

# Bulletin

## OF THE WORKERS PARTY

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OPEN LETTER TO THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY, FRENCH SECTION  
OF THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

Esteemed Comrades:

Two years after the termination of the most devastating and reactionary war which history records, the French party faces a grave crisis, a concentrated expression of the crisis of the International, the latter in turn a reflection of the tremendous crisis which the world labor movement is suffering each year more acutely. It is therefore necessary to judge the actual situation of the French party and to seek a solution in the operation of its two determinant causes, the Fourth International and the world labor movement.

"The crisis of humanity", we repeat a thousand times with L.D. Trotsky, "is a crisis of revolutionary leadership." However many explanations may try to throw the responsibility for the defeat of the revolution on the objective conditions, the ideological backwardness or the delusions of the masses, on the potency of Stalinism or the illusory attractiveness of the "degenerated workers' state", they are erroneous and fit only for exculpating those responsible, diverting attention from the real problem and obstructing its solution. Given the state of the objective conditions today for the taking of power, an authentic revolutionary leadership must conquer all obstacles, overcome all difficulties, triumph over all adversities. The condition of the party in France, center of Europe and even now the influential nucleus of the world is in no way satisfactory. To speak fully and explicitly, since it is necessary to speak fully and explicitly if we wish to make progress, the condition of the French party signifies for us, and consequently for the proletariat, the revolution and all of humanity, a major calamity. Having gone through an imperialist war which offered unsurpassable conditions for its transformation into civil war; in the presence of an arch-reactionary policy of the Big Three conquerors; in the midst of a complete corruption of Stalinism and reformism; with the decadence of capitalism which threatens to drag down the whole of humanity with it already clearly begun; with a proletariat avid for social revolution in spite of the evanescence to which the Stalinist and reformist leaders subject it; the French party does not yet represent a hope for the masses. No subterfuge; the fault is in the political leadership. Remember the French revolution. In its culminating period it shot the generals guilty of defeat, rejecting extenuating and even exculpatory reasons. Today we must mercilessly rout the policy and the exponents of the policy which brought about our defeat or even prevented triumph. Reasons much more imperious than those which compelled the French revolution to shoot the generals guilty of ineptitude demand this.

The world labor movement ought to have triumphed over the old capitalist world and the Russian counter-revolution during the imperialist war or immediately afterward. The war was simultaneously a result of the crisis of the world labor movement and the opportunity for its recovery and definitive victory. The ideological causes of the crisis and with them the organisations responsible for it should have been destroyed. But a reverse phenomenon has been produced. The organisations which caused and heightened the crisis have increased their organic power over the working class, binding it more strongly than before to the general system of the world counter-revolution. We, on the other hand, have nowhere attained the organic force, the

ideological authority and the combative prestige which give a revolutionary party its qualification as such. This result cannot be in any way accidental and still less a product of the objective circumstances. The crisis of the world labor movement acquired official status in 1914, when the Second International deserted to the capitalist camp. The Russian Revolution, in 1917 vigorously started the recuperation. But shortly afterward the Stalinist thermidor arrived to add its own factors of ideological crisis to the old reformist factor. Since then Stalinism has been continually deepening its degeneration, getting prestige from the country of the revolution and money and stringent orders from the caste which has destroyed that same revolution. The social-democratic desertion was serious, very serious, and costly to the proletariat, but the intransigence of the Bolsheviks diminished its importance and the triumph of the Russian proletariat doomed it to a certain and early defeat. By turning against the Russian Revolution and chaining to itself the Third International, the Stalinist Thermidor coincided with the social-democratic desertion, obstructed the complete recuperation of the workers' movement and immediately itself deepened the crisis. From the Chinese Revolution to the Spanish Revolution, Stalinist foreign policy runs its degenerative cycle, which begins in complicity (ideological opportunism) with the petty-bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie of the Kuomintang and culminates in the destruction by its own hand (capitalist reaction) of a triumphant revolution, that of July 19, 1936. In this cycle there is a duplication of the evolution of Stalinist thermidor in Russia which goes from the suppression of proletarian democracy and the Left Opposition to the extermination of the Bolshevik Old Guard and tens of thousands of militants, the Moscow Trials and the assassination of Trotsky, a retarded effect of the trials. The Russian government and its external appendage, world Stalinism, left the old social-democracy far behind, both having converted themselves, closely united, into the most powerful and dangerous cause of the crisis of the world labor movement. A cause which, furthermore, has at its disposal the GPU, a police force internationally organized and subsidized with millions!

The first point to understand in the world situation, without which understanding all the rest becomes fogged and action grows sterile, is that the present Russian state and government, far from having as its base or carrying along with it any remnant whatsoever of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, represents in respect to the latter the most ferocious and complete counter-revolution. By itself, alone the present Russian government has contributed much more to the defeat of the world revolution and to the state of prostration of the masses than all the old capitalist governments together. Yes, the politics of Russia, and world Stalinism, image of its economic interests, dishearten human hopes and aspirations much more severely than the finance capital of Wall Street and the City with their respective armies and police forces. Without Moscow and world Stalinism, the imperialist war would either not have begun, that is, it would have been prevented by the European revolution, or it would have been rapidly and victoriously transformed into civil war. The spontaneous action of the masses under the Nazi occupation moved in the latter direction, but Stalinism and world capitalism, in a formidable show of unity, detoured them to the support of the imperialist war by means of nationalist movements. Thus we find ourselves today facing the most complete and reactionary domination of the world by the victorious Big Three, which means the continual threat of a new imperialist war and gives the masses a bitter sensation of frustration, a pledge of Stalinist and reformist domination. The crisis of the

world labor movement thereby resolves itself into Stalinism's organic capacity (social-democracy is completely secondary) to nail the activity of the masses during and after the war into the sarcophagus built jointly in spite of their quarrels, by the old imperialisms and the Russian counter-revolution.

In its quality as regenerating nucleus, the Fourth International ought to have developed as the world party fighting for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war and adapted its tactics, general arguments and slogans to the changes which were produced or clearly manifested during the war. Mistakes uncorrected in any of these aspects and persistence in tactics and slogans superseded by events must inevitably have resulted in grave political and organic injury to the International. It cannot be doubted for a single instant that the latter is the principal cause of our feeble development and the particular crisis which the International is undergoing, a crisis expressed by diverse tendencies and sub-tendencies with points of view contradictory and even radically opposed on the most important problems. Yes, the International, or its principal parties in the period in which it did not exist as a directing center, have committed grave errors and persisted in slogans which ought to have been abandoned. But the major error is that to this very day it does not appear disposed to correct past mistakes and to abandon outlived slogans. And against this everyone must be alert, because it could prove disastrous.

Let us take up the main problems in chronological order.

The fight against imperialist war. One can scarcely speak of the International in respect to this, because the international center, isolated, cut off from any contact with all the sections in Europe and Asia, was practically non-existent. But it is possible to speak, on the other hand, of the principal parties. The most visible of them all, the one which by its geographic position, its economic resources, its conditions of legality and its capacity to influence and attract, appeared automatically as exponent of the policy of the Fourth International--did that party maintain an intransigent revolutionary and internationalist attitude toward the imperialist war? Did it wage the necessary struggle against it? No, categorically no. Any other reply would only serve to render difficult a positive solution to our difficulties, if not to aggravate them. Faced with war, the American party had an opportunist attitude similar to that of centrism, not to that which must be ours. It itself defined this as non-support, transformation of the imperialist war into a genuine war against fascism, political opposition, etc., and in general abstained from agitation and specific action against the war, as much in the rearguard as <sup>in the</sup> vanguard. And the policy of this party appeared before the world for years as the official policy of the Fourth International! Furthermore, what then existed as an international center accepted it tacitly as sound. Evidently, the policy of the American party led all of the groups of the Fourth International in the world toward opportunism. By following its example, or at least taking shelter behind it, the English party itself, although in general to the left of the American party, weakened its policy toward war in a centrist fashion. There were other opportunist manifestations, but we do not consider it necessary to speak of them here. It is sufficient to point to the fact for later discussions. Did our principal parties on the

European continent maintain a completely internationalist attitude toward the war? There is nothing to reproach them with, up to the Hitlerite occupation. From then onwards, their policy is almost entirely unknown to us and therefore we wish to assert nothing one way or the other. We must note, nevertheless, that diverse indications and some documents suggest, in the French party, for example, the existence of non-internationalist attitudes. The comrades who continued the general struggle for the revolution around our ideas under frightful conditions during the occupation have become the creditors of the esteem and admiration of the entire International. To all of them, the fallen and those who survive, go our sincerest respect and friendship. This itself obliges us to point out mistakes which today obstruct the growth of the organization and revolutionary progress in general. In order positively to resolve its crisis and to help to resolve that of the International, the French party must analyze its own conduct and that of the International during the imperialist war and condemn all opportunisms and vacillations.

The most serious error in this field proceeds from the new world leadership elected in the Pre-conference of April, 1946. To date, more than a year having elapsed it has not arranged for a discussion of the politics of the principal parties during the imperialist war. Its error is all the more unpardonable since it had at its disposal from the instant of its formation important documents with which to open the discussion. Its error can be all the more fatal for our movement in so far as this new leadership resists placing as the first point on the agenda for the world Congress in preparation the attitude of our principal parties toward the imperialist war and the national movements. An error can be serious or even very serious; but a party which knows how to correct it will continue to progress toward the revolution. An uncorrected error produces theoretical/consumption organic ossification, annulment, sooner or later. The Fourth International would demonstrate its inability to take itself seriously if, when the Congress is held, it did not place in the foreground the attitude of its parties toward the imperialist war and did not severely condemn the opportunisms manifested in its ranks. We are certain that the parties and groups will know how to react.

The movements of national resistance under the Hitlerite occupation. There are positions of all shades in the International, from those who have openly supported the Committees of Resistance, demanding the entry of our parties into them, to those who opposed any compromise with them, leaving aside those who favored them more or less surreptitiously. Because the occupation --yesterday by the German troops, today by the Yankee, Russian and English,-- is a new phenomenon posed for the labor movement by the decomposition of capitalism, up to a certain point it was natural that many varied positions should arise in our ranks. They would certainly have appeared even supposing that all our parties had maintained an integrally internationalist attitude. But the latter has not been the case; instead there have been opportunist tendencies which discarded revolutionary defeatism and internationalist tendencies which maintained it in every instance. All of the positions which arose round about the national movements can be catalogued under these headings. The opportunist tendencies supported and pronounced themselves more or less in favor, and the internationalist tendencies decidedly against. The former considered the fight against the occupation as a function of "the anti-fascist war"; the latter as a function of the imperialist war. As a consequence, the former saw in the resistance

movements a positive element in the struggle against fascism, and the others an element of return to the imperialist war which the peoples had begun to transform into civil war. One group supported guerilla warfare and sabotage, instruments of the national movements, while the other combated them as nationalist methods incompatible with the supreme objective of transforming the imperialist war into international civil war.

