The American
Socialist

THE STEEL STRIKE AND LABOR'S CRISIS

The East-West Battle for Supremacy

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SOCIAL ROOTS OF CRIME

JULY-AUGUST 1959 *35 CENTS*

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Washington Youth Movement

The editorial entitled "The Next Generation of Radicals," which appeared in the June issue of the *American Socialist* portrays accurately the Youth March for Integrated Schools as an indication that young people can be and are moved by ideas. Youth are not willing to settle for platitudes and promises on issues such as civil rights but want to engage in protest demonstrations demanding action directed toward the elimination of the inconsistencies of our society. Also mentioned are critical weaknesses of the March in terms of inadequate press coverage and a watered-down program in Washington, consisting of an abbreviated route for the March avoiding Congress and the White House, pious speeches, and the reception of a token delegation to the White House by a Presidential assistant.

However, as coordinator of the Chicago Area Youth March committee and a participant in the program at the nation's Capitol, I would like to point out a few facts about the process of mobilization for the Youth March. The first March, which took place in October, was a grassroots effort which had only the reluctant, last-minute support of the NAACP. Because of the tremendous enthusiasm and dedication manifested in October, the NAACP could not afford to overlook the demonstration in April. It endorsed the second March from the initial launching of the effort and gave the full-time services of its youth director, Herbert L. Wright, in the work of coordination. Granted that the conservative leadership of the NAACP succeeded in crippling the impact of the March itself and outmaneuvered the more radical leadership of Bayard Rustin, Martin Luther King, Jackie Robinson, and Mrs. Daisy Bates, nevertheless, support of the March was, for the dominant element in the NAACP, a concession.

While it is true that only four young people saw a Presidential assistant and were given a lukewarm statement by the President with no specific commitment, the fact that they received an appointment and the Presidential statement represents response and recognition of 31,000 young people. In October, many of these same youth stood at the gates of the White House and were not heard.

In Chicago over four hundred youth went to Washington as a result of door-to-door canvassing and fund-raising efforts by the young people themselves with the help of a few adults. The Chicago NAACP contributed at best vague promises of support. In addition, these youth and others are now engaging in local projects and have formed a Chicago Area Youth Council on Human Relations. The sending of a delegation of this size to Washington, D.C. and the follow-up involvement indicates that people can mobilize and protest with some results in spite of organizational apathy and institutionalized conformity.

Norman Hill *Chicago*

Passport Revocation

We have had our passports #816,975 and #816,976, revoked for visiting China and for writing a book on our travel, *The Brave New World.*

The charges are not the breaking of any law, but having traveled in violation of the restrictions printed on the passports and in contravention of the foreign policy of the present party in power.

A hearing in the Passport Office in Washington DC on April 14 resulted in a letter dated May 29, 1959, signed by Frances G. Knight as Director of the Passport Office, cancelling our present passports and refusing "further passport facilities under the Provisions of Section 51.136 of the Passport Regulations."

Our rights have clearly been abrogated. Although our old passports had half a year to run, we are immediately applying for new passports. "What is involved here" (*New York Times* editorial on "Reporters and Red China," May 20, 1959) "is the principle that the American people have the right to be informed through firsthand observation by American citizens of what is going on all over the world, including such an important area as Communist China."

Helen and Scott Nearing *Harborside, Maine*

Recent issues of the *American Socialist* have been great. I thought Bert Cochran's piece on China ["New Thunder out of Communist China," April 1959] and his reply to Michael Harrington in the following issue were exceptional.

B. D. *Milwaukee*

About the *Opinions* article by Jay W. Friedman called "Socialism and Pacifism" in your May issue: It seems to me that loving mankind and hating injustice, socialists should use every method, including pacifism, to hasten the decline of the capitalist system and the birth of socialism. As a *strategy,* pacifism has merit and can be put to good use. But to worship it as an *ideology*—above socialism—is, I believe, a mistake which can result in more of the very violence it is meant to curtail.

R. K. *Baltimore*

Missing a Month

I have taken the *American Socialist* for a couple of years and feel that it is worth a great deal. I do think you should revise your publishing plan: We really need the magazine both July and August. You are missing the impact of one whole month this way.

W. B. O. *Minneapolis*

I've just come off a bad job of terribly long hours to a better one and so can devote more time to reading and study. The *American Socialist* is one of my "musts." More time to visit may lead to interesting friends in subscribing to your splendid line of communication. Enclosed find donation —and how I wish it could be more!

E. W. G. *Hollis, N. Y.*

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The American Socialist

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The Steel Strike And Labor's Crisis

IT seems like only yesterday—maybe it was only yesterday—that labor leaders were talking with their heads in the clouds. These self-confessed down-to-earth men had been seduced by flattery and good living. Their union treasuries were growing; they operated from new fancy offices in the nation's capital; they read articles in the slick magazines telling them how important they were and how Big Labor was getting stronger than Big Business; they heard from the academic fraternity how society was now neatly balancing itself through countervailing forces—and it was all sweet music to their ears. Now begin the days of reckoning. The Auto Union, after a prolonged jockeying game, signed last year one of the poorest contracts in its whole history. The Steel Union is now up against the same kind of intransigent employer front.

Many cynical newspapermen, who have seen this type of conflict repeatedly resolve itself into a love fest, with the principals enthusiastically gripping each other's hands and thrusting their grinning jowls into the camera, believe the same thing will happen all over again. After a strike of more or less limited duration, after the appropriate threats and charges are exchanged by both sides, the union will get a new agreement granting the steel workers an increase from 8 to 10 cents an hour, the steel companies will put through another boost in the price of steel, and the nation will settle down to another splurge of inflationary economics. Even if this is a fair prediction of the steel settlement—and the strike may be longer and more bitter than some anticipate—it does not gainsay that labor is in a major crisis, so palpable, as a matter of fact, that union officials who make a profession of optimism are talking and worrying about it.

A CONFERENCE sponsored in mid-June by the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department in Philadelphia was full of gloom and doom. Auto Union President Walter Reuther said that last year was the "most difficult bargaining year in more than four decades," that the steel workers "are experiencing the same hardened attitude we did last year," that hostility is growing and this means "trouble—serious trouble—in the future." The IUD statement read that "The institution of collective bargaining is being attacked by many major employers, certain academicians, politicians within both political parties, and others who see an opportunity to exploit this situation for their own personal ends." Clearly, something new is happening in labor-management affairs.

Labor's crisis can be viewed from different angles, but it encompasses no less a fact than that business unionism is up a blind alley. Labor's philosophy —if such it can be called—is inadequate under current conditions to win the allegiance of the liberal public, or for that matter, even inspire its own ranks. The demand for "more—more" runs up, in our debt-ridden, price-administered war economy, against the dangers of inflation which frighten middle-class salaried people and even worry the unionized part of the population who question the worth of nominal money increases. The attempts to run unions as simple business organizations selling the labor commodity inevitably breeds corruption as a swamp breeds maggots. In the American society, once labor officials accept the mores of the business community, they are led—or at least a good number of them are led—to copy their styles of living and modes of behavior, whether this takes the Beck-Hoffa or David McDonald routes.

AS the college and foundation sociologists and social psychologists have not yet succeeded in exorcising classes and class conflicts out of our society—they are still working on it—the great corporations naturally take advantage of labor's loss of sex appeal and the confusion of purposes and goals in its ranks to scandalize the labor movement, to undermine it, to try to drive down wages, and to increase management prerogatives. The steel negotiation points up labor's predicament and its indifferent standing in the nation.

Considering the record of the major steel producers, you would think that the union would at least have won a clear-cut victory in the battle of the paid advertisements; that the companies would be on the defensive so far as public opinion was concerned. Here is the steel monopoly which is the main villain of the inflationary spiral; the steel companies have raised prices 22 times since the war; stockholders have enjoyed a 1,000 percent capital gain in ten years; U.S. Steel shareholders who had held their stock ten years are today earning 18 percent on their investment, Bethlehem Steel shareholders are earning 28 percent; in the same period, new plants worth $10 billion have been built by internal financing out of super-profits, in other words, paid for by the consumer through exorbitant prices.

From labor's side, it can be pointed out that for every $1 industry paid out in increased wages, the steel firms extorted $3 in higher prices; that over the past 20 years labor productivity has gone up 88 percent while real hourly earnings (including fringe benefits) have risen by about three quarters; that according to expert testimony given before the Kefauver Senate Committee, the industry could cut its current prices by $10 a ton and still continue paying the current rate of dividends.

Yet despite this impressive array of data, the Steel Union stands in a be-

draggled state before the public, and in the mind of a good deal of liberal opinion, bears equal guilt with industry for a "public-be-damned" attitude and a determination to mulct the consumer for its own special group interests.

YOU can't get away from the fact a lot of people are worried about inflation. Besides, many think that $3 or better an hour for steel workers is plenty; some think it is too much. And the newspapers and commentators are driving hard at the proposition that if only Big Unions would stop demanding more and more wages, prices would stop going up. This demonstrates that the unions, especially the big unions, cannot operate as labor did in Gomper's day. They need an overall program that will talk in terms of using this marvellous production apparatus that we have for the common good, not just one special segment of the nation. Furthermore, to get across a program of this kind, a better instrumentality is needed than inserting paid advertisements in the metropolitan papers, or feeding free breakfasts to Democratic politicians.

Why should steel workers get more than $3 an hour? What are the criteria? What kind of a political power setup is required to actually control prices? To argue these and similar questions persuasively, labor has to rid itself of its narrow "pressure group" psychology and think in terms of political leadership on a national scale. The larger publics cannot even be talked to while labor persists in a pseudo-Machiavellianism of "Let's get ours and to hell with everybody else."

Smaller unions, especially of skilled workers and bargaining with purely local concerns, can still practice one or another variation of the traditional business unionism, and in the absence of rapid technological changes, can offer reasonable protection to their members. But David McDonald, as the spokesman for a million steel workers, cannot with impunity tell Senator Estes Kefauver who is investigating high prices "to keep your nose out of my affairs"; nor can he get very far in countering the claims of the industrialists by calling inflation "a phony issue." The big unions in the important industries are miniature political parties, whether they know it or not. They have to equip themselves with a program and organization strategy in keeping with their needs—else labor's crisis will be resolved in its disfavor.

THIS is not a brand new problem. It is just getting harder and harder to sweep it under the rug. In the course of the big strike wave right after the war, labor faced the question whether it was going to organize itself as a more up-to-date Gompers type of pressure group, or whether it was going to form a social movement. The business interests were holding out at the time for the dismantling of the OPA and other war-time controls before agreeing to any wage increases for their workers. Walter Reuther fought for "wage increases without price increases" in the bitter General Motors strike of 1946. But this and a number of other social demands were laughed out of court by Phillip Murray and his entourage. The steel monopoly got its first big price boost (with the union's tacit consent), the rest of industry followed suit, and the pattern was set for the unions either supporting or acquiescing in the inflationary thrusts so long as they were taken care of.

Not that there is a fundamental social difference between Auto Union and Steel Union bargaining. Reuther was running for the Presidency at the time and he put on a good show. Once he took over the administration, his keener social understanding found its main outlets in catchy sloganeering and public-relations jugglery. So far as social policy goes, the big difference between Reuther and McDonald is not in the play but in the performance, between a virtuoso and a ham.

Actually, unions are not well placed to do very much about prices (except where they enter into collusive arrangements with trade associations to help police an industry). The price mechanism is at the heart of the capitalist market relationship, and prices have never been successfully controlled except in times of war, and then only partially. The history of attempts to regulate industry in the context of the present power structure makes it pretty unmistakable that the labor and liberal publics can hope to do something about prices and inflation only when they establish a responsive political machinery, a new progressive daily press, and the other accouterments that go to make up an effective political force. Under the present political arrangements and dispensations, there is no effective leverage from which to work on the inflationary problem. And without an overall national policy and daily press, the labor movement cannot even educate the public on the issue and put the finger of responsibility on its opponents. The occasional propaganda forays of Reuther and some other union officials do some good to counter hostile testimony from the other side, but they cannot cut too deep because of their improvised and evanescent character, and their acceptance of the present power dispositions.

OF course, reality often evades clear-cut solutions and many feel that the labor unions will muddle through somehow this year and the next as they did last year and the year before. Even in 1958—a bad year for labor—settlements averaged 8 to 10 cents an hour, and after all, as we admitted, the problem has been with us for over a decade. The crisis of the labor movement cannot be likened to the crisis of a patient who will either drastically change his ways in the next six weeks or drop dead. Social developments move more slowly, and unionism is such a basic, front-line of defense for the wage earner, that it is able to survive many blows and setbacks without getting phy-

sically destroyed. Nevertheless, the crisis is a real one; the moral disintegration is there for all to see; the troubles are piling up; and if the retreat is continued for another few years, it can turn into a rout. What we are arguing is that only a new social philosophy and corresponding political strategy can materially alter the present drift. Nothing significant will change if labor reforms are limited to public relations, or slicker new handouts.

