in the North. The solidarity demonstrations and the growing sympathy in Britain with the plight of Northern Catholics restrict the range of options open to the ruling class. Through the imposition of direct rule, Westminster has taken direct responsibility for Northern Ireland. The next explosion in the six counties cannot be blamed on Stormont but must be directly accounted for by British imperialism, not only to the Irish masses, but to the British population as well. By exporting its direct rule, the British ruling class has imported a political powder keg.

The heart of the struggle in Ireland remains the fight of an oppressed nationality for self-determination. This basic democratic right, won by most European nations during the bourgeois revolutions, continues to be denied the Irish. Only a socialist revolution can today assure this right. It is this fact which gives a revolutionary dynamic to the struggle by the masses of Irish people for the most elementary democratic rights -- such as freedom from arbitrary arrest, free speech, assembly and press.

The policies of British imperialism have driven tens of thousands of Catholics from a simple desire for a reform of Stormont towards an unyielding struggle for an Ireland free from British rule. They have become less susceptible to deceit and open to even the most revolutionary methods of struggle; mass non-cooperation with the government, mass demonstrations in defiance of the state, and armed self-defence.

The best internationalists in Ireland are, as they were in Marx and Engels day, those who are the most nationalistic. The fact that national consciousness is deeply rooted in the Catholic ghettos, where participation in the struggle ranges from school children to the aged, is one of the main guarantees of the resolute continuation of the struggle.

The nationalist struggle by the oppressed minority threatens not only the continued stability of the imperialist enclave (as Bloody Sunday symbolised) but also the stability of the neo-colonial regime in the South. The Lynch government's collaboration with British imperialism in trying to crush the Republican movement was limited by the massive reaction of the Irish people against the Derry massacre. The effects of the deepening struggle in the North threaten to undermine the various schemes being considered by the ruling class as a way of smoothing the entry of Britain and Ireland into the EEC, and threatens to precipitate struggles that could put into question the very existence of the neo-colonial regime in the South. While partial reforms and concessions and ebbs and flows in the struggle are likely, the fundamental position of British capitalism makes impossible the massive and deep-going reforms necessary to "solve" the Irish "troubles" within a neo-colonial and capitalist framework.

The national question in Ireland will be solved in the final analysis only through a united Ireland governed by the working class. This struggle to win democratic rights which are taken for granted in most of the advanced capitalist countries will remain a permanent thorn in the side of British imperialism and a decisive political issue facing both rulers and exploited in Britain.

As Marx pointed out, the British working class will not be able to free itself as long as it permits British troops to be used to subjugate the Irish people. Any defeat for British imperialism in Ireland can only give a big impetus to the class struggle in Britain. And any defeat of the forces fighting for self-determination would be a major setback for the entire British labour movement.

Despite the anti-Irish chauvinist propaganda that the British people have been exposed to for decades, it became clear in the aftermath of the Derry massacre that growing numbers of British people are beginning not only to see the results of imperialist repression in Northern Ireland but are capable of sympathising with the struggle there. Internment, occupation troops, and the torture of Irish militants were opposed by tens of thousands of British people in the streets. The 20,000 strong October 1971 AIL⁺ demonstration revealed the potential for mobilising the masses in struggle to demand that the government get its hands off Ireland. This was further confirmed by the demonstrations that erupted after the Derry massacre.

Such mass actions will inevitably have an impact on the consciousness of the British troops serving as an occupation army in the six counties, a goal which revolutionaries must be conscious of promoting.

Events in Ireland -- and their potential impact on British politics -- cannot be seen in isolation from the struggles of the oppressed and exploited taking place elsewhere within the frame-

+ Anti-Internment League

work of the new rise of the world revolution. The heroic struggles of the Vietnamese and the mass actions of the anti-war movement, the May-June 1968 explosion in France, the Black liberation struggle in the USA, all have influenced the thinking and tactics of many Irish militants. Conversely, the struggle by the nationalist minority to win their fundamental rights have become a source of inspiration and a new factor in developing revolutionary consciousness around the world.

