
August 1942

Fourth International

Trotsky Memorial Number:

- Trotsky's Revolutionary Optimism . *Editorial Comment*
On Some Critics of Trotsky *By Marc Loris*
The Second World War *By Leon Trotsky*
The Trial of the Assassin *By Walter Rourke*

What the Soviet Press Reveals

By JOHN G. WRIGHT

- American Patent Monopolies *By C. Charles*
The Real Situation in Argentina . *By Terence Phelan*
Chen Tu-hsiu: Chinese Revolutionist . . *By Li Fu-jen*
China in the War *By Felix Morrow*

INTERNATIONAL NOTES

Twenty Cents

Manager's Column

The Business Manager is away on a well-earned vacation, and I should like to use this opportunity to talk to the literature agents and salesmen and women who are responsible for the distribution of the *Fourth International*.

Your letters to this office are primarily occupied with ordering bundles, sending in subs and payments, etc., but also include comments on your opinion of the latest issue and the opinion of those to whom you have sold it. Do you know how eagerly and carefully we read those comments? For they are our most important means of knowing how the magazine is being received.

Unfortunately some literature agents, all too modestly, consider their business with this office limited to naming the size of their bundle order and sending in payments. They appear unaware of the fact that they have the opportunity, much more than the editor, of knowing just what readers are finding of value (as well as what they don't like!) in the magazine.

Other agents content themselves with reporting that the latest issue was very good. Such reports are perhaps flattering but not very informative. Precisely what articles made the latest issue satisfactory—that is what we would very much like to know.

Which articles are our readers finding of particular interest from month to month? Which ones do they find of little interest? Do they mention subjects which they would want to see dealt with in the magazine? These are some of the questions which the literature agents and branch organizers can answer for us and the answer to which would undoubtedly result in an increase in circulation of the magazine.

* * *

In addition to reporting the reactions of readers, literature agents and organizers should encourage readers to write their own letters to *Fourth International*, not only to make general comments on articles but also to make specific cri-

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Editor FELIX MORROW

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ticisms of points they do not agree with. We should be only too glad to publish such letters and to attempt to answer their objections. Such correspondence would be interesting not only to those who write it but to all our readers, for it would undoubtedly bring the magazine closer to the problems which are pre-occupying our readers.

* * *

Occasionally an enterprising literature agent or branch organizer finds an article of such value that he or she requests that the article be re-issued in pamphlet form, and

usually this is possible, especially if the branch which requests it is prepared to place a substantial initial order for the pamphlet. Recent examples of this were the New York Organizer's request for turning into a pamphlet Albert Parker's "Roosevelt and the Negroes" in the May 1942 *Fourth International*; and Chicago's request for Art Preis' "America's Sixty Families and the Nazis" in the June 1942 issue, which will shortly be published as a pamphlet.

Were these the only articles immediately useful as pam-

phlets or did it just happen that New York and Chicago were on their toes while similar opportunities are not being utilized? The question cannot be answered here without much, much more comment from the branches on the uses to which they can put the material appearing in *Fourth International*.

* * *

Once we begin to think in terms of what problems are of interest to various groups of readers or potential readers, new opportunities appear for sales. We have gotten into the habit of thinking of *Fourth International* as not "popular" reading matter, because it operates on the level of scientific propaganda and not of agitation. But the war is posing all big questions so sharply that scientific articles which might under other circumstances appear as heavy reading are today of vital interest to many audiences. New York enterprisingly demonstrated this recently when it sold a considerable number of an issue featuring articles on India on the street outside a mass meeting on India. Similarly a number of agents reported sales by comrades to their shopmates of issues featuring articles on the monopolies and inflation.

* * *

Sales per branch membership are best, reports show, where the literature agent or organizer sees to it that there is a monthly educational meeting given over to a report on the contents of the latest issue. And some of the most valuable hints to the editor have come from letters describing the questions and criticisms offered at such educational meetings.

In short, the literature agents have invaluable information for the editor. In turn, the consequent improvement of the magazine means more sales. The division of labor between the circulation setup and the editorial and writing section must not become so compartmentalized that we never get together to pool our knowledge. For our part, we solemnly pledge to answer publicly or privately every letter received.

THE EDITOR

The Assassination of Leon Trotsky The Proofs of Stalin's Guilt

By ALBERT GOLDMAN

The record of the cross-examination of the assassin by Trotsky's attorney, together with the other facts which establish the GPU's responsibility for the murder.

74 PAGES

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FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

VOLUME III

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Editorial Comment:

On the Second Anniversary of Trotsky's Death—His Prophetic Warnings on Fascism and the War—His Equally Prophetic Revolutionary Perspectives for India and America

The second anniversary of the death of the founder of the Red Army comes in Soviet Russia's darkest hour. With what insight he foretold this moment of mortal danger for the first workers' state; how he fought to prevent that moment from coming! For this he died on August 21, 1940, at the hands of an assassin sent by Stalin. Millions of workers are alive in the Soviet Union who remember from their own experiences how Trotsky led the Red Army to victory against imperialist intervention. Millions more know the true facts despite Stalin's monstrous lies. Stalin knew that during the war the thoughts of these millions of Soviet workers and peasants would turn to their leader of old. Stalin feared that in the moment of danger they would demand the return of the man who once before had led the Soviet Union to victory against imperialist invaders. It did not matter to Stalin that in murdering Trotsky he struck a damaging blow to the Soviet Union. Stalin is interested in saving the Soviet Union only in such a way as to preserve the rule within it of the Kremlin bureaucracy. But millions of Soviet workers mourn with us on this bitter anniversary.

