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MINUTES OF UNITED SECRETARIAT MEETING

May 27-30, 1979

PRESENT: Adair, Aubin, Brewster, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Jones, Georges, Kurt, Manuel, Marcel, Melan, Otto, Riel, Roman, Stateman, Susan, Walter

IEC PRESENT: Alfonso, Lachance, Nemo

GUESTS: Allio, Bourgueil, Greco, Jorge, Karl, Maria, Mario, Peter, Samuels

Chairpersons: Stateman, Bourgueil, Adair

AGENDA:

1. Bureau reports
2. Germany
3. Britain
4. Czechoslovakia
5. Colombia
6. Bolivia
7. Peru
8. Mexico
9. Canada
10. European Election Campaign
11. World Congress Preparations

1. Bureau reports

a. Dates of next United Secretariat meeting

Stateman reported on proposal that the dates of the next United Secretariat meeting be changed from July 12-15 to July 2-5. Given that vacations begin in July, and other scheduling problems, this would permit a more representative attendance. The agenda of this meeting would include important points on the preparations of the world congress, a balance sheet of the European Election campaign, and relations with the OCRFI, among other items.

AGREED

b. Antinuclear work

Duret reported that a common leaflet of the Fourth International was sent to sections for distribution at the international antinuclear demonstrations scheduled for the June 2-4 weekend; that comrades responsible for coordination of antinuclear work, in collaboration with the Bureau, are preparing a draft resolution on the antinuclear movement which will be presented to the September meeting of the United Secretariat.

c. Olympic games

Georges reported on the proposals contained in the April 25, 1979, circular concerning the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, which was sent by the Bureau to all sections and sympathizing organizations.

Motion from the Bureau:

The United Secretariat is opposed to calling for a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games, and is opposed to participation in committees organized to carry out such a boycott.

a. It is incorrect to call for a boycott of the games by the capitalist states, which could only be interpreted as an act hostile to the workers state by imperialism.

b. It is tactically wrong to call on the spectators and individual athletes to boycott the games, as outlined in the April 25, 1979, letter from the Bureau to all sections and sympathizing organizations.

c. The United Secretariat approves the proposal contained in the Bureau letter to explore the possibilities of organizing activities along the lines of the call issued by Dutschke, Moneta, et al.

Vote on Bureau motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Jones, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Nemo, Otto, Riel, Roman, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: Greco

Abstentions: none

Not Voting: none

Statement by Nemo:

I vote for the motion, in agreement with the position of struggle against boycott initiatives and rejection of participation in organizations of this type.

However, I disagree with the reference made in point (b) to the arguments used in the previous letter of the United Secretariat Bureau, arguments which seem to me to be confused and eclectic in regard to the main question:

As is indicated in the draft "World Political Resolution," the Fourth International--which tirelessly defends the rights of the Soviet masses against the bureaucracy--fights against any initiative that claims to be carrying out this struggle by looking to bourgeois governments to defend democratic liberties in the USSR.

This principle corresponds to the elementary requirements of independence of the struggle of the proletariat and defense of the gains of the workers and the workers states against pressures of all kinds--including the pseudo- "democratic" pressures of imperialism.

From this point of view, whatever might be the antibureaucratic intentions of some of its promoters, the call for a boycott of the Olympic Games in Moscow is not only an ineffective tactic but an initiative that contradicts this elementary principle. In fact the concrete content of a mass campaign on this theme could

only be to make pressure on bourgeois governments that they not send athletic delegations to Moscow and that they organize the games in another country--a bourgeois country--with a "more democratic" reputation. This leads in effect to placing ourselves in the framework of the imperialist policy of putting pressure on the USSR.

AGREED to attach to the minutes the motion adopted by the French LCR Central Committee concerning the Olympic Games. (See Attachment A.)

d. "Fourth International^{ist} Tendency (TCI)"

Duret reported on the formation of the "Fourth Internationalist Tendency," composed of the POR (Lora) of Bolivia, Politica Obrera (Argentina), the Committee of Liaison of Trotskyists of Chile, the OTI of Peru, the Trotskyist Tendency of Brazil, and Politica Obrera of Venezuela. This formation describes itself as independent of both the United Secretariat of the Fourth International and the OCRFI, characterizing the Fourth International forces as an obstacle to the construction of a Trotskyist Fourth International.

e. Portuguese abortion case

Jorge reported on the coming trial of Maria Antonia Palla, vice-president of the journalists union of Portugal, who has been placed on trial for having collaborated in producing a television program on abortion.

AGREED that the sections and sympathizing organizations should respond as quickly as possible with solidarity initiatives. Information concerning the case will be made available to the sections by the Bureau.

f. El Salvador

Maria reported on efforts by the Bureau to step up its communications and collaboration with the organizations supporting the Fourth International in El Salvador, the GSI and the LOR.

g. Africa Commission

Duret reported on the proposal of the African Commission, in agreement with the leadership of the Belgian section, to add Comrade Peters of the Belgian LRT as a member of the commission.

AGREED

h. Meeting of Chilean exile comrades

Maria reported that the Bureau is organizing a meeting of Chilean comrades in exile. This meeting will discuss the present situation in Chile, Chilean solidarity work, and the possibilities for unification of the three Chilean organizations that support the Fourth International, the PSR (official section), the Liga

Comunista, and the Izquierda Socialista (formerly Fracción Dissidente del MIR).

1. OCRFI

Bourgueil reported on three discussions that have taken place since the last United Secretariat meeting between delegations of the OCRFI and the United Secretariat Bureau concerning the draft world political resolution for the coming world congress, analysis of the trade unions, and the situation in Southeast Asia.

The report also dealt with developments inside the OCI in France leading up to the special congress of the OCI that took place May 24-27.

The Bureau did not yet send out the circular concerning relations with the OCRFI that was proposed in the motion adopted at the last United Secretariat meeting because of the fast-moving developments preceding the OCI congress. The Bureau will now send this circular as quickly as possible, including information on the debates taking place within the OCI.

2. Germany

Walter reported on the situation in the GIM (German section) prior to its national congress scheduled for June 9-10, and on the draft resolution prepared by the Parity Commission of the GIM in collaboration with the delegation of the United Secretariat that has participated in the Parity Commission established after the previous GIM congress in December 1978. (For a translation of this resolution, see Attachment B.)

Kurt presented a counterreport in opposition to the line of the draft resolution of the Parity Commission.

Discussion

Motion by Jones:

The United Secretariat has heard a report from the delegation, decided by the United Secretariat, that attended meetings and participated in the work of the Parity Commission of the German section. All reports agree that there has been a situation of extreme crisis in the section.

On the basis of this report the United Secretariat believes that two lines need urgently to be adopted by the German section.

(1) All evidence shows the need of a turn by the GIM in the direction of the trade unions and industry. Despite the relative strength of the West German economy compared to the other imperialist powers it is moving towards another recession; there have in the last period been the beginning of new struggles by the West German working class; no serious evidence is presented of major areas of growth outside the trade unions. Without adopting a turn in the direction of industry and the trade unions

the GIM will be outside the key developments in West Germany and not able to overcome its crisis.

The document drafted by the Parity Commission, taken as a text solely on this point, can provide a basis of this turn.

(2) Where the draft of the Parity Commission is in serious error, however, is in not taking up the issue of the SPD.

The United Secretariat holds that the incorrect analysis of the SPD adopted by the section in West Germany has grave consequences, not only for political positions but for the practical work of the GIM.

The view that the SPD has become a party of the bourgeoisie, but that the majority of the German working class has neither broken from this party nor vigorously fought this transformation entails necessarily the view that the West German working class has suffered an enormous setback, both at the level of organization and even more catastrophically at the level of political consciousness.

This incorrect view has clear political conclusions. It means the political organization and consciousness of the West German working class must essentially be rebuilt from the base upwards. Given the grave collapse in political consciousness involved in such an analysis, it leads to the conclusion that it is likely for a considerable period the working class would be primarily only capable of responding on elementary economic demands and therefore it creates a serious economist deviation in our work. Furthermore, it is obvious that the total rebuilding of the political consciousness and organization of the West German working class would inevitably only start initially on a localized and fragmented basis. Such a perspective tends strongly to playing down the importance of central political campaigns, of a strong regular political newspaper of the section, and the importance of building a strong leadership and professional staff, etc. Errors on these positions are therefore not isolated, organizational questions but completely linked with the wrong analysis of the SPD.

It is also false to believe that simply by putting comrades into industry, vital as this is for other reasons, will by itself correct the line on the SPD. If the SPD were in opposition, it is true, a turn into industry and the trade unions would produce a strong pressure to correct ultraleft views on the SPD. This is not the case, however, when the SPD is in the government on its present line. It is a general phenomenon that when there are right-wing Social Democratic parties in the government this produces a tendency to ultraleftist, economist tendencies, even among layers of militant workers. The reasons for this are obvious--any group of workers going into struggle meets head-on as a central enemy the policies of the Social Democratic government. Therefore in the present situation, a turn into industry and the trade unions can actually increase ultraleftist and therefore in the

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present situation economist and localist pressures on the organization. These pressures do not constitute an argument against the turn into industry and the trade unions by the GIM. What the pressures produced by the objective situation show, however, is the fact that a turn to industry and the trade unions must be accompanied now by a fight to adopt the correct position on the SPD. It is the task of the United Secretariat and of the delegation to the GIM conference to present its position on both the turn to industry and the SPD. Even if initially its position on these two questions would only be supported by a small number of comrades inside the GIM.

For this reason the United Secretariat cannot support the draft drawn up by the Parity Commission. By dealing only with the question of the turn into industry and the trade unions and taking no position on the SPD, it cannot in fact provide a coherent framework for the activity of the section, and any bloc it creates inside the GIM will come apart at the first serious test. This will be in a situation where there is a grave danger of demoralizing comrades both in the bloc and outside it by the results of this operation.

Instead of this type of manouvering, the only correct course for the United Secretariat is to openly and frankly state its position to the German section. It is of course for the congress of the GIM to decide whether it accepts this position or not, or merely passes a position on a turn to industry and the trade unions but takes no position on the SPD. The United Secretariat can only decide on its own line of intervention and not that of the GIM. The United Secretariat can, however, fight for the correct line.

For that reason the United Secretariat proposes to the German section:

(1) To urge the GIM to postpone the congress to allow further debate on the documents presented to it.

(2) To urge the necessity to integrate all currents in the organization in the leadership and that the majority must take the prime responsibility in fighting for this.

(3) That all minorities should see it as their duty to participate in leadership bodies at every level of the organization.

(4) To support a turn into industry and the trade unions as the priority of the organization.

(5) To characterize the SPD as a bourgeois workers party, to call for a vote for it in the election, and to call for an SPD government. To propose to add a section to the Parity Commission document on this.

(6) To point out the great importance of maintaining a fortnightly paper and a strong, central, full-time staff.

(7) To clarify the section of the Parity Commission document on women's oppression in the light of the discussion at this meeting.

Motion from the Bureau:

The United Secretariat has heard a report from the United Secretariat delegation that attended meetings and participated in the work of the Parity Commission of the German section (GIM). The Parity Commission was open to all the tendencies and groupings in the section. The United Secretariat has also heard reports from representatives of the Parity Commission, as well as from Comrade Kurt, who has withdrawn from the Parity Commission.

All reports agree that there has been a situation of extreme crisis in the section.

In order to give more time to try to reach agreement on a common document, the Parity Commission proposed--and the leadership body of the section accepted--to postpone the convention originally scheduled for Easter to June 9-10.

The United Secretariat notes that the Parity Commission has agreed on a draft document for the June 9-10 convention. This agreement cuts across old tendency line-ups.

The axis of this document is to implement a turn by the organization to implant itself in the industrial working class, outlining the main lines of trade-union work as well as certain central political campaigns for the organization. The United Secretariat agrees that carrying out such a turn is decisive to overcoming the crisis and paralysis of the overall activity of the section. It accepts the conviction of the United Secretariat delegation and the Parity Commission members that if this perspective is adopted at the June 9-10 convention and carried out by the leadership, this will provide a framework for the opening of a discussion on other political questions--such as all the questions related to our line toward the German Social Democracy (SPD)--on which there have been sharp differences in the past in the section--and that without this framework this necessary discussion will not move forward because of the organizational, political, and leadership crisis. Carrying through this turn will help make this political discussion more concrete. The reporters from the Parity Commission to the United Secretariat have affirmed the necessity of opening an organized discussion on these political questions, which are listed in the draft document.

The United Secretariat delegation to the June 9-10 convention of the GIM will express its position on the questions of the German Social Democracy, of the role and importance of a regular (at least fortnightly) political newspaper of the section, of the importance of building a strong leadership and professional staff, along the lines of the draft resolution: "The Crisis of Capitalist

Europe and the Tasks of the Fourth International." The United Secretariat delegation will also stress the importance of adopting correct positions on these questions in order to successfully carry out the turn to implant the organization in industry.

The United Secretariat delegation will propose to clarify the section of the document concerning women in the light of the discussion at this meeting, which the representatives of the Parity Commission agreed was necessary.

The United Secretariat calls on all tendencies in the GIM to participate in the daily leadership following the convention to help implement the turn and to prepare the political discussion necessary to carry it through successfully, opening a new stage for the organization.

Vote on Jones motion:

For: Jones, Nemo

Against: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Abstentions: Greco

Not Voting: Roman

DEFEATED

Vote on Bureau motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Abstentions: Greco

Not Voting: Roman

Against: Nemo, Jones

CARRIED

Motion by the Bureau:

In response to the request of Comrade Karl (GIM) of the Parity Commission, the United Secretariat delegation will discuss with the leadership of the Swiss section the availability of Comrade Karl (LMR) to continue in the next period to work with the GIM leadership.

Vote on above motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Jones, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Nemo, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: none

Abstentions: Melan, Greco

Not Voting: Roman

CARRIED

Motion by the Bureau

The United Secretariat will discuss with the leadership of the British section the availability of Comrade Jones to function as part of the United Secretariat delegation to the GIM in the next period.

Vote on above motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Duret, Frej, Jones, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Nemo, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: Claudio

Abstentions: Greco

Not Voting: Roman

CARRIED

Motion by the Bureau:

That the United Secretariat delegation to the GIM convention is: Duret, Stateman, Karl (LMR), Susan, and Jones.

Vote on above motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Jones, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Nemo, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: none

Abstentions: Greco

Not Voting: Roman

CARRIED

Motion by the Bureau:

To make available to the GIM for internal publication the minutes of this United Secretariat meeting and previous meetings relevant to this situation, and propose to the GIM that they be so published.

Vote on above motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Greco, Jones, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Nemo, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: none

Abstentions: none

Not Voting: Roman

CARRIED

Motion by Jones:

To translate and circulate the text submitted by the Parity Commission, Cde. Winnie, and any other line documents on central orientation submitted to the vote. To place West Germany on the agenda of the next United Secretariat meeting and to invite representatives of all tendencies in the GIM leadership to the meeting.

Vote on above motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Greco, Jones, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Nemo, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: none

Abstentions: none

Not Voting: Roman

CARRIED

Motion by Jones:

To vote on the document prepared by the Parity Commission based on a draft prepared by the United Secretariat delegation.