Student Struggles

The Tory offensive has included a basic attack on the students many of whom over the past decade, have been amongst the first to identify with the struggles of the oppressed and exploited. The Tory attack on student union independence is not only an attempt to hinder a student resistance to the Tories' plans for the restructuring of higher education, but results from a class conscious recognition of the political role which can be played, and has been played, by the students in the struggle against capitalism. Thatcher's proposals to destroy student control of their unions detonated the biggest and broadest student demonstrations ever seen in Britain. This was a reflection of the increased tempo of the class struggle. The mass actions in the street drew into activity large numbers of students from further education, technical and teacher-training colleges, many of whom had never before been involved in political action. This added an important new dimension to the student struggles. In face of such opposition, the Tories were obliged to make a partial retreat. But far from defusing the struggle and dampening its militancy, 30,000 students demonstrated in London after Thatcher's retreat demanding Hands Off the Student Unions.

This demonstration coincided with the beginning of the miners strike. Many students saw their struggles as part of the same fight as that being waged by the miners, and directed against the same enemy -- the ruling class and its Tory government. The high rate of unemployment which more and more affects graduates drives this point home in a new way for students. This feeling of identification was expressed in the large fees paid to miners for addressing student meetings, by militant miners declaring their solidarity with the student struggle, and in our ability to mobilise several thousand students to march on the Coal Board offices. In Colchester, students opened the facilities of the university to the miners who had come to the area for picket duty.

The correctness of and the potential for implementing the red university strategy -- that is, organising and mobilising the masses of students to occupy and utilise the resources of the university in order to link the student struggles with broader manifestations of the class struggle -- were clearly revealed through these experiences.

The Miners Victory

The first official national miners strike since 1926 resulted in the most important victory for the British working class in the entire past period. It shattered the Tories' version of an "incomes policy" as the wage increase won broke

through the government's guide lines of a "non-inflationary" 7% increase. The result of the miners successful struggle to defend their standard of living against the effects of inflation will serve as a model and source of inspiration for other sectors of the working class.

The strike against the nationalised mine industry employers was a battle against the Tory government from the beginning, and it was the government that was forced to concede.

Three facts stand out:

1) Unlike the power workers strike, the miners gained widespread sympathy and support from the majority of the population, in the face of the Tory attempts to isolate and discredit the strikers and blame them for the power shortages.

2) Against the initial wishes of the NUM and TUC bureaucracies 50,000 Birmingham engineering workers downed tools for 24 hours. 10,000 of them joined the miners' pickets and were decisive in closing down the largest coke stockpile in the country. This action decisively nipped in the bud the Tory strategy of trying to break the strike with scab deliveries of stockpiled or imported coal.

3) The organisation and scope of the miners' flying picket squads marked a new level of effectiveness in class struggle strike strategy and showed the imagination, aggressiveness and determination of the miners to win. This both reflected and increased the new self-confident and fighting mood of whole sections of the working class.

The most important lessons of the miners strike are:

1) Militancy, boldly worked out tactics and mass extra-parliamentary actions -- not class collaboration and reliance on negotiators and MP's -- wins sympathy, solidarity, and strikes.

2) The NUM's bureaucratic leadership was willing to compromise and betray the struggle; but what was decisive in the miners' victory was the capacity of a united rank and file, using class struggle methods, to limit the scope of the NUM and TUC officials to manoeuvre.

3) Despite the crisis of British capitalism and the anti-trade union policies which the Tories have made law, the ruling class can be forced to retreat and is still able to make some concessions to the workers.

4) While international trade union solidarity actions are important to a struggle such as that waged by the miners and are a strategic necessity for the entire European working class in the face of the integration and co-operation of European capital, the absence of such actions is not necessarily decisive in strike struggles like the miners.

In spite of reformist illusions, in spite of the absence of a class struggle union leadership, in spite of the Tory offensive

and the crisis of British capitalism, in spite of minimal international solidarity actions, the working class can struggle and win victories. These struggles and victories are decisive in combatting the same reformist illusions, in laying the ground for the construction of a revolutionary leadership in the unions, in demoralising and undermining the plans of the ruling class, and in inspiring the European working class as a whole.

These are key lessons for Trotskyists to absorb from the miners' strike, in preparation for the coming struggles.

Women's Liberation

The last year has seen a growth in awareness among women of their nature and extent of their oppression as women. More and more women have become receptive to the ideas and initiatives of women liberationists. More and more women are seriously searching for explanations of the roots and causes of their oppression and how to eliminate it. This phenomenon is not limited to Britain but has appeared in countries around the world.