The problem is not one of exclusively retrospective merit. The attitude taken today toward Russian and world Stalinism depends in great measure on the attitude taken previously toward the national movements, of which Stalinism was everywhere the principal inspirer, from Poland and Yugoslavia to France and Belgium. Even today Europe is totally occupied by the Big Three. It is therefore absolutely impossible to have a correct attitude toward the occupation by the Big Three without correcting the mistakes committed during the German occupation, because the occupation, despite quantitative differences, is not a characteristic result of this or that imperialism, but of imperialism as a world factor in the present epoch, the Russian counter-revolution being included under the imperialist denomination. The problem is indissolubly linked with that of the imperialist war and therefore both ought to be at the top of the discussion in each party and in the future world Congress. Without correcting the errors committed in these aspects we shall never be a genuine world revolutionary party and any organic progress will slip through our fingers as so much has slipped through the fingers of the centrist parties.

"Unconditional Defense of the USSR" It is not, as some tendencies unfortunately seem to consider it, absolutely consubstantial with our movement. The criterion which has always determined our attitude toward this problem is : does the defense of the USSR in a war against foreign enemies help or hinder the world revolution? The answer depended naturally on the criterion held as to the social nature of the USSR, whether something of the October Revolution did or did not remain which merited its defense. It is impossible for us to analyze this problem here. We must proceed by declarations since we are attempting solely to make the entire International think and discuss. The development of Russian foreign policy while the armies of the Kremlin were advancing toward the west revealed a more and more acute contradiction with the "degenerated workers' state" idea based on the remnants of the proletarian revolution, on which rested the idea of unconditional defense. With deep distress, because the world leadership is a part of our organization, a part of ourselves, we cannot refrain from saying that the International Secretariat failed in its most elemental duties by not bringing up for discussion on the day following its constitution the question of whether the "unconditional defense of the USSR" continued to be favorable to the world revolution or whether it seemed incompatible with it in the light of the tremendous supervening events. The IS simply ignored the tremendous events and continued tacitly to accept unconditional defense as sufficient, in which it devoted itself to influencing the International. Without doing anything here besides making assertions, we repeat, we declare to you, comrades of the French party, comrades of the International, that the "unconditional defense of the USSR" has revealed itself to be incompatible with the defense of the world revolution. Abandonment of the defense of Russia is of utmost urgency, because it is fettering all of our movements, blunting our theoretical progress and giving us in the eyes of the masses a stalinoid physiognomy. It is impossible to defend Russia and the world revolution at the same

time. Either one or the other. We pronounce ourselves for the world revolution, against the defense of Russia, and we ask you to pronounce yourselves in the same way. Be careful, above all, of those tendencies which hide their opportunism towards the imperialist war and the present situation by boasting about their fidelity to the program of the Fourth International on the Russian question! A fidelity of this kind is a destructive fidelity, similar to that of the "old Bolsheviks" in 1917 in respect to the old theory, completely bolshevik, of the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry toward which Lenin appeared as a revisionist. In order to remain faithful to the revolutionary tradition of bolshevism, Lenin broke with essential ideas of bolshevism, effecting a prior revolution in his party which made possible the October revolution. In order to be faithful to the revolutionary tradition of the Fourth International, we must abandon the Trotskyist theory of the defense of the USSR; we shall thus bring about in the International an ideological revolution indispensable for the success of the world revolution.

This is, beyond doubt, the most important question in dispute inside our movement, because all else depends upon it, in greater or less degree. If the tendency opposed to the defense of Russia can be accused of revisionism, its revisionism has the same character as Lenin's revisionism in 1917. On the other hand, out of the tendency supporting the defense of Russia if it does not rectify itself, will emerge a new reformism, such as was already emerging from the "old bolsheviks" when Lenin intervened with his April theses. In fact, the supporters of defense come to the conclusion that the counter-revolutionary Russian caste, upon entering the countries of western Europe and Asia, "is obliged" to expropriate capitalism and put the economy on the road of adaptation to the forms of property existing in Russia, forms which they themselves still consider socialist, produced by the revolution. When Thorez, Togliatti and other Stalinist leaders referred to the "new routes" offered by achieving socialism without the need of revolution, they had in mind, grosso modo, this same idea. But the supposed expropriation of capitalism consists in nationalization--whether more or less complete, with or without indemnification, is not important--of the means of production. On one hand, the nationalization is an automatic result of the concentration of capitalism in its epoch of involution, that is to say, degeneration and decay. On the other hand, years ago the European proletariat became master of the means of production. By nationalizing these means the Russians performed--as did also the English and the Americans, either by this procedure or by giving them back to private capitalists--an operation of expropriation of the proletariat. And thus it is that the supporters of "unconditional defense" have presented the expropriation of the proletariat, carried out by Russian troops with the aid of the Stalinist parties and reformists, as a progressive act, almost revolutionary, something which the proletariat should defend. Herein is contained potentially to say the least--a completely reformist tendency.

Stalinist-Reformist Governments and United Fronts with Stalinism. In France this idea is expressed concretely by the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government, held in common by the Craipeau and Frank factions, which in addition share the potentially reformist theory of the defense of Russia and the majority of the ideas which are injurious to the French party.



On this question we must limit ourselves to declarations also since the analysis of each problem would not enter into the scope of an open letter. In its entirety, the position on this slogan depends on the position on the defense of Russia, and in a more general way on the valuation of the present conditions of capitalism and the state of consciousness of the masses. When in 1917 the Bolsheviks enunciated the idea of a Menshevik government (oust the capitalist ministers from the government), they did it by taking into account on the one hand the deluded faith which the masses at that moment had in the Mensheviks and in bourgeois democracy; on the other hand they took into account the nature of the contradictions between the Mensheviks and the old classes which would cause the former, willy-nilly, to grant greater liberties to the masses and to the revolutionary vanguard in particular, which would allow the masses to condense their experience in organic forms and rise to higher stages of struggle. The existence of the soviets, legally allowed by the Kerensky government and in which the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and Bolsheviks participated in a united front, permitted this development.

Do such conditions exist today? Decidedly not, as regards social democracy, and much more decidedly as regards Stalinism. We do not believe it necessary to point out here the conservative evolution of social-democracy in recent years: It has been simply a case of going from bad to worse.

Stalinism is today a thousand times more dangerous for the revolution because it represents the ideas and interests of a triumphant counter-revolution in Russia which offers the world and more immediately Europe, its experience, its power and its particular solution against the proletariat on the march toward socialism. The Stalinist parties are today mere representatives and disciples of the counter-revolution installed in the Kremlin. Compared with them, the Mensheviks of 1917 were very revolutionary. The slogans of united front and government of the workers' leaders constituted in Russia a whole at once inseparable from and derived from the forms of proletarian democracy existing in the soviets, which--this is of the utmost importance--were created and maintained with the collaboration of Mensheviks and revolutionary socialists. Stalinism is today absolutely incompatible with any proletarian democracy. Wherever organs of revolutionary power have emerged, from Spain to Warsaw, Paris and Milan, it has hastened to destroy them. Stalinism cannot allow the revolutionaries to speak. The tactic of a united front with it and the CP-SP-CGT government cannot facilitate in any way the creation of organs of democracy and proletarian power, and any government that is Stalinist or under Stalinist influence brings with it an imperious tendency to annihilate physically the revolutionary vanguard. It is therefore urgently necessary that the PCI and our international movement withdraw these two now outmoded slogans. Is not the example of eastern Europe eloquent?

On the other hand, the proletariat today does not suffer from any real delusions about bourgeois-democracy, social-democracy or Stalinism. What it does suffer from is the fact of finding itself imprisoned in the organic apparatus of both tendencies, Stalinism first and foremost. The non-existence of a revolutionary organization which would inspire it with confidence and combative sureness contributes more than a little to this, that is, our actual policy contributes directly or indirectly. Yesterday it was indispensable



for the proletariat to go through the experiences of governments set up by the leaders of the traditional organizations in order to understand that the revolution was the only possible way out. Not today; you have to cover your eyes obstinately with your hands not to see it. The experience has been long and painful. The proletariat understands that there is no solution to its problems other than the revolution, but it is pessimistic and somewhat inert in the hands of the traditional organizations because it sees no other organization which offers serious possibilities of making this revolution. It would hardly break away from this pessimism and inertia if we, to whom it looks with a little hope, without our succeeding in inspiring it with the necessary confidence to take action, say that it ought nevertheless to see a Thorez government. Let us hope it will never see it! In order to inspire confidence in the proletariat and persuade it to action and to a break with the organizations which imprison it, the thing most indicated would be the creation of a united front of all those minority labor organizations which oppose class collaboration and are supporters of the revolution and proletarian democracy in general. Thus the proletariat would see a relatively solid nucleus which would break the asphyxiating circle drawn around it by Stalinism and reformism.

To sum up, the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government such as has been used in France, the call for a Stalinist-reformist government in general, is today entirely false and will serve only to hold back the masses where they are, and also--it is painful but necessary to say it--develop the new potentially reformist tendencies existing in the Fourth International. We cannot refrain from telling you, comrades of the International Communist Party of France, that the crisis of your party in particular and that of the International in general will not be solved positively by supporting the Frank faction against the Craipeau faction, but rather by supporting the two factions which are against the defense of Russia and against the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government. Fidelity to Trotskyism is not fidelity to the written word, but to the revolutionary spirit of Trotskyism. Between the two factions which today appear the strongest in France, the least bad will be that which offers the party a more democratic regime allowing it to carry out the political changes indispensable today through the widest and most democratic discussion.