As Hitler's armies continue advancing deep into the Soviet Union we recall how clearly and how long ago Trotsky warned of this danger. Urging the united front between the Communist and Social-Democratic parties to prevent Hitler from coming to power, Trotsky warned in 1931:

"Once Hitler comes to power, and proceeds to crush the vanguard of the German workers, pulverizing and demoralizing the whole proletariat for years to come, the Fascist government alone will be the only government capable of waging war against the USSR. . . . In case of victory in Germany Hitler will become the super-Wrangel of the world bourgeoisie." (*Germany, the Key to the International Situation.*)

In July 1932 Trotsky gave his famous outline for the course the Soviet government should follow in the event of the victory of fascism in Germany:

"In my opinion this is how the Soviet government OUGHT to act in case of a Fascist coup in Germany. Upon receiving the telegraphic communication of this event I would, in their place, sign an order for the mobilization of the army reserves. When you have a mortal enemy before you, and when war flows with necessity from the objective situation, it would be unpardonable lightmindedness to give that enemy time to establish and fortify himself, conclude the necessary alliances, receive the necessary help, work out a plan of concentric military actions—not only from the west but from the east—and thus grow up to the dimensions of a colossal danger." (*Liberty*, July 16, 1932.)

Two months after Hitler took power in 1933 Trotsky wrote:

"Even leaving aside the question of help to the German proletariat, there remains the question of the defense of socialist construction against German Fascism, the shock troops of world imperialism. Do the Stalinists deny this danger? . . .

"Or have the Stalinists perhaps assimilated the pacifist wisdom of the 'purely defensive' war being the only permissible one? . . .

"He who does not outstrip the enemy while he is still weak; who passively lets him strengthen and reinforce himself, protect his rear-guard, create an army for himself, receive support from abroad, assure himself of allies; who leaves to the enemy the complete liberty of initiative; such a man is a traitor, even if the motives for his treason are not to render service to imperialism, but consist of petty-bourgeois weakness and political blindness." (*The Militant*, April 8, 1933.)

But Stalin's policy prevailed and has brought the Soviet Union to the brink of annihilation, while Trotsky was murdered to prevent the development of a Soviet mass movement centering around the demand for the return of Trotsky to help defend the Soviet Union.

Yet, if Trotsky is no longer with us, and without minimizing what the international proletariat lost by his death, the methods by which he brought the Red Army to victory can still bring victory today.

In 1918-21 the Red Army, far more than now, was inferior in equipment to that of its imperialist enemies. Despite this the Red Army won. For, in addition to its arms, it had a unique weapon which only it could employ: revolutionary propaganda, which demoralized and disintegrated the enemy armies.

In an article of May 21, 1922, summing up the experiences of the Red Army against its capitalist foes, Trotsky wrote:

"The superiority of our propaganda lies in its content. Our propaganda invariably fused together the ranks of the Red Army and disintegrated the army of the enemy not by any sort of special technical methods and tricks but by the communist idea which constituted the content of this propaganda. This is our military secret and we advertise it openly without any fear of plagiarism on the part of our enemies."

In speeches early in 1920, Lenin likewise explained the rôle of Bolshevik propaganda to the Red Army soldiers:

"In all their sheets, the White Guards write that the Bolsheviks conduct excellent agitation, and do not spare money for agitation. But after all, the people have listened to all sorts of agitation—including that of the White Guards and that of the partisans of the Constituent Assembly. It is silly to think that the people have followed the Bolsheviks because the agitation of the latter was more skillful. No, the whole thing

lies in this, that the agitation of the Bolsheviks tells the truth." (*Collected Works*, 3rd Russian ed., vol. 25, p. 14.)

"How is this victory over the interventionists to be explained? Clearly this was not achieved only by victories at the front, but rather by this, that we were able to attract to our side the soldiers of the countries warring against us. . . . By means of agitation and propaganda we took away from the Entente their own soldiers. We vanquished the imperialists not only by means of our own soldiers but by basing ourselves on the sympathy of their own soldiers." (*Ibid.*, p. 26.)

Stalin too conducts propaganda, dropping leaflets over the German lines, addressing them by loud-speakers, etc. He has had far better technical resources for carrying on such propaganda than Lenin and Trotsky had. But his most sycophantic hirelings do not pretend that this propaganda is having any effect. *Why does not the Kremlin's propaganda today have the same effect as the Bolshevik propaganda of Lenin and Trotsky?* Let the Stalinists answer that question?

The superiority of the Bolshevik propaganda lay, as Trotsky said, in its *content*. It told the truth. It called on the soldiers and workers of the imperialist armies to join hands with the young Soviet republic in overthrowing the imperialist governments and fighting for a socialist world. General Ludendorff wryly testified to the powerful effect of this propaganda on the German armies of occupation in the Ukraine. The German armies of today are as susceptible to such propaganda as those of Ludendorff. But Stalin's propaganda has an entirely different *content* than that of Lenin and Trotsky. Instead of revolutionary internationalism it is permeated with anti-Germanism. Instead of calling for a Soviet Germany and the Soviet United States of Europe, it offers no better prospect than a second and worse Versailles. In this difference in propaganda content is expressed the fundamental difference between the revolutionary government of Lenin-Trotsky and the bureaucratic régime of Stalin. Before the Soviet Union can return to the revolutionary propaganda which brought victory in 1918-21 the Soviet masses must overthrow the Kremlin bureaucracy.

