


The American
Socialist

**DEMOCRATIC
LANDSLIDE:**

**VICTORY
FOR WHAT?**

THE CASE OF DR. ZHIVAGO



- *The Background Story*
- *A Review of Boris Pasternak's Novel*

Swaybacked and Spavined:

The Iron Horse Slows Down

DECEMBER 1958

35 CENTS

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

in England, and as attractive as the active play of boys, and nobody would shun it; almost everybody would delight in it for its own sake."

David Herreshoff, *Minneapolis*

Incentives Examined

Don Harrison of Elmsford, New York, had a letter on "Socialist Incentives" in your November issue which deserves elaboration.

Long after Bellamy our now elderly friend Harry F. Ward wrote a good book that descriptively and predictively explained the incentives developed by the early Sovieteers, called *In Place of Profit*. It deserves review by those forced to belabor this old question, and surely not all copies have been burned.

It may be useful to point out that the profit motive actually moves very few of us. It is more of a cliché than a fact; conservatives are full of clichés and sometimes socialists must take them seriously in discussion with the uncertain.

The stereotypes of the elite penetrate every society. The bourgeois are obviously motivated by the pursuit of profit, or acquisition of as much for as little as possible. Values are notoriously contagious, inherited, and rationalized, in America perhaps lethally, thanks to monopoly control of the mass media of communication. . . .

For those of us who want a society of more just and lasting values, I agree with Harrison that the incentives argument against socialism must be answered, but I believe the best arguments should be based upon these observations:

1) A fifth or more of workers work directly for the public, or some branch of government, and work well. It is obvious that profit per se is outside their experience. This certainly is true of most and the best of our scientists.

2) Most of the rest work under or for others and, except for the small proportion of salesmen on commission, depend upon "advancement" rather than profit for getting ahead. This advancement is different from that under socialism mainly in the greater justice and accuracy of selection under socialism. For example, whereas now evaluation is usually by a boss or employer or his representative, under socialism—as in most enlightened educational situations today—evaluations are by colleagues and "consumers" as well as supervisors.

3) Failure among U.S. profit seekers—by small business—is the rule rather than exception today; indeed, the larger the corporation (and the more bureaucratic, accurately speaking), the greater the profit and the fewer the profiteers.

Socialism has been imposed upon few. It is being chosen by the majority of people in the world today, where freedom of choice still prevails outside the Dulles brothers' free world, because people are fed up with the futile pursuit of individual profit and are learning that individuals gain most through social profit, or the socialized pursuit of profit and wealth.

Harry C. Steinmetz *San Diego, Calif.*

I disagree with Don Harrison when he says that "one of the major arguments and possibly the most effective one, used against socialism is that it destroys initiative and incentive." I would agree that this argument used to have quite an effect. But for a long while now it has been pretty obvious that an economy of public ownership and planning is more dynamic than capitalism. Claims that capitalism is the most productive possible economic order already fail to carry conviction. The case against socialism now rests mainly on the argument that collectivism inevitably carries with it a tyranny which denies us our civil liberties and personal freedom.

I agree with Mr. Harrison that we ought to discuss our concept of socialism in America more than we do. Surely the century-old strictures of Marx against the drawing of blue-prints and the painting of cloud castles are not as valid today as they were in the middle of the nineteenth century. But as we try to make our ideas of the future society more precise, I doubt that many of us will worry as much as Bellamy apparently did about the problem of indolence. We are more likely to be concerned about showing that "Though man's first step in civilization is slavery, his last step shall be freedom." I am quoting from the early American labor radical, Orestes Brownson who, by the way, has a remark about incentives which I am eager to pass along:

"The laziest man among us will angle or hunt all day. Gentlemen, fond of field sports, often exert themselves more than the common day laborers. Boys, wholly averse to hard work, will yet delight in still harder play. Strip labor of the degrading ideas now associated with it, render it as honorable, as much in keeping with the character of a gentleman, as fox-hunting is

Although not a socialist, I find tremendous value in your paper. The articles are intelligent, well-written, timely, and powerful. Your journalistic standard is markedly superior, and an example of quality to be set before the mediocrity that characterizes American newspapers and magazines.

The socialists I have met here in Toronto at various labor and socialist meetings are usually crude and bigoted individuals that support my opinion that the so-called working class is not worth the trouble one may indulge in to better it.

Your articles usually give me the impression of sincere searching for the more fundamental factors underlying contemporary developments. It is refreshing to bask in this absence of platitudes and puerile commentary.

I hope socialism never devours America, but I also hope your excellent paper becomes more widely read. For we need socialism as little as the church, but we need penetrating thinking as much as religion.

Bernard Singer *Toronto*

One of the hottest controversies raging today is over the merits of Krebiozen. Despite the fact that 70 percent of 1700 cases submitted to the American Cancer Society have shown marked improvement and in many cases "cures" (patients have been free of cancer up to five years after having had their cases diagnosed as hopeless) this organization refuses to give the drug a fair test. The test suggested by Dr. Ivy has been called "eminently fair" by Senator Douglas of Illinois. Those desirous of the test may make their views known by writing to Dr. Harold S. Diehl, American Cancer Society, 521 West 57 Street, New York 19, N. Y.

Thomas Grabell *Brooklyn*

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Victory for What?

ANALYZING American election returns is hardly an exact science. Some even consider it a variety of harmless indoor sport—a notch below crossword puzzles. In the mythology of democracy, the electorate is confronted periodically with various candidates and parties representing different policies on the major questions of the day, and the people in their wisdom or foolishness pick this or that alternative. But how are we to evaluate electoral results when political issues are deliberately engulfed in double-talk, and candidates concentrate on perfecting the art of the handshake and the photogenic grin?

Don't get us wrong. We are enthusiastic advocates of free elections. We think that even a degenerated and crippled parliamentary democracy gives the people a better chance for influencing government than a plebiscitary regime. But in an era when we have made the welkin ring with our boasts of free elections, we have certainly reduced the institution at home to farcical proportions. The Founding Fathers of this republic, who went to such infinite pains in setting up intricate constitutional controls to keep the propertyless in check, would laugh today at their forebodings and fears, could they see the ease with which their propertied successors are able to manipulate a population with the very techniques once thought the hallmarks of the institution of popular sovereignty.

One would imagine that the phenomenal sweep which has piled up for the Democrats staggering majorities in both houses of Congress, 34 out of the 48 governorships, and landslide victories in leading states legislatures, would signalize as a matter of course the end of the repudiated Eisenhower policies and the introduction of a new program. But even the most optimistic and glib doubt that this is the mean-

ing of the Democratic victory. It will take far more to dislodge the planned confusion, organized stalemate, and entrenched reaction in our government.

DESPITE the impressive Democratic totals, Southerners will head nine of the 16 powerful standing committees of the next Senate, and 12 of the 19 House committees. Tax policy will still have to pass through the fine mesh of Virginia's Senator Byrd. Labor policy will have to clear Representative Barden of North Carolina. Armed Services bills will have to satisfy Senator Russell and Representative Vinson, both of Georgia. If you add the Southern representation to the Republican, which in rough terms is what has occurred for the past twenty years on all crucial legislation, the Democratic majorities dwindle to minorities.

The notion that the Dixiecrat and right-wing Republican coalition has now been broken is, at the very least, an exaggeration. There may develop greater pressure on it, and it may have to compromise at times. But the coalition is still alive. (Besides, what do most of the so-called Democratic liberals stand for? If in 1958 you opposed the "right-to-work" laws and made some vague noises about progress and new ideas, the chances are you would be put down by the newspapermen as a bold rebel well to the left of center.) Finally, if by some unlikely freak a drastic progressive bill manages to elude the innumerable booby-traps, hazards, and dead-ends, there is still the presidential veto.

David Lawrence, the most hysterical of the big business watchdogs, does not feel there is any cause for alarm. Says the November 7 *U.S. News & World Report*: "Coalition of Southern Democrats and Northern Republicans can be effective in the new Congress as in past Congresses . . . The balance of

political power, for two more years at least, is likely to be held by those classed as 'moderately conservative.'" Even the labor leaders, who are elated about the "big liberal victory," know in their hearts that they better not press their luck too far with the 1958 vintage of liberalism. Their call for a "bold, new program" does not include their old demand for the repeal of the Taft-Hartley law, but contents itself with calling for repeal of the one section which permits passage of "right-to-work" laws.

IT is all but impossible to visualize anything beyond marginal shifts in Washington's course in the next two years. But let us disregard what the people will get. What did they want? What did they vote for? Here, too, things have been rigged: The organized confusion of American politics makes a sure answer impossible. Everybody is free to speculate. *Solidarity*, the Auto Union paper, thinks: "What the people said was simple enough: this country must move ahead. They voted for progress against reaction; for action against 'sitting tight.'" The *Nation* is more cautious if less clear: "What the voters want is a leadership that will fashion, through its achievements and stated objectives, an image of the collective American effort in which they can take pride." Samuel Lubell has probably caught most accurately the vague, uncertain, gnawing feelings bothering so many people, which have not yet gotten translated into political terms, and which by the nature of the existing political setup, cannot yet get translated. "One finds," he wrote, "a deep uneasiness. This uneasiness has a curious quality. It is not fretting over something that has already happened. Mainly, it reflects an anxiety over impending disaster, a sense that as a nation we are beset by problems which are slipping beyond our control."

This national neurosis is at least as old as the cold war, and is by now a chronic state. Twelve years of threshing about from the Democrats to the Republicans and back again, have not been able to bring any amelioration, much less resolution, of the frustration. But what probably precipitated the unfocused discontent into a Democratic landslide this year was the recession and the anti-labor offensive.

Vote analysts have also mentioned the farm problem and the question of leadership. Some of the European commentators stressed foreign policy. Of course, it is a tricky business trying to disentangle what is in people's minds when they are not too sure themselves, and when the whole system of saturation propaganda endeavors with malice aforethought to ensure bewilderment and fatalistic resignation.

But while the Republicans were victims of an inchoate and diffused discontent, to form which many elements mingled, it is doubtful that the Democratic victory would have been so impressive, or whether it would have taken place at all, without the recession and the anti-labor thrust. And one can go further and say that it is doubtful that the anti-labor attempt would have been so clearly set back, or set back at all, without the recession. It was this which brought back fears which had never really been pushed out of people's minds, and imparted the edge of impatience about the antics of our neo-Harding administration, antics which were accepted with tolerance or cynical approbation but two years ago. Our President hasn't gotten the point yet. He scratched his head in honest bewilderment as he peevishly explained to reporters after the election that he hasn't been doing anything different in the past two years than he did in the previous four when he was returned to office by an overwhelming majority.

IT would be risky to the point of foolhardiness to try to read portentous trends out of the election figures. After all, the two-party system is designed precisely for the job it is so ably performing. The people are permitted to vent their anger by bouncing one set of politicians in favor of another. All the time, despite the noisy fireworks and pseudo-battles, the behind-the-scenes power apparatus remains intact and functions undisturbed. To force through significant reforms by means of this trick instrumentality, as was done in the first years of the New Deal, requires a popular upheaval which transcends the mere marking of paper ballots at stated intervals.

The signals are too mixed, what with the election of Rockefeller in New York, and the prevailing apathy in the

nation at large, to say with any degree of assurance that the 1958 landslide presages a complete Democratic victory in 1960—and because of its very sweep, the beginning of a new liberal era. The very absence of clear-cut differences between the two parties makes for fickleness on the part of the electorate. There is plenty of discontent abroad in the land, alright. But discontent without leadership and without organization, as we know, can be steered in all sorts of directions and harnessed for all sorts of purposes. However, certain long-term trends are emerging whose fruition will spell a historic reform of the customary political lineups.