Vote on above motion:

For: Jones

Against: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Frej, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Riel, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Abstentions: Greco, Melan, Nemo

Not Voting: Roman

DEFEATED

Statement by Jones:

The refusal of the United Secretariat to vote on the Parity Commission document constitutes a real manouever. Every single member of the GIM will understand the intervention of the United Secretariat delegation as supporting the document produced by the Parity Commission and of attempting to create a new leadership of the GIM on the basis of this document.

The United Secretariat of course has the right to intervene to attempt to persuade the GIM to adopt such a position. But if it does so it must do so openly and honestly--by a clear and open vote on the line of the document. The situation whereby the United Secretariat in fact intervenes for a document, and even de facto endorses the formation of a leadership on its basis, but refuses to openly vote on and endorse the line of the document is unacceptable. It objectively constitutes a manouever.

Statement by Stateman and Walter:

The charge made by Comrade Jones that the majority of the United Secretariat is carrying out a manouever by not voting on the GIM Parity Commission document is irresponsible. The motion adopted by the United Secretariat makes its position on the parity Commission document crystal clear.

First of all, the United Secretariat as a whole is not able to take positions on a series of campaigns, etc., contained in the document. Moreover, it would be wrong to adopt the document as a United Secretariat resolution; it is better that this document, which is a document of the majority of the leadership of the German section, be so presented for discussion, modification, and adoption at the GIM convention, and not as a United Secretariat document.

Concerning the central axis of the document, to make a turn to implant the organization in industry, the United Secretariat motion makes it clear that the United Secretariat agrees with this axis of the document. There is no cover-up or manouever on this score.

Concerning the procedure of how best to proceed with the necessary political discussion in the GIM on such questions as the nature of and tactics toward the Social Democracy, the United Secretariat accepts the judgement of the members of the Parity Commission and of the United Secretariat delegation. They tell us of an extreme crisis in the section, with a danger of disintegration. It is their judgement that the best way to proceed is to take up the question of the turn at this upcoming convention, and on this basis proceed to the discussion of the other important questions. One factor in accepting this judgement is that the question of a turn to implanting the organization in industry has been one of the issues of sharp contention in the section. The fact that there is now majority agreement in the leadership of the section on this question represents an important step forward. Another factor in our accepting this judgement is the breadth of both the United Secretariat delegation and the Parity Commission, both of which agree on the best way to proceed, given the nature of the crisis. Comrade Jones disagrees with their judgement, while the majority of the United Secretariat has decided to accept it. That constitutes a political difference but not a manouever by either Comrade Jones or the majority of the United Secretariat.

The United Secretariat motion makes clear that it will defend its positions on the Social Democracy, the need for a regular political newspaper, and strong leadership and professional staff, etc.,

as part and parcel of the turn; it stresses that a correct position on these questions will largely determine the success of the turn.

The United Secretariat delegation did not proceed by simply writing down the positions of the United Secretariat on the issues in dispute in the GIM, to be presented to the GIM convention. The positions of the United Secretariat majority on these questions are already contained in the draft resolution submitted to the World Congress, "The Crisis of Capitalist Europe and the Tasks of the Fourth International." Rather, the delegation proceeded by attempting to bring together all tendencies in the GIM to discuss the crisis and see if a way forward could be found. It worked with those comrades who agreed with this approach--a majority of the leadership--to help them prepare their own resolution. We think this was a good way to proceed.

Finally, Comrade Jones is off base when he charges that the United Secretariat is trying to "create a new leadership" of the GIM. As its motion makes clear, the United Secretariat majority is of the opinion that all the tendencies should pitch in to the work of the section following the convention, including in the daily leadership, and the United Secretariat delegation to the GIM convention will work to achieve this.

Statement by Roman:

The reason I did not participate in the vote on the resolutions concerning the situation in West Germany is that I was absent from the United Secretariat meeting during the discussion on this subject.

3. Britain

Jones reported on the results of the general elections and the orientation of the IMG. (See Attachment C for resolution of Political Committee of the IMG.)

Discussion

4. Czechoslovakia

Georges reported on recent repression in Czechoslovakia (see June 1 circular from the Bureau to all sections and sympathizing organizations).

AGREED to begin an international campaign in defense of Petr Uhl, Sabata, and the other arrested leaders of Charter 77.

5. Colombia

Maria reported on proposal from the Bureau for an international campaign of solidarity against the rise of repression in Colombia, and in particular to organize protest actions around the time of Colombian President Turbay's trip to Europe in mid-June.

AGREED

Maria reported on positions taken by the PSR and the PST in regard to the struggle against repression and the new labor law adopted by the Colombian government last year (see Attachment D for "Open Letter" from Comrade Libardo Gonzalez, and articles from the PSR

and PST newspapers concerning the new labor law).

Motion by Melan: Having taken note of the open letter of Comrade Libardo published in the newspaper Combate Socialista, the United Secretariat thinks it appropriate to ask the COLOMBIAN PST for clarification on this matter prior to June 25, 1979 (before the next United Secretariat meeting).

CARRIED UNANIMOUSLY

6. Bolivia

Maria reported on developments leading up to the national congress of the COB and the national elections scheduled for early July, as well as on the letter sent by the Bureau to Vanguardia Obrera and to the Bolivian section urging a joint election campaign by the forces associated with the FROC and the Vanguardia Obrera.

7. Peru

Riel reported on the political situation in Peru in relation to the coming elections to a national parliament, and on the discussions taking place inside the Peruvian organizations of the Fourth International (PRT and PST) and of the OCRFI (POMR) on their intervention in the current situation.

When the Constituent Assembly is dissolved at the end of July, Comrade Hugo Blanco will lose the element of protection that is provided by his membership in that body. Given the special financial needs to guarantee the security of Comrade Blanco, as well as to participate in the coming election campaign (in which Comrade Blanco will probably run for president), the PRT has requested that a tour be organized for Comrade Blanco to several major cities in Europe and North America to raise money for these purposes.

The PRT also requests that the United Secretariat send a delegation to Peru in the near future, together with a delegation of the OCRFI, to aid in the process of fusion discussions between the PRT, PST, and POMR.

AGREED

8. Mexico

Alfonso reported on special congress of the Mexican PRT at the end of April to decide on tactics in the coming elections.

Discussion

9. Canada

Samuels reported for the majority viewpoint in the Canadian section concerning the debates that took place at the national convention of the RWL/LOR in April. The issues under discussion included the strategic framework of the Canadian revolution, the role of the Quebec national question, tactics toward the New Democratic Party, and the turn of the section toward implanting itself in the industrial working class.

Lachance reported from the viewpoint of the largest minority tendency at the congress.

(See Attachment F for summaries of positions of Tendencies 1 (also called Tendency for a Proletarian Turn), 3, and 4 on the strategic framework of the Canadian revolution (Tendencies 2, 5, and 6 did not adopt positions on this question), as published in the April 12, 1979, issue of the LOR newspaper Lutte Ouvrière.)

Discussion

AGREED to refer to the Bureau how best to collaborate with the Canadian comrades in discussing what position to take in the coming referendum on the question of Quebec's relation to the Canadian federal state.

10. European Election Campaign

Bourguell reported on the European assembly of the Fourth International held in Turin May 19-20. Aubin reported on the joint campaign in France between the LCR (French section) and Lutte Ouvrière. Brewster reported on the campaigns of Tariq Ali in England and Bernadette Devlin McAliskey in Ireland (which is supported by our comrades of People's Democracy).

(See Attachment E for correction to minutes of March 31-April 4, 1979, United Secretariat meeting concerning Ireland and the European elections.)

11. World Congress Preparations

a. Dates

Duret proposed for the Bureau that the dates for the World Congress be set for November 6-15.

AGREED

b. Finances

Duret reported that precise financial quotas and proposals will be presented to the next United Secretariat meeting, when the Bureau will have more precise information on the exact costs of travel and accommodations.

AGREED

c. Basis of representation

Motion by the Bureau:

Since the last World Congress there has been a significant increase in the number of countries where there are groups adhering to the Fourth International, as well as growth in the sections. While this growth is reflected in an increase in the budgets of the International and of the sections and sympathizing organiza-

tions, the overall financial situation is such that it is imperative to hold down the costs of the upcoming World Congress as much as possible. In addition, the United Secretariat believes it is politically important to hold a meeting of the IEC approximately one year after the World Congress. This IEC will also be expensive to organize.

To hold down costs, it is necessary to raise the ratio of the number of members to the number of delegates for each section or sympathizing organization compared to the last World Congress, when it was fifty to one delegate. At the same time, it is important to guarantee the representation of smaller sections and sympathizing organizations. The following motion would mean that the World Congress would be about the same size as the previous one.

Motion: 1) That the number of delegates each section or sympathizing organization is entitled to shall be based on the number of full members--i.e., members with the right to vote--of the section or sympathizing organization at the time of its convention at which the votes are taken on the documents before the World Congress.

2) That the number of delegates assigned each section or sympathizing organization be as follows: a) For sections or sympathizing organizations of less than 1,000 full members, there be one delegate for each 100 full members or major fraction thereof (50 constituting a major fraction). All sections or sympathizing organizations of less than 100 members are entitled to one delegate. b) For sections or sympathizing organizations of more than 1,000 full members, there be one delegate for each 150 full members. Such delegates will have one and one-half votes.

3) In the case of conflicting political positions as defined by votes for conflicting resolutions, the section or sympathizing organization's delegates will be apportioned according to the ratio of votes for the conflicting positions.

4) In the case of sections or sympathizing organizations entitled to one delegate where there is a political division along roughly equal lines, the section or sympathizing organization may wish to propose that more than one delegate be elected with fractional votes, to represent the different positions. Or, a section may find it necessary to send less than its full allotment of delegates, and may request that its delegates be allowed to represent more than one vote each. In these and other similar cases, the United Secretariat will make recommendations to the World Congress.

5) The World Congress will decide on the status of organizations presently sympathizing organizations and the status of their votes. The United Secretariat will make recommendations on this point to the World Congress.

Amendment by Greco: Add the following to point 3:

Members of the International who wish to propose or vote for candidates for delegate to the World Congress as individuals can

do so. The delegation of the section should include such candidates in proportion to the votes that they receive individually.

Vote on Greco amendment:

For: Greco

Against: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Otto, Riel, Roman, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Abstentions: none

Not Voting: none

DEFEATED

Vote on Bureau motion:

For: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Otto, Riel, Roman, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Against: none

Abstentions: Greco

Not Voting: none

CARRIED

Motions by Greco:

Motion No. 1:

1. The United Secretariat authorizes the Parity Commission to investigate the financial books of all sections and sympathizing organizations of the Fourth International as well as to attend all meetings of cells or whatever might be the basic unit of the organization in order to verify the true number of real members--that is, those who pay dues, regularly attend meetings, regularly sell the press, and regularly carry out the tasks projected by their party units--in view of the coming World Congress.

2. The Parity Commission is obliged to carry out such a verification process in any organization of the Fourth International on the request of any part of the International.

3. Any organization of the International that refuses to open its books and/or meetings to examination by the Parity Commission will be automatically suspected of fraud and their delegation automatically not recognized at the World Congress.

Motion No. 2

The United Secretariat recommends to the mandates commission of the Eleventh World Congress, and to the Congress as a whole, that the following criteria be adopted to guarantee a representation that corresponds to the reality of the sections and sympathizing organizations:

1. Any section or sympathizing group living in a situation of legality which does not publish a weekly paper regularly for the nine months preceding the World Congress (with the sole exception of vacation periods, during which a suspension of no more than one month is acceptable) will not be recognized, under any circumstances, as having more than 200 members.

2. Any section or sympathizing group working under full legality will be recognized as having a maximum membership equal to the number of political full-timers that the section or sympathizing organization has nine months before the World Congress multiplied by 40. This number of full-timers should include only political full-timers, that is, those paid by the party to carry out political leadership tasks; thus the employees paid by the party to work in various parts of the apparatus would be excluded from this category.

Vote on Greco motion No. 1:

For: Greco

Against: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Otto, Riel, Roman, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Abstentions: none

Not Voting: none

DEFEATED

Vote on Greco motion No. 2:

For: Greco

Against: Adair, Alfonso, Allio, Aubin, Bourgueil, Claudio, Duret, Lachance, Manuel, Maria, Melan, Otto, Riel, Roman, Stateman, Susan, Walter

Abstentions: none

Not Voting: none

DEFEATED

Proposal by the Bureau that all motions regarding the agenda of the World Congress be referred to the next United Secretariat meeting, when a proposal will be presented by the Bureau, and that all proposals concerning recommendations to the congress on criteria for recognizing sections and sympathizing organizations be referred to the United Secretariat meeting of September.

AGREED

Meeting adjourned

ATTACHMENT AResolution of the Central Committee of the French LCR on the Moscow Olympic Games (translation)

1. The organization of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow provides an opportunity for a massive intervention to denounce the crimes of the Stalinist bureaucracy and repression in the USSR and the "people's democracies," as well as to make known the existence of currents in opposition to the regimes in these countries and to encourage contacts between them and the workers movement in the West in order to sensitize the mass of workers to the defense of workers democracy and socialism.

It will also provide an occasion to denounce the hypocrisy of Carter's policy on human rights and in general the real violations of democratic liberties in all of the countries participating in the Olympic Games.

2. The Kremlin bureaucracy is organizing these olympic games to try to bolster its prestige and consolidate its relations with the imperialist states in the framework of "peaceful coexistence."

The aim of our intervention in relation to the Moscow Olympic Games should be to assure that there is no letup in the denunciation of the crimes of this regime. At the same time we must dissociate our campaign from anticommunists who are ready to fight repression carried out by Moscow but not to denounce repression in the case of Chile or the Shah of Iran.

3. The massive entry of Olympic Games spectators into the USSR and the coverage this will receive in the press throughout the world will provide an exceptional opportunity to denounce the bureaucratic betrayal of socialism. This denunciation will be most effective if it contributes to turning the workers movement against the Stalinist regime, to promoting ties between the workers movement and oppositionists in the USSR and the "people's democracies," and to express, on the spot in Moscow, the solidarity of the workers movement in the struggle for democratic, trade-union, and political liberties and for workers democracy in the bureaucratized workers states.

4. The boycott of the Olympic Games is not in itself a boycott of the noncapitalist foundations of the USSR, which we defend unconditionally against all attacks by reactionary forces. Thus, our position on such a boycott is a tactic and could change in a different context (for example, in the case of a Soviet intervention in Poland). While it is correct to utilize the Olympic Games in Moscow as the focus of the campaign, a boycott of the Games is not the most effective way to denounce the Soviet bureaucracy and to bring internationalist support to the workers of the Soviet Union and to the opponents of the bureaucratic regime. In fact, a campaign to boycott the Olympic Games contains many limitations and political traps:

--the limits: The boycott cannot take advantage of the particular conditions stemming from the ties which the USSR has with

the Western workers movement. To decide the best forms of action, it is important to begin from the fact that organizations linked to this workers movement will send thousands of young people and workers to the USSR: we need to bring into the Soviet Union itself information on, and positions taken by, the workers organizations; when people return, to organize debates and the adoption of positions on the repression in countries that claim to be socialist; to propose workers commissions of inquiry, etc. It is a matter of taking advantage of the relative "opening-up" which the Soviet bureaucracy seems ready to accept during these games so that we can turn it into a political weapon against the bureaucracy (even if there is a chance that, fearing the development of the campaign, the bureaucracy will organize tight police controls of its borders). But in that case the point will have been made even more strongly the the bureaucracy itself will have been forced to hold the games behind closed doors, contrary to its initial plans.

the political pitfalls: First, a boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games inevitably poses the problem of the other countries where these games could have taken place--most immediately, the problem of the USA, where the Winter Games will take place at Lake Placid. We cannot in any way give credibility to the "free world," which is inevitably the result of any boycott of the Moscow Olympic Games which does not also call for a boycott of Lake Placid (which poses, in fact, the question of boycott as a universal weapon).