Trotsky's Revolutionary Optimism

No one reading Trotsky's writings during the years preceding the second World War could accuse him of blind optimism. On the contrary he expected the most awful catastrophes, preventable only if the workers overthrew their oppressors. After the crushing of the Spanish workers by the Negrin government in 1937 and the derailment of the French workers by the Blum government the same year, he knew there was no way to stop the imperialist war from beginning and unfolding. It was not optimism that critics accused him of, but undue pessimism. (We have in mind particularly the ludicrous figure of Norman Thomas, who complained that Trotsky's insistence of the inevitability of the war was paralyzing resistance to it; naturally Thomas now sees "no political alternative" to the war.) Many of Trotsky's dire warnings sounded, indeed, in the old prophetic tradition of Jeremiah. And how many of them came terribly true!

Trotsky won the right to have his predictions listened to. Not only for his dire warnings, but also for his revolutionary optimism. No man saw more clearly the deadly pattern of war and fascism that was to unfold. But, equally, no man more firmly looked beyond that pattern to the revolutionary consequences of the war. Over and over he explained that the catastrophes of war and fascism were expressions of the death agony of capitalism. World imperialism would not be

strengthened by them but all the more speedily would be undermined. As in the dark days of the first World War he and Lenin saw the revolutionary aftermath, so in the first days of this war he urged us to prepare for the great days that were coming at blitzkrieg pace.

His revolutionary optimism was not all based on a mere analogy with 1914-18. He sharply emphasized that this war was not a repetition of the first but a *continuation* on the part of all the imperialist powers. The continuation was bringing new forces into play which were passive in 1914-18. This time, unlike the last, a principal arena of struggle would be the basin of the Pacific. That meant that the great masses of Asia, who played almost no rôle last time, would now come forward to "utilize the war" to win their freedom. "The most important object of the struggle will be China, embracing about one-fourth of the human race. The fate of the Soviet Union—the other big stake in the coming war—" he wrote in 1938, "will also to a certain degree be decided in the Far East."

On July 25, 1939, a few weeks before the war began, he wrote an Open Letter to the advanced workers of India, urging them to prepare for the opportunity which would be opened for them by the war. "The Indian people must divorce their fate from the very outset from that of British imperialism. The oppressors and the oppressed stand on opposite sides of the trenches. No aid whatsoever to the slave-owners! On the contrary, those immense difficulties which the war will bring in its wake must be utilized so as to deal a mortal blow to all the ruling classes." How eagerly he would be reading the dispatches from India today as the revolution he so ardently anticipated actually begins to unfold!

In bold strokes he outlined the concrete course which the Indian workers and peasants must follow. "In the event that the Indian bourgeoisie finds itself compelled to take even the tiniest step on the road of struggle against the arbitrary rule of Great Britain, the proletariat will naturally support such a step. But they will support it with *their own* methods: mass meetings, bold slogans, strikes, demonstrations and more decisive combat actions, depending on the relationship of forces and the circumstances. Precisely to do this must the proletariat have its hands free. Complete independence from the bourgeoisie is indispensable to the proletariat, above all in order to exert influence on the peasantry, the predominant mass of India's population. Only the proletariat is capable of advancing a bold, revolutionary agrarian program, of rousing and rallying tens of millions of peasants and leading them in struggle against the native oppressors and British imperialism. The alliance of workers and poor peasants is the only honest, reliable alliance that can assure the final victory of the Indian revolution. (*Fourth International*, September 1939.) There, in a few words, is the program of the Indian revolutionary party.

The Stalinists have now come out openly in opposition to India's struggle for independence. Trotsky expected that: "Stalin and his clique, for the sake of an alliance with the imperialist governments, have completely renounced the revolutionary program for the emancipation of the colonies." For Stalin this is a method of defending the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy; for the real defense of the Soviet Union, however, the success of the Indian revolution would be a gigantic advance. Revolutions in the capitalist world will create really reliable allies for the Soviet Union and, as Trotsky

wrote in his *Letter to the Workers of the USSR* (May 1940), "shall re-invigorate the Soviet working masses with new courage and resoluteness and shall undermine the bureaucratic props of Stalin's caste."

Like the involvement of the Pacific basin in world war and the consequent new opportunities for revolutionary development of China and India, the new situation of the United States was also considered of revolutionary significance by Trotsky. Just before his death he noted that America's problems in the second World War were vastly different from the first. The long years of "peaceful" and extremely profitable sales to the Allies (1914-17); the triumphant entry of the A.E.F. into France and its speedy victory with relatively little expenditure of men and equipment—that bore little resemblance to the gigantic undertakings of the United States in the second World War. Hence, in the very last weeks of his life Trotsky was thinking especially about the revolutionary future of America. On August 7—less than two weeks before the assassin struck him down—Trotsky wrote "Some Questions on American Problems" (*Fourth International*, October 1940). "Now," he wrote, "the war will teach the American workers social thinking. The economic crisis has already begun and in the CIO we see the first reaction of the workers—confused but important. They begin to feel themselves as a class. . . . Now the war will continue to teach them social thinking, and this means revolutionary thinking. . . . The next historic waves in the United States will be waves of radicalism of the masses; not fascism. Of course the war can hinder the radicalization for some time but then it will give to the radicalization a more tremendous tempo and swing."