What made possible the drift, the evasions, the babbitry, not to mention some of the corruption, of the current crop of labor officials, was the complacency and indifference of the ranks. If the industrial masters now elect to make a mockery of all the labor officials' declarations — concerning the beauties of a free labor movement, the beneficences of free collective bargaining, and the sure and steady advances of free men in a free society—then they are taking a big chance; a considerable calculated risk, as the Pentagon terminology goes. For once they push real hard, the labor ranks may tear themselves away from their television sets and get over to the union halls to press for a more effective social stance than labor has adopted during the fat and lazy fifties.

Tom Paine: The 150th Anniversary of a Rebel

by Raymond Fletcher

WHEN George Washington died the whole world mourned. Even the British channel fleet and the French army were temporarily united in a common grief.

But Tom Paine, whose pen had done as much as Washington's sword to bring the United States into being, had no such salutations at his death. He went to his grave, a hundred and fifty years ago this week, accompanied only by two Negroes, two Frenchwomen and a Quaker.

He had fought for liberty in three countries, found little honor or gratitude in any, and his innumerable midget-souled enemies, secure at last from the lacerations of his deadly pen, publicly rejoiced at his death.

Then their revenge began. A jungle-like growth of lies and and legends, carefully cultivated, obscured the dead rebel.

The good he did was allowed to lie buried with his bones. The evil others thought of him survived and multiplied—so much so that Theodore Roosevelt could describe him as a "filthy little atheist."

Historians, less vulgar, were almost equally ignorant, squeezing Paine into a paragraph or two or pushing him down into a footnote.

He fared little better at the hands of those who ought to have been his friends. J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People,* in its day a revolutionary departure from the kings-queens-and-battles tradition of history writing, said nothing of Paine except what Pitt said of him. Max Beer's classic *History of Socialism* described him as a "moderate social reformer" and gave him less than a page of attention.

Even today he is something of an embarrassment. Americans forget the pamphlets from which their Republic sprang and remember only that he committed the sacrilege of attacking Washington. The Labor Party barely remembers *The Rights of Man,* where its roots are to be found, but cannot forget *The Age of Reason,* which dissected organized religion and found nothing in it.

Practical politicians find it rather terrifying to be measured against one who so repeatedly upset the voters.

Tom Paine's restless talents sought many different outlets before he went to America in 1774. He had been a schoolmaster, an exciseman, a sailor and a shopkeeper.

He had also attended scientific lectures and designed a new type of iron bridge. But it was not until he became editor of the *Pennsylvanian Magazine* at the age of 37 that he found his true vocation.

His apprenticeship to the writer's trade was short but fruitful. Only two years after entering journalism he literally wrote the United States into existence.

Before *Common Sense* there was a dispute between colonials and George III. Few understood what it was really about and even fewer where it was leading. After *Common Sense,* which sold 120,000 copies in three months, confused resentment hardened into the will to independence.

No book in history ever had so decisive an influence on its course. For it was not Washington's armies (in which Paine fought) which finally defeated the British.

It was as the American military historian Walter Millis has pointed out, the absence of a pro-British counter-revolution. There might have been one had not Paine's pen cut it down.

Characteristically, he made nothing out of his phenomenal best-seller, giving all the proceeds—some £50,000—to the American treasury. Later, he similarly donated the profits from *The Rights of Man* to organizations which advocated its principles.

He was back in England when the French Revolution broke out. Edmund Burke greeted it with a farrago of rant, cant and fustian, miscalled *Reflections on the Revolution in France,* in which there was not a singe milligram of real reflection. In its second most famous passage, indeed, Burke equated political thinking with social disruption. To him, radicals had ideas and good Tories only prejudices.

The Rights of Man not only poinarded the sawdust out of Burke (". . . accustomed to kiss the aristocratic hand that hath purloined him from himself, he degenerates into a composition of art, and the genuine soul of nature forsakes him."). Paine's real reflections on politics carried him from the arguments of his own age into the problems of ours.

A FULL century before practical politicians got around to them, he put forward proposals for land nationalization, death duties, old age pensions, unemployment benefits, free education, maternity grants and humane laws governing marriage and divorce.

Pitt hounded him out of England, but the people of Calais elected him to the French Convention. There, too awkwardly honest for Robespierre, he fell out of favor and escaped the guillotine only by accident.

But he did not turn against the revolution because it seemed to have turned against him. ("It is not because right principles have been violated that they are to be abandoned.")

The moral grandeur that characterized his life did not desert him in prison, where he hourly expected death. There he wrote *The Age of Reason,* his masterly demolition of religious superstitions. For this his enemies called him infidel and the common people he loved howled their assent. When he returned to America his popularity had gone.

In 1959, it seems that his significance has gone too. Autocrats have departed but unimaginative bureaucrats crawl into the seats of power they left vacant.

But these are only the little truths about our time. Wherever men dignify themselves by protesting against the denial of dignity to others, wherever they preserve freedom by using it, wherever they protect justice by extending its operations, wherever, in fact, they prove that humanity can add a cubit to its moral stature—there is Tom Paine's territory.

And it is growing.

—British *Tribune* June 12

The challenge for world supremacy by the Soviet system cuts across all slow-motion schemes of development and confronts the United States with drastic alternatives.

Choices Before America

by Bert Cochran

THE West has been the cradle of Marxist socialism. Were one to judge by the present, one might also conclude that it will be its grave. The decline of Marxism—indeed of any variety of socialism—has been catastrophic. Even the organizational spread of the socialistic labor parties in the post-World War II decade in England, Belgium, West Germany, and the Scandinavian countries, has been accompanied by their divestment of their socialist aims and their settling for a mild welfare-statism scarcely differing from New Dealism in America.

Many have attributed the bad days which have befallen Marxism to the fact that many of the master's prophecies have gone awry and that the capitalism of today differs materially from the capitalism he was analyzing almost a century ago. Yet no one—to take a handy analogy—patronizes Darwin because his hypothesis of sexual selection has been found wanting, or because growing knowledge of genetics has modified some of his explanations. Considering how many of Marx's ideas retain seminal significance and his profound impact on the progress of social thought, his various mistaken judgements, standing alone, do not explain the unqualified rejection of a tradition that as recently as twenty-five years ago stirred millions in the West.

The decline of the tradition in the West—contrary to some recent assertions—is not to be attributed to Marx's mistaken notion of growing immiseration, nor even to the fact that the more recent schools of Marxism have proven exceptionally sterile in employing the tradition of the Founding Fathers to analyze the world around them. The eclipse of Marxism is explained by the fact that Marx was a revolutionary prophet as well as a social scientist. The two are inextricably intertwined. The author of *Capital* was also the founder of the International Workingmen's Association. And here is the rub. Almost a hundred and ten years after the *Communist Manifesto* defiantly announced that the downfall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat were equally inevitable, this very proletariat seems as little interested or capable of challenging the rulers for power as it was when Marx and Engels first penned their classic.

Since Marxism has been viewed, in the first instance, as a revolutionary crusade rather than as a theory of economics, or sociology, or history, its lack of worldly success in the West has inevitably led to its discreditment there. Ever since the debacle of socialism in the first World War, there have been periodic crises of Marxism. Consequently, no amount of scholarly works—which have other important uses and consequences—can resuscitate its influence while this fatal defect remains. Marxism, after all, unlike Christianity, promises its disciples the triumph of the Kingdom of God this side of the grave.

THE ground has been thoroughly plowed about the ability of capitalism in the advanced West to expand, to enlarge the national income, to raise living standards, to grant social improvements, to keep its working classes reasonably tied to the existing system—and it is unnecessary to recapitulate these analyses for purposes of the present discussion. Whether the emphasis is placed at this or that point, and whatever historic conclusions are drawn, the situation itself is undeniable. The working classes of the West are animated not by revolutionary but welfare-statist aims. They are led as a rule by conservatives, not radicals. Western trade unionism is an instrument of social stability and adjustment, not civil war. All this is widely recognized. The question we would like to address ourselves to is this: Was Marx—we can broaden it and ask, was modern socialism—totally wrong in viewing the working class as the inheritor of the mantle of the revolutionary bourgeoisie of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, destined to inherit power in order to reorganize society on new socialist lines? Or, was the error of the kind that frequently occurs between the theoretical exposition of an idea and its worldly realization, and which with suitable modifications can still retain some historical validity?

For Marx, as we know, the motor force of history was the class struggle. Under capitalism, this was supposed to manifest itself in the struggle between the capitalist and working classes. In the course of these struggles, schooled and disciplined by the factory, their ranks constantly augmented by impoverished middle-class recruits, their fighting ardor aroused by desperate need for change, their abilities perfected by battle experiences, the proletariat would finally shape the required political instruments to dislodge the capitalist masters and set up their own class rule which in time would lead to the displacement of all classes and exploitation of man by man. The moderate, reformist, and non-Marxian socialists of the pre-World War I era usually accepted this general thesis as well, but stressed that with the growth of parliamentarism and democratic traditions, the labor victory could be secured by the ballot, and the labor changeover introduced by constitutional means.

WITH all due respect to the learned researchers of our universities and foundations, we believe that the history of the past century, including the past ten years, has demonstrated the reality of the class struggle. The working classes have displayed a remarkable capacity for protective organization, a doggedness of purpose to keep chipping away improvements and warding off hostile

blows. This part of the prediction has been fulfilled. But contrary to Marxian expectations, labor's ambitions have remained small, its horizons limited, its outlook provincial. Heroism and blood offerings were necessary to found the immense labor unions of today; but once established, they quickly settled down as bureaucratized bodies that secured small gains for their constituents, and in return disciplined the workers to stay within the prescribed limits of capitalist-run industrialism. Similarly, the political labor parties, once they completed their organizational phase, lapsed just as rapidly into a mild liberalism that was resolved not to ruffle unduly the status quo.

Luxemburg, Lenin and the left wing of pre-World War I Social Democracy saw the process that was afoot when they reviewed the causes for the collapse of the socialist movement in 1914. They attributed the trend of bureaucratization and adaptation to the era of unusual prosperity and economic expansion that had preceded the war. It was this, in their opinion, which corrupted the labor leadership and led to the departures from the doctrines of the Founding Fathers; but with the war, they asserted, the era of opportunism had come to an end. They were wrong in their expectations. Europe saw a period of instability and revolutionary turmoil after the war, of course. But the opposition was in all cases more or less handily repulsed, and the pre-war system re-stabilized. Again, in the thirties, Trotsky and others tried to explain the non-revolutionism of the labor organizations and their folding up in times of crisis in terms of a betrayal on the part of the leaders. But he failed to grapple with the root problem why leaders who allegedly betrayed the wishes of their ranks continued to enjoy their support and were re-elected time and again after committing their so-called betrayals. Today, the balance sheet reads that despite two world wars the system remains firmly in the saddle and the Western trade unions and labor parties are rightfully considered as a prime element of the social stability. The Western working classes, at least judging by the past century, seem to lack the will to power that gripped the merchants and entrepeneurs during the twilight of feudalism.

OF course, the unfavorable comparison between the modern working classes and the insurgent bourgeoisie of the past, and the conclusion that the class struggles in the West produced trade unionism and welfare statism instead of socialism, is based exclusively on the experiences of one century. Some have argued that that is too short a period of time for definitive judgements; that, after all, it took several hundred years of evolution for the bourgeoisie to produce its Hampdens, Pyms, and Cromwells. This might be a reasonable suggestion, and in any case, cannot be disproved, except for one new fact that is cutting across the old Marxian perspective.

Western capitalism is now being challenged for world supremacy by the Soviet system with the contest possibly to be resolved in the next half-century. In other words, because the Western working classes have not in good time stepped forward as the leaders of their nations to solve the historic problems emanating from the national state, private ownership and control of social production, and imperialism—or, put in another way, because the class struggle, while sufficient to harass capitalism and force from it welfarist concessions, was insufficient to reorganize society on cooperative lines—the working classes are now entering a new era where the competition of an anti-capitalist social system is about to play a major role in world affairs, and to exert incalculable pressures upon the Western course. This remains true whether one views the conflict as of the kind between Carthage and Rome, or Rome and the "Barbarian" nations, or even as between Christendom and Islam. There are some who have already concluded that the Western countries are destined to lag behind in the race and will eventually change internally by some kind of slow process of osmosis.

LET us attempt to work up a projection in more specific social terms than is possible by a bare biological analogy. If we assume that the race between the two social systems is a preponderant fact of world affairs today, and that the Western powers will in time be outdistanced given their present social arrangements—and we believe both assumptions are reasonable ones—then the internal social reactions inside the Western countries would appear to fall within the following possible alternatives:

(1) The labor movements, which are presently tied to the private enterprise welfare states, at a certain point, swayed by their observations of the superior possibilities inherent in a nationalized economy, and goaded by the prospects of the inglorious decay of their own countries under capitalist domination, proceed to drastically alter their attitudes and aspirations. Their faith in the status quo broken, especially once the declining power of the nation is coupled with internal economic difficulties, they take the lead in forging alliances with other dissatisfied formations to assume the helm of government. The new leadership thereupon introduces drastic alterations in the national power structure in order to preserve the national strength, or as DeGaulle calls it, "grandeur," and to provide the

people with the enlarged opportunities that all now comprehend lie within the loins of an advanced industrial society. What the internal class struggle alone could not accomplish, the class struggle in conjunction with the outside pressure of a more dynamic social system finally brings into being.