In addition, while the boycott of the World Cup soccer match in Argentina was a notable success, this was due to the fact that it helped expose the silence of the imperialist governments and press on the crimes committed by the junta in Buenos Aires.

The situation is different with the Olympic Games in Moscow. The axis of a campaign in regard to the games should be one of solidarity of the workers movement in opposition to Stalinism, whereas a boycott of the Olympic Games could lead many currents to turn toward the bourgeois governments, demanding, for example, that Giscard break the official relations he has with the Soviet government through the International Olympic Games Committee.

5. This is why we propose:

--an informational campaign on the bureaucratic repression in the USSR and in the "people's democracies" and more generally on the violations of individual rights and of democratic, trade-union, and political liberties in all the participating countries. In doing this, our platform should distinguish us from currents hostile to socialism;

--a campaign of solidarity with victims of Stalinist repression and for liberation of all political prisoners, through obtaining as many statements as possible from political, trade-union, and workers organizations;

--sending delegations to the Soviet Union which, during the Olympic Games in Moscow, will publicly express solidarity against the repression that the Kremlin bureaucrats use against the work-

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ers, the oppressed nationalities, the intellectuals, and defenders of democratic rights in the USSR.

It is on this basis that we should solicit statements from the mass organizations in which we are active and take steps toward the formation of united campaign committees. Such committees should address themselves to all components of the workers movement and should plan all kinds of activities, including with currents that are for boycott of the Olympic Games--whether because they see the boycott as a way of opposing sports as an instrument of regimentation of the masses, or because they consider the boycott a way of supporting the struggle of the democratic and workers opposition against Stalinism--but who share our point of view in other respects.

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ATTACHMENT B -1Document submitted for vote at the GIM Conference June 9-10, 1979
(translation)

Submitted by members of the Parity Commission: Benjamin, Daniel, Karl, Mecki, Peter, Siegfried, Sonja, Wolf/Mainz

Introduction

This document is based on a draft proposed by the United Secretariat delegation in the Parity Commission. It was reworked at the May 2 and May 12 meetings of the commission. The members of the Parity Commission who have signed it put it forward as the basis for a resolution for the upcoming conference and as the basis for building a collective leadership in which all currents and positions in the organization should participate. Other positions should be expressed through amendments to this proposed document. In particular, no agreement could be reached in the Parity Commission concerning the rhythm of publication of Was Tun. On this question (and possibly others) the currents of opinion that exist in the commission will propose alternative motions to the conference. Motions concerning Was Tun should not be longer than three pages and should be sent to Frankfurt by May 21.

1. Main features of the political situation

West German imperialism has had a better recovery than most other imperialist countries from the long-term economic depression that was triggered by the world-wide recession of 1974-75. In addition it has had better conditions of competition on the world market as well as a more favorable economic and political relationship of forces and more stable conditions of rule in its own country. However, the general trends of development of the capitalist world economy make themselves felt in the BRD as well. Slacker periods of recovery, followed, in shorter intervals, by recessions, mean that the margin of manouver of capital to grant reforms and concessions to the working class shrinks. In the BRD as well it is necessary to carry out an austerity policy in the interests of capital, in the form of attacks on the real income, jobs, and social gains of wage earners.

But at the same time, despite the social-partnership policies of the bureaucracy, the working class still represents an organized massive power and has neither been atomized by the attacks of capital nor subjected to defeats of historically decisive dimensions. Therefore the previously mentioned developments must necessarily come up against the growing resistance of at least a section of the class. Thus the general tendency in the BRD as well will be for the class struggle to be on the rise, although this should not at all give rise to exaggerated predictions about the tempo and extent of this upsurge, or to the idea that the development of class consciousness will follow mechanically from the sharpness of the attacks by capital.

Moreover, the tempo and extent of this upsurge are, in and of themselves, hardly decisive for a small organization like the GIM, whose main axes of activity must be determined in the framework of its overall, long-term task: the building of a new revolutionary vanguard party of the West German working class. For, given the growing interpenetration of international capitals, especially on a European level, it is impossible in the long run that such an economically decisive country as the BRD should have a contrary development to that of the general tendency in late capitalist economy and society.

Taking into account all of the particularities of West German imperialism and of the West German working class and organized workers movement, a Marxist analysis leads to the general conclusion that: The BRD stands as an example of growing instability, not of growing stability. The working class and the workers movement are at the beginning of a long-term and deep-going process of regroupment and mobilization. The development of the class struggle is fundamentally different from what it was in the years 1948-67. Moreover, the development of deep social crises and class struggles in other parts of the world, above all in Western Europe, will affect developments in the BRD to a growing extent and will be a longer-term pressure in this direction.

Because of the low level of political class consciousness of the West German working class and because of the enormous power of the trade-union apparatuses in the most important branches of industry, the unions will be the crucial framework for the first differentiations on a mass level. This was reflected in the big role of trade-union strikes in the class struggle since the 1974-75 economic crisis and particularly in 1978-79. Even the factory-based strikes and fight-back actions--such as Erwitte, VFW, Weserkurier, and Michelin, as well as countless smaller struggles in the metal and printing industries--started from the trade-union structures in the factories or from the union factory council. While the defeat of the steel workers strike represented a setback for union wage struggles, the trade unions remain the most important framework for the radicalization and differentiation of workers consciousness.

Parallel to this, a development is taking place on the periphery of the unions, due to the lack of, or ossification of, the rank-and-file trade-union structures and to internal union repression. Expressions of this radicalization were: a part of the 1973 factory strikes, the emergence of left slates for the factory councils, and the spread of numerous left coordinating committees for factory work. However, since the 1973 Ford strike, these kinds of developments no longer led to any large-scale strike. For us the meaning of these structures lies in the fact that they are important arenas for activity by rank-and-file unionists, often the only such arena. But as independent formations existing apart from the unions, these formations have no future in the long run. We decide case by case whether participation in such structures is useful to our factory and union work. Our work in such structures is not based on a special political line different from our line in trade-union work. Rather, our task is to orient these structures toward the unions and to fight tendencies toward ultraleftism and factory-syndicalism.

Whether, how, and when this rising trade-union consciousness will also be expressed in a rising political class consciousness that encompasses broad political questions remains unclear at this conference and will consequently not be dealt with in this document. However, this question has a fundamental meaning for the line and the construction of the GIM, since revolutionary Marxists, despite their weakness, can influence this process through their program. This question must also be taken up quickly, however, and a conclusion must be reached that can be translated into the work of the organization because in the long run it is not possible to have a correct trade-union work and policy without resolving the question of the relationship of the working class and its most advanced layers to the SPK, to the DKP, to a possible "new left party," and to the groups of the socialist left. Without clarifying this question in our own ranks to arrive at an adequate line, we will also be unable to prepare the layers and circles of workers that we reach through our work for the problems that can arise from possible manouvers or shifts by the bureaucracy.

2. The necessary turn by the GIM

We can summarize the development of the class-political situation as follows:

The center of politics is shifting to the working class. Direct struggles between the working class and capital will have more and more of an impact inside society and will mark the overall course of developments. The weight of the working class in other social mass movements will increase.

The impact of the recent workers strikes, the growing number of radicalized and politicized workers in the factories, and the increasing internal discussions in the unions are the first signs of this development.

For the GIM this brings both an opportunity and a danger.

On the one hand there exists today the possibility of ending the unnatural situation in which one can work around and recruit to the program for a proletarian organization mainly outside of the working class. The foundations for building the GIM as a revolutionary workers organization can and must be laid today through a deliberate turn to work in the industrial working class. The thesis that it is possible to work politically in the working class but impossible to recruit workers and build the organization in the class is today already false and becomes increasingly inapplicable. On the other hand, however, the danger exists that the GIM could underestimate the problems flowing from its recent development and might hope that it could play a role in the coming differentiations and struggles of the working class solely on the basis of its program. If the GIM does not make a deliberate effort to change its social composition, its political field of work, and its methods of work, it will not be able to integrate itself in these developments and will be pushed to the sidelines.

Our organization also faces specific problems. Our program is geared to the differentiations that we predict taking place inside society as a whole and in the workers movement. It is the program for those layers of the class who begin to go beyond the framework of reformism and are looking for an alternative in order to mobilize the majority of the working class on the road to power. In view of the development of the German section of the Fourth International in the years of the cold war and the long postwar boom, however, the forces who carried out activities inside the class on the basis of this program dwindled to very few. The construction of the organization in sectors outside of the working class, based on the broad social mobilizations, did renew our capacity for action. But it did not solve the problem of how we could again root our program in the class and become capable of translating it into action.

Two empirical attempts that we undertook did result in a few successes, but they did not turn the organization as a whole toward this central goal: the construction of a party that is proletarian in its program, in its social echo, and in its social composition. Factory work with leaflets and intervention from the outside in relation to struggles did in some cases provide important contacts for the organization. We did not succeed, however, in orienting the organization in such a way that as a whole it would be seen by these contacts as a useful political instrument in which they could participate. The other attempt, which was to begin some trade-union work with comrades who were working--above all in sectors where new union organizing was taking place--did succeed in providing sections of the organization with an important experience in mass work. But it did not enable us to carry out a conscious building of the organization according to objective and subjective criteria. Moreover, both of these attempts did little to prepare for the political problems of a future radicalization and politicization of the working class, because in these efforts our confrontation with reformism scarcely went beyond propagandistic denunciation.

A third attempt to respond to this problem--that is, to transplant an isolated section of the organization into the factories without orienting the work of the organization around this effort and without a clear political line--also was unable to resolve the difficulties arising out of the temporarily restricted and conjunctural building of the organization parallel to the class. The turn that must be carried out today should provide answers to these problems as well as to the beginning radicalization and differentiation in the class.

As a precondition for this, the physical presence of revolutionary Marxists must be extended inside the class. We cannot expect to achieve this presence solely by recruiting workers, if they must then enter an organization marked by its university origins. This presence of the organization can be achieved through sending members of the organization themselves into factories. Without this precondition it will be very difficult to take the next steps forward.

The problems which arise out of this work and must be grappled

with should be at the center of the organization as a whole and of all its structures. In order to assure this, the leadership itself must participate in this turn, because it is not just a matter of a correction of our perspective for building the organization; rather, it is a fundamental shift in our orientation that has wide-ranging and long-term implications for individual members as well as for the whole organization.

At the same time organizational structures must be established and our political line must be clarified. Both are necessary if the organization is going to tackle this work over the long term as its central axis of construction.

This turn is not a matter of a single decision or a single correction of our course.

The cold war and the development of consciousness of the proletariat in the long period of economic boom had consequences for the building of a revolutionary party in the BRD. What has happened is that today the conditions have arisen which enable us to overcome these consequences. Just as in the process of building the GIM up to now on the basis of the development of differentiations in which we did not take part directly, this work today demands special efforts of the organization and the membership to root themselves socially in those places where the decisive developments will take place.

3. Preparation of an action program

For the political appearance of the GIM and its members as a party in the class itself, and in face of the differentiation processes taking place there, it is important that the organization have a comprehensive action program.

This will make it possible:

--to intervene in the slowly differentiating and radicalizing sections of the working class, especially among those who have already had initial experiences in struggle, on the basis of an overall political strategy that provides an alternative to that of the SPD, the DKP, and other forces and that would be based on an updating of the Transitional Program of the Fourth International;

--to deal with the broad social problems that have been raised by the large social movements outside of the working class in such a way as to integrate them in the most fruitful possible way into the new orientation of the class and into the struggle against the policies of the bourgeoisie and to provide the organization with a comprehensive political profile and a corresponding education.

This program should begin from the objective problems facing the working class and should formulate proposals for action which can provide solutions in face of the subjective and organizational weakness of the class. The themes of social movements such as the fight against nuclear installations and destruction of the environment, the oppression of women, and education belong today in such an action program, because they are important objectively as well as subjectively for the further development of the class and for its struggle against capitalism and its consequences.

Given the existing isolation of these movements from the organized movement of the class, such an integrated action program is decisive for the whole organization. Without it, it is impossible to prevent the de facto appearance of two lines in the organization-- a so-called "general political" line for the movements, and a "trade-unionist" line for the work inside the working class and the workers movement. This would of necessity lead to a split in the organization and a deformation of both sides of the organization and of its line.

This action program cannot, however, be a substitute for an organizational-political project for building the organization. It is clear that such a project should base itself on the action program, but a small, still inexperienced organization cannot move forward in building itself on many different axes at once. A propagandistic intervention based on this program is important, however, for the understanding of the organization and the education of its members, as well as for contact and recruitment work, in order that all members of the organization are able to accumulate experiences in concrete work and at the same time that to a certain extent the presence of general social perspectives and activities is assured.

This action program should today be developed and built around the following axes:

--Against the consequences of the crisis and restructuration on the working class: Beginning from the problems that are worsening every day in the work place (greater intensification of work, speed-up, technical changes) and from the problem of unemployment, we must show that only a central solution such as the shortening of the work week to thirty-five hours can guarantee real protection. Beginning from this central solution, we also point to the meaning of workers control for the immediate problems that arise. Only when the workers movement can achieve a relationship of forces which permits a veto against decisions of the capitalists will it be possible to protect itself from the attacks. This also includes, however, workers control over the organization of work, a sliding scale of wages based on the cost-of-living increases calculated by the unions, and a struggle against the new system of wages. We also explain that these goals of struggle only provide answers to immediate questions if they are utilized in a comprehensive sense (that is, through nationalization under workers control of industries in crisis, with workers control over training programs, etc.).

--Against the policies of imperialism and for international solidarity: Imperialist policies are an immediate problem for the working class. The most well-known expressions of these policies are the presence of foreign workers and foreign investments, and the displacement of factories. Beginning from these problems and from the defensive struggles in the semicolonies and the other capitalist countries, we develop demands and proposals that stand in direct opposition to the dead-end of nationalism in which the reformists and Stalinists are stuck.

--Against the capitalist threat to social life and social relationships: We show how the capitalist offensive has not only direct material effects but also has much wider-ranging results, in comparison with the economic results, which in the long term pose a direct threat to the whole of social life. The main themes in rela-

tion to this are the building of atomic power stations, and the problems of the development of the state, destruction of the environment, the subjugation of women, capitalist rationalization, and education (elementary and high school). In thus placing the main emphasis on the meaning of these themes for the strategy of the workers movement (and this in opposition to other tendencies inside the workers movement as well as inside the broad social movement), we necessarily come into conflict with the reformist and people's front (state monopoly capitalism) strategies in a very concrete way.

--Against the capitalist policy of repression by the state:

We explain how in all these questions the state plays a decisive role, and we develop concrete demands in relation to them, both on an internal and international level. This would include the limitations on the right to strike, the reduction of democratic rights through the Berufsverbot, etc., as well as policies in the sphere of social security and taxes. It would also include the membership of the BRD in NATO, the European Community, and similar bodies. We place special emphasis on the role of the state in capitalist destruction of the environment (nuclear programs and city planning that are clearly designed to support profits), and on its role as an imperialist economic power of the first rank. As the economic depression sharpens, the question of an alternative, anticapitalist economic policy--and with it the question of a workers government--will become central.

