


# YOUNG SOCIALIST

# REVIEW

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NAC DRAFT AMERICAN RESOLUTION

The main characteristics of American social and political life following World War II derive their origin from causes stemming from the cold war between world capitalism (at the head of which stands the United States) and stalinism, and from the accompanying Permanent War Economy. These two factors will continue to influence future developments in a decisive manner, although not in the form of a continuous development of tendencies which have hitherto been dominant. The past period has witnessed a continuous movement in a single direction: in the economy an increase of production and rise in living standards; in social life a growing conservatism and amelioration of social conflict; in politics a strengthening of all forms of bourgeois ideology and their petty bourgeois variants; in public affairs a growth of the Garrison State and an unprecedented attack on civil liberties; in the labor movement the entrenchment of a conservative bureaucracy and decline of militant and left-wing tendencies; among the youth a turn from social to individual interests. Within this context socialism has become an isolated movement, without influence or broad appeal. The prospects for building a socialist movement in the future depend upon a change in the objective economic, social and political conditions now prevailing. This resolution will attempt to establish the basis and nature of such a change, and the tasks and problems that will be posed.

Contrary to the expectations of both capitalist and socialist economists, the American economy did not revert to the condition of semi-paralysis of the pre-war decade following World War II. Instead of unused industrial capacity, a vast expansion of facilities; instead of mass unemployment, over sixty million employed; instead of chronic crisis, an almost continuous boom; instead of mass misery, a general increase in the standard of living. On the basis of this record the defenders of capitalism have claimed that capitalism has overcome its traditional barriers--that it has found ways to prevent depression and insure a continuous improvement in the well-being of the masses of people. With a certain measure of truth it is claimed that the government has been able to maintain economic stability by direct intervention in the economy.

The primary form of such intervention, however, and the one form without which all others would have but slight effect, has been the vast extent of government spending for military purposes and foreign aid. At the height of New Deal "pump priming" the entire government budget never amounted to much over six billion dollars a year. Since 1946, on the other hand, military spending has been at the rate of 10 to 40 billion per year, and at the present time it has stabilized at a figure of about 35 billions. In addition, since 1946 over 50 billions have been spent on foreign aid. The artificial market thus created has served as the outlet for the overproduction of commodities which is the particular characteristic of capitalism, and the origin of its tendency to develop crises.

The origin of present American prosperity is not to be sought, then, in the "exceptional" character of American capitalism as such, but in its internationally derived position as the world organizer of the capitalist struggle against stalinism, and in particular, as the leading military opponent of stalinism. And inasmuch as this primary conflict cannot be eliminated, whatever steps the contending powers may take to bring about a lessening of tension, the Permanent War Economy

can be expected to continue. All discussions of the prospects of the American economy must take into account the fact that military and para-military spending will not cease abruptly, or undergo any significant decline. As long as this is the case, an economic crisis of the depth and degree experienced in 1929 must be excluded. The improbability of such a crisis is not the same as guaranteeing a continuation of present economic conditions. Rather, even with the continuation of the Permanent War Economy, there are indications that the tendency toward overproduction will assert itself. Rather than a general industrial crisis, however, this crisis will most likely take the form of a slowing down in growth, collapse of certain sectors of industry (most prominently the consumers goods industries), a moderate but growing number of unemployed, etc. There are indications that in the past period the conditions for such a decline have been accumulating. While military spending continues to provide an important sustaining effect, it has ceased to be the source of expansion. Instead, the expansion of economic activity in the immediate past period has been based upon those "normal" means which become prominent during periods of capitalist upswing, but which eventually exhaust themselves and become sources of collapse.

The first of these means is private business spending on improving efficiency by introduction of machinery. In this area, the most spectacular development is the widespread introduction of automation, the aim of which is not only to reduce labor costs, but to eliminate labor completely, wherever this is possible. While the degree of displacement remains concealed while the process is taking place, once the limits imposed by technical development and profitability are reached, the reduction in the working force necessary becomes evident through an increase in unemployment.

The second source of present prosperity is an even more unhealthy sign, namely the enormous expansion of consumer credit. The housing boom, one of the mainstays of the economy, has been financed by a 75 billion dollar mortgage. Autos and household appliances, the other main prop under the civilian economy, have been sold only with the aid of a 30 billion dollar installment credit bill. Particularly in the last year the increase of credit over repayments represents a danger sign for the economy. Another such sign can be seen in the absence of general inflation during a period of business expansion. Only in the speculative market have inflationary tendencies been evident. While the length and durability of the present prosperity cannot be definitely limited, neither can it be excluded that all of these and other factors will assert themselves in the next year or two, with consequences of an important political significance. Whatever the timetable, however, barring a vast increase in military outlays beyond present levels, the American economy must run up against the limits imposed by the inability of the market to absorb the total amount of goods produced under free enterprise conditions.

Since the general condition for business prosperity is the maintenance of profitability, it is necessary to note not only the fact that profits have reached extraordinary levels, but also the form of their distribution. Even during a period of general prosperity, it has been the largest, most advanced and highly monopolized industries which have been the leading beneficiaries. And in the past three years it is those corporations which have increased their share of the total profits from 69 to 81 per cent.\* The struggle of smaller business to

\*These corporations represent the 3,440 corporations (out of about 500,000) which own 50 per cent of total assets.

maintain themselves, and of large corporations to increase their profits, has led in the past period to a wave of mergers, the sole effect of which is to carry further the high degree of concentration already dominant in all major sectors of industry, and a decline in the relative economic (and hence social) importance of small and medium-sized enterprises. A similar trend, although at a slower pace, has been taking place in the agricultural sphere, where the family farm is being continually replaced by capitalist type "factories in the fields" which are completely entangled in the net of control exercised by finance capital, and hence entirely dependent upon the maintenance of general prosperity, to provide a market. In addition, as a relatively "free" and competitive area, agriculture depends also upon direct governmental subsidy through the price-fixing and crop-limitation programs.

The situation in American agriculture is significant, not of the general success which necessarily attends state intervention in the economy (which in this case is derived from the political power of a small group due to its widespread geographical distribution, and the over-representation of farmers and rural population in our electoral system), but of the basic acceptance of the intimate relation between government policy and economic life, and the transformation of political life which this acceptance implies. For if we cannot expect a sudden and catastrophic collapse of the economy, we can be sure that even a moderate, limited decline in the economy will produce important political consequences. It is such a decline that we expect. Particularly if it should assume a chronic form, the most profound change in the character of political life would occur. With this, it is necessary to turn to an analysis of the major political forces in America, always keeping in mind the basic problems which will be posed by an economic recession.

For twenty years the Democratic party maintained itself in power by claiming to stand for the interests of the "little people" as against the selfish and reactionary interests of big business represented by the Republican party. Standing firmly for the maintenance of capitalism, and defending it against both international threats and attacks by the American workers, it nevertheless sought to overcome the past flagrant injustices of capitalism as a means of restoring confidence in a system overcome by depression. Thus it enacted a series of social welfare measures, sought and succeeded in harnessing a militant labor movement by making it a "partner," and campaigned against economic royalists, big business and the Republican party. Very early in its career it exhausted the resources of a social reform program available to a capitalist party, limiting itself henceforth mainly to appeals to special groups (farmers, Negroes, organized labor) on behalf of very limited appeals, but particularly to the deep and widespread fears of depression and misery which the Republican party was the focus of. The depth of these fears was proved in 1948 when Truman played upon them with consummate skill. Fifteen years of war and war-spending induced prosperity, together with the inability of the Democratic Party to go beyond its early program, served both to weaken the basis of its negative appeal, and dissipate its political capital as the party of progress and social advance.

The election of the Eisenhower Republican administration signified the restoration of confidence, particularly by the middle classes, in the stability of the system, and the political fitness of big business to resume direct control of the state. The administration responded by installing a business man's government, rewarding special interests by a whole series of legislative measures (tax reduction for the rich,

give-away programs for national resources, administrative rulings hampering the labor movement, etc.) and otherwise attempting to give free sway to its business supporters. Yet despite this blatant favoritism, the significant aspect of the Republican return to power was that it did not seek the revocation of any basic New Deal measures, contrary to the Fnd hopes of its more reactionary wing, and in a few insignificant sectors (minimum wage legislation) even presented the appearance of carrying on a program of reform under the slogan of "dynamic conservatism." In the field of public power, while it abstained from expanding government owned facilities, and sought indirectly to undermine the position of TVA, it quickly retreated on Dixon-Yates rather than fight for the "principle" of free enterprise. Thus, in their cautious and timid way, Eisenhower's policies recognized the extremely tentative and hesitant degree of confidence invested in his party, which publically admits the degree to which its success depends upon not its program, but its individual leader.

In its failure to develop the "maximum program" of big business (which is expounded in the latest report of the Hoover Commission) the Republican party has recognized the fact of its tenuous position as the majority party (a position reversed only two years later in the congressional elections of 1954) but it has also revealed its own lack of confidence in the factors which restored it to power, namely the bases of the current prosperity. It understands that its tenure depends upon the perpetuation of prosperity; even the specter of a depression in the form of a sharp rise in unemployment would undercut its political position. There is every indication that the Republican party is prepared to undertake major steps to bolster any economic decline. Thus it is preparing a major road building program, talks about expansion of public works, etc. In preparing such measures, the government recognizes the truth of a leading "elder statesman" that "our way of life" could not survive either a war or another depression. And while such a consciousness cannot prevent the occurrence of either, it will determine the approach of the bourgeoisie in the initial stages of a recession.

Government policy in the face of a recession would be influenced not only by domestic considerations of minimizing its social effects, but also upon its international political position vis a vis stalinism. Even five million unemployed would constitute a powerful political deficit in America's propaganda in Western Europe and Asia, and one which would be quickly exploited by native anti-capitalist and stalinist movements against the United States.

If military spending excludes a major collapse, and the government is prepared to combat any recession, it does not follow that such a recession can be successfully surmounted, or be accompanied by only minor political consequences. Objectively, any form of economic intervention would be limited by the necessity of not encroaching upon the fundamental property rights and interests of the bourgeoisie. It was such considerations which limited the New Deal to its largely ineffectual measures. Further, the major steps which the state has at its disposal involve various forms of financial support to selected areas of the economy, and those create the basis for struggle between those areas which are the direct recipients of such benefits (e.g. agriculture, consumer goods industries, etc.) and those which bear the cost in the form of higher taxation. Finally, in the last analysis, all such measures depend upon a policy of inflation, which takes place at the expense of

fixed income groups, and in relation to the working class, serves as the basis for industrial struggles and strikes. Under such conditions, even without a severe depression, the political conditions of the 1930's would be reproduced. The important fact is that between 1929 and the present time such significant changes have taken place that political struggles take place on an entirely different plane and around entirely new problems. The depression decade not only left a deep impression on the people as a whole and the working class in particular, but it produced an entirely different kind of consciousness, an entirely different labor movement, and a tradition which fifteen years of prosperity has not eradicated.

The Republican victory of 1952 coming at the height of post war prosperity, reflected the hopes of the middle classes for a stabilization of social relations at home, but also for "normalization" of international relations, above all, for the liquidation of the Korean war. Insofar as Eisenhower has actually carried out at least the beginnings of negotiations for "peaceful co-existence" (over Korea, Indo-China and now at Geneva) he has capitalized upon the widespread desire for peace which lies at the basis of his personal political popularity. That the Republican party does not secure the same support is a measure both of its division over foreign policy (between the Eisenhower moderates and its right wing which advocates essentially a war policy) and the fact that it, rather than Eisenhower, is held responsible for economic difficulties. If the Republican party's victory had been succeeded by a relatively long period of both peace and prosperity, it would undoubtedly have consolidated its position as the majority party. The minor recession of 1954, however, was sufficient to show that Republican success rests upon economic stability. If the present prosperity should continue through the 1956 election, another Republican victory would be possible. If, on the other hand, a resumption of the recession of 1954 were to set in, the return of the Democratic Party to full power would appear to be the immediate consequences.

In contrast to a Republican party victory, the election of a Democratic administration would mark a swing to the left, a rise of dissatisfaction on the part of the workers and fear of depression by the middle classes. As the reflection of such sentiments, a Democratic victory would mark the beginning of a new political stage. In the first place it would indicate a decline in the strength of conservative feelings, an increase of social consciousness in general, and the beginnings of social protest in particular. The Democratic party would be the first beneficiary of any such leftward swing, not so much on the basis of its only slightly more progressive program, but because of its tradition as the champion of the "little people" against ~~the~~ big business. In the absence of any significant alternative movement, the Democratic party would be the immediate beneficiary of such a leftward swing. In the second place, such a development would bring the existence of the Democratic party itself into question, by revealing its incapacity to solve the country's basic social problems, and the class antagonisms which they generate. The New Deal period exhausted the resources of capitalist reformism. This is the source of liberalism's current ideological "crisis." The liberal movement, which consists of the intellectual defenders of the New Deal, is currently engaged in admitting its lack of any program sufficient to deal with an economic crisis.

The programmatic crisis of liberalism presages the future political crisis of the Democratic party, above all its inability to

to compromise the antagonistic forces which represent its social and electoral basis. The decisive political consequence of the depression decade was that political life, including the general working class or labor movement remained within the bourgeois political orbit, expressing itself only as a tendency in a capitalist party. This was possible only because the growth of unionism coincided with the crisis, which was curtailed before the limits of the labor-democratic party alliance could be revealed.

The American working class has participated in the general improvement in the standard of living, and has even raised its relative position in relation to other strata of the middle classes, in particular has this been true of workers in major industries, organized in the trade union movement. As the primary instruments of struggle for improvement of economic existence of the workers, the trade unions have been and continue to be regarded as the first and broadest form of organization of the working class. The socialist movement has always supported the struggles of the unions against employers, viewing the labor movement as the basic economic organization of the working class. Today the trade union movement comprises not only a large proportion of the workers, but commands the class support of the most advanced, the most conscious and the most militant sections of the proletariat. Socialists, who seek to raise the working class to political power, view the trade unions as the basic arena for the dissemination of socialist consciousness in the working class. For the trade union, as the broadest form of working class organization, and commanding the allegiance of workers of varied political, religious and cultural background, can be the means of setting workers into motion as a class, thus instilling a conscious sense of its own power and at the same time providing the workers with the experience necessary for the class to arrive at a socialist consciousness and socialist convictions.

The trade unions have won basic improvements for the workers not only in such basic fields as pay and working conditions, but in matters of even greater social importance. Thus old age pensions, unemployment and disability pay, and the abolition of racial discrimination have been obtained largely as the result of the political efforts of the labor movement, as well as its industrial struggles. Such struggles, as well as anti-labor legislation such as the Taft-Harley law, have brought labor into an even deeper involvement in politics. In the main, this has been in the form of support to the Democratic party.

