

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS

1968-73

A STAFF STUDY

PREPARED BY THE
COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
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The House Committee on Internal Security is a standing committee of the House of Representatives, constituted as such by the rules of the House, adopted pursuant to Article I, section 5, of the Constitution of the United States which authorizes the House to determine the rules of its proceedings.

RULES ADOPTED BY THE 93D CONGRESS

House Resolution 6, January 3, 1973

RESOLUTION

Resolved, That the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-second Congress, together with all applicable provisions of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, as amended, and the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, as amended, be, and they are hereby adopted as the Rules of the House of Representatives of the Ninety-third Congress * * *

* * * * *

RULE X

STANDING COMMITTEES

1. There shall be elected by the House, at the commencement of each Congress.

* * * * *

(k) Committee on Internal Security, to consist of nine Members.

* * * * *

RULE XI

POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMITTEES

* * * * *

11. Committee on Internal Security.

(a) Communist and other subversive activities affecting the internal security of the United States.

(b) The Committee on Internal Security, acting as a whole or by subcommittee, is authorized to make investigations from time to time of (1) the extent, character, objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups, whether of foreign or domestic origin, their members, agents, and affiliates, which seek to establish, or assist in the establishment of, a totalitarian dictatorship within the United States, or to overthrow or alter, or assist in the overthrow or alteration of, the form of government of the United States or of any State thereof, by force, violence, treachery, espionage, sabotage, insurrection, or any unlawful means, (2) the extent, character, objectives, and activities within the United States of organizations or groups, their members, agents, and affiliates, which incite or employ acts of force, violence, terrorism, or any unlawful means, to obstruct or oppose the lawful authority of the Government of the United States in the execution of any law or policy affecting the internal security of the United States, and (3) all other questions, including the administration and execution of any law of the United States, or any portion of law, relating to the foregoing that would aid the Congress or any committee of the House in any necessary remedial legislation.

The Committee on Internal Security shall report to the House (or to the Clerk of the House if the House is not in session) the results of any such investigation, together with such recommendations as it deems advisable.

For the purpose of any such investigation, the Committee on Internal Security, or any subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such times and places within the United States, whether the House is in session, has recessed, or has adjourned, to hold such hearings, and to require, by subpoena or otherwise, the

attendance and testimony of such witnesses and the production of such books, records, correspondence, memorandums, papers, and documents, as it deems necessary. Subpenas may be issued under the signature of the chairman of the committee or any subcommittee, or by any member designated by any such chairman, and may be served by any person designated by any such chairman or member.

* * * * *

28. (a) In order to assist the House in—

(1) its analysis, appraisal, and evaluation of the application, administration, and execution of the laws enacted by the Congress, and

(2) its formulation, consideration, and enactment of such modifications of or changes in those laws, and of such additional legislation, as may be necessary or appropriate.

each standing committee shall review and study, on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws, or parts of laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.

* * * * *

FOREWORD

In recent years there has been an alarming number of successful or attempted kidnappings with political overtones that have occurred in various parts of the world. These incidents for the most part have involved diplomats from "politically important" countries but have also included other government officials and prominent business executives. While kidnapping as a concept of guerrilla warfare is not a new tactic, it has never before become as common as it has in the past few years.

During the period covered by this study there have been 42 attempted or successful major political kidnappings which have involved 21 U.S. citizens. In connection with these kidnapping incidents, 13 of the victims have been killed and 5 others have been injured. Among those killed were six Americans. Four of the intended kidnapping victims were successful in effecting their escape and 22 victims were released unharmed by their kidnapers. Ransom demands were made in 26 instances and the kidnapers' demands were met, at least partially, in 14 instances.

The terrorist group responsible for the most political kidnappings in recent years has been the People's Revolutionary Army, an adjunct of the Revolutionary Workers Party, an Argentine Trotskyite communist organization which is affiliated with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. The terrorist acts carried out by the Argentine Trotskyites have been lauded by the Fourth International.

Although the United States has been fortunate to escape the rash of political kidnappings that have shaken so much of the world in the past few years, we must not be beguiled into feeling that "it can't happen here." Whereas some countries, notably in South America, have been afflicted with kidnapping problems generated by a single terrorist organization, such as the Tupamaros in Uruguay, in the United States there are numerous groups and individuals acting independently to create the climate of terror that the guerrillas believe will so undermine the Government as to bring about its complete destruction. It should also be noted that the Socialist Workers Party, the largest and best organized Trotskyite communist group in the United States, is affiliated with the notorious Fourth International and a violent militant minority of the SWP supports the terrorist activities of its Argentine counterpart.¹

Events which no one can foresee today will, of course, vitally affect the plans and possible success of terrorist elements plotting political kidnappings. No one can predict with certainty whether this tactic will be attempted in the United States or just how successful it might be. Threats and dangers to our internal security are ever changing in their nature and scope. I am, like most Americans, appalled by the brutish insensitivity of political kidnappings. Whether this tactic is carried out in the United States or not, it is my belief that the committee in calling attention to this situation is carrying out its duty of

¹ See app. B, p. 36.

informing the Congress and the American public of a matter that warrants their attention.

Because of its timeliness, as evidenced by requests made by committee members, private citizens, and by official agencies, this study has been prepared in an effort to demonstrate just how powerful a weapon political kidnaping has become and to serve as a warning that such acts are capable of creating chaos and threatening the very principles upon which nations are founded.

It is the purpose of this study, which was compiled from various news media and data supplied by the Department of State, to bring together in reference format a concise history of political kidnapings which have occurred in recent years. As used herein, the definition of political kidnaping will refer to only those kidnapings or attempted kidnapings directed against diplomats, government officials, and prominent business executives that are motivated by political rather than personal relationships.

RICHARD H. ICHORD,
Chairman.

July 30, 1973.

POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS

Background

Extremists of all political ideologies, especially Marxist-Leninists, apparently have decided that kidnaping is a highly effective tactic in a battle against superior forces. Terrorist groups in all parts of the world, showing a cruel and callous disregard for human rights, have engaged in kidnapings primarily for the purpose of winning the release of so-called political prisoners; to obtain ransom money to further their revolutionary objectives; to embarrass government officials and to strain relations between nations. Another reason for political kidnaping is to propagandize a particular political or ideological point of view. Although political kidnapings may be committed for different reasons, by far the commonest is for the purpose of terrorizing the ruling regime. Under such conditions, the kidnapers may accomplish their objective even though the kidnaping attempt is unsuccessful.

Although political kidnapings have occurred in many different countries, the greatest number have been in Latin America. The April 3, 1973, issue of the Washington Star-News reported that more than 50 Argentine and foreign businessmen have been kidnaped in the past 2 years and more than \$5 million in ransom has been paid to get them released.

In this connection, the Washington Post of May 24, 1973, reported that on May 23, 1973, the People's Revolutionary Army, a Trotskyite band of revolutionaries operating in Argentina, demanded more than \$1 million from the Ford Motor Co. as "protection" against repetition of an abortive kidnaping of one of Ford's executives on May 22, 1973. The terrorists warned that if their demand was not met, they would invade the Ford plant in suburban Buenos Aires and take retribution against company officials. The article noted that Edgar Molina, a Ford vice president, stated that the company would comply with the terrorists' demand for more than \$1 million worth of medical supplies. Mr. Molina was quoted as saying, "We believe that under the circumstances, we had no choice but to meet these demands."

This is the first instance reported of an American company paying "insurance" in advance to forestall a threatened kidnaping. It is feared that such payment to the People's Revolutionary Army would open a company up to similar demands from other revolutionary groups.

Because of the terrorists' proven ability to persecute foreigners, many American firms in Argentina have reduced their foreign staffs and some are known to have considered pulling out altogether.

Most kidnaping attempts have been made against victims when they are traveling in automobiles. Typically, the terrorists traveling in a car or truck force the victim's vehicle off the road and its occupants are then compelled, at gunpoint, to surrender. It is common

practice for the guerrillas to use stolen cars which they quickly abandon, making police efforts to track them down extremely difficult.

The use of bodyguards, riding with diplomatic personnel or in trailing vehicles to prevent any attempts at kidnaping has not seemed to deter the kidnapers. As a general rule, the kidnapers usually attack in groups of five or more, outnumbering the average bodyguards. In addition, the terrorists usually employ superior firepower, often using submachine guns, and bodyguards are unlikely to endanger the diplomat's life by firing the first shot.

EFFORTS TO COPE WITH POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS

Security measures imposed

Some countries have reduced the size of the kidnapers' target by cutting down on the size of the embassy staff. In a few cases, countries have sent home the wives and children of diplomatic personnel who also are potential targets of kidnapers.

The United States has assigned more security officers to its missions abroad and has provided bullet-proof automobiles for many of its embassies. As a result, terrorists are beginning to avoid the major capitals of the world where U.S. embassies have fairly good security forces and are concentrating on less prominent capitals, where it is easier to kidnap American officials and hold them as hostages for the release of outlaws elsewhere in the world.

Another security measure imposed has been to drastically reduce the amount of travel and the use of secrecy in planning any essential trips. Times for travel to and from work have often been changed daily because terrorists are known to study their targets for weeks, to learn the habits of their intended victims. Other security measures that have been taken include the removal of diplomatic license plates from many embassy cars and in some instances large embassy cars have been traded for small inconspicuous ones, preferably those made by a local manufacturer.

In some instances, diplomats have managed to escape their kidnapers by fighting them off or fleeing. However, this has resulted in severe injury and even death to some who have elected to follow this course of action.

The imposing of strict security regulations has caused many diplomats to protest over what they consider to be restrictive measures lest these arrangements isolate them from the nationals of the country to which they are accredited and thus nullify their effectiveness.

Organization of American States

In view of the fact that the majority of political kidnapings have occurred in Latin American countries, the issue of political kidnapings was the main item on the agenda at a meeting of the Organization of American States which was held on June 30, 1970, in Washington, D.C. At this meeting, Argentina and Brazil called for a uniformly hard line, in which all governments would agree not to provide asylum to any political prisoners freed as ransom for kidnaping victims. But a number of governments, notably Chile and Mexico, objected, feeling that such a measure would infringe on the Latin American principle of political asylum. The countless coups in Latin America have caused a steady flow of political exiles from one country to another.

The meeting adopted a compromise resolution sponsored by the United States that condemned terrorism and called on the Inter-American Committee of Jurists to prepare a draft treaty that would declare kidnappings of foreign diplomats to be an international crime not subject to political immunities. In the meantime, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Guatemala pledged not to make any deals with kidnapers whatever the cost in human life.

The first convention on the problem of protection of diplomats was drafted by the Organization of American States at a special session of the OAS General Assembly held in Washington, D.C. in 1971. The OAS Convention provided that kidnaping, murder, and other assaults against persons to whom the state has the duty under international law to give special protection shall be considered common crimes of international significance. If the fugitive is not surrendered for extradition because of some legal impediment, the state in which the offender is found is obligated to prosecute, as if the act had been committed in its territory. President Nixon submitted the OAS Convention to the U.S. Senate which gave its advice and consent to ratification unanimously on June 12, 1972.

United Nations

In addition to the OAS Convention, many nations expressed a preference to develop another convention in the broader United Nations forum. As a result, the International Law Commission of the United Nations at its 1972 meeting developed draft articles on the protection of diplomats which have been submitted to the United Nations General Assembly. The U.N.'s International Law Commission's draft articles vary somewhat from the OAS Convention, but both require extradition or submission for prosecution of persons alleged to have committed certain enumerated crimes against diplomats. The draft of the International Law Commission covers "violent attacks" upon the person or liberty of an internationally protected person as well as violent attacks upon his official premises or residence if likely to endanger his person.

News correspondent Roscoe Drummond, in his syndicated column of March 10, 1973, noted that only a few months ago, 14 nations proposed that the United Nations take "adequate measures to prevent acts of violence against innocent people," at which point the entire communist bloc, together with the third world Arab and African members, joined to produce enough votes to immobilize the United Nations.

U.S. Cabinet Committee To Combat Terrorism

Alarmed by the outbreak of terrorism at the Olympic games in Munich that left 11 Israeli athletes and 5 Black September guerrillas dead, President Nixon on September 25, 1972, ordered the formation of a 10-member Cabinet Committee To Combat Terrorism headed by Secretary of State William P. Rogers for the purpose of reporting on measures that are being taken to combat terrorism. Other members of the Cabinet Committee are the Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of CIA, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, and the Director of the FBI.

The Cabinet Committee has taken many specific measures in its fight against terrorism. These include the following:

(1) Tightened visa, immigration, and custom procedures. The U.S. Government suspended the regulation allowing transit through the United States without a visa. The suspension applies to every traveler on a nondiscriminatory basis. In the past, approximately 600,000 visitors a year were permitted to spend up to 10 days crossing the United States without prior approval or screening.

(2) Screened more than 28,000 visa applications of individuals, with the result that several persons were refused entry into the United States including a known leader of an international terrorist organization.

(3) Implemented Public Law 92-539 providing Federal protection for foreign officials and giving the FBI the Federal investigative jurisdiction concurrent with that already held by local law enforcement officials.

(4) Alerted post offices and likely targets on the danger of letter-bombs. Several letter-bombs have been intercepted in the United States by customs and postal employees and citizens, with only one injury. (A batch of 72 letter-bombs, with American addresses, was intercepted by authorities in India.)

Policy of U.S. Government covering kidnaping of American officials

The policy of the U.S. Government in handling a crisis when American officials are kidnaped and held for ransom is to avoid being "blackmailed" even if this means risking the lives of the captured American officials. However, other countries do not always go along with this policy. For example, when the U.S. Government refused to pay the ransom the Haitian terrorists asked for the release of U.S. Ambassador Clinton Knox last January, the Haitian Government put up \$70,000 and supplied an airplane to buy off the rebels. Likewise, it has been the policy of the West German and Mexican Governments to yield to terrorist demands. Most specialists in this field believe that acceding to the terrorists' demands induces more terror, not less. They believe that the best method is to reduce the reward.

An article which appeared in the March 2, 1973, issue of the New York Times noted that U.S. Secretary of State William P. Rogers had recently pointed out to Arab governments that the wave of kidnapings will never be stopped so long as the people who commit these crimes are allowed to go free. In this connection, it was noted that of all the criminals involved in attacks on foreign embassies in recent years, only one is still in jail. All the rest have been released, including the Arab terrorists who survived the murderous attack on the Israeli athletes at the Olympic games in Munich.

Acts of violence against foreign diplomats in the United States

Last March, a spokesman for the U.S. Department of State reported that violence or threats of violence against foreign diplomats in the United States had risen by more than 40 percent. He noted that there were 122 attacks or threatened attacks on foreign diplomats and their families in the past 9 months compared with 112 in the preceding 12-month period. At that time nearly all crimes against diplomats and their families were local offenses, meaning that detection and punishment of the criminals were a local matter, with standards varying from State to State.

On October 24, 1972, President Richard M. Nixon signed into law an "Act for Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States" (Public Law 92-539) which provides the Federal Government with crucial new legal authority to investigate or prosecute covered offenses. Enactment of this legislation is a concrete step in the effort of the U.S. Government to enhance the safety and well-being of diplomats and other officials in this country. Provisions of the act complement existing municipal law in the United States by making it a Federal offense to murder, kidnap, assault, or harass foreign officials or official guests of the United States. The act also prohibits, under certain conditions, demonstrations within 100 feet of buildings belonging to or used by foreign officials or international organizations. In addition, there is a provision outlawing the international destruction of property belonging to or used by foreign governments, international organizations, foreign officials, and official guests.