In Britain the rising interest in women's liberation has been reflected in the new attention the mass media pays to the problems of women and even modest initiatives to struggle; the growing pressure on parliament as it debates the anti-discrimination bills before it; the attention paid to the struggles of women and their special roles in Ireland and in industry and the effect of these struggles on the consciousness of women throughout Britain; the reaction of the ruling class to every advance made by women and the attempt to push back any victory that threatens to undermine sexist oppression such as the right to abortion and contraception.

Despite the tremendous potential that exists today for building an independent, mass action-oriented women's movement, little progress in this direction has been made in the past year. This is due primarily to the absence of a revolutionary socialist leadership that understands both the oppression of women as women and the inter-relationship of the struggle for women's liberation with the fight for socialism.

The heart of the oppression of women lies in their special role as domestic slaves within the patriarchal family institution of class society. That is why the abortion-contraception-enforced motherhood question has evoked such a broad and enthusiastic response from women in a whole series of countries in the last year as women's liberation ferment has begun to spread. It is why the forces of reaction have also concentrated on trying to turn back even the meagre gains that have been made in this domain. A clear indication of this is the increased growth and activity of the anti-abortion forces in the last year. It is around this struggle for the right of women to choose that thousands of women -- French, German, Swiss, American, Canadian, Australian and others -- have been drawn into actions in support of demands which would fundamentally alter the lives of millions of women.

The right of a woman to decide for herself if and when to have a child is a fundamental precondition for her liberation. As long as she is denied this right she does not have control over the most basic factor determining her life. Science has

made it possible for women to have this control. The denial of safe, efficient birth control and abortion are therefore amongst the most brutal aspects of women's oppression today, especially for working class women who are most often the victims of the abortion racketeers. This is becoming clear to increasing numbers of women who are beginning to demand the necessary changes.

It is around a campaign on this same basic issue that the greatest potential exists for building a mass action women's liberation movement in Britain today.

Oppressed National Minorities

Over the past two decades the policy of the ruling class has been to bring tens of thousands of non-white immigrants to work in the low-paid service industries. This has resulted in the development and growth of Black nationalist consciousness, particularly under the leadership of West Indians, and is a new and permanent factor in the current radicalisation. Events over the past year have confirmed this.

The reaction of large numbers in the Black community who demonstrated against the imperialist deal with the white racist regime of Rhodesia, police harassment, slum housing; the reaction of a sector of the Black community to the Mangrove trial, and the popularity of Angela Davis particularly amongst the youth -- all express the growing sense of dignity, defiance and national consciousness within the Black communities as a whole.

The fact that the government has for the first time initiated Black studies courses in some London schools is a reflection of the growing nationalist consciousness as well as the ruling class fear of its potential explosiveness.

Racist harassment and persecution against the non-white population will increase as the ruling class looks for scapegoats to create divisions within the working class, to divert attention from the real causes of unemployment and inflation and the deterioration of the social services. This will increase the nationalist consciousness of Blacks as Blacks as well as their consciousness as workers.

Westminster's nationalist chauvinist policy of restricting the use of the Welsh language has resulted in a rise in opposition led by militant Welsh nationalist youth. This is a further indication of the incapacity of capitalism in its decline to satisfy the growing demands of every oppressed sector and layer of the population, as new reservoirs of potentially anti-capitalist forces are brought forward by these progressive struggles.

THE TASKS OF THE IMG

Our central responsibility in the coming period is the development of a mass campaign in defence of the right of the Irish people to self-determination,

Given the objective openings and the size of our forces, major

efforts must be made in our student work and in the development of a mass action abortion-contraception campaign as the central focus of our work in the women's liberation movement.

We have few forces in the labour movement but the receptivity to our ideas is increasing and the opportunity to attract a small but important number of militants to us is the greatest it has ever been in the history of the IMG. We should take advantage of every opening we have in the labour movement to put forward our fundamental political programme around which a class struggle left wing will be built.

We must restructure a framework to carry out mobilisations in defence of the Vietnamese revolution.

These campaign priorities can be carried out at the current stage of the IMG's development only if we abolish the cell system as it has been developed and reorganise on the basis of large branch-type units which can educate and develop politically rounded cadres capable of leading this work.