This is a distinct possibility, even though the present labor movements do not show any signs of such organizational initiative, political drive, or social vision. But labor movements, especially some in Europe, have exhibited short-lived bursts of social greatness in their lifetime, and it is certainly premature to write off the possibility of their resurgence under the stimuli of inexorable and novel pressures.

(2) The second alternative is that the labor movements lack the vitality to assert imaginative national leadership, and the Marxist perspective of a social reorganization under labor aegis is definitively established as utopian. In that case, circles within the upper-level elites, sensing the dire nature of the national crisis, and realizing that it can only be resolved by a fundamental structural renovation, finally secure enough support throughout the nation to take over governmental affairs and force through the drastic changes that the times call for. This would represent a sort of bastardized and bureaucratized socialism installed by means of a revolution from the top. This, too, is a possibility; although, here again, there are no present manifestations of sufficient magnitude to argue the case on empirical grounds. But history has shown that it can happen this way—even though the crisis will probably have to be pretty far gone for such an alternative to become operative.

Let us recall the two main revolutions-from-the-top of the last century, which we have had occasion to refer to once before when discussing the more immediate prospects facing America: Bismarck Germany, and the Meiji Restoration in Japan.

IN the case of Germany, bourgeois liberalism set the tasks of the 1848 revolution as the erection of a united modern German state, and democracy. When the upper capitalist circles got frightened of the socialist spector which appeared in the French revolution of the same year, they deserted the liberal cause. The Frankfurt Assembly was dispersed; and at the next stage, the Prussian Monarchy, representing the Junkers, and backed by the capitalists, took over the job that the liberals had proven incapable of performing. But Bismarck and Moltke carried on in accordance with the character of the Prussian autocracy: by military conquest and administrative imposition. Germany thus got its modern unified state, which paved the way for its subsequent national greatness. But of the Frankfurt Assembly's program of unity and democracy, only unity was realized; democracy was a casualty. Germany achieved its capitalist revolution in a bad Prussian manner.

An even worse instance of a bureaucratized revolution occurred in Japan at about this same time. In this case, the class of merchants and traders had scarecly advanced to the point of being an independent estate, much less a political entity. The slowly decaying feudalism that characterized Japan in the mid-nineteenth century was menaced not from within, but from the outside, by the Western powers, who were imposing trade treaties, extra-territoriality, and, it was feared with good reason, would in time

deprive the country of its independence. The ruling *Shogunate* proved helpless to stem the tide. Out of the sense of desperation and panic that swept over the feudal heads, a group of *Samurai* (corresponding roughly to the knights in feudal Europe) succeeded in overthrowing the *Shogunate* and getting the leading feudal clans to unite behind the figure of the Emperor. The new oligarchic regime thereupon proceeded to put through a series of far-reaching economic and social measures which transformed the feudalists into modern capitalists, transplanted in Japanese soil some of the scientific and technical achievements of the West, and by forced draft, built up a modern industry and army. But the hothouse growth of capitalism was accompanied by no flowering of liberalism. The model of the Meiji "Westernizers" was not the British Parliament, but Prussian Junkerdom.

IN the light of the German and Japanese experiences, we are not unjustified in concluding that were a changeover to occur in this country from the top, it would very likely be done dictatorially and by oligarchic bureaucratization. In that case, socialism would first appear in this country in the guise of an omnipresent regime of regimentation rather than a more enlightened and fructifying democracy.

(3) There is still a third possibility: that no social class or combination has the vitality to introduce the necessary change. In that case, the Western countries would be doomed to a long era of decline, losing their places of world eminence and creativity, until at some distant point, a complex of social forces would arise to contest the course. It is clearly pointless to pursue this alternative into the remote reaches of the future, except to say that it may be considered as the least likely of the three. The least likely, because the huge complexes and pools of industrial, scien-

tific, and cultural accumulations and skills in the West will demand, so to speak, to be put to useful labor, and will tend to create political instrumentalities to realize this objective—unless they are reduced to ashes and dust by war.

Naturally, a projection of this kind is highly speculative, but it should not on this account be thought of as a useless exercise. If it points up the actual historical needs, it provides an underpinning for today's politics, and a profounder standard by which to judge the worth of this or that institution, ideology, and program. It should be kept in mind that the alternatives are meant as very free, and in part arbitrarily drawn, sketches of the possible roadways of advance. Furthermore, neither of the first two alternatives are locked in airtight compartments. Combinations of the two are possible. To revert to historical analogy again: The Italian *Risorgimento* saw the country united from the top by the aristocrat Cavour under the Sardinian Monarchy, but supplemented and aided by a lot of action on the part of Garibaldi and the Republican insurgents, from below. (That is one of the reasons why the subsequent regime of the House of Savoy was more liberal than the Prussian.)

WE used to think that the introduction of socialist measures in the economic sphere carried with it more or less automatically the corollaries of mass democracy and equalitarianism. Russia and China have already provided us with examples of nationalization and planning as a superior mechanism to realize rapid industrialization and modernization via political dictatorship and the proliferation of a new bureaucracy. It was later suggested by some that while such lamentable manifestations could occur or were unavoidable in backward countries, they were ruled out in the advanced West because of the higher cultural and educational levels, the superior living standards, and the long traditions of democracy. But are they? If the labor-liberal democratic elements—democratic at least in potential—prove incapable of seizing the helm of government for required social reorganization, and if circles of the corporation world step into the breach, is it not likely that the changeover will be driven through by methods, and animated by thinking, which these personnels have acquired in their previous experiences and associations?

History has shown that anachronistic social arrangements can be swept away and new social relations established by libertarian or Prussian methods. This should not surprise us when we consider that modern society was ushered in under such diverse banners as Cromwell's Puritan Incorruptibles, or Robespierrist Jacobin Virtue, and also under the Royalist flags of the House of Hohenzollern, the House of Savoy, and the Celestial Emperor. It is probably correct to consider an American collectivism as inevitable. Will it be animated by the spirit of Jefferson and Jackson, Garrison and Wendell Phillips, Marx and Debs—or, Taylor, Bedeaux, and Henry Ford? The choice rests in large measure upon what masses of American people do or fail to do.

Slow Death in Algeria

by Lucien Weitz

THE Algerian war has been going on for more than five years and is now taken for granted. The French people have pushed it to the back of their minds.

It is true that a public opinion poll recently showed that 63 per cent of the people would be in favor of negotiations to bring the conflict to an end. But even those more closely affected, the families (there are 500,000 of them) of the soldiers who have done more than 12 years of their military service on the other side of the Mediterranean, even their people who are living under the terrible strain of separation don't seem to take up any positive political attitude and blame the Government. Public opinion condemns the outrages of the Ultras and at the same time is hostile to the "bicots" and accuses the FLN of intransigence. It is a negative attitude which lumps the two sides together and in the end puts trust only in de Gaulle.

A document has recently been published which gives a horrifying picture of what has been happening to the Algerians. It is an official report although once again the Government has issued a denial. But in spite of the denial, the accuracy of the report is undeniable.

Here are some of the facts: more than a million people, mainly the elderly, the women and children, have been turned out of their villages and reassembled in camps; villages in the pacified areas have been summarily surrounded with barbed wire. All the inhabitants who have been uprooted are living in appalling conditions.

An extract from the document reads: "When the resettlement takes place from five to 30 kilometers from their own land—this is the most common—the fellaghs return, under guard, to cultivate it once, twice or possibly three times a week. It is estimated that about 200,000 of those who have been removed have no access at all to their former land as it is too far away or lies in a forbidden zone.

"In the cases we observed, rations were limited to 11 kilograms of barley per adult a month. In another center we visited, the food distribution, the only source for a third of the settlers, had mysteriously disappeared for the last six weeks.

"The statistics for the death rate are not easily available. Even so, certain facts are clear. In a village where there were 900 children the death rate was very nearly one a day. . . .

"When the resettlement affected a thousand people, a child died about every two days. . . ."

As well as isolating the fellaghs, civilians have been uprooted, starved, condemned to a slow death.

IN such circumstances, it is not surprising that the people are steadfast in the fight for independence led by the rebels.

In the towns it is quite common for a wounded fellagh or terrorist to be hanged and exposed to the gaze of the European population, while the musulman population are invited —one can imagine the terms of the invitation—to be present at the spectacle.

There is reason to fear that the Army is exporting its methods of intimidation to the other side of the Mediterranean. Last week, on the eve of a trial of some Algerian students, for whom he was pleading, a lawyer, Amokrane Oukd Aoudia, was mysteriously assassinated in the middle of Paris. The colleagues of the victim, M. Verges and M. Ousesdik, two lawyers who have courageously defended Algerians for several years, declared: "We have been marked down by the counter-terrorists."

—British *Tribune*



In the tortoise-hare story, slow and steady won the race. But how about a contest in which the steady contestant is also the fast one, and the slow runner is erratic?

The Economic Race

by Harry Braverman

THE most astonishing fact about the voluminous literature that has been issued on the economic race between the United States and the Soviet Union is that it has proved easier to assess the Russian rate of growth than our own. Unquestionably, it is harder to get comprehensive information about the Soviet economy, and suspicions of unreliability and exaggeration surround what is available. But the fact remains that while wide agreement has been reached among American observers about the Russian rate of growth, no such agreement prevails about the American.

Some of the less conscientious analysts try to solve the problem by setting down, with a great show of certitude and assurance, an "average three percent" growth figure. Since 1880, they tell us, we have increased our real national product at an average rate of just about three percent a year, compounded annually, which means that the output of the economy roughly doubles every twenty years. This figure is not without importance, as we shall show later. But we must keep in mind that it is arithmetically possible to strike an average for any column of figures, no matter how erratic. The entire decade of the thirties shows no growth at all in the American economy. But total production grew 15 percent in one year from 1940 to 1941, another 15 percent the following year, and by 1944, the gain over 1940 had reached 60 percent, instead of the 12.6 percent to be expected under the three-percent rate. The fitful and irregular performance of the economy thus makes it dangerous to rely on averages, which sometimes testify more to the analyst's prowess in arithmetic than to his economic perspicuity.

When we depart from the long-term averages and try to find out just how fast the economy is growing *now,* we get a wide variety of answers. The grand panjandrum of the magazine world, *Fortune,* recently gave our growth rate as "almost four percent," while its opposite number in the newspaper field, the *New York Times,* gave the figure as "less than 1.5 percent." Economists and money lenders will recognize the enormous difference represented by the gap between the two figures when they are compounded over as little as a decade. If you look into enough papers and magazines, you can have your pick of growth rates ranging from nothing or even less than nothing all the way up to and above *Fortune's* four percent.

IT is startling testimony to the capriciousness of the American economic performance that all of these estimates have validity. In almost all cases, they are derived from the same figures: a simple listing of the Gross National Products in constant prices for the years 1946 to 1958, the Gross National Product being the most widely accepted measure of national output and year-to-year growth. From the figures for those 13 years, it is possible to derive no fewer than 78 growth rates, each of which depends upon your choice of base year and terminal year. The accompanying table (see page 12), constructed by *Business Week* and printed under the heading "You, Too, Can Play With Numbers," shows the impressive selection of growth rates stocked by all economists. And it is surprising how many of them can be chosen in good conscience as "the true" growth rate of the American economy.

One economist may choose the years 1946 to 1958 as his base and terminal years, in order to include the "whole

picture," and will come up with the rate of 2.9 percent. Another will argue that it is not fair to include the recession year of 1958, and will stop at 1957, getting an average growth rate of 3.4 percent. A third will prefer to skip the "post-war reconversion" years, will start with 1949, stop at 1957, and wind up triumphantly with a 4.2 percentage. Democrats will argue innocently that they are only interested in the Eisenhower years, and for 1953-1958, they will get a devastating 1.3 percent. Union leaders and those who take a radical view of the economy will point out that for the last couple of years, our growth has been zero. As the table shows, the possible growth rates range all the way from an increase of 8.5 percent (1949-1950) to a decrease of 2.7 percent (1957-1958).

Actually, this is not just a numbers game. It is true that for any given 13 years, it is possible to construct this kind of table, giving 78 different choices of base and terminal years for figuring the growth rate. *But the table will not show such irregularity unless that is already present in the economy.* An economic structure which grows according to purely technical and population factors will show a comparatively even and steady rate of progress. In our case, however, social factors get in the way. The anarchy of planlessness results in a rate of growth which fluctuates sharply, and is all but unpredictable except in general terms.