In the latter part of January 1973, two diplomats from Turkey were slain in Santa Barbara, Calif., by unknown persons. They were Mehmet Baydar, Turkish Consul General at Los Angeles, and his Vice Consul, Bahadir Demir. The motives for the slayings have not been determined. President Nixon, in a telegram to President Sunay of Turkey, expressed his shock at the brutal slayings and assured President Sunay that this deplorable act of violence is being investigated by U.S. authorities with a sense of great urgency.

Following the attack by Black September terrorists at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum in March 1973, which resulted in the murder of three diplomats including two Americans, new U.S. security measures were employed. Under these new measures, most Arabs seeking visas to the United States from American embassies overseas must receive clearance from Washington. At least one major terrorist attack, allegedly being planned by Black September terrorists in New York City in March 1973, at the time of a visit by Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, was broken up by FBI agents and police officers who found large quantities of explosives in cars parked in front of two Israeli banks and the Israeli's El Al Airlines.

On April 16, 1973, shots were fired through a window in the Washington, D.C., home of the New Zealand chargé d'affaires in what may have been an Arab terrorist attempt to harm a Jordanian diplomat who had previously lived in the house. No one was injured in the shooting, but a sign left below the window by the perpetrator read: "There will be a homeland for all or a homeland for none. Death to the Zionists and their functionaries." Inside a five-pointed star painted above the message were the words "Black September," the name of a Palestinian terrorist group.

According to the U.S. State Department, this was the first local incident in which the name of the Black September group or any other Arab terrorist organization had been used by the perpetrators. The house had been purchased by the New Zealand Embassy just a few months ago after it had served for 2 years as the residence of the Jordanian Ambassador to the United States.

MAJOR POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS

Case studies set forth in chronological order, have been made of major political kidnappings to show the modus operandi and to give an insight as to how the kidnappings have varied by the motivation of the terrorists.

JANUARY 16, 1968—GUATEMALA

Col. John D. Webber, U.S. Army
Lt. Comdr. Ernest A. Munro, U.S. Navy

On January 16, 1968, while returning from lunch, U.S. Army Col. John D. Webber, commander of the 34-man U.S. military group in Guatemala, and U.S. Navy Lt. Comdr. Ernest A. Munro, head of the group's Navy section, were shot to death by bullets from a passing car in what was thought to be a kidnapping attempt. Two U.S. military enlisted personnel were wounded in the attack.

The following day a terrorist group known as Armed Forces of the Revolution (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes; FAR) distributed leaflets throughout Guatemala City claiming responsibility for the killings. The leaflets declared that the shootings were to avenge murders by clandestine rightwing organizations which the FAR said received orders from the U.S. military mission.

U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John G. Mein expressed the opinion that the killings were an attempt to force an escalation of U.S. military strength in Guatemala, aimed both at arousing the population against the United States and at diverting U.S. soldiers and equipment from "wars of liberation" elsewhere. In short, it was like Che Guevara's strategy of weakening the United States by creating "many Vietnams."

AUGUST 28, 1968—GUATEMALA

John G. Mein, U.S. Ambassador

On August 28, 1968, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John G. Mein was shot to death while en route in the chauffeur-driven U.S. Embassy limousine from a luncheon at the Embassy residence to his office in downtown Guatemala City. The Ambassador's car was forced to the curb by a Buick and blocked in from behind by a small truck. Several young men dressed in green fatigue uniforms and armed with at least one automatic weapon scrambled from the Buick and surrounded the Ambassador's car. Ambassador Mein leaped from the car and ran. He was struck in the back by a burst of submachinegun fire and killed instantly.

The following day the FAR issued a communique, given to the Guatemala newspaper *El Imparcial*, announcing that Ambassador Mein was killed "while resisting political kidnapping" in answer to the capture of FAR Commandant Camilo Sanchez. It was speculated that the FAR sought to kidnap Mein as ransom for the release of Sanchez who reportedly was a prisoner in Guatemala City. Sanchez is believed to have been in command of FAR urban guerrilla units.

Ambassador Mein, whose life had been threatened repeatedly, knew that he was a possible target of the leftist guerrillas. Nevertheless, he spurned a bodyguard, believing that the U.S. policy was best served

by refusing to give the terrorists an opportunity to boast that they had intimidated the United States. In conversation with friends, Ambassador Mein had indicated that he would attempt to escape rather than submit to capture and provide the terrorists with an opportunity to humiliate the United States and Guatemalan Governments.

SEPTEMBER 4, 1969—BRAZIL

Charles Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador

On September 4, 1969, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick was kidnaped by four gunmen who ambushed the Ambassador's car in a Rio de Janeiro street near the Embassy as the Ambassador was returning to his downtown office from lunch at his residence. Ambassador Elbrick, recently assigned to his post in Brazil, refused an armed escort, a precaution which his predecessor, Ambassador Lincoln Gordon, regularly took.

The kidnapers forced Ambassador Elbrick into their car and drove off, leaving behind the Ambassador's chauffeur, a ransom note, and a homemade bomb which failed to explode. The ransom note said that the Ambassador was seized because he was "the symbol of exploitation" and demanded the publication of a manifesto. The ransom note also demanded that the Brazilian Government release 15 political prisoners who were to be flown to Algeria, Chile, or Mexico. The note warned that if the demands were not met within 48 hours, Elbrick would be "executed."

The kidnapers' manifesto was signed by two leftwing terrorist organizations, the Revolutionary Movement-8 (Movimento Revolucionario; MR-8) and the National Liberation Action (Ação Libertadora Nacional; ALN), both dedicated to the overthrow of the military government. In the manifesto the kidnapers declared they would no longer tolerate "tortures, beatings and killings" of their members at the hands of the authorities. The manifesto contained a violent condemnation of Brazil's military regime.

The kidnapers negotiated with the Brazilian Government by notes, left first in an alms box in a church in Rio and then in the suggestion box at a supermarket in suburban Leblon. On September 5, 1969, the Brazilian Government agreed to the kidnapers' demands and on that same day broadcast the terrorists' manifesto. On the following day the 15 specified political prisoners were flown by the Brazilian Government to Mexico. The prisoners were a varied lot—representatives of student organizations, unions, and peasant groups—representing the orthodox Brazilian Communist Party as well as representatives from the more radical Castroite, Trotskyite, and Maoist groups.

On September 7, 1969, Ambassador Elbrick was released by his captors, whom he described on the following day as "young, very determined, intelligent fanatics" who would have carried out their threat if their demands had not been met.

MARCH 6, 1970—GUATEMALA

Sean M. Holly, U.S. Labor Attaché

On March 6, 1970, Sean M. Holly, U.S. Labor Attaché in Guatemala, was seized by two carloads of men armed with submachineguns who intercepted his automobile on a main street in Guatemala City as he was returning to the Embassy from lunch.

The kidnapers identified themselves as members of the FAR organization. They threatened to kill Holly if the Guatemalan Government refused to release four imprisoned FAR members. The Guatemalan Government agreed to meet the kidnapers' demands. Two imprisoned FAR members were released and given political asylum in the Costa Rican Embassy on March 7, 1970. A third FAR member, whose release the guerrillas had demanded in the mistaken belief that he was in jail, contacted the Costa Rican Embassy on the morning of March 8, 1970, and was given political asylum there. All three were then given safe conduct to Mexico. The fourth FAR member on the kidnapers' list was allowed to go to Mexico earlier.

U.S. Labor Attaché Holly, who was held hostage in the mountains for 39 hours, was taken to a church in the working-class district of Guatemala City on March 8, 1970, by two FAR members who turned him over to a priest with a warning that the police not be called for 1 hour.

MARCH 11, 1970—BRAZIL

Nobico Okushi, Japanese Consul General

On March 11, 1970, Nobico Okushi, Japanese Consul General in São Paulo, Brazil, was abducted by terrorists while on the way home from his office in São Paulo. Three cars forced the Japanese Consul General's car to stop; then armed men threatened the chauffeur, made the Consul get out of his limousine, and drove him off in another car. In a ransom note received the following day, the kidnapers said they would release Mr. Okushi only after five political prisoners had been released from prison in São Paulo and sent into exile, preferably in Mexico.

The abductors identified themselves as members of the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, an urban terrorist organization under the leadership of a former Brazilian Army captain. They threatened to kill Mr. Okushi if the five political prisoners were not released and if the Brazilian Government did not call off its massive manhunt. Soon after the kidnapers made their demands, a note from Mr. Okushi saying he was well and asking for caution by authorities was delivered to the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in São Paulo.

As the deadline set by the kidnapers approached, the Brazilian Government announced that it would meet the ransom demands. The Brazilian Government also agreed to an additional demand made by the kidnapers—to guarantee all prisoners in Brazilian jails good treatment.

On March 14, 1970, the Brazilian Government released the five prisoners and sent them on a jetliner to Mexico. The prisoners included three self-confessed urban guerrillas and two women. One of the latter was the Mother Superior of a Catholic Church-sponsored orphanage in São Paulo, who was imprisoned on October 25, 1969, on charges of allowing members of the terrorist organization Armed Liberation Front to use her convent as a base of operations. The other woman was the wife of a guerrilla leader who had been detained on February 26, 1969, following a raid on her home in which her husband was killed in a shootout with the police. Upon arrival in Mexico, all five of the released prisoners claimed that they had been tortured in prison.

Approximately 10 hours after the released political prisoners arrived in Mexico, the kidnapers released Mr. Okushi unharmed.

MARCH 24, 1970—DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, U.S. Air Attaché

On March 24, 1970, U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, Air Attaché in the Dominican Republic, was kidnaped on arrival for his customary 6 a.m. calisthenics on the polo field beside the Embajador, a Santo Domingo hotel. Five or more men in military uniforms and armed with rifles forced Colonel Crowley into the kidnapers' automobile. In a note to the Dominican Republic evening newspaper, *El Nacional*, the kidnapers identified themselves as members of the United Anti-Reelection Command, a group of leftists seeking to block incumbent President Balaguer's attempt to serve another term as President of the Dominican Republic.

The kidnapers demanded that 21 prisoners be brought to Santo Domingo's main square by 10 a.m. the following morning and released in a public ceremony attended by the auxiliary archbishop of Santo Domingo, the president of the university, and the president of the bar association. The kidnapers stated that Colonel Crowley would be released 10 hours after the public ceremony. They cautioned that if anything happened to any of the prisoners, Colonel Crowley would be killed.

The Dominican Republic Government agreed to exchange the prisoners for Colonel Crowley but balked at waiting 10 hours for his release and at freeing the prisoners in Plaza Suarte. With Archbishop Hugo Polanco arbitrating between the Dominican Government and the kidnapers, a compromise was reached whereby 20 prisoners would be placed on board a jet airliner under the protection of the Mexican Embassy, with Archbishop Polanco aboard as an escort, and the plane would be permitted to depart as soon as Colonel Crowley appeared.

In accordance with the compromise worked out between the Dominican Government and the kidnapers, Colonel Crowley was released unharmed on March 26, 1970, and the 20 prisoners were allowed to proceed to Mexico.

MARCH 24, 1970—ARGENTINA

Waldemar Sanchez, Paraguayan Consul

On March 24, 1970, Waldemar Sanchez, Paraguayan Consul, in the border town of Ituzaingo in Corrientes Province of Argentina, was kidnaped during the late afternoon while showing his car to a group of prospective buyers in Buenos Aires. The abductors identified themselves as members of the Argentine Liberation Front (*Frente Argentino de Liberacion*; FAL), an organization formed in 1968 by militant dissidents of the Soviet-oriented Communist Party of Argentina. They threatened to kill the Paraguayan Consul if two of their members, Carlos Della Nava and Alejandro Baldu, were not released by 10 p.m., on March 25.

The following day, President Stroessner of Paraguay arrived in Argentina for a scheduled vacation. That day, the Argentine Government (apparently with President Stroessner's approval) refused to comply with the terrorists' demands. The Argentine Government declared that Baldu was not in custody and that Della Nava was a common criminal and would stay in jail. In response, the Argentine Liberation Front said that Baldu had been either killed by the police or tortured so severely that the Government could not release him.

Della Nava was shown for 10 seconds on television to show that he had not been tortured. However, his father declared in a news conference that his son had been stripped by police, beaten, and tortured with an electric prod.

On March 25, 1970, the kidnapers told the Buenos Aires newspapers that if the two prisoners were not released, they would execute Paraguayan Consul Sanchez and would thereafter begin the execution of "all managers of American businesses." On March 26 and 27, all radio and television stations throughout Argentina declared every half hour that the Government would not be blackmailed into releasing any prisoners.

On March 28, 1970, the kidnapers released Mr. Sanchez unharmed in a suburb of Buenos Aires. The kidnapers' organization, the Argentine Liberation Front, said that it did not go through with its threat because of "humanitarian reasons." The Front cited its previous unwillingness to shed unnecessary blood. In its final statement, issued after releasing Mr. Sanchez, the Front declared that it would now "undertake the execution of an undetermined number of police and government officials."

Argentina's Interior Minister Francisco Imaz hailed Sanchez' release on March 26 and maintained that the Argentine Government's decision to reject the kidnapers' demands "was the only position possible." Imaz stated that any other position would have been tremendously dangerous for the future of the country. Imaz added that a police search was underway for members of the Argentine Liberation Front.

MARCH 29, 1970—ARGENTINA

Yuri Pivovarov, Soviet Assistant Commercial Attaché

On March 29, 1970, an attempted political kidnaping of Yuri Pivovarov, Assistant Commercial Attaché, Soviet Embassy, failed when the kidnapers' getaway Mercedes crashed during a police chase. Four men were waiting in the commercial garage in Buenos Aires used by Soviet diplomats when Mr. Pivovarov, his wife, and infant daughter returned from a Sunday drive. The terrorists forced the wife and child from the car, subdued Mr. Pivovarov with a blow of a pistol butt and drove off. The screams of Mr. Pivovarov's wife alerted a police guard who fired at the fleeing car. A passing police car took up the chase and riddled the kidnaper's car with bullets. The terrorists' car collided with another and smashed into a tree. Mr. Pivovarov was not seriously hurt in the accident. Three of the abductors were injured and captured by the police while a fourth abductor escaped.

The Argentine Government identified one of the captured kidnapers as Deputy Inspector Carlos Beningno Balubuana of the "Federal Police's 33d Precinct," a man well known for his rightwing beliefs. The other two abductors were not connected with the police. A rightist terrorist organization, the Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO), circulated a statement claiming responsibility for the attempted kidnaping and described the three captured kidnapers as "war heroes."

The Soviet Union issued a formal note to Argentina on March 30, 1970, protesting the kidnaping attempt as well as "a campaign of threats and blackmail" which it alleged had been leveled against

Soviet officials in Argentina. MANO had threatened on March 27 to kill the Soviet Ambassador to Argentina Yuri Yolski and his family in reprisal for the kidnaping of Paraguayan Consul Waldemar Sanchez.

The Argentine Government on March 31, 1970, apologized to the Soviet Union and asserted that it had not been involved in the incident. Argentine President Onganía stated that an investigation of the incident was being conducted and blamed the provocative action on "gangsters" and "armed delinquents."