Vietnam Solidarity

It is as important now as ever for Trotskyists to shoulder their responsibilities in defence of the Vietnamese revolution. The capacity to defend the Vietnamese revolution remains a revealing test for all those who consider themselves internationalists and revolutionaries.

The most effective strategy for mobilising broad support in defence of the Vietnamese revolution is through the building of a non-exclusionary united front solidarity action campaign around the central demands of immediate withdrawal of American troops and material, and an end to British complicity. This is based on our fundamental principle of unconditional support to the right of the Vietnamese people to self-determination.

The initiative taken in Glasgow by the April 22 Indo-China Committee to organise an action on April 22 in response to the international call of the American anti-war movement should be emulated. It is an indication of what could be done in major cities throughout the country if the solidarity appeal of the Fourth International was responded to with initiative on our part.

For a mass solidarity campaign on Ireland

The building of a mass campaign in solidarity with the Irish struggle for self-determination is the key task before us. It should be the central axis of our work in the coming period.

Such a campaign must be on-going, have a mass-action perspective and make concrete demands on the British government. The principled basis of all our activity, as revolutionaries within the imperialist oppressor, is unconditional support of the right of self-determination of the Irish people. It involves building a united front type mass action oriented coalition of all organisations and individuals

prepared to work for the following demands: (1) Withdraw British Troops Now; (2) End Internment; (3) Release all Political Prisoners. The key demand is Withdraw British Troops Now.

The objective situation makes it possible for a mass campaign to be built with sufficient power to force the government to withdraw its troops from Ireland. This would mean a gigantic step forward for the Irish people in their struggle for self-determination and change the balance of forces in the class struggle in Britain.

Trotskyists should therefore be active in the Anti-Internment League, helping to build it and giving leadership to the efforts to turn it into a powerful united front type organisation fighting for and able to win the above three demands. Our goal is an action coalition based on non-exclusion, oriented toward mass mobilisation, imposing no restrictions on the banners carried by participants in the actions.

We must make every effort to convince the united front coalition of its responsibility to propagandise and agitate amongst the British troops on the right of the Irish people to self-determination and draw them toward the mass movement of solidarity. We must also do this work in our own name. This is the application of a revolutionary socialist policy towards the British troops being used in Ireland.

Failure to do these things will mean that the campaign in solidarity with the Irish struggle will be diverted into the dead ends of reformism or ultra-leftism.

We should propose this perspective to the members of the Irish Solidarity Campaign and move the dissolution of this sectarian front group. We should present our full analysis of the Irish revolution under our own name in our own paper. This is a necessary principled component of our responsibility to the Irish revolutionaries and the British working class.

The Labour Movement

The permanent threat of large-scale unemployment and rampant inflation are symptoms of decaying capitalism. Productivity deals, factory mergers and closures, laws restricting the independence of the trade unions, and incomes policies are all weapons of the ruling class that the workers confront more and more.

The ruling class has decided that a confrontation with labour is an economic and political necessity. Massive defensive struggles will have to be waged by the labour and trade union movement to win decent living and working conditions and the right to a job.

The demand for a sliding scale of hours -- for the work week to be reduced in proportion to the work available with no reduction in pay -- along with the slogan for an extensive and bold public works programme, is fundamental in the fight for jobs for all with the continual threat of increasing unemployment.

With the increasing cost of living, the trade unions must

demand collective agreements which guarantee automatic wage increases -- a sliding scale of wages -- geared to the real rise in the cost of living. This is the key demand in the fight for protection of income under the permanent inflation of capitalism and is always advanced as a complement to, not a substitute for, demands for periodic increases of wages with no strings attached.

The popularisation and sensitive application of the transitional demand for a sliding scale of hours and wages must be at the centre of our propaganda and agitation in the labour movement. No ceiling on wage increases. Capitalism, not the workers, cause inflation.

When the capitalists argue that the economic situation cannot justify wage increases and better working conditions, the workers must demand an end to business secrets and that the books be opened, thereby posing the question of who actually controls and owns industry. The workers or the bosses?

In the face of threatened factory closures, we must aim to win the labour and trade union movement to demand nationalisation under workers control.

To defeat the industrial relations act and the strategy -- which the ruling class must try to implement in this epoch -- of integrating the trade unions into the state apparatus, we must take up and fight for the slogans: Hands Off the Trade Unions, Repeal the Industrial Relations Act, For the Independence of the Trade Unions.