This is the reason why in the American economy we have to fall back on guesses based on so-called "averages" of the past. It is a very unsure method, and carries with it not the slightest guarantee that it won't turn out very wrong, but it may yield some idea of the possibilities ahead.

IN his book *The Conditions of Economic Progress,* Colin Clark made the following estimates of the annual average rate of growth of the American economy: from the post-Civil War period to the pre-World War I period, 4.5 percent; from the early years of the century to 1929, 3.2 percent. The Department of Commerce estimates the rate of growth from 1929 to 1950 at just under 3 percent a year. Our table of growth rates shows an average annual percentage since 1950 of 2.8 percent, and the same table shows that if we take any later year than 1950 as our base, the growth rate is still lower.

It is hard to extract any sure rule out of the melange of figures, but what seems to emerge is this: Over the long haul, since the Civil War, we have had an average annual growth rate of about 3 percent, but in the earlier years the rate was higher and in recent times it has been lower. If this kind of decline is projected into the future, we can expect a growth rate closer to 2½ percent than 3 percent in the next fifty years.*

As I have said, there is more agreement among American analysts about the Russian rate of growth. Western economists naturally prefer their own independent assessments to those of the Russians. Their results are somewhat lower than the claims of Soviet economists and statisticians. Nevertheless the estimates of the two groups are now drawing closer together. Where official Soviet figures claimed a growth rate from 50 to 100 percent higher than that allowed by Western economists for the 1928-1937 period, the gap is far smaller between the present claims of Nikita Khruschev and admissions of the hostile Western economists. If this is accounted for by the scaling down of the extravagant statistical mountains of the Stalin period by the present regime, it also reflects the grudging admission on the part of our own analysts that Soviet rates of growth have been amazingly high and steady.

SOVIET growth did not begin until 1928, as until that time the country was occupied with civil war followed by reconstruction. It was only in 1928 that the pre-World War I levels of industrial production were regained. From 1928-1937, according to several independent Western estimates, the total net growth of Soviet economy proceeded at a rate of between 6.5 and 7 percent a year. Then the war intervened and made necessary another period of reconstruction. The Western estimates for the rate of growth of the Russian economy after 1948 put it at least as high as in the pre-war period, and probably somewhat higher. At the present time, most Western analysts concede an average annual growth rate of 7 percent to the Soviet Union. As Khrushchev has set the current speed of industrial increase at 8.6 percent a year, and the planned rate of agricultural increase is only a trifle less, it is clear that little statistical disagreement remains.

We have now talked about a 7 percent rate of climb for the Soviet Union, and a 3 percent rate for the United States. The capitalist, who more than anyone else in human history has been seized by the explosive potentialities of compound interest, will grasp at once what this means. An economy which is expanding at the 7 percent rate will double in output every 10 years. One which is growing at the 3 percent figure will double every 20 years. If Soviet output is now a little less than half of American, it will equal ours in a bit more than twenty years. This is the perspective accepted and warned against by Allen W. Dulles, and implies a parity between the two nations in economic size by about 1982.

Khrushchev, on the other hand, has spoken of overtaking the United States by 1970. He based his estimate on somewhat different figures. If, however, we judge the American economy by its performance over the past hundred years and guess that while we are now on the unfavorable side of the 3 percent level we will probably hold

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* It may be objected here that big depressions used to pull our average down, and since we have "licked the depression problem" we will have a higher rate of growth in the future. Even if we agree to this extremely uncertain assumption, the conclusion is by no means logical. If we have "licked the depression problem," it has been at the expense of the growth rate in boom years. A part of the national income has been shifted to the government, thus cutting down the proportion available for investment; this has held down the growth of productive capacity a bit, and dampened the speculative frenzy that used to raise our booms to such a peak. Whether we still have enough speculative frenzy and excess productive capacity to touch off deepgoing depressions like that of the thirties remains to be seen. But many have argued that, insofar as we have prevented economic crises, we have done so at the expense of our rate of growth, and the experience of the last decade certainly bears them out.

to at least 2½ percent over the long haul, the time when the Soviets pass the United States seems to fall somewhere between 1975 and 1980.

HAVING arrived at this estimate, we had better include a number of modifications to give it greater realism:

(1) All of this is nothing more than a projection or "extrapolation" of past statistics into the future. It suffers from all the defects of that method. If, for instance, 1959 were analagous to 1929, and we have a depression in the sixties comparable to that of the thirties, the Russians would be ahead of us in a few years. Or if, to take a more reasonable assumption, the Eisenhower rate of growth of about 1½ percent turns out to be our speed for the coming period, we would have to lop at least five years off our 1975-1980 estimate. Or, if the Russians were compelled to raise the standard of living more sharply than they expect, they would have to slow down and the race would consequently be lengthened. It is only fair to say, however, that the many modifications, accidents, or changes which may affect the picture are far more likely to be helpful to the Russians than the other way around. It is very unlikely that we will achieve an average growth rate above 3 percent, and not at all unlikely that it will fall well below. For the Russians, on the other hand, a growth rate of at least 7 percent seems assured.

(2) The Soviet population is higher than that of the United States by some 20 percent. Thus for the Russians to catch up in total output does not mean that they have caught up in per capita output, which would take a few more years.

(3) Even a parity of per capita output does not put the two countries on an equal economic level. Accumulated wealth of all sorts, including roads, buildings, housing, consumer goods, and so forth, cannot be reproduced without the passage of a certain amount of time. Granting that the Soviet Union will not require the lengthy span needed by the West, some time will be needed for the Russians to reproduce a comparable "plant for living" to that of the United States—although, being built according to a plan rather than by patchwork and for profit, it is likely to be far more satisfactory.

(4) The basic structural differences between the Soviet and capitalist economies have to be taken into account in order to make a realistic estimate. From the point of view of economic efficiency, most of these differences weigh in favor of the Russians. A large part of the cost of doing business in this country, notably in the form of advertising and other kinds of waste which are essential only if a product must have a forced sale in competition with other manufacturers or products, need not be subtracted in the Soviet economy. To the extent that there exist in America entire industries the output of which is essentially non-productive but which is reckoned in dollars and added in with our national product, to that extent, our own figures for national output are inflated without conscious dishonesty on anybody's part. By means of a more efficient use of their output, the Russians can catch up with us in real living standards long before they have caught up in per capita output. Already, for example, there is no question that the Russians provide themselves with better educational facilities, medical attention, child nursery care, and possibly better pensions—out of their less-than-half of our production and despite their larger population—than we do.

REGARDLESS of details, it is clear that what we have been describing is a major shift in the balance of eco-

ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF THE U. S. ECONOMY, 1946-58

(Percent increases, base year to terminal year, of GNP in 1958 dollars)

Base	Terminal Year												
Year	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958
1946	x	0	1.8	1.2	3.0	4.0	3.9	4.0	3.2	3.8	3.6	3.4	2.9
1947	x	x	3.8	1.9	4.1	5.0	4.7	4.7	3.8	4.3	4.1	3.8	3.1
1948	x	x	x	0.1	4.2	5.4	5.0	4.9	3.7	4.3	4.1	3.8	3.1
1949	x	x	x	x	8.5	8.2	6.7	6.1	4.5	5.2	4.7	4.2	3.4
1950	x	x	x	x	x	8.0	5.8	5.3	3.5	4.4	4.0	3.6	2.8
1951	x	x	x	x	x	x	3.6	4.1	2.0	3.5	3.3	2.9	2.1
1952	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	4.5	1.3	3.4	3.2	2.8	1.8
1953	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	—1.2	2.9	2.8	2.3	1.3
1954	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	8.0	5.2	3.8	2.1
1955	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	2.5	1.8	1.8
1956	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	1.0	—1.8
1957	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	—2.7
1958	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

This table is taken from Business Week, May 23, 1959. Given the figures for Gross National Product each year in 1958 dollars, it takes nothing more than a set of logarithmic tables to produce the compound rates of growth for any combination of base and terminal years. To read the table, simply choose any base year on the left, and look along that line to the terminal year; the percentage shown will be the annual average rate of growth of the GNP. This table can be constructed for any economy, but only one which, like that of the U.S. fluctuates irregularly in its output-performance, will exhibit such wide swings (between the 8.5 percent increase in one year, and 2.7 percent decrease in another) as are shown here.

nomic power which would have appeared unthinkable as little as ten years ago. If we can imagine the fabled race between the tortoise and the hare—which the hare lost despite his greater speed because he ran erratically—with a new wrinkle, a slow and unsteady tortoise and a swift and systematic hare, we can get some idea of the odds in the race. Barring a war or other major unforeseen events, there is not the slightest question that the Soviet Union will have a higher per capita income than the United States within a single generation.



Naturally, there is alarm in high places over this prospect. In a volume published a year ago by the top-industrialists' Committee for Economic Development, Prof. Jerome Wiesner said: "When I really feel gloomy, I think that five years from now they [the Soviets] will be obviously superior to us in every area. But when I am optimistic, I feel that it will take 10 years for them to achieve this position." Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, who is not given to this kind of exaggeration (his estimates of the climax in the race running to over 20 years), has warned that if present trends continue, "the United States will be virtually committing economic suicide."

How explain this sudden turn of the wheel of economic fortune against America, the presumed darling of the twentieth century and of many centuries to come? Here the poverty of thought is appalling. The economic analysts who write the First National City Bank's *Monthly Letter* think the Russians are getting ahead of us by adopting capitalistic methods at the very time that we are abandoning them: "It could be that the speeding of industrial progress in the Soviet Union may be related to the new emphasis given to reward for achievement." They cite Crawford H. Greenewalt, president of du Pont, who says in his recent book:

If financial rewards in the two countries are examined quantitatively, the Russians are not far behind us. What troubles me is to note that at the very time the Soviets are embracing our principle of incentive and show signs of benefiting thereby, we ourselves seem intent upon abandoning it.

Others grasp at the straw of a presumed "diminishing rate of returns." Russian industry is growing into the vacuum of a new country; as the country develops the rate will slow down. In this view, there is no contrast between the Russian development and our own except that theirs comes later in time. There is some sense to the "diminishing returns" argument, but it fails to answer the specific case at hand. Briefly, there are two points that stand out: (1) By no stretch of the imagination can the American rate of growth in the post-Civil War period of industrialization be equated to the present Russian rate, as is shown by the figures given by Colin Clark. (2) If the Russians suffer from diminishing returns, so must we. And for the coming generation, they, with their still large labor reservoir on the countryside to draw upon for industry, will feel this brake far less than we, with our comparatively small agricultural population. (This assumes, for the United States, that what holds us back is a shortage of labor, which is hardly the case.)

THE most popular explanation for the unequal race is simply that the Russians, with their dictatorship, can keep living standards down, invest more in the expansion and modernization of industry, and thus grow faster. In the broadest economic sense, this explanation certainly has validity. A nation's output is divided between consumption and investment, and the more it diverts to investment, the more quickly will it expand, all other things being equal. According to Allen Dulles, Russia is now investing approximately the same amount in her industries as is the United States, although her national income is below half of ours.

Yet when this point is given its invidious twist, namely, that the Russian people are being starved and deprived for the greater glory of the State, it somehow fails to convince. Obviously, there are any number of rates of growth that a planned economy can choose. If the Russian people had their choice ten years ago, it is doubtful that they would have chosen to plough back so much. Today, with higher living standards and a great consciousness of the race with the West, the outcome of a vote on the issue is open to more question. Now that some of the fruits of the long industrialization are starting to fall, it is harder to create an image of deprivation. According to the Joint Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress, consumption accounted for 57 percent of the Soviet gross national product in 1955. This is perhaps 6 to 9 percent below our own proportion (although the figures are not really comparable). And yet it is 57 percent of an economy as much as 8 or more times as big as it was forty years ago, and due to be roughly sixteen times its present size in forty years from now, at present rates of growth! The Indians consume a much larger proportion of their own national income, but is that any comfort, with per capita income in India at about $60

a year and not going anywhere? The whole point is that, while you can make a formal case that the progress of the Soviet economy is due to deprivation (as it is, in a sense, in any economy) throughout much of the rest of the world the people have the deprivation without the progress.

AFTER all the explanations and alibis are in, a hard core of basic truth remains which, for example, *Business Week* caught a glimmering of in its question more than a year ago: "Is an economy that swings upward and downward with the business cycle basically miscast in a race with the Soviet Union?" The heart of the dilemma was forcefully put by Donald K. David, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Ford Foundation, in a speech right after the first Sputnik:

> *Behind Sputnik we see a rocket and behind the rocket we see advanced science and technology. However, there is something more behind this. There is a social system of human institutions that, in this case, has made the correct decision about what was important to achieve and has motivated and organized efforts to achieve it.*

We need not get quite as radical as Mr. David, and endorse any of the Russian decisions as "correct." For purposes of understanding the dilemma of American capitalism, it is enough to recognize that Russia has, and we do not have, "a social system of human institutions" that is in a position to make basic decisions about "what was important to achieve," and then "motivate and organize efforts to achieve it." The beauty of our economic system has long been thought to be that, when every man does the best he can for himself, results are achieved which are beneficial for all. It has now become apparent that the weakness of our economic system is that it may achieve results which are desired by no one. There is no possible doubt that the masters of American industry—if "masters" is the right word in this connection—would like to develop a growth rate of 5 percent, 7 percent, or even more, and that they would have few worries over the fact that this would cut down the people's expenditures for consumption. But they see no way of achieving these results without surrendering their powerful duchies of wealth to central control. Hence, they can advocate only lower taxation, higher profits, and greater incentives to the amassing of private wealth, even though they know that this answer could not possibly succeed in changing our rate of growth by more than a tiny fraction. And some of them are sophisticated enough to understand that a higher rate of growth under our present economic structure is likely to end in crisis.