It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that labor cannot defend either its own interests or those of the working class in this way. Within the democratic party it is confronted on the one hand by important business elements, on the other by its arch opponents in Congress, the southern conservatives. On the other hand, as the traditional machine of the Democratic organization in the big cities declines, the labor movement is becoming the primary source of votes. Now or later, but particularly under the impact of a recession, and the need for a political program capable of defending the standard of living of the workers, the labor movement must undertake to organize its own political party, a development witnessed decades ago in practically every other advanced capitalist country.

The formation of a labor party in the United States would mark

a tremendous political advance for the working class movement, and at the same time open up entirely new possibilities for the growth of the socialist movement. For whatever its formal program, and under whatever leadership it occurred, the formation of a labor party would serve as a means of political education for the workers by raising the class struggle to the political plane. Whatever impetus the socialist movement would receive from an economic crisis, it could not expect to win the support of the general working class before that class had accumulated certain body of experience on the basis of its own organized political development. This is the reason why socialists must consider as their main political aim the encouragement, fostering and promotion of the idea of a labor party. While, like other slogans, the idea of a labor party today remains primarily propagandistic in character, along with the general socialist program, socialists must be prepared for the opportunity to make it the main axis of their political and organizational activity.

Socialists should be prepared to give their full support to a labor party, even as they do to the unions themselves, despite the non and even anti-socialist program of these organizations. Socialists cannot impose as a condition for their support, acceptance of a socialist program or socialist leadership. The latter can come about only by the activity of socialists within the labor, and labor political movement, on the basis of the proven devotion of socialism to the advancement of labor's interests, and the superiority of a socialist ideology as the best, most advanced and consistent basis for the workers's struggle for a better life and a world of peace and security for all. From this standpoint socialists, while giving their complete support to every progressive movement, must maintain their separate identity to the most advanced and conscious elements, formulating the concrete tasks posed by each stage of development, and fighting at each stop for that program which will advance the movement in the direction of a full realization of the socialist goal.

The achievement of socialism depends upon the political development of the working class to the point where it has embraced, in its majority, the socialist aim, and is prepared to struggle for it. It can achieve this consciousness, in part through the activity of socialists within the labor movement, in part through its experience in the fight for the satisfaction of its immediate economic and social needs. Even without a party of its own, the labor movement is an instrument of tremendous influence in advancing the consciousness of the workers. With the winning of such demands as the escalator clause productivity increased, and now the "principle" of a guaranteed annual wage (which in fact is none of the three), the most advanced sections of the trade union movement have implanted the conception that questions of broad social concern are the legitimate province of the labor movement, and subjects of collective working class action. Transplanted from the narrow field of trade union bargaining with a few corporations on to the field of labor politics, such issues (guaranteed income, full production, etc.) could become issues arousing the broad levels of society, and the focus of a direct attack upon capitalism.



A major obstacle to the rise of a labor party has been eradicated by the merger of the two large labor federations into a single organization. Not only does it strengthen the labor movement for defensive struggles on both the economic and political plane; by removing a major source of conflict within the labor movement it permits the coalescence of progressive tendencies in both the AFL and CIO. Although unity was achieved on the basis of accepting both industrial and craft unions, the ultimate effect will be to give predominant weight to the large industrial type unions which represent the most advanced form of union organization. It will also lay the basis for a genuine and successful struggle against racketeering and gangster elements which have traditionally entrenched themselves behind the craft halls of the AFL. Finally, it lays the basis for a considerable expansion of unionism in agriculture, white collar fields and above all the South. While initially it may strengthen the already stifling tendencies toward bureaucracy in the labor movement, it will also lay the basis for a much broader and inclusive struggle against it by bringing all major parts of the labor movement together under one roof. One of the prime tasks of socialists in the labor movement will be to participate in all movements in the labor movement which fight for greater democracy, wider rank and file participation, and for an advanced social program.

### The Fight for Democracy

The concerted attack on democratic rights, initiated by the government, promoted by its police agency the FBI, and carried into every field of public and private life, has become the leading feature of political life in America. It has fed on and extended the atmosphere of social conservatism by making adherence to ideas and organizations subject to legal, economic and social penalties. The main target of this attack, and the rationale for its defense, is derived from the fight of American imperialism against stalinism, and the police mentality of the government which can conceive of stalinism only as a criminal conspiracy, to be combatted by police measures. The employment of such means as loyalty programs, subversive lists, anonymous informers and a whole series of other anti-democratic measures has affected not only its main target, but the entire liberal, labor and non-stalinist left. It facilitated the rise of demagogues like McCarthy who employed the anti-communist hysteria as a vehicle for achieving personal power. And it reinforced all reactionary, conservative and charlatanistic tendencies who sought to identify "communism" with labor, social reform, and even water flupridation.

The last year, beginning with the censure of Mc<sup>U</sup>Carthy, has seen a series of victories against the witch-hunt, mainly in the form of court decisions placing limits on the power of the government to deny rights to individuals accused of "subversive" associations. These victories represent the reaction of responsible conservative and liberal elements to the "excesses" of the witch-hunt, which it was recognized was undermining both America's internal unity and her propaganda position in the face of international stalinism. At the same time, they represented no decisive defeat for the witch-hunt, or for its basic ideology. The witch-hunt has received both popular and institutional support at all levels, particularly insofar as it is and continues to be applied against the stalinist movement. The "detent" in civil liberties, however, permits socialists to fight for a full program of

civil liberties for all, including stalinists, under far more favorable conditions and with the possibility of greater support.

Not only because socialism is nothing less than the extension of democracy to social as well as political life, but also because the struggle for socialism can be pursued most fruitfully under conditions of free and democratic existence, the socialist movement bears the responsibility for combatting every anti-democratic measure to the limit of its ability. Despite its insignificant size, it would appear likely that, in the face of the default by official liberalism, and its own particularly favorable position for undertaking such a struggle, the Young Socialist League and the political organization with which it is closely associated, the Independent Socialist League, can together make a significant contribution in this field. Thus, the victory of the ISL in the Shachtman passport case represented not only a significant and important victory in one area of civil liberties, but also has helped in restoring a measure of confidence in all democratic forces, and instilled a greater willingness to fight the more flagrant abuse of democracy represented by the witch-hunt. An even more significant issue is raised by the ISL in its fight to be removed from the "subversive" list, along with its predecessor the Workers Party, and the Socialist Youth League, one of the two organizations which united to form the YSL.

Victory for the ISL in its fight against the list would mean not only an important gain for itself and the YSL which is fraternally related to it, but a defeat for the witch-hunt itself. In part it would help all democratic forces to regain their voice on civil liberties, and to continue the revival of interest in the fight for democracy which began to revive with the censure of McCarthy last year. The socialist movement stands to gain not only the respect and admiration, but also the gratitude of every democratic force and organization for this reason, and for others, the YSL must make every effort to publicize, promote and organize public support for the fight of the ISL to be removed from the list no matter how difficult or lengthy this process may be.

While the ISL case represents perhaps the main possibility for the YSL, primarily because around this issue it can mobilize support from wide and varied sources, it must also seek other issues for which such support can be gained in the fight for democracy. One potential issue of this kind, simply because it constitutes a threat to the entire youth of the nation, is the fight against the system of compulsory military training, or its watered-down version of compulsory reserve training. This measure would subject every physically fit youth to six or eight years of part-time military training, in addition to a period of full-time service.

Another area of particular significance to the YSL is the fight for academic freedom. In this, as other democratic rights, the YSL recognizes no exception to the principle that no discrimination based on political ideas is justified, up to and including discrimination against members and sympathizers of the stalinist movement. The experience of the witch-hunt has demonstrated, to our satisfaction not that of official liberalism, that the denial of rights to some results in the destruction of rights for all.

The fight for academic freedom, on the above basis, can attract the wide support of students who in this field have an important role to play in the defense of civil liberties.

In the fight for academic freedom, as well as civil liberties in general, it is necessary to note the capitulation of official liberalism to the fundamental hypothesis of the witch-hunt. The position of the YSL in favor of the right of stalinists to teach, allows it to appeal to the widespread support for democratic rights which are found among students.

The concern of socialists for democratic rights for stalinists rests upon our adherence to democracy and not upon any common interests or agreement with the stalinist movement. The socialist position toward the stalinist movement in the United States flows from our analysis of that movement as the political instrument of a totalitarian and reactionary regime which has demonstrated its anti-working class character by reducing the workers to the status of industrial slaves wherever it has achieved political power. In the United States stalinism exists as the political extension of those regimes. It exists as a competing tendency in the labor movement primarily on the basis of its ability to employ the anti-capitalist appeal which stalinism can direct to the working class. Toward this tendency, however, socialism can only adopt an attitude of implacable hostility exposing stalinism for the reactionary and anti-socialist force it is.

One of the most significant trends of American society which threatens the security, or infringes on the life of almost every young person, is the growing militarization of the nation, a trend which we characterize as the development of a Garrison State. Socialists oppose the growing influence of the military over civilian life, not only because we reject the ability of American imperialism to pursue a democratic foreign policy, but also because of the reactionary influence of the military machine on social life.

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EDITORIAL CORRECTION

The issue of YSR which carried the letter of resignation of Robert Ilson omitted the date the letter was written. Since this letter appeared some time after it was submitted, the date was considered an important part of the letter by its author, who has asked that this appear as a correction. The omitted date was June 29, 1954.

DRAFT TASKS AND ORIENTATION of the YSL

The Young Socialist League is the only American youth organization that speaks out against both American and Russian imperialism and for the Third Camp of peace and socialism. Although there is little prospect of a mass radicalisation of American youth, the YSL, nevertheless, can increase its size and influence among those youth who become increasingly aware of the dilemma that capitalism and stalinism have brought to the entire world.

The main task of the YSL is to fully exploit the growing opportunity to extend its influence. Today's thin strata of politically conscious youth will penetrate deeper and deeper into the fabric of American life tomorrow. It is among the younger people that the YSL must concentrate its appeal.

Our generation is growing up under the threat of a Third World War. It can be said that the past two generations have known little else but war or the threat of war. The preparation for war has seeped into every pore of American life and its consequences are of daily importance.

The prosperity of the nine years since the end of World War II is still with us, but now it is the Permanent "war Economy. It is still easy to get jobs when schooling is over, the take-home pay is high compared to other countries, but there is an existing and threatening price to pay for this "prosperity" -- the draft, UMT and the constant threat of a world war. However, the forces of war and reaction have not yet come into full pay and American youth is only beginning to become aware of its future under capitalism. The economic prosperity of the richest and most powerful capitalist country in the world strengthens the traditional lack of widespread interest in radical politics or even of politics in general.

The problems which confront the socialist movement today are more complex and difficult than those of the Thirties. Then the primary problems were unemployment and war, the solution was socialism and it was not too difficult to convince young people of it. Because of past failures, the task of the socialist movement and of the socialist youth is that much greater. Where the interest in politics does come forth, it is often in search for the quick and easy "solution", the elusive magic formula that will provide for a "peaceful co-existence" of the rival imperialism.

It is the task of the YSL to convince young people of the futility of such "solutions" to their problems. It is to teach them to go to the root of the matter, to convince them that radical politics are realistic politics in a world threatened by destruction and barbarism and to reject the politics of the "crackpot realists". It is to instill in them a feeling of self-reliance, an understanding that the way out of the present impasse lies only through their activity, understanding and organization - and ultimately in their devotion to the fight for socialism. There is the need for the idealism of youth, an awareness that the socialist reorganization of society is the only realistic hope for a world of peace and freedom and the realization that in the labor movement lies the strongest

force to accomplish this goal. It is necessary to point out that there must be a consistent and continued fight for the preservation and extension of our democratic rights and against compromising these rights in the interests of the fight against "communism". And at the same time, it is important to clearly differentiate ourselves from the Stalinists and Stalinism.

To facilitate reaching these objectives the YSL must grow into an organization that can take the leadership among young people. The devotion and loyalty to the fight for socialism and to the YSL are prerequisites for our developing into an organization with recognized leadership among radical youth. It is necessary to develop a leadership within the YSL and to stimulate maximum membership participation in the internal life of the YSL. No organization can function in a truly democratic manner without the full participation by the rank and file in its life and activity. A democratic structure can only lay the necessary foundation, but it is the responsibility of the membership as a whole to give this democracy an organic character through their participation. The YSL today is in a position to carry its program to a greater number of young people than ever before. But to be able to carry on in the most effective way, it is necessary to develop politically stable cadres, idealistic and devoted to the cause of socialist democracy.

1) The past year and a half since the founding of the YSL, there has not been the revival of political interest and activity in the arenas of youth activity. In general the situations and objective circumstances that hold back a revival of the socialist movement, affects the YSL and the Independent Socialist Movement as well as other radical and socialist tendencies. The country has passed from the recession of late 1953-54, to an unprecedented boom; the war crisis in Indochina and the Formosa straits have at least temporarily suspended leading into the Big 4 meeting at Geneva; the power and influence of McCarthy has receded, although McCarthyism, the politics of the witch-hunt remains, and there has also been a receding from the heights and "excesses" of the anti-democratic trend. However, while national and world situation broadly limits what we can do, there, nevertheless, remains considerable area for political activity and recruitment.

2) The YSL occupies a unique position among radical youth today. It is the only socialist youth organization that functions, carries out activity and presents itself to American youth. The merger of the Socialist Youth League and the Young People's Socialist League was a complete success from every point of view. It halted the decline in both organizations, and in the period since its founding, the YSL has increased its membership and activity. It is not that the YSL is an all inclusive organization, with only a vague and nebulous point of view, and therefore there is no need for another socialist youth organization. It is rather a tribute to the strength and vitality of the ideas and politics of our movement and the devotion to the cause of socialism of the membership that has carried the YSL forward in a period most, if not all, youth organizations declined. While we recognize that it is a sign of the times when

only one socialist youth organization exists, but it also provides an opportunity for greater recruitment and growth.

3) It is well recognized that the crisis of the socialist movement is based upon the objective nature of the political situation in which we find ourselves in the United States. There is no section that has not been tragically decimated by the loss of members and failure to recruit. This is true both of the revolutionary as well as the reformist tendencies, - it cuts across all political lines. However, a youth organization does not feel its effects in the same way and to the same extent. The reason is to be found in the nature of youth activity itself. Youth is naturally the idealistic and radical in tendency, and not weighted down by the cynicism and defeatism usually prevalent among the older generations. The effect of this general fact is to bring a constant influx of new contacts into the periphery of socialist youth organizations. Therefore, even in those periods of the greatest weight of unfavorable circumstances, a youth organization never loses its arena of activity in quite the same way an adult group does. This is true today, especially for a movement which consciously strives to build a youth group.

4) The main arena of activity for the YSL will continue to be the campus. It is this perspective which has enabled the YSL to make the gains of the past period. The founding convention of the YSL did not believe that a period of large scale political activity or revival of interest in socialist ideas was in the offering, and this has proved correct. Nevertheless, the campus has not been barren. And while we do not anticipate a development enabling the socialist youth movement to break out of its isolation, we do expect the campus to remain the most meaningful arena in terms of activity and recruitment. Without this orientation, it is likely that the YSL would have suffered a serious decline.