And in the very last article he wrote—it remained unfinished—he wrote: "It is quite self-evident that the radicaliza-

tion of the working class in the United States has passed only through its initial phases, almost exclusively in the sphere of the trade union movement (the CIO). The pre-war period, and then the war itself, may temporarily interrupt this process of radicalization, especially if a considerable number of workers are absorbed into war industry. But this interruption of the process of radicalization cannot be of long duration. The second stage of radicalization will assume a more sharply expressive character. The problem of forming an independent labor party will be put on the order of the day. Our transitional demands will gain great popularity. . . . Ahead lies a favorable perspective, providing all the justification for revolutionary activism."

"Of especial importance to the workers of the United States," Trotsky concluded in this last article, is to understand that they have a clear opportunity to conquer power before the rise of a mass fascist party. "We may set it down as a historical law: Fascism was able to conquer only in those countries where the conservative labor parties prevented the proletariat from utilizing the revolutionary situation and seizing power. . . . Only under these conditions and in this situation did the stormy rise of Fascism and its gaining of power prove possible." First in the United States will come the radicalization of the great masses and the revolutionary opportunity.

We will have our chance; and we shall not miss it!

That is what Trotsky taught. By his prophetic grasp of events, demonstrated throughout the past decades, he earned the right to be believed. We honor his memory in the only way he wanted it. His last words are our directives: "I am sure of the victory of the Fourth International. Go forward."

On Some Critics of Trotsky

By MARC LORIS

Liberals have always distinguished themselves by lack of understanding of revolution. For them it is merely an "excess," an "accident" which interrupts the "normal" course of history. They have no key with which to penetrate the determinism of this accident. This is not surprising. The consciousness of the classes and of their spokesmen depends on their position in society: only those who stand firmly on the ground of revolution can grasp all the aspects of the social forces.

Liberal thought is no better equipped to understand the personalities of the great proletarian revolutionists. Its inability to enter into the dynamics of events leads it to a false conception of men. Everything that the liberals have written on Lenin is barren, revealing the limitations of their thinking rather than Lenin's genius. An even more difficult object of study for them is Trotsky.

One of those who has attempted to explain Trotsky is Max Eastman.* Better equipped than other liberals by his contact with the revolutionary milieu and his personal acquaintance with Trotsky, Eastman reveals only the more clearly the liberal's organic inability to comprehend the personality and historic rôle of a great Marxist.

Trotsky ended the introduction to his autobiography with these words: "To understand the causal sequence of events and to find somewhere in the sequence one's own place—that is the first duty of a revolutionary." This duty Trotsky fulfilled to the utmost. For him (or for Lenin) the task of the biographer, just as that of its hero, is to "understand the sequence of events." Only then can the man's real place in history be found and his true rôle established.

Historical materialism does not deny the rôle of the individual in history nor the influence of the different aspects of his character. On the contrary, it reveals for the first time the mechanism of this process by recognizing the individual as the representative of a class or a layer of a class. It thus provides a rational explanation of his historical rôle and at the same time establishes the limits of his activity. All the idealistic jargon about "heroes" loses its mystical and mystifying character. The trajectory described by each historical personality is the result of the interaction of the different social groups, each of which demands different qualifications from its representatives. Of these delicate relationships between a social group and its leaders, liberal thought grasps nothing; history becomes a mere backdrop for the hero, the liberal observer delves more and more deeply into the indi-

*Heroes I Have Known, by Max Eastman. New York, 1942.

vidual in order to discover his "secret" and that of the events.

For years the liberals insistently explained Stalinism as the product of some original sin of Bolshevism, Lenin's quasi-diabolic invention. As for the defeat of the Left Opposition, from where could it spring if not from some "defect or weakness," as Eastman puts it, in Trotsky's character? He remained isolated, hence "he could not handle men." He was beaten, hence "poorer politician never lived."

Hegel once observed that common sense, when unable to give an explanation, often takes refuge in the type of metaphysics which "explains" that opium causes sleep because of its "dormitive quality." Having separated the party or the individual from the historical development of the class struggle, the doctors of liberalism then observe them through the metaphysical spectacles of common sense. Thus to give rise to Stalinism, Bolshevism must contain a "dictatorial quality" and the fall of Trotsky can be explained only—obviously—by his lack of "political quality." How simple!

A Bullet or a Cup of Tea?

We are waiting to be told what this "political quality" is. Max Eastman merely points out to us two possible manifestations of this quality. The first would have been for Trotsky to "have gone into the factories with a few forthright speeches and raised every fighting revolutionist in Moscow and Leningrad against the Stalinist clique." In short, Trotsky should have made an insurrection. The second would have been to invite Kamenev, "who was his brother-in-law," to come take a cup of tea and "talk it over man to man." We leave it to Max Eastman's common sense to reconcile the armed insurrection against the Stalin-Zinoviev-Kamenev *troika* and the cup of tea with the same Kamenev.

An insurrection does not fall from the sky, even when there is someone to lead it. What are the indications that, in 1923 or later, the Soviet working masses were ready to revolt against the rising bureaucracy? An appeal to the masses against the party could have led only to an immense Kronstadt and prepared the entrance of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie. As for arousing the party against the bureaucratic tops, precisely this was the task undertaken by the opposition, but it had to begin with the work of educating and of gathering together cadres for this task. How can one speak of an armed insurrection when the opposition was in the minority even in the ranks of the party? How call on a party member to take gun in hand and fight in the street when in his party cell, under pressure of his superiors in the factory or office, through fatigue, through lack of confidence in the forces of the revolution, he voted for the apparatus?