Nationalizations. From all the foregoing, our opposition to the slogan of nationalization can be logically deduced. It also belongs in the realm of the written word, and far from expressing fidelity to the revolutionary Trotskyist tradition, it expresses or at least aids that which we have designated above as the new potential reformism. In revolutionary movements, nationalizations have served the Russian counter-revolution as well as the counter-revolution of the purest bourgeois derivation to expropriate the proletariat as it was taking possession of the instruments of production, and in moments of passivity of the masses, to concentrate the property in the hands of the state, religious fetish and oppressor par excellence, so as to make strikes difficult, restrict democracy (Stalinist-reformist police in the French factories) and begin the creation of a corporative order. Against this senile slogan we must hoist that of the expropriation of capitalism and destruction of its State by democratically elected workers' committees. Every one of the situations and conflicts which arises between the proletariat and capitalism must reinforce in the workers the idea that nationalizations far from favoring their interests and those of the revolution in general, only aggravate the situation. The slogan of expropriation must

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become more comprehensible to the proletariat all the time. We believe that, in so far as its general meaning is concerned, it is already so.

The International has not had a revolutionary policy during the war, more exactly, it has had no policy. It slept while its most visible parties, principally the SWP followed an entirely opportunist policy of "revolutionary triumphism" toward the war at the same time that they pretended to set themselves up as trustees of fidelity to the program (what part of the program is more important than the struggle against war?), raising as their camp colors the defense of Russia above all else. We tell these tendencies which are not absent from the French party, that they have violated the most essential part of the program and that only a thorough, honest and critically undertaken correction will permit them to speak of fidelity to the program without sowing confusion. But there are also other tendencies whose fidelity to the program is more "genuine" who ought to keep a watch on themselves, for they run the risk of facilitating the International's remaining in the hands of the most opportunist tendencies which are dangerous on account of their organic strength--and this would, very probably, mean its ideological death. Our program must be adapted to the gigantic changes brought about by the war. It is here where fidelity to it lies and not in unchanging repetition, and even less in partial repetition, discarding revolutionary defeatism and interpreting the rest in right-wing fashion.

The criminal destruction of the Spanish revolution principally at the hands of Stalinism and the subsequent beginning of the imperialist war mark the end of a stage which opened with the end of the former imperialist war and the triumph of the Russian revolution. Everything has undergone changes of great importance, the old capitalism and Stalinist Russia, the general attitude of the masses and their ideas or beliefs with respect to bourgeois democracy and traditional organizations. Europe is a vast prison, a torture-camp whose guards and torturers are sometimes German or Italian at other times Russian, American, English or French. A new stage has appeared in the implacable struggle of our epoch to find a revolutionary solution to its conflicts. Our program cannot be exactly the same as in the former stage. If it is to continue being equally revolutionary, it must be modified.

We do not doubt for a single instant that the fundamental cause of the crisis in the French party and the International can be summed up in the opportunisms of yesterday toward the imperialist war and the resistance movements plus ideological inertia in changing in time what needed to be changed. Today this inertia continues in full on the part of the new world leadership. The crisis will only be aggravated if it is not solved by adopting the changes indicated in this letter.

The Frank faction has had the party occupied for nearly a month in discussing an article entitled "The Party in Danger". As a matter of fact, the French party is in danger. But its crisis, as we pointed out at the beginning, is an expression of the crisis of the International, in turn connected with that of the labor movement. It is a problem of very concrete ideas and slogans of which the principal ones are explained in this document. The Frank faction is fully co-responsible for the crisis of the French party and of the International, and the PCI would be in as much or more danger if its

leadership passed from the Craipeau faction to that of Frank. The danger stems from all those tendencies which have shown themselves indulgent toward the opportunisms committed during the war by the American party or by any other, and who continue to proclaim themselves supporters of the defense of Russia, a Stalinist-reformist government, a united front with Stalinism and nationalizations. The most important of those tendencies internationally, to which has been added the Frank faction, are the same which had an anti-fascist attitude and not an internationalist during the war. In no decisive aspect does the Frank faction differentiate itself from the Craipeau faction. Their real differences do not even merit separation into distinct factions. If one is opportunist toward Stalinism, the other is opportunist toward Stalinism; if one finds something progressive in the counter-revolution of the Kremlin, the other also, etc. They are indiscriminately part of the right-wing of the International.

The next congress of the International Communist party will have enormous importance for the future of our world movement. It is necessary that the problems posed here be duly discussed; in order to save the party, it is necessary that the entire party, including the Craipeau and Frank factions, realize the urgency of radically changing their positions on the points herein indicated; it is necessary to reconsider our transitional program in general and to put ourselves in a position energetically to aid the International in effecting its own ideological revolution. Whatever the divergences are between the two factions opposed to the defense of Russia and the slogan of a Stalinist-reformist government, through them can be glimpsed a positive solution to the crisis of the French party, a most important premise for solving the crisis of the International. It is the duty of these two factions to get along together and not help false left-wings in the International.

Once more: fidelity to Trotskyism is not the literal repetition of what Trotskyism said yesterday, even supposing it were not distorted in a right-wing manner. Fidelity to Trotskyism is the firm, sincere, and courageous rectification of some of the assertions it made yesterday. The revolution also is revolutionary; it requires shifts, modifications and radical negations of its own former assertions. Yes, the revolution is also revolutionary!

Down with "Trotskyist" conservatism!

Down with "Trotskyist" fetishism!

Out with "unconditional defense" of the USSR!

For an Ideologically firm and renewed International!

Long live the French proletarian revolution!

Long live the world revolution!

Long live the Fourth International!

Mexico, D.F. June, 1947

Natalia Sedova-Trotsky, Benjamin Péret,  
G. Munis

A DECLARATION BY THE CUBAN PARTY

Havana  
July 19, 1947

To the I.S. of the IV International

Dear Comrades:

We have received your communication concerning the Third Plenum of the IEC, containing the resolution on the preparation of a World Congress. Below we give our point of view on the subject.

In the first place we would like to express our protest against the absurd procedure used for establishing the basis for representation to the Congress. The division of the countries where our movement exists into three categories (those of greatest importance, of medium importance and least importance) we consider to be completely arbitrary since it is not based on a concrete analysis of the situation existing in each one and its relation to the world situation. It appears rather like a caricature of the categories which exist in the U.N., categories which, it is obvious, having nothing in common with the revolutionary concepts of the IV International. On the other hand, if it is a question of establishing categories, it would be well to take under consideration the theory developed by Paul Levi from 1922 to 1928, that in the event of a new world war, the world center would be transferred from the European continent to the American continent, a prediction which, obviously, has already been realized.

In the present state of development of our organizations, very few of which have a numerical strength of a thousand, basing the representation on the combination of the importance of the country and the numerical importance of the section has little to commend it. On the contrary, by virtue of this same limited membership of our organization, the division adopted obviously assumes a negative and totally anti-democratic character. For this reason, we believe this basis for representation must be modified and we must adopt the principle of proportional representation according to the number of militants of each section, without regard to the countries they are in.

We want to emphasize the fact that the representation of the Cuban section, given its small numerical strength, would not be affected by the proposed procedure, but we believe it to be a question of principle to oppose any method which will be harmful, now or in the future, to our international organization.

Another thing. The resolution does not take up the problem of the representation at the Congress of the different groups in any one country which consider themselves members or sections of our International. The existence of one official section is irrelevant to the basic question, since in many cases the "official" group is of less importance than the non-official. On that basis no decision can be made which can be really beneficial for our organization. The different groups in Mexico and Argentina must be considered on their merits without trying to arrive at unification through ultimatum measures. And it is obvious that any one of these groups which has proven itself to be for the defense of our principles and our program, should have representation at the World Congress.

We also consider ill-advised the decision not to invite to the Congress the POUM and the International Communist Party of Italy, as the French comrades have proposed. We consider this attitude sectarian and in complete disagreement with the best traditions of Bolshevism, especially during the early period of the Communist International. Since the IV International is at present the only organization in the international political arena with the character of a world party, on it should rest the initiative for opening a wedge to these centrist or ultra-leftist parties, in an effort to steer their militancy in our direction.

The tendency to convert our International into an "exclusive" organization is evidence of a political blindness incompatible with the struggle for a socialist revolution. As comrade Trotsky so ably observed in his polemic against the ultra-left Oehler, only sectarians attempt to make a world in their own image and resemblance. We will narrow our organization within a schematic frame which, at the present time, is equivalent to renouncing in advance the leadership which historical events has placed in our hands.

Because of all these considerations we ask the comrades of the IS to reconsider this point, as well as the ones pointed out previously, since the decisions reached can cause irrevocable harm to our movement.

We hope to hear from you soon. With fraternal greetings,

FOR THE TRIUMPH OF REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALISM

FOR THE NATIONAL AND SOCIAL LIBERATION OF CUBA

Revolutionary Workers Party,  
Cuban Section of the 4th International.

for the C.C.  
Lasalle

POSTSCRIPT TO THE "OPEN LETTER TO THE INTERNATIONALIST  
COMMUNIST PARTY OF FRANCE"

(The following quotations from articles of Leon Trotsky have been added by the authors of the "Open Letter" as a postscript:)

"Of course we are not fetishists. If new historical facts require the revision of the theory, we will not stop at that. But the lamentable experience of the old revisionists should, in any case, inspire us with a healthy caution. We ought to reflect ten times on the old theory and the new facts before constructing a new doctrine." (Article in Russian, Leon Trotsky: "Neither Workers' State nor Bourgeois State?" dated in Coyoacan, November 27, 1937, published in the Bulletin of the Russian Opposition, No. 62-63.)

"Let us admit for a moment that, in agreement with the Stalin-Hitler pact, the Moscow government leaves intact the right of private property in the occupied territories or confines itself to "controlling" it in the Fascist manner. These concessions might have a profound principled character and might be the point of departure of a new chapter in the Soviet regime and, consequently, would call for a new evaluation of the nature of the Soviet state on our part." (Article in Russian, Leon Trotsky: "The USSR in War", dated September 25, 1939 published in the Bulletin of the Russian Opposition, No 79-80.)

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STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE  
WORKERS PARTY

Prefatory Note

The Statement of the National Committee of the Party on the Johnson split and its meaning is delayed in publication. Originally drafted by the Political Committee, it was submitted to the referendum vote of the National Committee after the Johnsonite request for a "transfer" to the S.W.P. A number of formulations in the original draft were amended or objected to outright by members of the National Committee. The objections dealt particularly with the section on the relationship of the split to the Joint Statement on Unity. It was feared that the draft indicated that the P.C. might seek to take "legal" advantage of the Joint Statement for the purpose of "vetoing" the entry of the Johnsonites into the S.W.P. This was never the intention of the P.C., however. It was simply concerned with not lending itself to approving of the Johnsonite split and especially with not contributing to the idea that such a split could be organized and carried through under the guise of the Joint Statement and with a continued recognition on our part that its terms, now reduced to a hypocritical formality, are still valid. On the basis of the referendum, the Political Committee therefore had no difficulty in amending and reformulating the draft to meet adequately any objection that had been raised, and to issue it in its present form as a Statement of the National Committee. The coming Plenum of the National Committee will be the occasion for a complete review of the situation, not only with reference to the Johnson capitulation but to the question of unity itself.