MARCH 31, 1970—GUATEMALA

Count Karl von Spreti, West German Ambassador

On March 31, 1970, the West German Ambassador to Guatemala Count Karl von Spreti was forced from his limousine by armed men in downtown Guatemala City as he was riding with his chauffeur from his Embassy to his home shortly after noon. The FAR claimed responsibility for the abduction and demanded the release of 17 political prisoners, among whom were three accused of killing a congressman and three policemen, others accused of taking part in the shooting of pro-Government politicians and attacks on military installations, and five who were accused of carrying out the kidnap-ransom of U.S. Labor Attaché Sean Holly. The Vatican Ambassador announced that he had been contacted by the kidnapers to act as an intermediary.

On April 2, 1970, the Guatemalan Government announced that it would not release any prisoners since some of them had already been convicted and sentenced and could not be freed by executive order. The Government issued a general declaration of war on the terrorists under which all political and labor activity was suspended, all personal rights suspended and the military authorized to arrest and question any suspicious persons. The West German Government issued a protest to Guatemala stating it could not "accept the decision" against freeing prisoners to obtain Ambassador von Spreti's release.

On the morning of April 3, 1970, a delegation of foreign ambassadors met with Foreign Minister Alberto Fuentes Mohn to protest the Guatemalan Government's decision not to meet the kidnapers' demand for the release of the 17 prisoners. Meanwhile, in a note to the Papal delegate, the kidnapers increased their demand from 17 to 25 prisoners and also demanded \$700,000. On the same day, Bonn dispatched William Hoppe, a special envoy to Guatemala to press its case. The West German Government reportedly offered to pay the \$700,000 demanded by the abductors. However, that evening the Guatemalan Government renewed its refusal to meet any of the kidnapers' demands.

The kidnapers' ultimatum expired at 3 p.m. on April 4. On April 5, after an anonymous telephone call, the body of the West German Ambassador was found in an abandoned house some 17 kilometers from Guatemala City. According to a coroner's report, Ambassador von Spreti died instantly from a bullet wound in the temple.

Reacting to the news of Ambassador von Spreti's death, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt denounced the Guatemalan Government for the "infamous murder" charging that it had "shown itself unable to give the accredited diplomatic representative the necessary security." He added that the West German Government had been willing to pay the \$700,000 in ransom demanded by the kidnapers.

The Guatemalan Government offered its "condolences and regrets" to the West German Government and indicated there would be retaliation against the prisoners whose release had been demanded by the kidnapers. Guatemalan President Mendez Montenegro ordered 3 days of national mourning for the slain envoy and announced that his coffin would be placed on view in the Guatemalan National Palace. Meanwhile, Guatemalan Army troops swept through Guatemala City in an intensive search for the kidnapers.

A Guatemalan Government spokesman reported that four of the prisoners on the kidnapers' list had confessed to complicity in the August 1968 killing of U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John C. Mein and "we could not let those go."

On April 6, 1970, the West German Government ordered its diplomatic relations with Guatemala reduced to a bare minimum and the Guatemalan Ambassador to West Germany was notified that his departure was expected.

APRIL 5, 1970—BRAZIL

Curtis S. Cutter, U.S. Consul General

On April 5, 1970, U.S. Consul General Curtis S. Cutter was shot in the back when he thwarted a kidnaping attempt in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Cutter, his wife, and a friend were returning to the Cutter's residence after a late dinner when the path of Mr. Cutter's car was blocked by another in an apparent attempt to kidnap him. Four or five men wearing dark glasses and armed with submachineguns and revolvers jumped out of the car and headed toward Mr. Cutter's station wagon. Cutter stepped on the accelerator of his station wagon and as it sped forward it hit one of the would-be abductors dragging him on the bumper for several yards. The other terrorists opened fire wounding Mr. Cutter in the back, a fraction of an inch from his lung. The terrorists picked up their injured comrade and escaped. Mr. Cutter's wound was not serious and he was able to drive to a hospital.

In a statement released in Rio de Janeiro on April 6, 1970, U.S. Ambassador to Brazil Charles Burke Elbrick stated:

This latest act of terrorism heightens our concern for the safety of our diplomatic and consular personnel. While I am aware of and appreciate the efforts of security officials in this connection, I am reiterating our concern to the Brazilian Government.

MAY 29, 1970—ARGENTINA

Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, former Argentine President

On May 29, 1970, Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, a retired general and former President of Argentina, was kidnaped from his apartment house in downtown Buenos Aires. The "Montoneros," an Argentine terrorist group which described itself as "Peronist and Christian" claimed on June 1 that they had "tried and sentenced" to a firing-squad death Aramburu who had played a key role in overthrowing Argentina's exiled strongman Juan Peron. The Argentine Government on July 17, 1970, announced that a body found buried in the basement of a farmhouse some 400 miles from Buenos Aires was that of Aramburu, who as a general and President from 1955 to 1958 had been known as a stern and incorruptible man. Aramburu had been Presi-

dent when 27 followers of deposed dictator Peron were executed following an unsuccessful revolt. The bold manner in which the crime was committed underscored the growing unrest in Argentina and the growing power of the Peronistas who claimed the support of about one-third of Argentina's voters. Following Aramburu's death, the Argentine Government legalized the death penalty for political crimes for the first time in a century.

JUNE 11, 1970—BRAZIL

Ehrenfried Von Hollenben, West German Ambassador

On June 11, 1970, striking suddenly, machinegunning one security guard to death and wounding two others, Brazilian revolutionaries of the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard and the National Liberation Action succeeded in kidnaping West German Ambassador to Brazil Ehrenfried Von Hollenben, from his automobile while he was en route to the Embassy. The kidnapers' organization soon extracted an agreement from the Brazilian Government to release 40 leftist prisoners in return for the Ambassador's life. Ambassador Von Hollenben was released unharmed on June 16, 1970, after the Brazilian Government had complied with the kidnapers' demands.

One of the kidnapers' organizations, the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard, is an urban terrorist organization under the leadership of a former Brazilian Army captain. The other, the National Liberation Action, is a leftwing terrorist organization dedicated to the overthrow of the military government that has ruled Brazil since 1964.

JULY 31, 1970—URUGUAY

Daniel A. Mitrione, U.S. Public Safety Adviser

On July 31, 1970, the Tupamaros, a group of terrorists who have been engaged since 1964 in a struggle to overthrow the elected Government of Uruguay, abducted Daniel A. Mitrione, a U.S. Public Safety Adviser, from his chauffeured automobile. The Tupamaros kidnapers demanded that all of their comrades who were in jail at the time—approximately 150—be liberated in exchange for three Tupamaros captives: Mitrione, who had been instructing the Uruguayan police in modern crime detection methods; the Brazilian Consul Aloysio Mores Dias Gomides; and U.S. soil expert Claude Fly, who had been helping an institute belonging to the Uruguayan Ministry of Agriculture in research work. Uruguayan President Areco Pacheco remained firm and refused to negotiate with the Tupamaros. Instead, police authorities cordoned off all of Montevideo and turned the capital city upside down with an allout police search that netted 20 alleged terrorists.

The Tupamaros countered by threatening to kill Mr. Mitrione. After 36 hours of anxiety and suspense, the bullet-ridden body of Mitrione was found in an abandoned car. He had been wounded when resisting his captors on July 31 and the Tupamaros had treated his wound. However, the Tupamaros later bound his wrists with wire, blindfolded him, wrapped him in a blanket, and then fired several shots into his back and neck.

On August 10, 1970, the day when the bullet-riddled body of Mr. Mitrione was found, the Uruguayan Parliament decided to suspend for

20 days certain individual rights—an emergency measure provided for in the Constitution as a means of dealing with exceptional situations. Although law enforcement officers could enter all homes without a search warrant, even at night, and the police were allowed to hold a suspect indefinitely, the search for the other abducted victims remained fruitless.

Although the Uruguayan Government was bitterly criticized, the situation was also unpleasant for the Tupamaros. The image of the Tupamaros as “Robin Hoods” came down with a crash when they killed Mr. Mitrone, who left behind a wife and nine children. Much of the sympathy for the Tupamaros had withered away the year before, when the terrorists started killing police officers. To soften the effect of Mr. Mitrone’s murder, the Tupamaros tried to spread the rumor that Mr. Mitrone was a man who taught the Uruguayan police how to torture prisoners. The overwhelming majority of the people of Uruguay were shocked beyond expression by the cold-blooded killing of a father of nine children. This was not only inhuman but a national disgrace. With two hostages still in the hands of the Tupamaros, the Uruguayan people began doing something highly unusual—they began cooperating with the police.

JULY 31, 1970—URUGUAY

Aloysio Mores Dias Gomides, Brazilian Consul

On July 31, 1970, a group of Tupamaros posing as telephone repairmen invaded the home of Brazilian Consul Aloysio Mores Dias Gomides and abducted the Brazilian Consul. The Tupamaros announced that Consul Dias Gomides had been kidnaped because he was a representative of a dictatorship which had tortured and assassinated hundreds of Brazilian patriots. Although Consul Dias Gomides was originally part of a package deal whereby the Tupamaros demanded the release of 150 political prisoners in exchange for Daniel Mitrone, Claude Fly, and Dias Gomides, the Tupamaros later reduced the ransom for Mr. Dias Gomides to \$250,000. With the payment of this sum, Consul Dias Gomides was released unharmed on February 21, 1971.

JULY 31, 1970—URUGUAY

Michael Gordon Jones, U.S. Foreign Service officer

On July 31, 1970, when U.S. Foreign Service officer Michael Gordon Jones entered the garage of the apartment house where he lived in Montevideo, the Tupamaros guerrillas were waiting for him. The kidnapers pounced on Mr. Jones, struck him on the head with a pistol, and threw a blanket over him. They then tied him up and threw him in the back of a pickup truck.

Mr. Jones’ courage and strength saved his life. While lying on the floor of the truck being used by the kidnapers to transport him, Mr. Jones somehow managed to pull the blanket from his face inch-by-inch, so that he could see. Then he swung himself from the fast-moving truck and hit the ground so hard that he almost lost consciousness but he had successfully evaded his kidnapers.

AUGUST 7, 1970—URUGUAY

Claude Fly, U.S. Agricultural Adviser

On the morning of August 7, 1970, U.S. Agricultural Adviser Claude Fly set out as usual for his laboratory office in the Ministry of Agriculture on the outskirts of Montevideo. Shortly after arriving at his office, five men in street clothing burst in and hustled Mr. Fly out a back door. Outside, the terrorists blindfolded Mr. Fly, bound him hand and foot, and shoved him into a large burlap sack. He was then dumped into the back of a pickup truck. After a long, jolting ride, Mr. Fly was held captive in an abandoned building where a hole about 3 feet deep had been dug under the floor. After a few days, he was removed to a second hideout where he was imprisoned inside a 4- by 6-foot cage. At least two Tupamaros guarded him at all times.

After having been held captive for an extended length of time, Mr. Fly suffered a heart seizure. A daring band of Tupamaros promptly kidnaped Dr. Jorge Dighiero, a prominent cardiologist, from a medical convention in Montevideo. Dr. Dighiero, after examining Mr. Fly, told the kidnapers that Mr. Fly was in serious condition and would die if not given prompt medical treatment. On March 2, 1971, the Tupamaros drove both Dr. Dighiero and Mr. Fly to a British hospital in Montevideo where they deposited them in front of the hospital before speeding off. Fly eventually regained his health.

The Tupamaros indicated that they had kidnaped Mr. Fly in an effort to strengthen their demand for the release of 150 political prisoners which was made at the time U.S. Public Safety Adviser Daniel Mitrione was kidnaped on July 31, 1970.

OCTOBER 5, 1970—CANADA

James R. Cross, British Trade Commissioner

On October 5, 1970, James R. Cross, British Trade Commissioner in Quebec Province, was kidnaped from his home in Montreal by four or five men who entered his home at gunpoint and abducted him. The terrorists used a taxicab in carrying out the kidnaping.

A ransom note found on the campus of the University of Quebec in Montreal on the next day linked the kidnaping to the Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ), a clandestine extremist French-Canadian separatist group whose objective is the severing of the political ties between the province of Quebec and the rest of Canada. It is a militant group of young French Canadians dedicated to overthrowing capitalism as well as separating Quebec politically from the rest of Canada.

In the ransom note the kidnapers warned that they would kill Mr. Cross unless a long list of demands was met. The demands included the freeing of 13 of its jailed members who had been convicted of murder, armed robbery, arson, and bombings carried out in an attempt to win independence for Quebec. The ultimatum also asked the payment of \$500,000 in gold and the publication of an FLQ manifesto. Other demands included the reinstatement of certain post office workers who had lost their jobs earlier in the year and the publication by the police of the name of the informant whose tip led to a police raid on an FLQ hideout in June 1970.

The Canadian Federal and Provincial Governments rejected the kidnapers' demands as wholly unreasonable. The authorities sought a way to communicate with the kidnapers. For a time they worked through a lawyer who had defended FLQ members at previous trials, but these efforts failed.

The crisis took a new turn on October 10, 1970, when Pierre LaPorte, Minister of Labor in the Quebec Government, was kidnaped outside his home by FLQ members. The kidnapers threatened to kill LaPorte if the original ransom demands for Mr. Cross were not met. The Government again rejected the demands but promised to give the kidnapers safe conduct out of Canada provided Mr. Cross and Mr. LaPorte were released unharmed.

Possessing evidence that the FLQ planned a series of political kidnappings and assassinations, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa asked the Canadian Federal Government to invoke emergency powers, previously used only in time of war, to deal with the FLQ threats. On October 16, 1970, the Cabinet of Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau approved emergency powers to preserve public order in Canada using the long-standing War Measures Act as its authority. The act outlawed the FLQ and any other organization advocating the use of force or criminal acts to change the Government. The police were authorized to conduct searches and make arrests without warrants.

On October 18, 1970, following an anonymous telephone call, Pierre LaPorte's body was found in the trunk of a car parked in a Montreal suburb. A massive manhunt for the kidnapers followed and the police made almost 600 separate raids in Quebec arresting more than 400 persons who were suspected of being either FLQ members or sympathizers.

On December 3, 1970, the FLQ kidnapers released James Cross unharmed, after holding him for nearly 2 months in a house on the north side of Montreal. Three kidnapers and four of their relatives were flown to Cuba aboard a Canadian military plane in accordance with the terms of an agreement worked out earlier by representatives of the Quebec Government and FLQ members.

In a press statement following his release, James Cross said that he had always been treated courteously by his kidnapers. He described watching television almost constantly and being forced to keep his head straight and not look at his abductors.

OCTOBER 10, 1970—CANADA

Pierre LaPorte, Quebec Labor Minister

On October 10, 1970, amid continuing extensions of the deadline for the execution of kidnaped British diplomat James R. Cross, FLQ members kidnaped Quebec Labor Minister Pierre LaPorte. LaPorte was playing football with relatives in his front yard and had just crossed the street to pick up a football when four armed and masked men snatched him from the street. The men, armed with submachine-guns forced LaPorte into their car and pushed him to the floor where he was covered with a trenchcoat. He was driven to a house in the suburbs. After the car was driven into the garage, LaPorte was taken blindfolded into the house, where he was kept handcuffed most of the time.

The kidnapers threatened to kill LaPorte if the original demands made for the release of British Trade Commissioner James R. Cross were not met. The Canadian Government rejected the demands promising only to give safe conduct out of Canada to the kidnapers.

On October 18, 1970, Pierre LaPorte's body was found in the trunk of a car parked near the Canadian Air Force base at St. Hubert, south of Montreal. The car carried the license plates of the original car used by the kidnapers when they abducted LaPorte. The Labor Minister had been strangled by a neck chain he wore to hold a religious medal.

The murder of LaPorte, a respected former journalist and one of the most experienced members of the new Provincial cabinet, shocked Canadians from coast to coast. The Government easily won backing from Parliament for the actions it had taken under the War Measures Act, which allowed the police to arrest suspects and imprison them for up to 21 days without formal charges.