The most important part of the Democratic victory was the decisive defeat of "right-to-work" laws in five of the six states where they were on the ballot. This was the most genuine issue before the American public. It went beyond the immediate matter of the union shop. What was involved was a massive assault on the part of some of the biggest corporations to extend the anti-labor campaign which the "Class of '46" inaugurated with the passage of the Taft-Hartley law. The campaign was carefully built up and skillfully mounted. For two years, the McClellan Committee had been exposing crookedness and racketeering in many unions. The image was implanted in the public mind that unionism was a dubious, where it was not a sordid, business. Then, with a deft sleight-of-hand, the image was coupled with the "right-to-work" bills which allegedly were designed to free the enslaved



American worker from grasping union bosses.

The Big Shots spared neither money nor effort to put over their scheme. The NAM and Chamber of Commerce set up an elaborate political school program for businessmen. The officers of Gulf Oil and General Electric took the lead in mobilizing the corporations. Hordes of "junior executives" were rounded up for leg-work and missionary tasks. Huge advertisements sprouted on the billboards. Propaganda materials were rained upon the voters. They even enlisted the talents of the fascistic gutter journalists.

This campaign was not the brainchild of some select extremist circles of the business world. It came straight out of the horse's mouth. The contributor's lists bristled with such names as Chrysler, Ford, General Dynamics, General Electric, Shell Oil, Gulf Oil, U.S. Steel, Allied Chemical, Johnson & Johnson, Bristol-Meyers. Before the campaign was over, Eisenhower himself was induced to pass up his golf for a few days and do his bit in the crusade against Democratic "radicals," and to save the country from the imminent menace of socialism.

But the scare campaign didn't scare. It is hard to terrify a nation with the bugaboo of Walter Reuther and socialism when more than four million people are still out of work. The voters showed a fine ability to distinguish between the problem of racketeering in unions and the rights of the labor movement—and indicated unmistakably that they did not want the latter tampered with. The unions, for their part, displayed a new high in organizational skill. The independent labor-liberal bloc, which has been in the making since Sidney Hillman set up the CIO-PAC in 1943, has been further perfected and extended.

The repulse of the labor-haters is a victory for progress, even though the victory is a defensive and negative one. An attempt to translate the victory into much new socially beneficial legislation will probably encounter rough going in the next two years. But the experience is part of an important process. The preconditions are accumulating for the emergence of a new factor which will eventually alter the political structure of the country, if not in 1960, certainly within the next decade.

After the Auto Settlement

Detroit
THE most publicized, protracted, and confusing negotiations in Auto Union history have resulted in the smallest economic gains in Reuther's 12-year stewardship of the union. This union—which stopped the 1946 post-war offensive against labor, which set the pace with cost-of-living raises, productivity improvement-factor raises, industrial pensions, and supplemental unemployment compensation—has ground to a stop with the current three-year contract.

The new contract is only a rearranged version of the 1955 contract. Perhaps the best example of this is furnished by the annual 2½ percent improvement factor. Though all reports, including those from the Auto Union to its members, stated that the annual improvement factor would remain the same, it has actually been changed from a 12-month to a 13-month improvement factor. Under the old contract the annual raise fell due in June. The new contract changes this from June to July the first year, from June to August the second year, and from June to September the last year. It is estimated that this change of date saves the auto companies approximately \$70 per worker during the life of the contract. The \$70 is the equivalent of all the money gains in pensions, insurance, the eight cents to skilled workers, and other minor improvements.

It was this rearrangement which Reuther couldn't wring out of the corporations in May when they offered a two-year extension of the 1955 contract. Reuther had to get the eight-cent skilled trade raise as a minimum to hold these workers in line. For the last two years the skilled workers have been bitter about their wage standards and threatening to bolt the Auto Union. With the eight cents, Reuther felt safe in signing the contract.

The main other change in the new contract is the extension of the Supplemental Unemployment Benefit Fund. In 1955, the union received five cents per hour for the SUB. Since benefits from this fund were figured conservatively, it is now possible to pay larger payments over a longer period, and have money left for a Severance Pay Plan, without increasing the fifty cents per hour. This latter plan is for workers whose jobs are eliminated. The payments range from 40 to 1200 hours for workers with seniority of 2 to 30 years.

While the union can justly claim that it did not lose ground in economic matters in spite of the recession this is not true in other important areas. In both the Ford and Chrysler agreements the number of full-time union representatives was reduced.

What the contract means to the Auto Union membership can be best understood by placing it in the setting of the

workers' problems in the industry. At the April 1957 UAW Convention, "the largest package ever" was projected. The aim was a "shorter work week with increased take home pay." The demand met with universal approval. The ranks were enthusiastic. The shorter work week demand arose to meet the permanent reduction of manpower in the industry due to the rapid rise of productivity in the wake of automation. Reuther's report to the convention stated:

The age of automation makes it possible to achieve both greater abundance and greater leisure for the enjoyment of that abundance. In fact, we are advancing so rapidly in learning to produce more goods with fewer hours of work, while our national and particularly our business leadership learns so slowly to distribute properly what we can produce, that our only real choice may lie in the form in which we shall take our increased leisure. The only realistic alternative to the involuntary and barren idleness of widespread unemployment is the voluntary and constructive leisure that flows from rational reduction in the hours of work.

It must be remembered that the UAW Convention projected the shorter work week with a full knowledge of declining auto sales. Reuther continued in his report:

As we meet in convention in the early part of April 1957, the general economic outlook is uncertain and the economic outlook for the automobile and agricultural implement industries is even less reassuring.

IT became clear within a few months after the convention that the auto companies would not concede a shorter work week without a tremendous battle. Two great campaigns were directed at the Auto Union. First, that its demands were "inflationary and excessive." Second, that the union was a labor monopoly and involved in practices similar to those exposed by the McClellan Committee. It was in the face of these attacks that the union leadership began to waver on its "biggest package ever."

The first retreat took place long before the union ever got to the bargaining table. It took the form of the proposal by Reuther that if the corporations would cut the prices of automobiles by \$100, the union would take this into consideration and lower its demands. This the corporations rejected. In turn they offered a two-year extension of the 1955 contract. The next move of the union leaders was to scuttle the shorter work week entirely and substitute in its place a headline-seeking, profit-sharing plan which produced utter confusion in the union ranks.

By the time the union arrived at the May expiration date, the demands had been so reduced that no one could be inspired to fight for them. There was very little at stake any longer. It is at this stage that the companies' offer of a two-year extension of the old contract had a debilitating effect on union morale. Throughout the lengthy negotiations there were over 400 strikes at Chrysler. Most of these resulted from the company's attempt to impose GM production standards on the Chrysler workers. Tom Nicholson, *Detroit Free Press* labor writer accounted for them by

... the company's continuing efforts to produce cars on what it terms a "competitive basis." This has resulted in the streamlining of dozens of operations, an increase in the amount of work required of many employees, and—most important to the workers—the elimination of an estimated 25,000 jobs during the past two years.

The inability of the UAW to obtain full-time representatives and better production standards in General Motors has made it very difficult for the Chrysler workers to maintain their superior working conditions. Far-sighted union members had often warned that the failure to improve GM standards would act as a drag on the whole industry.

FOLLOWING the signing of the contract, most General Motors workers remained on strike for an additional one to four weeks in an effort to obtain some of the conditions that have long been prevalent in Ford, Chrysler, and independent plants. Their willingness to strike over local issues, which they fully understood, was a demonstration of their willingness to struggle, even in recession times, on issues of importance to them. The results varied from plant to plant. In some places, improvements were gained in work conditions, such as wash-up time, furnishing of safety clothing by the company, etc. To secure any improvements in work standards from this obdurate pace-setter of the corporation world, however, will require a far more coordinated and aggressive effort. While the GM locals were permitted to strike, the International was putting pressure on the local officers to settle quickly and get the men back to work.

Nevertheless, the strikes loosened things up in the auto plants. The fear of company disciplinary punishments is not what it was before. As the permanent nature of unemployment permeates the consciousness of the auto worker, new pressure will be generated for the shorter work week. The largest "no" vote in Auto Union history on the present contract presages new turbulence in the life of this union.

A lyric poet, the shifting winds of Soviet censorship, and the pot-and-kettle debates of the cold war: These are the elements that went into the most explosive literary event of the century.

The Case of Dr. Zhivago


by Harry Braverman

THE case of *Dr. Zhivago* was a long time in the making. The three major strands of which it is woven stretch back across the entire history of the Soviet Union. They are: first, the personal history of a Russian poet, Boris Pasternak; second, the Soviet government policy towards art and artists; third, the state of tension and antagonism between that government and the capitalist world, with its attendant cold war of the last dozen years.

The early Soviet literary period in which Pasternak's art matured displayed an amazing richness, variety, and experimental profusion of schools and tendencies. Imagists, futurists, proletcult, symbolists, Tolstoyan and Gorkian realists, romantics, satirists, innumerable aesthetic cults and interpretations vied with one another for supremacy or for a place in the new Soviet sun. The revolution released an enormous ferment, and while much of it seemed strained or specious, it was not without permanent impact and results.

Most of the new art was produced by artists whose careers dated back well into the old regime, and who were themselves products of the nobility or intelligentsia. Yet the Russian intellectuals had long been seething with discontent which had, under the Czar, expressed itself variously in socialist, populist, or mystical forms. The new literature and theater were generally favorable to the revolution and the Soviet regime, but the artists insisted—as artists always will, to the horror and mystification of philistines and blockheads of all political persuasions—on investing the revolution and the new society with their own intensely personal visions, and on viewing it often in non-political ways.

The greatest poet of the period, Alexander Blok, celebrated the death of the old order in his remarkable poem, *The Twelve*, in which a Red Guard detachment is ambiguously honored, as founders of a new land and also as looters, and in which the figure of Christ appears as the unit's ghostly leader! Serghei Essenin, of peasant origin, who had been one of Russia's leading poets before the revolution, joined a combat detachment and worked with the Bolsheviks, but he was later to describe his work: "I was on the side of the October Revolution, a most fiery fellow traveler, but I interpreted everything in my own



way—giving it a peasant slant." Even Mayakovsky who joined the Bolsheviks and became the poet laureate of the revolution, never rid himself of a strain of lyricism and romanticism, and filtered the events he celebrated through the fibers of his theatrical personality.

An impressive school of satirists arose which fed bitingly and affectionately on the post-revolutionary opportunism, bombast, and pretensions: Petrov and Ilf (*The Little Golden Calf*); Katayev (*The Embezzlers*); and the stories and sketches of Zoshchenko. By the end of the twenties, Tolstoyan realism had found its renewal in, among others, Sholokhov, whose *The Silent Don* pictured with unflinching truthfulness how the revolution came to the peasant communities. Its protagonist cannot stomach the Bolsheviks and fights for the Whites, then wavers and joins the Red Cavalry, later resumes his anti-Red activity; to him, the new regime has brought confusion and disappointment, and he has been compelled to accept it when he can no longer fight against it. This most famous of all Soviet writers offers no message other than that which emerges organically from his art, and purveys no political propaganda.

THUS, of the many imaginative interpretations given to Russian revolutionary society, few were impeccably Communist in their views, and almost all reflected judgments and complex reactions alien to the strictly political way of looking at things. Boris Pasternak was far from being an exception; from the first, he displayed a strikingly individual standpoint in art. Born in 1890 to a father who was a noted painter and a mother who was a gifted musician, he studied law, music, and philosophy in Moscow and Germany. He was strongly influenced by the composer Scriabin, a leader of the Symbolist movement in Russian

art, and while he never became a Symbolist, the school left its ideological mark on him in the form of its post-1905 preoccupation with mystical Christian concepts. His writing began in 1913, but he won his way to fame and influence only after the revolution.