5) In a period when there are narrow restrictions on the activity and influence of the socialist movement, they do not affect the campus with the same intensity. It is one of the few phases in American society where a socialist group can function openly in its own name and receive a serious audience as legitimate and meaningful political alternative, at least among the politically conscious strata of students. If the YSL can not function openly in its own name, at least a socialist club or avowedly radical club is often possible.

6) The campus, however, along with other areas of American activity, is an area of political quiescence. The last really significant large scale political activity and interest occurred during the 1948 presidential campaign. Since then there has been a steady decline with only slight upturns for short periods. The major reason for this decline has been and is the witch-hunt - both the officially government sponsored variety inaugurated by the reactionary subversive list and the McCarthy variety. Students became more interested in their own private careers and eschewed contact with socialist groups and politics in general. Politics because it was meaningless in the sense that the world problems were so large and complex. From this flows a feeling of impotence and incompetence to achieve a goal which they feel may be desirable. Although there seems to be easing in the general situation in recent months, it is still too early to see what effects it will have on the campus. A slight revival in

political interest does seem to be likely, however, if, for no other reason, than the 1956 presidential campaign. It is bound to create an opportunity to pose our socialist point of view, to criticize the reactionary politics of both the Democratic and Republican parties and to argue for the necessity of a labor Party and a democratic foreign policy.

7) It will remain one of the main tasks of the YSL to concentrate on re-establishing roots on campus. In the past year and a half we have extended our activities to colleges where we formerly did not exist or had the most tenuous of contact. We also managed to consolidate some contacts which were on the verge of disappearing. However, our position is certainly not one where we have stabilized our influence. Toward this end, units should give special attention to the problems faced by our campus fractions. This has in the past and will in the coming period remain, our main area of recruitment, directly and indirectly. It is also important that we seek out younger students to provide a base of activity when older members graduate.

8) It should be the goal of every comrade to participate in the political life of the campus. The organization form will have to depend on the circumstances in each particular situation. On a campus where there exists real tradition of political freedom or at least a toleration of dissident political points of view, it is not excluded that, if there are the minimum number of YSLers, a YSL club may be organized. However, this will not be the typical situation. Far more common will be the opportunity to form a socialist or socialist-orientated club where we can openly present our socialist ideas. A broader group will provide an arena of activity for those students who are not ready or willing to join a socialist organization. It is often through participation in a broader campus club that we are able to recruit. In those situations where the reactionary nature of the administration or the apathy of the student body is such that it would be impossible to form a socialist-orientated club, YSLers should join such liberal groups, such as the SDA, if they exist. The main objective is to find or create a political arena in which to operate. One of the factors limiting our freedom of choice is the small size of our campus fractions. However, we have seen examples where even an isolated member is able to build a periphery, form a socialist club and create a center of political activity. The subjective factor of organization ability affords a considerable degree of maneuverability which can spell the difference between the campus club or an isolated comrade. But whatever the particular situation, it is the responsibility of every active YSLer to be known as a Third Camp socialist and the most articulate defender of our democratic rights.

9) The main emphasis of our campus political work centers about the struggles over the attacks on our democratic rights and against the imperialist politics of both war blocs. In a period such as the present, when both blocs desire an easing of the heights of the war tensions and a detente in order to consolidate their positions for the next phase of the struggle for world dominion, we must not relax our political criticism of the politics of the struggle. We should not fall into the mood of

confusion surrounding the talk of peaceful co-existence and the feeling of a developing era of good feeling. We would be abandoning the meaningfulness of our role as socialists if we did not point to the reason for this present respite, what are the politics behind it and the fact that it is impossible to achieve peace through the method of a deal between the imperialist powers. At the same time we must avoid giving the impression that we are critical of the present period because it is an easing of tensions. We must constantly take the lead in the advocacy of peace, especially in the era of nuclear weapons. But we must point out that peace can not be achieved through any means. We must point out that only a truly democratic government - working class government which has broken with bourgeois politics can rally the people all over the world to defeat the twin dangers to peace - capitalism and Stalinism.

10) In the course of our campus work, one our main tasks is to attempt to involve broader sections of the student body in political activity. We seek to break out of the isolation of the anti-political mood and anti-socialist prejudices. Toward this purpose, we seek to join in united front activities with liberal, pacifist and other socialist tendencies. While there are wide gulfs of political and theoretical differences separating us, there are also immediate political issues where we are in agreement.

11) The particular situation where this is possible varies. Such united front activities in no way imply an abandonment of our point of view or concessions to opposing tendencies. Rather we attempt to convince them of the need for a consistent and principled defense of civil liberties. YSLers through their militant position can often create a periphery on campus which will look to the YSL and YSLers for leadership. We attempt to force the liberals to fight consistently for their point of view where the results would lead toward a consistently democratic position. Part of this is connected to our criticism of their failure to tie up the anti-democratic reaction of the post-war period with the cold war itself and their tendency to compromise with reaction.

12) YSLers in their campus activities come in contact with other political tendencies. The exact nature of these groups vary from campus to campus. Today, given the decline of organized political groups, we still seek to enter into united fronts and cooperation with liberal groups on civil liberties and democratic issues.

Although the Stalinist youth and Stalinist tendencies have born the heaviest blows in present years, it is not at all unlikely that they will gain significantly in the coming period. The atmosphere of a cold war detente, real or apparent, even for a brief period, will be conducive to their growth. Illusions of peaceful co-existence and an era of cooperation the U.S. and Russia will naturally develop among those with least political experience and the Stalinists have already made a turn in the direction of exploiting this sentiment. To a certain extent, many who would naturally tend toward liberal organizations will be attracted into the Stalinist periphery or there may be an overlapping. It is not excluded that a period of closer cooperation of liberal and Stalinist organizations may be at hand, especially as the Stalinists become more "liberalistic" In the past we often had to argue to convince the liberals that they should defend the Stalinists' civil rights, now we may be arguing against united front cooperation between the two tendencies.



13) While we call for united fronts with liberal groups, this attitude does not extend to Stalinist groups. We do not call for united fronts with the IYL or Stalinist-controlled organizations. Rather we seek to isolate them politically and organizationally. The Stalinists have suffered the same set-backs experienced by other groups. But compared to other organized tendencies, they still remain a major force. Rarely will we find a IYL, YPA or a Marxist Study group; instead they will attempt to form a "peace" committee or a group organized around specific issues. While the Stalinists may have a periphery of "innocents" or those with Stalinoid attitudes our basic position remains unchanged. This does not mean that we abandon this periphery to the Stalinists for they are often the same group we attempt to recruit. We seek to win them away through political discussion and by demonstrating in action that we are the most militant and consistent partisans of peace and democracy.

14) While liberals are the defenders of the imperialist policies of one side in the cold war, and the Stalinists of the other, it does not follow that we adopt the same attitude toward both. [To call for united fronts with the Stalinists would be compromising with totalitarianism.] The liberals when they enter into a particular action to protest the firing of a teacher, join an anti-ROTC campaign or oppose the sending of U.S. troops to Indo-China, it does not have the same meaning and consequences as when the Stalinists propose the same thing. The liberal is opposing a particular action of the cold war policies at home or abroad from what is objectively a democratic position, and not from the point of view of defending or justifying a totalitarian force. It is a step toward our point of view or it is a step we can support because if carried to its logical conclusion it would lead closer to our position - for civil liberties and a democratic foreign policy. Not so with the Stalinists. The objective meaning and consequence of their actions leads to or is part of their support of the Stalinist camp.

15) There are many times, however, when liberals insist that the Stalinist be included in a united front, often out of the mistaken notion that it is undemocratic to exclude anybody. This may be a greater likelihood in the present situation where the Stalinists have reduced their "program" to the absolute minimum - "peace". Where this is the case we do not isolate ourselves by refusing to participate in the action. We have the responsibility of participating in the united front which includes the Stalinists to advance the particular action and to educate liberals to the need of operating without cooperating with Stalinism. We should raise political criteria such as opposition to totalitarian regimes, in both Fascist Spain or in Russia - in the attempt to exclude the Stalinists. Often this will be sufficient to force the Stalinists to exclude themselves. However, it is not ruled out that we move to expell a Stalinist organization from a united front under circumstances where their presence would perilously compromise the objectives of the particular campaign or action. While we do not propose cooperation with the Stalinists, we, nevertheless defend their civil liberties. The attack against them is carried out as part of the attack against radical and democratic ideas. We defend the right of the Stalinists to advocate their ideas and attack the reactionary forces subverting our democratic rights.

16) While the general student orientation must continue, it

is important to remember that building a student YSL movement is not an end in itself. The YSL can become a significant youth organization only if it develops a proletarian basis. It is the present task of the YSL to develop and educate sufficient members to provide a cadre for a working class youth movement. But it is important to remember that the continued vitality of the YSL and its predecessor organization is due to the campus orientation.

17) It is necessary to prepare for a time when YSLers leave school by encouraging individual and group preparation for an industrial occupation, and enable the YSL to participate in the life of working class youth. This does not mean that the YSL should abandon its campus work and prepare to go into the shop, but rather that we should simultaneously engage in industrial training and encourage YSLers to learn an industrial skill and seek employment in a union shop.

18) The YSL has established the Young Socialist Review, a combination discussion bulletin and magazine. However, it has not played the role in the YSL's political life that it should. It has appeared too infrequently, primarily due to the lack of material. Members should be encouraged to write articles on general political topics as well as discussing the problems of youth and the youth movements. The frequency of appearance and the nature of the articles in the YSR are an important index to the vitality of political discussion in the organization.

19) Our weekly publication, the Young Socialist Challenge, appearing as part of Labor Action, is a real accomplishment since our founding convention. A weekly organ plays an important educational and agitational role in bringing the YSL to larger groups of youth. However, there is need for wider distribution of our press and the failure to do so will not be caused by any short supply of Challenge.

20) There is the need to educate the membership in both the theory and politics of the socialist movement. The MAC after our founding convention set itself the task of writing a series of educational pamphlets and study outlines. This has not been done but the need remains. It should be the task of the incoming MAC to set up an educational committee to carry out this job.

21) Inside of the limitations of the objective situation we recognize that we have not fully exploited our potentialities for growth. A great part of the reason is the size of the YSL which limits our ability to utilize or even make contact with many areas or campuses. In the past year and a half, to the extent that we were able to send out tours, they were successful. It should be our aim to send out as many tours as possible. A tour or a visit by a YSLer from one of our larger units often serves as a morale booster to an isolated member or sympathizer, and if followed up can result in recruitment.

22) While attending YSL meetings is an important function of membership, each member should participate in at least one outside activity. It can be a campus club, a trade union, a liberal organization or a NAACP chapter. For those members who have left campus, are unable to function in the student movement, the YSL should attempt to direct them into activity in other political and social areas in which youth and young adults can be reached. Such areas are to be found in unions, civil liberties and liberal organizations, community services, fraternal and social organizations. We must, of course, draw the line between spreading ourselves out too thin everywhere resulting in the inability to concentrate an effective group of members anywhere, and mere internal functioning. But at the same time, we have to build a periphery for the YSL. Wherever we do function, YSLers

have to develop a recruitment consciousness. There is a special need to recruit younger members who will form the cadres tomorrow. To the extent that we recruit, then to that extent we break out of our isolation, and provide the basis for further growth.

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AMENDMENT TO NAC DRAFT RESOLUTION ON YSL-ISL RELATIONSHIPS  
by LOS ANGELES YSL

1. In the last paragraph, section I, after the words "membership in the YSL." insert: The YSL (particularly) welcomes to membership without discrimination, members of the Socialist Party and Socialist Workers Party. *by virtue of such membership alone*
2. In paragraph A, section II, second line, strike the words Third Camp.

FOR A CONSISTENT ATTITUDE TOWARD DUAL MEMBERSHIP  
(Statement in favor of the accompanying amendment)

From its beginning in 1954, the YSL has faced the problem of members who are also members of other socialist organizations, specifically organizations other than the ISL. Because one of the organizations which united to form the Young Socialist League had been the youth section of the Socialist Party, the YSL had, at its birth, members who retained SP membership after the unity convention. Presumably some of these persons are still members of the SP.

The existence of a few SP members in its ranks presented no difficulties and provoked no controversy in the YSL. No objection was raised when YSL units in California repeatedly appealed to the Socialist Party youth in that area to unite with the YSL without necessarily giving up their SP membership. The SP is no serious problem primarily because of the loose organization and lack of a meaningful program which could be counterposed to that of the YSL. Furthermore, any SP member who joined the YSL would be likely to agree with the YSL on political questions more than with the SP.

The issue of dual membership was raised concretely by the existence of a group of members of sympathizers of the Socialist Workers Party in the Chicago unit. This situation precipitated at least one crisis in the Chicago YSL and controversy in the YSL nationally. Dual membership with the SWP was a different issue from that of SP membership because the SWP could be expected to form a fraction in the YSL and to be more aggressive both organizationally and politically.

After considerable alarm and confusion, the YSL National Action Committee affirmed the principle that membership in the YSL and the SWP were not necessarily incompatible. But neither the NAC nor the Chicago unit has followed this principle consistently. They have continually tried to force on the SWP group a kind of "second-class citizenship" in the YSL. The fact

that the YSL has had no defined attitude toward dual membership is partly responsible for the contradiction.

#### THE CASE FOR DUAL MEMBERSHIP

In the NAC resolution as amended we intend strongly to affirm the admissability of desirability of dual membership. By broadening the membership, even if only in one or two units, we can make a reality of the YSL's claim to be the organization of all socialist youth. The YSL has a powerful weapon to dissuade other socialist organizations from establishing competing youth groups, and an even more powerful attraction to those socialistically-inclined youth who are bewildered by the existence of several competing sects, but who, without yet making a final decision on difficult theoretical issues, can join a broad youth organization which asks no specific theoretical commitments.

In ordinary campus or industrial fraction work, there is no reason why the existence of dual members in more than one organization should cripple YSL activity any more than the YSL's existing internal differences now do.

The existence of diverse tendencies in the YSL should serve to stimulate political discussion and education, which are at best badly neglected, and often treated with contempt in both the SP and the SWP. We have no intention of making the YSL primarily an arena of struggle between the ISL and SWP, for instance. We feel, however, that there is little danger from this source. The normal procedures of democracy and discipline provide adequate protection from deliberate disrupters, and the superior programmatic and theoretical equipment of the Third Camp majority in the YSL can cope with any political problem which may be raised.

#### THE RECORD OF THE NAC

Reading the NAC draft resolution on YSL-ISL relationships would lead one to believe that the Committee accepted the attitude outlined above. Special attention should be paid to the last paragraphs of sections I and II of the resolution. What makes one suspicious is not the content of the resolution, but the fact that the NAC passed it unanimously. This is the same committee which:

(a) instructed the Berkeley unit of the YSL to cease negotiations with the local SWP branch in which the unit proposed that the SWP send its youth in the YSL (2-10-55).