--For a reorientation and restructuring of the trade-union movement: All previous actions have shown how central the orientation and role of the trade unions is for future developments. Our orientation against the policy of social partnership and class collaboration and for a policy of class independence and class unity at all levels must be developed in function of the goals of our action program. Within this framework we point out the significance of the broadening of trade-union democracy and the antibureaucratic struggle in order to be able to defend the historic interests of the working class. This is the way an answer can be given to the revitalization of plant trade-union structures and the importance of a line for strengthening the trade unions. Within this framework, our analysis of the Social Democracy and our tactics in relation to it must be rediscussed.

The working out and discussion of an action program by the entire organization, starting with the question of the areas of work for the GIM, and completed by the governmental question, is the task for the next period and should be begun immediately after the conference.

4. A concrete plan for building the GIM

The beginning of a process of regroupment and development of consciousness in the West German working class is of extraordinary importance for the building of the GIM. The nuclei of the emerging workers vanguard can be won for the building of the revolutionary party. There are no objective reasons at all today that make this goal impossible. It is rather a question of orienting the organization, through our plan of construction and through our line, in

such a way that as a whole it can take on this task. This goal can be summed up by the concept of proletarianization of the organization.

Until now the GIM has had little success in setting processes in motion on its own. It has been limited largely to commentary-type propaganda. The current development and the plan for building the GIM that we are presenting will not fundamentally change this. Quick breakthroughs can therefore neither be organized nor expected. We have, however, the possibility of creating in this way the necessary conditions for playing a role in the coming class mobilizations. In order to utilize this opportunity the GIM has to commit itself to a clear plan of construction. The turn is aimed at achieving such a plan of building the organization: though sending comrades into the plants and beginning systematic mass work by the organization, the conditions necessary for building the GIM as an organization of the workers vanguard will be created.

In this sense our plan for building the GIM should be oriented in such a way that the whole organization, as well as every individual and every structure, is aware in all its activities of how it is thereby:

--strengthening the GIM organizationally, and at the same time,
--making it possible to answer the decisive political questions and in this way strengthen the GIM politically.

Every improvement in political orientation makes it possible to strengthen the GIM and recruit--such possibilities must also be taken advantage of.

On the other hand, all recruitment and strengthening of the GIM must also allow us to apply our political orientation--developed in a thorough way in the action program--from a reinforced organizational and political standpoint.

It would be wrong to want to simply reinforce our factory and trade-union work within the framework of the previous construction of the organization, while at the same time continuing all our previous work. The organization as a whole and the majority of its bodies and members, as well as the way in which the organization's line is elaborated, are still ill-prepared to be able to give the necessary organizational and political answer to the developments within the class. If the new possibilities are to be taken advantage of, the entire organization must be concentrated on doing this and on the plan for building the GIM established in function of this necessity.

In order to be able to move forward in this way, we have to first of all accomplish a simple necessary first step: our physical presence in the working class and the workers movement. Our previous work, contact work, leaflets, and mass work in trade unions on the periphery of the (industrial) working class do not in and of themselves mean that the organization will systematically and on a long-term basis center itself organizationally and politically on this problematic of regrouping, mobilizing, and politicizing the class.

For this reason, the organization and its members should be

colonized in the plants to the maximum extent. This maximum colonization does not flow from a moral criterion, rather from the goal we are pursuing:

--The greater the number of comrades who participate in this colonization, the more probable it is that we can succeed, at least within a year, in concentrating groups in a few key plants. Having merely isolated individuals in industry over a long period would be extremely dangerous for the organization. The depoliticizing pressures would increase enormously.

--Also, the greater the number of comrades that participate, the easier it will be afterwards within the organization to follow through on the results of the turn in terms of discussion and organizational structures.

--Every branch should be able to build up a foothold in the plants. Wherever this is impossible or not worth while--whether for organizational or objective reasons--a collective transfer to another city should be envisaged. This is a task for the entire organization. That is, not in the sense that only those comrades who themselves are ready to colonize have a place in the organization, but rather in the sense that everyone should help out to see that the best conditions are created for this project. During the next year, local leaderships, together with the Central Committee and Political Bureau, should carry out a continuous campaign and continuous organizational work for colonization. The emphasis has to be put on collective discussion and carrying out the campaign so that colonization is not left only to individual comrades to decide.

The factories to be colonized should be selected according to the following priorities: steel, printing, and chemical.

Comrades should not be colonized into the public sector or into the HBV or GEW sectors [HBV is a white-collar union; the GEW is the main teachers union--translator]. However, comrades who are already working in this sector and doing work there that is useful politically and for the building of the GIM should not be taken out for colonization into other areas. In any case, the work in this area must be structured centrally, so as to be able to exchange experiences and centralize the work.

The organization should be structured in such a way that this work is at the center of the real functioning of the organization and that we are able to work out political points of emphasis that correspond to our priorities regarding colonization and mass work.

If we center on this as the axis for construction of the GIM for the coming years it is clear that we are not simply creating a daily, additional task for the organization and its militants. The development of our program in a working class and a workers movement that have still had little experience with, or channels for, mass activity also poses serious problems in relation to changing the social milieu in which we work. The experiences of the GIM, as well as those of sections of the Fourth International in more politically advanced countries, show that it is precisely comrades sent into factories who can easily fall victim to tendencies to economism, localism, ultraleftist isolation, and circle-type existence, which affect

many radicalized but politically unarmed elements within the class. For this reason it is crucially important that from the very beginning the organization be capable of responding to these problems and arming its members politically to confront these tendencies within the class. This includes:

--regular coordination on a local and national level among all those carrying out plant work. A central aspect of this will be the organization of a plant workers seminar at least twice a year. This will begin with a plant workers conference in 1979.

--building of a leadership and local leadership structures that are themselves involved in this colonization process and that are capable of integrating comrades who are already experienced in this area.

--Precisely because of the reorientation to industrial work, the entire organization needs a newspaper that gives every comrade and every basic unit of the organization a clearly developed political profile by taking up the important questions for the working class and for socialist politics in the framework of the revolutionary Marxist program and the current political emphasis of the organization. Over the above their own work, comrades must be able to present their political positions through their reference to the newspaper and their collaboration with it. Work for the newspaper and with the newspaper can also help comrades who are still isolated in their city or in their area of work to develop systematic contact work. Above all, the paper must regularly give comrades material and a line with which they can participate in the developing processes of discussion and regroupment in the working class.

The newspaper can only meet these tasks under the following conditions:

--It must appear regularly;

--There must be a clear and systematic prioritization regarding the content of the paper to correspond to the agitational demands, lines of argumentation, and campaigns developed by the organization;

--There must be a simple presentation of international, political, economic, and programmatic questions that are not easily accessible.

Such a newspaper cannot be produced by the editorial board in the center alone; rather, it presupposes systematic collaboration by the members. Collaboration with the branches and the structures of intervention (cells, commissions, committees) should be encouraged. Qualified correspondents must be developed in the organization. The most important articles in every issue should be discussed in the Political Bureau.

The new leadership and the local leaderships must make special efforts to increase the number of papers sold and the subscription base and to put the newspaper on a sound financial basis.

The developments in the trade unions have a special significance for the regroupment process in the working class. Regroupment and the process of growth of consciousness will not be massively ex-

panded and stabilized without a transformation of the trade unions themselves and the expression of this change in their structures as well. This process is important to enable the first nuclei to break out of their isolation. If this problematic--in addition to its fundamental aspects--is not integrated into our axis of construction of the GIM, we will ourselves help lay the basis for the demoralization of the first nuclei of activists in the class or for their incapacity to resist attempts by the bureaucrats to coopt them. For this reason we must put great emphasis on:

--within the organization, concretizing our analysis of the trade unions as it relates to factory and trade-union work, and guaranteeing that we become neither simple tail-enders of the bureaucrats nor de facto antiunion. This means in particular discussing how we bring the trade-union question as a concrete orientation into groups that are not active in the trade unions and how we relate to differentiations within the trade-union bureaucracy and what their significance for our work is.

--systematically organizing the GIM comrades locally and nationally on the basis of which trade union they belong to, in order to guarantee collective work beyond the plants and the various cities and to create the most effective instrument for intervening in a united way in left-wing currents, developing tendencies, and differentiations.

Tied to this is the importance of the campaigns we carry out. These campaigns should not simply flow from a goal of launching demonstrations and actions; rather, they should enable the organization to influence the process of political clarification and to give it a public political face. We are conscious of the fact that the first regroupments, discussions, and mobilizations within the class will be very quickly confronted with vast problems, raising the questions of the objective situation and the attacks of the bourgeoisie and the state, and also the policy of the bureaucracy. For this reason a campaign policy for the organization which generally prepares and directs these confrontations is as necessary as it is indispensable for the construction of the organization as a political party. Given our current forces and the tasks for building the GIM that we have set for ourselves, only campaigns that have a central political importance should be selected for long-term work; they must be useful to the entire organization.

However, this also means that these campaigns must be given special emphasis:

--They should be projected in such a way that they can also be integrated into mass work in the workers movement and thereby influence the regroupment of the working class.

--They should respond to objectively decisive problems for the class confrontations in the BRG.

--They should help the branches carry out specific party-building and recruiting campaigns to win other forces directly to the GIM, while the largest portion of our forces are used for immediate tasks.

5. What campaigns should be part of this plan to build the GIM, and what political orientation

Colonization is neither a substitute for a political orientation nor a goal in and of itself. Colonization is a means to realize our medium-term political-organizational plan to better root the GIM in the most advanced sections of unionized workers who are slowly becoming active and going through a process of political differentiation. We want to be better able to politically influence and encourage this radicalization and regroupment process on all levels. And this perspective is in turn part of our long-range goal to become a revolutionary party of the German working class or--what comes down to the same thing--to actively take part in a decisive way in a qualitative raising of the political consciousness of the working class and play an essential role in determining the content of this consciousness and the actions of the class. There is no objective reason at all why we cannot already today begin, and move forward in, the task of actively participating in this process.

As important as are the current sociological differentiations inside the class (professional structure, types of work, origins), it would be wrong to determine the vanguard according to such criteria. It would be just as wrong to apply purely ideological criteria to define the vanguard, thus selecting as our sole "target" those layers that have a "socialist" consciousness. Our main criterion can only be the degree to which sections of the class are able to respond to the decisive objective problems, to address these problems inside the working class and the workers movement, and to oppose the bourgeoisie. Also decisive today is to what degree sectors of the class participate, and what role they play, in struggles against the employers and in debates inside the unions, as well as how much they contribute to the overall development of class consciousness in the direction of a rejection of class collaboration and how much they contribute to the extension, generalization, and coordination of workers struggles and organizational forms to larger sectors of the class.

The conditions of work that we find in the factories and unions in the BRD include a very low level of political class consciousness, a class activity that is still limited and marked by discontinuity, strong bureaucratic control over the unions, and repression. Given these problems, it is impossible to identify a retreat into factory work pure and simple, or a limitation of ourselves to only those questions that can be related to immediate "work bench" -type problems, with the building of a revolutionary vanguard party. Such a perspective would only lead the GIM even farther from its goal. Neither study circles, nor the organization of discussions, nor regroupments can in themselves counteract or oppose the pressure that the backwardness of the class constantly exerts on the vanguard. This can only happen when, parallel to its colonization, the GIM comes forward as a party with its own independent political profile in the outside world and achieves some growth in the middle term.

The ideal variant would be if the rising class struggle and formation of class consciousness, along with the simultaneous development of internal differentiations in the trade unions, would permit us to achieve this public, independent appearance of the GIM by more and more integrating our central political campaigns with our daily activity inside the unions--and doing this in connection with left currents inside the unions who, through their attempts to generalize from differentiations in the unions, begin to come into conflict with the role and line of the bureaucracy. The possibility of achieving

this, however, depends largely on factors that are not in our control. The extent and success of our colonization does make possible systematic trade-union work, which can have an impact on developments while not alone determining the outcome.

From this point of view it is necessary that at the same time as we step up colonization of comrades into industry, we must make a concrete decision on the weight and meaning of central political campaigns for the GIM. From a general viewpoint, this has to do with a question of principle, that is, with the difference between a syndicalist and a Leninist approach to the problem of the class vanguard. The concrete steps that should be taken in this direction by a particular organization at a particular point in time can, however, only be determined pragmatically, since they depend on the concrete situation and are also crucially affected by the strength and internal situation of the organization.

The GIM today is not in a position to carry out over a year's time four or five central political campaigns at the same time or one after another, even if it could achieve certain successes by doing this (such as influence in layers with a growing political consciousness, modest recruitment, and the creation of contacts). At the same time, the priority on factory and trade-union work must not be endangered.

Given the limited forces at our disposal, we decide on the following axes for the work of the organization:

1. Against the massive unemployment: shortening of the work week (the 35-hour week)
2. Trade-union democracy
3. The fight against nuclear power stations

Around these axes campaigns can be developed. The concrete proposals and centralized activities for the year ahead will be worked out by the new leadership organs in collaboration with the comrades responsible for the city organizations and the various areas of work.

These choices were made so that the following pressing tasks could be accomplished:

Axes 1 and 2 should help support our intervention in the factories and unions--including what we can do from the outside--and help put us forward as a political and useful organization. At the same time, the trade-union question in the broad sense can only be taken in hand through a long-term, prepared approach--which is not possible through working in factory structures alone.

Axis 3 is necessary because of the extent of the existing mass movement and growing consciousness that exist around the question of nuclear power and that can develop even further. Through a centrally led intervention in the anti-atomic-power movement--based on the AKL [Aktions Kreis Leben, an anti-nuclear organization based in the unions--translator] but not necessarily limited to this organization--the GIM can raise important questions that can also be combined

with certain recruitment activities. This should be taken into consideration in the apportioning of resources and cadre of the organization.

Other important areas for activity and gaining of political influence can at present be dealt with systematically only by the newspaper or can be accomplished by a small part of the organization. These themes will be systematically taken up in sympathizer circles, in classes, and in public meetings, since they form central parts of our program and give us a special political advantage in comparison to all other currents--something that is recognizable to broad layers of people. The leadership should also centralize this work as much as possible through ad hoc commissions and a comrade in charge from the central committee (this includes work on internationalist themes, women's work, East European work, etc.). This must be done to avoid a deviation from the priorities in the division of resources and areas of activities of comrades, through local or personal initiatives. Individual determination of such areas of work should in any case be avoided because with the present low level of the working-class movement, this would quickly lead to serious political and organizational mistakes.

6. Tasks and structure of the new leadership

In this concept of building the organization special importance must be given to the leadership. It must be capable of leading the turn and the first steps that the organization as a whole will undertake in factory and trade-union work. These tasks fall on the political leadership of the organization--the political bureau and the central committee--and in a more limited way, on the local level, to the city leaderships. These tasks cannot under any circumstances be given over to a factory and union commission, because this immediately brings back the danger of a division in terms of political line and ways of building the organization or it results in the de facto appearance of two parallel leaderships of the organization.