Editor

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STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE  
WORKERS PARTY

The National Committee of the Workers Party condemns the split of the Johnson faction and the resolution of its conference on which it is based as a capitulation to the Cannon group and as a studied blow at the attempt to achieve the unification of the Trotskyist movement in the United States on a firm and healthy basis.

Unity based upon capitulation, which no revolutionist worthy of the name can demand, cannot possibly yield fruitful results. In its declaration of political solidarity with the Cannon group and its unbridled and calumnious denunciation of the Workers Party, the capitulation of the Johnson faction is represented by its abandonment not only of those positions which, in the past, it held in common with the Workers Party but also those positions which distinguished its own political tendency, or by the effectual abandonment of those positions which it now relegates to a state of unimportance. These include the Johnsonite opposition to the theory that Stalinist Russia is a workers' state and to the official International position of unconditional defense of Stalinist Russia, questions which Johnson declared only yesterday to be decisive for the fate of the world revolutionary movement; the Johnsonite solidarity with the internationalist position of the Workers Party in the struggle against the imperialist war and its rejection of the Cannonite position during the war as semi-social patriotic; the Johnsonite solidarity with the internationalist position of the Workers Party against support of China during its participation in the imperialist war, and its rejection of the Cannonite position of defense of China; the Johnsonite support, even if with an ultra-leftist motivation, of the national resistance movements during the war, and its rejection of the Cannonite position as insanity; the Johnsonite solidarity with the revolutionary proletarian policy and activity of the Workers Party during the war in the ranks of the working class of the United States and in its mass organizations, and its rejection of the Cannonite course in the American mass movement as opportunistic; the Johnsonite solidarity with the principles of genuine party democracy proclaimed and unwaveringly practiced by the Workers Party, and its condemnation of the Cannonite conception of the party and party regime as monolithic; and not least of all, the Johnsonite solidarity with the Workers Party's course on unification since it was first adopted two years ago, and its rejection of the Cannonite course as being responsible for the continued division of the Trotskyist movement in this country.

This capitulation, the culmination of a process whose origins and nature were analyzed by the Workers Party, which was thereby enabled to predict its outcome with complete accuracy, is not the result of a purely arbitrary decision by the Johnsonites. It is rooted in the political line which the Johnson faction developed in opposition to the Marxist position of the Workers Party. The present outcome of the development of this line, which is in general characterized by a purely rhetorical, abstract and sterile radicalism having little in common with revolutionary Marxism, shows how short is the distance between verbal ultra-leftism and the opportunism which it supplements. The bankruptcy and impotence of the ultra-leftist phrasemongering of the Johnson faction having been crushingly revealed by world events of the past few years, on the heels of the equally crushing political defeat it



suffered, by its own avowal, in the course of the fullest and most democratic discussion of all disputed questions in the ranks of the Party, have impelled its leaders to a hysterical and precipitate capitulation to the faction which throughout the past it characterized as opportunist in all the decisive questions of the revolutionary movement.

Inseparably combined with this capitulation, is the new formulation by Johnson of the basis upon which the revolutionary party must be built in the United States. This new formulation declares that the fundamental problems of Marxian theory, of international revolutionary strategy and politics, around which the crisis of the world movement has revolved without successful solution so far - the so-called "Russian question", the so-called "national question," etc. - are now characterized unimportant or even "alien to the new tasks" in the United States. Johnson now considers a discussion of these decisive questions "nothing else but a demoralizing repetition of the disputes of 1940." His resolution states that the political evaluation of unity "cannot be based upon anything else but the strategic perspective of the American revolution and the building of the American Party;" that it is necessary to "proclaim the needs and tasks of the American Revolution as the base for the unified American Party."

The vital importance for us of the needs and tasks of the party and the socialist revolution in the United States cannot be over-emphasized. This statement has, however, nothing whatsoever in common with the new conception of the Johnsonites. It is a conception that breaks with the spirit of internationalism, with the program and traditions of the Trotskyist movement and all Marxist movements before it, and is only a new variety of National-Bolshevism. It is only necessary to translate this formulation into all languages and to apply it to the revolutionary movements in all countries to understand that it means automatically the end of the international movement and the end of internationalism, i.e., Marxism, in the movement. Never in the history of our movement has the basis of the revolutionary party been formulated in such a crassly vulgar, philistine-nationalist manner. The Workers Party condemns and rejects this view as a gross caricature of Marxist Internationalism and a product of utter political demoralization. The world movement is divided into two main tendencies by the question of the nature of the Stalinist state and its defense, and the attitude of revolutionists towards Stalinism and the Stalinist parties. One tendency would transform the Fourth International increasingly into a left wing, or left cover, for Stalinism. The other would preserve its historic role of revolutionary vanguard, left wing, of the proletariat. This division is not a "Russian question." It is as American as it is French, as British as it is Russian, as Chinese as it is German. It is the key question of the world movement. Johnson oscillates between these two tendencies. Unwilling to propagate the position of the defense of Stalinism himself, he becomes the defender of the defensists. Rejecting the defense of Stalinist Russia as meaning the defense of a fascist imperialist state, he unites with the defenders of Russia against those who oppose its imperialism. The artifice of the so-called "American question" is, so far as Johnson is concerned, merely a cover for his capitulation on the key questions of the movement. Johnson is a shield of the right wing in the international movement.

The National Committee has taken note of the proposal, originally made by Johnson, "to request from the Workers Party a transfer of its membership to the Socialist Workers Party." It points out that this strange and unparalleled proposal was not made on the basis of any claim or even suggestion that the Johnson faction was at any time or in any way prevented from freely presenting its views and defending them inside the ranks of the Workers Party and in its press, but only on the ground that its views were not adopted by the majority of the Party and that Johnson has now found that the defense of his views inside the party involves him "in wearisome and futile political struggles." 1652

The democratic character of the Workers Party is known to all and it has been repeatedly affirmed and confirmed in word and in practice. Our Party is proud of its democratic regime and holds firmly to its inclusive revolutionary conception of the party. It is this conception that made it possible for the majority and the minority to exist and work together in a single party for seven years in spite of the wide political and theoretical differences between them. It is this conception which has made possible the consistent position of the Workers Party in favor of unity with the Socialist Workers Party in spite of the differences between them. Despite the uncalculated provocation of the Johnson resolution and the split which has followed, the National Committee sees no grounds for abandoning its conception of the democratic character of the revolutionary party. Therefore, the National Committee calls upon every member of the Johnson faction to remain at his post as a loyal and disciplined member of the Workers Party, retaining to the full all the democratic rights and obligations of all other members of our Party.

At the same time, the National Committee endorses the position taken by the Political Committee in denouncing the proposal that it grant a "transfer" of membership from the Workers Party to the Socialist Workers Party not only as an example of political childishness, but as a cowardly evasion by the Johnson faction of its own responsibility. Up to recently, this faction bitterly denounced as "Menshevism" the change of affiliation from one of the parties to the other, in connection with the adherence to the Workers Party of the SWP Minority in 1946, even though it occurred under circumstances radically different from those now prevailing.

When it became clear that the Political Committee would not enter into an agreement with it to split the Workers Party, a step which the Committee had neither the authority nor the desire to achieve, the Johnson faction, in the face of its own repeated commitments to the contrary, decided to split from the Workers Party and to apply for membership in the Socialist Workers Party.

The Workers Party appeals for new members and seeks to retain in its ranks those who are already members by the only means which it has at its disposal and which it desires to have, the power of political persuasion. The Workers Party is opposed to keeping members or groupings inside the Party by any other force or pressure, or by any organizational and mechanical devices.

The National Committee is a co-signatory to the Joint Statement for Unity of the Socialist Workers Party and the Workers Party. Upon the initiative of the former organization, this Statement contains a specific provision against either party accepting into its ranks, during the period of unity negotiations, any members who have been expelled from or who have withdrawn from the other party, without mutual agreement. The National Committee did not agree with this provision, inasmuch as it was designed to prevent or to make it difficult for former members of the SWP to join the Workers Party and, above all, because our Party opposes the use of any such mechanical measures to retain members or to prevent militants from joining the party of their choice. Our Party acquiesced in this provision, finally, only upon the insistence of the SWP.

In view of its position on this point, the National Committee has neither the desire nor the intention to invoke this provision for the purpose of preventing the Johnsonites from entering the S.W.P. If the

Johnson faction has now concluded that the only arena for the triumph of its political line is the SWP, then it is this faction and the SWP itself - not the Workers Party - that must take upon themselves the full responsibility for their course.

The position of the Workers Party on unity and the basis upon which it can be achieved, has been repeatedly stated for two years and requires no elaboration here. However, the NC, without involving itself in any way in the decision as to the relations between the Johnsonites and the SWP, is fully aware of the fact that the split of the Johnsonites and their application for membership in the SWP is tantamount to a declaration that for their part the question of unity between the WP and the SWP has been removed from the order of the day. It is obvious that no group in our party would leave it now to join the SWP if it envisaged the unity of the two parties in their entirety as a practical perspective. The NC is likewise fully aware of the fact that a corresponding action by the SWP would similarly be tantamount to an open declaration on its part that the Statement on Unity no longer retains even the formal meaning to which the actions and statements of the SWP leadership have reduced it.

The Workers Party will not hesitate to draw the conclusions from the particularly hypocritical blow at unity delivered by the Johnsonite split and all those responsible for it and will continue to act in unwavering fidelity to its conception of the democratic character of the party and its revolutionary principles in general.

National Committee, Workers Party

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NOTE

The Appeal of the SWP Minority

The SWP Minority has requested that the following note be added to the Appeal which follows. It arrived after the article had already been mimeographed. It reads as follows:

"1. The comrades who have the present Appeal at hand will undoubtedly understand the formulations in it. Will they please explain them and the reasons for them to their comrades in the oral discussions that take place.

"2. We ask all comrades reached by this Appeal and concerned with it to communicate their opinions to us at the following address: B. Kushn, 56 Seventh Avenue, New York, N.Y.