(b) implicitly endorsed the attitude of the Chicago unit which hypocritically censured three comrades for concealing their membership in the SWP (5-24-55). Hypocritically because no body of the YSL has ever required ISL members to reveal their membership. The main reason why it has not is absolutely correct, and just as applicable to the SWP as to the ISL; the YSL is a broader organization than either the ISL or SWP and presumably more accessible to the police; it furthermore does not expect as high standards of discretion from its members. The ISL and SWP are on the "list"; the YSL is not.)

(6) in criticizing comrades Scott Arden and Pat M. for not revealing the SWP affiliations of other YSL members, established the outrageous principle that YSL members must "expose" members of other organizations in the YSL (5-11-55). (One can imagine the uproar if I were to "expose" all the ISL members I knew about! Comrade Arden was correct in his first reaction: If a comrade has a responsibility to another organization, e.g. the ISL, to report on the activities of its rivals in the YSL, that is a matter between him and the ISL, but so long as the SWP is not a rival of the YSL, the latter cannot require it of him any more than it can require him to report on the activities of a minority tendency in the YSL.)

At least one member of the NAC (Morse), who presumably voted for the draft resolution, wanted to present an ultimatum: "Either justify in political debate continued membership in the SWP or resign from it. If they will do neither then they should be brought up on charges, for expulsion" (5-17-55).

If the SWP group, as has been alleged, scrupulously avoids political debate, and refuses to defend its position, then it deserves every rhetorical device which exploits this fact, every political accusation which goes unanswered, and the contempt of its opponents. But this kind of political incompetence or irresponsibility is not a crime against the YSL, but only ~~x~~ against the guilty tendency itself. No one in the YSL has proposed to discipline anyone else who refused to defend his political position of his affiliations, and we can all think of several others who are subject to the same accusation.

#### WHY DELETE THE WORD THIRD CAMP?

The inference of the words Third Camp in Sec. II, paragraph A is to make adherence to the idea of the Third Camp, a condition for membership. The only requirement for membership (other than paying necessary dues and assessments) has been and is agreement with the objective of socialism. There is no contradiction between this simple requirement and the YSL's character

as a Third Camp organization. Leaving the membership requirements simple allows the unsophisticated young socialist to complete his political development inside the YSL, rather than excluding him until he has assimilated the entire YSL program (or drifted off to the Stalinists, etc.).

A. Tussing  
(Los Angeles)

The sense of this resolution endorsed unanimously by the Los Angeles unit.

## NAC Action on Resolutions on International Question

The National Action Committee at its meeting of August 15, 1955 acted on the three resolutions on the International Question, the ones proposed by comrades Harrington, Martin and Shane. The resolutions proposed by Harrington and Martin appear in this issue of YSR. Comrade Shane's document was published in YSR, Vol 2, No. 2.

The resolution proposed by Martin was adopted, with certain amendments which appear below, by a majority of the NAC consisting of comrades Jackson, Martin, Taylor and Radetsky (with NEC Alternate Harris, concurring. The Martin resolution, as amended, will therefore be proposed to the convention as the Draft Resolution of the NAC majority. Comrades Harrington and Shane will propose their respective resolutions.

### Amendments to Martin Resolution Adopted by NAC Majority

1. Paragraph 9 on page 24 : Strike the clause beginning, on line 2 with "primarily the contradiction" and ending on lines 6 and 7 with "to an extreme degree," The first sentence of this paragraph therefore now reads: "As a result of the crises engendered by the contradictions of Stalinist society the drives to imperialism are built in features in the system."
2. Paragraph 18 on page 26 : Add "if it breaks out" on line 1, following "The Third World War" and preceding "will contain features..."
3. Paragraph 25 on page 28 : Strike the entire paragraph and substitute the following: In recent years there has been little growth of an organized, politically conscious Third Camp movement. There has been a significant increase in an unformulated anti-war sentiment throughout the world, expressing itself in the parties of all classes and, more often than not, taking a neutralist tone. This phenomena - referred to by the leaders of the two war blocks as "world public opinion" - has clearly played a role in moving the big powers to negotiations. Where this anti-war sentiment is not articulated politically and remains a mood, albeit a neutralist mood, it exhibits a positive character. Though illusory in certain aspects, this sentiment provides an arena for Third Camp ideas and agitation. In so much as it usually represents a break from both war camps, it is a step in the direction of a Third Camp attitude. The neutralist tendency, however, contains many dangers and illusions which have to be combatted if the progressive significance of the neutralist movement is to be realized and is to advance to a full Third Camp position. Coexistence ideas and notions that the solution ~~is~~ lies in neutrality between the two imperialist camps, as differentiated from the Third Camp struggle against both imperialisms, are reactionary. So, also, is the conciliationism towards Stalinism to be found in neutralism. The destruction of such illusions is the task of the revolutionists."

Paragraph 38 on page 31 : Add "and new exploitative rule" to the end of the first sentence on line 5.

Paragraph 51 on page 33: Strike "illusion" in line 1 and substitute "assertion". Also add "is false" to the end of the first sentence in line 3.

Paragraph 56 on page 34: Strike "occupy" in line 3 and substitute "sieze".



## Draft Resolution on the International Question

(1) The basic factor which has dominated the international arena since the end of the Second World War resides in the cold war struggle between the camp of capitalist imperialism headed by the United States and the camp of totalitarian Stalinism headed by Russia. The rivalry of these two imperialisms, which have during the past decade produced several "small" wars and which threatens all of mankind with the dreaded disaster of a third, atomic world holocaust, began immediately after the Second World War, or more accurately, during the war itself, without a period of "peaceful stabilization" and peace illusions as an interlude. The two big powers began at once to jockey for allies and positions and produced a series of war crises as each mobilized or endeavored to mobilize uncommitted nations and peoples behind itself and organized its economy and military machine for the war.

(2) Russia brought all of the peoples and nations of Eastern Europe as far west as the Elbe under its imperial heel and, with the exception of Tito's Yugoslavia which defected in 1948, consolidated its empire throughout this area. In Asia the Stalinist parties bid for power in a series of countries, and succeeded in establishing their regimes in northern Vietnam, and more important, in China. The United States, the sole important capitalist power, established its imperialist overlordship over the rest of the capitalist world based on the economic subordination of Western Europe and sections of Asia to itself and upon the construction of a capitalist military camp under its leadership and hegemony.

(3) The working classes of Europe and the colonial masses have demonstrated time and again during the ten years since 1945 their will and desire to struggle and have made clear their profound wishes for a world of peace, freedom and plenty. In a series of struggles ranging from the victory of the British Labor Party and the general and political strikes on the Continent in the first few years following World War II to the struggles for national independence in the colonial countries to the recent economic struggles in France and the political battles in East and West Germany - the historic June, 1953 uprising of the East German workers against the Russian quisling regime and the struggles of the West German workers against the integration of Western Germany into the American military bloc - the masses of the world have manifested their fighting spirit. Above all, in one form or another the peoples ~~xxxx~~ of the world have made abundantly evident their revulsion against the threatened war and their desire to prevent it.

(4) The aspirations and struggles of the workers are, however disoriented and vitiated by the development of new trends in capitalism and by the rise of a new factor, Russian bureaucratic collectivism, to the status of a contender for world domination. In most of the world the struggle for socialism is no longer one of proletariat versus bourgeoisie but rather a three-sided struggle in which the workers are ranged against two class enemies who are also the enemies of each other. The problem is complicated by the fact that Stalinism, which in its own right is a bitter opponent of capitalism and capitalist imperialism, fraudulently appears or attempts to appear as the personification of socialism, or as a road to it, and on the basis of its false claim to be socialist and its authentic anti-capitalism appeals to and wins the support of masses of workers in Europe and millions of workers and peasants in Asia. Sections of the working class regard Stalinism either as socialism or as an ally in the fight for socialism and also as an ally against the war.

(5) Other sections of the working class regard American capitalism as its ally and defender against Stalinism. In addition, the might of the two imperialist super-powers and the fears engendered by the spectre of atomic warfare tend to instill feelings of impotence in the masses. And still further, each stage of the cold war, including the current detente, creates fresh disorienting problems and sows illusions about the need for and methods of struggle.

(6) A clear understanding of the new phenomena in the world, particularly of Stalinism, is essential for the correct orientation of socialism towards the problems of our time. Upon such an understanding are the politics of the Young Socialist League and its Third Camp struggle against Washington and Moscow and against the war based.

#### Stalinism

(7) As a result of the backwardness of Russia, the hardships and privations it endured during the post-revolutionary days, and above all, because of the failure of the West European working classes to establish their power in Western Europe, the Russian workers were unable to maintain the power they had established in the 1917 revolution for more than a few years. At the same time the Russian bourgeoisie was incapable of restoring capitalism to Russia. A new social force, the bureaucracy, stepped in, therefore, on the basis of the degeneration of the Russian Revolution, and reorganized society on a new basis. It destroyed all of the gains of the Russian Revolution, physically liquidated tens and tens of thousands of revolutionists, destroyed all working class organizations, wiped out all aspects of democracy and instituted its own totalitarian power.

(8) A new social system, bureaucratic collectivism, in which the means of production are owned collectively by the ruling class, the bureaucracy, through its monopoly of state power, came into existence. The view that Stalinist Russia is some kind of workers state, albeit degenerated is totally false; having been decisively proven to be so by the developments of the last fifteen years. The same is equally true of the idea that Russia is some form of capitalist society. The new social system existing in the Stalinist countries is profoundly reactionary, exploitative to a degree unknown even under capitalism, and contains, like all exploitative class society, contradictions which create the basis for the destruction of the system by the masses.

(9) As a result of the crises engendered by the contradictions of Stalinist society, primarily the contradiction between the statified nature of the economy and the social planning of the economy necessitated, on the one hand, and the totalitarian political structure of the society, a structure necessary to it, which makes all planning inevitably bureaucratic to an extreme degree, the drives to imperialism are built in features in the system. Russian imperialism has amassed a vast empire since the end of the Second World War and has emerged as a leading imperialist power. In all the nations which it holds subject Russia has destroyed capitalist rule and capitalism, substituting the bureaucratic social system therefore, and has at the same time enslaved the workers.

(10) Stalinism converted the Communist Parties in all countries, and without exception, into instruments of the Russian ruling class, serving the needs and aims of the Russian bureaucracy. The Stalinist Parties in all countries are working class parties in no sense whatsoever. They are within the labor movement but not of it; Stalinism is an alien class force operating within the proletariat. At the same time as they operate as adjuncts of the Kremlin foreign office, the Stalinist Parties are ultimately contenders for state power in their countries; they aim at establishing bureaucratic collectivism with the native Stalinist bureaucracy as the ruling class.

(11) Since the death of Stalin there set in a policy of liberalization in Russia, a turn towards some appeasement of the masses. Pro-Stalinist apologists of all hues attempted to magnify the range and significance of these changes and a growth of the false theory of the possible democratization of the regime occurred. The rumored "curbing of the GPU" and "rise of the Army to power" were among the fraudulent claims advanced as examples of significant change in Stalinist Russia. Neither of these events has any basis in reality. The GPU was never an independent factor in Russian political life; it was and remains under the control of the central Stalinist bureaucracy which uses it to defend the bureaucracy's rule against the masses. Likewise, while the state attempts to use the popularity of some of the Army commanders to enhance its prestige with the masses, the Army remains under control of the bureaucracy whose instrument it is.

(12) That some concessions have been made to the masses in the past few years is a fact. In response to the continuing agricultural crisis, the need of the lower bureaucracy for a "let-up" and the passive opposition of the masses, the Kremlin was forced to make concessions to the peasantry, abandon the policy of super-collectivization, and begin a greater emphasis on the production of consumer goods. These concessions at home have been accompanied by a modification of foreign policy.

#### American Capitalism

(13) The United States emerged from the Second World War as the sole stable, important capitalist nation. During the war itself it already moved towards replacing its allies, primarily Britain, in many areas previously within their imperialist domain. In-so-far as American imperialism exercises control in a different fashion from earlier capitalist imperialism, ~~xxxx~~ it attempts to pose as a non-imperialist nation. America need not and does not, in most cases need to take away the "sovereignty" of the nations and peoples under its domination; its superior economic situation combined with the total bankruptcy of the capitalist system in all areas of the world is enough to create the subordination to Washington. In addition, the threat from Moscow drives the nations of Western Europe into the arms of that imperialism which at least props up its system and ruling class.

(14) Not that the United States is unwilling to take a hand in the direct overthrow of regimes which assert any real independence from it. The recent outrageous example of Guatemala proves the contrary to be true. There the United States blatantly

intervened and participated in the overthrow of a democratically elected regime by force and violence, and established a reactionary regime in its place which immediately proceeded to wipe out democracy and the trade unions and to restore to the old land-owners those lands which had been distributed to the peasantry.

(15) The Guatamala pattern, however, is rare, for in the current situation its use is not necessary, just as the direct colony-"mother country" relationship which pertained between India and Britain prior to India's winning its independence, and which pertains between the United Staes and Puerto Rico is not necessary, and indeed in most cases is undesirable, for American imperialism. The relation is one of vassel to lord: the capitalist world is a heirarchy under the military and economic overlordship of Washington in a system of mutual but unequal obligations with the dominant imperialism of the United States skimming the cream.

(16) As part of its cold war struggle against Moscow, America organizes its vassels into various military alliances and upon these it bases its sole hope for victory in the war. Reluctantly the other countries of the capitalist world take their place in the American military structures. Concomittantly the U;S. props up every reactionary regime in the world under its hegemony, props and bases itself upon the Franco's, Sygmnan Rhee's, Chiang's, etc. In Europe its allies are the reactionary forces represented by the Catholic parties, whose powerx it reenforcesx and bolsters. The United States is unable to attempt to wage political warfare against Stalinism; nowhere can a popular democratic movement be found among its allies. It can and does only lean upon and support the most discredited reactionary social forces and movements. This is neither accidental nor do to stupidity. The masses everywhere are fed up with capitalism and capitalist imperialism. The United States cannot appeal to them because its aims and goals are precisely the maintainence of capitalism. The United States cannot support those forces which are as much antithetical to capitalism and capitalist imperialism as Stalinism is, and which indeed are even more so. Stalinism, on the otherhand, because it is anti-capitalist, can wage a political appeal to the millions who are fed up with capitalist tyrrany and do not yet know the nature of Stalinist tyrrany as well as they do the system which has lived on their backs for centuries.

(17) Hand in hand with the building of vast military machines, NATO, SEATO, etc, the establishment of far-flung bases and maintenance of troops in all parts of the world, have gone, as their domestic corolary, the bureaucratization and militarization of the economy, the creation of a Permanant war Economy and the Garrison State and the withhhunt assualt on democratic rights.