The critics credit Pasternak with extraordinary inventiveness and verbal imagination, "perfect poetic pitch." But that is less important to us here than to take note of his special artistic vision. Politically, he was a consistent sympathizer of the revolution, a "fellow traveler," in the phrase invented by Trotsky to describe those non-Communist artists who went along with the party, and wrote poetic homages to the 1905 and other anti-Czarist rebels. But his major expression of revolutionary temperament came rather in his rebellion against conventional rhythms and styles, in his challenge to customary ways of looking at things, which he expressed in both the forms and contents of his work. His view and approach were profoundly personal, and his preoccupations were not the dramatic and significant events of the world stage, but the plays he acted out in his own being. His romantic lyricism obeyed an inner voice, and his concern was always with the private, the psychological, and the flux of individual emotion.

While the country moved, in his words, "toward the sea, into the light—into the socialism looming ahead," he compared himself to a man in a rowboat being out-distanced by a big fleet heading down the river of history. It was a role he frankly preferred, and defended stubbornly. He refused to write on current problems of economic reconstruction and political conflict, and resisted the pressures to make him keep up with the fast-moving times. Rather, he was concerned with creating and preserving for himself and his readers an island of individuality or a moment of feeling, and as for the charge that he was not keeping up with events, he answered: "In an epoch of rapid tempos it behooves one to think slowly." The revolution which impelled most thinking men to furious activity only encouraged in Pasternak his bent towards contemplation.

Whether because or in spite of this, or probably more accurately without reference to this, Pasternak became after the deaths of Mayakovsky, Blok, and Essenin the most eminent of Russian poets. In his own land, he was the subject of bitter controversy and the object of repeated attacks, but even there, when he turned his talents—perhaps in search of refuge—to translations of Shakespeare, Goethe, and the Georgian and Armenian poets, his stature was not to be denied. In the late thirties, rumor had it that he was "being persecuted," or "languishing in prison" (the latter apparently without foundation). Opposite rumor said that he aroused Stalin's grudging admiration with his translations of the Georgian poets, so that the dictator gave him the villa he now occupies. During World War II, when the ideological atmosphere was slightly relaxed, he published two new volumes of verse to add to his seven earlier ones. Before Stalin died in 1953, he had started *Dr. Zhivago*, a novel in the epic style that he completed by 1955. A few years earlier, the fate of *Dr. Zhivago* would have been foregone; but Soviet policies were in a state of uncertainty at this time.

AS we have related, back in the twenties government policy towards the arts had been tolerant. The Bolsheviks had brought with them into power the Marxist concepts that "being determines consciousness" and that the ideas of any epoch are reflections of an economic and social sub-structure. Some among them were eager to transmute these insights and tenets of sociological analysis into political imperatives and government fiat, but, for a time, wiser heads prevailed. The early censorship was relatively light, and allowed room for a variety of artistic expressions and critical interpretations of Soviet life. Then, with the New Economic Policy and the end of the worst days of crisis, official encouragement was offered to the many non-Communist fellow travelers. The authors of the famous resolution on the arts of 1925 recognized that if they stamped out all but "proletarian" and Communist writers, they would have little remaining save a promissory note for the future.

With the destruction by Stalin of all opposition tendencies in the party, and with the inauguration of the forced marches of industrialization and collectivization, all of this was changed. The regime began to insist upon a favorable political content in all literary output, and, more than that, arrogated to itself the function of literary critic as to form, subject matter, and treatment.

That all art was not choked off is demonstrated by the many creditable products under the new dispensation. "Socialist realism" lays claim to a place as one way of approaching the artistic problem, and numerous unfriendly critics in the West have conceded that their canons of artistic taste are well satisfied by much writing done in the Soviet Union since the thirties. Nor is every artist necessarily thwarted by having imposed upon him a method and faith which, in many cases, correspond to his own inner vision, developed under the tutelage of the one accepted school.

But there is little question that the literary dictatorship did enormous harm in many fundamental ways. It encouraged an outpouring of bad writing, tendentious, oversimplified, false to life, formula writing on the themes of industrialization, collectivization, and patriotism in which statistics take the place of imagination and insincere posings and political rhetoric take the place of emotion. Especially damaging was the discouragement or suppression of every other form of expression, some of which had already demonstrated in the twenties that they had far more than experimental value. The result was a literature suffering from an unnatural uniformity both of ideas and approach, exhibiting some good writing and occasional peaks of achievement, but on the whole stunted and repressed.

With the war and with the emphasis on the theme of national unity, the demand upon writers for a specifically Communist ideological content was weakened for a time, causing writers to expect (and to ask for) a relaxation of controls after the war. The Russian victory, followed by the mounting cold war tensions, produced an opposite result. The new literary policy was formulated in August 1946 in a resolution by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and was later enlarged upon by Andrei Zhdanov of the Politburo. Two literary monthlies were

attacked for publishing "politically and ideologically obnoxious works," and one was dissolved while the other was reorganized. Two writers were expelled from the Union of Soviet Writers and blacklisted, and the Union was given a new head. "Cosmopolitanism" was denounced as the chief enemy, and under the then current interpretation of this term, the fight against it involved banning the work of foreign writers from Eugene O'Neill to Arthur Miller. Novels of the war which had been received upon publication with great acclaim (like *The Young Guards*, a sweeping epic of the resistance movement among teenagers) were withdrawn and rewritten upon orders to enlarge the "leading role of the party."

THERE is no need to describe here the literary "thaw" which began after Stalin's death. It was bound up with the massive changes, rumblings, and shifts in the regime which began with the struggle to constitute a new mode of rule after Stalin. It was in the midst of this that Pasternak submitted *Dr. Zhivago*.

The novel presented a new and unusual problem to the regime. Other books, like Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* and Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone* were sharply critical of aspects of Russian reality against which feeling was rising in post-Stalin Russia, but they were "problem novels" written within the framework of the society. *Dr. Zhivago* transcends the accepted forms entirely, and is written from Pasternak's old preoccupation with the personal, the private, the emotional, and lyrical. The major human themes which have been artistic commonplaces for many centuries had gotten so submerged and repressed in Soviet society that an approach exclusively directed to them made their author look like a relic of the nineteenth century, and took on a "subversive" appearance to the dominant publishing authorities.

For the better part of two years, the authorities wavered. Pasternak was asked to make abridgments and revisions, something he was apparently prepared to do, as Tolstoy had at first permitted *War and Peace* to be published in abridged form. Announcement of imminent publication was made several times, and during one of these times, Pasternak sent the novel to an Italian Communist publisher, Feltrinelli. In the fall of 1956 came the Polish and Hungarian revolts; it was these events and the subsequent tightening up in all ideological spheres that apparently put a final end to prospects of publication. In the summer of 1957, the Italian publisher received a letter from Pasternak asking return of his manuscript for revision, a request urgently seconded by Soviet consular officials in Italy. He refused, published the novel in Italian, and it is from this manuscript that the subsequent translations into English and other languages were made.

Nothing was heard from Soviet sources until the recent award of the Nobel Prize for Literature to Pasternak. A day after this event, he was attacked as a "pig" who "dirties the place where he sleeps and eats," bitterly invited to go back where he came from, expelled from the Soviet Writers Union thus threatening his livelihood, and called, in the unrestrained style of old Stalinist discussions, a "traitor" and "Judas." The book was denounced in typical language as "artistically squalid" and "malicious."

We have now arrived at the point where *Dr. Zhivago* becomes entangled with the cold war. It is entirely possible that the Swedish Academy took its action in awarding the Nobel Prize with concern for the political objects thereby served. The enormous novelty alone of presenting the world's most honored award to a novel which had been censored out of publication in the author's own country gave the move strong political overtones. The *New Republic*, in its editorial on November 3, showed good sense in admitting:

Pasternak, to be sure, deserves the prize purely in terms of his literary achievement; he would have deserved it even before the appearance of Dr. Zhivago. But there is no reason to deny that this award at this moment has political motives and implications. How could it not?

But, whatever the motives of the Swedish Academy, cold warriors who have hitherto shown little interest in poetry and still less in Pasternak's transcendental lyricism quickly jumped into the fray and the world was soon treated to another of those ghastly pot-and-kettle Billingsgates that have so entangled the ideological scene. To start with, innumerable commentators quickly transformed *Dr. Zhivago* into an "anti-Communist" novel despite clear indications out of the author's whole career that his is not the kind of work that is made to be torn at and haggled over by political partisans, and despite the advance warning of Max Ascoli, editor of the *Reporter* (which published long excerpts from the novel before the storm broke), that the book is rather "a-Communist," and denying the "anti-Communist intentions glibly attributed to him [Pasternak] in the West."

Then, many hastened to add their voices to the outcry without stopping to answer the question where they were when punitive boycotts were being set up against even the non-political expressions of politically identified artists like Charlie Chaplin, Paul Robeson, and others, or Hollywood writers, directors, and actors having unorthodox backgrounds. We can salve our consciences by saying that the ban here is less absolute, that it is not enforced by the government, that it is informal, unofficial, and has many loopholes in it, but we cannot thereby erase the essential similarity, nor relieve the hypocrisy of those who oppose censorship only in Russia, but are not particularly bothered by it in America, France, Spain, or the Dominican Republic.

FOR Soviet life, the meaning of the development is clear; it reinforces the impression that after Hungary, the ideological thaw was sharply arrested and reversed. It adds another stroke to the picture which the Soviet Union continues to give of a regime in unresolved tension, which is fearful of slight and, in themselves, harmless relaxations out of apprehension over the floods that might be turned loose.

Coming in the same month when the government announces a prodigious economic effort, the case of *Dr. Zhivago* takes on a symbolic air. Few deny, at this date, the reality of Soviet threats to overtake the living standards of the West. But the Soviets have not yet promised to overtake the West in freedom for the mind and the per-

son, a precious ingredient of the standard of living of any nation. On this score, we hear no threats or boasts from Krushchev, no statistics are given, no hint is offered that it is even a desirable objective. Are we to understand that Russia will march into the socialist future, all the while manhandling lyric poets and thundering "pig" at every artist whose view of life runs more to Thoreau than Edgar Guest?

The history of art and artists shows a rebellious, heterodox strain which strongly suggests that writers, painters, musicians, and poets cannot exhaust their potentialities and functions simply in praise of the status quo. If an artist cannot express discontent with the world because it fails to measure up to the images presented by his mind,

if he cannot express discontent with life itself and the hard terms upon which it is offered to men, he cannot fulfill what his past shows to have been one of his chief functions, and what the most thoughtful portions of humanity have always demanded of him. In this sense there is bound to be an antagonism between organized society and its artists, if only as between performer and critic. Boris Pasternak may be hopelessly out of step with the attempt to build a socialist society, or a modern industrial society of any kind—he certainly doesn't cast himself in the role of a celebrant of modernism. But a regime which cannot tolerate artists who are out of step is, to that extent at least, an uncivilized regime, and far from a model for a socialist society.

Boris Pasternak's Epic Novel

by Jules Chametzky

DR. ZHIVAGO by Boris Pasternak.
Pantheon, New York, 1958, \$5.