AS an economy of growth and of the achievement of chosen goals, there is a demonstrable superiority about the Russian system. Yet there remains a wide area of disagreement among thoughtful and socialist-minded people as to what all this portends. Politically, culturally, humanly speaking, the Russian's life remains unattractive. Is Russia, therefore, the prototype of a "monstrous dictatorship" which merely whips the most in economic effort out of its people? Or is it an "advanced economic system" with great potentialities for good? Certainly, the first of these statements is true, although the verbiage ought to be toned down to suit the governmental methods of the post-Stalin period, which do not rely nearly so much on coercion as used to be the case. But there is plenty of empirical evidence to show that the second of the two alternatives is also true.



It will help a great deal, I think, if we view Russia as a process rather than a fixed entity. Except for die-hard Stalinists on the one side, or equally die-hard rightists on the other, it should not be difficult to agree on what Russia looks like today. The economic progress, the social-welfare orientation, the political dictatorship, the artistic barrenness, the bureaucratic hypocrisy, are there for all to see. When it comes to judging what kind of a process this present entity forms one stage of, agreement is harder to get. Since this involves an element of prediction as its major feature, no one can "prove" an absolute case, although there are some who think they can.

For socialists, there are two basic choices:

(1) We might say that in Russia, an unexpected way of solving the economic difficulties of capitalism and getting a planned society has been found, but it is a way that has nothing to do with socialism, either past, present, or future. Thus socialism has a frightful rival: rule and planning by a dictatorial elite. Marx was therefore shortsighted in placing the economic at the heart of his concept of history; alternative economic evolutions are possible, and it is the political struggle which will decide the direction and fate of society.

(2) We might say, instead, that a modern society which adopts collective economic forms is in the socialist lineage, whether we like it or not. It may have a long way to go to socialism, and as in the Russian and Chinese cases, may display the most twisted and repulsive characteristics at this stage in its evolution, all the more so as the long path of transition starts from Asian semi-feudalism rather than from the higher level of the Western capitalism. According to this interpretation, Marxists were shortsighted in failing to see that revolutions in the social order and leaps to collectivist economic forms could come in the most underdeveloped of nations instead of in the most developed. But the new economic form bears within itself the seeds of an eventual socialist development, after the first stages of using the new methods to solve centuries-old problems of feudalism and capitalism have gone by. In this view, then, socialism has no economic competitor, and even though

the Russian-Chinese development may have made things harder in some ways for socialists of the West, by fracturing the humanist image of socialism without which it cannot attract support, in the long view it is part of the socialist current of history.

TWENTY or twenty-five years ago, when this choice first arose among socialists, it was much harder to evaluate. On the one side, the Stalinists had succeeded in obscuring for most of the socialist movement even the most elementary facts about Russia, so that while the terror was at its height and thousands of innocents were being sent to their death, the image was broadcast of a nation "more democratic than ours," with just a couple or three Benedict Arnolds being taken care of by due process. On the other side, the claimants for the view of a fixed and retrogressive dictatorship had many strong points, as little motion was visible, and it was not too hard to make out a case that insofar as things were moving, they were getting worse instead of better.

From the present vantage point a quarter-century later, the process is much clearer. There is no longer any doubt about the economic transformation. Neither can there be any question that popular living standards are due to be revolutionized within a generation. Even in the United States, where private enrichment and inequality are open principles of society, the growth of the economy has meant the improvement of living standards; what shall we say of an economy which is growing at a rate twice as rapid? What could any clique of rulers do with the output? No matter how much inequality remains thirty years from now, the Russian standard of living will have been revolutionized at least to the highest present Western level.

But certainly the process is not entirely an economic one. We have seen how, in the past five years, the easing of the strains of the Stalin era has encouraged new perspectives, new demands, new thinking among the intellectuals. The intellectuals have the advantage that they feel ideological breezes first, and that their feelings are more likely to win notice and report. We may be sure that the same stirrings are penetrating throughout Soviet society.

Twenty years ago, in other words, all socialists could do was to cling hopefully to the theory that an economy set up for collectivist ends would sooner or later find a way to right itself, humanize its governmental structure, liberate its culture, and return to its earliest purposes—that socialism was inherent, if not yet present, in national ownership and control of the means of production. Today, the question is still not settled in any decisive way, but the portents increase that out of the cauldron of revolution, civil war, world war, industrialization, and dictatorship, a nation will finally emerge prepared to shape its own conscious image of the good life, and to organize its efforts toward that image—which is what socialists have essentially demanded of the future society.

There is no denying the formidable governmental obstacles that the Russian people will have to leap or smash on this path, and we cannot pretend to know exactly how the process will develop further. But this much looms before us: If Soviet socialism succeeds in clearing such a road, and at the same time Western socialism does no better than its present standstill, the Russian people may one day take the lead to re-create for the world the image of socialism which their own development had smashed.

"Oppressive Government is Worse than Tigers"

Following are excerpts from the testimony of John L. Lewis, president of the United Mine Workers, before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and Labor on May 13. Lewis testified in opposition to the Kennedy-Ervin bill, or any form of restrictive labor legislation.

MEMBERS of labor unions are natural citizens. Corporations are artificial citizens under our judicial procedure, stemming from the Constitution. Yet corporations, concerned only with property rights and economic values are left free from such responsibility, while the labor unions, formed to make a contribution to the human needs of their members, are held liable under a Federal law proposed now in many quarters.

Why? Are property rights superior to human affairs—human life? If so, why? Has it come to the point where the Republic will worship the golden calf of money, rather than the well-being of its citizens, as expressed through the devices they have set up?

* * *

. . . our chief stock in trade in dealing with Russia for the last 20 years is our diplomats' constant usage of the fact that Americans are free and that American labor unions are free, and that they are not the puppets of the government, while a contrary condition prevails in Europe. Our own representatives of labor have been encouraged by the State Department and the government and the Congress to go abroad, participate in these conferences, make such statements. We have done so. I have made a lot of short addresses myself that have been sent overseas for various information services to be used there in those other countries on that very subject, emphasizing that point by request of the State Department.

* * *

So what? Are we merely only temporarily free, or are we free? Are we going back now into those conferences, after this Congress adjourns, woefully to tell them that due to the act of our Congress we have now had to leave the procession of free men, and may be numbered among the group of economic slaves of whom we talk part of the time?

* * *

A few years ago I looked up the vital statistics in several mining states—representative mining states—where the ratio of bankers and banking executives, as near as could be computed, was about one to six or eight coal miners, and you may judge my consternation and my personal surprise and my humiliation, to a degree, when the vital statistics of those states revealed that numerically there were more bankers in the penitentiaries than coal miners.

* * *

One of the great Chinese philosophers said one time—speak-to a woman who lived in a country that abounded with tigers; she had lost her husband and then she lost her son from tigers —"Woman, why dost thou not leave a country that abounds in tigers?"

And she said, "The government here is not oppressive."

And the philosopher said to his mandarins, "Let that be a lesson: Oppressive government is worse than tigers!"

Attack on the Supreme Court and the New Majority

by Harry Lore

THE spate of attacks against the Supreme Court for its civil liberties and civil rights decisions was so crude that few expected they would have any effect. Perhaps now, after the 5-to-4 decisions of the Court in the Uphaus and Barenblatt cases in which the reins were loosened on Congressional and state investigations into so-called "subversion," they will be taken more seriously. There is little question that the atmosphere created by the attacks aided in the formation of a slim majority led by Justices Clark and Harlan, against the minority of Warren, Black, Douglas, and Brennan.

Recent history will disclose that the post-war onslaught on the Supreme Court began after the decision in the school desegregation cases in 1954, thus testifying to the continued power of Southern policy-makers to set a national trend. It has continued ever since. The attack has run the gamut from well-annotated and sophisticated articles in the law journals to the backwoods polemics of the Talmadges and the Eastlands found almost daily in the *Congressional Record*. The condemnatory report of the Conference of State Chief Justices (with a notable minority dissent) gave the Southern position a measure of respectability and universality which the critics of the Supreme Court had hitherto lacked. And the position taken by the American Bar Association at its last convention added more weight to the attack.

When the American Bar Association, in one of its earlier conventions, chose as its motif the phrase "Rule of Law," it undoubtedly did so for the purpose of showing in a world torn by strife and dissension the value of order and symmetry in human relations obtainable by the effective social utilization of an enlightened judiciary. It seems reasonably clear that what the selectors of these words had in mind was the Anglo-American ideal of "a government of laws, not of men." Yet now it has castigated those very rules of law which guarantee to the individual his Constitutional rights, as well as the very institution through which so many of these rules of law have been defined.

The House Un-American Activities Committee came out in February 1959 with its report purporting to show how a handful of supposedly "Communist" lawyers had "used" the Supreme Court to widen the scope of the Fifth Amendment, upset contempt of Congress convictions, and *inter alia,* limit the scope of Congressional investigations. The report was an attack not only on a group of lawyers who appeared frequently before the Supreme Court, usually on behalf of politically unpopular defendants, but also on the Supreme Court for supposedly adopting in their decisions the rationale advanced by these "Communist counsellors-at-law."

Criticism of the Supreme Court is, of course, nothing new in American history. However, not since the days of Jefferson when Fisher Ames could declaim, "The angels of destruction are making haste. Our judges are to be as independent as spaniels," has the attack been so vicious or so unfounded. The American Bar Association has placed itself ignobly on record, and the baseness of its stand is underlined by the praise it received from Senator Eastland on March 5, 1959, when he placed the entire report in the *Congressional Record:* "I am glad that the American Bar Association report has in unequivocal terms called the attention of the American people to the inexcusable failure of the Supreme Court. . . . The most important thing about the action of the American Bar Association House of Delegates is the clear indication it gives that the heart of the nation's lawyers is sound."

What is this report, which came from the ABA's Special Committee on Communist Tactics, Strategy, and Objectives and which was called a "monumental work" by the National Commander of the American Legion? The report itself begins with a warning about the international Communist menace, after which there follow six recommendations, beginning with a disclaimer of any intent to limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, and ending with a plea for legislation to upset Supreme Court rulings in *Yates vs. U.S.* and *Watkins vs. U.S.* The recommendations propose to give back to the Secretary of State the arbitrary and unequivocal right to deny passports, and to expand the powers of the House and Senate Internal Security Committees. What follows is a purported analysis of Supreme Court decisions relating to Communism, and a hackneyed rehashing of the alleged mechanics by which Communists accomplish "blackmail, counterfeiting, forgery, kidnapping, lying, mass murder, slavery, subversion, theft, and treaty-breaking," to further their nefarious ends. By indirection, the Supreme Court is made an accessory both before and after the fact to this syllabus of fact and fiction regarding Communism. The report ends with a reference to the House report on Communist legal subversion, and expresses regret over the neglect of local bar associations in purging their ranks.

The official view of the American Bar Association was, then, that the Supreme Court of the United States had encouraged an increase in domestic subversion. The repudiation of this view was quick in coming. In several quarters this attack on the Supreme Court was recognized as being, in the words of Solicitor General Rankin, "an insidious and indirect effort to affect its judgment." The Philadelphia Bar Association, by vote of its membership, labeled the ABA document as not so much a report as an advocate's brief. Representative Frank Thompson, Jr., of New Jersey, called the ABA to task for saying, in effect, that it is a better judge of the Constitution than the highest court in the United States. The *Washington Post and Times Herald,* in criticizing the report, recalled what has long been an ABA sore spot: the view of seven former ABA presidents before Congress in 1916 that Louis Brandeis was not fit to be a Supreme Court Justice. Dean Jefferson B. Fordham of the University of Pennsylvania Law School rebuked the writers of the report: "When it comes to recommendations for substantive legislation I think the ABA should assert leadership in the realm of civil rights and civil liberties." In an article in the *New York Post,* Max Lerner remarked that the American lawyer has declined in stature to the point where "some lawyers have acquired a Wall Street mind, others have acquired a G-man mind, and some have acquired the two."