#### World War III And Socialist Policy

(18) The Third World War will contain features entirely or partly absent from its two predecessors. The first and perhaps most important of these resides in the fact ~~XXXX~~ that it will be a struggle between two different and antagonistic social systems. The victory of Russia will spell the destruction of capitalism and its replacement with bureaucratic collectivism, and conversly, the victory of America will mean the destruction

of bureaucratic collectivism. That neither of these exploitative systems are viable in the long-run and that the masses would continue to struggle against whichever was the victor, until all exploitative society had been vanquished, should not obscure this fact.

(19) The aim and direction of the struggle on both sides is for the domination of the whole world, including the leading nations of the world. Not merely the colonial and underdeveloped area of the world will be deprived of national sovereignty and redivided but all of the advanced nations of the world, other than the victor, as well. This aspect is the result of the balance of forces in the world, that is, of the fact that to defeat the other side, each must bring the whole world under its sway, and, most important of the social system antagonism factor in the struggle.

(20) The existence of weapons of destruction which carry the potentiality for destroying civilization, or at least of wreaking mass slaughter and destruction of the productive forces on a staggering scale, one not heretofore unimaginable in the experience of mankind. To base oneself on the hope that the two sides will not use the A and H Bombs is utterly utopian.

(21) These new factors reinforce the opposition of the YSL to the Third World War. The YSL is unalterably opposed to the war plans, war drives and war aims of both imperialist camps. It calls for the Third Camp struggle of the international proletariat and colonial peoples against both Washington and Moscow. Only such a struggle opens up the road to the solution of all social questions without war to the bitter ( atomic ) end.

(22) Should the Third Camp struggle of the people be unable to prevent the outbreak of the Third World war, the YSL will continue to oppose American imperialism in the war period, as it does in the pre-war period. It will urge the workers to continue their class struggles and will urge the workers to establish their power and take command of the nation. (Only a workers' government could replace America's reactionary aims in such a war with a progressive, democratic policy, thereby shortening the war and before atomic annihilation by blowing up the Russian empire from within, just as only in the pre-war period, only a democratic policy can explode Stalinism from within and prevent a war.)

(23) In pursuing the class struggle and in fighting for a workers' government the revolutionists, needless to say, do so only with the aim of securing the victory of the workers and not for the purpose of aiding Moscow and conduct their struggles in accordance with this aim. In this, as in all other matters, they are clearly distinguished from the Stalinists.

#### The Third Camp

(24) The summary formulation "Third Camp" points to the key idea of the YSL position on the war. Negatively, it means opposition to both imperialist war camps. On the positive side, it refers to the existence of a third social force in the world, the working class and colonial peoples, whose interests and needs are not

represented by capitalism or Stalinism. It points to the necessity for a working class struggle against capitalism and Stalinism and for socialism and therefore to the creation of a labor and socialist movement to conduct that struggle.

(25) Third Camp tendencies exist throughout the world, but are unorganized, disoriented and politically confused. Millions grope for, a way out of the blind alley of the cold war and look for a way to oppose both systems and both blocks. These tendencies operate under many illusions and frequently take reactionary forms, "neutralism" being one among others.

(26) The Third Camp struggle is a struggle for the most consistent and far-reaching program of democratic demands. The emphasis on democracy which must be made is not accidental, for today, more than ever, the struggle for democracy is the key to the struggle for socialism. The fight for democracy, a consistent thoroughgoing democracy leads to the fight for socialism, for only socialism is capable of realizing the democratic demands of the masses. To the solution of international questions by imperialist war which Moscow and Washington pose, the YSL counterposes a political program of democracy and socialism aimed against all reaction. To those who correctly desire to struggle against Stalinism and today can see only relying on the military power of American imperialism, the YSL points to democratic political program of struggle as the only road of defeating Stalinism without atomic war. For the American labor movement we propose a democratic foreign policy as an alternative to the self-defeating sabre-rattling policies of the capitalist government.

(27) The decay of capitalism and the rise of Stalinism have produced retrogressive and barbaric symptoms in all fields of life, including specifically the wiping out of democratic features in political and social life which had been won decades and centuries ago, and the bureaucratization of society. Featured among such symptoms is the gross denial of political sovereignty and independence to nations and peoples and the development and growth of totalitarianism. Hence the struggle for democracy is a vital necessity for today and an integral and indispensable part of the struggle for socialism just as the realization of socialism is an indispensable condition for the realization of the fullest democracy.

(28) A democratic political program for the struggle against all forms of reaction would include the following:

(a) The right to national self-determination and full independence and sovereignty for all peoples of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the subject nations of Eastern Europe and full support to the independence movements struggling against imperialism in these areas.

(b) Complete support to all popular democratic revolutionary and reform movements in the colonial, semi-colonial and oppressed nations and opposition to the political and military actions of all imperialist governments engaged in denying any peoples their basic democratic rights to self-determination.

(c) An end to all military and economic aid to such reactionary

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puppet regimes like Chiang Kai-shek's in Formosa. No aid to England in its suppression of Malaya and France to its suppression of North Africa.

(d) No aid to or alliances with such regimes as Franco's in Spain.

(e) Withdrawal of all occupation forces from Germany and the conclusion of peace treaties with out annexations or tribute and without denying to Germany of its complete sovereignty.

(f) The elaboration of a world-wide program of fraternal technical and financial aid to all underdeveloped, underprivileged and backward countries with no strings attached, and with no imperialist concessions ~~granted~~ exacted, and with unambiguous guarantees against imperialist exploitation.

(29) Such a policy cannot be expected of the bourgeoisie and bourgeois governments. For such a program a genuinely democratic movement and a genuinely democratic government is needed, a socialist labor movement and a workers government. The task facing the socialists is the assembling of such Third Camp movements of the people and their being armed with such a program.

(30) The elements for the Third Camp consist of the colonial peoples and the working classes of Europe and America.

#### The European Situation

(31) The end of the Second World War did not produce, as had World War I, mass revolutionary socialist movements and socialist revolutions. Instead, the wartime resistance movements which embodied great socialist potential, were oriented around democratic demands and slogans, although in some countries the beginnings of proletarian socialist demands and struggles were present. The activities of these movements and the social and class struggles in general soon became intertwined with the international situation and the cold war. In the early days following the war when the American-Russian honeymoon period had not yet ended, the Stalinists helped disarm and disorganize the resistance movements. Later it began to distort them in the interests of Russian imperialism.

(32) The post-war years witnessed a resurgence of the Social-Democratic parties with mass memberships and followings among the workers, and in some countries with more militant programs than Social-Democracy offered in the years following World War I. At the same time the Stalinist parties also emerged in some European countries with considerable strength. As a general rule, it can be said that where the Social Democracy was strong and was engaged in offering some resistance to capitalism, there Stalinism could make little headway among the workers, as in England and Germany, and where, as in France, Social-Democracy was particularly discredited for its extreme conciliationism towards capitalism, the Stalinist Party was able to gain the support of the working class who could see no other weapon with which to combat capitalism.

(33) At the end of the First World War Social Democracy played the role of chief prop to capitalism. To a great extent, it still plays this role, but the increasing decay of capitalist society makes another element exist in social democracy at the same time; it becomes the vehicle in which the bureaucratic collectivist & tend-

encies present in capitalism are carried. The anti-capitalist inroads made by the British Labor government illustrate this. These inroads opened the road to socialism in that country, although at the same time they opened the road to a long development headed in the direction of such bureaucratization. While being firm supporters of the BLP and the labor government and also of its anti-capitalist actions, and while recognizing the vast differences between the British and Russian situations, the revolutionary socialists warned that unless the Labor government's program were infused with a socialist program of workers democracy, its social trend in the long run could lead to such a bureaucratization of society. The task of the revolutionists in Britain then, as today, was to be inside the Labor Party fighting for a socialist policy.

(34) What applies to the British revolutionists is in general applicable to all European revolutionary socialists. It is the height of sectarian folly to remain outside of the European Social-Democratic and Labor parties in which the workers are to be found. The winning of the workers to a socialist policy and leadership can only take place in these parties for the workers will not leave their mass class organizations to go to tiny sects no matter how correct their programs are. Unlike the Stalinist parties, the Social-Democracies are working class parties based upon the proletariat. The future development of a revolutionary socialist working class will come from the left-wings of the Social-Democratic parties which in most countries are already quite strong and desirous of moving in a revolutionary socialist direction, even though they show much political confusion today.

(35) Despite the economic recovery experienced by much of the economy of Western Europe in the last few years, European capitalism is in a state of permanent crisis. The recovery is based to a large extent upon American aid - without it, the recovery would not have been possible - and is moreover extremely precarious. Europe's dire necessity for the solution of its economic, political and social problems is the elimination of the artificial and restrictive national boundaries and the unification of the reactionary national states which today compose it. The European bourgeoisie has proved utterly incapable of unifying it; the only serious attempt having been Hitler's attempt at a reactionary fascist unification. The unification of Western Europe on a progressive basis would result in an enormous economic advance and create a political entity capable of standing up against Stalinist imperialism independent of American capitalist imperialism. Thus the slogan of an Independent Western Union is a profoundly progressive slogan for Europe today. Its achievement requires the existence of working class governments in Western Europe, for the bourgeoisie will not unify Europe; its realization points the road to the next stage of the struggle for the United Socialist States of Europe.)

#### The Colonial Revolution

(36) World War I ended with the strengthening of the colonial empires of the victors; the Second World War ended with the beginnings of the dissolution of the empires of the European



capitalist imperialist states. This difference is a measure of the degeneration of capitalism. Terrifically weakened, capitalism loosens up, first at the fringes, in relation to its colonial slaves.

(37) For the first time since the early progressive days of capitalism peoples in revolt have won their independence. The British, French and Dutch empires are breaking up. India, classic example of colonial subjugation, is now independent. So are Burma and Indonesia. Egypt and most of the Arab world are no longer under direct British control. These revolutionary struggles for independence have an extremely progressive significance and merit the support of revolutionary socialists.

(38) At the same time the new social force of Stalinism also appears as a contender for power in Asia, mobilizing and leading struggles against the old imperialisms, but doing so not in order to liberate the colonial countries, but to enslave them to the new imperialism. We reject the idea that the interests of the Indochinese people require political or military support to the Vietminh, for it is decisively dominated by its Stalinist leadership and functions as an instrument of Stalinist imperialism in Indochina. In this connection, the convention approves the position taken by the National Executive Committee of the YSL on the Indochinese war.

(39) While the victory of Stalinism in China struck a blow at capitalist imperialism from which it will never recover, it at the same time raised the new enemy of socialism to power and set back for an indefinite period the working class, democracy and socialism. The destruction of feudalism and capitalism by the Chinese Stalinists is not progressive for it is replaced by the new exploitative and reactionary society. The peasants are freed from feudal relations but converted into the state serfs of the Stalinist bureaucracy. The working class is enslaved. All of the fundamental traits of Russian Stalinism are reproduced in China. The YSL is the mortal enemy of Stalinism in Asia, as it is in other sections of the world.

(40) The liberation of the colonies of yesterday was carried out without a socialist revolution and not under the leadership of the working class. This was possible because of the accelerated degeneration of capitalism and capitalist imperialism. But at the same time, the social problems of industrialization and the land question, problems whose solution is classically the task of the democratic revolution, still await resolution. These problems can only be solved in a fundamental sense and in a progressive manner by the working class and socialism.

(41) The emergence of mass socialist parties in Asia represents a progressive development. As compared with European social-democracy, these parties represent a healthy and militant movement, on the whole, stemming from their recent association with the national-revolutionary movements and because of the distinctive social, political and economic positions of their countries. The formation of the Asian Socialist Conference and its extreme reluctance to unite with the Second International is a welcome sign.

(42) The victory of the colonial forces in Asia presages tomorrows upsurge of the colonial masses in Africa. Already in North Africa the masses are carrying on a heroic struggle against French imperialism, a struggle to which the YSL announces its support. Tomorrow this will spread to the rest of that continent and to all other areas in which imperialism still rules.

(43) The YSL opposes the intervention of the old and new imperialisms in Asia and to the effort of American imperialism to defend or restore to its imperialist allies any of their former colonies or tomorrows former colonies. It opposes also the efforts of American imperialism to supplant the older imperialisms in the area. It shares the opposition of Asian revolutionists to the SEATO alliance and counterposes to it as the next practical step in Asian politics the formation of an Independent ~~xxxxx~~ Southeast Asian Federation, which can secure the defense of the area against Stalinist imperialism and the old capitalist imperialism and also assure tampooling of resources democratically as a basis for progressive modernization and industrialization of these countries and the carrying through of a radical agrarian reform, prerequisites to further progress.

#### The Detante

(44) Since the end of the Korean war there has set in an abatement of the war danger and the relaxation of international tensions, the so-called detante. This period has not, however, been a uniformly more "relaxed" one; on the contrary, twice in these years we witnessed the sharp oscillation back to great tension in the cold war struggle and the danger of hot war, once last year in the Indochina crisis, and again, over Formosa. In both cases armed conflict was averted, tension reduced and the world-wide war, ~~xx~~ postponed. These developments reflect the fact that both sides realize that it is highly doubtful that "small" wars can be fought without the dreaded World War III resulting, and neither side is prepared for the this final showdown. Hence the stalemate.

(45) During the last few months the detante has become intensified and the relaxation of ~~xxxxxx~~ conflict more pronounced. "Statesmen" on both sides have stopped hurling pronouncements bristling with threats and counter-threats at each other, a certain "normalization" of relations has set in, and in general the atmosphere and mood have cleared up somewhat. The meeting at the "summit", the Austrian treaty, the Russian rapprochement with Tito, the American-Chinese Stalinist talks: all are signs of the changed atmosphere.

(46) The "peaceful interlude" which "normally" would have taken place right after the conclusion of the last war occurs ten years later. The length of this period and the degree of "pacification" cannot be predicted. It is possible that it will be shortly interrupted or terminated by a fresh crisis and it is also possible that the detante will last for a longer period of time. This question depends upon the domestic situations in both imperialist powers, the international balance of forces and the Third Camp struggle of masses.

(47) The degree of tension between Washington and Moscow had reached the point where either its relaxation or the outbreak of the war was the next stage. To attempt to resolve any of the crises of the last two years by a small, Korea-type war would have most likely resulted in the big war itself. Neither camp wanted this development since each must line up as many of the uncommitted nations and peoples on ~~xxx~~ its side as is possible and each wishes to achieve a definite superiority over the other in regard support from other nations and peoples, military might, and economic strength. The various successful struggles of masses of people against both sides ~~xx~~ during the recent years, the reluctance of America's European allies to be dragged into such a war, and the "slowdown" in all of the Stalinist empire including Russia itself, have set back the two imperialisms. In addition, the final securing of German rearmament, even if it is still on paper, by the United States, over the bellicose belligerency of Stalinism has caused Russia to shift to new methods of struggle against the final realization of America's military plans in Europe, upon which its whole global strategy for fighting Stalinism is based.

(48) Together with all of humanity, the YSL welcomes the postponement of World War III, which the detente marks. Such postponement holds off the mass slaughter which the war would entail and at the same time gives the forces of the Third Camp time in which to assemble their ranks, become ideologically clarified, and to struggle to prevent the war entirely.

