“The Last Superpower: Exorcising the demon of Vietnam in the burning oil fields of Kuwait.” — Photo caption, Time magazine, Gulf War special, February 1991
THE DEMON IS back: Ten years after the U.S. air war began over Kuwait and Iraq on January 17, 1991, tens of thousands of sick Gulf War vets await treatment and/or compensation for chronic health problems brought on by their military service.
By the end of 2000, 186,000 Gulf vets and active duty GIs have sought government evaluation and treatment for a variety of symptoms they’ve exhibited since returning home from Gulf duty: neurological problems, chronic skin rashes, respiratory problems, chronic flu-like symptoms including severe body aches, immune system disorders, severe fatigue, joint pain, gynecological infections, bleeding gums and mouth lesions and unexplained rapid weight loss.
Medical evaluations by both Department of Veterans Affairs (DVA) and military medical personnel have typically resulted in the conclusion “undiagnosed illness.” Government scientists can’t decide whether the health problems suffered by Gulf War vets constitute a previously unidentified medical condition, or a combination of illnesses. More importantly for veterans, these scientists haven’t been able to offer meaningful treatment protocols or credible explanations for what ails them.
What some have called “Gulf War Syndrome” most likely was brought on by exposing Gulf service personnel to a synergistic mix of multiple toxins, including:
Following the Gulf War, some influential analysts have argued that American victory in the Gulf was ensured by our clear advantage in sophisticated weapons and information technology. Some have predicted that “digitization of the battlefield means the end of Clausewitz,” i.e. of classical military doctrine.
Former Army chief of staff Gen. Dennis Reamer even speculated that if the Vietnam-era Pentagon had possessed the information technology it has today, we might have “won” the Vietnam War. (4) Whatever the truth of these hypotheses, there is no doubt that America’s GIs were fighting on a very toxic battlefield in the Gulf.
When the first sick veterans began to seek medical help just months after the war ended, the Bush administration responded cautiously. After all, President Bush and Generals Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell were still basking in the glow of their great victory, which had supposedly laid the “Vietnam syndrome” demon permanently to rest.
Once Clinton-Gore took over the sympathetic rhetoric increased, but there was little change in the behavior of either the VA or the Pentagon. Indeed Clinton allowed the upper reaches of both agencies to be staffed with some of the worst pseudo-medical hacks Washington had seen in a long time.
After a year of highly publicized hearings, a panel of so-called experts at the end of 1996 published a report which must have greatly pleased Bill Clinton. It allowed him to broadcast his concerns about the well-being of Gulf veterans while avoiding a showdown with the Pentagon and CIA.
The report begins by acknowledging that “many of the health concerns of Gulf vets may never be resolved fully because of lack of data.” It drily ticks off some of the deficiencies: “missing medical (and vaccination) records, absence of baseline (pre-war) health information about GIs, inaccurate information on troop locations and incomplete data on health effects (that) should have been reasonably anticipated risks.”
After admitting these deficiencies, the panel felt that it could credibly conclude that none of the principal risk factors (listed above) were “causally linked” to the health problems reported by Gulf veterans. (5)
As one of the leading veterans’ advocates, Paul Sullivan of the National Gulf War Resource Center coalition, succinctly put it, “this report was dead on arrival.”
Unfortunately for Gulf veterans, any assigning of blame would require the U.S. military to shoulder responsibility for its past negligence or incompetence – and possibly to abandon its use of certain weapons.
For example, many vets believe they were harmed by DU exposure. But from the command’s point of view this devastating new weapon was a resounding success: DU shells knocked out every Iraqi tank or armored vehicle they struck, to say nothing of more than a few American ones that were mistakenly hit by “friendly fire.” The generals clearly are unwilling to surrender such an advantage just because it pollutes the battlefield or causes collateral damage to GIs or the civilian population.
Another example is the injury caused by exposing GIs to fallout from chemical nerve agents. The Pentagon for several years clung to the story that few if any GIs were hit by residue from such deadly weapons. But when Sgt. Brian Martin presented a House investigative committee with a videotape he’d made of the destruction of the huge Iraqi ammo dump at Khamisiyah, the military (and CIA) were forced to change their tune.
“We placed explosives in and around 33 bunkers,” Martin told the committee. “Witnessing these awesome explosions was a remarkable sight. Our excitement however quickly turned to fear when ‘cook offs’ or fallout from the explosions began showering down on us.”
Martin also testified that since Khamisiyah he has suffered from “blood in my vomit and stools, excruciatingly painful headaches, blurred vision, memory loss, severe diarrhea and mood swings.” (6)
After a long struggle, Brian Martin was finally rated by the VA as 100% permanently disabled. He had enjoyed excellent health before deploying to the Gulf.