It is in the process of directly fighting the ruling class for demands such as these that workers will come into conflict with bureaucratic misleaders and build a new and revolutionary leadership in the labour movement. Thus the fight for rank and file democracy is inseparable from the fight for a class struggle line.

We must explain the need for the trade unions to support the progressive struggles which are taking place as part of the deepening radicalisation and are helping set the example of independent mass extra-parliamentary action against all forms of capitalist oppression -- full support to the campaign to get the British troops out of Ireland, to the student struggles, to the actions of the women's and Black liberation movements, against British complicity in the imperialist war in Vietnam.

Our teachers' caucus is almost as large as all our other union caucuses combined. Our teacher comrades should utilise the trade union avenues open to them to popularise and promote our fundamental transitional programme for the creation of a class struggle left wing in the unions. This can be a valuable testing ground for the concretisation of our slogans and a transmission belt to other industries where we as yet have no significant forces.

At this stage in the development of the class struggle and given our relatively small number of cadres, we should not see the Claimants Unions as major work areas or take responsibility for organising them. Where there are unemployed comrades in areas where viable CU's exist, and it doesn't cut across our priority campaigns, we may decide to participate in them. If

we do so, our main responsibility is to fight for the CU's to become affiliated to the organised trade union movement and for unemployed workers to remain or become union members with full rights. We must raise the key transitional demands, especially the sliding scale of hours and wages and a massive public works programme. We must fight to orient the CU's toward independent mass actions to win these demands and force the trade union movement to use its power to organise the unemployed.

These are the next steps in our battle to propagandise on and agitate for a class struggle left wing in the trade unions, the first step towards their transformation into revolutionary instruments of struggle by and for the working masses.

Labour Party

Without a clear understanding of the dynamics of the relationships between the trade unions, the working class and the Labour Party, a Leninist orientation able to win the leadership of the proletariat, is impossible. We must clearly understand that the loyalty of the working class to the Labour Party represents both the strengths and gains as well as the limitations of the working class movement. The loyalty of the working class to the Labour Party represents a gain in working class consciousness, a recognition of the necessity of the workers having their own party independent of the capitalist parties. Working class loyalty to the Labour Party indicates that the workers understand that their problems cannot be solved solely at the factory or local level. At the same time, loyalty to the Labour Party is an indication that the working class has not come to the realisation that policies of class collaboration cannot answer their pressing problems. The working class will only break with policies of class collaboration and their class-collaborationist leaderships in the process of struggle for the realisation of demands which the capitalist class and its state -- regardless of government -- will not grant.

In the next general election, when the electoral choice before the workers is that of Tories or Labour, we must be unconditionally for the defeat of the Tories and for the return of Labour. The three major ways in which we intervene should be:

- 1) To say unequivocally that we are for returning Labour to power and at the same time put forward our series of class struggle demands which will offer the workers a programme of struggle -- not class collaboration and dependence on parliamentary reformism.
- 2) To struggle against the Labour Party bureaucracy we call:
 - (a) for the Labour government to carry out Labour Party conference decisions.
 - (b) for the recall of any MP who fails to carry out these policies.
 - (c) for an end to all bans and proscriptions -- freedom for organised political groupings.

3) To look for openings to enable us to enter the electoral arena. We should put our own candidates forward in selective safe Tory constituencies that will get our ideas and organisation maximum publicity. (e.g. Tariq Ali against Enoch Powell). The purpose would be to make use of the opportunities thus afforded us to put forward our ideas and popularise our transitional programme to thousands and possibly millions of workers.

It is impossible to transform the Labour Party into a revolutionary instrument. The policy outlined above is part of the strategy necessary to win the allegiance of the workers in order to construct a mass Leninist party. It is a key component of the Leninist strategy of party building.

The problem of the Labour Party has confounded the British communist movement since its formation. Despite the fact that Lenin explained this problem half a century ago, the British Trotskyist movement has never surmounted the twin errors of ultra-left abstention on one side and opportunist adaptation to Labour reformism on the other.

While there are, at this time, no general openings for meaningful revolutionary work in constituency Labour Parties, it should be the norm for comrades working in industry to be a delegate from his or her Trade Union branch to the appropriate constituency Labour Party.