On December 28, 1971, after a long manhunt that involved as many as 10,000 police officers and troops, FLQ members Paul Rose and Francis Simard were arrested and charged with the murder of Pierre LaPorte. They were found guilty as charged and sentenced to life imprisonment—Canada does not have the death penalty.

The Canadian Government moved firmly in rooting out the revolutionary FLQ movement which after LaPorte's death seemed to lose its appeal as an outlet for French-Canadian resentment.

DECEMBER 1, 1970—SPAIN

Eugene Beihl, West German Consul

On December 1, 1970, the honorary West German Consul Eugene Beihl was kidnaped by a radical wing of the Basque Nation and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; ETA), a small underground group fighting for the independence of Basque provinces in northern Spain. An anonymous telephone caller said the Consul's fate would depend on what happened to ETA members currently on trial for "political crimes." However, Consul Beihl was released unharmed on December 24, 1970.

On December 28, 1970, the military court found 15 ETA members guilty and sentenced 6 to death by the firing squad. Prison terms for the other 9 totaled 700 years. The severity of the sentences shocked the Western World and Governments from Great Britain to the Soviet Union asked Spanish President Francisco Franco to commute the death sentences.

On December 30, 1970, President Franco announced that the death sentences had been changed to 30 years in prison.

DECEMBER 7, 1970—BRAZIL

Giovanni Enrico Bucher, Swiss Ambassador

Armed leftist terrorists affiliated with the National Liberation Action organization and the Popular Revolutionary Vanguard kidnaped Giovanni Enrico Bucher, Swiss Ambassador to Brazil on December 7, 1970, in Rio de Janeiro. During the abduction, the terrorists fatally wounded the Swiss Ambassador's bodyguard. In a ransom note the terrorists demanded the release of 70 "political prisoners."

The Brazilian Government agreed to the terms and Bucher was released unharmed on January 16, 1971, 2 days after the 70 "political prisoners" were flown to Chile where they were given asylum.

Ambassador Bucher stated that during his 40 days of captivity he was kept in a small room and had suffered from the terrible heat.

JANUARY 8, 1971—URUGUAY

Geoffrey M. S. Jackson, British Ambassador

On January 8, 1971, Britain's Ambassador to Uruguay Geoffrey M. S. Jackson was kidnaped in downtown Montevideo by Tupamaros guerrillas. He was being driven to his Embassy when a vegetable cart obstructed the street. The vegetable vendor took out a submachinegun from under some lettuce and forced the Ambassador, his chauffeur, and an unarmed guard who was following in another car to get out of their vehicles. A kidnaper's car which had rammed the vehicle escorting the Ambassador's car, contained four terrorists who severely clubbed the Ambassador's driver and bodyguard. The Ambassador was forced into the kidnapers' car which quickly sped from the scene.

The kidnapers demanded the release of 150 "political prisoners" in exchange for the Ambassador. The Uruguayan Government announced that it would not meet any demands and would not negotiate with what it considered to be "terrorists." The Government offered a reward of \$8,000 for information leading to the Ambassador or his kidnapers.

Ambassador Jackson was held hostage for 8 months and 1 day by the Tupamaros guerrillas before being released unharmed in Montevideo on September 9, 1971. The Ambassador was released just 3 days after 106 of the "political prisoners" on the kidnapers' list had escaped from prison. The Tupamaros announced that since the "political prisoners" were no longer being held there was no further need to detain the Ambassador.

MARCH 4, 1971—TURKEY

James Sexton, Larry Heavner, Richard Caraszi, and James Gholson

As four American airmen drove home in the early morning of March 4, 1971, from a radar station near Ankara, Turkey, they were stopped by a roadblock. When the Americans left their vehicle to dismantle the roadblock, they were forced at gunpoint by the terrorists into a waiting car and driven off.

The Turkish Government received a manifesto from a group calling itself the Turkish People's Liberation Army, a leftwing terrorist organization connected with Dev-Genc, the main radical leftwing student group in Turkey. The manifesto denounced "American imperialism" and promised to clean Turkey of the Americans and all foreign enemies. The kidnapers demanded that the "manifesto" be publicized through the public news media and that a ransom of 400,000 Turkish lira be paid for the freedom of the American airmen.

The Turkish Government acted swiftly and nabbed one of the kidnapers as he was about to park the airmen's car near the Soviet Embassy in Ankara. The captured kidnaper, a university dropout named Mete Ertekin divulged the names of his four accomplices who were also former or present university students active in a student terrorist

group. The kidnapers released the four U.S. airmen unharmed on March 8, 1971.

Some 45,000 police and soldiers were recruited for a manhunt in search of the kidnapers. At the Middle East Technical University at Ankara, a hotbed of antigovernment sentiment, the troops were met by a hail of bullets and dynamite sticks. In the ensuing exchange of gunfire, one student and one police officer were killed and 20 students and 2 police officers were wounded. Some 350 students were arrested.

The kidnapers were arrested, tried, convicted, and executed.

MAY 17, 1971—TURKEY

Ephraim Elrom, Israeli Consul General

On May 17, 1971, four armed terrorists of the Turkish People's Liberation Army kidnaped Ephraim Elrom, Israel's Consul General in Istanbul, in a raid on his home. The kidnapers demanded that all revolutionary guerrillas under detention in Turkey be released by May 20, 1971, or the diplomat would be killed.

Rejecting the demand, the Turkish Government began an intensive search for Elrom and his kidnapers. A 15-hour curfew was put into effect on May 22 and a house-to-house search was conducted. The body of Consul Elrom was found on May 23, in an apartment near the Israeli Consulate. He had been shot to death.

A 2-month extension of Turkish martial law set up 10 days earlier was approved by the Turkish Parliament on May 24 and the Government intensified its search for the kidnapers. On June 1, Turkish police stormed an apartment in Istanbul where two of the terrorists had seized a 14-year-old girl as a hostage. One of the two terrorists who was wanted in connection with the Elrom kidnaping was killed in a shoot-out. The other terrorist tried to flee the building but was grabbed by an angry crowd which wanted to lynch him. However, the police intervened and took him into custody. He was later tried for the murder of Consul Elrom, convicted, and executed.

MAY 23, 1971—ARGENTINA

Stanley Sylvester, British Consul

On May 23, 1971, Stanley Sylvester, honorary British Consul in Rosario, Argentina, and an executive of the Swift Meat Packing plant in that city, was kidnaped by the People's Revolutionary Army, a Trotskyite communist organization which in recent years had become Argentina's most active leftist group. A kidnap note left in a downtown bar made no mention of ransom, stating only that Sylvester would be at the "disposition of popular justice." The note linked the abduction to the second anniversary of the death of Luis Noberto Blanco, a leftist, killed in a gun battle with the police in 1969.

Sylvester, who held an important executive post with the Swift Meat Packing Co., was seized outside his home by three armed men who forced him into a car. The kidnap car was found abandoned a few blocks away and was identified as a stolen car. The kidnapers in a later note demanded that \$62,500 in food and clothing be given to the poor by the Swift Meat Packing Co. The company complied with this demand and Sylvester was released unharmed on May 30, 1971.

MARCH 22, 1972—ARGENTINA

Oberdan Sallustro, business executive

On March 22, 1972, Oberdan Sallustro, a Fiat executive, was kidnaped in Buenos Aires. The kidnapers identified themselves as members of the People's Revolutionary Army, a Trotskyite communist group. They demanded that the Argentine Government release 50 jailed guerrillas and fly them to Algeria. In addition, the kidnapers ordered the Fiat Co. to deliver \$1 million in ransom in the form of gift packages of exercise books, shoes, pencils, and other items to the children of 798 schools in poor areas all over the country. The kidnapers further demanded that Fiat reinstate 250 workers fired after labor disputes at their main factory in Cordova last October. Mr. Sallustro had been the managing director of Fiat's Argentina subsidiary for 16 years and was held responsible by the kidnapers for "repression" of the workers.

The Argentine Government rejected the kidnapers' demands and began an all-out drive to locate the kidnapers. Shortly after the kidnaping, the police found an improvised dungeon in the basement of a rented farm mansion in a small town some 10 miles from Buenos Aires where Sallustro had been confined temporarily. Sallustro's fingerprints were detected on the walls and on eating utensils.

The Fiat Co. accepted the kidnapers' demand for the \$1 million ransom but the Argentine Government warned Fiat executives that they would be prosecuted for "illicit associations" unless they immediately broke off the ransom contacts with the kidnapers.

On April 10, 1972, a police squad car on routine patrol in a suburban working-class district of Buenos Aires discovered the kidnapers' hideout where Sallustro was being held. The kidnapers opened fire on the police, critically wounding one police officer before reinforcements were called in. The police captured four terrorists in the hideout including one woman. Just moments before the police broke into the hideout, the terrorists shot Sallustro to death. His body was found in the hideout with two bullet wounds in the chest and one in the neck. His hands had been tied behind his back.

JANUARY 23, 1973—HAITI

*Clinton E. Knox, U.S. Ambassador**Ward L. Christensen, U.S. Consul General*

On January 23, 1973, masked gunmen kidnaped U.S. Ambassador Clinton E. Knox as he returned to his suburban residence from the American Embassy in downtown Port au Prince, Haiti. Ambassador Knox's car was blocked by the kidnapers' car and a woman and two men jumped from the kidnapers' car. One of them carrying a gun warned "Do as we say and no harm will come to you." Knox was forced into the kidnapers' car and driven to the grounds of his residence. A watchman at the residence reported that Mr. Knox had been accompanied by two men and a woman and had given the guard orders to admit the car. Upon entering the Ambassador's residence, the kidnapers forced Knox into an upstairs sitting room where he was held at gunpoint.

Knox's chauffeur was released unharmed and sounded the alarm which sent U.S. Consul General Ward L. Christensen to the Embassy residence, where he too was seized. The kidnapers' initial demands included the release of 30 "political prisoners." Haitian authorities insisted that only 12 of those named were in prison and the kidnapers agreed to accept that number. The kidnapers also demanded a ransom of \$1 million but French Ambassador Bernard Dorin, acting as an intermediary, persuaded the kidnapers to accept \$70,000, which was all that could be raised within the kidnapers' 4-hour time limit.

With the ransom demands met, the kidnapers and hostages drove together to the airport on January 24, 1973, and there parted company as the kidnapers and the 12 prisoners left for Mexico.

Ambassador Knox and Consul General Christensen were both released unharmed after being held captive for 18 hours. However, it was noted that during the negotiations, the kidnapers were nervous and at one point seemed on the verge of shooting the Ambassador.

In Mexico, the kidnapers' leader was identified as Raymond Napoleon, a schoolteacher, who declared that he was part of a group who are fighting the Duvalier government in Haiti. The kidnapers were reportedly linked with the Coalition of National Liberation Brigades, a Haitian exile organization.

MARCH 1, 1973—SUDAN

Cleo A. Noel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador

G. Curtis Moore, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission

Guy Eid, Belgian Consul

On March 1, 1973, while attending an evening farewell party at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan, for U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission G. Curtis Moore, who was scheduled to return to the United States, U.S. Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., Belgian Consul Guy Eid, and Mr. Moore were seized by eight Black September guerrillas, who had forced their way into the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The diplomats were bound and pistol-whipped. Ambassador Noel was shot in the ankle.

The guerrillas barricaded themselves in the Saudi Arabian Embassy with the hostages. They demanded as ransom the release of 60 Palestinian guerrillas held in prison in Jordan as well as the release of Sirhan B. Sirhan, the killer of U.S. Senator Robert Kennedy.

A few hours after President Richard M. Nixon declared at a news conference on March 2, 1973, that the United States would not yield to "blackmail," the Black September guerrillas announced that they had killed the three diplomats. They claimed this action was taken "as a result of the arrogance and obstinacy of American imperialism represented by President Nixon's statement." However, information was received from foreign diplomats in Khartoum indicating that the terrorists had planned from the outset to kill the three diplomats.

The Black September terrorists surrendered to Sudanese authorities after killing the diplomats. They are currently imprisoned in the Sudan awaiting sentence for their crimes.

APRIL 2, 1973—ARGENTINA

Francisco Agustin Aleman, retired admiral, Argentine Navy

On April 2, 1973, Francisco Agustin Aleman, a retired admiral of the Argentine Navy, was seized before dawn at his downtown apartment in Buenos Aires by three young terrorists of the People's Revolutionary Army, a Trotskyite terrorist group, who tied up the admiral's wife and son. The kidnapers painted slogans on the walls of the apartment calling for "popular justice for Trelew," a reference to 16 guerrillas killed in August 1972, at the Navy's prison in Trelew. Argentine authorities reported that the 16 were killed trying to escape but members of the People's Revolutionary Army alleged that the prisoners were taken from their cells and murdered. On April 7, 1973, Admiral Aleman was released unharmed after he admitted wrongdoing by the Argentine Navy in the death of the imprisoned revolutionaries last August. Aleman, in a published statement, termed the killings in Trelew in Southern Argentina "a sad affair" and stated that the version presented by his captors indicated the Navy's role was "ignominious." Two other Argentine Navy admirals more closely tied to the Trelew shootings were assassinated by the Trotskyite revolutionaries earlier.

APRIL 2, 1973—ARGENTINA

Anthony R. DaCruz, U.S. executive

On April 2, 1973, Anthony R. DaCruz, a naturalized U.S. citizen, who was serving as technical operations manager for Eastman Kodak Co. in Argentina, was kidnapped in a Buenos Aires suburb.

About six young men rammed a pickup truck into DaCruz's car near the Kodak plant in a suburb of Buenos Aires. The six youths, some shouting that they were guerrillas, jumped from the truck and pulled DaCruz from his car. DaCruz was forced at gunpoint into another vehicle which sped from the scene.

The kidnapers later called Kodak Co. and identified themselves as members of an unnamed guerrilla organization. They demanded a record \$1.5 million ransom.

DaCruz was released unharmed on April 7, 1973, after the Kodak Co. paid the ransom demand.

APRIL 4, 1973—ARGENTINA

Col. Hector Alberto Iribarren, Chief of Intelligence, Argentine's Third Army

On the morning of April 4, 1973, Col. Hector Alberto Iribarren, Chief of Intelligence, Argentine's Third Army; while driving alone to his office in Cordoba, was shot to death in what was believed to be an attempt by terrorists to kidnap him. Two young guerrillas crashed a pickup truck headon into Colonel Iribarren's car near his home in a Cordoba suburb. The terrorists descended from the truck—one with a shotgun, and the other with an automatic rifle. They found Colonel Iribarren slightly dazed by the crash, clutching his briefcase to his chest. Colonel Iribarren resisted efforts of the terrorists to snatch the

briefcase and both terrorists fired at pointblank range at Colonel Iribarren, then jumped back into their truck and raced away.

Iribarren was a leader in the Army's fight against leftwing guerrillas in Cordoba.

MAY 4, 1973—MEXICO

Terrence G. Leonhardy, U.S. Consul General

On May 4, 1973, Terrence G. Leonhardy, U.S. Consul General in Guadalajara, Mexico, was kidnaped while en route to his home in Guadalajara at night after attending a police exhibit on ways of fighting the drug traffic. In what was the first kidnaping of a diplomat in Mexico, a guerrilla band consisting of four armed youths pulled Leonhardy from his car.