(49) at the same time it is necessary to note that the breathing spell, is a breathing-spell for the imperialist camps as well as for the masses, and enables Washington and Moscow, as well as the Third Camp, to regroup itself, and prepare for the war. Furthermore, the detente helps create illusions in the minds of the masses and furthers ideas of passivity, tends to inhibit the notion that Washington and Moscow can solve the various international questions peacefully, and without mass struggle. It reinforces ideas of "neutralism" and ~~x~~ "peaceful coexistence". These illusions present a great danger to the Third Camp aspirations of the peoples. Unless they are shed the time gained as a result of the detente will be frittered away.

(50) What must be understood firstly is that the detente does not mark an end to the cold war nor signalize a fundamentally different period in international relations. The detente is a new stage of the cold war, one in which the cold war struggle between Stalinism and capitalism goes on, but in new, less belligerent forms.

(51) Secondly, the illusion that it is possible for Stalinism and capitalism to coexist permanently or for a very long period of time. The imperialist nature of the two social ~~ix~~ systems and the social-antagonism factor in the struggle make inescapable the effort of both blocs and systems to vanquish each other.

(52) Thirdly, while it is possible for the two imperialisms to work out some deals with each other for the short run period, it is not possible for them to solve any of the problems

which face mankind in any kind of progressive, democratic manner.

(53) Just as the independent socialist movement poses the alternative of a democratic struggle against all forms of reaction to the threatened solution of international problems by atomic war and poses for the labor movement the adoption of a democratic foreign policy as an alternative to the reactionary politics of American capitalism, a democratic foreign policy with which to defeat Stalinism progressively and without war, so too, the YSL counterposes the struggle for a democratic and socialist program as the alternative to solutions of the various international questions by imperialist deals at the expense of the people.

(54) What especially needs stressing is the absolute necessity for Third Camp struggle against Stalinism, as opposed to the attitude of appeasement of Stalinism and conciliation with it, an attitude which is rife in the various neutralist movements and in the left wings of European Social-Democracy. Feelings of passivity, the idea that Eisenhower and Khrushchev will solve all problems and that the struggle of the masses is not needed is profoundly false and must have counterposed to it the Third Camp struggle against war and all reaction.

(55) To the projected solutions for the various international questions and problems which emanate from the imperialist powers, both the solutions they really desire and those they hint at for propaganda purposes, the socialist movement must counterpose concrete democratic solutions and urge the struggle for their realization.

(56) A short time ago the United States and Stalinist China were on the brink of war over Formosa. Stalinist China cyniacally claimed its right to occupy this island while the other side claimed the right of continuing the Chiang police-state under American overlordship. With utmost cynicism, both sides ignored the fundamental democratic right of the Formosans to themselves settle the problem of the status of their land. As against the solutions presented by Stalinism and capitalism the YSL urges the right of self-determination of their status by the Formosans themselves. The only democratic solution consists of the people of Formosa deciding democratically whether they desire union with Stalinist China, wish to remain under the rule of Chiang and his American overlords, or wish the third status of an independent, democratic Formosa. If such a genuine plebiscite were to be held, the YSL would urge the Formosan people to chose the third alternative.

(57) It is highly doubtful that the scheduled elections to unify Vietnam will ever be held. In opposition to the reactionary solution of a divided country with the Stalinists in control of the North and French imperialism or American imperialism or the combination of the two subjugating the South, the YSL sets forth the program of a Third Camp struggle by the Indochinese workers and revolutionary ~~xxx~~ and democratic nationalist forces against both the Vietminh and against capitalist imperialism. The assembling of such forces in South

Vietnam is the urgently required next step.

(58) The same solution applies equally to Korea, except that there the situation is worse than in Indochina in respect to the existence of independent forces capable of playing such a progressive and democratic role. But this merely means that the task is more difficult and will take longer - which is all the more reason why it has to be begun.

(59) There is great danger that the old European imperialist powers will use the relaxation of cold war tensions to intensify their subjugation against the colonies and their struggle against the nationalist movements. France has already threatened and begun such action in North Africa. The peoples of North Africa and other subject and oppressed nations must intensify their struggle in return. The YSL declares its unqualified support of the fight of the North African peoples and all other oppressed peoples in their fight for national independence and calls upon the international labor movement to extend to them its support and aid.

#### Germany

(60) The partition of Germany between the Western powers and Russia and the denial of the elementary democratic right of self-determination to the German people, as a consequence of the Second World War was a reactionary act with far-reaching retrogressive results for Europe. Germany is the key to all of Europe in that its geographical location, its economic development and its size make it the natural organizer of the continent. The unification of Germany will also bring the German working class to the fore and enable it to play a leading role in the struggle for an Independent Western Union and other progressive developments.

(61) In Eastern Germany, the Russian quisling Stalinist regime continues to fasten its yoke upon the people on the basis of Russian bayonets, as the June, 1953 uprising so thoroughly proved. The West German government has been granted a measure of national sovereignty by Washington but at the price of the integration of West Germany into NATO and the American military bloc. And while the German bourgeoisie may desire precisely this, the West German workers have demonstrated their understanding of the reactionary international and domestic consequences of it and waged militant struggles against it.

(62) As a consequence of the detante there have been rumors of a Russian proposal for the unification of Germany on the basis of a neutralized country without the right to rearm, or even neutralization on the Austrian pattern including the right to certain limited armed forces. Even if such rumors were more than propaganda talk, they would still involve the denial to the German people of their democratic right to all the attributes of national sovereignty including the right to control its military establishment and to conduct its foreign relations as it sees fit.

(63) The recent "summit" meeting in Geneva failed to produce any such Russian proposal. On the contrary. Both sides are

in favor German unity, but on a basis the other will not grant. America wants a united Germany which can be part of its military bloc. Russia would be willing to see Germany united at the price of destruction of American military plans and the structure which America has so painfully erected in Europe.

(64) This underscores the necessity of a Third Camp struggle for German unification. The struggles of the German workers have in part been vitiated by the fact that the orientation of the SPD leadership has been towards Big Power negotiations as the road to German unification. The shedding of these illusions and the beginnings of a program and outlook that relies on the strength of the German workers and the seeking of aid from the natural allies of the German proletariat, the international working class is a prerequisite for a successful progressive and democratic struggle.

(65) Every sincere democrat must urge the unification of Germany and its restoration to full national sovereignty and independence including full control of its social, economic and political ~~xxxxxx~~ rights, including the right to control its own military and international policy. The German working class must raise the slogan of withdrawal of all foreign troops and the unification of Germany on an independent and democratic, which is to say, on a working class basis. It is incumbent on all working class and democratic movements to give all aid and support to the German workers and people in this struggle.

-- Max Martin

(The foregoing resolution is being submitted for consideration by the NAC. It appears here before the NAC has been able to act on it)

## DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL QUESTION

(Submitted to the SAC for discussion and vote by Mike Harrington.)

- (1) For socialists, the problem of international politics in our time is, above all, the problem of peace.
- (2) The first half of the Twentieth Century has seen two World Wars. The second half has begun with the threat of a Third, nuclear World War which, in terms of destructiveness of human life and civilization, would exceed anything known to man. To be a socialist in such an era is to be opposed to such a war; to be a socialist is to make this opposition concrete and specific, to analyze the imperialist causes which lead to war and to propose an anti-imperialist struggle against these tendencies.
- (3) This document is a restatement of our basic analysis of the problem of peace and war in our time. It defines our opposition to the two great imperialist power blocs which menace mankind, and our adherence to the struggle of the vast majority of the people of the world for peace and freedom.

## I

The General Background

- (4) The basic political reality of the past decade has been the struggle between the United States and Russia. In this conflict the needs of the people of the world have been subordinated to the self-interest of the two antagonistic social systems and their ruling classes. In the Western Camp, the defense of "freedom" has actually been the defense of capitalism and the conditions necessary for its existence; for the Stalinists, the defense of "socialism" has been the perversion and betrayal of the socialist revolution. In the struggle between these two power blocs, the world has been led to the very brink of a third world war.
- (5) The starting point of all of our politics is the support of the people of the world against both of these exploitative social systems. The content of our politics is based upon the conviction that this anti-imperialist struggle must, in our time, become the struggle for socialism, that only the creation of non-exploitative, socialist world can insure lasting peace. This fight for freedom and against both of the war camps is the struggle of the Third Camp.
- (6) However, there are no mass movements in the world which have articulated the politics of the Third Camp. In day to day struggle, then, our function is to work within the various socialist and anti-imperialist movements, always attempt-

ing to bring them to a consciousness of the necessity for a socialist and Third Camp struggle.

(7) In recent months, events have taken place which do not change our basic analysis but which do require its re-interpretation in terms of a new situation. There has been a let-up in international tension, a phenomenon characterized by a mood of conciliation and negotiation more than by any specific acts. Given this fact, it is necessary for us to describe the reasons for this change and to assess its consequences for the tactics of Third Camp Socialism.

## II

### The Detente

#### A. Definition

(8) The present detente, as pointed out above, is, at this date, a mood of conciliation and negotiation, and not a basic change in actual political relationships. In the Geneva talks, the conversations between the United States and China, the Austrian Treaty, etc., there has been an easing of tensions. The disputes which caused an intensification of the cold war - German rearmament, German reunification, the Stalinist satellite empire, American interference in Asia, etc. - remain unsettled in the new atmosphere of cold peace. In order to determine (a) how far the detente can actually go in proposing real solutions to the problems of international politics and (b) the opportunities which the detente poses for anti-imperialist movements, we must analyze this shift in terms of the major social forces in the world today.

#### B. Stalinism

(9) Since World War II, Stalinism has expanded its totalitarian empire and followed a policy of sharp hostility to the non-Stalinist world. Between 1945 and 1948, it eliminated all vestiges of democracy from the Eastern European satellites. From 1948 to the present period, the Stalinists used all their might to counter American foreign policy in Europe, fighting the Marshall Plan, Nato, and, above all, German rearmament.

(10) Within Russia, this same period was characterized by an intensification of exploitation, by the construction of a huge armament sector in the economy and a consequent diversion of investment from consumer goods production to heavy industry. Added to this exploitation of the Russian people was the exploitation of the satellites, at first in the almost naked form of "joint companies," later, after the Tito split, in a somewhat milder fashion.

(11) In general then, we would define the development of Stalinism from the end of World War II to the death of Stalin in



1953 as characterized by increased exploitation on the home front, the creation of an empire in eastern Europe, and by a policy of sharp and open hostility to the Western Camp, especially with regard to the Marshall Plan, Nato, and German re-armament.

(12) After Stalin's death, changes began to take place within Stalinism. The propaganda for negotiation and co-existence was stepped up, and certain concessions, in terms of increased consumer's goods, were announced by Malenkov and later qualified, but not abandoned, by Khrushchev-Bulganin. At the same time, the Stalinists were openly admitting the existence of an agricultural problem of significant proportions, perhaps even an agricultural crisis.

(13) As usual, the change in Stalinist foreign policy was accompanied by a change in domestic policy. To a certain extent, there would seem to be some kind of causal relation between the two shifts, i.e., the necessity to solve domestic problems coupled with the economic effect of an aggressive foreign policy (especially, the armament burden) influenced the let-up in international affairs.

(14) However, it must be noted that it is impossible to make any precise definition of this causal relationship, particularly because of the scarcity of data. Moreover, autonomous factors unconnected with the problems of domestic Stalinism undoubtedly influenced the change. Chief among these is the victory of the United States in securing ratification of German re-armament - an event which marked the frustration of many years of Stalinist policy and clearly called for a change in tactics to accommodate to a new situation.

(15) Given such an outline of the role of Stalinism in the detente, how does this effect our basic analysis of that social system?

(16) The first, and perhaps most important, point which must be made, is that the change of policy in no way alters our fundamental definition of Stalinism as an exploitative system tyrannized over by a bureaucratic ruling class. The change is clearly explicable in terms of the self-interest of that ruling class. There is not one shred of evidence to support the notion that the Stalinist social system has democratized or in any way changed its class character. All evidence does point to the fact that the change is one of bureaucratic self-interest.

(17) Secondly, the data available to us does not allow any accurate prediction of the extent of the change. Three hypotheses are often suggested as possible analyses: (a) that we are primarily confronted with a tactical shift in policy; (b) that the change is explicable in terms of the normal rhythm of Stalinist society; (c) that the change is closely related to the

internal development of Stalinism.

(18) If we take the first point of view, we must give a greater emphasis to the effect of America's victory in securing German re-armament. In such a theory, Stalinist policy is simply accommodating itself to a new situation with a new tactic of struggle. Its basic aim - consolidation and perhaps extension of its empire through opposition to the United States - remains the same.

(19) The second theory claims to find a regular rhythm in Stalinism: the tightening up of controls brings mass pressure for relaxation, the relaxation brings mass pressure for more relaxation which in turn causes a tightening up of controls. There is some validity to this insight, but its basic proposition must be rejected, both as a description of the past and of the present. It is simply impossible to find this pattern in the Stalinist past; and even if it were there, many factors in the present situation would constitute an exception to it.

(20) The third view places a greater emphasis on the relation between the policy shift and internal development. The Stalinist economy is one of guns or butter. Therefore, a reduction in international tension which would allow for a stabilization, or even a cut-back, of armament expenditure would fit in with a necessity for an increased concentration on domestic problems. If this view is true, the chances of concrete and serious Stalinist proposals coming out of the present situation are somewhat better.

(21) It is necessary, however, to emphasize that all of these hypotheses operate within the general definition of Stalinism as a totalitarian, exploitative society. Therefore, a limitation is placed upon all possibilities of future Stalinist action: that it cannot endanger the basic rule of the bureaucracy. The liquidation of the Stalinist Eastern European Empire is thus politically and economically out of the question. An Austrian Peace Treaty is obviously not. Mid-way between these two extremes is the question of Germany. Its reunification is not impossible from the Stalinist point of view - as, say, the freedom of Poland would be; but then neither is it as possible as the freedom of Austria was. In a sense, the German question is the most sensitive index of how deep the present change goes. At the present time, we can only await further events in this regard.

(22) This, then, is our general analysis of the role of Stalinism in the present detente: that its change in policy in no way signifies a basic alteration in the nature of the regime; that it probably reflects a combination of internal pressure and reaction to the external event of ratification of German re-armament; and that the extent of the change is seriously

limited by the self interest of the bureaucratic ruling class.

### C. The Colonial Revolution

(23) A social force of growing importance in international politics, and one which plays a significant role in the present detente, is the colonial revolution. Throughout the world, subject masses have risen against their imperialist masters.

(24) The historical task of this anti-imperialist struggle is that of the bourgeois revolution: the creation of an independent, capitalist state. Yet, because of the development of the world market on the one hand, and the emergence of Stalinism as a force in the colonial revolution on the basis of its anti-Western-Imperialism on the other, the colonial revolution either occurs in a fashion strikingly different from any previous bourgeois revolution, or else is transformed into a movement toward the establishment of a bureaucratic collectivist society.