To carry out these tasks, given the internal situation today, the GIM must give priority to the formation of a collective leadership. This means:

--The leadership must itself go beyond the old factionalism and tendency struggle in order to create enough leeway so that mistakes and difficulties stemming from the turn do not deepen the old organizational division and the paralysis of the organization that went with it, thus making the GIM completely incapable of acting. This does not mean that the political bureau and central committee should stick under the table the old political differences, but rather that they place the accent on the areas of agreement that permit them to lead the organization in turning outward, and in this framework to also discuss the political differences and seek to resolve them. The same method should be applied in the process of reuniting the local groups and in the formation of city leaderships.

--The leadership must organize their work so that, independent of their internal divisions of tasks, all of them together take responsibility for the tasks laid out in this document. Their goal should be to prepare for decisions on all important questions through

discussion with experienced comrades in the local groups and in the central committee so that a line emerges that can be applied by the whole of the organization.

The composition of the leadership bodies (political bureau, central committee, city leaderships) should be such that they can assure on even a daily basis an exchange of experience, coordination, and political centralization.

This can only be achieved if members of the leadership themselves participate in the colonization plans of the organization, and, on the other hand, if comrades who work in the unions and factories are elected to the leadership. Other prerequisites for this are the reestablishment of collective city leaderships and structures to lead areas of work (cells, commissions, work meetings) on a local and central level, as well as the integration of all central committee members into leadership functions on various levels.

The leadership cannot, however, truly carry out their tasks unless they maintain regular and frequent contact with the basic units of the organization and the structures for leading areas of work, through circulars, information material, and visits to the local groups; unless they can organize and prepare work conferences; unless through their work they can not only take part in the public appearance and intervention of the organization but also follow the development of the local work and organize the internal discussion around the central political questions. This is only possible with an apparatus that has at its disposal a sufficient number of political and technical full-timers.

--Within the framework of this concept of construction of the organization, it will also be the task of the transitional leadership to devote sufficient space in the life of the GIM to the questions of political line and of sectoral work that remain open. Without this discussion, the minimal agreements that exist at present could threaten to become a purely administrative compromise that could not be sustained and would lead the organization into cynicism and demoralization. This means that discussion on the following political questions must remain open following the congress:

- the SPD and the united front policy
- clarification of trade-union strategy
- the action program
- election tactics

Before the end of the year a new conference must decide on the tactics of the GIM in the 1980 Landtag elections and then in the Bundestag elections.

Important questions concerning the work of the organization must be resolved immediately in the transitional period by the new leadership or the organization will lose forces or not win forces that could be won. This must be done without placing in question the agreed-upon axes of intervention. These questions include:

- student work
- women's work
- work in GEW, OTV, and BIs

In the framework of the concept of construction presented here, the possibilities for recruitment to the organization and for its public appearance cannot be fully exploited unless the organization begins to build a youth organization in the not too distant future. The next congress cannot make a decision on this question, nor can the new leadership. The latter can, however, determine what forces can be freed up for this project over the coming years and what kind of preparations will have to be made to carry it out.

The decision on this should be made by the congress after next.

7. The newspaper

(Here there will be alternative proposals placed before the congress, together with introductory material.)

8. Democratic centralism

In the past period of the GIM's development, the question of democratic centralism has become simply a problem of discipline, and the differences over it have been characterized by pure self-defense. In the framework of the new orientation, democratic centralism should again become a political foundation of the effectiveness of the party internally and externally.

The democratic centralism of even an organization as small as the GIM can be decisive for the beginnings of regroupment of a vanguard of the class which is still objectively, subjectively, and organizationally isolated, and for the breakthrough of these regroupments onto the trade-union level. The possibility of working together, from various starting points, in the same direction, and the possibility of dedicating ourselves as a whole to the problems of winning back the trade-union organizations and of the reality of the confrontation between the classes beyond the factory level, must be essentially accomplished through the centralization of the revolutionary organization itself.

The internal democracy of the organization is designed to aid this external task. It allows us to centralize the different experiences gone through by sections of the organization working in particular places, areas of work, factories, and unions, and also, in the course of this process, to develop cadres. It is in this area that the major difficulties arose in the past years as a result of the crystalized tendency and faction situation in the GIM. Cadres were formed not in the framework of the work of the GIM as a whole, but only in the framework of the tendencies, and, on the leadership level, only in the framework of the tendency struggle. For this reason it is important to give a new importance to democratic centralism as a whole in the framework of the turn. It is only in this way that the first cadres in the working class that the GIM already has--and who will be reinforced in the coming period--will be effective in a comprehensive way inside the organization and in outside work.

To achieve this it is important that the local membership assemblies should regain their important place in the internal life of the organization. The membership assemblies must become the decisive place for discussion, planning, and concretization of our tasks. Here there is a clear difference between the membership assemblies and the intervention structures (cells, commissions, comrades in charge of certain areas of work) on a local level. The membership

assemblies are the decision-making structure before which each member and each intervention structure is responsible.

The application of democratic centralism is decisive even for the continuing differences over the necessity of the turn. This does not mean that the preconference discussion will be continued after the conference. It does mean, however, that comrades who are not involved in factory and union work, or do not want to become involved in it, will still participate in the realization of the overall orientation of the organization and of its construction, and will subordinate their work to the priorities decided by the organization as a whole. Only in this way can we prevent a conflictual development in the organization with the intervention in factories and unions on the one side and participation in mass movements or activities on a general political level on the other.

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ATTACHMENT C

(Resolution adopted by IMG Political Committee May 6, 1979)

1. The relation of class forces

The results of the election reflect fairly accurately the shifts in the situation of the classes in Britain in the last years. The Tories, or other ruling class parties, have not succeeded in making major swathes into core working class areas. This reflects the fact that despite the setbacks of 1975-78 no qualitative defeat has been suffered by the working class and oppressed. At the same time however the bankruptcy of the policy of the labour bureaucracy has allowed the ruling class to succeed in significantly recomposing its forces, and layers outside the core of the working class, around the project of Thatcher. The situation represents and reflects a definite but not qualitative shift in the class relation of forces in favour of the ruling class. It places the working class and oppressed definitively on the defensive but under conditions where they have real capacity for resistance and to reshift through struggle the relation of forces.

In terms of immediate perspectives the situation may be summed up by saying that the Tory Party and ruling class have gained the initiative to formulate a definite anti-working-class project. What is not at all decided yet is whether they will have the capacity to implement it. That will only be decided by struggles in the coming period which will involve many layers of the working class and oppressed. It is for these struggles, and not a period of apathy and defeat, for which the IMG must prepare itself.

In that framework the question of fighting for socialist policies which answer the crisis and the Tory and bosses offensive becomes crucial. The fight for basic rights and the fight to break all class collaboration by the trade union bureaucracy demands the posing of a socialist alternative.

2. Political slogans and axes

Although not a qualitative change in the class relation of forces the existence of the Tory government obviously means a major change in the political form of the class struggle and therefore a turn for the organisation in this field. The following should provide the basic framework around which we organise our work and line.

1. The fundamental axis is to unite the working class and oppressed in struggle against the policies and existence of the Tory government. This is the decisive axis for the fight for the united front of the working class. Our chief slogan for guiding and organising our work is "Unite to Fight the Tories."

11. In that framework the following constitute the key slogans and areas in which to concretise demands: Mass Action to Defend Basic Rights!; Kick Out the Tories! For a Labour Government!; Build a Class Struggle Left Wing!; The Trade Unions and the Labour Party Must Adopt Socialist Policies!; Make the Left Fight; Remove Callaghan and his Supporters; For a United Revolutionary organisation.

3. Key Priorities

For the IMG the key priorities should be *to build a revolutionary youth organisation, *to make the centre of work the trade unions and to make a decisive turn to the industrial unions. *to discuss building a fraction in the Labour Party with a national presence *to greatly strengthen centralised political campaigns and centralised propaganda.

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ATTACHMENT D (part a)

(From Combate Socialista, May 25, 1979)

Carta Abierta a "El Socialista"

Bogotá, abril 26 de 1979

Compañeros
EL SOCIALISTA

Quiero dirigirme a Uds. para manifestarles mi protesta por la actitud asumida por ese periódico, al omitir toda mención al allanamiento de mi residencia y retención por veinte (20) días por parte de la Brigada de Institutos Militares, acogidos de la aplicación arbitraria del artículo 28 de la Constitución Nacional y del mal llamado Estatuto de Seguridad.

Al guardar silencio sobre este ominoso episodio y mencionar solamente el caso de la compañera Gloria Gallego, miembro del PST; Uds. han aceptado la tesis de *El Tiempo*, que me tiñó de sospechoso de pertenecer al Movimiento Autodefensa Obrera, en un acto de irresponsabilidad que intentaba cubrir con un sucio manto no sólo a mi persona, sino al PSR y al movimiento trotskista colombiano del cual Uds. hacen parte.

La actitud miope de vuestro periódico se nota de bulto, ya que una inculpación personal a mí, como la que reprodujo *El Tiempo* sólo buscaba incrementar la represión

hacia la izquierda legal, y concretamente hacia las organizaciones trotskistas. En ese sentido, yo reclamaba la solidaridad, no por mis calidades personales, sino por el contenido político que ella debía tener, mostrando la falsedad de quienes pretendían vincular al trotskismo con el terrorismo, que en este caso eran la BIM y *El Tiempo*.

Es deplorable que tengamos que quejarnos de la falta de solidaridad de quienes se reclaman ser hermanos nuestros, cuando la prensa de otros partidos de izquierda, como *Voz Proletaria* y *Alternativa*, hizo mención de mi detención en tono desaprobatorio, para no hablar de los dirigentes del PSR, *Combate Socialista* y las publicaciones de la IV Internacional, que exigieron mi libertad y estuvieron prestos a dar todo tipo de colaboración a la campaña de solidaridad.

Mis compañeros de trabajo, amistades no políticas, sindicatos de diversa orientación —como ASPU, ACPES y el de Profesores de la U. Libre— fueron mucho más consecuentes que Uds. al realizar actos de solidaridad y enviar comunicados a las autoridades pidiendo mi libertad.

El propio Juez Penal Militar me concedió

la libertad a los veinte (20) días, sin inculparme de vinculaciones con grupos terroristas. No puedo creer que él haya sido más consecuente que Uds., al no tomar en cuenta las provocaciones de *El Tiempo*, y me haya liberado de la Escuela de Caballería, luego de una larga permanencia allí y expuesto al tratamiento brutal de quienes tratan a los presos políticos. Lo pueden preguntar Uds. a la compañera Gloria Gallego, por quien se hizo campaña de solidaridad, tanto en las intervenciones de los dirigentes del PSR, como en *Combate Socialista* y en las publicaciones de la Internacional, sin discriminación.

No me queda más que pedirles que retomen el curso proletario, revolucionario, socialista, y que den solidaridad a los cientos de presos políticos que aún continúan en manos del BIM, ya que, afortunadamente, en mi caso, no hizo falta. Fueron tantos los que se manifestaron por mi solidaridad, que puedo pedirles que la que Uds. reservaron con tanto celo, la cedan a los que quedan detenidos.

Gracias,

LIBARDO GONZALEZ

ATTACHMENT D (part b)

(Editorial from August 9, 1978, issue of Combate Socialista)

Reforma Laboral o Caricatura de Reforma

Mucho se ha hablado de la reforma laboral en los últimos días, los voceros del gobierno incluído el expresidente López, no han dejado de señalar los "revolucionarios alcances" de los nuevos decretos, y hasta el senador por el partido conservador y presidente de la UTC ha dicho de manera textual: "Si el gobierno hubiera expedido los decretos antes del 14 de Septiembre, no se hubiera realizado el Paro Civico". Algunos voceros de la CSTC han manifestado por su parte, que los decretos reflejan con todo, el máximo nivel de concesiones que se podían arrancar a la burguesía, dada la poca fuerza movilizatoria que presentan las masas obreras en la actualidad... por su parte "Voz Proletaria" ha editorializado que la reforma a pesar de ser progresiva, no ha dejado de encerrar una maniobra del actual gobierno en el marco del empalme con el próximo, una y otra apreciación acerca de este enconado tema, tiene que ser confrontada sin embargo con claridad meridiana a la luz de los hechos.

Como también debemos confrontar con vigor la insólita posición sostenida por el periódico El Socialista quien hablando a nombre del socialismo y el trotskismo, ha llegado a sostener en sus dos últimos números el carácter progresivo en general de esta reforma capitulando vergonzosamente ya no solo a la burocracia sindical sino al propio gobierno quien en este caso ha quedado según ellos muy bien librado.

QUE NOS DICEN LOS NUEVOS DECRETOS

La primera impresión que cualquier observador desapercibido se lleva a primera vista, es de que por fin se ha establecido en Colombia el pleno derecho de asociación y sindicalización; sin embargo un detenido juicio sobre las reformas nos pone al descubierto el carácter claramente secundario de las concesiones: la personería jurídica automática que se concede sigue siendo sometida a las trabas administrativas, la obligación de reintegro a las empresas cuando se den despidos masivos de trabajadores solo se autorizará después de la debida certificación del Ministerio del Trabajo.

Al lado de estas concesiones secundarias se ha colocado el eje reaccionario de la nueva legislación: El pacto colectivo no solo se permite sino que se le reglamenta al nivel de la Convención Colectiva, los trabajadores hoy pueden levantar pliegos de peticiones por fuera de los sindicatos, con la anuencia y aprobación y estímulo por parte del Ministerio del Trabajo uno de los puntos del Pliego Nacional del 14 de Septiembre era el de su eliminación de la legislación laboral por su carácter claramente antiobrero—; el número de Sindi-

catos o de federaciones requeridos para formar la federación o la confederación se ha elevado de tres a diez constituyéndose de por sí en un bloque real para la construcción del sindicalismo de Industria.

Los decretos por su parte no contemplan ampliación de los derechos de negociación y huelga, a la vez que se sigue manteniendo el férreo control sobre la vía sindical [estatutos, manejo financiero] cuestión ésta que es rechazada por los acuerdos internacionales de la OIT; la ingerencia del estado en los asuntos internos de los trabajadores es tan grande hoy, que son los delegados gubernamentales los que convocan la huelga, debilitando de paso la capacidad convocatoria de los sindicatos y fortaleciendo de paso ampliamente el poder de los Tribunales de Arbitramento Obligatorio; finalmente no se contemplan los mecanismos de control que les permitan a los trabajadores garantizar el cumplimiento de las convenciones colectivas.

EL CONTENIDO POLITICO DE LAS NUEVAS REFORMAS

No se necesita ser un mago o un excelente visionario para comprender el verdadero contenido político de la nueva reforma; mientras que por un lado se abren las esclusas para la formación masiva de sindicatos, por el otro se estimula la actividad reivindicativa de los trabajadores por fuera de las propias organizaciones sindicales con la nueva reglamentación del Pacto Colectivo, debilitando la lucha unificada de los trabajadores y por ésta vía el propio derecho de asociación. Anotamos al margen que la legislación laboral en los países que soportan dictaduras militares en nuestro continente se fundamentan en el Pacto Colectivo.

En nuestro país la clase obrera lo logró echar atrás con la gran movilización del primero de Mayo de 1973, sin embargo las debilidades por las cuales atravesaba el movimiento obrero, permitieron a la burguesía su reimplantación posteriormente.