APPEAL BY THE MINORITY (SWP) TO ALL SECTIONS OF THE MOVEMENT

The SWP Minority believes that it should submit the following facts and opinions to the attention of all militants of the movement:

I. The Problem of Unity

1. It was the Minority that took the initiative in proposing unity to the members of the two parties concerned, the W.P. and the S.W.P.. Such a unity then appeared both necessary and possible. Five years of split had proved that the existence of two groups, recognized by working class and socialist opinion as belonging to the same political denomination, was an obstacle to the growth of a section of the movement. The split therefore had no further reason for existence provided that 1) a will for unity was manifested in the two groups; 2) the political problems that had been at the origin of the split (nature of the USSR, its place in the world, its relation to imperialism on the one hand, and to the socialist revolution on the other.) were re-examined in the light of the war's consequences and the resulting international conjuncture.

2. This is what the Minority recognized when it formulated in its unity proposal the conditions which would make it possible. Namely, a) despite the political disagreements there was a political basis shared by the two groups permitting unity, b) to assure a lasting future to the unified party and to prevent as far as possible all risk of subsequent split, the two groups should agree to base unity unequivocally, on the one hand, on the recognition of the majority line as the political expression of the party, that is to say, the subordination of the minority to the discipline of the majority in action, and on the other hand, on the recognition by the majority of the minority's right to discuss without any restriction any and all majority positions inside the party and to have its platform known to workingclass opinion on the occasion of each national gathering of the party.

3. Confronted by this unity proposal clearly formulated by the SWP Minority, the response of the leaderships of the two parties concerned was no less clear in fact. The leadership of the WP accepted the proposal and explicitly agreed to recognize majority discipline as a counterpart to democratic guarantees in the unification process and in the functioning of the unified party. The leadership of the SWP rejected the proposal, tried to justify its refusal by all sorts of sordid maneuvers, redoubled its violence against the minority as "agents of the WP in the party", and, finally, at its last National Convention, rejected all perspective of unity for reasons of fundamental political incompatibility, thus unmasking the hypocrisy of all the formal reasons it had advanced against unity up to then.

4. The decision of the SWP National Convention brought the struggle for unity to a dead end and put off into the future its reconsideration. The question was unexpectedly reopened by the decisions of the CIC. At the same time that it decided to push towards unity of the two parties concerned, despite the resolution of the SWP National Convention, the CIC decided to prepare, convoke and hold an EPC of the movement. Confronted by the decisions of the CIC,

the SWP Minority and the WP had nothing to change in their previous stand. They therefore reiterated their position and resolved to follow step by step the putting in practice of the commitments made by the CIC. However, in view of the recent decisions of the National Convention of the SWP and of the well-known attitude of its leadership, they made it clearly known that unity must be guaranteed by the EPC and had no meaning except as the outcome of a democratic EPC truly representative of the movement. The leadership of the SWP, on the contrary, flung itself into an incredible campaign of lies, maneuvers, violent attacks against the Minority and unfounded allegations about the WP. The maneuver was clear. It was a case of a violent attempt at blackmail aiming to prevent the discussion of unity, force the WP into a bureaucratic unification or, failing this, to prevent unity.

5. If the question of unity, as soon as it was reopened resulted in the greatest confusion, the responsibility lies with a parallel decision of the majority of the CIC, namely not to oppose the leadership of the SWP on any point and to surrender to it the initiative in the regulation of unity. This so-called "diplomatic" (to use the expression of the CIC representative) attitude was in fact devoid of all principle and political realism. It simply showed up the political and moral cowardice of the CIC in the face of the SWP's bureaucratism. It revealed that the CIC had no intention of resolving the question of unity but only intended to make a facade concession ("diplomatic" in its style) to the discontent existing in the movement on the unity question as on so many others. Was this formal concession capled behind the scenes with a dirty bureaucratic maneuver between the CIC and the Martin clique? We do not know and it is scarcely important. The facts speak for themselves. The "diplomacy" of the CIC permitted Martin to conduct his habitual maneuver. He pretended to accept a compromise and betrayed it the next day, then imposing his own solution on his accomplices, active or passive, in the movement. He tried first to "cook up" an immediate unity without discussion and closing the discussion for the EPC. When the Minority had unmasked his bureaucratic maneuver and the WP had declined it, he threw himself into a compensatory double maneuver: to put pressure on the CIC to cook up an EPC which would endorse his plans and to prepare the ground everywhere for a rupture of unity, for the expulsion of the Minority; therefore for the deepening of the split, and even more, for its extension throughout the movement.

6. Faced with the present situation, the Minority limits itself to repeating its initial proposal. Unity of the two groups is possible and necessary on the basis which it has indicated. A bureaucratic solution of unity, be it proposed by the Martin clique or its annex in the CIC, will not be accepted. To bring about the proposed unity, to maintain unity in the movement, it is necessary: 1) to accept the actual political differences as an existing fact throughout the movement and to attempt to promote a political solution by means of discussion; 2) to guarantee, along with the discipline of the majority line in action, the democratic functioning of the party--that is to say, a permanent guarantee of the right to expression and to polemic of minorities, be it inside the party or before working class opinion when necessary (national gatherings, etc.); 3) specifically, to prepare unity of the two parties concerned by a common political discussion and a common practical collaboration, despite political differences; and this in the ranks as well as at the top; 4) to recognize openly that in the present situation the principal danger for the movement is bureaucratism.

## II. The Plenum Resolutions

1. The S.P. Minority is astonished at not having received all the resolutions issued by the last Plenum of the CIC. It is an unprecedented action in the annals of our movement to send such or such a resolution to such or such a group or political tendency according to the pleasure of the responsible organism. The Minority is equally astonished at not having received to this day any letter in reply to its letter to the CIC, sent for consideration by the Plenum, - a reply which had nevertheless been announced in the Resolutions.

2. The Minority protests indignantly against the pretexts of security which the CIC employs to try to cover up the bureaucratic maneuvers which it is undertaking together with the Martin clique; to impose such measures on the whole movement without information or discussion on the part of the ranks which the EPC is supposed to represent; in a word, to try to cook up a bureaucratic gathering, lacking any correspondence with the real movement and destined to record purely and simply without effective debate among all the forces of the movement, the factional decisions already reached, without discussion before the movement, by the CIC and the Martin clique.

The Minority is perfectly well aware of the prudence required in connection with gatherings of this type. But it also knows perfectly well how to distinguish between technical preparations and political preparations for such gatherings. Under false colors of security the CIC is preparing the organization and the holding of an EPC under bureaucratic control, which will no more represent the real movement than it will correspond to the requirements of the present political conjuncture. The Minority protests this attempt and herewith records every reservation on the validity of such a gathering.

3. The Minority protests once more against the "preliminary condition" imposed for participation in the EPC. It denounces anew its arbitrariness, its bureaucratism and its unprecedented character. The more events develop, the more clearly it appears that this preliminary condition constitutes, in the dubious hands of the Martin clique, one more maneuver worthy of low-grade Machiavellianism.

The Minority records that the Plenum did not bother to furnish any answer to the criticisms raised up on various sides against such a condition, limiting itself in a typically bureaucratic manner, to renewing, without explanation, the demand for this condition, at the same time accepting with an absurdity which condemns it, the participation of the IKD in the EPC despite the refusal of the latter to accept such a decision.

4. The S.P. Minority protests against the obscurity which is deliberately maintained with regard to the method of convoking the EPC. Who will convoke it? And when? The commitment made by the IS representative to convoke it only in agreement with minorities on the basis of a democratic preparation recognized as such by all -- is this still in effect? Or does it only constitute an idle proposal, like so many others?

5. The Minority protests indignantly against the method of

representation proposed by the Plenum. Its formulation appears mysterious, but its import is only too clear. First a geographic representation, function of the "importance" of the countries under consideration. Such a method of division is completely foreign to the traditions not only of our movement but of every democratic movement. But if the principle is surprising, its application is even more so. Why, for example, include, and in the foreground, the USSR and China, where our forces are nonexistent or verifiable only with difficulty? Doubtless their representatives to the EPC will enlighten us on the character of the projected maneuver. By what criteria are Italy and Indo-China judged less important, from the point of view of the political situation, than France or China? What, from the same point of view, the only worthwhile one, justifies a different classification for Cuba than for Chile, for Peru than for Bolivia, for Uruguay than for Argentina, for Palestine than for Holland?

The numerical distribution is not less unjustifiable. Is it necessary to recall preconditions for representation as elementary as 1) the past development of each section; 2) the local conditions and possibilities for propaganda and recruitment, from which <sup>one</sup> can judge the real extents of its roots; 3) the relative importance of each section in proportion to the population and the economic co-efficient of the country? Such recollections are obviously disagreeable to the Martin clique, for, from this angle of reality, the New Zealand group appears far behind the French, not to speak at all of a Latin-America group like Cuba, for example. Who, moreover, will control the alleged figures? Will they not be the same ones who dare to propose these discriminatory measures? Shall we admit, without discussion or control, the myth, nourished by the Martin clique, of the 2000 members of the New Zealand group (who in reality comprise 900 effective members plus 250 to 300 members "on the books")?

The method of minority representation constitutes a scandal against the revolutionary tradition, above all in the actual circumstances. A minority as such, that is to say, as a political entity, has a right to political representation. It is only secondarily that its representation varies with its numerical importance. Then, it is one of the contentions of the minorities that the systematic functioning of the New Zealand group, and under its pressure, of the movement as a whole on the level of monolithic bureaucratism, have for a long time completely distorted the process of representation of political currents. In this respect the procedure is simple and well-known in the social-democratic, syndicalist and Zinoviev-Stalinist tradition, of which the Martin clique constitutes the worthy successor in our movement. Where the bureaucratic clique can directly exercise the power of its machine, it imposes a mechanical control on the party, reserves for the central apparatus all initiative, and systematically imposes upon the party a functioning from top to bottom without ever tolerating its functioning from bottom to top. The measures of the central apparatus are never proposals, but decisions. They are never presented to the ranks to be discussed, but to be executed. Any opposition, from the moment it appears, is immediately violently denounced as a peril to the party, distorted, broken and stifled by means of isolation and organizational and personal repression. The rank and file is trained by systematic pressure to pervert its party patriotism into a clan partisanship. When the opposition, undiscouraged, persists it is subjected to new tribulations, its rights in the party are denied on the pretext of disloyalty, its leaders are deprived of all functions, at the same time being accused of sabotaging party work



(work which is made impossible for them by a calculated atmosphere of systematic hostility and of unremitting slander); they are finally expelled in order to decapitate the tendency, which itself is not long in following, if it continues to prove viable. When, on the contrary, the bureaucratic clique cannot put its machine directly into action in the brother sections, it puts everything to work, particularly the democratic functioning of the corresponding section to encourage artificially there the birth or development of factions on no matter what basis, and at the price of no matter what compromise in order to sabotage the party work there, to encourage the tactics of blackmail and split.