*It snowed hard throughout the
month
Of February, and almost con-
stantly
A candle burned on the table;
A candle burned.*

—from *The Poems of Yuri Zhivago*

THERE is a story concerning Boris Pasternak's first appearance in decades before a Moscow audience—in 1956, during the first flush of the heady days following the Twentieth Congress revelations. He had been invited to read from his verse—and the students flocked in droves to hear him. During the reading something occurred that

Jules Chametzky recently took his doctorate in English literature, and now writes, and teaches at an Eastern University. This is his first review for the American Socialist.

is even more revealing of Pasternak's unofficially acknowledged position in the world of Russian letters: He stumbled over or momentarily forgot some of his lines, and from the audience hundreds of voices immediately and un-



BORIS PASTERNAK

erringly prompted him. The students "had" his poetry by heart. Pasternak apparently enjoys the same kind of national reputation and esteem for his poetry enjoyed in this country by Carl Sandburg or Robert Frost. This fact—in addition to his partial withdrawal from creative work in the public eye in order to do translations—seems to have saved him through twenty-five years of official condemnation, the terror, the purges. The mere fact of his survival—when so many other artists have been destroyed—I find moving and significant; that he should have survived with his memory, his artistic independence, and his courage intact I find almost miraculous. The novel *Dr. Zhivago* is, above all else, testimony to that survival.

THE book opens on a death—that of Yuri Zhivago's mother—at the beginning of the century, and in one of its three "conclusions" (about which more later), it ends with the death by heart failure of Dr. Yuri Zhivago in 1929 at the age of forty. In the three decades encompassed by these events we follow the fortunes of Zhivago—physician, poet, lover, father—and the lives that touch his through the stormiest events in Russia's history: the revolutions of 1905 and 1917, the first World War and the Civil War—seen from the various perspectives of city and countryside, front and forest, intellectual and *lumpen*, Yogi and Commissar. What emerges, however, is not so much a chronicle of this history as, rather, a chronicle of a man's attempt to preserve his identity and integrity in the face of these events.

Because of its scope and subject, the-

book inevitably invites comparison with *War and Peace* and *The Silent Don*. This, I believe, is unfortunate. If we hold up these books as standards of what this type of novel should be like, *Dr. Zhivago* can easily be criticized because its hero, unlike Andrey, Pierre, or Gregor, is much too passive and unchanging. The comparison is bad, and the conclusions derived too facile, precisely because *Dr. Zhivago* is not the same kind of nineteenth-century "well made" novel—although Pasternak makes many concessions, not all of them successful, to that form (in this connection its heavy reliance on "plotting" and its relationship to the "family chronicle" might be cited). *Dr. Zhivago* is, primarily, a poet's book, a knotty one that makes its most telling points elliptically, by leaps and starts, imagistically, symbolically, poetically. The essential difference as regards the conception of the hero is that Zhivago knows himself, and—if we are willing to accept the book and its technique on its own terms—the story really concerns itself with his pilgrimage into and his articulation of the self. Zhivago is a *sensibility* rather than the usual novelistic character—his characteristic form of discourse is the monologue, the journal, the poem. As the staggering events crowd in, the journey becomes more urgent, the need for articulation more intense.* The self that clearly emerges from Zhivago's reflections, art, and life is one that is increasingly alien to the world developing in Russia after the Revolution.

Taking this into account, as well as Zhivago's own realization of his isolated position ("To the moderates, whose obtuseness made the doctor indignant, he seemed dangerous; to those whose politics were advanced, not Red enough. Thus he belonged to neither group. . . ." The ordinary Marxian critic might conceivably bid Zhivago good riddance and let him stew in his self-created bourgeois hell. It could be argued that what we are asked to consider here is merely the disintegra-

tion of the typically negative, immobilized, bourgeois intellectual in an age of transition, shrinking from the demands of "history," unable to see the "positive" side of the dialectic process, etc. This view would, it seems to me, accuse Zhivago falsely of typical bourgeois short-sightedness. Because of his peculiar family connections, his sensibility, his dedication to concrete reality and the loftiest ideals, Zhivago has only the most tangential connection with the exploitative aspects of bourgeois society—which he rejects totally in welcoming the 1917 revolution. What he has acquired from the old order is the ability to reflect profoundly and originally upon the nature of life, a respect for the integrity and worth of individual destiny, and he has been touched by love. *Dr. Zhivago* is a man invested with humanity: man thinking, man feeling, man loving. When this man and his values are alienated by the aftermath of the revolution it is an indictment of that aftermath, revealing its tragic flaw. The cleansing, even harsh, knife of the revolution was necessary, but were the irrationality, the lies, the deceit, the cruelty, the new barbarism that followed? And when, if ever, would these things end? We can begin to understand both the fury of the official Soviet critics of this book and the impression Pasternak undoubtedly must make upon some Soviet writers and students who have recently been asking the same kind of questions.

IS Zhivago, and behind him his creator, a monster of arrogant individualism, "anti-sociality," and black reaction?* Let us note some of the things Zhivago opposes: the phoniness of empty eloquence, political casuistry, thoughtless adherence to empty ritual and formula ("He longed to shout to him and to the people in the railway coach that salvation lay not in loyalty to forms but in throwing them off."), the tangle of 1984-like unreality ("Was it possible that he must pay for that

rash enthusiasm all his life by never hearing, year after year, anything but these unchanging, shrill, crazy exclamations and demands, which became progressively more impractical, meaningless, and unfulfillable as time went by? Was it possible that because of one moment of overgenerous response he had been enslaved forever?").



And what does Zhivago affirm persistently throughout the book? Truth ("I think that if the beast who sleeps in man could be held down by threats—any kind of threat. . . . then the highest emblem of humanity would be the lion tamer in the circus with his whip, not the prophet who sacrificed himself. But. . . what has for centuries raised man above the beast is not the cudgel but an inward music: the irresistible power of unarmed truth, the powerful attraction of its example."); Goodness ("People must be drawn to good by goodness."); and finally, Beauty, Love, and Life. Above all he evokes and celebrates life, which wondrously and spontaneously renews and resurrects itself in art, nature, and human destiny, despite dogma, contempt, and death. These are the powerful themes and leitmotifs that support the entire structure of the novel.

I don't mean to imply that Pasternak has written a flawless work, or that it is a compendium of all the knowledge and goodness the world offers. I have suggested earlier that there are technical limitations to the work conceived as a novel. It might also profit from greater specificity of reference, or elaboration upon the concretely historical (Tolstoy, for example, did not constrain himself in his treatment of Napoleon). I think that Pasternak relies

* In a play called *List of Good Deeds*, by Yuri Olesha there occurs a line worth preserving: "In an age of rapid tempos, an artist must think slowly." This play, written and produced in 1931, offers many other suggestive connections with *Dr. Zhivago*. cf. N. A. Gorchakov, *The Theater in Soviet Russia*.

* Boris Kryloff, the cultural attache of the Soviet Embassy, said the following to a group of Barnard students recently: Pasternak is an "angry and frustrated author," "up to his neck in money," and out of step with progress in the Soviet Union. "He is not with us. We're going ahead. He's not."—*New York Times*, November 14.

perhaps too heavily upon his reader's supplying corroborative details from a knowledge of Soviet life *up to the present* to support generalizations presumably inspired by the events of the twenties. Occasionally, therefore, Zhivago's irritations and anguish, as in his vision of a 1984 world, may seem insufficiently motivated, his generalizations hasty. The reasons for this strain and, conversely, constraint, would seem to be personal, technical, and political.

The wonderful thing is that within these conditions and limitations, Pasternak has created a unique work of art. His chief method of resolving his difficulties has been the creation of an elaborate symbolic or allegorical structure. The symbolism is rich and complex but it is by no means impenetrable. The device of the three endings is illustrative of the method, and also distills the essential themes of the book: in the first, Zhivago (the seeker after the light, the repository of humane values) dies; in the second, an epilogue that takes place fourteen years later, we learn, almost by accident, that a child was born of the union between Zhivago and Lara (like Dante's Beatrice, she may allegorically represent many things: Joy and Suffering, The Life-Principle, Love, Creation) and has somehow survived, but is for the moment ignorant of her heritage; and last, there are the collected poems of Yurii Zhivago, which come out of his life and his death(s), but finally transcend him in an imperishable life of their own—the final, and perhaps most certain, twisting of death's tail.

A REALLY intriguing question is whether Zhivago is merely a resurrected fossil of the twenties and early thirties when Soviet literature offered many such examples of the distressed intelligentsia whose roots went back to the past, or whether, with his idealism, religiosity (although I think Pasternak's version of Christianity is peculiar to him and fits in primarily with his concern for individual dignity), and tormented sense of alienation, he does not, indeed, express ideas and values relevant to Soviet life in the fifties. Even the sketchiest view of developments and themes in Soviet literature in the last five years (the period of the post-Stalin thaw from 1953 to 1955, and the later post-Twentieth Congress *sturm und*

drang) suggest that Zhivago is by no means a relic.

During the thaw there was a satire of the made-to-order Zhdanov novel (*Horizons Beyond Horizons*, in which the author regards the accumulation of official clichés as “so indigestible that one feels like screaming”); a play by Zorin picturing a terrible and *typical* government bureaucrat and his family; and Ehrenburg's work, which presents a very unlovely picture of life in a small town and factory and suggests further that the task of constructing a Soviet humanism remains to be done (it seems to have been forgotten somewhere along the line). In the second period we have Dudintsev's *Not by Bread Alone*, sketches, plays, and especially poems by the braver young poets which represent real criticism of the regime and often of its fundamental values: the chief themes in this period would be those continuing the Ehrenburg-Zorin material, personal and apolitical themes (love, marriage, the fam-

ily), the search for the unvarnished truth (a “tearing away of the masks”; “Without truth, there can be no happiness”) and the search for humanitarian values (respect for people, the need for compassion, an expression of deep sorrow for the harshnesses and injustices of Soviet life).

In this context, it seems to me that *Dr. Zhivago*—unique as it is, and ought to be—cannot be regarded as extraordinarily atypical. Its reception by the West will probably accelerate a tightening-up process that was beginning last year—in which Khrushchev himself finally had to hold audiences with recalcitrant and unrepentant writers—but I don't think this can last. There has been a definite movement towards freedom on the part of Soviet writers, and I don't believe it can be suppressed for too long. After all, as Pasternak has been at pains to show us in his work and by his example, life, art, and truth stubbornly resurrect themselves from apparent death.

The Passing Storm

The air is heavy with the passing storm
The earth lies calm and free and glad again,
Through all its pores the flowering lilac bush
Drinks deep the pure cool freshness of the plain.

The world's reborn, transfigured by the storm.
The gutters shed a flood of rain. Now fair
And vast the blue beyond the shrouded sky,
And bright the ranges of celestial air.

But more exalted far the poet of power,
Who washes clean the dust and grime away,
When by his art emerges transformed the harsh
Realities and truths of naked day.

The memories of decades with the storm
Retreat. Free from the past of tutelage,
Our century demands the time has come
To clear a passage for the coming age.

No swift upheaval swelling of itself
Can make the way for our new life to be;
Our hope—the message of a spirit kindled
By truth revealed and magnanimity.

Spring 1958

Boris Pasternak

Despite shifts from coal to oil, railroads still run on—and for—money. Are the bitter complaints of shortages of money really true, and if not, why is service deteriorating so badly?

Swaybacked and Spavined:

The Iron Horse Slows Down

by Frank Bellamy

IN the nineteenth century, when rails were frenziedly laid across the continent, public scandals centered around vast government give-away of land, wholesale bribery and even ownership of legislatures by the rail barons, stock frauds, rate-gouging and the like. The railroad scandal in this century—stemming from less crude but just as insidious wrongdoing—is the calamitous decline in standards of passenger service: fewer trains, slower schedules, abandonment of routes, higher fares.

The rail moguls blame deterioration in service on sharply reduced traffic, lower income, “unfair competition,” and governmental “indifference” to their “plight.” To be sure, the rail situation has deteriorated, but the principal victims have not been management and the stockholders, but the hundreds of thousands of railworkers who have lost their jobs and the millions of customers who have been inconvenienced and overcharged.