(25) The first factor, the impact of the world market, will not allow the colonial bourgeoisie to create its own state in "normal" bourgeois fashion. Forced to move rapidly from an almost primitive economic level to one of competition with developed nations, the colonial countries face a task of capital accumulation which, in terms of mass and rate, exceeds the capacities of the bourgeoisie. The state, as the only force in society capable of organizing this accumulation, therefore intervenes.

(26) This situation holds in countries like India, Egypt, Burma and Indonesia. There, the pattern of the colonial revolution is one which sees the development of a state sector in the economy, with the bourgeoisie concentrating itself in light industry and commercial capital. In this kind of a case, however, the revolution is still recognizably a bourgeois revolution, i.e. it accomplishes the tasks of national independence and the creation of a capitalist, albeit state capitalist, economy.

(27) A different situation pertains where the colonial revolution is taken over by Stalinism. In the major case where that has happened, China, there is a state sector to the economy and a "national bourgeoisie", but the actual reality is sharply differentiated from that of, say, India or Burma. Here, the state sector is absolutely dominant, and it is in the hands of a bureaucracy which, molding itself on the Russian Stalinists, is consciously working for the creation of a bureaucratic collectivist society.

(28) To speak of this bureaucracy's role as "progressive in some aspects" is to isolate it from history. The destruction of feudalism and the industrialization which it accomplishes cannot be abstracted from the historical context. For at the same time as the feudal past is destroyed and an impediment to socialist development removed, the bureaucratic collectivist future appears on the scene as a totalitarian force denying even those minimal bourgeois freedoms which the working class requires for its development, and thus constituting a new impediment to socialism.

(29) These two forms of the colonial revolution have different political expressions. Where the colonial revolution is not taken over by the Stalinists, where it is a bourgeois revolution (albeit profoundly modified by the period in which it takes place), it develops against the forces of both American and Stalinist imperialism. The Imperialist West is clearly an enemy, and the struggle for national

independence usually takes place against Western nation. The Stalinists are opposed, though not out of the same immediacy, because Stalinist movements are in opposition to the bourgeois revolution, e.g. Burma.

(30) In those cases where the Stalinists are in the leadership of the revolution, there is subservience to, or alliance with, Russian Stalinist imperialism. In Indo-China, for example, the activity of Ho in the revolutionary movement was clearly dictated by the exigencies of Moscow's policies, e.g. while the French Communist Party was in the French Government, Ho took a conciliatory line and literally had to be bombed into opposition. In China, where the Stalinists came to power on their own (and perhaps in contradiction to Stalin) this condition of subservience does not pertain. Here, we find rather a close alliance.

(31) If we place the colonial revolution into the context of the present detente, two important facts emerge. Those colonial revolutions which are independent of the Stalinist camp (India, Burma, Indonesia) have, in foreign policy, generally taken a neutralist line. As such, they have resisted polarizing forces of the cold war. If they maintain this position, they can have only a negative effect, i.e. as a check on the efforts of the two power blocs to recruit the world. Only if they take a Third Camp position can they offer a positive program in world politics. As supporters of the colonial revolution, socialists are therefore highly critical of this neutralist policy and should work within the revolutionary movements for the Third Camp.

(32) A second consequence of the detente concerns Stalinism and emphasizes the need for Third Camp militancy. As apart of their general co-existence line, the Stalinists have muted their oppositional activities within the colonial revolutions which they do not yet control. The Indian Communist Party, for example, is moving toward support of the Congress Government. In such a situation, it is all the more important that socialists seize the opportunity to offer a militant, third camp leadership to the colonial revolution.

#### D. The United States

(33) American politics are basically imperialist. This follows from the necessities of its capitalist social system in a world which is increasingly hostile to capitalism and imperialism. America thus defends itself by supporting the interest of the bourgeois status quo.

(34) Since 1947, the official American position in foreign policy has been one of collective security against Stalinism. Initially promulgated as part of a plan to "negotiate from positions of strength", it has undergone various transformations in the eight years of its existence. In all of its forms, however, American policy has manifested a persistent reality, whether under Truman or Eisenhower: the inability to formulate any kind of political program against Stalinism, the consequent tendency toward a militarist foreign policy.

(35) In 1947, America began the Marshall Plan. Point Four was announced in 1949. The first was an attempt to maintain the stability of the nations within the Western Camp, the second, an attempt to win the colonial revolution to the "Free World" and in so doing to moderate its revolutionary force. Both were based upon the aim of strengthening world capitalism, the Marshall Plan through its aid to the European status quo (its chief beneficiaries were the European and American bourgeoisies), Point Four through its insistence upon creating "a favorable atmosphere for private investment. In 1950, with the Korean war, these economic and political aims were more or less abandoned. The two plans disappeared into the

totally military oriented MSA and NATO became the primary goal of American policy.

(36) The detente of recent months must be viewed, in the main, as a defeat for American policy. In Europe, it has meant a more critical and independent attitude toward America on the part of its allies. In Asia, it has been partly the result of the refusal of the Asiatic nations to follow American policy down such militarist imperialist alleys as SEATO. In political terms, then, whatever Eisenhower's "peace offensive" at Geneva may have meant, the recent detente has been one more symptom of the political instability of American foreign policy, of its inability to find a political basis for its anti-Stalinism.

(37) At the same time, it must be understood that the ratification of German re-armament represented a victory, in a limited sense, for the United States. Undoubtedly, the incorporation of the German industrial and military potential into NATO is of great importance. But when this is placed into a context - above all, a context which gives weight to the fact that the political price of the victory was quite dear - it is difficult to find any significant and lasting success in the ratification of German re-armament.

(38) In view of the foregoing analysis, the liberal view that the present detente is a victory for the "negotiate from positions of strength" attitude must be rejected. First of all, because the detente has been, by far and large, a political victory for Russia, i.e. has taken place to the accompaniment of a weakening of the American system of alliances. Secondly, because Russia is not, in the main, currently reacting to American pressure, but is acting out of a complex of causes, most of them uninfluenced by American foreign policy (see the section on Stalinism).

(39) In addition, the limitations which America's imperialist position in the world places upon its participation in the detente must be underscored. The United States has been unable to formulate any kind of a successful political struggle against Stalinism; its policy has primarily been one of military alliances. If it is considered possible that it can scrap an entire decade of its policy (and this is, to say the least, highly doubtful), then its only alternative is to cease its anti-Stalinism. The subject peoples of the Stalinist Empire who were, such a short time ago, the cause of a great Crusade are already being played down in the first months of the detente.

(40) Moreover, peace will pose grave economic problems for the United States. This by no means indicates that America will consciously maintain the cold war in order to maintain the permanent war economy. It certainly does mean that the possibility of any acceptance of disarmament proposals must be limited by the necessity of a gradual reduction in the armament sector. We must be careful in this area to avoid any simplistic, machiavellian explanations of American conduct; we must, at the same time, be aware of the pressure which the war economy exerts on American policy.

(41) In the coming period, then, American foreign policy faces grave problems. It is confronted with the weakening of its system of European military alliances and the non-existence of any real, popular support in Asia. Yet, if it abandons this unsuccessful military-oriented policy, it is incapable of formulating an alternate political struggle against Stalinism, i.e. it must de-emphasize its anti-Stalinism. Moreover, the second situation that of a limited effectiveness for negotiations, also involves domestic problems through the impact of a contraction of the permanent war economy.

(41a) In the last period, our primary political emphasis, especially to liberals, was upon a "democratic foreign policy." At a time when everyone in American political life was concerned with the problem of struggling against Stalinism, we entered the debate with (a) a criticism and analysis of the actual method of struggle; (b) a call for a democratic, political fight against Stalinism. It is possible, however, that the central position which this slogan occupies in our politics will change under the pressure of events. For if, under the condition of a continuation of the mood of co-existence and negotiations, political debate focuses on the question of negotiations, their content, their limitations, etc. then the emphasis, the tactical orientation of our slogans must change.

(41b) This by no means indicates that we abandon our demand for a democratic struggle against Stalinism. On the contrary, one of our major positions must be a criticism of American policy for giving up any fight for the enslaved masses of the Stalinist Empire. In making this point, however, we must make it absolutely clear that we do not call for a preventive war, or for a policy that would lead toward a Third World War. In the past period, this was largely unnecessary since all of the non-Stalinist liberals we talked to were committed to a military struggle against Stalinism. If their orientation changes, then we must accommodate ourselves to this fact tactically. Mainly, this will mean (a) stating plainly and often that we welcome the detente in so far as it represents a recession of the threat of immediate war; (b) by proposing democratic slogans for negotiations and calling for mass, democratic pressure upon the imperialist powers. A prime example of where this is possible is on the question of German unity.

### E. The Third Camp

(42) In recent years, there has been little growth of an organized, politically conscious Third Camp movement. There has been a significant increase in an unformulated anti-war sentiment throughout the world, expressing itself in the parties of all classes and, more often than not, taking a neutralist tone. This phenomenon - referred to by the leaders of the two war blocs as "world public opinion" - has clearly played a role in moving the big powers toward negotiations.

(43) In some cases, this amorphous sentiment has found explicit statement. India and Yugoslavia have become the spokesmen of this articulate co-existence tendency. It is of great importance to note that both of them have moved away from whatever incipient or rhetorical third camp elements they had had and, as they have emphasized negotiations, have become consciously anti-third-camp. This is the negative aspect of neutralism, especially where it takes on ideological form.

(44) On the other hand, where this anti-war sentiment is not articulated politically and remains a mood, albeit a neutralist mood, it exhibits a positive character. Though illusory in certain aspects, this sentiment provides an arena for Third Camp ideas and agitation. In so much as it usually represents a break from both war-camps, it is a step in the direction of a Third Camp attitude.

(45) This second situation pertains to Europe especially. Here, the Communist parties are suffering something of a decline, and the Social Democracy is shot through with various forms of anti-American and neutralist thought. In such a situation, the posing of the revolutionary politics of the Third Camp has an immediate and practical relevance.

(46) In general, then, the recent period has not seen the growth of a conscious Third Camp movement. It has seen all kinds of Third Camp manifestations, i.e. pressures to break from the demands of one or the other war camps which come from the people. As yet, the conscious level of these manifestations is neutralist. In this fact, we find a danger - the various opportunistic illusions of neutralism and co-existence propaganda - and also an opportunity, the growth of a willingness to at least consider courses of independent political action.

### F. Conclusions

(47) From this analysis, the following general conclusions flow:

- (a) the basic factors which underlie international politics today are still those of the two war camps in their unresolved struggle and the anti-imperialist politics, confused and uncoordinated, of the vast masses of the world;

- (b) a relaxation in international tension, chiefly motivated by the self-interest of the two war camps, partly motivated by the pressure of the world's people in the form of anti-war sentiment, usually neutralist in tone;
- (c) this detente is of such a nature that it cannot provide any kind of a lasting solution to the problems of international politics;
- (d) this detente also is a movement away from the imminence of war and the polarization of increasing tension.

### III

#### Evaluation

(48) How does this analysis effect the tactics of Third Camp socialism in the coming period?

(49) In so far as the present situation involves a lessening of the pressures toward polarization, it opens up the possibility of a more vigorous Third Camp agitation. In Europe, this agitation should center around issues such as that of German unity. In Asia, as noted before, the new Stalinist line may well result in their playing a reformist role in various movements of national liberation or in newly independent countries. In these cases, Third Camp socialists should play a militant, revolutionary role in opposition to any sell-outs.

(50) In all cases, in Europe and in Asia, Third Camp socialist should be conscious of the necessity and of the possibility of actually bringing their program to the masses of the people. If the new mood continues, if there is a further lessening of polarization, the workingclass may well be open to new political ideas and leadership. In no sense should we delude ourselves that the present, small Third Camp movement is, in the immediate future, a real alternative to the entrenched Communist and Social Democratic parties of the world. What we do conceive of as possible is that there will be much more of an opportunity for Third Camp socialists to do mass work in the coming period.

(51) In the United States, there are no mass movements of a socialist or anti-imperialist nature. Socialists will continue to address themselves to a small group of liberals, pacifists and Stalinists-Stalinoids. In this area, our emphasis must be sharp against the illusions, whether pro-American or



pro-Stalinist, of co-existence, but within a context of forthright commitment to peace and rejection of World War III. We must not, in any way, give the impression that our demand for a democratic foreign policy has as its goal a democratic Third World War. Rather we must raise the slogans of democratic peace and political struggle.

(52) Therefore, in all of our statements we must make it clear that we welcome the detente under its aspect of a retreat from imminent war, that we regard it as an opportunity for an intensification of Third Camp struggle, that we reject the illusion that an imperialist deal can achieve lasting peace. As an alternative, we pose struggle against both Stalinism and capitalism, within the context of rejecting World War III.

(53) In general, the following slogans should indicate our over-all political line and a few of its applications:

For the Third Camp!

Peace! Not Co-Existence

For a Democratic Peace!

German Unity!

For the Freedom of All Subject Peoples!

SHOULD WE HAVE TRIED TO PICKET THE MCCARTHY RALLY? ... IN REPLY TO  
COMRADE HARRIS.

... By Jack Walker

This contribution is in reply to Comrade Harris' article "On Comrade Walker and the McCarthy Rally", appearing in the July 4, 1955 issue of Young Socialist Review. However, the article in the February 7 issue of Young Socialist Challenge that comrade Harris was criticizing was submitted by the Berkeley unit of the YSL after discussing, amending and approving the article appearing over comrade Walker's signature. Comrade Harris' YSR piece was written about that time, although undated.

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(1) Apparently there were two different estimates among the leading comrades in New York over the advisability of picketing the McCarthy rally at Madison Square Garden last year. Comrade Martin, although he had not thought of this move at the time, looked upon it as a tactical problem based on acquiring the forces necessary to sustain such an act.

ie. from a letter of YSL Chairman Martin to Walker, Berkeley Organizer, dated 12/10/54.

"....On the question of having tried to get a picket line up. No such effort was made, and unfortunately, it never even occurred to anyone, undoubtedly a reflection of the state of the organization today, as compared with the days of the other rally in the 30's. I frankly doubt that any response would have been gotten from any of the groups you mention. .... At any rate, I will certainly bring the question of a picket line up to the YSL ... if there are any follow-up McCarthy rallies. It's certainly worth exploring. Thanks for the suggestion."

Comrade Harris has a different attitude which is composed of two ingredients: (a) lack of suitable slogans for such picketing in Comrade Harris' mind, so that (b) a picket line could only be directed against denying the McCarthyite forces the right to hold their meeting. The latter assumption is based upon the utterly false notion that the Berkeley unit of the YSL seeks to interfere with the democratic rights of reactionary or even fascist groupings before they have embarked upon a visible campaign of violence which provokes counter-attacks. This point will be taken up later in the article.