Las lecciones sobre la potencialidad de combate de las masas expresada el 14 de septiembre se ha relegado al cuarto de los trastos viejos en la clara actitud conciliadora de las centrales obreras frente a la reforma, por ello y sin desconocer la necesidad no solo de mantener la unidad en el Consejo Nacional Sindical, sino la de fortalecerla en la perspectiva de la conformación de la Central Única de Trabajadores, es que creemos que está en plena vigencia hoy más que nunca la lucha por la aplicación de los acuerdos internacionales de la OIT, contra todo tipo de maniobras o de caricatura de reformas, como la que expresa el decreto 1496 reglamentario de los acuerdos internacionales.

ATTACHMENT D (part c)

(Editorial from July 25, 1978, issue of El Socialista)

Solamente del 15 al 20% de los trabajadores colombianos cuenta con esa herramienta de lucha que es el sindicato. Sin embargo, a partir de luchas tan importantes que hemos desarrollado, como el Paro Cívico Nacional del pasado 14 de septiembre, un gran número de trabajadores se está encaminando hacia el objetivo de construir el sindicato en su lugar de trabajo o ingresar al ya existente. Se ha desarrollado toda corriente en ese sentido, que parte de la necesidad de los trabajadores de contar con ese instrumento básico de lucha, en la pelea que vienen desarrollando contra la patronal y el gobierno, en defensa de su salario y de su estabilidad laboral. Si a esto sumamos el creciente sentimiento unitario y los avances logrados en torno a la unidad sindical, que se materializan, entre otros, en el Consejo Nacional Sindical, los Consejos Regionales y el Pliego Unificado de las cuatro centrales obreras; los planteamientos que empiezan a insinuarse por parte de directivos sindicales en torno a la creación de partidos obreros o laboristas, como es el caso de los compañeros de Sintramet, al igual que el surgimiento de importantes corrientes clasistas y unitarias, como la que recientemente se ha consolidado en el interior del Sindicato de trabajadores del Ministerio de Hacienda, no podemos menos que concluir que existen condiciones muy positivas para que esta corriente se desarrolle favorablemente.

Y por si lo anterior fuera poco, están las condiciones que nos ofrece la nueva reforma laboral, donde se han arrancado mejores condiciones al gobierno en este terreno, y el caso mismo de la situación que encontrará la

próxima administración de Turbay Ayala, que posiblemente se vea obligada, en sus comienzos, a ofrecer algunas concesiones al movimiento obrero y a los trabajadores en general, con el propósito final de "borrar" un poco la mala imagen que deja el gobierno de López.

Pero todo lo anterior no basta. Es indispensable que, además, implementemos los mecanismos necesarios para que este proceso rinda sus mejores frutos.

Sindicalicemos impulsando pliegos de peticiones:

El primer punto al cual debe responder este proceso de sindicalización no es otro que el de las reivindicaciones que los trabajadores podemos plantear en nuestros pliegos de peticiones. La lucha por nuestros salarios y por la estabilidad laboral reclaman - solamente para poderse llevar a cabo - ese instrumento básico que es el sindicato. Por esa razón, al calor de las luchas que en ese sentido vienen librando importantes sectores de trabajadores, podemos dar grandes pasos en la construcción de sindicatos.

Fortalezcamos los sindicatos existentes y luchemos por la unidad sindical:

Hay también otro elemento: incluso en los sectores donde existe un buen porcentaje de trabajadores sindicalizados, se puede luchar por el fortalecimiento de los sindicatos y al sentimiento de los trabajadores de romper la aguda división y la carencia de organismos permanentes de centralización, que les permita tener unas mejores condiciones para enfrentar de manera más efectiva a la patronal y al gobierno. También es ese un terreno propicio para la lucha por la

sindicalización y la unidad de los trabajadores.

La Comisión Nacional de Sindicalización:

Pero de nada vale señalar que las condiciones están dadas en muchos terrenos.

Debemos, necesariamente, dotarnos de los instrumentos organizativos correspondientes para poder llevar adelante esta tarea. Esa es la razón por la cual nuestro partido - que ha decidido volcar lo mejor de sus esfuerzos en la lucha por la sindicalización masiva de los trabajadores colombianos - ha venido proponiendo que se den los pasos necesarios para centralizar nacionalmente el

impulso de la sindicalización masiva. Ese es el llamado que hacemos a las directivas sindicales, para que ellas mismas convoquen a una reunión en donde se conforme la Comisión integrada por dirigentes de federaciones y sindicatos, se vote un plan de trabajo y se empiece a sindicalizar.

Y, obviamente, este llamado también se extiende, de manera especial, al Consejo Nacional Sindical y a los Consejos Regionales, para que tomen como suya esta tarea y constituyan una comisión amplia que atienda el trabajo de sindicalización. Por eso, compañeros, vamos a sindicalizar! Los últimos decretos del gobierno, que son una conquista laboral en relación con la retrógrada legislación hasta ahora vigente, tienen elementos que van a facilitarnos en buena forma la construcción de los sindicatos. El 80% de la población trabajadora los requiere, para enfrentar con el resto de los sindicalizados la política antiobrera del gobierno y la intransigencia patronal: manos a la obra!

(Article entitled "Nuestras Diferencias Políticas con el PST" from February 19, 1979, issue of Combate Socialista)

Dos son las organizaciones trotskistas existentes actualmente en Colombia, ambas simpatizantes del Secretariado Unificado de la Cuarta Internacional: el Partido Socialista Revolucionario y el Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores. Dichas organizaciones adelantan actualmente discusiones tendientes a fusionarse en una sola organización. Tal proceso unitario incluye, entre otras cosas, una clarificación no solo de los puntos de vista programáticos y políticos en común, sino también una dilucidación de las diferencias políticas en materia nacional e internacional que pudieran existir entre ellas.

El texto que presentamos a continuación, aprobado por el Comité Ejecutivo Nacional del PSR el 15 de enero, constituye un aporte a tal clarificación y por lo tanto viene a ser un aporte y un paso hacia adelante en tal proceso de unificación de los trotskistas colombianos. Discutir públicamente es decir ante las masas, nuestras diferencias políticas a nivel nacional, no sólo es legítimo, sino necesario. Al hacerlo así estamos dando la oportunidad a los trabajadores del país, que nos ven trabajando divididos, no solo de observar, y si es preciso, participar, en tal debate sino de constatar cómo los trotskistas sí estamos empeñados en avanzar sería y metódicamente hacia nuestra unificación, la cual redundará en beneficios para el movimiento de masas de nuestro país.

Esperamos de los compañeros del PST una pronta y franca respuesta.

En la política de unificación aprobada por el P. S. R., en su Congreso de Fundación se aprobaron dos criterios fundamentales:

La definición de pasos reales en la unidad de acción de los dos partidos, en la conformación de mecanismos prácticos, de coordinación en todos los aspectos (desde la prensa, que debe unificarse en un plazo relativamente corto) y en la permanente disposición a dar prioridad a los acuerdos tácticos en la intervención de ambos partidos en el movimiento de masas. Es claro que dos partidos no pueden entrar en un proceso de unificación si no se dan estos pasos concretos, y que la conformación de cualquier mecanismo que no contenga este criterio se convierte en un simple llamado demagógico y sin contenido.

El P. S. R. ha llamado al P. S. T. a conformar tales mecanismos y a definir una unidad de acción en el espíritu de integrar la militancia de ambos partidos en las tareas prácticas, y para tal efecto ha convocado al P. S. T. a llegar a acuerdos con el P. S. R., en los eventos de ASPU, FECODE Estatales y en la lucha contra el Estatuto de Seguridad, encontrando siempre una muralla china que se opone a todos los acuerdos, de parte del P. S. T.

Hemos creído siempre que para unificarnos solo basta estar dispuestos a ello, y que los mecanismos, los plenarios, la unificación de la prensa y los acuerdos en los eventos de masas, se allanarán fácilmente, a pesar de las divergencias que podamos tener en materia programática, táctica o de construcción de Partido. Para el P. S. R. se trata de que somos parte del mismo Partido Mundial, reivindicamos el Programa de Transición y la metodología contenida en él, y luchamos por la Revolución Socialista. Colocar las divergencias tácticas como barrera insuperable para llegar a la

unidad, hace que los compañeros del P. S. T. tengan que inventarse las divergencias o exagerarlas, como en el caso de la campaña de UNIOS (a la que tildaron de frente populista en un momento en el que estaban los compañeros del P. S. T. en acuerdos con los sectores liberalizantes de FIRMES).

Impulsemos la unidad de los trotskistas

En los actuales momentos, se hace más urgente la unidad de los trotskistas en Colombia, ante una situación que evoluciona rápidamente hacia la militarización y la persecución política de toda la izquierda, así como al amedrantamiento de los trabajadores y la oposición a la política turbayista.

Por otro lado hemos definido otro criterio importante en la unificación que no invalida nuestro propósito de acortar los plazos propuestos por la permanente dilación del P. S. T. en este proceso, y por el contrario, se trata de establecer los puntos en los cuales los dos partidos encuentran divergencias en su política. Solo discutiendo estos puntos, podremos llegar a esclarecer la dimensión de tales divergencias, y a definir la metodología para abordar el debate.

A este objetivo apunta el presente material de discusión, que adelantamos a los camaradas del P. S. T. teniendo como tribuna, no solo la prensa trotskista, sino la toda la izquierda que enfrenta una discusión sobre estos mismos puntos.

No estamos de acuerdo con el P. S. T. en su propósito de marchar separadamente en todos los eventos, y de definir a puerta cerrada s a lineamientos encerrados en el cenáculo de sus propias paredes.

En cuanto a su propuesta de que la unificación se logrará con la conformación de una comisión de los dos Partidos, que contenga veinte sindicalistas, dirigentes de Partido del P. S. R., y veinte otros del P. S. T. se cae de su peso ya que otros precisamente estos compañeros los que pueden medir con mayor profundidad las dificultades que presenta el P. S. T. para el trabajo de masas en forma conjunta.

Otra vez insistimos que sin disposición a unificarse y por ende a discutir los mecanismos más viables para lograr esto, no funciona ninguna comisión, por más proletarios que sean quienes estén en ella.

Nuestra discusión versa sobre los siguientes puntos en materia de táctica política:

Sobre el gobierno de Turbay

Los compañeros del P. S. T. se apresuraron a despedir el gobierno de López con elogios a la Reforma Laboral, contenida en el decreto 1469, en el que se derogaban los acuerdos que del gobierno habla contraído con la OIT en materia sindical, y se entronizaban los Pactos Colectivos.

Todo esto estaba encubierto por una reglamentación sobre la personería jurídica de los sindicatos, de agilización de los trámites burocráticos que, efectivamente representaban un avance. Sin embargo el contenido de la Reforma era de lo más reaccionario que se halla podido inventar la burguesía en los últimos tiempos ya que los Pactos Colectivos pesan sobre los trabajadores más duramente que los Tribunales de Arbitramento. El patrono se cura en salud, reuniendo los trabajadores no sindicalizados, para propiciar a su vez la desafilación de los trabajadores de los sindicatos y debilitar sus organizaciones de base.

Sin embargo el Comité Central del P. S. T. en aquella oportunidad, solo tuvo en cuenta el aspecto burocrático de la reforma para anunciar que representaba un avance en la legislación laboral. Ninguna defensa de los acuerdos del gobierno y la OIT, ningún rechazo a los Pactos Colectivos, ninguna apreciación crítica sobre el contenido de la reforma pudimos observar de parte del C. C. del P. S. T. en aquella oportunidad.

Pero tuvimos esperanzas de que los compañeros del P. S. T. corregirían pronto este curso desviado ya que su periódico EL SOCIALISTA comenzaba a tomar un

giro diferente. Ilusión vana porque el primer C.C. que se reunió al comienzo, del gobierno de Turbay nos dice:

"Las concesiones hechas a FECODE, la participación de los portuarios en la reestructuración de Colpuertos, la intervención directa del Ministerio del Trabajo en los escasos conflictos huelguísticos que se han presentado, evitando la aplicación del Tribunal de Arbitramento, la expedición del 1469 en las postrimerías del gobierno de López y la petición de facultades extra ordinarias para reformar el Código Sustantivo del Trabajo anunciando la participación de las cuatro centrales en la discusión y elaboración de dicha reforma, son algunas de las manifestaciones concretas de esta política" Se refiere a la política de Turbay!

El perfume conciliador con el gobierno no es muy grato para los maestros de FECODE, que todavía no han visto las concesiones, del gremio portuario, que aún no ven la luz de la reestructuración de Colpuertos tal, lo anuncia el P. S. T., o de los trabajadores en conflicto, que todavía no ven la intervención del Ministerio del Trabajo a su favor.

Por el contrario, Turbay se ha empeñado en una furiosa campaña antimagisterial, anunciando la "barrida" de los comunistas de su seno, y colocándolo a los pies de los directores políticos; ha ilegalizado todas las huelgas que se han presentado, y ha permitido que los patronos hagan su agosto, despidiendo a los trabajadores en conflicto, Además el P. S. T. subestima al movimiento obrero al hablar de los "escasos conflictos huelguísticos", mostrando así que se encuentran cada vez más aislados del movimiento de masas.

No basta con esto, sino que el mencionado C.C. agrega:

Si nuestra caracterización no es correcta las reformas que se introducirán el Código Sustantivo del Trabajo lo harán más progresivo que el existente y la UTC y CTC serán presentadas como sus principales gestoras.

"La mencionada reforma será un examen a nuestra caracterización: si se cumple lo señalado anteriormente habremos trabajado con la hipótesis correcta, de lo contrario será necesario replantearla y reconocer que nos hemos equivocado" Es hora de replantear esto, camaradas del P. S. T. no

olvidemos que el gobierno de Turbay se encuentra en plena ofensiva contra el movimiento obrero, y que sus reformas no buscan el progreso, sino la reacción. Con la frase anterior, no han hecho más que combinar a Perogrullo (si todo sale como dijimos, estamos en lo cierto, si no, estamos equivocados) con el oportunismo político más craso. Y cuando piensan en rectificar este aserto, ya habrán creado ilusiones en algunos trabajadores sobre las mencionadas reformas y las normas que ya han impuesto los Pactos Colectivos,

Attachment D (part d)

¿Es Turbay Democrático?

La manía en pintar el cuadro "democrático" y amplio del gobierno de Turbay, los lleva a concebir las reformas proyectadas del gobierno de turno, como otros tantos pasos progresivos hacia la democratización del país.

En sus propias palabras, el gobierno de Turbay se va a hacer: "...con la participación de todos los sectores de la burguesía y también con el movimiento obrero, quiere que las "fuerzas vivas de la sociedad" tengan participación activa en la discusión y definición de sus principios políticos". Cuando los camaradas del PST escribían esto, ya estaba en curso el Estatuto de Seguridad y todas las demás medidas que han desembocado en la persecución abierta a toda la oposición política y al movimiento de masas. Dónde está el llamado a las Cuatro Centrales a discutir las principales políticas del gobierno?

Acaso los intentos de Turbay de dividir el Consejo Nacional Sindical pueden comprenderse como intentos de dar participación al movimiento obrero?

No hay peor ciego que el que no quiere ver, y esto es más grave en política, cuanto que al cambiar el sentido que tienen las disposiciones del gobierno y presentarlas como progresivas, claudicamos ante él y creamos ilusiones falsas y peligrosas entre los trabajadores.