But after all, didn't Trotsky have unequalled popularity in the army? This is true and there is little doubt that in 1923 it would have been very easy, with the help of the military apparatus, to disperse the *troika*—a matter of only a few hours and very little blood, if any. Here common sense seems to triumph. With such a simple operation all the degradation of Stalinism would have been avoided—and it was not even tried! But history makes a fool of common sense.

One cannot use the army like a sword which one puts back in its sheath once the operation is done. Any army which enters the political arena and assures the victory of one of the fighting factions proceeds to pay itself well. The prices would have been, for the officers corps, more security and more privileges. Instead of spreading chiefly through the party

apparatus, then, the Thermidorian reaction would have spread through the military apparatus. Undoubtedly the régime would have had a different coloration than that of Stalin, but the fundamental political reality would have been the same and the process of degeneration probably more rapid. Citing the revolutionary integrity of Trotsky changes none of this. He would have found himself, the day after the Bonapartist *coup d'état*, faced with the demands of an officers corps become conscious of its power in the country. He would then have had to capitulate to the officers, or, in resisting them, fall victim to one of their plots.

Indeed, the army is always a stronghold of bureaucratism. The Red Army was no exception. The military apparatus was not separated from the state apparatus by an air-tight partition, but was part of it, following the same process of degeneration. In 1921 the war was over, and the heroic epoch of the revolution was succeeded by the hum-drum of daily existence. The difference between the two periods was even greater for the army than for the rest of the population, and could not fail to be reflected in its state of mind. Moreover, the army had been reduced from 5,300,000 men to 600,000 thus greatly increasing the specific weight of the remaining cadres. We must not forget that a not negligible fraction of these remaining cadres came from the Czarist army.

The demobilized part of the army was also a strong factor in the bureaucratization of the country. Many of the commanders, returning to their villages and provincial towns, found themselves placed, by their prestige and their experience, at the head of the local administration. There they often employed methods differing very little from the military command to which they were accustomed, and they integrated themselves very easily into the Stalinist apparatus. In face of these social realities the prestige of their former leader carried little weight.

Politics, Science of Perspectives

In July 1933 Trotsky was living near Royan; nearby lived a Communist worker, an old influential party member, dissatisfied with the Stalinist line. Lev Davidovitch desired to meet him. The enterprise was risky. His sojourn in France might have been compromised, but the desire to speak with a worker won out. So, one evening, with all possible precautions, this worker was brought into the workroom of Lev Davidovitch. The conversation soon turned to the defeat of the Russian Opposition. "How did you lose the power, comrade Trotsky?"—"Ah, you know, one does not lose power like one loses his pocket book." Then came an explanation which lasted long into the night.

Power is not a trophy presented to the most clever, but it is above all, through individuals, a relationship between the classes and their social layers. The leader, as a representative of a social group, defends the interests of that group more or less well. But if the position of the group changes, he loses his footing, is suspended in the air, powerless. Thus, on the 9th Thermidor, Robespierre, head of the government, appears before the Convention. The session is so tumultuous that he cannot speak and it is ended by a decree of arrest against him. The following day he is guillotined. Clearly, the forces which supported him were exhausted. Any explanation that would reduce the dynamics of the revolution to a comparison of the personal qualities of Robespierre and of Barras would not get very far.

Never weary of accusing Trotsky of being a poor politi-

cian, the philistines rarely take the trouble to expound their own conception of politics. But their accusations show clearly that their lack of understanding of the relationship of the individual to the party, of the parties to the classes, reduces their conception to the most degraded form of politics, the art of personal combinations. Of course, this art is far from being unnecessary. But the first condition for its use is to know its limits. One can deceive men; one cannot deceive history. Stalin thought he could. In 1923 he was merely looking for a "surer" way for the revolution, thought he was avoiding danger by confining the revolution within the frontiers of the USSR and by building socialism in one country. This "ruse" led him to the terrible catastrophe of today. The "impractical" theory of the permanent revolution was, on the other hand, full of profound realism. Likewise, one could not, in 1923, skip over the wave of Thermidorian reaction by such a "ruse" as an insurrection, a military *coup d'état* or a cup of tea with "brother-in-law" Kamenev.

In July 1935 Lev Davidovitch was speaking of the France he was leaving: "There is truth in what the French say: politics is the science of proportion. Oh, for them it is the science of *small* proportions." Thus he described in a single word a striking characteristic of the French bourgeoisie. Then he continued: "To be exact one must say that politics is the science of perspectives." If one accepts this definition of politics—and this is the only valid one for Marxists—Trotsky was a great, a very great politician.

Revolution and Reaction

The critics of Trotskyism like to repeat: when it is a question of explaining the defeat of the Left Opposition, you underline the importance of the objective factors, but when it is a matter of accusing Nin of having collaborated in the defeat of the Spanish revolution, you bring to the fore the subjective factor and you place the responsibility on the individual. Precisely! In the Spanish revolution the movement of the masses created the objective conditions of victory. Subjective initiative was lacking and our criticism of Nin rests on his definite acts, such as his entry into the Catalan government, which acted directly against the movement of the masses. Nin and his party did not provide an outlet for the revolutionary energy of the Spanish proletariat. One proof, among others, is the leaderless May 1937 insurrection of the Catalan workers in Barcelona. Was there some analogous insurrection in the USSR during the struggle of the Left Opposition or even some bold movement of the workers? A revolutionary leadership must not let an occasion pass, but it cannot create this occasion as it likes when objective conditions are not ripe.