Shortly thereafter an anonymous caller told a newspaper that a communique had been left behind an alms box in a church in Guadalajara. In the communique, the guerrillas set forth their conditions for releasing Leonhardy, whom they described as a "member of the exploiting class," and "representative of North America's capitalist interests." The conditions included the release of 30 "political prisoners," 26 men and 4 women, members of various organizations who were being held on charges including participation in bank robberies and kidnapings; publication of the communique in the national press; suspension of the police and military search for Leonhardy until the "bourgeois" has been freed; a television appearance by Cuba's Ambassador to Mexico on May 6 confirming the safe arrival of the 30 prisoners in Havana.

The communique warned that unless all conditions were agreed to by the Mexican Government, their captive would be killed.

The guerrillas identified themselves as members of the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces and indicated that they were members of the group that had previously robbed three banks simultaneously in the Mexican city of Chihuahua.

Mexican radio and television stations broadcast the guerrilla communique soon after the kidnaping took place, and after the third day the guerrillas increased the ransom to include a demand for \$80,000.

Mexican President Luis Echeverria, noting that Mexico had given in to ransom demands in recent kidnapings of its own nationals and for "humanitarian reasons," ordered the 30 prisoners freed and the \$80,000 ransom paid. This decision to accede to the kidnapers' demands caused some consternation in Washington, causing the U.S. Government to send a note to the Mexican Government stating that American policy was not to yield to "extortion and blackmail" for the release of U.S. officials anywhere in the world. It was feared that the Mexican Government's compliance with the demands of the kidnapers would stimulate other such instances of kidnaping American embassy personnel.

The \$80,000 ransom money was raised by Mrs. Leonhardy who was able to negotiate a loan from a local state-owned bank in Guadalajara. The money was taken by a friend of the Leonhardy family in a paper bag to a local shoe shop in accordance with the kidnapers' instructions.

After the kidnapers' demands were met, Leonhardy was freed unharmed about 10:30 p.m. on the night of May 6, 1973. He telephoned

his wife from a bar in the center of Guadalajara. Leonhardy said he did not see his abductors or his hiding place because he was blindfolded for the entire 76 hours he was held. He said that he had only spoken with one person with whom he had discussions "about Marxist theories." Several suspects have been questioned by Mexican police but no charges have been placed.

MAY 22, 1973—ARGENTINA

Luis V. Giovanelli, Ford Motor Co. executive

On May 22, 1973, an attempt was made to kidnap Luis V. Giovanelli as he drove from the Ford Motor Co. plant in suburban Buenos Aires. Giovanelli and a female employee of the Ford plant were machinegunned when plant security guards tried to intervene. The terrorists escaped after seriously wounding both Giovanelli and the female employee. Giovanelli's associates could offer no explanation as to why he might have been singled out by the kidnapers.

In a communique received by a local Buenos Aires newspaper on May 23, 1973, the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army said the victims were shot because they resisted. The communique also demanded that the Ford Motor Co. pay the terrorists over \$1 million as protection against repetition of this abortive kidnaping attempt.

MAY 23, 1973—ARGENTINA

Aaron Bellinson, Argentine business executive

On May 23, 1973, Aaron Bellinson, Argentine business executive, was kidnaped near his home in Buenos Aires by members of the People's Revolutionary Army, a Trotskyite terrorist group. The terrorists demanded a \$1 million ransom for the release of Bellinson.

In a communique Bellinson said he had been ordered to read, the terrorists stated that the ransom money would be used "to help finance the revolutionary struggle" and pledged to continue to fight to "overthrow the capitalist system and construct Socialism, workers' power."

Bellinson was released unharmed on June 3, 1973, after his company paid a ransom which was believed to be the equivalent of the \$1 million demanded by the terrorists.

JUNE 6, 1973—ARGENTINA

Charles Lockwood, British business executive

On June 6, 1973, Charles Lockwood, an executive of an Argentine affiliate of Britain's Acrow Steel, was kidnaped by four terrorists outside his home in the northwestern suburb of Hartingham about 20 miles from Buenos Aires. The terrorists, reported to be members of the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army, physically assaulted Mr. Lockwood's chauffeur, knocking him to the ground. Mr. Lockwood was forced at gunpoint into the kidnapers' vehicle which quickly sped from the scene.

It has been reported in the press that the terrorists have demanded \$2 million ransom for Mr. Lockwood's freedom. On July 30, 1973, Mr. Lockwood was released unharmed after the payment of a ransom estimated to be \$2 million.

JUNE 18, 1973—ARGENTINA

John R. Thompson, U.S. business executive

On June 18, 1973, John R. Thompson, a U.S. citizen serving as president of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.'s Argentine operation, was kidnaped by 10 armed guerrillas, who used five vehicles to intercept his chauffeur-driven automobile shortly after it left the Firestone plant in a Buenos Aires suburb. The terrorists, after intercepting the automobile, smashed in its windows and seized Mr. Thompson at gunpoint. They pushed his chauffeur into a ditch, fired a few warning shots into the air, and sped from the scene. The kidnaping took place not far from the greeting stands at the Buenos Aires Airport just as the first of a crowd expected to number in the millions was gathering on the road to the airport to participate in a homecoming celebration for former Argentine President Juan D. Peron.

Soon after the kidnaping, the Trotskyite People's Revolutionary Army claimed responsibility for the abduction of Mr. Thompson. Although officials of the Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. refused to comment on the ransom terms, news reports revealed that the guerrillas had demanded \$3 million, a new high for a ransom payment. In the early part of July, news reports stated that the \$3 million ransom had been negotiated openly at the Presidents Hotel in downtown Buenos Aires. It was reported that an undisguised member of the People's Revolutionary Army had walked into the hotel and had worked out the final ransom figure with Firestone representatives. Funds were transferred to Argentina from New York and converted into pesos for payment of the ransom. Huge piles of 500-peso notes were delivered, reportedly filling an armored car which was provided by the guerrillas.

On July 6, 1973, some 3 days after the ransom terms had been met, Mr. Thompson was freed unharmed and in good health. He said he had been held captive in a tent inside a room somewhere in Buenos Aires. He was unable to identify his kidnapers.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF TERRORIST GROUPS PARTICIPATING IN POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS

Terrorist acts, such as political kidnapings, although a trademark of communist agitation, are not limited to Marxist-Leninist organizations. Such tactics have been utilized by other groups within the political spectrum. Patterns of political kidnapings have sometimes indicated that there is coordination between terrorist groups. However, there is little hard evidence of such coordination either within or between countries.

Argentine Liberation Front (Frente Argentino de Liberacion; FAL)

The Argentine Liberation Front was founded in 1962 by militant dissidents of the Soviet-oriented Communist Party of Argentina. It participated in the March 24, 1970, kidnaping of Waldemar Sanchez, the Paraguayan Consul in Corrientes Province of Argentina. The Argentine Government refused to meet the group's ransom demands and after threatening to kill Sanchez, the group released him unharmed on March 28, 1970. Following Sanchez's release, the Argentine Liberation Front issued a statement to the effect that it had not gone

through with its threat to kill Sanchez because of "humanitarian reasons." The group also cited its previous unwillingness to shed unnecessary blood.

Argentine National Organization Movement (Movimiento Argentina Nacional Organizado; MANO)

The Argentine National Organization Movement is a small rightist group of terrorists who on March 29, 1970, made an unsuccessful attempt to kidnap a Soviet diplomat. The group had made previous threats to kill Soviet diplomats as reprisal for the kidnaping of the Paraguayan Consul Waldemar Sanchez.

Armed Forces of the Revolution (Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes; FAR)

The Armed Forces of the Revolution was formed in 1962 principally from elements of the Communist Party in Guatemala. Believed to have some 50 to 100 members and several hundred sympathizers, its activities have ranged from guerrilla encounters with the Guatemalan Army in the countryside to bombing and terrorist attacks in Guatemala City. The FAR has emphasized urban activities, such as political assassinations and the kidnaping of businessmen and politicians—whose safe return has been guaranteed only in exchange for the release of "political prisoners" held by the Government and the payment of large sums of ransom or both. In general, the FAR is reportedly strongly pro-Castro and sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

Basque Nation and Liberty (Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna; ETA)

The Basque Nation and Liberty is a small underground group in Spain which is fighting for the independence of the Basque provinces in northern Spain. It has cooperated with the Communist Party of Spain and advocates armed struggle to achieve its objectives.

Black September

The Black September group is composed principally of Arab fanatics dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of a Palestinian state. In the past year it has earned the reputation as a notorious and ruthless international terrorist group. Black September terrorists are fanatical to the point of suicide. Their targets are related either to Israel or the Mideast monarchies, or to individuals, institutions, or governments that support them. Their acts of terror are carefully planned and staged for spectacular publicity value. Not all members of the Black September group are Arab nationals. The group's leaders have indicated that Black September members include Japanese, Turks, Iranians, and "strugglers from the four corners of the world."

Black September terrorists acts have included: the assassination of the Jordanian Ambassador in Cairo in 1971; attempted assassination of Jordanian Ambassador in London in 1971; successful hijack of West German airliner for \$5 million ransom in 1972; sabotage of German electronic factory manufacturing parts for Israel in 1972; slaughter at the Tel Aviv Airport resulting in the death of 26 and injury to 80 others in 1972; massacre of Israeli Olympic athletes in Munich in 1972; rash of letter-bombs mailed worldwide in 1972; planned kidnaping of Secretary of State Rogers for ransom purposes (in exchange for Sirhan B. Sirhan, assassin of Senator Robert Kennedy) aborted in 1972; seizure of Israeli Embassy in Bangkok in 1972; and thwarted kidnaping of Jordanian Prime Minister in 1973.

Coalition of National Liberation Brigades

All communist political parties in Haiti were proscribed in 1949 when a law was passed declaring all forms of communist activity as crimes against the state. The Coalition of National Liberation Brigades is an exile group of Haitian nationalists that has opposed President François Duvalier's government in Haiti. At the time of the kidnaping of U.S. diplomats in Haiti in January 1973, this group issued the following statement:

The Haitian Government may claim that we are communists. We are simply revolutionaries seeking to liberate our oppressed people. By seeking to obtain the release of some important political prisoners the people of the world should know that those prisoners have been under constant threat to be eliminated in case of any disorder in the country. And disorder there will be. For our patience has come to an end. The archaic, farcical government, led by Clinton Knox and the (U.S.) State Department, must go.

Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)

The FLQ is a clandestine extremist French-Canadian separatist group whose objective is the severing of the political ties between the province of Quebec and the rest of Canada. It is a militant group of young French-Canadians dedicated to overthrowing capitalism as well as separating Quebec politically from the rest of Canada. The Canadian Government moved firmly in rooting out the revolutionary FLQ movement after the group had kidnaped and murdered the Quebec Labor Minister Pierre LaPorte. Following LaPorte's death the movement seemed to lose its appeal as an outlet for French-Canadian resentment. As of mid-1973, there have been no further major acts of political violence attributed to the FLQ.

Montoneros

The Montoneros are a small Argentine terrorist group which describes itself as "Peronist and Christian." The bold manner in which it operates has underscored the growing power of the Peronist revolutionary groups in Argentina.

National Liberation Action (Ação Libertadora Nacional; ALN)

The National Liberation Action is a small, leftwing terrorist group with communistic and nationalistic views. It is dedicated to the overthrow of the military government that has ruled Brazil since 1964. A predominantly Castroite group, it functions at local levels since it is not organized on a national basis. The National Liberation Action was established in 1968 by dissident Communist Party members who became disappointed with the nonviolent "conventional models and methods" of the pro-Soviet party and decided to adopt the tactics of urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Its membership ranges from 1,000 to 5,000 and it draws support mainly from students, workers, and former soldiers. A manifesto issued following the group's kidnaping of U.S. Ambassador Elbrick in September 1969 contained a violent condemnation of Brazil's military regime and declared that it would no longer tolerate tortures, beatings, and killings of its members at the hands of the Brazilian authorities.

People's Revolutionary Armed Forces

The People's Revolutionary Armed Forces is a leftist Mexican terrorist group which is believed to be following the Trotskyite philosophy. It has taken credit for many acts of violence and has engaged in

bank robberies. In view of the fact that this organization came into prominence for the first time with the political kidnaping of U.S. diplomat Terrence Leonhardy in May 1973, little is known of its size, leadership, or activities.

People's Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario Popular; ERP)

The Revolutionary Workers Party, the main Trotskyite communist organization in Argentina, which is aligned with the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, created an exclusively armed group within the party known as the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP). The ERP seeks to develop a revolution against Argentine "dictatorship and imperialism." The ERP first came to attention in September 1970, when its members attacked a police station in Rosario to gain weapons. Its current membership is estimated at about 2,000 well-disciplined revolutionaries.

The ERP is the most active and best-organized terrorist group operating in Argentina and has been responsible for many kidnapings and killings over the past 2 years. In a June 1973 press release, ERP leaders let it be known that there would be no pause in their attacks against "the repressive armed forces, foreign exploiters and Argentine capitalists."

Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (Vanguardia Popular Revolucionaria; VPR)

The Popular Revolutionary Vanguard is an urban terrorist organization holding communistic and nationalistic views which operates under the leadership of Carlos LaMarca, a former Brazilian army captain. Its membership of 5,000 is derived primarily from a small leftwing organization of former army officers. The objectives of the VPR are "to overthrow the dictatorship; to promote land reform by expropriating large landholdings; to guarantee the widest freedom of organization and expression for the Brazilian people."

Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario; MR-8)

The Revolutionary Movement-8 (MR-8) is a leftwing terrorist organization operating in Brazil which is dedicated to the overthrow of the military government in Brazil. It derives its name from the date of the capture of Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in Bolivia on October 8, 1967. It is a small but active group which advocates armed struggle both in the cities and countryside. MR-8 has suffered large numbers of arrests of its leaders and is believed to be ineffective at the present time.

Tupamaros, also known as the National Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional; MLN)

The National Liberation Movement in Uruguay, which is better known as the Tupamaros, is one of the most active terrorist organizations in South America. The name Tupamaros is derived from Tupac Amaru, an Inca chieftan who led an unsuccessful rebellion against the Spanish forces in the 1780's. The Tupamaros organization was formed in the early 1960's and attracted considerable international attention by kidnaping foreign nationals serving in Uruguay.

In a "manifesto to public opinion" published in September 1970, the Tupamaros organization described itself as an "armed political orga-

nization of the students, workers, employees, rural workers, intellectuals and unemployed." Its membership is believed to number some 1,000.

A Tupamaros leader, identified only as "Urbano" in a public statement issued in October 1970 stated that kidnappings were originally intended to get money or secure the release of imprisoned comrades and to "undermine the foundation of the system." He explained that kidnaped U.S. Security Adviser Dan Mitrione, who was murdered, would have been released if the Government had met the Tupamaros' demands for the release of 150 political prisoners. However, when the Government refused, the "kidnaping exchange method had to be carried to its logical consequence in order to save it as a tool."

The attacks on law enforcement personnel and kidnappings of foreign diplomats carried out by the Tupamaros in recent years has seriously damaged the "Robin Hood" image that the group had carefully cultivated during the early years of its existence.

Turkish People's Liberation Army

The Turkish People's Liberation Army is a leftwing terrorist organization which is connected with Dev-Genc, the main radical leftwing student revolutionary group in Turkey. In a manifesto issued following the group's kidnaping of four American airmen in February 1971, the Turkish People's Liberation Army denounced "American imperialism" and promised to "clean Turkey of the Americans and all foreign enemies."

United Anti-Reelection Command

The United Anti-Reelection Command was a group of Dominican Republic leftists seeking to block incumbent President Balaguer's attempt to serve another term as President of the Dominican Republic.