Así el C. C. del P. S. T. haciendo el resumen de lo que representa el gobierno, anota tres aspectos fundamentales: a) La política de negociación y de concepciones ya mencionadas, b) Se mantiene el ascenso del movimiento obrero, y c) "Esta política de la burguesía y las características del ascenso se apoyan y explican en la buena situación económica del país

en el éxito de la política antinflacionaria iniciada en la segunda mitad del último gobierno, en los resultados electorales que se caracterizan por el incremento del desprestigio de los partidos liberal y conservador expresada en la abstención, en el fortalecimiento de la coalición del gobierno de López, la paridad de los dos partidos tradicionales y la derrota de los partidos obreros y la izquierda y sobre la base de una nueva relación de fuerzas en el campo burgués".

Por disparatado que parezca este párrafo, resalta el comentario apoloético de la obra de López y su continuador Turbay, al aceptar la caracterización de la situación del país como buena en términos económicos, haciendo eco en los titulares de EL TIEMPO. A ningún marxista se le ocurriría hablar en estos términos, cuando de lo que se trata es de un proceso continuo de centralización y concentración de capital que produce la bonanza para los capitalistas, y la miseria y el desempleo para las masas. Así, el país no se encuentra en "buena situación económica" ni la inflación se ha detenido para los artículos de primera necesidad, amigos del P. S. T. Por favor, consultemos la realidad de la resistencia patronal a acceder a las demandas obreras, y encontraremos el eje de la situación del movimiento obrero, correlativa con una gran riqueza concentrada en manos de los capitalistas.

Y además, a nivel político e institucional, no se trata de que el gobierno de Turbay se componga de sectores burgueses y obreros; más bien se trata de afirmar a toda la reacción liberal y conservadora y comprometerla en el manejo del Estado, abriendo las arcas del Tesoro a la burocracia de los dos partidos. En cuanto a las proyectadas reformas del Código Laboral, Penal y del Congreso, en todo esto van compaginado con la militarización cre-

ciente, a la que se ve sometido el movimiento obrero en los actuales momentos. Todas estas reformas llevan el sello característico de la reacción política y no son "dados sueltos" que el gobierno halla lanzado para dar mayor auge al Congreso, ni nada parecido. Los razgos bonapartistas del régimen no tienden a desgastarse por estas reformas, y por el contrario, no hacen más que acentuarlos.

Sobre el Movimiento Obrero y de Masas.

Para el P. S. T. la situación actual es la de un ascenso del movimiento obrero y de concepciones de la burguesía; estas dos tendencias no casan sino en la mente de los camaradas del P. S. T., ya que ni la historia, ni la teoría, ni la realidad actual, da cuenta de un proceso en el que tanto el movimiento obrero como la burguesía se encuentran unidos en el curso de la lucha por sus intereses. Estamos acostumbrados a considerar que los intereses de una clase se oponen a la otra y que éste es el contenido de la lucha de clases. Dentro del marco de análisis del P. S. T. el movimiento obrero termina a la cola de las medidas progresistas de la burguesía, en materia laboral de reforma del Congreso, etc. Pero todo esto va encubierto de una buena dosis de obrerismo, necesario para dar la imagen de que se está concentrando toda la actividad sobre el proletariado industrial, y se desprecia a la pequeña burguesía "Ojalá este desprecio acogiera también a la burguesía y tendríamos una táctica política que si bien no sería menos incorrecta, al menos sería más consecuente.

El desprecio a otros sectores por fuera de movimiento obrero es más marcado en el P. S. T., cuando se dejan de lado los grandes movimientos huelguísticos de los maestros, bancarios y empleados estatales, de gran importancia en el proceso de radicalización de las masas. No se puede despreciar al movimiento

estudiantil, por más articulado que se encuentre en la actualidad, y lo que ha influido sobre la radicalización política, incluso del P. S. T. El movimiento de los pobladores de los barrios tuvo su aparición durante los años 60 y se ha mantenido fuerte en coyunturas como la del Paro Cívico Nacional del 14 de septiembre de 1977. El movimiento por la emancipación de la mujer es un elemento progresivo en nuestro país, ya que contribuye a develar los mecanismos de la dominación capitalista en sus diversas formas, incluso en la de la separación de sexos. Sin embargo, el P. S. T. ha decidido no participar en el Encuentro de diciembre último en Medellín bajo la argucia de estar muy ocupados en la "sindicalización masiva". A qué se refiere con este término? Veámoslo en sus propias palabras: a) "A SINDICALIZARI!!! Tiene que seguir siendo la consigna rectora en la política del Partido porque así nos lo exige el ascenso del movimiento obrero (uno de cuyos principales fenómenos es la sindicalización de miles de trabajadores) las condiciones que nos ofrece la política definida por el gobierno y los reacomodos que se han producido en el régimen y en los partidos burgueses. Tenemos que ésta es una orientación general para un período más o menos largo de tiempo y no una campaña como la electoral..."

Así como pretenden los compañeros de P. S. T. que los movimientos de trabajadores del Estado, de maestros y de bancarios son de la "pequeña burguesía", también el proceso de unidad del movimiento obrero a través de las cuatro centrales, la constitución del Consejo Nacional Sindical, la conformación de Un Pliego Unificado de las cuatro centrales y la lucha por cohesionar a todo el sindicalismo en una sola central, son temas "propagandísticos y superestructurales". Es la sindicalización masiva la panacea a los trabajadores en los actuales momentos.

Ya hemos anotado lo inconsecuente de la política del P. S. T. al aceptar los pactos colectivos, que resalta aun más en su concentración de efectivos sobre la sindicalización, cuando los patronos están obligado a la desafiliación masiva de los trabajadores de los sindicatos, y destruyendo estos. Tal vez los camaradas del P. S. T. están con el mote de que "el que peca y reza empata".

Además dejar de ver que el movimiento obrero se encuentra abocado a resolver ingentes problemas planteados por la arremetida del gobierno y la patronal en contra de sus organizaciones de base, y que estos problemas afectan las conquistas ya obtenidas por los trabajadores, en derechos sindicales y democráticos, es ceguera política. De la unidad del movimiento sindical, de la supervivencia y la lucha de las organizaciones de base existentes, y del mantenimiento de una base de lucha contra la patronal y el gobierno, se desprende todo el marco de las relaciones del movimiento obrero, y las posibilidades de lograr mayores conquistas. Así la sindicalización masiva es uno de los aspectos

del fortalecimiento de las organizaciones de base, de gran importancia pero deben subordinarse a las conquistas fundamentales del movimiento obrero en su conjunto.

Por las Libertades Democráticas

El P. S. R. ha propuesto la lucha por la unidad sindical como medio fundamental de lograr la unidad de acción y el Frente Único de todas las organizaciones gremiales y políticas del movimiento obrero, que permita rescatar las reivindicaciones y conquistas que se han ido perdiendo en los últimos tiempos, por efecto de los gobiernos reaccionarios, sobre todo el de López y el de Turbay. A este objetivo deben vincularse todos los demás aspectos, como el de lograr una mayor intervención en uno o varios sindicatos. En este sentido, tenemos divergencias con los compañeros del P. S. T. cuando dicen refiriéndose a la sindicalización: "ésta debe articularse permanentemente a problemas concretos de la lucha de clases como los de unidad sindical, el surgimiento y consolidación de corrientes clasistas en el movimiento sindical y de independencia de clase en el movimiento obrero, o a otros más coyunturales como el rechazo al Estatuto de Seguridad, el pronunciamiento del C. N.S. sobre dicha medida..."

Se invierten así los términos de la situación, en la que se encuentra como factor predominante la aplicación del Estatuto de Seguridad, que intenta volcarse sobre los sindicatos, así como sobre las organizaciones de la izquierda. Por otro lado no se trata de que el C. N.S. se pronuncie sobre este esperpento de la burguesía;

Attachment D (part d)

sino se realiza una política de Frente Único para derrotarlo, él acabará con toda posibilidad de lucha reivindicativa por mucho tiempo. O acaso los camaradas del P. S. T. creen que el Estatuto de Seguridad se propone dar seguridad a los ciudadanos, como dice el Presidente Turbay? Tomar frívolamente esta medida y sus consecuencias, constituye una claudicación al gobierno más reaccionaria que haya habido en los últimos tiempos.

Así bajo el argumento de que los compañeros del P. S. T. se encuentran muy ocupados en la sindicalización masiva, han dejado de lado las tareas que competen a la lucha contra el Estatuto de Seguridad y sus secuelas. Quisieramos recordarles que los comunistas, desde Marx defienden los intereses del movimiento obrero, y no simplemente los de fortalecerse como grupos políticos.

Invertir los terminos equivale al sectarismo que en última instancia solo sirven a los intereses de la burguesía.

El P. S. R. considera que, en efecto, es importante la sindicalización masiva, habida cuenta de lo planteado anteriormente, pero que esto debe acompañarse de una clara política por la unidad del movimiento obrero, en torno a demandas concretas. Así, en tanto que luchamos

por constituir sindicatos, también pugnamos porque se afilien a una central, la que garantice una mayor convergencia con la lucha de los trabajadores e interprete los razgos de la radicalización obrera. A la vez, intentamos que los sindicatos ya existentes se afilien a una de las centrales, y que se extinga el sindicalismo independiente de tan ingrata memoria para el sindicalismo colombiano, ya que solo ha propiciado la división y el sectarismo. En el caso del P. S. T. no hay ningún planteamiento de unidad sindical, como no sea en forma vaga.

No es que se encuentren aislados los compañeros del P. S. T. sino que ya han escogido su aliado en la UTC a través de SINTRAMETAL. Los acuerdos a que han llegado con este sector burocrático del sindicalismo, revierte en el fortalecimiento de SINTRAMETAL, y no del P. S. T., que ha subsumido toda su militancia en el sindicalismo, sin orientaciones políticas, arriesgando diluir la organización política en las organizaciones de lucha reivindicativa

Es por esto que no se atreven a plantear en la política de sindicalización masiva, el punto de la democracia sindical, que afectaría los oídos de la burocracia utecista, y podría entorpecer la marcha nupcial en la que se han comprometido con ellos.

El P. S. R. tiene otra perspectiva. En el proceso de unidad sindical luchamos porque la UTC se mantenga en el Consejo Nacional Sindical, y porque se gane hacia la política de una sola central obrera. Pero en el concierto de las cuatro centrales, buscamos que se fortalezca la central que representa mayormente a los sectores clasistas, que se encuentran sobre todo en la C. S. T. C. Esto no constituye un cheque en blanco a la C. S. T. C. pero entre la UTC y su acción al conservatismo, y aquella, preferimos hacer unidad de acción con la C. S. T. C.

La C. S. T. C. adelanta también una campaña por la sindicalización masiva, y dentro de ella cabe desarrollar una política sindical que comprenda tanto el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones de base de la clase obrera como la democracia obrera al interior de los sindicatos.

El P. S. R. además, cuenta entre sus elementos de intervención en los sindicatos, el fortalecimiento de las corrientes clasistas dentro del sindicalismo, y el sindicalismo de industria, que permite afirmar el proceso de unidad de los trabajadores sobre un terreno firme, evitando la atomización que ha sido tradicional.

Estos son los puntos más importantes que ubicamos en el terreno de la táctica política. Esperamos que la discusión enriquezca la apreciación que debemos tener sobre este aspecto. Otros puntos de discusión como el de la Construcción de Partido, será objeto de un material aparte.

Comite Ejecutivo del P. S. R.
15 de enero de 1979.

¡ Solidaridad con el P.S.T. !

Cerrada la edición supimos del allanamiento del local del PST el 13 de febrero por autoridades militares y la detención allí mismo de los compañeros Rodolfo Galindo, Carlos Alberto Trujillo, Alvaro Niño e Isabel Lorens.

Expresamos nuestra solidaridad con el PST y exigimos la inmediata liberación de

los compañeros. Tal detención es evidentemente arbitraria y violatoria del mismo artículo 28 de la constitución, pues sobre ellos no recaen graves indicios de que atenten contra la paz pública. Son miembros de un partido legal y rotundamente opuesto a las acciones de terroristas.

Tener ideas socialistas, difundirlas mediante la prensa partidaria, fundar sindicatos, participar en elecciones, no está prohibido ni por el Estatuto de Seguridad!

Exigimos libertad inmediata para nuestros compañeros ! ¡Que cesen las torturas y los allanamientos !

ATTACHMENT E

Correction to minutes of United Secretariat meeting of March 31-
April 4, 1979:

Point 4 of Comrade Walter's resolution on the voting slogan for the European elections (page 5) is incorrect. As written, this point --which was drawn up after the meeting to take into account remarks made by Comrade Peterson--is based upon lack of information and a misunderstanding.

Accordingly, it should be reworded as follows:

"4. That in the special case of Ireland, given the conditions of British imperialist oppression (division of the country and occupation of the 6 counties), we support the call of Irish revolutionary Marxists for a write-in vote in the Republic and support for the candidacy of Bernadette Devlin McAliskey in the occupied 6 counties."

T1ATTACHMENT F (part a)

"Gouvernement du NPD et des syndicats québécois..."

□ Une des armes les plus importantes que les marxistes-révolutionnaires ont développée pour lutter contre les partis réformistes de masse dans le mouvement ouvrier est de demander à de tels partis de prendre le pouvoir et de former des gouvernements ouvriers. Comme le programme de transition le dit: "De tous les partis et organisations qui sont basés sur la classe ouvrière et les paysans et parlent en leurs noms, nous exigeons qu'ils rompent politiquement avec la bourgeoisie et qu'ils avancent sur le chemin de la lutte pour un gouvernement ouvrier et paysan. Sur ce chemin, nous leur promettons un soutien total contre la réaction capitaliste. En même temps, nous développons infatigablement l'agitation autour des revendications transitoires qui devraient selon nous former le programme du gouvernement ouvrier et paysan."

Ceci n'est pas la même chose que d'appeler le parti réformiste à diriger le gouvernement de l'Etat capitaliste. En 1917, les bolcheviks avaient exposé les programmes procapitalistes des mencheviks et des socialistes-révolutionnaires en les appelant à 'prendre le pouvoir' même si ces deux partis réformistes dirigeaient déjà le gouvernement provisoire. La revendication bolchevik voulait dire: rompez avec l'Etat capitaliste et formez un gouvernement basé sur votre majorité dans les soviets. Les bolcheviks mettaient de l'avant cette revendication parce qu'ils savaient que pour former un gouvernement basé sur les soviets, les réformistes auraient dû contredire leur allégeance programmatique à l'Etat bourgeois.

Si les mencheviks et les socialistes-révolutionnaires avaient acquiescé aux bolcheviks leur gouvernement aurait été ce qui est appelé dans le mouvement trotskyste un gouvernement ouvrier et paysan ou un gouvernement ouvrier, dépendant de la composition sociale du pays concerné. Un

tel gouvernement est ni un gouvernement ni la dictature du prolétariat, mais un phénomène extrêmement instable et de courte durée qui peut survenir lorsque l'Etat capitaliste a été sévèrement affaibli mais pas détruit et lorsque les travailleurs et leurs alliés n'ont pas encore, pour une raison ou une autre, établi la dictature du prolétariat. Un tel gouvernement est indépendant de la bourgeoisie et va ainsi être renversé par la bourgeoisie à la première chance qui se présente s'il n'abolit pas avant le pouvoir des capitalistes en instaurant un Etat ouvrier.