It is in this way that the Martin clique, by a series of systematically conceived measures, prevents all normal functioning of the party and all development of political controversy, denounces the latter in its gross ignorance as disloyal attacks, outlaws the opposition, deprives it of all legitimate expression of its platform in the meetings and publications of the party and in the movement in general; finally reduces it, according to the typical expression of Martin, to the rank of "second-class citizen", and so to speak, of virtual expellees. At the same time it deprives the other groups of objective information and unduly controls their functioning by all sorts of means, overt or covert. And that is the state of affairs which the Plenum Resolutions purely and simply sanctions.

Another impermissible decision is the prohibition of proxy representation. This is likewise contrary to all the traditions of the revolutionary movement, which is always confronted by great material difficulties which become insurmountable without recourse to such methods as proxy representation in this specific case. Such a decision obviously has no other aim but to confine participation in the meeting only to representatives of those groups which have the financial possibility, and we know what that means. This method of pressure, always scandalously exercised by the Martin clique, is today cynically approved as a result of the CIC decision.

In conclusion, it is plain to see what is the meaning of the Plenum resolution on the method of representation to the EPC. It is a question, contrary to all tradition, to all reality, to all democracy, of assuring in advance an automatic majority to the bureaucratic combination of the Martin clique and to reduce the political deliberations to a simple rubber-stamping formality. And one is no longer astonished at the repugnant details of all these bureaucratic manipulations when one learns that S., non-member of the Plenum, but executive agent of the Martin clique, was rushed to the Plenum to notify it of the plans arrived at by the clique and to have them underwritten.

6. The Minority protests against the deliberately and needlessly clandestine character imposed on the EPC. It has already thoroughly marked the distinction between security tasks which the convocation imposes -- technical problems which can be easily resolved -- and the deliberate refusal, veiled under this pretext, to deal with the political tasks which the present international conjuncture imposes on us. In an historic moment of political confusion, when different political movements struggle to attract and retain attention of world opinion when an already moribund movement like the ILP tries to reassemble the socialist left on the historic perspective of the Socialist

United States of Europe, the CIC, under the pressure of the Martin clique, tries to transform a gathering of the importance of the EPC into a bureaucratically organized meeting, to remove it, not only from the control of the very movement which it is supposed to represent but, more serious still, if that is possible, from the control of world working class opinion. The bureaucratization of the organs in charge is already such that it refuses to submit the debates of the movement to the normal and necessary pressure of working class opinion, choosing once more the sterile alternative of confronting it with a manifesto cooked up at the top and in unjustified secrecy.

7. The Minority protests against the refusal of the CIC to invite other groups other than those of the Movement to the EPC. At a time when the Movement, thrown into isolation as a general consequence of the war and particularly of its war policy should be doing everything to attract the attention and adherence of revolutionary militants outside, the CIC deliberately maintains it in a sectarian isolation in order to preserve control by the bureaucratic machine. This refusal betrays the incapacity of the CIC and of the majority elements to constitute themselves into a revolutionary center of attraction obliging the maximum number of elements susceptible to influence to engage in political discussion. It expresses their incapacity and their fear to discuss political positions, which have become untenable, with other currents of the workers' movement. It is needless to add that such a decision is contrary to the constant tradition not only of our Movement, but of revolutionary Marxism in general.

8. The Minority records the fact that the CIC has not up to the present organized any general discussion. It has been content to publish pell-mell and arbitrarily a heterogeneous collection of articles, without consultation with minorities and without any consideration for the ignorance systematically imposed for many years about minority positions, which continue as a general rule to be unknown in the Movement. More than this, the CIC has not up to the present published any theses or resolutions expressing officially the majority line, whereas such documents should be submitted to discussion in the Movement at least six months before the convocation of the EPC. We repeat, the pretended democratic discussion, except for the partial publication of certain minority positions which were arbitrarily selected, has up to now been the only occasion for an outpouring of majority texts which have already for years enjoyed a practical monopoly in the organs of the Movement.

9. The SWP Minority protests against the conditional admission of one of the parties concerned in the unification, the W.P., (Resolution on Unity #3) and against the highly symptomatic character of such an article. While all the Plenum's resolutions lead to and deliberately aim at mutilating in advance the representative character of the EPC, its sovereign powers and capacity for initiative, the only point on which the Plenum demands the EPC's decision is the above-mentioned party's right of representation. Nothing serves better to show up the low maneuvering character of this series of resolutions than the exceptional nature of the article concerning this party.

10. The SWP Minority protests -- once again -- against the Plenum's proposal to "close" all organized discussion after the EPC, against the ambiguous formulation of such a proposal, finally against the proposed rules for an eventual resumption of the discussion. The CIC -- or some other organism of the Movement -- can intervene in this domain, and at that under the statutory control of the sections only within in well-defined limits -- namely, to open or close and formally regulate (but not as to its gist) a discussion in view of this or that meeting of the Movement. If that is what the CIC means by closing all "organized discussion", it is a question of a banal truism accepted as a matter of course and which has never been expressed by writing in any resolution. But we know it is not a question of this, but of forbidding any kind of discussion, after the EPC (and naturally the formation of any political current or tendency resulting from such a discussion) on the theses, resolutions and other political texts emerging from the EPC both outside and inside the Movement. We have plainly stated, and we repeat here, that such a claim is illegitimate, inadmissible, generally speaking and particularly in the international conjuncture born of the war. Any organic agreement and all normal relations between majority and minority in any democratic movement have as their fundamental precondition -- unconditionally and previously -- the right of the minority to discuss the majority's positions inside the party. No organism -- CIC, EPC, or any other -- no majority may destroy such a right, which is at the very root of the democratic functioning of any movement, and whose destruction signifies the destruction of democracy in the movement and its replacement by a growing process of bureaucratic monolithism. The Minority has several times made it known -- particularly to the IS representative -- that in no case would it accept such a decision. Today it adds, in the light of the real state of the Movement and of recent experience, that it will not accept the EPC's decisions unless they contain specific provisions guaranteeing the right of discussion without limitation and the right of political tendencies to exist within the Movement.

11. The Minority scornfully rejects the Plenum's infamous resolution on comrades M. and J. Nothing betrays better than such a resolution the CIC's servility towards the Martin clique. The "political" solidarity which binds these two groups together was not involved in this question. The Minority had submitted to the Movement a quantity of facts proving the bureaucratic regime of the Party. Independently of the Minority's action, it is proved by the facts themselves, such as the suppression of Minority documents, the cynical admission of S., organizing secretary of the party, that the minority comrades were treated in the party like "second-class citizens", etc. The CIC representative himself recognized on several occasions that the attitude of the party leadership towards the opposition was inadmissible. In spite of these facts, and of the openly monolithic character of the last National Convention (of which the Plenum dares, with indecent effrontery, to invoke "the almost unanimous agreement") the CIC condemns exclusively and onesidely the expelled comrades, without investigation, and without a single word of criticism or blame for the Martin clique. ("We are not strong enough to attack the leadership of this party", according to the shameful formula thoughtlessly proffered by the representative of the IS)

The pretended restoration of the expelled comrades' rights until the EPC has turned out to be a degrading, demagogic comedy like all the rest. These comrades are excluded from all participation in the life of the party to which they belong, and, through the Plenum's provisions, from the preparation and holding of the EPC.

The demand for readmission into the SWP promised and guaranteed by the CIC representative, has of course received no reply -- which is equivalent to a practical refusal -- from the professional liars of the Martin clique.

The Minority is practically deprived of all its rights in the party. Its regime is a regime of exception in the strict sense of the term. The so-called discussion to prepare for the EPC is a degrading parody which reproduces all the maneuverist behavior of a bureaucratic clique. The few, carefully organized meetings are solely aimed at allowing the Martin clique to continue warping and inflaming the militants' minds against the Minority, while the latter are deprived of such rights as would allow them to reply. A practice of this kind is equivalent to an actual expulsion of the Minority, and at the same time it demoralizes the whole party.

Once again we reply to those who would dispute the truth of these facts with our previous proposal: let an investigation commission be set up, provided with sufficient conditions of objectivity, to inform the Movement as to the real situation of the party.

The mere perusal of the CIC's texts exposes, even in their form, this organism's degrading conduct and its discriminating attitude in the Movement. The German comrades are "given orders", the French leadership is "criticized" at every step, the English leadership is "given advice", and before taking any resolution whatever that concerns the Martin clique, its "consent is asked". This base and arrogant attitude, mirroring the relationship of forces in the capitalist world, does not belong to the revolutionary tradition and must be rejected with disgust.

### III. The CIC - what it is - where it is headed-

The CIC was born of the famous Preconference. What was the latter's aim? After the forced interruption of connexions imposed by the war and the paralysis imposed for years into the bargain on the functioning of the Movement leadership by the Martin clique, an urgent task had to be accomplished. Contacts had to be re-established, there was the whole activity of the Movement since the last Congress to be examined, and the prospect for the immediate future had to be decided. That is to say, concretely, a first meeting had to be fixed and provisional organisms named, charged with organizing an ample discussion that would represent all the currents belonging to the Movement, and as soon as the unfolding of the discussion allowed for it, a general meeting had to be prepared in which the Movement's political line for the next two years would be decided.

What actually happened? The Minority urgently demanded the convocation of this meeting, while the Martin clique, not at all inclined to give an account of itself, opposed it with a hesitant, passive attitude. Then, with contacts re-established, the clique ascertained

the weakness of the Movement as a result of the war, the destruction of most of the old European cadres, the weakness and lack of education of the sections, and, more than anything else, the terrible pressure which Stalinism, consolidated by its military victory, was exercising on Europe. It understood that a manoeuvre favorable to itself was possible, and decided on it. Suddenly a meeting was called, without informing the Movement, with no previous discussion, leaving the members of the old leadership of the Movement in ignorance, and on the sole basis of the Martin clique's manoeuvres behind the Movement's back. No sooner was this meeting convoked than it decided without further ado to transform itself into a political Congress, published a political Manifesto, adopted various measures of a political kind affecting the Movement, and finally names some organisms which instead of being provisional were invested with political and administrative powers. The Movement looked on at this spectacle, of which it is hard to know whether it was more degrading than irresponsible, the spectacle of a "conference" manoeuvred and convoked "conspiratively"; without instruction, discussion or previous agenda, conducted according to the rules of the most canonical bureaucratism and ending in that incredible, still born Manifesto of unfortunate memory which events promptly refuted.