Even after the CIA/Pentagon admission that at least 100,000 U.S. troops were exposed to varying levels of chemical nerve agents, nearly all other information about chemical and biological weapons remains classified. Former CIA analyst Patrick Eddington, author of Gassed in the Gulf: The Inside Story of the Pentagon/CIA Coverup of the Gulf War Syndrome (Insignia Press, 1997), estimates that the two agencies are withholding more than a million documents with potential bearing on the health of Gulf War vets.
What’s worse, Eddington argues that recent legislation has broadened the categories of intelligence records exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). (7)
In a related development Dr. Khidir Hamza, formerly chief of nuclear weapons programs in Iraq, charges in his new book Saddam’s Bombmaker that Saddam Hussein ordered that thousands of chemical and biological weapons be buried along the likely U.S. invasion routes:
“Saddam’s thinking was that the Allies, following U.S. tactical doctrine, would blow up the bunkers as they advanced, releasing plumes of invisible gas ... onto themselves. The pattern of contamination would be so disparate and the symptoms so amorphous (that) the sources of illness couldn’t be easily confirmed.” (8)
The Pentagon’s institutional stake in continuing to downplay health effects from such exposures is all too apparent. Obviously, however, if Hamza’s account is accurate, those celebrated military commanders Norman Schwarzkopf and Colin Powell – now George W. Bush’s Secretary of State – come off as bunglers, not to mention indictable perjurers for their sworn testimony that U.S. troops were never exposed to fallout from chemical nerve agents.
After the Presidential Advisory Committee report was issued, Clinton and the Pentagon decided to shift from denial to pretending to actively look for answers about Gulf War illness. A new agency was created, the Office of the Special Assistant for Gulf War Illness (OSAGWI – how they love those acronyms!) headed by retired Admiral Dr. Bernard Rostker.
Since then, this agency has spent nearly $250 million on “research” projects of dubious value. Instead of funding human health studies to compare the health of sick Gulf vets with similar people who didn’t serve in the Gulf, OSAGWI has financed mostly “literature reviews” which essentially survey the existing published scientific literature in a given area and attempt to summarize it.
Human health studies, especially those that involve medical monitoring, are of course very costly and time-consuming. They carry the added risk that they might actually uncover significant health deficits in Gulf vets that might be difficult to explain away.
One literature review, on pyridostigmine bromide (PB) pills, which were given to protect GIs against soman, backfired on the military when its author concluded:
“PB cannot be ruled out as a possible contributor to ... unexplained illness in some PGW [Persian Gulf War] veterans. Second, uncertainties remain (about) the effectiveness of PB in protecting humans against nerve agents.” (9)
After a one-day news flurry, however, the report was shelved, soon (the Pentagon hopes) to be forgotten.
Clinton’s decision to leave control of Gulf War research in the Pentagon’s hands directly contradicted a unanimous vote by the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, which stated that:
“Congress should create an agency independent from the DOD [Department of Defense, i.e. Pentagon] and DVA (to serve) as the lead federal agency responsible for all research into Gulf War veterans’ illnesses and ... all research funds.” (10)
If one wanted a textbook example of the naked political power the Pentagon can bring to bear when it feels its prerogatives threatened, the rise of OSAGWI would be a good choice. In a special report prepared for the tenth anniversary of the Gulf War, Pat Eddington, now director of the National Gulf War Resource Center coalition, summarized OSAGWI’s efforts to date:
“Its case narratives on potential toxic exposures are replete with analytical and factual flaws ... The existing DOD/DVA medical research programs are, by and large, scientifically useless (and) squander research dollars better spent on private-sector research initiatives that have demonstrated real progress in identifying disease and disability.” (11)
Unfortunately for the Pentagon, its continued control of Gulf War research has deepened the distrust felt by many veterans as well as active-duty military members. In Citizen Soldier’s recent advocacy organizing against the military’s mandatory anthrax vaccination program, young GIs would commonly mention Gulf War syndrome as an important factor in their doubts about the vaccine’s safety.
Despite the Pentagon’s iron hand, a few independent scientists have been able to publish significant human effects research on small groups of Gulf veterans. Summaries of two recent studies follow.
The National Gulf War Resource Center coalition, of which Citizen Soldier is a founding member, plans to call on the new Congress to enact legislation to fund Gulf War illness research outside the existing DOD/VA funding process.
In this effort NGWRC expects to receive the endorsement of the big traditional veterans’ organizations, the American Legion, Veterans of Foreign Wars, and the Disabled American Veterans. The bitter experiences of a decade have left even the die-hard Cold Warriors who lead these groups with no confidence in the discredited DOD and VA medical hierarchies.
Once again, progressive veterans and their advocates must take the lead in challenging the corrupt cynicism of the irredeemable militarists who continue to control these agencies.
ATC 91, March–April 2001