Trotsky a reconnu dans le programme de transition que "la création d'un tel gouvernement par les organisations ouvrières traditionnelles" est "pour le moins fort improbable". Toutefois, a-t-il dit, "l'agitation autour du slogan d'un gouvernement ouvrier-paysan a dans toutes les situations une valeur éducative très grande. Et pas accidentellement. Ce slogan généralisé est entièrement dans la ligne du développement politique de notre époque (la décomposition et la faillite des vieux partis bourgeois, la tombée de la démocratie, la montée du fascisme, le mouvement accéléré des travailleurs vers une politique plus agressive et active). Chaque revendication transitoire devrait donc mener à une seule conclusion: les travailleurs doivent rompre d'avec tous les partis traditionnels de la bourgeoisie dans le but, avec les paysans, d'établir leur propre pouvoir."

La lutte de classes au Canada n'a pas encore produit des soviets, qui simplifieraient considérablement la tâche de présenter la revendication d'un gouvernement ouvrier. Toutefois, nous avons développé des slogans qui expriment essentiellement le même concept que la revendication des bolcheviks pour que les réformistes "prennent le pouvoir". Pendant les campagnes électorales, par exemple, lorsque la question du gouvernement est la plus présente dans la tête des travailleurs et des opprimés, nous mettons de l'avant des slogans du type: Voter NPD, Pour un gouvernement du NPD et des syndicats québécois. Luttons pour des politiques socialistes. A savoir, nous appelons à un gouvernement des organisations de masse de la classe ouvrière, mais pas avec le programme bourgeois du NPD et de la bureaucratie syndicale, mais bien à un gouvernement indépendant de la bourgeoisie qui s'introduit "sur le chemin de la lutte pour un gouvernement ouvrier et paysan".

Nous appliquons ces idées au Canada-anglais en exhortant les syndicats à s'unifier et se mobiliser derrière le NPD dans les élections, à utiliser leur poids financier et leur appareil organisationnel pour aider à élire le NPD. Nous exhortons les syndicats à débattre du programme du NPD, à formuler leurs propres propositions au sein du NPD. Nous encourageons les

syndicats et le NPD à tenir des meetings de masse, des assemblées d'usine, des lignes de piquetage d'information et des manifestations pour aider à gagner des milliers de travailleurs aux côtés du mouvement ouvrier et du NPD. Et en dehors de périodes électorales, nous poussons les syndicats à travailler pour un gouvernement du NPD et des syndicats québécois en intégrant cette perspective générale dans une stratégie de lutte de classe autour de revendications et sujets de mobilisations clés, par exemple pendant la grève des postes. Bref, nous cherchons à construire un mouvement de masse pour un gouvernement du NPD et des syndicats québécois qui pourra créer une puissante dynamique anti-capitaliste indépendante du programme du NPD et de la bureaucratie syndicale, un mouvement qui peut unir et mobiliser l'ensemble des travailleurs dans une véritable lutte pour le pouvoir.

ATTACHMENT F (part b)**T3****" Pour une alliance ouvrière binationale... "**

Le point de départ de toute stratégie révolutionnaire doit être l'Etat canadien. C'est la lutte pour la destruction de l'Etat central et l'établissement du pouvoir ouvrier et du socialisme qui constitue le cadre stratégique de la révolution dans l'Etat canadien. Cependant, aucune stratégie ne peut se limiter au moment final de ce processus. Une stratégie révolutionnaire véritable doit englober l'ensemble de la période préparatoire à la révolution.

Nous comprenons que pour toute la prochaine période, l'Etat impérialiste canadien est confronté à une crise double et combinée qui crée une base objective à la mobilisation des deux prolétariats dans la lutte pour renverser l'Etat. D'une part, la question nationale québécoise met en cause la structure politique de l'impérialisme canadien; d'autre part la crise économique et sociale pousse la classe ouvrière à se mobiliser et à combattre l'offensive bourgeoise et, à terme, à combattre l'Etat qui est au centre de cette offensive.

Mais le facteur politique qui empêche l'assaut conjoint des deux prolétariats contre l'Etat central est la division nationale au sein du prolétariat. Ainsi, un élément central de la stratégie révolutionnaire doit consister à expliquer les tâches nécessaires au renforcement de la lutte de libération nationale et d'expliquer comment ceci se combine avec la lutte pour le pouvoir politique des deux prolétariats.

Les trotskystes doivent être très clairs sur les raisons qui motivent leur appel à l'indépendance du Québec. La revendication d'indépendance constitue à l'heure actuelle la concrétisation la plus claire de la rupture avec la Confédération impérialiste. Elle dresse la classe ouvrière québécoise directement contre l'impérialisme canadien et contre l'instrument central de sa domination sur le Québec et sur les classes ouvrières des deux nations, l'Etat fédéral. La lutte pour l'indépendance nationale constitue aussi un élément central de notre lutte pour l'indépendance politique de la classe du prolétariat québécois. Ce n'est qu'en prenant la direction de cette lutte que la classe ouvrière québécoise pourra conquérir son indépendance en tant que classe et empêcher que les forces nationalistes bourgeoises et petites-bourgeoises ne continuent à canaliser et à dévoyer l'aspiration des masses laborieuses à en finir avec l'oppression nationale.

Le combat pour faire reprendre la lutte de libération nationale par le mouvement ouvrier québécois constitue donc une dimension fondamentale de notre combat contre la collaboration de classes des directions syndicales et pour le lancement

par les syndicats d'un parti ouvrier capable d'assumer la lutte pour l'indépendance et le socialisme.

Contrairement à ce qu'affirment les stalinien et sociaux-démocrates, la lutte pour l'indépendance du Québec ne va aucunement à contre-sens de l'unité réelle entre les classes ouvrières des deux nations dans la lutte pour le socialisme. Au contraire, la lutte pour une République des travailleurs du Québec permet de poser les bases objectives du dépassement de la situation actuelle où le prolétariat des deux nations se heurte le plus souvent de façon séparée à l'Etat impérialiste central pour la satisfaction de ses aspirations. La Confédération nie les droits nationaux des Québécois en même temps qu'elle bloque la possibilité pour la classe ouvrière du Canada-anglais de réaliser ses aspirations à un gouvernement de ses propres organisations, aspirations canalisées à l'heure actuelle par le NPD.

Les révolutionnaires doivent donc avancer dans les deux nations la perspective d'une alliance ouvrière basée sur les éléments suivants: la rupture de la classe ouvrière québécoise d'avec le nationalisme bourgeois et la constitution d'un parti de classe prenant la direction de la lutte pour l'indépendance et le socialisme; la défense active du droit à l'autodétermination du Québec par la classe ouvrière canadienne-anglaise afin de liquider le cadre oppresseur de la Confédération et permettre tant au Québec qu'au Canada-anglais l'instauration d'un gouvernement des organisations ouvrières. En ce sens, non seulement la lutte de libération nationale du Québec constitue-elle une composante essentielle de la lutte pour la conquête du pouvoir, mais elle offre aussi à la classe ouvrière canadienne-anglaise une possibilité historique de prendre elle-même le pouvoir.

Nous devons donc mettre de l'avant une perspective politique qui vise à approfondir les luttes communes et à élargir l'horizon politique de ces luttes afin de les aider à dépasser leur caractère épisodique et immédiat pour déboucher sur la question du pouvoir politique.

En soulevant des mots d'ordre gouvernementaux, nous exigeons des organisations reconnues par la classe ouvrière qu'elles rompent avec la bourgeoisie pour prendre le pouvoir. Cette exigence de rupture avec la bourgeoisie se concrétise différemment dans les deux nations. Au Québec, elle se concrétise par la rupture avec le PQ et la constitution d'un parti des travailleurs et des travailleuses. Au Canada-anglais, la rupture avec la bourgeoisie se concrétise par la rupture avec la défense du cadre de la Confédération et la reconnais-

sance du droit à l'autodétermination, sans laquelle la conquête du pouvoir par une alliance politique avec la classe ouvrière québécoise est impossible.

Les élections fédérales permettent de l'illustrer de façon assez concrète. Nous pouvons expliquer que la seule possibilité d'opposer une alternative ouvrière gouvernementale aux Libéraux et aux Conservateurs réside dans la rupture de la classe ouvrière québécoise d'avec le PQ, la rupture de la classe ouvrière canadienne-anglaise d'avec la politique chauvine du NPD et du CTC et la conclusion d'une alliance ouvrière binationale sur la base du respect du droit du Québec à l'autodétermination, pour chasser les gouvernements bourgeois. L'appel à un gouvernement ouvrier nous permet de poser la rupture avec la bourgeoisie dans les deux nations.

La lutte pour un gouvernement ouvrier commun et pour la République des travailleurs du Québec ne sont pas des processus parallèles ou opposés, mais bien interdépendants. Car c'est à travers la lutte pour l'indépendance et le socialisme qu'il sera plus vital que jamais pour les masses des deux nations de construire activement une alliance stratégique afin de renverser le pouvoir bourgeois à travers tout l'Etat canadien et instaurer l'indépendance et le socialisme.

Nous rejetons les tentatives qui, sous une forme ou une autre, tentent de 'concrétiser' à l'heure actuelle notre perspective d'alliance en termes des organisations existantes ou à être créées: gouvernement du NPD et des syndicats québécois, gouvernement NPD-parti ouvrier, etc. Ces diverses 'formules' ont en commun de préjuger des formes que prendra l'alliance binationale et tendent à imposer aux masses de la nation dominée les formes particulières que prend la radicalisation spontanée dans la nation dominante, c'est-à-dire le réformisme trade-unioniste de type social-démocrate.

Or, il n'y a pas d'équivoque possible, le fait pour la LOR-RWL de faire de la revendication d'indépendance nationale un élément clé de la stratégie révolutionnaire dans l'Etat canadien conditionne de façon décisive les formes dans lesquelles il sera possible de construire concrètement une alliance de classe binationale.

T4 "Les deux classes ouvrières ont besoin d'une stratégie commune.."

Pour renverser et détruire l'Etat canadien, les travailleurs québécois doivent s'allier avec ceux du Canada-anglais. De même ces derniers ne peuvent atteindre le socialisme sauf en alliance avec les travailleurs québécois. En d'autres mots, les 2 classes ouvrières ont besoin d'une stratégie commune pour détruire le pouvoir d'Etat bourgeois, instrument de leur exploitation et de l'oppression nationale des québécois.

La classe-ouvrière canadienne-anglaise n'accomplira jamais rien tant qu'elle ne jouera pas un rôle actif dans la prise en charge de la lutte contre l'oppression nationale. Comme le disait Marx: "Le peuple qui en asservit un autre forge ses propres chaînes". La classe ouvrière québécoise sera incapable de mener jusqu'au bout la lutte contre l'oppression nationale si elle ne fait pas alliance avec la classe ouvrière canadienne-anglaise. C'est forcément lié. Une non-alliance avec sa classe au Canada-anglais implique une alliance interclassiste nationale au Québec.

L'autonomie de la classe ouvrière québécoise ne passe pas uniquement à travers une lutte intransigeante contre le PQ et le nationalisme, mais aussi par une lutte intransigeante contre l'Etat fédéral. L'un implique l'autre, car si la classe ouvrière laisse au PQ le combat contre l'Etat fédéral (combat dévoyé à cause du caractère bourgeois du PQ), c'est alors l'inévitable alliance nationale interclassiste derrière le PQ.

Il ne suffit pas de convaincre le prolétariat québécois d'être plus "radical" que le PQ en lui "arrachant" la direction de la lutte de libération nationale. Encore faut-il expliquer qu'il n'y a pas de solution "nationale" possible à l'oppression de la nation québécoise; que la supériorité du prolétariat c'est justement sa capacité à dépasser le cadre de la nation et ainsi à se donner les moyens pour contrer l'alliance interclassiste nationale. D'où la nécessité d'une action politique autonome de classe à l'échelle de l'Etat canadien dans son ensemble comme "cadre stratégique".

Il est effectivement probable, dans le développement actuel de la lutte des classes qu'une éventuelle crise pré-révolutionnaire prenne, dans un premier temps, la forme d'une lutte de libération nationale des québécois, débordant massivement le cadre politique parlementariste imposé par l'hégémonie du PQ. Mais alors, le problème de l'alliance stratégique avec la classe ouvrière canadienne-anglaise et ses organisations sera central, car c'est la question du pouvoir qui sera posé.

Pour que le processus de libération nationale puisse s'achever, il doit s'étendre pour détruire l'Etat canadien. Ceci doit donc s'intégrer dans notre stratégie et conséquemment avoir des réponses programmatiques. Car il n'y aura pas de libération nationale sans révolution socialiste et cette révolution doit détruire l'Etat

canadien. L'issue victorieuse de cette révolution exige l'unité politique programmatique et stratégique des deux classes ouvrières. par exemple, même si au moment où la prise du pouvoir est possible d'abord au Québec, les masses canadiennes-anglaises suivent encore dans leur majorité les organisations réformistes, il sera justement encore plus indispensable que jamais, en utilisant le poids des masses révolutionnaires québécoises, comme levier, de bâtir une tactique de front unique ouvrier, en défiant la ou les organisations ouvrières canadiennes de s'allier avec les masses québécoises pour renverser l'Etat fédéral central.

Une telle hypothèse n'exclut pas à priori la possibilité de la survie d'un Etat ouvrier québécois isolé. Mais ce serait là la situation la plus défavorable, cause d'une défaite rapide aux mains des bourgeoisies canadienne et américaine. Un tel Etat serait nécessairement instable et fragile, et la lutte pour sa consolidation poserait dès le départ, le problème de l'extension de la révolution au Canada-anglais. Il ne s'agit pas de faire l'unité des 2 classes un préalable absolu à la lutte pour le pouvoir, mais de bien comprendre qu'une telle unité ne sera pas le fruit spontané du processus révolutionnaire, donc que l'une de nos tâches centrales est de transformer cette nécessité objective en un élément conscient de la stratégie de classe des deux prolétariats.

La lutte de libération nationale des québécois et l'unité prolétarienne bi-nationale ne sont pas contradictoires mais sont au contraire les pièces maîtresses de la stratégie révolutionnaire à travers tout le territoire canadien.

A l'heure actuelle, de par la radicalisation au Québec, cette stratégie rend possible et nécessaire le rôle dirigeant de la classe ouvrière québécoise dans l'alliance entre les deux classes ouvrières. Le cas du Syndicat des postiers dans sa lutte contre l'Etat fédéral, tant au niveau des conditions de travail qu'au niveau de la défense des droits nationaux des québécois, montre bien les tendances de fond sur lesquelles nous devons appuyer notre stratégie et la construction de notre organisation.

L'alliance nécessaire entre les 2 classes ouvrières, l'unité prolétarienne pour la révolution socialiste et la libération nationale, ne se réalisera que par une lutte implacable contre l'Etat canadien et contre le nationalisme "canadien" et québécois. L'indépendance politique des classes ouvrières ne peut se gagner qu'à travers un tel combat.

Pour détruire cet Etat, prison des peuples, il faut faire rompre les classes ouvrières canadienne et québécoise d'avec le nationalisme, les partis et les institutions étatiques bourgeoises. La condition sine qua non pour cette rupture avec la collaboration de classe sur les lignes nationales, c'est l'unité des classes ouvrières dans un but et un combat commun: socialisme et libération nationale.