(2) The Berkeley comrades, when they recommended that the MAC seriously explore the possibility of such a picket line, looked upon the McCarthy rally from two sides. It was, on the one hand, a reactionary mobilization of the more dedicated pro-McCarthy forces to protest moves to censure McCarthy. On the other hand, it was also a possible opening gun in mobilizing mass support for a McCarthyite movement. Note, I did not say a fascist movement - either open or covert. There are and were no SWPish notions about McCarthyism being "incipient fascism" in the leadership of the Berkeley YSL, so that all of comrade Harris' allusions on this point are wide of the mark.

The creation of pro-McCarthy clubs, which would attempt to rally support for the witchhunt that McCarthy personifies in their minds would be a profoundly reactionary development at that time, given the fragile forces such as ACLU, the few liberals and the radicals that were working in the opposite direction. Comrade Harris apparently overlooks this latter aspect. We in Berkeley considered it a

possibility, but one which seems to have been ruled out by the flop of the New York rally, after which rallies in Chicago and on the west coast were called off.

(3) The slogans which would have been appropriate for such a picket line would be anti-McCarthyite and also directed against the Eisenhower and Truman witchhunt, for which McCarthy is a demagogic huckster and a personal opportunist. For example: (a) "DOWN WITH McCARTHYISM - EISENHOWER'S BRAND AND McCARTHY'S!" (b) "AGAINST GUILT BY ACCUSATION -- CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR EVERYONE!" (c) "DON'T CENSURE McCARTHY ON THESE TECHNICAL CHARGES. CENSURE HIM - ALONG WITH EISENHOWER, NIXON AND TRUMAN - FOR DENYING CIVIL LIBERTIES TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE!" (d) "NO POLITICAL TESTS FOR NON-POLITICAL GOVERNMENT JOBS OR FOR TEACHERS! THIS IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE 'FREE WORLD', REMEMBER!" ...etc.

This unique viewpoint should have been raised as publicly as possible at that time, to bring up the issue of civil liberties instead of relying upon the split within the Republican party plus the Democratic party's objection to McCarthyite smearing ("20 years of treason") to settle McCarthy's fate. Otherwise such a fruitless falling out among the McCarthyites of respectability and non-respectability might not recur, and there would not have been a correctly guided struggle against the evil of McCarthyism (ie. denial of civil liberties), itself, to prepare the American people - especially the labor movement - for the next official wave of McCarthyism (bi-partisan, of course). Additionally, the struggle against McCarthy as it was being conducted was not propitious for a re-examination of other anti-civil liberties measures passed by Truman and Eisenhower.

(4) I disagree with comrade Harris' viewpoint that our picket line (and leaflets) must necessarily be directed against permitting the McCarthyites the right to hold their meeting since "....it was not an audience with which we had something in common, for which reason we could hope to convince or influence it in some manner."

First, there were liberal and radical spectators at the McCarthy meeting who would have been heartened at seeing an anti-McCarthy demonstration outside. Second, our presence outside would have influenced the McCarthyites inside. Our dialogue with these people would be that of opposition. One seeks to dissuade as well as to persuade. Third, it is possible that the anti-McCarthy press would have given our picket line some publicity - at least locally - because of their aversion to him personally. Such publicity would have heartened those who stayed at home. It would have also indicated to them the type of activity that is possible - by our example (ie. leadership). Likewise for the organizations that we might have approached which were not ready to have come along with us at that time.

I hope that comrade Harris and other YSLers do not look at all picket line demonstrations as a threat of violent interference to those who cross the line. Otherwise it is difficult to rationalize such events as (a) the picketing of the Russian consulate in New York after the East German workers' uprising in 1953; (b) the picketing of the Spanish consulates in New York, Chicago, San Francisco and Los Angeles in 1951 following the General Strike in Spain; (c) the picketing of the GLK Smith meeting in Oakland in 1953, which was attended by elderly people by invitation only. The Berkeley YSL had also considered picketing the amalgamated meeting of such reactionary groups as Pro-America, For-America, and several other right wing groups in San Francisco in April 1955. It should be obvious by such a listing that all picket lines do not presuppose violence. Naturally there is the possibility that defensive tactics might be necessary to protect picketers who are physically attacked, but I don't think that comrade Harris would oppose limited violence here.

(5) The purpose, again, of calling for a picket line against the McCarthy rally would have been: (a) publicity for our unique posters; (b) shattering the farcical and demagogic atmosphere of official anti-McCarthyism by indicting the other side as well; (c) involving other forces in such a principled defense of civil liberties, before whom we could legitimately raise the banner of the YSL; and (d) indicating to the "more enthusiastic" elements who were disappointed with the mildness of the meeting, that they would face continued opposition if they carried their ideas into additional mass meetings. (See Hal Draper's article: "The Face of the Crowd ...", Labor Action, Dec. 6, 1954)

Comrade Harris, after concluding that a "counter-demonstration to the McCarthy rally ... lacks a political basis" -- at least a correct one -- is opposed to the idea of picketing simply "to get publicity for the YSL". We agree, comrade Harris! One does not picket unless there is a reasonable political goal to be attained that way. Before jumping to the conclusion that we had no goal in mind besides interference with the McCarthyites' right of assembly, you might have asked us for a more detailed picture of our goals. Actually, even in the Berkeley unit's piece appearing in the Feb. 7 Challenge there is a clue to our purposes.

ie. "...The purposes of such a picket line would have been; (1) to mobilize political opposition to this ultra-reactionary grouping/notice elaboration on this point in this article. JW /- which probably would have been good for national publicity; (2) to encourage further counter-demonstrations if additional meetings are called (offer leadership), and if called off to push our role as a contributing force/also commented upon in this article. JW /; (3) to gather enough forces outside of ourselves to defend such a political gesture from the possible violence of the senator's more enthusiastic supporters." ....

(6) I am not sure that I share comrade Harris' conviction that the YSL should have thrown itself "whole-heartedly" into the fight to censure McCarthy inside of whatever "spontaneous groups" that might have been formed, by passing out their pro-censure petitions on campus, etc. That is, by merging ourselves opportunistically in the phony censure move that was going on (As comrade Harris indicated, it was a phony censure ground.) instead of raising the cry: "Censure McCarthy for his violations of civil liberties instead of these picayune charges." In other words, we should have raised a principled defense of civil liberties, detaching both the Republicans' and the Democrats' guilt on the issue of McCarthyism. Obviously such an attack and position would have played a progressive role in clarifying the thoughts and political objectives of such groups where we might have been present. Actually such local protest groups would not be instrumental in settling the TV farce then going on.

(I agree with comrade Harris' idea that the YSL should have appeared at a pro-censure rally with leaflets criticizing the "nature of the censure motion and its sponsors, and calling for censure for McCarthy's real crimes against democracy.")

If Comrade Harris' remarks about the YSL not playing a "leading role" in such a campaign mean a critical propagandistic role for the YSL within such a new arena -- which comrade Harris might mean -- I would agree. Likewise if he meant that we should have encouraged campus liberal groups to have participated in such a hypothetical movement, fighting to get them to accept a more principled position and color the campaign accordingly. However, we would have to realize the limited character of such a campaign, its transientness, and the necessity to push our ideas on civil liberties continuously and vigorously before everyone had gone home.

Should we have tried to picket the McCarthy rally? - P. 4

A separate but similar case, is that of the "Joe Must Go" movement in Wisconsin. Such an attempted popular move to recall one of the most virulent apostles of the anti-civil-liberties current in the government certainly merited YSL participation as an arena. Again, we would go beyond the mere anti-McCarthy personal aspects of the campaign and try to introduce a principled, all-sided defense of civil liberties. As a minority element, we would also seek to relate the need for a labor party as a prerequisite to any serious and long run successful campaign to defend civil liberties, since both parties were too deeply compromised to repudiate their past.

(7) And now, finally, I want to take up comrade Harris' mistaken views and charges directed against the Berkeley YSL in his article. Comrade Harris says:

"...Any disagreement over whether the YSL should have called such a demonstration as comrade Walker/ie. the Berkeley YSL. JW / proposed would seem to be of minor significance, and it would be if it were not logically related to what seems (from a previous article by comrade Walker) to be other differences over 'the rights of fascists'."

Now it is no great secret that the Berkeley YSL has been in a discussion with the YSL - NAC over what we are talking about when we say that we defend the civil liberties of fascists. However, there is not as great a clarity within the YSL over the fact that when this discussion proceeded further, there turned out to be no real differences between us, except for one new point (hitherto not discussed) where Berkeley seems more "lenient" about civil liberties for fascists ... ie. opposing outlawing of fascist paramilitary groups by the bourgeois State.

Let me quote from some relevant signposts in this discussion:

- (a) Letter from YSL Chairman Martin to Berkeley Organizer Walker and NEC member Robertson, March 10, 1955:

"...On your talk re: Civil Liberties and fascists...Jack. I also agree that there is no substantive difference between us, now that you clarified the matter in your second piece/ie. Feb. 7 Challenge article./ There is probably a large difference in emphasis however. .... Today, I feel that one should emphasize ones support for civil liberties for all, including the fascists, rather than the right of the workers to defend themselves against fascist violence with their own counterviolence./I agree. JW/.

- (b) Minutes of the NAC of May 24, 1955:

The NAC "adopted unanimously" the view that "there were no substantive differences between the Berkeley and national YSL on this question/civil liberties for fascists/"

Comrade Harris (as NAC alternate) was present at this meeting.

- (c) Letter from YSL Chairman Martin for the YSL - NAC to Berkeley Organizer Walker and others in the Berkeley area, dated June 2, 1955:

"...as a result of the February 7 article in Challenge by Comrade Walker, the NAC had felt that no substantive differences remained on this question ...."

- (d) Letter to The Daily Californian, March 24, 1955, by the chairman of the Berkeley YSL:

"....The Berkeley YSL stands for the right of all fascists to pursue non-violent activities free from legal harassment. ... However, our support of the right of all Fascists to engage in non-violent activities is not a limitation on upholding civil liberties for Fascists or Communists, for that matter. ...."

It is unfortunate that comrade Harris did not see fit to add an explanatory paragraph to his article written in February 1955, in view of its destined appearance in July. Some comrades might continue to think that the apparent differences late last year and early this year were (a) real differences, and (b) still exist. I am sure that comrade Harris would not want such misunderstandings to continue.

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The one emerging difference coming from Berkeley's exchange with the YSL - NAC seems, strangely enough, to put us closer to the views of the suspicious comrade Fredericksen. Although we start from different vantage points, the immediate result is at least initially similar. Namely: The Berkeley YSL opposes the right of the bourgeois State to suppress political organizations, including fascist organizations, and fascists' military organizations!

In general, this is motivated by profound hostility (as well as mistrust) over empowering the capitalist state to license political organizations or class organizations. If this power be accorded it in theory (even today) the groundwork is laid for the eventual suppression of the bourgeois State's real opponent - the revolutionary socialist movement (when theory comes home to roost in actual situations). And in particular, the question of a serious fascist movement poses a constellation of forces that would also militate against calling upon the bourgeois state to outlaw political groups or even paramilitary groups of political parties.

The appearance of such dangerous groups as the S.S. and S.A. in Germany marked the breakdown of the everyday capitalist regime. The fate of the nation was no longer to be decided in parliament, but in more direct clashes between the fascist and socialist movements - between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat - in the streets. This situation presupposes an abstentionist role for the capitalist state's instruments of repression (police, army) in the face of attacks upon the labor and radical movement by fascist hoodlums and bands. Violence by fascists is condoned and left unpunished by the State - despite - despite bowel-shaking illusions on the part of the liberals, if only they can get through to the right state official! The eyes of all people in society are turned to the real foci of strength - the workers and the fascists.

The workers' movement is mobilizing defense squads, irrespective of political demarcations, and employing them to prevent the pillaging of working class districts, radical newspapers, etc. Trade union committees are being formed to coordinate working class policy in this crucial arena and also to lead major political and economic demonstrations by the working class. To call upon the capitalist state at this time to outlaw any armed group - naturally meaning the fascists in our own minds and exquisitely worded petitions - is to give it a recognized power to suppress other armed groups, especially the workers' defense squads. It would be a deadly mistake not to expect the fury of suppression to be visited upon the workers' defense squads first and most tellingly by the bourgeois state, when the fascist militia is sworn to uphold that state in the last analysis.

Therefore, socialist policy in such circumstances should be: (a) to call upon

the workers and their economic and political organizations to form defense squads and general trade union committees to coordinate working class strategy (united front) in this vital field; (b) to expose the dilatory and unconcerned attitude of the State in the face of this anti-working-class violence; and (c) to proclaim the need for absolute self-reliance by the workers, and summoning them to more direct efforts to take political power and establish a socialist re-ordering of society to solve the problems of capitalism's death agony.

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Now this brief glance at the necessary dynamics of a socialist fight against fascism comes against the reasoning of comrade Martin (writing for the NAC) and comrade Harris (the latter less clearly, although I believe it implied from his writing) on the question of urging the capitalist state to outlaw fascist organizations. ie.

From "Discussion: Civil Liberties and Fascist Groups ... The Rights of Organizations", by comrade Martin in YS Challenge, May 23, 1955.

"....It is hard for us to believe that comrade Fredericksen believes that action against the Nazi SS by a socialist government or a bourgeois government/my emphasis. JW/ would have been a violation of civil liberties. It is not a verbal question at bottom - the government declaring the SS to be outlawed - but rather one of confiscating its weapons, breaking up its training camps, etc. In the context of German society in the early 1930's and the repeated and unmistakably demonstrated activities of the SS, not of this or that SS member, but of the SS as such, the government would not have been violating anyone's democratic rights, for nobody has the democratic right to engage in such actions."

and

From "Comrade Walker and the McCarthy Rally", by comrade Harris, YSR, July 4, '55.

"....While no democrat is for unlimited rights for fascists (ie. to terrorize their opposition, beat up Jews, wreck working class meetings, etc.) we are for certain rights for them, that is, the same right we demand for ourselves and for any other political tendency, as long as it confines its activities to "peaceful" means. When it goes beyond those limits, we are for the state suppressing its activities (at least we call upon it to do so --- no. JW/ ) and we call upon its victims to defend themselves, whether the state sees fit to protect them or not."

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In other words, the NAC, as expressed through comrade Martin in Challenge (and also comrade Harris in his current polemic with Berkeley), is adopting a "classless" attitude toward calling in the bourgeois state to suppress groups. But the bitter experience of the radical and labor movement, and the fields of bleached bones in testament thereof, proclaim that the capitalist state is not an "impartial" state power, and therefore such a viewpoint is profoundly mistaken.

Thus, even in the immediate practical present, there is a decisive need to review theory to come up with practical answers that will stand up in the face of events. Therefore, the Berkeley YSL's contribution to the discussion of "civil liberties for fascists" has not been superfluous in its review of the 30's! Not by a long shot. (At the same time I want to reiterate my agreement with the NAC that our press should stress our concern for civil liberties for everyone.) I hope that the NAC and the YSL membership will address themselves to this proposed change in our attitude toward outlawing fascist groups, as raised by comrades in Berkeley.