WITH American foreign policy in a position of extreme difficulty, and the politically influential South going through a rough cultural metamorphosis, hard times clearly are ahead for the civil rights and liberties of many. The liberal lawyer may become the new whipping boy of the current watchdogs of reaction (as foreshadowed in the case of Bernard Schwartz and the FCC investigation). It seems this is the time for the legal profession to close the gap between what Max Lerner calls "'a liberal elite—perhaps even a civil liberties elite—and the profession as a whole."

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The search for causes shows crime to be a part of modern culture, an alternative way of life for deprived and embittered youngsters and adults.

Social Roots Of Crime

by Martin Oppenheimer

THE very magnitude of the crime problem in America has caused many social scientists to throw up their hands in dismay. At this point, we can do little more than begin to make a dent in this particular aspect of the decay of our society. I will try here to outline the problem of crime and more particularly juvenile delinquency, explore some of the theories which seek to explain these forms of "social disorganization," and sketch out some of the more likely steps that might be taken to cope with this ugly situation.

Crime, including juvenile crime, appears to be on the increase not only in this country but throughout many areas of the world. In this country it seems to be concentrated in low-income groups. Negroes appear to commit more crimes of certain kinds than their proportion in the general population. These three facts are generally assumed by the public and accepted by trained observers. The precise nature of what this means, however, is something not so readily agreed upon. Actual crime statistics are full of flaws. There is a wide gap between crimes reported in police records and crimes actually taking place. Some kinds of crime, such as murder, are more carefully reported than others—for example the white-collar crimes such as tax evasion. Some crimes are less likely to show up on the books, depending on the nature of the criminal (his race or class), or the need to protect the record of a police department or a political administration during an election year. There is an even wider gap between crimes reported and convictions.

Generally, statistics of crime are those offenses known to the police and reported to the FBI for its Uniform Crime Reports by some 1,475 cities with a total population of over forty million. These are recorded annually. Figures released in April 1958, covering the year 1957, show that 2,796,400 crimes were reported, an increase of 9.1 percent over 1956, and a 23.9 percent increase over the average for the previous five years. Figures for 1958 are not yet available. These increases, even in rural areas, are accounted for largely by increases in numbers of "property crimes" such as burglary and theft.

In the same year, 1957, arrests increased 4.3 percent as a whole, but arrests of persons under 18 increased 9.8 percent. Since 1952, the population aged 10-17 has increased by 22 percent, but arrests of persons under 18 have increased some 55 percent! On the whole, the crime rate seems to be rising four times as fast as the population.

That is what the problem looks like in numbers. But in human terms the picture becomes grimmer. Too often it ends in death, as with the killing of In-Ho Oh, an innocent student on his way to a mailbox, by eleven Negro youths (reported in the December 1958 *American Socialist*). Even more often it ends in overcrowded "Youth Study Centers" or prisons where young offenders are thrown together with the "pros" to learn vice the easy way; or back on the street and the low-rent housing project where it started.

IN New York City, for example, one family out of twenty lives in a low-rent housing project, including 2,000 of the city's 20,000 "multiproblem" families—those involved in 75 percent of all delinquency. Overcrowded living conditions and lack of privacy, general chaos after dark causing guards to desert their posts on weekends in dismay, lack of any program to organize recreation, and other similar factors often force children into the streets to seek security—and sometimes food itself—in the "bopping" or fighting street gang. There are some 75 to 100 of these in New York. They are chiefly based on geography, not on race, and are organized on military lines for self-defense and offense against other gangs. In Philadelphia's public housing projects, some 11,000 families have one social worker assigned to them; after two weeks on the job he had 85 "multiproblem" families in his files with no end in sight. The project becomes the catchall for every kind of social problem from the surrounding area. Able, rising families which could create some kind of stable social fabric as potential community leaders are forced out above a certain income. So are, in many cases, "troublemakers," including mothers of illegitimate children, which only throws the problem back into the street, solving nothing.

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Poverty remains more than anything else the inseparable companion of delinquency, now as in the past. The accessories of poverty, namely substandard housing, little education, disease, unemployment, and in this country Americans of African descent, and Puerto Ricans, form an ever-present backdrop to any discussion of crime and delinquency. The ugly picture of discrimination in hiring and firing, which today finds unemployment rates among Negroes twice as high as among whites (partly because Negroes are concentrated in unskilled labor) cannot be over-emphasized in any explanation of differential racial crime rates. Varying cultural standards (that is, what some groups consider "crime" others may not) add to the confusion.

In short, then, when we look at the police districts which have the highest concentration of reported crimes, both juvenile and adult, we find in most cases that these same districts are also the centers of the so-called "jungles" of our larger cities, areas heavily overpopulated and either rundown and/or populated by inhabitants of public housing projects: Negro and Puerto Rican in ethnic character; heavy concentrations of persons unemployed and on public assistance; high in deaths due to such diseases as tuberculosis, venereal disease, pneumonia, birth injuries and pre- and post-natal complications, and, of course, homicide; and generally low in number of years of education per adult person. We find in these areas heavy percentages of illegitimate births; rampant fire hazards even to the point where insurance companies refuse to write any insurance at all; case after relief case in which a woman has children by a series of men, many of whom have long since disappeared; and other indices of what sociologists like to call "disorganization" or "social pathology."

THE answer, for young people, is the gang—pitiful, tragic and dangerous. The "security" of the gang lies in a world of alleys and slums which leaves the neutral defenseless and makes membership almost a prerequisite of life. Critical periods, where long-term "cools" verge on and run over into hot wars, are weekend and summer nights. Alliances between gangs are sought to prolong "cools," altogether too much reminiscent of the adult world of which the gangs seem to be a bitter mirror. Gang members pin their hopes on the Army as a way out, an even sadder commentary on a society of "opportunity," but even this is barred for those with jail records. Social workers concentrating on gangs are few and far between. Most efforts to deal with juvenile delinquents in an organized manner have not yet shown any significant results. The police are regarded by most youths as a natural enemy, for police departments are in business to enforce the law, not to prevent crime. They are not social workers. As for the social workers, for the most part they are overworked, underpaid, and permeated by the values of the class from which they come, or to which they aspire, which means that they bring little understanding to the tasks for which their texts ill fit them. Almost without a doubt, an anthropologist would be of greater use in the culture of the gang than most social workers.

There is the immediate problem, one which, it can readily be seen, is incomprehensible without an understanding of the broader problems of which crime and juvenile delinquency form only one aspect. The economy as a whole; the class structure of American society; the place of the Negro and other minorities within it; the values of a business culture; these are the things which are crucial to an understanding of crime. Yet they are absent from most examinations.

CONTEMPORARY social science has developed a number of approaches to the problem of delinquency. Roughly, they can be divided into (1) the individual approach; (2) the approach of seeing the individual acting in response to immediate variables surrounding him; and (3) an approach which tries to see the individual as part of a total culture. All of these have parts of the answer, but as we shall see, the last is perhaps the most fruitful that has been developed.

The individual approach tends to see each criminal or delinquent as unique and abnormal. The delinquent is a pathological case of one kind or another: he may be mentally defective, he may have innate tendencies towards criminality, he may be a constitutional psychopath or a sex pervert. This delinquent is sick. His treatment is on an individual basis—therapy, special schools, institutionalization. Society has little to do with the matter, except perhaps to push an already sick person over the brink. Unquestionably many delinquents fall into this category, and can be treated only in this way; we suspect this is true more of the middle-class neurotic delinquent than of the working-class delinquent. But it is still the working class where the bulk of delinquency falls.

Bordering on this school is the *"anomie"* view, which holds that crime is a way in which an individual who accepts the goals of the culture but has no way to reach those goals, creates his own means, which are different and not approved, to reach those same goals. A few scientists have begun to question these goals and the possibility of attaining them, particularly in view of our class structure and given the prevailing practices of racial discrimination. Most sociologists, however, do not choose to adopt this course. Another alternative is preferred: the study of variables involved in a mass of delinquent and non-delinquent cases to attempt to determine certain correlates of crime.

What happens here is that the social scientist takes a large number of delinquents, holds constant as many variables as he can, compares them with a similar group of

non-delinquents, and comes up with findings which show that delinquents come from broken homes, bad neighborhoods, poor surroundings, minority groups, have poor grades in school, etc. Or, he takes a similar group of boys, all judged as potentially delinquent, and divides them up, giving one group intensive "treatment" and the other group nothing (and finding, in most cases, no significant difference). Or, he spots the homes of delinquents on a social base map of a city and ends with the conclusion that delinquents come from areas of rapid population change, bad housing, heavy concentrations of minority groups, high rates of T.B., adult crime, and mental disorders. These are called areas of "disorganization." Presumably, if we could "organize" these areas, that would eradicate much of the crime.

This approach too has its value, although at the present time it serves mainly to tell us what we already know, and to confuse us by introducing the argument of social disorganization or pathology. This remains the dominant school of criminology in American sociology. It is one permeated by an unstated bias in favor of the social organization of America as it is, that is, healthy and not pathological, organized on middle-class patterns and not disorganized (which means all that is not organized on those patterns, almost by definition).

A MORE promising school is the cultural one. Simply stated years ago by Sutherland, it holds that criminals associate with others in a criminal culture, and non-criminals in a non-criminal culture. Change a person's associations and his habits will change. Criminality is learned. It is not necessarily innate, neurotic, or disorganized. William Whyte, in his pioneering *Street Corner Society* (1943) made the interesting discovery (for a member of the middle-class; and a shock it was) that the delinquent culture was very well-organized indeed. It is simply organized in a way which fails to mesh with the structure of the society around it. For the first time, here was an anthropological approach to delinquency which showed delinquency to be, basically, a part of a distinct and separate culture within American society, in a word, a part of proletarian culture.

Albert Cohen, in *Delinquent Boys* (1955) went even further. Delinquency is a way of life among certain groups in our society. The delinquent is not different either in his personality or in his immediate family circumstances, nor is he trying to "adjust" to some accidental circumstance or deep feeling of inadequacy, although all these things may enter into the makeup of the delinquent personality to some degree. Delinquent culture shares the values, in many cases, of working-class culture in general. Its crime is non-utilitarian, it is impulsive, unplanned, and hedonistic; its norms are upside-down from those of the larger culture. The gang is not amoral—it has a very good idea of right and wrong, but those rights and wrongs are different from those of the larger culture. It is in basic opposition to the values of the "Protestant Ethic," the middle-class ethos of the school and church, the ideals of ambition, responsibility, thrift, and, above all, respect for property. The working-class child, disadvantaged in this status game, doomed to failure in most cases in achieving "success" on this level, needs a solution, a face-saving device which provides criteria of status he *can* meet. This is the gang, an easier way to "succeed" than to desert one's culture and "pass" into middle-class life.

Even more necessary, then, is this face-saving device when working-class is coupled with Negro, when the harsh odds of being poor are compounded by being black as well.

But delinquency, as distinguished from just plain working-class adolescence, is more than this. The working-class boy plays truant because school interferes with his life. The delinquent plays truant because "good" boys go to school. He does not temporize, hence he never falls below middle-class standards. He has rejected them altogether, or nearly so. The opposites of middle-class life become the criteria for status, in particular that most onerous offense to bourgeois values, the destruction of property. Here we have an explanation of juvenile rebellion in terms of the entire culture, based on a social class within a system of property relations which sets a standard of morality unachievable for most people, and hence false to the core. Crime becomes an available alternative to this morality, a way to live and give some meaning to life, particularly in the company of others like-minded within the gang.

AS for cure, most studies conclude by stating that the problem is too complicated for any one solution. That this is true goes without saying; but that few attempts are made to provide any answers at all beyond the usual phrases about "strengthening family life" is a sad commentary on social scientists. At any rate, in study after study, the rates of recidivism (later convictions after an initial conviction and "treatment" of varying kinds) remain fantastically high. A study of Boston's Juvenile Courts in the twenties revealed that of 1,000 boys referred to guidance clinics, 88 percent later were "repeaters." Other studies show much the same thing .In Britain, of 700 boys sent to "Borstal" institutions, allegedly the very finest system of reformatories available, nearly 50 percent were reconvicted within seven years of discharge, and 30 percent

Poor Students?

Walter P. Coombs, executive director of the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, said in a speech in June to the convention of the General Federation of Women's Clubs:

THE evidence strongly suggests that our young people, by and large, do not know their economic facts of life. If our youth have no understanding of, or pride in, their own economic system, how can we be sure they won't be push-overs for the salesmen of antagonistic systems?

These conclusions are suggested by recent opinion surveys among American high school students. Typically, in a survey of 86 high schools conducted by the Opinions Research Corporation for the United States Chamber of Commerce, members of the senior classes were asked to indicate their preference for various statements descriptive of economic systems.

Fifty-five percent selected the old socialist slogan, "From each according to his abilities, and to each according to his needs."

had been reconvicted two or more times. In the American "Cambridge-Somerville" study of two groups of 325 each, composed of problem boys and "predelinquents," one group was treated by personal advice and regular counselling, the other received no treatment. After five years, ending with 75 boys in each group, no significant difference was found in delinquency rates. And so on.