Student Movement

The key conjunctural task before the radicalised students is to continue and extend the fight against the Tory attack on the autonomy of the student unions. At the same time, the sympathy of the students for the miners strike, and to the Irish struggle, shows that we must be alert to link up any major eruption in the class struggle with the student movement.

The National Union of Students (NUS) has become the main arena for the discussion of contending ideas and political programmes for advancing student struggles and relating them to struggles in other sectors of society. We should organise a class struggle wing of the NUS, projecting a programme to mobilise the students in independent mass actions to win their demands, and organising to draw support from and extend support to other sectors of the population also engaged in struggle.

A few comrades should be members of the Labour Party Young Socialists in order to assess its development and to determine whether there are fruitful openings for advancing our fundamental ideas and recruiting new forces to the Trotskyist movement.

To take full advantage of the opportunities created by the new upsurge in student struggle which has brought many new forces into action during the last year, a Trotskyist youth organisation must be built. Its main task would be to put forward demands and develop campaigns which would deepen and broaden the youth radicalisation. Its main concentration in the next period would be on the students. Such an organisation would be in political solidarity with the Fourth International and its British section

while being organisationally independent. It would be actively involved in struggles around specific student issues and seek to link these struggles with broader social questions through the strategy of the Red University -- i.e. to turn the universities into ideological and organisational centres for anti-capitalist struggles.

A Trotskyist youth organisation would be in the forefront of building a mass campaign in solidarity with the Irish struggle for self-determination. It would mobilise women's liberation activists to help build a massive abortion action campaign. It would help to build and lead campaigns around anti-imperialist struggles such as Vietnam and Rhodesia, and on issues relating to Black liberation.

Such a youth organisation would provide radicalising youth with a basic Marxist education. It would discuss the problems confronting youth and work out what to do about them. In this way youth will be educated in our political ideas and organisational concepts, and trained to intervene in and give leadership in all class struggle campaigns. In this way many new young cadres, essential to the building of the revolutionary party, will be recruited to the section.

Women's Liberation

The initial components of a programme for women's liberation have emerged around several key demands including:

- 1) Free, safe abortion on demand without forced sterilisation.
- 2) Free, safe contraception for every woman.
- 3) 24-hour child care facilities.
- 4) Equal pay for equal work.
- 5) Equal job and educational opportunities.

Trotskyists are duty bound to support all struggles of the oppressed for their liberation. This means that we give support for the demands of the Women's Liberation Movement, are active in it, give it revolutionary leadership and help to develop a programme of democratic demands and transitional demands which will bring millions of women into struggle for their liberation.

The struggle for women's liberation has a revolutionary dynamic because of the nature of women's oppression and the potential for mobilising masses of women in struggle against the ruling class and its government. The Womens Abortion and Contraception Campaign (WACC) has the greatest possibilities for mobilising women in the coming period, and we should see the WACC as the key campaign of the women's liberation movement and actively involve ourselves in it.

This does not mean we would work exclusively in this campaign. We would actively support particular struggles or actions which women organise to fight their exploitation and oppression.

We consider Socialist Womens Groups to be sectarian and would propose the SWG's orientate towards participating in and helping to build a mass action orientated WACC. Our perspectives would

be to merge the SWG's into this campaign. Women members of the IMG would work in the women's liberation movement as a Trotskyist fraction, putting forward a Marxist analysis of women's oppression, and trying to win the best women activists to the British section of the Fourth International. We would publish our full analysis on women's liberation under our own name in our weekly paper.

Black Liberation

The IMG must solidarise itself with the anti-racialist and Black nationalist struggles taking place. Through our paper, meetings, etc., we must explain the oppression of Blacks as Blacks, the character of their struggle as an independent form of the class struggle, the explosive character this gives to their struggles as workers, and the vanguard roles their struggles play in the fight against reaction.

An important educational task we have is to make available to as many black militants as possible the Marxist analysis of Black nationalism, made by the Socialist Workers party. The writings of Leon Trotsky, George Breitman and Malcolm X especially would help fill an important vacuum in understanding that exists on the British left. They would help lay the groundwork for the basic analysis we must make of the complicated racial-national class struggles of the immigrant and British born Black population.

We must defend the right of the oppressed Blacks to organise along whatever lines they think necessary just as we must give full support to their struggles, for emancipation and liberation, however limited these struggles might be.