In the first place, the railroads are not as bad off as they would have Congressmen (but not their stockholders) believe. True, profits are down—\$354 million for the first nine months of 1958 compared with \$540 million in the corresponding period last year. But so are the profits of most big corporations during the recession. The rate of return on rail investment has declined from 3.6 to 2.6 percent. But this yield is figured on the basis of total book value, much of it “watered.” Dividends have not suffered. Last year the average railroad stock yielded a 5.8 percent dividend, identical with the dividend rate in 1956 and 1955, and the highest average since the twenties. The roads in the Northeast, up against high maintenance costs for numerous yards and terminals, a static population, short hauls, heavy truck competition, and—most important—a greater percentage of less profitable passenger traffic, have been losing money. But their losses are more than

offset by the profit margins shown by western, southern and eastern coal-carrying lines.

RAILROADS carried fewer passengers (including commuters) this year than in any year since 1890. Railroad passenger-miles have sunk below air passenger-miles. Some railroads, to their credit, tried to preserve as much as possible of their passenger business by giving the traveler a better deal. The Lackawanna, Texas & Pacific, Kansas City Southern and Missouri Pacific have reduced fares between some points as much as 45 percent. The Burlington’s crack Vista Domes and Slumbercoaches have been unqualified successes. But these roads are in the minority. Most large carriers have failed utterly to capitalize upon the potential speed and comfort of rail travel for medium distances. They have in effect encouraged the shift to air, automobile, and bus travel by charging exorbitantly and by operating obsolete, uncomfortable passenger equipment.


So intent are the rail companies on skimming off the rich cream—that is, the freight business that reaps the highest rate of profit—that they openly shirk their role as a “common carrier,” which obligates them to furnish passenger service as well. The title of an article in the January 18 *Business Week* sums up rail management’s attitude: “Passengers: Curse of Railroads.”

Since the effective date of the Interstate Commerce Act, the Interstate Commerce Commission has permitted the abandonment of 42,000 miles of rail line. In a 12-month period in 1956-57, the ICC obligingly approved 88 percent of all applications to abandon trackage. Trains continue to be abolished wholesale. In the six-year period, 1951-56, the 46 state regulatory commissions that kept records approved 1,274 passenger train discontinuances, denying only 197. The Baltimore & Ohio, the nation’s oldest passenger railroad, alone has dropped 100 trains in the past few years, and this year carried its last passenger between Washington and Jersey City. The Southern Pacific dropped service to 45 Western towns. Milwaukee no longer has any rail service to the capital of the state, Madison, and another fairly large city, Paducah, in Kentucky, hears not

Frank Bellamy is the pen name of a newspaperman from New Jersey, a state, he reminds us, traditionally controlled by the Three P’s: Prudential, Princeton and—The Pennsylvania Railroad.

a single passenger whistle. Ordinary and crack trains alike have been dropped, down-graded, or combined. Examples are the Pennsylvania's Senator between New York and Washington (dropped) and the New York Central's Twentieth Century Limited and Commodore Vanderbilt between Chicago and New York (combined). Schedules that were once proudly maintained to the minute are now hardly more than approximations.

PASSENGER stations are going. During the six-year period, 1951-56, 46 state commissions allowed the closing of 2,466 stations, while denying 372 such applications. In the last year the Central alone has disposed of 75 of its passenger stations. Thousands of other stations throughout the country are open only part of the day, with one agent selling tickets, answering the phone, and handling the baggage. Many of these stations, to be fair, are deserted whistle-stops, but many others bring in enough business to earn their keep. The New York Central has threatened that unless New York City gives it a tax break, it will cease to run its trains into the city and leave bustling Grand Central Terminal as silent as a mausoleum. Passengers would complete the 30-mile trip into New York City by limousine, taxicab, bus—or foot. On another



front, the Central and two other lines are fighting in the courts for permission to kill the last ferry across the Hudson River, which would strand New York City-bound commuters on the New Jersey shore.

Dirty, dingy, dilapidated passenger coaches—these are the result of penny-pinching on maintenance and modernization. Orders for new cars have dropped off alarmingly. Last year all American railroads installed a scant 51 passenger cars. As with rolling stock, the railroads have drastically reduced their outlays for upkeep of track and structures. Expenditures for road improvements dropped 12 percent in the first half of 1958, as compared with last year's first half, and equipment improvements decreased 31 percent. "Excessive deferred maintenance" is what the rail companies call it when they save money in this way. This penny-wise, pound-foolish policy spells higher costs for the companies in the long run and—what's worse, jeopardizes the safety of rail workers and passengers. The 48 lives lost when the Jersey Central commuter train plunged off a bridge into Newark Bay September 15 might have been saved, experts agreed, if the diesel locomotive had been equipped with a dead-man control to stop the train when the engineer suffered a fatal heart

attack. Testimony before investigators revealed that the signal light on the bridge might have been faulty and, in any case, that a new electronic safety device could have stopped the train had it been installed on the bridge.

THE rail-riding public is paying more for less service. In less than two years, Pennsylvania and New York Central have raised first-class fares 35 percent and coach fares 15 percent. The first-class fare between New York and Chicago, exclusive of sleeping car charges, is now \$65.17 (compared with \$52.75 airline). The coach fare is \$41.07 (compared with \$38.89 air coach and \$25.74 bus). No wonder the railroads are losing business to air and bus lines! Robert E. Bedingfield, railroad expert for the *New York Times*, speculated September 5 that perhaps "the two roads (Pennsy and Central) are bent on hastening the drastic curtailment, perhaps even the liquidation of passenger service and particularly of first-class, by pricing away the market."

Threats to drop passenger service altogether have come not only from the railroads but also from members of the federal agency that is supposed to regulate the railroads. Charlie H. Johns, Jr., associate general counsel of the ICC, and Howard Hosmer, an ICC examiner, have both predicted the end of rail travel. And it isn't merely talk. According to the January 18 *Business Week*, "many outside the industry believe that the Eastern railroads are doing their best to get out of the passenger business entirely. The railroads themselves protest this idea, say that the theory has no foundation. To many, each fare increase the railroads seek and each petition they make to discontinue service makes their protest sound more hollow." The roads' public-be-damned attitude is too much even for the *Wall Street Journal*. It editorialized September 9: "It should be remembered that the railroads are a public service with a responsibility to the public. A move to price train travel out of the market, possibly with a view to eventually eliminating passenger service altogether, will certainly not be met with favor by the nation at large. And moves in that direction will only abet the government-ownership advocates who have a very simple plan for settling the railroads' financial problems once and for all."

SHIPPERS as well as passengers have suffered in the down-hill slide on all railroad service. As recently as 1929 the American railroads carried three-quarters of all commercial intercity freight. They now carry less than half. Trucks have steadily gained ground and pipelines have all but replaced the oil tank car. Nevertheless, the railroads are still carrying more than one and a half times the freight they carried in their best years in the twenties, and twice what they carried in the years preceding World War II. But their chief competitors are growing at much faster rates. One reason is that many shippers have lost patience with railway slowness: last year the average freight train made, including all stops, a piddling 18.8 miles an hour. The railroads' answer to their freight traffic problems is lobbying for restrictive legislation to throttle their competitors and, at the same time, raising rates. *Forbes*, magazine of big business, put it succinctly in its February 15 issue:

Up to now, their main attempts to offset rising costs have taken the form of 14 rate increases totaling 108 percent in the past 11 years. It was probably this, even more than ICC regulatory policy, that drove traffic away from the rails. A few railroad men, notably the North Western's Ben Heineman and the Southern's Harry A. deButts, have admitted as much. Says Chairman Heineman flatly: "Railroads have steadily priced themselves out of their markets."

But most prefer to base their rates not on cost of service, but on value of service—that is, on what the traffic will bear. (Emphasis is *Forbes'*.)

It wouldn't be so bad if the burden of the railroads' rate-grabbing were borne by big shippers alone, but unfortunately much of the burden falls upon small business men, farmers and, in the form of higher prices, on the consuming public.

The railroads complain that they need greater rate-making powers than the ICC allows them. Most railroads also want tax relief, subsidies and government-guaranteed loans. The 85th Congress, while refusing tax cuts to the people, repealed the 3 percent federal excise tax on freight. But state and local legislatures, with a few exceptions, have balked at reducing taxes on railroad property. As for subsidies, a few railroads shun them as door-openers to government ownership. The Milwaukee Road prefers to gouge the public with fare hikes, and has received ICC permission to boost its fares on Chicago suburban trains from 34 to 108 percent. The majority, however, extend eager cups for subsidies. The New Haven didn't hesitate in accepting \$900,000 from Massachusetts to keep its Old Colony line in operation. Other Eastern roads have threatened to shut down unprofitable branch lines unless they get cash handouts also. The Transportation Act of 1958 made available \$500 million in government-guaranteed loans. The first to request a chunk of it—\$18.5 million—was again the New Haven.

EVEN if the railroad owners got everything they wanted in the way of tax relief, subsidies and government-backed loans, they still would be unable to live in the manner to which they became accustomed in the days when their greed raged practically unchecked. The simple fact is that there are far too many railroads in the United States—635 in all. Their existence cannot be justified on the assumption that most of them compete with one another. With certain exceptions, they certainly don't compete in freight rates. Almost entirely exempt from the anti-trust laws, they get together and set prices under supervision of the ICC. This vast sprawling, decentralized network is the source of wasteful rivalry. It makes no sense, for instance, to have six roads running directly between Chicago and Omaha, and two others by more circuitous routes.

Railroad men themselves recognize that 635 lines is too many. But they differ on what to do about it. Some favor mergers. Four major mergers are in the talking stage, including the doubtful marriage of the Pennsylvania and New York Central. But, as the *New York Times* pointed out October 26, "the pattern for rail merger plans seems

to be: dramatic announcement, long 'study' and—nothing." One road block is management itself. There are only so many offices to spread around in a merged organization, and no one likes to merge himself out of a job.

More far-sighted than mergers is the plan put forth by *Fortune* in its August issue. *Fortune's* plan is consolidation of all competing railroads into three or four non-competitive, integrated, regional systems. "The remedy," writes Gilbert Burck, "is consolidation on a grand scale. . . . In fact, large-scale consolidation is probably the only measure that will enable the railroad industry to make enough money to survive as private enterprise."

But why should the railroad industry survive as private enterprise? What guarantee has the public that three or four huge rail companies, carrying passengers and freight for profit, would not abuse their enlarged powers and treat their customers as callously as do most of the existing 635 companies now? No doubt, as *Fortune* says, consolidation would cut waste and save "hundreds of millions of dollars a year." But consolidation is a makeshift reform, as Burck honestly points out when he remarks: "Theoretically, there should be as few systems as possible, and one big system for the whole country would be best of all." Burck's main objection to single management of all American railroads is that it would be too easy for the government to take over. Yet his article, 7,500 words long, contains not a single argument against government ownership.

GOVERNMENT ownership and operation of the rails would generate economies and speed services on a far vaster scale than possible under consolidation under private enterprise. In Chicago one of the government's first jobs would be to eliminate most of the eight passenger stations now in existence, making it possible to pass through that city without changing trains. Duplicating yards would be consolidated. Equipment repair shops would be centralized. Trains, track, and structures would be maintained properly to insure good service and safety. New equipment would be purchased to replace the obsolete. Duplicating routes would be eliminated without inconveniencing customers. Passengers would be won back through sharp fare reductions, new equipment, faster schedules, and other improvements in service. Fewer freight cars would be needed because of better distribution. The senseless practice of dispatching loaded freight cars over roundabout routes would end. (According to ICC studies, the average loaded car rolls some 13 percent farther than the shortest route between its origin and destination.)