But a number of things could actually be done, were the funds available. These have been suggested by writers usually not in the field of sociology as such. In public housing projects, community leadership must be developed; one way to help this along is by not penalizing families which raise their income level by forcing them out and back into the slums whence they came. Another way perhaps, is for the emphasis of redevelopment in cities to be changed from large slum-clearing projects which create high-rise concrete ghettos, to more renovation of already existing housing units, thus maintaining some semblance of community organization. Co-ops would be helpful here. Above all, slum clearance at present rates overcrowds the surrounding areas instead of making significantly more housing available.

Requiring presently unavailable funds are other valuable needs: more gang-workers, more recreation facilities, more CCC-type camps with trained social workers at better pay, more (and less-crowded) institutions to house juvenile offenders. But with increasing unemployment and public assistance rolls, and decreasing state revenues, it is unlikely that these needs will be met by the states, although the demand for such services usually increases in direct proportion with unemployment figures. The federal government too is unlikely to step in. Between budget-minded Republicans and armaments-happy Democrats, the chances for welfare legislation on the scale needed are slim. To cite one example, federal aid to urban renewal would have to be at the rate of $1.3 billion over a six-year period just to maintain the present aid level, in the face of increasing needs.

BUT more important in any consideration of crime and delinquency than money appropriations (which after all are calculated to deal with effects rather than causes) must be the search for the roots of crime. Here a recent finding to the effect that crime rates among Montgomery, Alabama, Negroes decreased during the famous bus boycott is extremely significant. For at the bottom of all investigations as to causes of crime we wind up with the search for a meaning to life itself. Crime, like suicide, seems to decline when life has a deeper meaning, either in the religious sense or in the sense of the individual's feeling that there is something worth fighting, working, or hoping for. While this society is unable to supply such a meaning for most people, the alienation of man and his isolation from his fellow-man and from the product of his labors will continue to result in alternative ways of finding meanings for life, and for finding life's necessities. One of these alternatives, within working-class culture, is crime. Ultimately, the eradication of crime is deeply involved with the search for a meaning to life.

BOOKS

How They Live and Work In Moscow

A ROOM IN MOSCOW, by Sally Belfrage. Reynal, New York, 1958, $3.50.

ONLY a small contingent of 160 Americans participated in the sixth World Youth Festival in Moscow in 1957, and of these, 42 took advantage of a free invitation to visit China after the festival, defying a forbidding order from the United States State Department. Among those who went both to the festival and to China was the then scarcely 21-year-old Sally Belfrage, daughter of the exiled editor of the *National Guardian,* Cedric Belfrage. Miss Belfrage had the unique experience of staying on in Moscow for five months after returning from China, having obtained a job editing English translations of Russian classics at the Foreign Languages Publishing House, and the account she has written of her contact with the Soviet people gives us a close-up and quite realistic picture of the situation there.

Only the better part of a chapter at the beginning is devoted to the China trip, but the significance of this far outweighs the amount of space devoted to it, since in addition to supplying a certain amount of information about China, it provides an interesting basis for comparison with Russia in the pages to follow. Specifically, the author found a much greater unanimity of opinion there than in Russia, as well as a spirit of honest self-criticism from the leaders down, and a resort to persuasion and "re-education" in place of violent purges. (" 'It is inevitable; China will get better steadily, and there are no limits. And it is simply the spirit of 650 million people that will do it.' One man said that to me, but I felt that any of the 650 million might have, and no one needed to anyway because it was everywhere and obvious.") Perhaps one has to be somewhat sympathetic to start with in order to form such conclusions; nevertheless, Miss Belfrage has made a sincere attempt to present an objective picture of what she witnessed, and there are few who would not credit her with displaying a remarkable degree of sound critical judgment.

UNDOUBTEDLY the greatest value of the book lies in the information it gives us about the Russian people—how they live and how they view their society and government. Conversations with people of various persuasions, mostly young people, are recorded verbatim. Those who are critical of the system fall roughly into two categories: the unguided critics, and the intelligent ones. To the former belong the "stiliagi," or style-chasers—Russia's beatniks—who seek thrills and escape from the boredom of their everyday lives by a preoccupation with foreign things, which includes obtaining articles of clothing, etc., from foreign visitors.

The thoughtful critics are for the most part those who had suffered under the Stalin regime and are convinced that things are not really getting much better. Some of them are violently bitter ("Khrushchev is very unpopular. Malenkov was better—things got a little better then, but this man is just another gangster.") There are many Jews who feel themselves in difficulty because of their interest in Israel, and they all resent having to register their nationality as Jewish rather than that of the republic or region of their origin. There are artists and writers who are disturbed over the lack of artistic freedom. There are those who oppose the Soviet system on theoretical grounds, such as an anarchist Miss Belfrage encountered. Finally, there are those who simply would rather live in the West because people there have higher standards. Although many of these people had been

in trouble for their beliefs and activities, now they didn't seem afraid to speak their minds, and apparently nothing happened to them. They did, however, constantly express concern that someone among them might be a spy.

On the other side, the persons who are pro-Soviet also fall into two main groups: the dogmatists, and those who have "faith based on thought." The typical interpreter will defend anything which forms part of the current official line; one of them is described thus: "He was a student of journalism but, he said, he was ashamed that he would never do physical work, only mental. He didn't believe in the superiority of the intellectual because that would create a stratified society, and one couldn't look down on the workers. He so obviously *did* look down on the workers."

THE remaining principal viewpoint outlined finds its chief representative in the person of Kolya, and it is his attitude which makes the most sense to Miss Belfrage, thus forming the chief basis upon which her own conclusions must be judged: "Lack of freedom in general distressed him, but he felt that to a large extent it had been necessary and that, as the country grew materially and more people were educated, freedom would logically follow as a result of pressure from below." This viewpoint takes on added significance when we are told that his own father had been arrested during the Stalin period and had died in a Siberian prison camp. This example supports the author's own belief that there is bound to be some sort of steady improvement in the Soviet Union because those people who have been made happy by the changes since Stalin's time would never tolerate a return to the old ways.

The narrative gives us, as well, a careful picture of what Moscow is like as a place to live and work (with a brief look at Leningrad thrown in for good measure). We get a glimpse of the crowded living conditions, where "one small room usually has to do for a family, however high its rate of growth, and kitchens and bathrooms are almost always shared." But rents, we are told, are negligible—only 3½ to 5 percent of income. A great deal is said about the inefficiency which characterizes the daily routine of living and the bureaucracy which is closely tied up with it.

Waiting in line is the Russian way of life, and when something goes wrong, it is difficult to place the blame; you have to go to the person in charge to get results, and this person is often difficult to find. These difficulties are quietly disposed of by calling them "traditional Russian specialties, legacies from years before the revolution." It would seem that the matter goes a lot deeper than that, although the author is right in not laying the blame entirely on the Soviet system. Bureaucracy exists in every modern society where the mode of living is complex, and it is by no means confined to government operations. The fact that it exists in the Soviet Union to a more pronounced degree than in most countries is an indication that their organization has not caught up with the needs of so large and growing a society. Beyond that, the problem of bureaucracy is bound up with the structure of the regime, and it will take a lot more democracy to prepare a full solution.

ONE final aspect of Russian life to which a great deal of the book is devoted is the sphere of art and culture. This is an area in which Miss Belfrage displays an unusual degree of personal enthusiasm, and it seems to be the one in which she is most capable of evaluation. Artistically creative persons are being alienated from the regime by its insistence on making art subservient to the aims of the state, thus causing many to conclude that the government is no good because it encourages bad art and stifles what to them is life itself. It is cogently suggested that the lack of sophistication in Soviet art is due to the fact that it lowers itself, rather than forcing the audience to make some effort for its appreciation, and that Russian artists might be able to produce better work if they were allowed contact with foreign contemporaries and open leadership among themselves. During a seminar at the youth festival Ilya Ehrenburg had made the statement that "in the West, culture tends to be for the few; in the Soviet Union everybody is capable of appreciating it." This would make more sense, as is pointed out, if the Soviet public really had access to representative art and literature.

There has been some improvement, as, for example, the fact that some foreign work, such as French impressionist painting, which had been suppressed until a few years ago, is now open to the public. Little has changed, however, as far as freedom of creativeness for Soviet artists themselves is concerned. As to just how this dilemma will resolve itself, the author is less certain than she is about most other things: "What happens next is hard to say, but the ferment that now exists in all creative activity may yet end well."

The book concludes with a strong plea for tolerance and understanding and by expressing hope that the future will be shaped by people at the lowest level rather than by leaders. In dealing with a subject such as this it is very difficult to be objective and impartial; Miss Belfrage tries hard but recognizes her own limitations. She repeatedly presents opposing viewpoints and shows how easy it is to "see" proof for either one depending on one's preconceived ideas. Marvin Kalb, reviewing the book in the *New York Times,* says that she is often "so anxious to be fair to the Russians that she's unfair to the truth." Of course, everyone is an expert on what the truth is. The point is that this is a book in which facts carry more weight than interpretation, although the latter cannot be ignored, and while tending at times toward naiveté, stands out for its youthful sensibility. The whole approach is novel and represents a welcome voice of sanity in a world in which a dangerous situation exists.

GAYLORD K. McDOWELL

Marx and Sartre

THE OBJECTIVE SOCIETY by Everett Knight. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1959, *available through British Book Centre, New York,* $4.

THE special interest of this book is that it presents the best exposition in the English language to date of the political and philosophical viewpoint of Jean-Paul Sartre. By birth and basic education the author is an American from Rhode Island and Brown University, but his three years at the Sorbonne and his specialization in French studies, on which he now lectures at the University College of Ghana, gave him the necessary background.

It would be wide of the mark to think of this book as a dispassionate academic treatise. Mr. Knight is a creative adherent of the Sartre school, and argues its case with intensity and originality. Naturally, it is impossible to try to reproduce the philosophical viewpoint in the short space of a review. Mr. Knight's book is itself in part a condensation of a small portion of Sartre's massive *Being and Nothingness.* But the line of argument can be indicated briefly as follows:

What Mr. Knight calls rationalism or scientism, which since the Enlightenment has dominated the human intellect, is used up, and must give way to a new way of looking at the world, or more precisely, of experiencing it. Science as a means of measurement is a worthy tool, but as an outlook, as Truth, it is doomed, because it assumes Truth to be a hidden property of a pre-existing world, which it is the job of the mind to unravel and discover. This "scientific method," the author insists, is but an artificial veil which men have thrust between themselves and the reality around them. In actuality, there is no hidden "truth," things are as men experience them.

We can know the world only through our experience of it and existence in it; hence our observation, contemplation, and activities are creative acts which bring into being the only world we can know. We can make no discoveries about an objective world existing apart from us; truth, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder, and in the intentions, purposes, mode of existence, of the human subject. What we need is the direct gaze which takes what it sees as truth, rather than allowing itself to become confused by what we think we "know." The realities of our existence, therefore, are not things outside ourselves to be discovered, but ours to create by our intentions and activities.

WHAT has attracted a bold and iconoclastic mind like Mr. Knight's to this type of thinking is not, it seems to me, the froth of mysticism and metaphysics, but

the path it seems to open for an escape from the intellectual prisonhouse which the orthodox Western social sciences have built for themselves in the last fifty years. The present dominant outlook of so-called "scientific relativism" is based upon the following syllogism: Human goals are a matter of taste, emotion, moral choice. Science cannot tell us whether plenty is better than starvation, peace is better than war, democracy is better than tyranny. Those choices must all be made on "non-scientific" grounds, and then the scientist can tell the world how to get the things it has chosen. By this syllogism, social science has removed itself from the largest single area of human concern: the goals of economic, political, and cultural activity. But we can add another observation: Social science has not made good in its self-announced area of concern. While there is, despite the mock-problem made of it by the scholars, almost universal agreement on what is needed, the social scientists haven't been of much help in getting these things for us. Thus, remaining virtually without a function, these academic disciplines have retreated into fact-gathering, and into what Kingsley Amis called in a telling phrase in one of his novels, the throwing of "pseudo-light on non-problems."

Despite the hullaballoo about the divorce between goals and means, it is hard to see where this is as much a problem as a non-problem. Once social science is conceived, in the spirit of natural science, as a means of understanding man's social evolution with a view to controlling it better, a considerable part of the problem disappears, and a good portion of the human objective gets built into the axiomatic foundations of science. It is true that the entire difficulty is by no means wiped out, as any maniac is still free to argue that the most desirable goal of human evolution is extermination as soon as possible, and I know of no "scientific proof" standing outside and above human concerns that can refute him. Neither can I see any reason for getting a case of lockjawed immobility over this presumed difficulty. The very fact that entire schools of social science have artificially blocked their own development over this axiomatic argument is not so much evidence of a theoretical difficulty as it is a sign that they have nowhere to go anyway, and have seized upon this as a handy reason for making time or retrogressing.