APPENDIX A
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MAJOR POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS

Date and place of kidnaping	Name and title of victim	Organizational affiliation of kidnapers	Ransom terms	Fate of victim
Jan. 16, 1968, Guatemala	Col. John D. Webber and Lt. Cmdr. Ernest A. Munro, U.S. Defense Attaché's Office.	Armed Forces of the Revolution (FAR)	None	Both shot to death.
Aug. 28, 1968, Guatemala	John G. Mein, U.S. Ambassador	FAR	do	Shot to death.
Sept. 4, 1969, Brazil	Charles Burke Elbrick, U.S. Ambassador	National Liberation Action (ALN), and Revolutionary Movement-8 (MR-8).	Release of 15 political prisoners.	Released on Sept. 7, 1969; received minor head wound.
Mar. 6, 1970, Guatemala	Sean M. Holly, U.S. Labor Attaché	FAR	Release of 4 political prisoners.	Released unharmed Mar. 8, 1970.
Mar. 11, 1970, Brazil	Nobico Okushi, Japanese Consul General	Popular Revolutionary Vanguard (VPR)	Release of 5 political prisoners.	Released unharmed Mar. 14, 1970.
Mar. 24, 1970, Dominican Republic	Lt. Col. Donald J. Crowley, U.S. Air Attaché	United Anti-Reelection Command	Release of 20 political prisoners.	Released Mar. 26, 1970, suffered minor contusions.
Mar. 24, 1970, Argentina	Waldemar Sanchez, Paraguayan Consul	Argentine Liberation Front	Release of 2 political prisoners.	Released unharmed Mar. 28, 1970.
Mar. 29, 1970, Argentina	Yuri Pivovarov, Soviet Assistant Commercial Attaché	Argentine National Organization Movement (MANO)	None	Victim escaped from kidnapers.
Mar. 31, 1970, Guatemala	Count Karl von Spreti, West German Ambassador.	FAR	Release of 25 political prisoners and \$700,000.	Shot to death Apr. 5, 1970.
Apr. 5, 1970, Brazil	Curtis S. Cutter, U.S. Consul General	Unknown	None	Wounded by gunfire but escaped.
May 29, 1970, Argentina	Pedro Eugenio Aramburu, former President.	Montoneros	do	Shot to death July 16, 1970.
June 11, 1970, Brazil	Ehrenfried Von Hollenben, West German Ambassador.	National Liberation Action (ALN), and Popular Revolutionary Vanguard.	Release of 40 political prisoners.	Released unharmed June 16, 1970.
July 31, 1970, Uruguay	Daniel A. Mitrone, U.S. Public Safety Adviser.	Tupamaros	Release of 150 political prisoners.	Shot to death Aug. 9, 1970.
July 31, 1970, Uruguay	Aloysio Mores Dias Gomides, Brazilian Consul.	do	\$250,000	Released unharmed Feb. 21, 1971.
July 31, 1970, Uruguay	Michael Gordon Jones, U.S. Foreign Service officer.	do	None	Escaped from kidnapers.
Aug. 7, 1970, Uruguay	Claude Fly, U.S. Agricultural Adviser	do	Release of 150 political prisoners.	Released on Mar. 2, 1971, after suffering heart attack.
Oct. 5, 1970, Canada	James R. Cross, British Trade Commissioner.	Front de Liberation du Quebec (FLQ)	Release of 13 political prisoners; \$500,000 and safe passage to Cuba.	Released unharmed Dec. 3, 1970.
Oct. 10, 1970, Canada	Pierre LaPorte, Quebec Labor Minister	FLQ	Same as for James Cross.	Killed by strangulation Oct. 17, 1970.

APPENDIX A—Continued

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF MAJOR POLITICAL KIDNAPINGS—Continued

Date and place of kidnaping	Name and title of victim	Organizational affiliation of kidnapers	Ransom terms	Fate of victim
Dec. 1, 1970, Spain	Eugene Beihl, West German Consul	Basque Nation and Liberty (ETA)	Release of 16 political prisoners.	Released unharmed, Dec. 24, 1970.
Dec. 7, 1970, Brazil	Giovanni Bucher, Swiss Ambassador	National Liberation Action and Popular Revolutionary Vanguard.	Release of 70 political prisoners.	Released unharmed, Jan. 16, 1971.
Jan. 8, 1971, Uruguay	Geoffrey M. S. Jackson, British Ambassador.	Tupamaros	Release of 150 political prisoners.	Released unharmed, Sept. 9, 1971.
Mar. 4, 1971, Turkey	James Sexton, Larry Heavner, Richard Caraszi, and James Gholson, U.S. Air Force enlisted men.	Turkish People's Liberation Army	400,000 Turkish lira	Released unharmed, Mar. 8, 1971.
May 17, 1971, Turkey	Ephraim Elrom, Israeli Consul General	do	Release of all revolutionary guerrillas currently under detention.	Shot to death, May 22, 1971.
May 23, 1971, Argentina	Stanley Sylvester, British Consul	People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)	\$62,500	Released unharmed, May 30, 1971.
Mar. 22, 1972, Argentina	Oberdan Sallustro, Fiat executive	People's Revolutionary Army	Release of 50 political prisoners and \$1,000,000.	Shot to death, Apr. 10, 1972.
Jan. 23, 1973, Haiti	Clinton E. Knox, U.S. Ambassador and Ward L. Christensen, U.S. Consul General.	Coalition of National Liberation Brigades	\$70,000 and release of 12 political prisoners.	Released unharmed, Jan. 24, 1973.
Mar. 1, 1973, Sudan	Cleo A. Noel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador; G. Curtis Moore, U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission; and Guy Eid, Belgian Consul.	Black September	Release of 60 Palestinian guerrillas and release of Sirhan B. Sirhan.	All 3 victims shot to death.
Apr. 2, 1973, Argentina	Francisco Agustin Aleman, retired admiral, Argentine Navy.	People's Revolutionary Army	Justice for death of 16 prisoners.	Released unharmed Apr. 7, 1973.
Apr. 2, 1973, Argentina	Anthony R. DaCruz, U.S. executive	Unnamed guerrilla organization	\$1,500,000	Released unharmed Apr. 7, 1973.
Apr. 4, 1973, Argentina	Col. Hector Alberto Iribarren, Chief of Intelligence, Argentine's 3d Army.	Unidentified terrorists		Shot to death.
May 4, 1973, Mexico	Terrence G. Leonhardy, U.S. Consul General.	People's Revolutionary Armed Forces	Release of 30 political prisoners and \$80,000.	Released unharmed May 6, 1973.
May 22, 1973, Argentina	Luis V. Giovanelli, Ford Motor Co. executive	People's Revolutionary Army	Communique to Ford Motor Co. demanding \$1,000,000 to prevent repeated attempts.	Seriously wounded by machine-gun.
May 23, 1973, Argentina	Aaron Bellinson, Argentine business executive.	do	\$1,000,000	Released unharmed June 3, 1973.
June 6, 1973, Argentina	Charles Lockwood, British business executive.	do	\$2,000,000	Released unharmed July 30, 1973.
June 18, 1973, Argentina	John R. Thompson, U.S. business executive	do	\$3,000,000	Released unharmed, July 6, 1973.

APPENDIX B

TROTSKYISM AND TERRORISM

LATIN AMERICA

The program for Trotskyite participation in Latin American guerrilla warfare and terrorism was outlined at the Ninth Congress of the Fourth International (the governing body for the world-wide Trotskyite communist parties) held in early 1969. A resolution on Latin America called for "rural guerrilla warfare". Instructions were given to the Latin American Trotskyites to, "Take advantage of every opportunity not only to increase the number of rural guerrilla nuclei but also to promote forms of armed struggle especially adapted to certain zones (for example, the mining zones in Bolivia) and to undertake actions in the big cities aimed both at striking the nerve centers (key points in the economy and transport, etc.) and at punishing the hangmen of the regime as well as achieving propagandistic and psychological successes (the experience of the European resistance to Nazism would be helpful in this regard)."¹

In response to this resolution the Argentine section of the Fourth International, "Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores" (Revolutionary Workers Party), referred to as PRT (Combatiente), organized the Revolutionary Army of the People, referred to as ERP. The decision to organize ERP was made at the Fifth Congress of the PRT which was held secretly in July 1970.

¹ Resolution on Latin America Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International "Intercontinental Press" July 14, 1969, pp. 720-721. (NOTE: Intercontinental Press is a public organ published by the SWP for the Fourth International.)

According to the resolution, on founding the ERP, the guerrilla army, "will be composed of the following forces: (a) Urban units represented by armed commandos organized by the party and by armed commandos outside the party who accept the discipline of the ERP. In the latter a leading party cell must be immediately formed. (b) Suburban units formed in the same way. (c) Rural guerrilla units."²

At the October 1970 meeting of the PRT Central Committee a resolution was passed advocating "expropriations". (This word is Marxist euphemism for holdups and burglaries.) The resolution reads as follows:

Needing to establish clear financial norms that can contribute to the sound functioning of the party, the Central Committee resolves:

1. The party's normal expenditures will be covered by the dues of members and sympathizers and the proceeds of mass work.
2. Deficits impairing good functioning will be covered by funds from expropriations.
3. In case of need, party organs can resort to borrowing from the funds acquired by expropriations.³

The April 1971 Executive Committee meeting of the PRT spelled out the responsibilities of Party members to the guerrilla war. The PRT said

² International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. X, No. 5, April 1973, p. 20. The full text of this resolution is attached. (NOTE: The International Internal Discussion Bulletin is a confidential publication of the Fourth International. The English language edition is published for the International by the SWP, U.S.A.)

³ Ibid, p. 37.

that

***every member of the Party is also a fighter in the Army, regardless of the front to which he is assigned. All members of the Party must undergo military training and be prepared to transfer from a mass to a military front when the organization requires it.

The Party went on to say-

The Party at present has mass cells, military cells, and apparatus cells. The main task of the mass cells is to penetrate the mass front for which they are responsible (the factory, neighborhood, student milieu, etc.) This is what they will devote most of their efforts to. At the same time they will train themselves militarily and carry out military actions, with the specification that these actions will be small scale (seizing and distributing food and goods, disarming police and soldiers, etc.) and the cells will try to carry them out in a way that contributes to their work in the respective mass fronts.

The military cells for their part engage in fighting as their principal task, and they will devote their main efforts to this; naturally they will carry out larger-scale actions. At the same time, each military cell is responsible for contacts and is assigned to a mass front (neighborhood, factory, etc.), which it must look after as a complementary assignment. The other area of mass work for these cells is our own military force, the ERP, which must absolutely be kept under the leadership of the Party.

Finally, the apparatus cells (publishing, etc.) have as their central task the efficient execution of their assignment, maintaining a high level and quality of publishing for instance. They also fight, because as we have already said no member of the organization is exempt from participating in military action but must carry out small-scale actions (seizures, disarmings, etc.) and seek by means of these expropriations to acquire the things they need to carry out their tasks effectively. These cells likewise work with mass fronts.⁴

⁴ Ibid, pp. 44 and 45.

The theoretical justification for guerrilla warfare and terrorism was contained in two articles in the January 1971 International Information Bulletin of the Fourth International. One article was by Livio Maitan of Italy, a member of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International. The other was signed Ernest Germain and Martine Knoeller. Both are from Belgium. Germain is the main theoretician of the Fourth International and is actually Ernest Mandel who has visited the United States and lectured under the cover of "an independent Marxist scholar."

FRANCE

Ernest Mandel explained in his article, In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International, that they were not suggesting guerrilla warfare in France but that instead the French section of the Fourth International, the Communist League advocates civil war in France.⁵

As a result of the civil war orientation of the French Trotskyites, the French Council of Ministers outlawed the Communist League, French Section of the Fourth International on June 28, 1973. This action came after the French Trotskyites participated in a number of violent street riots with weapons.

SPAIN

The Spanish section of the Fourth International, the Revolutionary

⁵ International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. X, No. 4, April 1973, p. 25.

Communist League, is split into two factions, one supporting, the other opposing, the guerrilla warfare orientation.

Despite the faction fight in the Revolutionary Communist League, both factions joined with the Workers' Commissions, controlled by the Communist Party, in a violent street riot in Madrid on May Day 1973. During this riot one police officer was killed and a number injured. Both the Communist Party of Spain and the Trotskyite Revolutionary Communist League are illegal organizations in Spain.

CANADA

Pro-terrorism faction

The Canadian section of the Fourth International is the League for Socialist Action/Ligue Socialiste Ouvriere. A minority faction in the LSA supports the guerrilla warfare orientation and opposes the leadership of the organization which has criticized the terrorism of the Argentine Trotskyites. The pro-terrorist group is called "The Revolutionary Communist Tendency". According to this group, "as Marxists, we do not believe in individual terror because it underrates the class struggle. We instead believe in increasing the struggle, in mass terrorism!"

The leadership of the LSA which is closely allied with the Socialist Workers Party in the United States explains that they are not against terrorism in principle but only wish to apply it at the most opportune time. They say, "Lenin, of course, did not reject terrorism 'in principle' - as the supporters of the RCT have often pointed out. Marxists do not reject

any method of struggle, 'in principle.' We judge each method according to one criterion: 'will this method, used at this time and in these circumstances, advance the cause of proletarian revolution?' If the answer is yes, then we use the method if we are able. If the answer is no, then we don't. We are concerned only with effectiveness, and anyone who reads the works of Marxism on terrorism, including the citations from Lenin made above, will see that effectiveness is the only criterion used,"⁶

UNITED STATES

Pro-terrorism factions

A faction has been formed within the Socialist Workers Party (the American Trotskyite party) which supports the guerrilla warfare orientation of the majority of the Fourth International. In a document dated April 27, 1973, Bill and Estelle Yaffe, spokesmen for this faction, issued a statement calling for "100% Support to the Strategy of Armed Struggle in Latin America!"

Two other factions in the Socialist Workers Party support the position of the International majority against the leadership of the SWP but these factions do not wish to openly advocate guerrilla warfare. Among those in the leadership of one faction are: Bill Massey (National Coordinator), Chicago Branch (formerly Oakland-Berkeley Branch and New York Branch);

⁶ Internal Information Bulletin, Socialist Workers Party, June 1972, No. 2, pp. 4 and 9. This publication contains two documents of the League for Socialist Action; an attack on the LSA leadership by the Revolutionary Communist Tendency and an article in support of the leadership signed Ian Angus, both of which had appeared in the LSA/LSO discussion bulletin in Canada.

John Shaffer, Houston Branch; Don Smith, Chicago Branch and Hedda Garza, Downtown Branch, New York City. The other group consists of members of West Coast SWP branches. Among them are: Ralph Levitt and Celia Stodola, Oakland-Berkeley; Judy Shane and Ron Warren, Los Angeles Branch; Jeff Beneke and Garth Chojnowski, San Francisco Branch.

The Yaffe, Massey and Levitt positions are expressed in the attached documents.

Anti-terrorism factions

Opposition in the Socialist Workers Party to the guerrilla warfare prospective of the Fourth International was led by Joseph Hansen, a political Committee member of the Socialist Workers Party and its leading theoretician. In a lengthy article published in the April 1971 issue of the International Information Bulletin of the Fourth International, Hansen argued that the net result of "guerrillaism" and terrorism would be the destruction of the meager Trotskyite cadre throughout Latin America.