Instead of trying to compete with long-distance trucks, the government-run railroad would cooperate with them. Much truck hauling could be done more efficiently by loading the trucks themselves onto flatcars, using tractors only for delivery at the other end. Instead of trying to compete with barges at less than cost, the government-run railroad would transfer cars to barges where water was the most economic route. Even without nationalizing all forms of commercial transport, the government could put an end to the hodgepodge of overlapping and conflicting policies (ICC for trucks and buses, Maritime Commission for water, CAB for air), and by combining these regulatory agencies into a single Department of Transporta-

tion, and establishing an integrated, national transportation policy.

OUTSIDE the United States, there are only two privately owned rail systems of any consequence—the Canadian Pacific Railway and the Companhia Paulista de Estradas de Fierro in Brazil. Opponents of public ownership in the United States are fond of pointing to the deplorable trains in Franco Spain and other backward countries as horrible examples of what happens when the state runs the railroads. The analogy is a poor one. As the pre-eminent industrial nation in the world, the United States should have the best-run rail system. It hasn't. In Switzerland where, tourist propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, peasants still thresh grain by hand, the rail system is under public ownership. This is what the March 24 *New York Times* says of it: "Rail service is fast and utterly dependable. Glistening modern equipment is found on all but the smallest spurs. Most Swiss feel their railroad system leaves little to be desired."

The rail unions were able to make many gains during the first World War period when the railroads were under government operation. After the war, the leading rail labor officials fought for the Plumb Plan which called for govern-

ment ownership and democratic operation of the railroads. But the movement lapsed after a few years when Congress ignored the pleas of the unions and returned the roads to private ownership in 1920. Since then, the rail Brotherhoods, grown increasingly conservative, have forgotten about nationalization. But the program continues to have merit from a union point of view as railroading has become a crisis industry. Rail employment hit a peak of 2 million in 1920. Employment this August was 1 million—just half. Over 171,000 rail workers lost their jobs in the 12 months preceeding August. Any blueprint for nationalization will necessarily have to include a comprehensive labor policy which would guarantee some stability and security to the men and women who do the work.

Government ownership of American railroads would not be "socialism," as the rail agents insist, no more than the Post Office is socialism. The cyclical tendencies of capitalism—boom, bust, war—would remain. Properly run, however, the state-owned railroad system could improve the transport situation considerably both for the public and the industry's workers, and would offer the people a glimpse of what could really be accomplished under full-scale socialism when all the major means of production are taken over for public use.

City of Brotherly Love

by Martin Oppenheimer

Philadelphia

THE "liberal" District Attorney of Philadelphia, Victor Blanc, interrupted his normal recreational activity (viewing Brigitte Bardot films prior to banning them) last April 30 to declare he would seek the death penalty for eleven Negro youths accused of murdering a Korean student at the University of Pennsylvania. The first of nine youths scheduled for trial, Alfonso Borum, 19, was sentenced to death by a jury on October 9. Blanc's declaration had marked a high-point of hysteria just five days after the Friday-night gang-stomping of In-Ho Oh, who had been on his innocent way to a corner mailbox to drop off a letter.

Only a month after the senseless slaying did the City of Brotherly Love begin to return to a semblance of normality. The initial reaction of the "public" (still represented at the Borum trial by an assistant D.A., who called the attackers "sadistic savages") had been utter lynch-law, with the surprising exception of the tabloid *Philadelphia Daily News*. Police Commissioner Gibbons said he would pull in off the streets 2,000 juveniles on probation; he threw a 175-man detail into West Philadelphia, which accosted every group of more than two persons seen on the streets, and slapped a midnight curfew on all citizens in the area, permitting police to accost any person and demand an accounting for his actions. "The

heat will stay on," said he, "untill we drive these gangs from the streets."

At that time the youths were called "vermin" by an attorney representing the University of Pennsylvania and the Drexel Institute of Technology, which are located a few blocks from the murder spot. The committing magistrate told the boys they were "barbaric" and "jungle-like." A neighboring church, which sponsors dances every Friday night (some of the accused had been turned away just prior to the murder) cancelled its dances. Letters poured in to the newspapers asking swift and just retribution, adult punishment for an adult crime. Only the *Daily News* cautioned that "the get-tough drive sounds too much like putting TB patients into hospitals forcibly, then releasing them with the disease uncured, to return to the old environment where they caught it." And, though swept along with the initial hysteria, the *Philadelphia Tribune*, circulated mainly among Negroes, calmed down quickly to state, "today's youthful gangsters. . . are the results of an adult philosophy that has subordinated the things of the spirit—decency, honor, truth, fair play, honesty, and virtue—to the mad rush for money and the things which money can buy." A few days later it pointed out: "It is absolutely stupid to expect people to be lawabiding citizens when they observe the law being flaunted with impunity

by men in high places." (Reference was to the resistance to the Supreme Court decision on school integration.)

AS for the boys themselves, at least five of the original eleven (two are state's witnesses: they have much to gain in testifying) did not live in homes with both parents living together. One is said to be mentally ill. Another lived with his mother, who is on public assistance, and four younger brothers. Of those living with both parents, at least two fathers were unemployed last spring, when there were 87,000 unemployed on the rolls in Philadelphia. Several of the parents thought their boys totally innocent, a notion which had not occurred even to those sympathizing with the plight of the accused.

In the welter of hysteria concerning the murder, the question which ran through the tons of irrelevant newspaper seemed to be: Why? Why do boys behave like this? What is the cause? Without going into such abstract ideas as the fundamental morality or immorality of the social system in which we live, a number of themes seemed to recur:

1) The police, who still generally follow the "head-beating" school of crime prevention (or at least this is the impression they leave with many), claim no allegiance or respect from the boys. Many youths seem to feel that if the accused had been white, people would have simply said "insanity," but the police, even Negro police, tend to treat all Negroes not as individuals on their own merits, but as *prima facie* open to suspicion. "If you're white, you're all right," as the song goes. Like Ferlinghetti's dog, the boys don't hate the cops; they just have no use for them. Police cannot work effectively on the preventive angle—in the entire city of Philadelphia there are only 25 gang workers; in the 31st Police District, which had 1200 juvenile arrests in 1957, there are only two gang workers.

2) The districts with the highest arrest rates are also those with the worst housing, the lowest incomes, the least years of schooling, the highest TB rates, etc. Yet State funds for the care of dependent, neglected and delinquent children have been cut for the 1957-59 period by nearly three-fourths. And one individual in the public housing field has estimated that at the present rate of improvement, it will take over one hundred years to get adequate housing for all Philadelphians. In North Philadelphia's notorious "fire belt" (in which the 31st Police District strangely enough finds itself), the Department of Licenses and Inspections found 58 percent of dwelling units with "gross violations" of fire laws; they had inspected only 10,000 buildings, and 45,000 remained to be inspected, much less improved.

3) The *Daily News* (not a socialist newspaper, let it be emphasized) found juvenile delinquency to be part of a general protest against the standards of current society. It quoted a psychiatrist of the New York Department of Corrections as saying: "These people (juvenile delinquents), on the basis of their anti-social behavior alone, and in their frame of reference and with their special values, do not consider themselves as being sick people. As a matter of fact, they often consider the non-criminal portion of the population as sick, hypocritical and con-

fused. . . . church people and school teachers tell you to be your brothers' helper but in the same breath intimate that personal success and wealth must be the constant goal, and achieved at any cost . . . the law of the land is, 'Hooray for me and the hell with you'—that life is short and the atomic bomb will make it shorter." Anyone for Jack Kerouac?

THAT much for cause. As for cure, none deal with the problem the *Daily News* raised, except for glib phrases about spiritual values. First, there is the "hard" school: the whipping post, corporal punishment. Quipped one authority (though the matter is far from humorous): "Suppose it doesn't work? Do we go back to the thumb-screw and the rack, then?" Next there is the school of parental responsibility: fine or jail the parents, if the delinquent has any. In fact, this has not been found to be effective where tried. These schools all agree generally that crime is a matter of free will, and that criminals must be punished as being personally responsible and alone to blame.

Then we have the "softs," the social worker types. These fall into several sub-species, which have together given social work a bad name which it does not really deserve: 1) "We must help these poor, suffering people to live in the nice, normal middle-class way we do, even though they may not want to, poor things." 2) "The problem is so big, so complicated, so frustrating, so confusing! We'll have to give it more study." 3) "We should pay social workers more." The plea is legitimate, but the money comes from the same place housing and school money does—and there isn't much of it.

The more valuable suggestions, such as variants on the CCC-camp theme, more gang workers, and neighborhood self-help, are of course only temporary stop-gap



measures. Except for self-help, which requires leadership the needy neighborhoods often do not have, they all cost money, a commodity which only the Federal Government seems to have at present, and between H-bombs and the fact that Northern liberals who voice a concern about these things are still hooked up to the economy-minded South, it looks as if it will be a long time before the delinquent will be able to look about him and recognize the difference between real values and real estate values. Meanwhile, the alternative offered by society, represented by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, remains the Chair at Lewisburg, Pa.

Man has not just one, but several "human natures," says an anthropologist, making him more adaptable and perfectible than sometimes supposed.

The Three Faces of Man

by Stanton K. Tefft

MUCH blood, sweat, and tears have been spilled by psychologists, psychoanalysts, sociologists, and anthropologists in trying to define what constitutes man's "human nature," "character," or "personality." What is human nature? Is it variable or relatively static? What are the relations between "human nature" and society? Is man doomed by his "human nature" to inevitable unhappiness or can he, by his creative powers, transform it, and thus achieve some sort of happiness in yet-to-be-created societies? In answering these questions some theorists have become pessimistic about man's ability to find happiness or, on the other hand, over-optimistic, in light of the difficulties in changing man's "nature."

Freud struck a deeply pessimistic note. In order to build his culture or civilization, man, Freud felt, had to suppress his instinctual drives, the satisfaction of which gave him much pleasure. Thus, immediate satisfactions gave way to delayed satisfactions, pleasure to restraint of pleasure, joy in play to toil in work, receptiveness to productiveness, and absence of repression to security through repression. Thus, in adjusting to the realities of social life, man learns to give up momentary, uncertain, and destructive pleasure for delayed, restrained, but assured pleasure.

The need to repress basic instincts, Freud thought, grew from the fact that in the "struggle for existence," group controls were necessary if man, as a species, was to survive at all. But since his basic instincts were still quite strong at every period of development, repressive control had to be continually re-established. As a result man was doomed to much unhappiness. Whatever satisfaction is possible necessitates work, more or less painful arrangements and undertakings. This "struggle for existence" takes place in a world too poor for the satisfaction of human needs without restraint, renunciation, and delay. As societies become more complex the necessities for social domination lead to

surplus repressive mechanisms which are added to the earlier basic ones dictated by the "struggle for existence." The notion of a non-repressed civilization was incompatible with Freud's theoretical ideas.

IN an attempt to overcome this pessimistic view, the Neo-Freudian school (Fromm, Sullivan, Horney, and others) has adopted the general thesis that with the acquisition of cultural behavior man freed himself forever from instinctive determined behavior and has acquired a new means—since he can modify his behavior by changing his social institutions—to achieve freedom. Man's problems arise not out of a conflict between his sexual and aggressive needs and the realities of group life which demand suppression, but as a result of imperfect social systems and conflicts between groups within such systems. The market economy has somehow destroyed man's freedom, and the aim of the Neo-Freudians is not only to help man adjust to the restrictions of society but to develop his potentialities in order that he may assume leadership in building a more constructive world. In these objectives the Neo-Freudians show the character of their theoretical orientation. Rather than emphasize, as Freud did, the destructive influences of Western culture on the personality, they have actually adopted its value system. If man, according to this viewpoint, is going to realize his "individual potentials," then he must acquire them within the system of which he is a part—which is tantamount to surrender to that system—or fight the system single handed and martyr himself. In either case his struggle is doomed to failure. The Neo-Freudians underestimate the force of cultural tradition in shaping individual character from birth onwards, and overestimate the ability of *any one individual* to transform himself within the cultural matrix in which he has been reared.