The only argument invoked up till now to attempt to justify this accomplished fact is that the delegates to the conference represented more sections than had been the case during the preceding meeting. This argument is both false in fact and valueless in its purpose. The Minority immediately declared that the "conference" constituted a political and moral swindle without precedent in the Movement. It declared that until a meeting, preceded by an ample discussion on past activity and on the problems of the near future, and representing all the political trends in the Movement, was seriously called and held, it would refuse to recognize the appointed organisms, not only, of course, under a political and administrative heading, but even as provisional organisms of the Movement. The Minority explicitly renews today this double declaration.

Since its appointment, the CIC has not only exercised political and organizational powers that do not belong to it, but, in this exercise, has constantly imposed on the movement a deliberate policy of accomplished facts, publishing political declarations and taking political measures without previous consultation with the sections or discussion, by means of clandestine manoeuvres coordinated with the Martin clique whose outside agent it has practically become.

The only argument invoked to support such an attitude is that the CIC would be upheld by the majority in the Movement. We question this affirmation on two grounds. No effective consultation of the Movement allows of proving this affirmation, which therefore in point of fact rests only on the bureaucratic manipulations of the CIC. On the other hand, even if this affirmation were arithmetically true, it would be worthless, since such a majority would only be based on a lack of exact information, a lack of discussion, the suppression of contributions from oppositionist trends. Actually, what this kind

\* The secrecy of the "conspiracy" worked very well against the Movement, which was left in ignorance of everything until confronted with the accomplished facts, but not against its enemies as experience proved.

of argument exposes is the process now under way in the Movement, inspired by the CIC, of a conception which is full-blown already in the New Zealand party, where the Martin clique has been imposing it for years: namely, bureaucratic monolithism, with its natural counterpart, plebiscitary majorities. Unfortunately our apprentice bureaucrats are on the whole still young, mediocre and without authority in power. They content themselves, for the times being, with making the most of the losses, weakness and confusion of the Movement. Unfortunately, though they can achieve nothing positive, these characteristics of the Movement allow them to keep it in a state of crisis.

Immediately after the "conference", the crisis, far from lessening, became sensibly worse, as one might easily have expected. Nothing had been solved and everything was getting worse. The celebrated Manifesto had scarcely been published before it was hastily mended and refurbished on the most important question of the international conjuncture (relations with the USSR). The refurbishments turned out naturally to be cheap-jack stuff. The usual zig-zags of a leadership with no political compass to guide it became all at once more laborious, more contorted and...more necessary. The national and democratic struggle and its revolutionary consequences, which had been overlooked or deformed, suddenly became, thanks to the "dialectic" genius of comrade Germain, the "first wave of the European revolution" (poor ersatz of the "imminent proletarian revolution" so constantly proclaimed...on paper, but pitilessly postponed...by the logic of events.) The CIC realized that it was not so easy to make the Movement believe that the moon is made of green cheese, or mistake accomplished facts for the results of democratic discussion, or accept their elucubrations as the contemporary expression of Marxism. It began to be vaguely aware that it was not being taken seriously. It finally recognized -- seemingly -- that the minorities' demands had some "raison d'etre". It therefore decided to "organize" the preparation and holding of an EPC (10 years after the preceding one!) and the accomplishment of the required unity.

A CIC representative was given the task of informing the Movement. His attitude, to say the least of it, was queer, at least in a Movement which is supposed to function democratically. His conversations with the New Zealand representatives were numerous, long, and in the way of their kind, truly "conspirative". His interviews with the minority representatives were few and formal. He always refused to put in writing the statements he made to them and the pledges he took with them. His affirmations were contradicted by the New Zealand representatives the very day after he proffered them. He then refused to confirm them on the pretext that he had to keep up a "diplomatic attitude" towards the New Zealanders. All these arguments led up to an attempt to convince the minorities' representatives that no possible solution would come to anything unless it were favorable to the New Zealanders, "who are the strongest at present" and "who are, besides, the only ones to give material aid to controlling organisms of the Movement". In the face of such strange "arguments", it was only too natural for the minorities' representatives to appear more and more reserved. They wondered, with some amazement tempered by experience, what kind of dish would result from the combined efforts of such skilful "cooks."

The dish has been served up piping hot, but savory for stronger stomachs than ours. It has come in the form of the last Plenum's Resolutions and the Remarks of S. and C. on unity, analysed above.

Unaccustomed to such strong spices -- foreign to the Movement's traditions -- the Minority rejects them resolutely and wholesale.

The Minority had imposed on itself, as a matter of principle, and still does, not to take any definitive decision before the preparation and democratic holding of a general meeting of the Movement, or before the CIC had plainly refused either to accede to such a demand or to satisfy it effectively. Since the Plenum's resolutions and the Martin clique's attitude towards unity, it has become clear that such a demand will never receive satisfaction, to the extent that this depends on the CIC. For its part, the Minority considers it useless to carry on any direct negotiations whatsoever on this point either with the Martin clique or with its branch establishment of the CIC. The CIC's facade manoeuvre regarding unity and the EPC has deceived nobody and has at least had the advantage of bringing things into the clear.

In order to defend and continue its policy of bureaucratic usurpation, the CIC has decided to either adjourn the EPC indefinitely or to "cook it up" in an irresponsible meeting, at the price of the disintegration of the Movement. To keep its hold, it must continue and it does continue its policy of prestige and outward show, systematically failing to inform the Movement, or, worse still, misinforming it. It continues its irresponsible partisan policy, overwhelming with criticism and difficulties the French party, the only branch of the Movement which shows any vitality today, and refusing to intervene on any point against the Martin clique and its perversion of revolutionary Marxism's political principles and organizational methods. It continues its policy of monolithism, and necessarily because of this, its zig-zags, constraining the real complexity of events at the price of scandalous silences or deformations, smothering the real divergences in the Movement at the price of bureaucratic combinations and the suppression of minority opinions, and is naturally constantly obliged to modify its proclamations and prognostications (without admitting it) so as to run after events. It continues its policy of verbal radicalism and real impotence, fearing discussion and prostituting Marxist analysis on the level of affirmations of empty generalities, with no grasp on events ("we believe in socialism" -- "we are living in the era of socialist revolution" -- "we are going towards imperialist world war number three" and other "revelations" of this calibre.) It continues its monopolist ultimatum and blackmail operations: "I am the Movement. You accept the rules which suit me, or you won't belong any more". For these reasons it is led, not only to approve silently of the system of material and moral corruption practised by the Martin clique, but to take an active part in it. It finally inaugurates a policy of typically bureaucratic combinations with the sectarian-defeatist minority in the Movement, with purely electoral aims, while at the same times it begins trying to draw near to the capitulationist group of the Revue Internationale. Thus it loses its one argument, that of "political homogeneity", which the Martin clique is always repeating, and which the Minority, in any case, had always taken at its proper value: zero.

What all this policy masks, what it feeds on, but also what it aggravates and nourishes, is the weakness and decay of the Movement. But the CIC at once precipitates and stabilises this decay by its policy of sectarian isolation outside the Movement and of bureaucratism tending to monolithism within it. What is really very serious in this



even more so than the moral baseness of these proceedings, is their political consequence: the Marxist analysis is perverted and replaced by dead formulas; schematism and messiahism become the sole criteria of judgment in face of the facts; naturally, routine and passivity are deepened by this; as a consequence of which, the systematic deformation and falsification of the facts inside and outside the Movement become a current method. Such a line admits of no opposition. Its fatal tendency and inherent political centrism push it forcibly to condemn the latter and eliminate it on a deliberately equivocal basis. That the Martin clique and its allied or dupes of the CIC are aiming at today is no longer the sabotage of unification or the expulsion of the minorities: it is, much more than that, the capitulation of the French majority or the split of the French party and the statutory imposition of a bureaucratic control on the Movement.

#### IV. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

There is only one effective reaction to the attitude of the Martin clique and the CIC, the single one to which they are sensitive: this is the direct pressure of the Movement. The bureaucratization process is much less advanced in the Movement than in the New Zealand party. Such a reaction must show itself in an organized manner. In order to understand the need and urgency, we have still to become aware of a certain number of facts:

1) The sections must free themselves of the fantastic picture they have been given of the New Zealand party. The Martin clique has felt with a really bureaucratic keenness the impression which this party, that has not suffered from the war, has made on the sections that were so badly shaken by the latter, having the greater part of their cadres destroyed and their whole make-up renewed. Instead of bringing this impression down to its proper proportions -- an elementary internationalist duty -- the Martin clique has been making the most of it and has started to "puff up" the party systematically in spite of reality. The party has not more than 900 members plus 250 to 300 members on the books. The 2000 members are purely and simply a lie. The "turn-over" in the membership is very high, analogous to that of the CP during the Third Period. The result has been a party of bureaucratized or passive cadres and recently recruited young militants with no information as to the past, no political education no experience of democratic functioning. The recruiting is systematically aimed at what Martin calls "raw workers", that is to say those who have not previously been organized. Most of the new-recruits leave during the first few weeks after their joining. Education is practically nil, as the members themselves admit. In such measure as anything is organized on this plane, in the form of courses on "basic Marxism", it perverts the mind of the members, trying to justify the bureaucratic and schematic conceptions of the Martin clique at the price of ignorance or deliberate falsifications of texts and facts. The cadres of functionaries are too numerous in proportion to the effective forces and the work carried out. And this is not by chance. If they have been reduced since a year ago, it is purely for constraining financial reasons. The material resources do not reflect the real state of the party. Outside of any other considerations, they express the relatively high level of salaries and Martin's administrative capacities on this plane. What is more important: they are shared out according to the arbitrariness of the Martin clique without any organized control by either the party or the Movement. The trade

union cadres are far less important than the Martin clique tries to make people believe. Their importance in the trade unions is negligible relatively speaking, comparatively less, for example, than that of the French party or the Cuban group. What is much more important, they function in the trade unions and keep themselves in them not as revolutionary political militants, but as "progressive" trade unionists, and by means of bureaucratic combinations with cadres that are either progressive reformist or, above all Stalinist. The faults which were pointed out on this subject by Trotsky in 1940 have become, since his death, the guiding and dominant norm in the party and its trade union work. The result has been a radical deviation from any political orientation of the party, its practical inactivity on all other planes, except for some "symbolic" acts; which allows, on the other hand, the leading clique to hide the real weakness of the party. But we do not propose to undertake here an exhaustive analysis of the party's situation. We will stop at these fundamental indications.