Hansen further complained that the public support given by international Trotskyite leaders to the Quebec terrorism in Canada was embarrassing both to the Socialist Workers Party and its Canadian affiliate, The League for Socialist Action. Hansen criticized the leader of the British Trotskyites, Tariq Ali, for his public support of the FLQ kidnappings and murders in Canada.

In August 1971, the Twenty-fourth National Convention of the Socialist Workers Party took place in Oberlin, Ohio. A letter was received

from Pierre Frank of France, a member of the international executive committee of the Fourth International, on behalf of the International. Frank opened by praising the Socialist Workers Party for its work in the so-called peace movement but criticized the position taken by "my friend Joe Hansen" that guerrilla warfare tactics were "ultra left". He wrote, "Concerning the activities of our comrades of the Argentinian section, the P.R.T. and its armed organization, the E.R.P., we don't look at them as being ultra-left."⁷

Despite this apparent opposition to terrorism by Hansen, the Socialist Workers Party leadership has made it clear that they are not opposed to terrorism under any circumstances, only that it is not a proper tactic at this time. As SWP national committee member Peter Camejo points out, "in the process of an insurrection, terrorist acts may be advantageous to the workers movement."⁸

⁷ Internal Information Bulletin No. 6, November 1971, p. 13 (The Internal Information Bulletin is a confidential publication of the SWP.) In connection with the SWP's involvement in the peace movement, Frank added, "This anti-war activity must not stop for one minute, even if the victory of the Vietnamese revolution seems imminent. It must continue in the U.S.A. as in the whole world to prevent American imperialism from making an orderly retreat, to insure that its defeat henceforth inevitable should be the worst possible."

⁸ International Internal Discussion Bulletin, Vol. X, No. 8, June 1973, p. 11.

This view had been previously expressed at the 1971 Socialist Workers Party convention where Mary-Alice Waters, a member of the SWP Political Committee, reported on the debate within the Fourth International. She stated that the International leadership held that, "revolutionary parties could only be constructed today in Latin America if the Trotskyists prove themselves the best guerrilla fighters, arms in hand." Waters denied that the faction led by Hansen rejected armed violence. She said that if they "were against armed struggle they would be social democrats or Stalinists, not Trotskyists." (Internal Information Bulletin No. 1, January 1972, pp. 4 and 11).

International Internal Discussion Bulletin

volume X number 5

APRIL 1973

Resolutions of the Fifth Congress of the Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores
(PRT (Combatiente) — Revolutionary Workers Party)

Plus Resolutions of the Subsequent Meetings of the Central Committee and Executive Committee

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Founding Resolution of the Revolutionary Army of the People

Whereas:

In the process of revolutionary war that has begun in our country, our party has begun to fight with the aim of disrupting the armed forces of the regime in order to create the conditions for the victorious insurrection of the proletariat and the popular sectors.

The armed forces of the regime can only be defeated by confronting them with a revolutionary army that by its very nature gives the revolutionary military forces a character distinct from that of the party, as the personnel involved must be recruited as much from outside as from inside the party.

Constituting a revolutionary army under the present conditions (our party's weakness, the nonexistence of a workers state on our borders, the absence of large armed forces) will be a prolonged political, social, technical and military process that will unfold "beginning on a small scale and growing to a large one."

For a whole long period our revolutionary war will assume the forms of urban and rural guerrilla warfare, extending to different cities and zones in the countryside with local operational radiuses. On the basis of extending these radiuses politically and militarily, it will be able to move from a war of movement in the countryside to building important strategic units in the cities.

The Armed Forces will have a working-class and popular character and will be under the firm leadership of the party, constantly maintaining the functioning of its cells and the political and ideological education of its cadres.

The Vietnamese experience recommends the principle of "leadership by the executive committee of the party and the responsibility for the unit chiefs. This guarantees that the principle of collective leadership will be applied and moreover, draws on the knowledge of the masses, further strengthens unity and internal structure, coordinates the different aspects of work in the army, achieving unity of action and thought." (Glasp)

The other basic principle of revolutionary war that our military force should apply is carrying out military operations in accordance with a political mass line, that is, actions aimed at mobilizing the masses and gaining their direct or indirect participation in the war.

The Fifth Congress of the PRT resolves:

1. To found the Revolutionary Army of the People [ERP] and give it a banner.

2. To consider the Revolutionary Army of the People and its different armed detachments as the party's military instruments for carrying out its political line in the current stage of the class struggle and as the embryo of the future revolutionary workers and people's army.

3. To build a Revolutionary Army of the People involving all elements prepared to fight against the military dictatorship and imperialism (and who accept the army's program), making a very careful and necessary selection of recruits, based on the criteria of security,

determination, courage, morale and proletarian hatred of the dictatorship.

4. Recruitment to units of the Revolutionary Army of the People will be supervised by party cells, party leaders, military leaders and political commissars, who will take charge of guarding against any deterioration of morale, discipline, and social composition of the units, or any weakening of the leading role of the party.

5. During the first stage of the revolutionary war, the ERP will be composed of the following forces: (a) Urban units represented by armed commandos organized by the party and by armed commandos outside the party who accept the discipline of the ERP. In the latter a leading party cell must be immediately formed. (b) Suburban units formed in the same way. (c) Rural guerrilla units.

6. The primary military task of the base cells of the party will be to assure that a mass political line is carried out by the ERP. They will help to achieve this by maintaining close contact with the army, transmitting information and relaying the spirit of the masses to the army in order to enable it to mobilize the masses by armed propaganda operations. They will also carry out resistance and intelligence: (a) In line with the needs and possibilities of their mass front; and (b) as auxiliaries of the ERP. In this latter case they will receive directives and orientation from the branch and section executive committees or from the executive committee of the party.

7. The Central Committee and executive committee of the party will make up the collective leadership conducting the war. It will appoint the national military secretary, the military leaders of the various units, the respective political commissioners and the military committee of the party. In the countryside, these military leaders will make up the branch and section executive committees of the party. On all levels the cells of the party that are in the army will assure that the military directives coming from the Central Committee and the executive committee are steadfastly and correctly applied.

8. Groups and individuals from outside the party who join the ERP will do so under the condition that they accept the party's military leadership and the political commissioners it designates.

9. *Intermediate organizations.* In addition, the People's Armed Commandos form part of the ERP: These are the organizations that the party and the Revolutionary Army [ERP] create from the active resistance of the masses. Their actions continue to increase from a small to a large scale with a minimal level of organization. They are organized to function with the maximum initiative and with the following objectives: To defend the immediate struggle of the masses, to give impetus to the class struggle, and to provide tactical support as well as a means of weeding out potential recruits to the Revolutionary Army [ERP]. Forming such units is of the greatest importance, because this will introduce armed struggle into the masses.



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man needs. It is that that underlies the thrust of the specific transitional demands, gives them unity and direction. To the extent to which we fail to evoke this unity of the transitional program, we place exaggerated emphasis on the party alone as the unity and mind of the total revolutionary process, thus giving unwitting support to those who accuse us of elitism.

If, as I expect, the general line of this article is not

incorporated into the political resolution, I will submit it as an amendment to the resolution. It should be stressed that the anti-accumulation theme is directed against U.S. capitalism (and by implication also Japanese and Western European, to a lesser extent) but not those countries oppressed by foreign imperialism.

April 8, 1973

IN SUPPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MAJORITY
TENDENCY: IN SUPPORT OF THE FOURTH
INTERNATIONAL

by Bill Yaffe and Estelle Yaffe, At-Large Members

We declare our political adherence to the International Majority Tendency. The political basis for adherence to the majority is agreement with the general line of the following documents:

1. "In Defense of Leninism, In Defense of the Fourth International";
2. The United Secretariat's Draft Thesis—"The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe";
3. The Declaration of the International Majority Tendency made at the IEC in December 1972.

Events of the 1960s throughout the world have demonstrated that the Fourth International is qualitatively stronger than ever before. The majority in the International has recognized that now it is vital for the world Trotskyist movement to turn towards the transformation of Trotskyist organizations from propaganda groups into organizations capable of those initiatives of a mass vanguard level which are required by the dynamics of the class struggle itself. The positions adopted at the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International reflect this crucial turn. The minority, objecting in the name of "Leninist-Trotskyist" orthodoxy, has refused to implement and has even attempted to block this historic transformation.

The comrades supporting the minority tendency have asked for an open and democratic debate so that the differences which are now dividing the International could be cleared up. This, however, can be achieved only if the debate is focused on the true differences in the Fourth International rather than on the imaginary opposition between a guerrilla strategy that nobody defends and a so-called Leninist strategy of party building.

If one carefully compared, for instance, the practical recommendations made by both majority and minority tendencies to our Bolivian section, it would be abundantly clear that the Bolivian section and the members of the majority tendency do give primacy to party building

and to mass work, and that the basic differences between minority and majority have to do with whether our sections should take initiatives of action and try to lead the masses, or simply tail-end the mass movements and limit itself to a largely commentarial role. The differences over party building in Europe show this pattern even more clearly. Evidently, two interpretations of the Transitional Program and two different strategies of party building are confronting each other in the International.

We believe that the position adopted by the minority in the International debate is not independent of the experience of the SWP in the United States. In effect, the minority line is linked to the difficulties facing revolutionary organizations which must work in the imperialist stronghold. That is to say, the historic political isolation of the revolutionary workers movement in this country and the relative retardation of the working-class radicalization in the United States in comparison with that of capitalist Europe, for example. Not having been confronted with a whole series of new problems faced by other sections of the Fourth International posed as a result of the development of the class struggle, the SWP too often confines itself to a conservative role, projecting its national political experience to the entirety of the other sections of the International. It is in this light that one can understand the minority's refusal to politically approve the United Secretariat's Draft Thesis for "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe."

Today one of the problems in the SWP and with its fraternal interventions in the International debate is the confusion between the vanguard party and the rearguard; that is to say, many seem to forget that the role of the revolutionary organization is to always be "one step ahead of the masses" and not simply to be in the mass movement as "its best builder," or worse yet, at its mercy. Therefore, we insist that it is necessary and possible today

for the SWP to develop a serious program of revolutionary socialist activity directed toward the most radical elements of the mass movement and the revolutionary movement at large. This means, for example, that we have to combine the single issue approach like "Out Now!" in the antiwar movement with a specific socialist activity directed toward a more limited audience explaining the permanent revolution, revolutionary violence, the role of the party, and so on, down the line. In brief, we're talking about the necessity of taking revolutionary Marxist initiatives based on a dialectic conception of the relationships between the vanguard, the party, and the working class.

Many in the SWP have made tail-ending a principle because they limit the use of the Transitional Program to raising demands simply corresponding to the level of consciousness of the masses. This is false and very dangerous. We feel that the consciousness of the masses must be raised in relation to the objective necessities of the class struggle. Transitional demands form a bridge between the present level of consciousness and the historic objective necessity of socialist revolution. Demands are transitional when they unleash struggles through which the masses recognize this necessity. After all, what is transitional in a transitional demand is the moving beyond, the raising of the existing level of consciousness. In conclusion, we state that differences in the interpretation and use of the Transitional Program are, in fact, the real heart of the International debate.

We reaffirm the necessity of building a strong centralized

International with an international leadership which effectively synthesizes the real experiences of the revolutionary movements on all the continents instead of juxtaposing them or mechanically generalizing them. We think that it is to be regretted that the minority refuses to decisively settle the international debate and instead chooses to further postpone the world congress under the veil of wishing to ensure democratic discussion. Everyone supports democratic debate, but all that means nothing if important decisions are never made. We believe that the further postponement of the Tenth World Congress would serve to paralyze our movement and be detrimental to its growth.

We strongly believe that the SWP has over the years, over the many difficult years during the long march of Trotskyism, shown that it is the real core of the future revolutionary party in the United States. We hope that the discussion will clear up the problems and that the minority politically led by the SWP will elaborate its political strategy in a more dialectic manner. We will soon issue a long contribution to the debate. We call upon comrades to indicate their fraternal agreement with the International Majority Tendency and work with us.

Long Live the Socialist Workers Party!
100% Support to the Strategy of Armed Struggle in Latin America!
Victory to the Fourth International!

April 27, 1973

MEMORANDUM ON THE GAY LIBERATION MOVEMENT

[The general line of this memorandum was approved by the National Committee on April 29, 1973.]

The plenum of the National Committee held last year adopted a motion that read in part, "To open immediately following the plenum an internal party literary discussion, for a three-month period, of the gay liberation movement and the party's orientation to it, leading to a decision by the subsequent plenum of the National Committee." This is that subsequent plenum, and the purpose of this memorandum is to make that decision.


1. The struggle against the oppression of gay people is a struggle for democratic rights. The party has taken a position in support of this struggle, and adopted the following position at the 1971 party convention: "To reaffirm the party's position stated in the Political Committee motion of May 25, 1971, of unconditional support to the struggles of homosexuals for full democratic rights, including full civil and human rights, and against all the forms of discrimination and oppression they suffer under capitalism." The adoption of the general line of this report will include reaffirming this as the basic political

position of the party on the oppression of homosexuals.

2. While we reject with contempt all forms of bourgeois prejudice against gay people, including quack psychological "theories" labelling gays as mentally ill—prejudices echoed by the Stalinists—the party does not and should not take a stand on the nature or value of homosexuality.

The party should not do this for the following reasons.

First, the party is a political organization. Its aim is a political one: to construct a mass revolutionary proletarian political party that will mobilize the working class and its allies, and lead in the conquest of state power by the working class, opening the road to the construction of socialism. In keeping with its aim, the party adopts political positions that guide its work. It does not take positions on a whole range of scientific, artistic, cultural and other questions—to do so would cut across its purpose, dilute its nature as a political organization, transform it into an organization advancing one or another



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LETTER TO THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE
ON THE FORMATION OF A POLITICAL TENDENCY

January 19, 1973

Political Committee
Socialist Workers Party

Dear Comrades,

This letter is to inform you of the formation of a political tendency within the SWP for the purpose of participation in the discussions preceding and the deliberations of the Tenth World Congress of the Fourth International. As cothinkers of the Fourth International, precluded from membership by reactionary United States legislation, the SWP receives fraternal participatory rights and we request that similar rights be accorded our tendency so that the most comprehensive discussion may occur. It is not possible for this letter to present a full statement of our views; what follows is simply an outline of our basic orientation.

I. The Transitional Program

Following the political leadership of the SWP, sections of the International such as the LSA/LSO have begun a theoretical accommodation to reformism and an adaptation to a petty-bourgeois milieu. These departures from the historic lessons embodied in the Transitional Program are marked by the gradual ascension of a minimalist "democratic" program, especially in day-to-day practice, and concomitant with this, the substitution of a multiclass "sectoral" approach for a proletarian class outlook. While this opportunist movement stems in part from the isolation of the parties from the class, it has reached a point qualitatively wherein no tactical turn of these parties can correct the problem by itself.

The strong emphasis on democratic demands in the imperialist countries in place of a program stressing transitional demands and the allied uncritical stance toward bourgeois democratic movements in general taken by the SWP and its allies within the International, are based on a thoroughly incorrect understanding of the theory of combined revolution and its application to imperialist and colonial countries.

The root of this error is the fundamentally idealist notion that the spontaneous tendency of development of democratic movements is toward revolution. This represents a tragic and dangerous misunderstanding of the historical process of permanent revolution, especially in the colonial countries, and it leads to the party's abdication of its responsibility for intervening among the masses with a class line.

The SWP's idea that "consistent nationalism leads to socialism" when speaking of the oppressed nationalities within the United States, is one example of this conception. Is the fight for the liberation of women, the SWP has adopted an overtly reformist position of restricting its propaganda to the simple reform of legalizing abortion. Again, the justification for this opportunism is that the struggle, in and of itself, will lead toward socialism.