Like the Neo-Freudians, certain social behaviorists, as C. Wright Mills, have stressed the importance of post-childhood's social "roles" in shaping the personality of human beings. Mills, reiterating anthropological views, states:

The author teaches anthropology at a large Midwestern university, and has written previous articles for the American Socialist.

The Human variety is such that no "elemental" psychologies, no theory of "instincts," no principles of "basic human nature" of which we know, enable us to account for the enormous human variety of types and individuals. Anything that can be asserted about man apart from what is inherent in the socio-historical realities of human will refer mainly to quite wide biological limits and potentialities of the human species. ("Psychology and Social Science," Monthly Review October, 1958.)

On the surface Mills' remark seems to imply that the human personality has a great potentiality for change and variation. But this is because of varying "socio-historical" traditions. Within any socio-historic reality (tradition), how do individuals change their "nature"? Mr. Mills does not inform us. And we seem to be back where the Neo-Freudians have left us with individual rebellions against the existing social order. Neither Freudian, Neo-Freudian, behaviorist, nor modern psychologist with his billiard ball (stimulus-response) theory and "the-world-is-a-good-place-adjust-to-it ethic," seems to offer much hope for man and his conquest of happiness.

THE average citizen must share some of the psychologists' despair when he looks at the series of blunders man has committed in trying to make his "utopias" a reality. Huge international systems now struggle on the brink of war. Frankenstein monsters, the political and governmental systems, seem to control men rather than to be controlled by them. The effects of radiation—X-ray, atomic, or cosmic—seem destined to profoundly change man's biological nature, possibly for the worse. In face of these immense problems, the most that modern psychology can offer is pills or "adjustive" therapy. Rather than wage war on "other directive" personalities, modern psychology seems destined to contribute to the proliferation and spread of social zombies.

One modern psychologist has recently published a book which goes a way toward resolving some of the difficulties encountered in the above theoretical schemes. A psychologist who is not only optimistic but also realistic in his approach to man and the problems of changing his nature is a rarity these days. But such a man is Gardner Murphy. In his book *Human Potentialities* (Basic Books, New York, 1958) Murphy has turned pessimism into optimism, but not by weaving idealistic and highly unrealistic speculations about man's ability to pull himself up by his boot-straps. Murphy sees the destructive aspects of modern industrial culture, but also sees the possibility that within its soil the seeds of a new human nature may grow and transform the cultural landscape beyond all recognition.

The fact that our society is technology-minded and science-minded is a source, feels Murphy, for jubilation rather than foreboding. "A new kind of humanity is coming into existence, rooted in the current historical trends, especially trends from science and the urge toward discovery," he writes. Man, by recognizing his future potentialities today, can in the course of a few centuries make radical changes in his biological, cultural and intellectual world. It is man's ignorance of his potentialities

that limits his development and narrows his horizons. Man will discover these new horizons because of his "need to understand." Murphy's thesis is stated this way:

There are deep forces within us that strive fundamentally for gratification of the need to understand; forces resistant to standardization and the molding process; forces that nervously and restlessly cut through the chrysalis of culture. It is just as human to fight against cultural standardization as to submit to it; and under conditions of modern living, the creative forces of curiosity and of artistic and scientific reorganization of the materials and ways of life may overpower the massive forces of culture.

It would appear, then, that just as curiosity killed the cat so man's curiosity will kill "other directed" "organization" men. Just as water frozen in the cracks in granite will eventually liberate itself by gradually expanding and crumbling the rock, so will man's inevitable search for understanding destroy the limitations of his existing society and replace it with new forms.

MAN, according to Murphy, has not one but three human natures. The *first human nature* is man's legacy from the past, his animal, or more accurately, simian attributes. Although man is an intellectual giant as compared with other animal species, he is also the most developed simian of the primate order. Murphy's ideas about the original human nature of man differ from Freud's notions. Not only does the *first human nature* contain "id" drives such as hunger, thirst, sex, cravings for oxygen, warmth, etc., and primary aversions such as fear, rage, disgust, etc., but other simian demands such as those involving curiosity, rhythm, manipulation, exercise, the need and capacity to learn, channelling drives and abilities for organization in specific directions. These drives, needs, abilities all have simian origins. Man's sex and aggressive drives are only two of many which he has inherited from his animal past.

The *second human nature* is man's cultural behavior, which developed when he acquired a language, became a socialized creature, and passed on his learning from one generation to another. Man wants "safety, order, protection against the unknown, and, on the positive side, companionship, love, and dependable cooperation." In trying to attain these objectives men began to share skills, ideas, feelings with his children, and his children, in turn, added to these ideas, feelings and skills, and passed this new knowledge on to their children. But Murphy, like Freud, recognizes the repressive aspects of all modern cultures. Modern societies, especially industrial ones, leave a "large part of human nature uncultivated and undeveloped." The latent potentialities of men are yet to be achieved. In developing his culture, man not only suppressed his sexual and aggressive urges but sacrificed much of his capacity for "exploratory perceiving and thinking." Strangely enough, he seems to have retained this ability only in his dream and phantasy life. In most other areas of behavior his creative abilities have been only minimally utilized by modern society. The ossification of creative thought is a

barrier to the emancipation of a new human nature. Thus, man's *second human nature* is that part of his behavior which is culture-bound and conservative.

While Freud, as well as many modern psychologists, looked with gloom on this habit-bound stylized man, Murphy, in contrast, looks with hope at the emerging *third human nature*, that human nature which struggles against the



culture mold in which it has been reared. Psychology has pictured modern man as escaping from reality through neurotic or psychotic solutions to his basic conflicts which, of course, are products of the social system in which he lives. But Murphy feels that "there is also a powerful positive motivation to make contact with reality." In fact, human beings may have such a "craving" for contact with reality "as will sweep away personal autism and the smug sense of cultural rightness." Modern industrial societies, then, in emphasizing the scientific attributes of objectivity and curiosity have unleashed a tremendous force for social and cultural change. As Murphy puts it:

There are latent creative powers which wait to move forward to their work when freed from the restless downward pressures of the alert mind; creative powers which spring into being when the narrow, nervous, pre-occupied world of waking activity steps aside in favor of quiet integration of all that one has experienced when one is willing to let the mind leave harbor and travel fearlessly over the ocean of new experiences.

Men today have more curiosity about the world in which they live, although a seemingly quiet, contemplative curiosi-

ty. They are beginning to break down the socially shared self-deceptions of the past (and this applies to "radicals" as well), and they have more leisure, if they would only use it, to let their minds, free from the immediate external tasks, explore the previously locked and barred rooms of their enormous cerebral domicile. If we have interpreted Murphy's point of view accurately, it would appear that as the "struggle for existence," which originally necessitated repressive modification of man's *first human nature*, becomes more attenuated, he can allow freer expression to his basic impulses and become less inhibited in his creative life. This would require radical changes in the social institutions, such as state structures, class structures, and so forth, which have created "surplus repressions" as man's culture has become more complex and his life dominated by complex mechanisms of control (this is my interpretation, not Murphy's). In any case, the stage has now been set by modern industrial society for a new human nature to emerge because it is fast becoming rich enough to end the necessity for renunciated satisfaction of man's primary needs.

UNLIKE most Neo-Freudians, Murphy sees no necessity for each individual to discover his potentialities in a lonely struggle against the power of the status quo. Although Murphy admits the importance of individual creativity and achievements, he feels that the human potentiality of the future will be the potentiality of institutional achievements. Just as scientific advances of the modern world are accomplished by groups of investigators working cooperatively, so new creative insights and achievements in the realm of politics, arts, and so forth, can be achieved through more rather than less "attention in industrial society and group centered way of life."


To extend Murphy's argument a bit farther, we can say that men will be able to build their new utopias by discovering new ways to use group structure. Group life *per se* is not the cause of the "organization man" but only a society which has evolved vast bureaucratic structures which demand not creativity but conformity. It is quite possible that men will devise schemes of social organization that do away with or limit the necessity for bureaucracy. It is inconceivable that men will reach a state where they can eliminate group activity altogether. Man can best express his creative talents and skills only in and through social groups organized to maximize creativity and minimize conformity. In future societies he may be able to transmit the creativity from a level of fantasy life into real world of social intercourse.

Murphy, being no sage or prophet, is himself not sure where man's "yen to discovery" will lead him. It is possible that men may devise some worldwide "authoritaria," a system based upon an international hierarchy of power. Another alternative which men may choose could be a society which has political centralization but an anarchic spirit in the areas of technology, arts, education, and elsewhere. Or, why not an ant-hill type, ponders Murphy, which is a gregarious society not requiring any higher control from the top. This sort of endless speculation flows logically from the point of view expressed by Mills, which sees man in his infinite cultural variety.

IN what kind of a society, Murphy asks, can man fulfill the needs of his three human natures, biological, cultural, and creative? In such a society, the three human natures must be "integrated into a new emergent whole". Today the three "natures" are in conflict, but by a dialectic process they will form a new synthesis and an entirely new human type will emerge. In the new human society, or at least in the one Murphy envisions, the opposition between man and nature will be overcome, and the fulfillment of man will at the same time be the fulfillment of nature. Not only conflicts between groups or classes will be absent but also, and what is really more important, the intra-personal and intra-psychic conflict will be reduced to a minimum, although not totally absent. It will be a society in which human impulses of curiosity and love are not thwarted or twisted. Individuals will be free in the sense that they can live their lives "unburdened by toil coerced by others but also free in the sense that they have an equally precious right of autonomy of decision (provided no damage is done to others)." A society such as Murphy contemplates would by necessity be one in which the level of material and intellectual wealth would allow the painless satisfaction of the needs of the *first human nature*.

The "instinct for workmanship" in its mean and despotic sense would happily disappear and men, no longer alienated from one another or nature, could enjoy the true fruits of social intercourse. But, as Murphy wisely points out, to get from today's society to the ideal one of the future, necessitates a period of struggle. For "in and through crises of today and tomorrow, [man] may find new fulfillment." And this fulfillment will only come by way of man's insatiable urge to discover the reality of the world around him.

Man has discovered curiosity and like Pandora, once having let it loose in the world, has no escape but to direct his own evolution in terms of it. But in Pandora's world, Prometheus, the hero of toil, progress and productivity through repression, will be a hero no longer. Today, not only the capitalist world but the so-called socialist world worships Prometheus. It is believed that man's love of toil and productivity is given in his "human nature." But what Prometheus has produced Pandora will enjoy. A million years of struggle have brought men on the brink of a new world where they may need brutal toil no longer. But is it now too late for him to enjoy the treasure of Pandora's box? Murphy does not think so.



Communism in the United States

THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY: A CRITICAL HISTORY (1919-1957) by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser. Beacon Press, Boston, 1958, \$6.75.

WE all have our views and opinions, especially about so provocative a topic as this one. And most of us are long since disabused of the notion that when historians practice their craft, they check ideology at the door to their studies. Many histories have been written in furtherance of particular ideologies and all histories carry the traces of, at the very least, a set of unconscious biases and preconceptions.

Still, every historical work must deal with a body of objective experience which exists independently of the author's opinion of it. While our best histories are not eunuch products but the work of intellectually committed men, it remains a fact that the art of writing history involves the ability to transcend opinions in the interest of a fair and judicious presentation. What the critical reader wants from a history first and foremost is a re-creation of events and their motive forces. If a historian is so overcome with mirth, bitterness, or a sense of his own moral and mental superiority that he

can't give his undivided attention to that task, then he ought to let a few years go by until the emotional jag wears off before trying to do a history of some subject matter that has definitely got the better of him.