BUT to return to Mr. Knight: What concerns us at the moment is the way existentialism handles this difficulty, at least insofar as it is expressed by the left-wing political school of Sartre. Mr. Knight is clearly attracted most of all by the smashing of the bothersome dichotomies between means and ends, science and ideals, truth and purpose, mind and matter, and so forth. What emerges from this book, in the form of a passionate appeal and bitter polemic, is that the thinker should think first of all and above all about man—what he wants, what he needs, what he can create if his will and intentions are liberated. It is possible to disagree flatly with Mr. Knight's philosophical framework and to agree most wholeheartedly with this conclusion, which may be arrived at by other and sounder paths.

Within his scaffolding, the author has built up a structure of political and economic insight, merciless polemic against the weakest aspects of current Western thought, and angry and sarcastic condemnation of the Western intellectual. He approaches by his own peculiar path the same problem that C. Wright Mills raises in his recent *The Sociological Imagination*: How can we turn our attention to the betterment of man rather than the present dessicated, dry-rot occupations of the academic intellectual?

The central accusation of the book is that Western society has no goal or purpose because that is the way it is constructed; it is not supposed to have an end in view for man or his institutions. Given this structure and ideology, the West is drifting purposelessly. It has neither the political, social or economic institutions for solving its problems and realizing its human potential, nor does it have an outlook towards creating those institutions.

MR. Knight's answer is quite radical. We must have, he says, a political solution, and the only political solution is that offered by Marxism, which he believes has no competitor worthy of consideration. But Marxism has also been corrupted by "scientism" and rationalism. Marx started his thinking, we are told, along existentialist lines in his early philosophical writings; later on, he, and more especially his followers, adopted the rationalist viewpoint. They allowed themselves to set up an absolute goal, instead of adapting themselves to needs and the conditions of existence. They thrust the veil of science between themselves and a world of reality which they might have experienced more clearly without their messianic dogmas and claims of "hidden laws." Thus Marxism needs to be overhauled in the existentialist way—this, he says, is the work that Sartre is doing—in order to revivify it.

What is most valuable about this book is, in my opinion, not the theoretical structure but the powerful passages in which the author dissects the going views of social science. He is a fervent, resourceful, and merciless polemicist, and the sparks he throws off about everything from the condition of the modern Western worker, the abdication of the intellectuals, modern art, the middle-class mind and its striving after status and after the "ownership" of culture —these are the most rewarding parts of his effort. He has a strong and original mind, capable of using the methodological weapons forged by others—Hegel, Marx, Sartre—and also of forming fresh insights where called for.

This book is worth reading, although it would be best for most readers to pay less attention to the philosophical framework and more to the social-economic-political conclusions. And even the philosophy, insofar as it is directed towards destroying the barriers between human thought and human purpose, has an occasional appealing or revealing point. Best of all, it offers that rare phenomenon in modern left-wing literature of a direct and assertive mind expressing itself through a hard-driving polemical style.

H. B.

The Green Room

TWELVE WHO RULED: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution, by R. R. Palmer. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959, $6.95.

THERE were European revolutions before the French; two important ones established the modern form of the state and the economic conditions for capitalist development in England and Holland. But for various reasons, it is the French Revolution that has gripped the imagination of mankind and taken its place as the cornerstone of the modern age. The institutional thoroughness, the ideological sweep, the twenty-year turbulence it unloosed upon Europe gave it a claim beyond all other events to this place in history.

Because the social currents and passions of modern times were first revealed in swirling collision in the Revolution, it has been the focus of mixed feelings ever since. The historian, the intellectual, the modern *bourgeois,* have their reasons for being attracted and repelled at the same time. On the one side, reason and rationality are drawn to the central function of the Revolution, that of clearing away the medieval thickets of absolutism, superstition, and entrenched privilege. The Revolution, however, seen in the longer panorama of history, created as many problems as it solved. The rule of reason meant the rule of the middle class, and for lower classes to aspire was usually considered unreasonable. The Pandora's Box opened by the Revolutlion unloosed things that were offensive to snobbery as well as flattering to reason, and alarming to new forms of privilege as well as inspiring to equalitarian feelings.

For a number of generations, much of the conflict centered around the Terror. And yet frightful as it was in fact and grotesque as it became in legend, the Terror was always an unsatisfactory point of purchase against the Revolution. The record of medieval autocracy excused much in the eyes of many. "There were two 'Reigns of Terror,' " wrote Mark Twain, "If we would but remember it and consider it; the one wrought murder in hot passion, the other in heartless cold blood; the one lasted mere months, the other had lasted a thousand years; the one inflicted death upon ten thousand persons, the other upon a hundred million. . . ." Moreover, the French bourgeoisie itself ruined the argument after the fall of the Paris Commune of 1871, by killing more victims in Paris alone in the space of a couple of weeks than had fallen in the

entire year of the Jacobin Terror throughout all France. As the Revolution receded in time its excesses receded in import, since no horror at the price of a step forward has ever prevented mankind from enjoying its advantages.

In our own age, the Revolution has been attacked on a far wider front. The new assault is at once far more honest and far more reactionary than the old. Modern conservatives have increasingly found themselves forced to admit that what they find distasteful in the Revolution was not alone the Terror, but those very features which in the nineteenth century compelled the admiration of all progressive mankind: its equalitarianism, democracy, reason, and enlightenment. Walter Lippmann, in his best-selling *The Public Philosophy* four years ago, traced the troubles of the present era, including Communism, to the "Jacobin conception of the emancipated and sovereign people" and the "popular religion of the masses to power" which arose out of the Revolution. This view is increasingly echoed, and amplified, so much so that Arthur Koestler, weathervane extraordinary, has just published in his otherwise excellent account of astronomy, *The Sleepwalkers,* a section which blames the conflict between "faith and reason" and the ideological derangement of modern man on Galileo, who, he feels, should have compromised with the Church rather than held out for the truth of the Copernican view of the universe.

OBVIOUSLY, what's involved here is not just the French Revolution, but a total view of man's condition on Earth. As in all times of social and political disillusionment, the retrograde view is in the ascendant, holding with the biblical allegory of the Garden of Eden that knowledge is the original sin, and that the aspiration to know, to control, to create a heaven on Earth, is sure to lead to downfall, anarchy, and ruination.

The present work, fortunately, was written at an earlier date and in a different spirit. Professor Palmer of Princeton published this book in 1941, and its reissuance now restores to print a major contribution to the history of the French Revolution by one of the foremost American authorities in the field. He is not very much concerned in these pages with the philosophical implications of the Revolution. Apart from a few unfortunate comparisons between the France of 1793 and the Europe of 1940, this is a factual and realistic narrative of the year when the Committee of Public Safety, dominated chiefly by the mind and personality of Maximilien Robespierre, ruled France. He is content to adjudge the Revolution for what it most obviously was —the piledriver of a new political and social order—and bitter strictures against any event in which large multitudes of people take a rowdy hand are pleasingly absent.

For the first three years of the Revolution, an impractical attempt was made to rule France as a constitutional monarchy. With the French aristocracy intricately connected by a thousand threads of intrigue to Coblentz—the center of emigre counter-revolution—this halfway house was doomed. On August 10, 1792, a tremendous uprising of the people of Paris took place, resulting in the calling of the famous Convention for the founding of a republic. The following winter the king was executed, and the French revolutionists had drawn the line of blood that was to separate them from ancient Europe by warfare for almost a generation, and in spirit for more than a century. Already at war with Austria and Prussia, the Convention now added England and Holland to its enemies, and opened a year of chaos and defeat.

Two-thirds of French territory was soon occupied by foreign troops, the entire coastline blockaded, by England, in the west the Vendéan insurrection broke out among the peasants, and in the great provincial cities the bourgeoisie revolted against Paris. Military disorganization and economic chaos threatened the existence of the Republic throughout its first year. In the crisis, revolutionary France looked to the Convention. But the Convention was itself divided. The Girondists had taken a strong initiative during the previous year, but they now shrank from the measures needed to meet the situation created by their own audacious actions. The creation of the Committee of Public Safety on April 16, 1793, did not at once solve the crisis. But a new revolt at the end of May by the most radical sections of Paris resulted in the arrest of the leading Girondists. On July 27, Robespierre joined the Committee.

AMONG its twelve members were some of the famous men of the Revolution. Marat was dead by an assassin's hand, and Danton had withdrawn from activity, feeling the problems to be insoluble and "preferring the boudoir of his new wife to the grim burdens carried night after night in the green room of the Committee." But, besides Robespierre, there were Carnot, the "organizer of victory," the talented and imperious Saint-Just, at 25 the youngest of the leaders, Barère, Billaud-Varenne, Collot d'Herbois, Couthon, de Séchelles, Lindet, Saint-André, and the two Prieurs. These twelve were, with the backing of the Convention which maintained a firm control over its ministers to rule France during the Year of the Terror.

What was accomplished in that year is well-known to history. There was the ferocious repression in Paris, in Lyons, and elsewhere, but more dangerous to the stability of the Revolution, there was the chronic self-purge of the revolutionaries, inspired by the frantic tension and the exaggerated rumors of plots and treachery. More permanent in result and significant for history, there was the creation of a stable machinery of government, the startling reversal of military fortunes and the surge of victory which was not to end until Waterloo twenty years after, economic stabilization, and the banishment of the threat of collapse and famine.

Ultimately, the Committee fell. Robespierre, abandoned by all save Couthon and Saint-Just, was himself brought to the guillotine on July 27, 1794, a year to the day after he joined the Committee of Public Safety. The fall of the Committee was due as much to its successes as to its excesses. It was not just that the bourgeoisie was tired of the Republic of Virtue and looked forward to the Republic of Enrichment, and that the revolutionaries themselves were growing frightened of the Terror. It was also that the victories of the Committee and the Convention on the economic and military fronts created a situation where it was possible to dispense with the extraordinary measures and fanatic strivings bound up with the rule of the Committee. Robespierre's sin in the eyes of his enemies, both to the right and to the left of him on social questions, was that he tried to continue his grip, and his efforts towards an ideal Republic of Virtue, after their function in saving revolutionary France had been exhausted.

Even after the fall of Robespierre, France was in no position to survive the free clashes of class interests. But the powerful bourgeoisie which had emerged found the Robespierrist way of suppressing class conflicts intolerable, as it involved an appeal to revolutionary feelings which encouraged what is was supposed to repress. In Bonapartism was found a mode of rule seeming to stand above the classes, preserving the bourgeois gains of the Revolution while suppressing its egalitarianism, and playing down the advanced ideas of the Enlightenment while stressing nationalism.

PROFESSOR Palmer details the staggering events of that amazing year—at once so inspiring and terrible—with care, completeness, and historical perspective. He has the indispensable good sense to judge the Revolution—where he ventures into judgment—in terms of its own problems and necessities. He condemns neither the Terror nor its makers on any wholesale basis, but brings to bear a critical faculty and understanding. "The Hundred Days before Thermidor (the fall of the Committee on the 9th of Thermidor, according to the revolutionary calendar)," he writes, "were not primarily a time of destruction. They were a time of creation, of abortive and perhaps visionary creation. . . . To found the Republic, and to create the institutions thought necessary to a democracy, was the chief aim of the victorious Committee. . . ."

Besides being an excellent work of historical reconstruction, this book has the advantage of a subject matter as dramatic as any ever treated in literature. Professor Palmer writes well, he keeps the story moving, he does not condescend, or skip around problems to make them easier, but he also does not complicate and mystify them after the manner of many scholars, and in general has created a classic work on a great event. It is highly recommended as absorbing and informative history. H. B.

SUMMER ISSUE

THIS is our summer double-issue. A letter from a reader complains at being deprived of the American Socialist for one month of the year, and asks whether there is not some way we might be able to appear for both summer months. The complaint is gratifying and flattering. We would like to be able to comply. But unfortunately, it is not practical to make such a change, in the light of our financial squeeze and office short-handedness. This has proved to be the only way we can catch our breath and refresh ourselves against another year's efforts, and we hope to make it up to our readers by the quality of the magazine the whole year round.

This July-August issue features two articles by the editors bearing on the entire, long-term perspective of world socialism. After you read them, we think you will agree that they pose the most essential questions facing socialism—of any school or variety—today. Whether they also shed light on those questions is for you to judge. We urge that you give the articles close consideration, and that you then write to us, at whatever length is convenient or required, about your thoughts on the topics raised. No problems are of greater importance for the future of socialism than these, and we are greatly interested in your opinions about them.

We think you will also agree, after reading these articles, that they discuss the issues of socialism in a way that will have broad interest for any reader, not just convinced socialists. The trends of development they point to matter for all of us, not just for people with a radical background. For that reason, it seems to us that this issue will make a good introduction to this magazine for any of your friends who are not yet readers, no matter what their political thinking may now be.

IN other words, this is a reminder not to forget the good cause during your summer vacation and the rest of the time until our September issue comes out. As we noted last year, summer generally brings you into contact with people you may not see the rest of the year, and it is a good idea to try to pick up a few readers among them.