Intermeshed with these theoretical deviations, the SWP has generated a "sectoral" analysis of social struggle.

Replacing the program of the class with a series of "programs" for each sector, it seeks to mobilize these multi-class constituencies independently of each other and without relation to the class. This confuses the whole outlook of the Transitional Program.

The purpose of our program is to provide a *system* of demands leading to dual power and culminating in the seizure of state power. No social layer or class, other than the proletariat itself, and most decisively the industrial working class, contains the human material and social weight required for such an undertaking. While certain demands pertaining to the special needs of distinct oppressed groups and strata can and should be raised, to speak of a transitional program for any *single* oppressed group or social layer—such as students—creates deceptive illusions as to the objective conditions of class struggle and miseducates the ranks of the party.

The practical effects of this theorizing is the orienting of the party to these sectors instead of to the hard, serious work inside of the class. The youth orientation, which originated with the document "The Worldwide Youth Radicalization" has become an excuse for an exclusive and self-perpetuating student orientation which has failed to relate to young workers, soldiers or to youth of the oppressed nationalities or to train new cadre for eventual implantation into the class.

II. The Imperialist Countries

The paramount task for the sections in the advanced countries during the epoch of the death agony of capitalism is the breaking of the grip of Stalinism and Social Democracy over the working class. A strategic orientation toward the class must be a priority of sections within the imperialist countries. The aborted revolutions of France (1968) and Italy (1968-69) serve to confirm this view.

At the same time, these events call attention to a new phase of class struggle in the advanced countries caused by a sharpening of the economic and social contradictions of world imperialism and characterized by a rise in the combativity of the working class and a generalized subsidence in the scope and importance of the student movement. The ability of the European and English sections to effect impressive gains over the last several years by shifting their orientations to the class in line with these changes has placed the International at an historic crossroads. For the first time, the International has the realistic opportunity of breaking out of its isolation and emerging as a mass party of the working class. Hence, the success of the turn taken by these sections has immense import to the whole International.

The difference in the pace of the working-class radicalization in North America should not obscure the fundamental similarity of the work confronting the SWP and the LSA/LSO to those confronting these other sections. The continuing abatement from work within the class by these parties can only lead to an inability to intervene in the proletariat in the battles ahead. A refusal by the SWP and the LSA/LSO to take advantage of the possibilities that open up to us in the coming period have the prob-

ability of plunging these parties back into decades more of isolation and thus may well result in an historic defeat for Trotskyism in North America.

III. The Colonial Revolution

The perspectives for the colonial countries are generally set forth in the Transitional Program: the building of a Trotskyist vanguard and the mobilization of the working class and peasantry around both democratic and transitional demands toward the seizure of state power and the creation of a dictatorship of the proletariat. Today, numerous differences remain within the International in terms of applying our theoretical program.

In the case of Palestine, the position adopted at the last convention of the SWP, that is, for a "democratic secular state in Palestine," stands in contrast to the correct slogan, "For a Unified Socialist Mid-East." This particular formulation of the SWP neglects the obvious need to point for a socialist solution to the Palestine struggle. Worse yet, to call for a "democratic secular state" without specifying its class character amounts to calling for the establishment of a bourgeois state. Such ambiguity is more than reminiscent of the two-stage theory of revolution of the Menshevik-Stalinists. At the same time the uncritical support to Al Fatah given by the SWP demonstrated an adaptation to the bourgeois democratic leadership of that national struggle.

The pattern to these errors is demonstrated in connection to the differences on Bangla Desh. While the SWP restricted its calls to the "self-determination of Bangla Desh," the United Secretariat correctly called for "Forward to the United Socialist Bengal" and "Forward Toward the Indian Sub-Continent Revolution." The mistakes of the SWP in this regard echo the political error mentioned earlier; the conception that democratic or nationalist struggles automatically develop into conscious revolutionary ones without intervention by the vanguard party. The fact is that while all bourgeois democratic tasks cannot be completed by the national bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie is quite capable of taking the leadership of such movements away from the revolutionary class and seizing control of the state for its own class interests. This has been the most frequent historical variant. There is no substitute for the necessity of building Leninist parties capable of winning the leadership of the workers and poor peasants away from the national bourgeoisie and over to a socialist program.

In the case of Latin America, we cannot agree with either the stated position of the SWP or the International majority.

The position put forward by the SWP which advocates party building is poorly recommended both by the record of the SWP in the United States and by its sterile and mechanical nature. Intrinsic to the SWP's position is a transferring of their sectoral approach to Latin America, as their fraternal collaboration with the centrist PSA of Argentina shows.

We reject the positions of the International majority as well, but not for any pacifistic or legalistic reasons. We believe that the positions of the International majority, which envisage a continentwide strategy of armed struggle, represent an adaptation to guerrillism.

The uneven social and economic development among the various Latin American countries does not necessarily

preclude any continent-wide strategy. But at the same time to call for any strategy on a continental scale before developing a clear concrete analysis and perspective of each of the Latin American sections and countries is to remain in the realm of impressionistic abstraction.

The policy of the majority is not based on the working class, but rather is a substitute for the class and hence is adventurist. We wish to make it quite clear that ultimately armed struggle (as the adjunct of the mass mobilization of the workers and peasants) will be the only way for the revolutionary victory in Latin America. The lesson of the necessity of arming the masses is one which must be driven home to counter the reformist influence of Stalinism and Social Democracy.

IV. The Workers States

The current discussion on China is of value chiefly in the adoption of a more correct analysis of the role of Stalinism and its Maoist and other national variants. The International majority evidenced in its positions a critical error in the consideration of Maoism as bureaucratic centrism. This position, if not corrected can only lead to illusions about other Stalinist leaderships which in turn could lead to projecting a course that would be detrimental to the building of the International. There is a certain tendency in this direction evident in some of the European sections' positions toward the leadership of the DRV/NLF and the Seven-Point Program.

The SWP while holding a substantially more correct position vis-à-vis Stalinism and correctly criticizing the Seven-Point Program, has demonstrated an unwillingness to build a movement of solidarity with the Vietnamese revolution and defense of the workers state of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

V. The Fourth International

We support the proposal for the rapid building of a genuinely democratic-centralist International within the framework of the Proposed Statutes published by the IMG. In this context we hold general agreement with the view put forward by Comrades Krivine and Frank in their contribution to the discussion entitled, "Again, and Always, the Question of the International." On this point we must reemphasize the necessity of the leaderships of the various sections and parties of practicing an extensive internal democracy and to provide for the rights of minorities to participate both in leadership and in international discussions.

We also wish to point out the harmful practices of the SWP: its lack of solidarity with the Argentine section when under repressive attack by the Lanusse regime, the refusal in its press to acknowledge that the ERP-PRT is the section of the Fourth International in Argentina, its interference in the internal affairs of the IMG. All of these exacerbate the current differences in the International and foment a factional atmosphere. This only makes the working out of a correct solution to current differences more difficult.

Comradely,
s/Bill Massey (Oakland-Berkeley Branch)
s/John Shaffer (Houston Branch)
s/Don Smith (Chicago Branch)

cc: United Secretariat
International Majority Tendency



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STATEMENT OF SUPPORT TO THE
INTERNATIONAL MAJORITY TENDENCY

Dear Comrades:

Since the inception of the 1973 pre-convention discussion a number of members of the Socialist Workers Party have declared political support to the International Majority Tendency in the party's internal bulletin. We wish to add our names to that list and also to state the primary reasons for our adherence to the general line of the International Majority Tendency; additionally, we will indicate several areas where we are not at this time in total agreement.

1) We do not accept the SWP leadership's claim that the schism in the United Secretariat of the Fourth International concerns advocates of Guevarism as opposed to orthodox supporters of Leninist party building. Instead, the division rotates around the most fundamental issues for all Leninists and Trotskyists: the character of the Transitional Program and the necessity of raising the political consciousness of the masses; the importance of initiatives in action and reaching the vanguard elements with overtly revolutionary propaganda; the primacy of a proletarian orientation, especially in the advanced capitalist countries; elections as a revolutionary weapon; democratic centralism and the nature of the International; Permanent Revolution and national liberation struggles.

May 1968 was the decisive turning point in the development of the Fourth International since the 1963 reunification. Subsequent to that historic crossroads it became clear that the SWP leadership was moving in the direction of becoming the right wing of the world movement, and the European parties the left wing. While the SWP leadership interpreted the aborted French revolution as a reaffirmation of their intercontinental-wide student strategy, the European comrades absorbed the true lessons: the importance of being able to challenge the Stalinists and reformists inside the workers movement. Despite hesitations and disagreements on certain formulations and historical questions, we stand squarely behind the document "The Building of Revolutionary Parties in Capitalist Europe," which represents an authentic affirmation of the proletarian tasks awaiting Trotskyism—as opposed to the SWP leadership's counterstrategy of minimalist demands and a petty-bourgeois orientation.

The so-called "Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency" represents an unprincipled combination out to challenge the leadership of the Fourth International for organizational control. One component of this combination includes the full political support of the SWP/LSA with their petty-bourgeois/minimalist perspective; and Moreno—one time guerrillaist and neo-Maoist. Also, unfortunately associated with this amalgam are Hugo Blanco, who penetrated mass organizations and developed armed struggle for defense of workers and peasants; and Comrade Peng, whose "Return to the Road of Trotskyism" argues the case for a thoroughgoing proletarianization of parties in advanced capitalist countries.

2) While we also support the general line of Ernest Germain's "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the

Fourth International," we wish to clarify before the SWP and International as a whole that we hold some differences, such as the following:

a) *Argentina*: It must unfortunately be acknowledged that Comrade Germain is all too correct when he observes that in Argentina there is a most favorable objective situation and a number of self-proclaimed Trotskyists, but no genuine Leninist-Trotskyist current. The ERP/PRT, no matter how admirable, is not Trotskyist in either theory or practice. The Moreno/Coral combination, on the other hand, lacks the willingness to advance the struggle beyond the legal channels and conforms to the classical definition of centrism—revolutionary in words, reformist in deeds. It should also be stated that under the concrete circumstances it was absolutely correct and necessary for revolutionaries to have entered into and participated in the 1973 Argentine elections—providing the elections were used to advance a *revolutionary transitional program*. This would include a call for the formation of workers councils, a workers militia and a workers government, while also a denunciation of the capitalist dictatorship and an exposition of its phony elections. In our opinion this was neither the spirit nor the letter of the PST campaign.

b) *Bolivia*: We agree with Comrade Germain's statement that—to say the least—there were incorrect formulations in the 9th World Congress Resolution on Latin America. However, despite certain errors of the POR-Gonzalez it manifested no deep-seated tendencies toward adventurism (like that of the ERP) nor toward opportunism (like that of the PST). The International Majority Tendency is 100 percent correct in their insistence that a revolutionary party undertake the task of educating the workers in action on the necessity of armed struggle. Although under the Barrientos regime the POR-Gonzalez turned mistakenly away from mass work, they did ultimately intervene fully in the urban mass struggles and they emerged from the battle unquestionably the only participant with a correct analysis and program—not only in words but in deeds. Nevertheless, we are in opposition to the sections of Livio Maitan's December 2 resolution, "Bolivia—Results and Perspectives," which explicitly give priority to the military side of the activities of the POR-Gonzalez in the next stage. Maitan clearly reaffirms those mistaken formulations in regard to a continental-wide strategy of guerrilla warfare.

c) We do not have full agreement with all of Comrade Germain's analysis of the political situation on the North American continent or with all his statements on SWP policy in the United States. This especially pertains to the party's orientation, and its confusion of the ideology of Black and Chicano nationalism with the national liberation struggles themselves.

d) There remain several additional issues in dispute within the world Trotskyist movement which are not presently incorporated into the Tendency Declaration of the International Majority as a basis of support. These include the nature of Stalinism, the struggle for women's liberation as opposed to feminist ideology, the correct slogans for the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent, etc. We

will state our attitude on these matters at the appropriate time.

Representatives of the Tendency now formed around this "Statement of Support to the International Majority

Tendency" in SWP branches on the West Coast are:

Oakland/Berkeley: Ralph Levitt/Celia Stodola

Los Angeles: Judy Shane/Ron Warren

San Francisco: Jeff Beneke/Garth Chojnowski

June 10, 1973

THE REAL UNEVENNESS IN THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

by Tom Scharret, Oakland-Berkeley Branch

In section 22 of the document "In Defence of Leninism: In Defence of the Fourth International" Comrade Germain advances the theory that the political differences within the Fourth International reflect the objective unevenness of the development of the radicalization internationally. On page 46 the comrade states, "The fact that the two numerically strongest sectors of the world proletariat—the American and the Soviet working class—have not yet joined the rising tide of world revolution, still gravely impedes and limits the upsurge at the present stage. And, subjectively, this fact reflects itself also inside the world revolutionary movement, inside the Fourth International. The present discussion is a partial expression of this fact."

The comrade is correct in trying to find an objective basis for the differences within the International. He is also obviously correct in saying that the radicalization of the working class is generally far more developed in Europe and in Latin America than in the United States. Two examples of this are Spain and Argentina, which also have sections which are among the strongest supporters of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency. The unevenness which Comrade Germain does not mention and which is the primary cause for the differences is the unevenness in cadre development between the various sections and sympathizing groups.

In the task of constructing a revolutionary party, the question of cadre development is key. The cadre, or framework, carries the program and norms within the party. What was the difference between the successful revolution in Russia and the defeated revolutions throughout Europe in the early '20s? In many cases, the objective conditions were more promising than in Russia. But the key difference was that in Russia a firm cadre with years of training existed, and in the other cases that cadre did not exist. Trotsky mentions in *The Spanish Revolution* that a revolutionary party can grow very fast in a pre-revolutionary situation if it has a trained cadre which is firmly grounded in Marxist principles and knows what to do next.

In section 13, Comrade Germain quotes Comrade Can-

non out of context to try to prove that because the radicalization is deepening, therefore the contention of the Leninist-Trotskyist Tendency that ultraleftism is the main danger within the International is ruled out. However, the radicalization of European workers during the early 1920s, which had an even faster tempo of development, was accompanied by major manifestations of ultraleftism. Lenin and Trotsky designated this as the main danger in the International. Lenin published "*Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder*," and Lenin and Trotsky demonstratively described themselves as "the right wing." They saw the central tasks of the International and its parties—which, although small in many cases, were much larger than the Trotskyist parties today—to be the winning of the masses through participation in mass struggles on a united front basis, and not to show "in practice" the necessity of violence in the class struggle. Was this "opportunist tailending"? There were no lack of Communists to make this charge. Today, anyone who knows the activities of the sections of the Comintern at that time knows that Lenin and Trotsky were correct in their analysis. The unevenness in that situation, as in this one, was the unevenness in the development of cadre. Thus, many Communists failed to see, as the Bolsheviks did, the necessity of a transitional approach to bridge the gap between the vanguard party and the broad masses of workers.

There are three important reasons why the leading cadres of the SWP recognize this as the central problem facing the International today, and why they realize that the gap in consciousness between the vanguard and the masses makes impatient ultraleftism a real danger. They are not the reasons Germain cites.

1. In Spain, the most central organizer of the Left Opposition was Andre Nin. In France, men like Rosmer and Molinier played key roles. In other places throughout Europe, the central responsibility for launching the Left Opposition fell on such accidental figures. In the United States, however, James P. Cannon undertook that task. No historical generalizations can be made to say that

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