Irving Howe and Lewis Coser of *Dissent* magazine have put together a lot that is worth while in this book in the way of quotations from newspaper and magazine articles, books, speeches, and resolutions, chiefly directed towards proving the ideological barrenness and depravity of the Communist Party, and its twists and turns of line in obedience to Soviet foreign policy. For those that still need it, there is plenty of proof here that the Communist Party does not have an honest or consistent record, that it reduced thinking to the level of mechanical dogma, that its various leaders disgraced and abased themselves repeatedly as part of the normal routine of the organization, that cynicism replaced idealism in many of its maneuvers and manipulations. But our authors have succeeded in producing a pamphlet instead of a history—a 600-page one, but a pamphlet nevertheless. One has only to compare it with Theodore Draper's *The Roots of American Communism*, the first volume of a projected complete history, which carries the story up to 1923, to see how the present book falls into the category of a political tract, where Draper's study, equally critical of the Communists and from a more rightist standpoint, nevertheless transcends incidents and trifles in probing for the essence of its subject matter.

AS it emerges from this book, the tale of the Communist Party becomes almost exclusively a record of gross stupidities, incredible depravity, miserable ineptness,

atrocious bungling and blundering, and a horrifying "atrophy of moral sensibility." What remains unexplained, and, in the authors' terms, inexplicable, is why and how the Communist Party won the field against all competitors and became the dominant force of American radicalism for a generation.

Every movement is entitled to be considered in its own setting. The powerful motivation of American Communism from its beginning was the conviction of many that Leninism had taken the socialist ideal out of the realm of talk and put it in the realm of reality—not just in Russia, but in the United States and all other countries as well. Widely interpreted as a summons to simple imitation of what the Bolsheviks did in Russia, that proposition turned out to be profoundly mistaken. Caricatured in a super-leftist fashion by the early Communists and some of the sects that followed, it often became ludicrous. When, in heaping Ossa upon Pelion, the Communists added Stalinist degeneration to the party's inherent difficulties, it seemed as though they were doomed to complete isolation. The authority of the new Soviet power had enabled them to become the strongest of the radical groups, but how could they win attention in a country like the United States with their outlandish views and bizarre appearance?

The answer came at the close of the thirties, with the simultaneous collapse of world capitalist economy and inauguration of the first Russian five-year plan. Interest in what was then called the "Russian experiment" grew apace in liberal, intellectual, and labor circles, at the same time as disgust with the miserable performance of the free-enterprise paradise mounted. Of course, few at that time tried to compare

the living standards in the two countries, but the contrast in the directions of motion was considered extremely striking.

Still, the caricatured Leninism on which the Communists were founded wasn't getting much of a play in the population at large. The twin gospel that swept the land as the American response to the Great Depression was industrial unionism and New Dealism. It was here that the Communists achieved a connection with American life in a way they had not foreseen. They were able to establish themselves as the left wing of the New Deal movement, and at the same time to ride the current of sympathy for the New Russia.

THIS was the period of the Communists' greatest strength and significance, and necessarily becomes the most important part of any history of the organization. Howe and Coser have been able to do very little with it. They emphasize the grotesqueries involved in a shift from the ultra-leftism of the early thirties to the rather extravagant pretensions to patriotism that followed soon after. They dwell on the maneuvers and the mechanics of Communist control in a series of organizations. But chiefly, the air exuded by this major portion of their book is one of haughty disgust—with the Communists, of course, but also with the liberals, with the New Deal, with "mass culture," with the CIO. For, while in the early portion of the book the authors make merry over the alienation of the Communists from any facet of American life, here, their chief complaint is that the Communists had become too closely attuned to American social currents. They comment a number of times that the Popular Front line of the Communists in some very important respects "fitted perfectly the temper of the time." But they think it suffices simply to deplore this all-important fact—to look down upon the mood of "undifferentiated political progressivism" of the New Deal period. It is at this point that Howe and Coser fail most emphatically, in refusing to discuss, in its own setting, not just the Communists, but the entire country. Their juvenile pose of distaste and disdain makes it impossible for them to discharge the task they have set themselves.

It is a mistake to think that the New Deal experience and the Communists' role within it can be disposed of that cavalierly. The subject is far bigger than that. The progressivism of the thirties was the opening of an entirely new stage in American protest movements. For one thing, it was primarily laborite in content and preoccupation, as against all previous populist movements that were primarily concerned with the farmers and the middle class. For another, it focused directly on the capitalist system and its dilemmas, instead of expressing a yearning for a return to an earlier small-capitalist paradise. Although many comparisons with pre-World War I protest movements can be made to the disadvantage of the New Deal, the latter expressed a far more fundamental ferment than any of the older waves of discontent.

NOR is this just a matter of history. The New Deal period foreshadowed all the basic elements of the protest movements of the future. The Communists' place within it thus becomes of great interest to any American left wing. It is true that, because of its special disqualifying characteristics, the Communist Party's role was foredoomed. It was a party that couldn't go anywhere because—among other things—it was not following its own road, as the next turns in line were to prove. (The current second-guessing by various ex-leaders to the effect that the CP would have done all right if only it had continued on a straight path actually postulates a different party.)

But, without here passing judgment on the many facets of the Communist line, some clearly wrong and others totally contemptible, the successful drive to become part of the New Deal-Laborite protest movement has to be taken far more seriously and treated with far greater understanding. To imagine that the obligations of a historian can be discharged simply by taking a supercilious attitude to the New Deal progressivism, including its left wing, is to betray a species of sectism. And sectism remains sectism, whether inspired by romantic revolutionary leftism or by ultra-sophistication.

The emotions inspired by the subject have overwhelmed the authors beyond the point where a prefatory note admitting "a point of view or strong predispositions" can redeem this book as a history. Considered as an extended pamphlet of the kind the various anti-CP left-wing groups used to issue, it is of uncertain usefulness, as there are very few remaining to be convinced of these particular points. The Communist era of American radicalism now calls for interpretation and analysis. The authors are incapable of that because by the time they get to their final chapter of interpretation, they are so hoarse and deafened by their indignant shouting, so overcome by the fiendishness and monstrosity of it all, so worked up to a state of high moral dudgeon, that very little perspective remains.

H. B.

Never Say Die

STRATEGIC SURRENDER: THE POLITICS OF VICTORY AND DEFEAT by Paul Kecskemeti. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1958, \$5.

THE Senate of the United States exploded recently in righteous political fervor and voted 88 to 2 for a proposal by Senator Richard Russell (Dem., Ga.) to cut off funds for any study on "when and how the government of the United States should surrender this country to its enemies."

One of the horrendous targets of this perverted patriotic outburst is this book of Kecskemeti's. The occasion was furnished by a news article in the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* which said that three agencies were making studies as to whether the U.S. can

survive nuclear war and that "one is studying the conditions when surrender would be advisable."

Of late, American foreign policy has been receiving a number of setbacks, from spittle on Nixon in South America to frustration in the Near East at the hands of the Arabs. Needless to say, this has made some ever-vocal Senatorial watchdogs jumpy. Although Kecskemeti's study is largely a detailed criticism of the Allied policy of unconditional surrender directed to the Axis powers in World War II, there is a small section devoted to future wars. Here in quite realistic fashion can be found what possibly angered the guardians of invincible massive retaliation. Let us quote from the book, which incidentally was prepared for the U.S. Air Force by the Rand Corporation as part of a research program:

The 'classic' attrition strategy of both world wars and the concept of victory based on it have become obsolete.

It is questionable whether an asymmetrical winning strategy can be developed at all for unlimited nuclear war between the two great world powers; such a war conceivably can have only losers, although this is by no means certain.

... even nuclear wars waged for high stakes cannot result in big shifts in the status quo unless they become total (in which case the shifts may well be ruinous to both sides).

In the nuclear age the powers must accustom themselves to thinking in terms of relatively small political payoffs.

We must also mention the possibility that a power might develop a perfect winning strategy for all-out nuclear war, i.e., the strategy of a first strike that eliminates all significant retaliatory capabilities on the adversary's side.

If one power has a monopoly of such a winning strategy, and its adversary knows it, a mere threat of attack might induce the latter to surrender politically.

... powers may seek to survive in the nuclear age, either by going to extremes of inhumanity and malevolence never imagined before, or by drastically limiting their expectations of gain from the application of armed power. Adjusting to the new conditions is bound to be particularly difficult for the United States, because both of the available alternatives are diametrically opposed to traditional American political attitudes.

We shall have to revise some of our deeply rooted traditional attitudes, such as our rejection of compromise and our faith in extreme, ideal solutions when the chips are down.

Such opinions have become commonplace in the speculations of military analysts and in the actual behavior of the

nuclear powers. An editorial in the *San Francisco Chronicle* cites a similar research project made by the Army while Eisenhower was chief of staff.

KECSKEMETI deals with the concept of strategic surrender. This means that one side renounces further use of its residual fighting capacity as a matter of choice. This was characteristic of the surrenders of France to Germany and of Italy and Japan to the Allies in World War II. There was no suicidal last ditch resistance. In the cases of France and Italy, disaffected groups seized control and arranged the surrender. For Japan, the effective ruling power surrendered. In all cases there was an evaluation of the "political stake" and the military prospects and cost of prolonging the war. Total resources rather than initial mobilization or the outcome of specific battles dictated the final outcome, in contrast to many earlier wars.

The Allied policy of unconditional surrender comes in for considerable criticism. This policy as originally laid down called for no negotiation except on details of capitulation, and the "no recognition" or "vacuum" rule calling for a transitional period with military governments replacing

the defeated governments. The author argues that there was a failure to draw a distinction between the problem of inflicting strategic defeat and the problem of inducing surrender. To him a surrender agreement is a political bargain; that bargaining strength is not nil before the last capabilities are used.

Here is the real point of Kecskemeti's study. What he argues in effect is that settlements should have been leniently negotiated to put "democracy" in a better position to fight the main danger: the Soviet Union. He points to the unnecessarily tardy recognition of the royal regimes in Italy and Japan. This is the reassessment being made generally in the West.

His second criticism of the unconditional surrender policy reinforces our conclusion. It is a false belief, he asserts, that the more completely the enemy was stripped, the more secure the peace. To him Japanese and German post-war revenge was not the main danger. He remarks that peace was and is more a matter of what he euphemistically calls "international balance." He is implying that the Soviet Union is the main enemy, for he also explains that earlier recognition of the Japanese Emperor would have kept Russia out of war with Japan and thereby out of Asian affairs more effectively.

THE author shows quite conclusively that the atomic bomb was not decisive in the Japanese surrender, that it did not even figure in Japanese thinking on surrender conditions. What was decisive was the combination of the Allied promise to keep the Emperor, the Soviet declaration of war against Japan, and the strength of the Emperor and the ruling group against the no-surrender military clique. This line of argument goes to reinforce a conclusion drawn by many as to the criminal use of the atomic bomb in Japan.

In his concluding section, Kecskemeti speculates on limited wars. He contends that strategic victory is meaningful only in non-total wars. And they can only be non-total if there is "artificial" limitation. This is possible if the political stakes are low. The payoff in a non-total war must be small. He plays gingerly with the exception of an air-counter-air strategy which would be supposed to permit large payoffs under nuclear conditions without there being a total war! But if we reach that stage, it is difficult to see how we can maintain "artificial" limitations.

Nothing in the book justified the political storm in the Senate. That there was such an outcry demonstrates the cowardly inhibition of our legislators in grappling with the realities of war in a nuclear age.

PHILIP SAMEN

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