Marxism gives great importance to the initiative and audacity of an individual or a small group in the carrying out of the insurrection, but at the same time it establishes precise rules for determining the moment of that insurrection, which does not just happen at any time but crowns the revolutionary rise of the masses. History demands so much from a revolutionary leadership precisely because the lost occasion cannot be recreated at will. The impossibility of acting when objective conditions are lacking and the obligation of resolutely intervening when they materialize—these are two sides of the same coin.

The defeat of the Left Opposition was too complete to allow us to attribute it to some tactical error of its leader. Naturally, this does not mean that events necessarily had to

happen as they did. Numerous variants were possible, but the general trend leaves little doubt. Trotsky's personal qualities have their importance in determining his place: it is not by chance that he led the opposition and that Stalin was the agent of the reaction.

In 1926, when she still felt fairly close to Lenin's last ideas, Krupskaja declared: "If Ilyitch were alive, he would be in prison today." By these words she wished above all to denounce the lie of Stalin's so-called "Leninism" and to show the reality of the struggle, that of the bureaucratic reaction against the revolutionary wing. However, Krupskaja's words also seem to contain, in their own way, a reproach directed to the Left Opposition: if Lenin were alive, he would have led the struggle against the bureaucratization of the Soviet state with such vigor that he would already have been in prison, while the opposition was still in the party. Surely we have the right to discern this criticism in Krupskaja's words, but in this case we must not forget the conclusion: Lenin himself could not have overcome the bureaucracy, "he would be in prison today."

To place the problem on the level of personal qualities alone leads, willy nilly, to a great exaggeration of the stature of Trotsky's adversaries. Thus, it is characteristic of liberal thought to confer some demoniacal power on Stalin when in reality Stalin's motivations were very simple and very narrow: the fear of revolutionary risk, the absence of perspectives, envy of a more brilliant rival, mediocrity and provincial grossness. But it was precisely these qualities that the apparatus required of its leader.

Does this mean that the struggle of the Left Opposition was futile? This mechanical and abstract way of posing the question betrays a fatalism foreign to Marxism. History does not give its verdict like an oracle. The relationship of forces can be determined only by the struggle itself. No one can measure in advance the depth and the duration of the reaction. A proletarian victory outside the USSR could have reopened the question. Above all there was the duty of assuring the revolutionary future. Where would we be without the struggle of the Left Opposition?

"The Tribe of Philistines"

While Max Eastman's lack of comprehension holds a good deal of naïveté, amusingly simple, that of J. R. Johnson* is mixed with a large dose of hypocrisy. His failure to understand "the causal sequence of events" leads him directly to conscious falsification, which is not amusing. Johnson broke from the Fourth International after a bitter factional struggle in which Trotsky actively participated—not on Johnson's side, as everyone knows—and Johnson tries to take revenge.

In Eastmanian terms he depicts Trotsky as a "very defective politician," who "in the hands of Kamenev and Stalin was a child." His entire criticism, superficial and impressionistic, without serious discussion of facts and texts, is sterile from a historical and political point of view. But Johnson quickly arrives at the *raison d'être* of his article. If he tries so hard to prove that Trotsky was a "child in Stalin's hands," it is to show that he was also a child in Cannon's hands at the time the Burnham-Shachtman group, to which Johnson belonged, left the Fourth International:

*"Leon Trotsky—His Place in History," by J. R. Johnson, *The New International*, September 1940.

"Despite his unwillingness he (Trotsky) was cunningly maneuvered into a position in which his authority and energy were unscrupulously used for an aim he did not have in mind. When he recognized what was happening, it was too late."

What baseness in this last sentence! What is Johnson hinting at in this hypocritical innuendo? He is careful not to be too precise. Yes indeed, Trotsky "recognized what was happening" and called it by its name: "a petty-bourgeois opposition opening a struggle against Marxism with ideological charlatanism." All this is well known. As for the split, Trotsky wrote:

"The discussion in the Socialist Workers Party of the United States was thorough and democratic. The preparations for the convention were carried out with absolute loyalty. The minority participated in the convention, recognizing thereby its legality and authoritativeness. The majority offered the minority all the necessary guarantees permitting it to conduct a struggle for its own views after the convention. The minority demanded a license to appeal to the masses over the head of the party. The majority naturally rejected this monstrous pretension."

And again:

"We have the fact that the minority split away from us, in spite of all the measures taken by the majority not to split. This signifies that their inner social feeling was such that it is impossible for them to go together with us. It is a petty-bourgeois tendency, not a proletarian."

No, Mr. Johnson, it is not so easy to make Trotsky out as a political simpleton whom Cannon leads around by the nose.

To support his fable of Trotsky, the "very defective politician," incapable of judging men, Johnson has one last argument: his assassination. Here is what he writes:

"Not the least significant was the tragic circumstances of his death. He had been warned against his murderer, but this GPU agent earned his favor by an exaggerated devotion to Trotsky's political position. For six months he discussed politics with the greatest living master of politics and Trotsky never detected a false note, apparently set no trap for him. We can be certain that whoever else might have been deceived by an imposter, Mr. Joseph Stalin would not have been. In the end the idea expressed was more important and interesting to Trotsky than the person expressing it. It was his strength, the cause of some of his greatest triumphs, but it was his weakness, the cause of some of his greatest failures."