Where possible we must involve ourselves in and help build defence organisations for victimised Blacks (for example, Davis,, Soledad, the Mangrove trial) and find out more about the existing defence committees and militant organisations of the Black community.

In addition we must intervene in the campaigns against the racist governments of Rhodesia and South Africa and the complicity of the British ruling class in maintaining them. In the process we will learn from the experiences of the nationalist struggles and win valuable Black militants to Trotskyism.

Defence Work

As the class struggle intensifies the numbers of militants victimised by the ruling class will increase. It is very important that the boss, the army, the university administration and the government learn that they cannot victimise militants with impunity. It is necessary for us to build defence campaigns and committees to carry out this responsibility.

The complete default of Stalinism and Social Democracy has left it to the Trotskyists to continue the rich tradition of the Bolsheviks and the Third International in defence of class war victims. A serious study of the historic lessons of defence activity and their systematic application to the defence cases of today is an essential part of leadership in the class struggle.

Many theoretical and practical lessons have been learned from previous experiences. Among the most important are the following. It is crippling and self-defeating for defence activity to be conducted along sectarian lines or in an exclusive manner. Appeals for support should be based on general civil liberties grounds -- not on the agreement with the specific views (real or alleged) of the defendant. The issues at stake affect the rights of others and we must get support from those willing to help regardless of their views on other subjects. Defence committees should be prepared to work with and collaborate with other groups which have similar purposes in defending legal and human rights.

It is essential to the homogeneity and self-confidence of every revolutionary organisation that its cadres know they will be defended if victimised while carrying out party tasks. It is an indication to the working class of the seriousness of such a party.

We have the responsibility to defend along with Trotskyists around the world the comrades who have been victimised by the reactionary oligarchies in Latin America.

The reactionary refusal, because of his political ideas, of a university post in Berlin for Ernest Mandel, and his subsequent ban from entering Germany, is an attack on the entire academic community and working class movement of Europe. The Fourth International has a special responsibility in fighting for the broadest support in answer to the growing encroachment by the European bourgeoisie on Ernest Mandel's elementary democratic rights. In Britain especially, there are excellent opportunities to mobilise extensive support in the academic and student milieu, in the British left and in some sectors of the labour movement. British Trotskyists must be in the forefront in campaigning to rally this support in defence of Mandel's democratic rights.

Weekly Paper and Intercontinental Press

A weekly paper, the essential political organiser of any serious Marxist organisation is now possible given our resources and size. It must explain and promote the political line and organisational tasks as outlined in this resolution and the fundamental Tendency documents.

At the same time we must write for and increase the circulation of Intercontinental Press -- the English language weekly journal which reflects the viewpoint of the Fourth International.

This will mean the views of the Fourth International will be more widely known and help our membership and periphery to gain a better understanding of world politics, thereby cutting across the insular concepts prevalent in the British left.

THE TRANSITIONAL EPOCH AND OUR METHOD

In our epoch -- the death agony of capitalism -- the transition from capitalism to socialism -- capitalism is less and less capable of solving the problems and satisfying the needs of those it exploits without bringing into question fundamental capitalist property rights. The capitalist class more and more often restricts

political rights that it once championed, (like the right of self-determination, the right to assemble or freedom of the press) and encroach upon social and economic measures wrested from it earlier (like subsidised rents and the national health plan).

Our epoch is marked not by a stable evolutionary development of the labour movement but by rapid twists and turns and explosive changes in the forms and moods of struggle of the working class. Different sectors of the population come into struggle often in an unpredictable way making demands the rulers cannot meet. They give vent to the pent up grievances flowing from capitalist oppression, exploitation and discrimination directed against their class, language, sex, nation, generation, race or religion. We see this exemplified today in the miners' strike, the struggles to use the Welsh language, women's actions, the Irish struggle, youth rebellion and students' actions, immigrant protest actions and the struggle by Catholics in Northern Ireland against religious discrimination.

All the problems created by the entire course of the rise of class society come forward and demand resolution through these various forms of the class struggle. In fact, in the period of imperialist decline, every serious struggle by the workers and the petty bourgeoisie tend to go beyond the limits of bourgeois property rights and the bourgeois state.