Two final observations. a) As a result of these characteristics, of the evolution undergone since 1940, of the struggle against the Minority and the perspective of unification, the party is in a grave state of crisis. In the bureaucratic atmosphere, this crisis hardly shows itself openly. Conversely, it clearly appears in an indirect manner in the unstable recruitment of the party, the uninterrupted resignations and the reasons which cause them. That is why the Martin clique will always refuse to specify, with the possibility of control, the party losses, to give a serious analysis of the reasons for them and to publish the letters of resignation.

b) The Minority freely admits that the above facts and appreciations may be disputed by the comrades. It limits itself to demanding on this point, once again, an investigation commission representative of the Movement. That is an objective and traditional solution in our Movement.

2) We must also get rid of a defect which is common to groups, trends or comrades opposed to the machinations and/or the line of the Martin clique and the CIC. We are not speaking here of an opposition of a properly political character. We have never neglected this fundamental aspect. The Minority believes that it has adopted a political position each time it believed this necessary, without any opportunist anxiety (to take only two examples: on the question of the Labor Party in relation to our English comrades, or on the Russian question in relation to our French comrades.). But it also recognized the importance, the autonomy and the political character, of organizational problems. It is therefore a matter even of groups or comrades who while sharing "grosso modo" the "political" perspectives of the Martin clique, are worried at seeing, or refuse to see it imposing itself on the Movement at the price of such proceedings, really at the price of a bureaucratisation of the Movement.

The Minority reproaches these groups or comrades for accepting the policy of accomplished facts of the Martin clique and the CIC in a spirit of mistaken legalism. Faced with such a crass manoeuvre as the convocation without discussion of the Preconference and its unjustifiable transformation into a conference, faced with the Plenum's Resolutions, with the Martin clique's pure and simple refusal of unification, the correct attitude is criticism of some detail or other

and acceptance of the whole, as if one were dealing with a legal majority functioning normally. We believe that the Minority's attitude in rejecting these ultimatums in principle is both the only correct attitude and the only efficient one. The mistaken and scandalous character of this or that manoeuvre or directive has its own importance. But what is much more important is the whole willed mass of this way of acting, inadmissible in principle. We are dealing with a bureaucratic bloc which is trying to strengthen itself and strengthen its control on the Movement by bureaucratic means. In face of this, the Majority-minority rule does not work, because it has been violated at the start. In accepting to respect the rule despite everything, these groups and comrades are giving way to the ultimatumist blackmail and monopolist pretensions of the bureaucratic bloc and strengthening it. And this with no valid reason. Quite the contrary. This is not the way to avoid the disintegration of the Movement. It speeds it up. We urgently demand of the groups and comrades that they put an end to this veritable masochism of misunderstood legality and purely and simply reject the Plenum's Resolutions.

3) We have to get rid of the "mass party" superstition and the harmful, demagogic role which such a concept plays in the Movement. Unfortunately, the Martin clique, itself half-dupe, gets a generally favorable hearing on this question in the Movement. This is not the place to point out why and how this concept is so false and contradictory when applied to the functions of a vanguard socialist party. The important point is the unreality of the conception in fact and the demagogic role which it has been playing in the hands of certain bands (Molinier, Martin) during all these years of being insistently propagated in the Movement. In the name of the requirements of a mass party, the contents and level of the party's political life, its principles and forms of organization and its general structure, its composition and cadres, are perverted and corrupted. For this very reason, naturally, far from leading to a "mass party", the development of the vanguard socialist party becomes paralysed and deformed. Because of this, more and more abundant recourse is had, on the political plane, to schematism and messiahism, on the practical plane to routine and passivity, masked with pseudo-revolutionary verbalism, in short, to forms of activity which allow the party's real weakness to be disguised while such forms as would expose it are refused. Such a state of things finally leads up to the situation of the New Zealand party, an ossified sect, going from one crisis to another, scoffed at and despised in those sections of the workers movement that know of its existence and this not without reason, since the rooted habits of its leadership are known: dishonesty, lies, brutality, a bureaucratic attitude even in the trade unions, a policy of prestige and bluff. In this case it is not the party's weakness which stands in the way -- in the first place -- of the Movement's progress, but its stagnation, the corruption of its leadership and the fact of the split situation.

4) Lastly we must particularly stress so as to combat it, the maniacal animosity which makes the Martin clique oppose political discussion at every turn (a derogatory epithet is invariably added) to the "demands of practical work". Such an opposition -- purely artificial -- is directly borrowed from the demagogic arsenal of Stalinist methods. It is the most negative symptom of the Martin clique's impotence to solve political problems and of their dishonest recourse to "practical" arguments, which the balance of results contradicts at every step.

As if the confusion of ideas and things which spreads into all domains and all circles -- even into the Marxist vanguard -- as if the commotion introduced everywhere as a result of the war, did not obviously place among the first necessities of practical tasks a constant political discussion that would allow us to adapt our program, our perspectives and our tactics to the course of events! As if in a Marxist movement, political discussion had ever harmed practical work (or vice versa)! As if the whole history of the Bolshevik party, which we look to for inspiration, were not a living slap in the face to the bureaucratic imbecility of such an opposition!

5) The central problem before all of us today (and which had been there before us for the last two years already, without drawing our general attention) is the political rearming of the Movement and its conditions. Our organizational tasks will spring naturally from this (which is not to say automatically.)

It is a matter of examining all the varied problems facing us in function of the historical situation in which the war has placed us. It is in vain that the "majoritists" presume to shut these problems up in a purely formal frame; see in them nothing but questions linked with organizational relations; thus reducing political reality to organizational police tasks, to simple questions of "discipline". This typically bureaucratic presentation ~~ought~~ not to deceive anybody. As for its initiators in the Movement they are certainly not deceived. This is an old war-weapon for them.

On the contrary, the Minority has always tried to analyse the crisis of the Movement in the light of the international situation born of the war, of the radical modification thus introduced in the relation of forces, and of the re-evaluation which this imposes on all political problems. That is why our overall task has been defined as a political rearmament. Then, in function of this political task, the Minority has defined the forms of organisation -- after all, traditional in the Movement -- which would allow it to come out successfully. Finally, in order to contribute to this task, it is presenting a political platform. It hopes to win over the majority in the Movement, in conjunction with the opposition to the Martin-CIC trend, if the discussion is given the place which belongs to it, that is to say, the first place, and if the exchange of political ideas is allowed free interplay over and above any other consideration. To practice an ostrich policy in the face of the Movement's crisis, to try and smother it instead of solving it progressively -- as the Martin clique and the CIC do -- betrays their incapacity not only to solve but even to rise to the level of the tasks of our present epoch.

This is why the bureaucratic operation of the bloc composed of the Martin clique and the CIC can only lead to the disintegration of the Movement. Their surgical operations weaken it and solve nothing. By the very force of things, the problems which are posed today by this or that minority will be posed tomorrow by other elements. Also all the sections, groups and comrades opposed to this bureaucratic operation must intervene actively and together against the Plenum's resolutions and the new turn taken by the Martin clique on unification. The Minority feels they should propose the following plan for their attention and discussion.

1) It will oppose a counter-resolution to each of the Plenum's Resolutions:

- a) on the preparation of the EPC
- b) on the unification and the last turn of the Martin clique
- c) on the expulsions
- d) on the IKD, demanding an investigation commission on the real situation of the Movement in Germany and Austria.

(The Minority asks for a copy of the counter-resolutions to be sent to it, since if these are contradictory of the Martin clique and the CIC, they will be suppressed as in the past.)

2) They will actively confront the political positions and organisational tasks --without worrying about the Plenum's Resolutions, which are designed to put a brake on the discussion and falsify it. If the CIC prints the texts which are sent in, very well. If it refuses, the discussion will go on without it.

3) It will examine its basis of agreement on this or that point (Russian question as a whole or in this or that aspect -- problem of the party -- democratic guarantees -- question of unity,--etc.) and form a bloc, without trying to hide or conciliate its political differences wherever these exist. We must put an end to the political and moral rottenness of bureaucratic combinations which suppress political debates so as not to shake up their rank and file and replace them with manipulations of the apparatus.

4) They will carry the debate in its double aspect, both political and organisational, to the rank and file and will inform the militants and call upon them to express their feelings.

5) They will follow the present process to its end, intervening against each arbitrary decision, leaving to the bureaucratic bloc the responsibility of its policy of split, but without tolerating any supposedly disciplinary expulsions.

### Conclusion

The SWP Minority has strictly confined itself here to presenting and evaluating the facts in order to reply to the maneuvers of the Martin clique and the CIC on unification and on the preparation of the EPC. However, it would be futile, we have already pointed out, to isolate absolutely this field of organizational problems, not only from their political basis but even, in the wider sense, from the political perspective within which they are situated.

This perspective is essentially determined today, from the socialist standpoint and as a consequence of the war, by the place occupied by and the function of the USSR in the world, and the new international relations resulting therefrom. On this crucial point, the organs of the apparent majority of the Movement are situated at the left wing of international Stalinism, toward which their attitude is that of "critical support". They conduct themselves, to all intents and purposes, as the left wing cover of the imperialist expansion of the bureaucracy. They think they justify this by a repetition of conceptions on the isolation of the USSR and its relations with the international proletariat in the capitalist world, conceptions which the war and what followed it have discarded, upsetting from top to bottom the isolation of the USSR and its relationships with the world proletariat.

On this crucial point, their line has been continuously strengthened in a pro-Stalinist sense. The acceptance of the orientation defined by shoving into the background the defense of the USSR and the shifting into the foreground the defense of the European revolution against Stalinism, was never sincere; it was a purely opportunist maneuver speedily cast aside by the declarations of Martin (in 1945).

Even more, in their struggle against the opposition, the Martin clique and its defensist allies of the CJC have constantly "toughened" their pro-"Soviet" position in the hope of finding a political line and, on the other hand, of burning their bridges to the opposition. It is along this line that the camps within the Movement are being marked off, contrary to the claims of the jumping-jacks like Johnson. It is clear that a resolution which decides to support, no matter how "critically", the international policy of Stalinism, would sound the death-knell of the Movement and mark the deliberate will to split.

The Minority of the SWP