Natalia Trotsky has already had occasion to indicate the direct and factual lies in these few lines: there was no warning, no favor earned by an exaggerated devotion, no six months of political discussion.* None of that existed. But we must ask ourselves why Johnson had to use such means.

Let us glance back and we will find a historical precedent which will enlighten us. In his old age Kautsky wrote of Marx and Engels: "Neither of them were great judges of men." Just like Johnson, Kautsky had a very precise object in making such a judgment. It was both self-defense and revenge. After Kautsky's first visit with Marx, the latter wrote to his daughter Jenny:

"He is a mediocrity with a small-minded outlook, super-wise (only 26), very conceited, industrious in a certain sort of way, he busies himself a lot with statistics but does not read anything very clever out of them, belongs by nature to the tribe of the philistines, but is otherwise a decent fellow in his own way."

These lines were written in 1881 and rereading them now, with Kautsky's whole life before our eyes, we can only mar-

vel at the power of insight which had penetrated so deeply into the young man of 26 years. We can easily understand why Kautsky could not let himself acknowledge Marx as a "great judge of men."

To justify this appraisal of Marx, Kautsky wrote:

"In 1852 Marx gave his fullest confidence to the Hungarian journalist Bangya, even turning over to him a manuscript in which various 'great men of the emigration' were portrayed. And then it turned out that this Herr Bangya was a spy in the service of the Prussian government into whose hands he delivered Marx's manuscript."

To try to save themselves personally, Kautsky and Johnson must build up a Marx and a Trotsky incapable of judging men. But, as there is no material for such a construction, both must have recourse to a completely artificial case, that of a spy-provocateur, a case which has no bearing on the understanding of men by men, but rather on the art of divination. What a striking parallel!

Trotsky's Methods

It is on such foundations of sand that Johnson tries to build a judgment of Trotsky and to establish "his place in history." After having presented Trotsky as "cunningly maneuvered" and "unscrupulously used" by Cannon, having described him as unable to "detect a false note" in his murderer, Johnson does not hesitate to conclude:

"To the end he remained what he was, a man incapable of leaving his main work and concentrating his powerful intellect on the tricks and dodges which are inseparable from politics. Unscrupulous men not fit to clean his pen could gain his confidence and get the better of him."

While Johnson believes he has discovered a deep characteristic of Trotsky, of important political consequence, he in reality just repeats an old and despicable calumny. Since the appearance of the Left Opposition on the international arena, Trotsky has had to break with a number of groups and individuals after attempts at collaboration. Not surprising: the Fourth International was born in a period of general retreat of the labor movement. Independently of each other, most of those from whom Trotsky had to separate repeated the same accusations: Trotsky's ideas are excellent, but he understands nothing of organization, he does not know how to judge men, he allows himself to be maneuvered; immersed in his theoretical work, he lets himself be misled by the false information and the intrigues of those who follow him, etc. . . . Not once, but dozens and dozens of times these same recriminations came from the different countries of Europe. Souvarine, whom Johnson knows well, is especially brilliant in this kind of rhetoric. For a long time Leon Sedoff was the target of these accusations. Rudolph Klement also suffered from them—in fact, all those who were close to Trotsky. For many deserters it was the only explanation of their break with the Fourth International. The thinness of this explanation betrays their lack of understanding of political reality as well as their resentment: it is not possible that Trotsky is really against me!

Whoever is even slightly familiar with Trotsky's methods of work can only shrug his shoulders at such accusations. Trotsky applied the same scientific conscientiousness in all that he did, whether it was writing the history of the revolution or intervening in an impassioned faction fight within a group of ten persons. In his office he studied the letters received like a scientist in his laboratory observing his test-tubes. He knew how to collate evidence and to hold back until he had been able to form a clear picture of the situation. But once he had

*"Natalia Trotsky Answers a Foul Slander," *Socialist Appeal*, October 26, 1940.

formed an opinion, he entered the fight with firmness and decision. Personal relations counted for little then and became entirely subordinated to political judgment. Numerous adversaries were disconcerted by this attitude. Incapable of penetrating to the bottom of political reality and its requirements, they tended invariably to slip over to another plane; they appealed to personal relations in order to reestablish an understanding which had become impossible. Or, as Trotsky expressed it in referring to one of them, they were like a child who shakes the watch whose spring he has broken in order to make it go again. Then in spite, they placed the responsibility for the break on the maneuvers and false information of which Trotsky had been the victim.

Johnson tries to raise this gossip to a theoretical and historical level, and present a Trotsky clever in the world of ideas but incapable of reading men. The facts decisively contradict such a fabrication. Among the great Marxists, Trotsky is incontestably the one who was the most interested in following the course of men through events. The correspondence of Marx and Engels does not lack penetrating estimates of the men of their epoch, in spite of what Kautsky might have thought. But Trotsky was able to draw much more rounded portraits. Before 1917 there were already numerous silhouettes among his writings: Victor Adler and Bebel, Ebert and David, Jaures and Vaillant, Plekhanov and Martov, Ledebour and Rakovsky—practically all the figures of the international movement. But it is in the writings of his third exile that Trotsky becomes master of the art of integrating the individual into the "causal sequence of events." His History of the Russian Revolution contains portraits of practically all the actors in the drama, from Nicholas to Kerensky, from Miliukov to Martov. With no artificiality! The men are in their places, with their words, their gestures, their intonations. The complex mechanism whereby each historical task chooses its men is revealed to us. Trotsky's other writings of the same period—his criticism of the program of the Communist International, his autobiography, etc.—reveal the same power of perception through his study of other individuals—the epigones of Leninism. The death of the old Bolsheviks, the Moscow Trials, furnished him with the occasion to paint portraits which history will record as definitive; among others, those of Lunacharsky, Krupskaya, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Smirnov. Finally, the last two great works, unfinished, were the portraits of Lenin and Stalin. The future historian will have to pause long over Trotsky's pile of manuscripts on these men before hoping to be able to say something new.