The existence of the material prerequisites for a planned economy on a world scale place the socialist revolution on the agenda. The problem is the limitation in political consciousness of the working class. Our activity is orientated towards actions which will help overcome the limitations in the consciousness of the working class and its allies and in the process build a mass revolutionary workers party. The guide used in outlining our tasks and perspectives is the same as our guide to all political activity. That is the method of the transitional programme.

This method consists in finding openings in the class struggle, opportunities which facilitate exposing the inadequacies and failings of capitalism, showing the superiority of socialism in this respect, and advancing the mobilisation of the masses or sectors of them on the broadest possible scale. The class struggle itself thus becomes converted into a school in which the masses gain in political understanding and the cadres of the mass revolutionary party are shaped and recruited.

In this process we put forward fundamentally two kinds of demands: democratic demands and transitional demands and we put them forward not as a recipe book but as a guide to action.

Democratic demands are related to the political rights of the mass of the people. Historically, they were struggled for and partially won during the bourgeois revolution. These include such rights as the right to self-determination, the right to assemble, due process of law, the right to strike, and others.

But today the bourgeoisie has not only ceased to fight for democratic rights (such as self-determination for Ireland) but more and more the rulers try and take them away. The Industrial Relations Act versus the right to strike, the AIL Trafalgar

Square ban versus the right to assemble, the early morning police raids versus the right to be free from arbitrary search and seizure.

The struggle for democratic rights is a "bourgeois" struggle only in an historic sense -- it was the bourgeoisie that first raised and fought for them. Today it is only the working class and its Marxist vanguard who can be consistent defenders of and champions of all struggles for democratic rights. And it is only a workers state that can finish this historic task. Thus democratic tasks are our tasks. They must be fought for by proletarian class struggle methods and not by bourgeois reformist methods (by independent mass mobilisations rather than dependence on parliamentary reform and judicial decision).

Transitional demands indicate the solution to the economic and social needs of the working class which capitalism cannot grant. They lead towards challenging capitalist property rights and the bourgeois state. Such demands include the right to a job, the right to decent pay, housing, social security, etc. Transitional demands, such as a sliding scale of hours and a sliding scale of wages, pertain to the socialist economy of the future and are only realisable under it.

Democratic demands and transitional demands are related in two ways. The first is that capitalism has reached the point where it becomes more and more incompatible with any form of democracy. The defence and extension of democracy thus become proletarian tasks along with the advancement of transitional measures that go beyond capitalism although stemming from its present point of development.

The second and more important way in which democratic and transitional demands are related is in the method by which we defend and advance them. The method is the same in both instances -- the proletarian method of mass struggle. The heart of this method is mobilisation of the masses assembled by capitalism as the human basis of its mode of production. The Transitional Programme deals with the problem of organising and developing this type of struggle and carrying it forward to its final conclusion in the victory of socialism.

In a period where we can as yet lead no mass forces under our own banner, how do we move towards closing the gap between our numerical weakness and the receptivity of masses in struggle to our political ideas? By maximising our initiatives in building united actions around clear class struggle issues; by fighting organisational exclusion and by keeping such struggles independent from subordination to the needs of any reformist bureaucracies. It was what was done initially with the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign and what must be done in our Irish solidarity campaign and in the struggle for women's liberation. In practice the minds of large numbers can be opened to the value of independent struggle as opposed to class collaboration, and militants can be won to the entire Trotskyist programme.

This has guided our proposals to relate to and champion the struggles of every sector of the population against the evils of capitalism. We are unable to choose the field of battle. In the class struggle, battles break out as a consequence of forces over which we have no control at the present stage of our development. The **IMC** as a revolutionary socialist group has no choice but to

engage in these battles, otherwise we will not grow but will wither on the vine. In fact an audacious and aggressive attitude in this respect lies at the heart of the transitional programme and the method it teaches. The audacity in the transitional approach consists in attempting to wrest these slogans out of the hands of the reformist politicians, who seek to utilise them to divert the masses into safe, parliamentary channels.

This is why we explain to the workers the need to first and foremost count on their own strength as a class against the enemy class beginning with the absolute independence of their unions from the state. This is one of the central lessons of the miners' victory. Through these experiences they will test and eventually reject the misleaders of their unions and the Labour Party.

It is by using the transitional method as our fundamental guide to political activity today that we will take the next steps towards the construction of the mass workers party capable of leading the successful struggle against capitalism.