From the time he left Moscow to his murder in the sunny office at Coyoacan, from the end of 1927 to August 1940, Lev Davidovitch carried on an active political correspondence. At first, during the year spent at Alma Ata, this consisted of the hundreds of letters to the oppositionists deported through-

out Siberia. Then in the 11 years of his last exile, there were thousands of letters to his co-thinkers in some 30 countries. New contacts, polemics, splits—all were present during this period and all that correspondence is full of his estimates of men. Although written for the immediate occasion, when re-read after a lapse of several years they are often astonishing in their depth and their keenness. In a few strokes, an individual's fundamental characteristics are painted with profound verity. More than once Lev Davidovitch predicted the road which an individual was going to follow when less perspicacious eyes were still far from discerning it. Certainly there were errors, but in the main they were astonishingly rare and the greater part of his judgments was confirmed by future developments.

Lev Davidovitch had an extraordinary capacity for drawing out people. By the questions he asked, by the discussion he started, he knew how to make his visitor reveal his background, his prejudices, his manner of approaching problems.

In explaining the defeat of the Left Opposition, Eastman always says that Trotsky did not know the art of personal relations and he adduces his own experience, that sometimes "you feel that he was not present in reality at all." Certainly Lev Davidovitch did not have much taste for sitting around over a cup of tea speaking of little nothings and eternal problems. Any conversation without a precise purpose greatly irritated him. When he grew weary of it, he developed, it is true, an air which might be termed "absent"; his politeness then became somewhat mechanical and affected as though he had to force himself. But he was very much present when contact was established with his visitor. Above all, the conversation had to have an object: comrades discussing political problems, young people whom he felt a desire to teach or, finally, someone having a branch of knowledge from which he wished to profit. Faced with visitors from whom he could learn nothing and whom he could teach nothing, he was somehow disarmed.

The great gift of Trotsky in dealing with men was that he knew how to mobilize them. He knew how to paint the grandeur of an aim, to inspire enthusiasm, to fortify the will. Lenin marveled at Trotsky's ability to rally many technicians to the Soviet power, to inspire them with confidence and to win them over to work in defense of the country. In his last exile, in problems small or big, he knew how to gain the cooperation and the devotion of people who were not directly tied to him by ideas and who could expect no recompense of any kind. His secret, if one wishes to use the word, was always to demand of an individual the best in him. Trotsky addressed himself to the best in men, for on the rest, he knew, one can build nothing durable.

The Trial of the Assassin of Trotsky

By WALTER ROURKE

The trial of the GPU murderer of Leon Trotsky is completing its second year with the criminal still to be sentenced. "Frank Jacson" or Jacques Mornard, as the assassin has called himself, has just employed another legal trick to continue the policy of dragging out the trial and postponing sentence. His latest is to accuse the trial judge of partiality.

Under Mexican law there is no trial jury. A case is turned over to a trial judge, who is required to hand down a verdict within one year. The trial consists of his investigation, examination of witnesses and the accused, etc., throughout the year's period, with the prosecutor playing a relatively minor rôle compared to American court procedure.

The trial may be divided into two stages: the first was the period immediately following the murder on August 21, 1940 until January 1941; the second part extends from then to the present. During the first part, the GPU made no legal moves to defend its agent. Jacson took great pains to hide his GPU antecedents. Pretending to have been close to the Trotskyists in Europe, he fabricated a story that members of the Executive Committee of the Fourth International had sent him to Mexico to serve as a secretary for Trotsky. This pose as a disillusioned follower of Trotsky was Jacson's main effort. In defining his motives for the crime, Jacson in general followed the line laid down in the "confession" letter placed in his pocket by GPU superiors. His only slips came when he forgot what had been written in his letter.*

In the course of interrogating Jacson about the motives for the crime, Trotsky's attorney, Albert Goldman, showed up Jacson as a very unclever liar. Goldman demonstrated that Jacson lied about his income, about his passport, and about his so-called connections with the Fourth International. During this questioning Jacson's "disagreements" and "discussions" with Trotsky were shown to be the purest invention. The GPU agent in his "confession" letter had pretended that Trotsky demanded that he go to Russia to commit sabotage and murder and that this had led to his determination to kill the man who had "ruined" him. It was established, however, that all the time Jacson had for all his deep laid plans and disagreements with Trotsky were 20 minutes—that was the total time he had spent with the Old Man during all his visits.

Jacson's Canadian passport was traced to a dead member of the Stalinist International Brigade who had fought in the Spanish Civil War. It is well known that the GPU seized all Brigade passports for its own use.

These facts, plus the circumstances of the previous GPU attack on Trotsky's life three months earlier, made it clear to everyone that Jacson, like Siqueiros before him, was one of Stalin's agents ordered to kill Leon Trotsky.

All these vital and conclusive facts were brought out during the first period of the trial from August through December 1940. During this period the case was in the hands of Judge Raul Carranca Trujillo who, although he committed some legal errors that caused some trouble as the trial progressed, conducted the investigation honestly and fairly. He ordered that a psychoanalytical report be drawn up by Doctors Alfonso Quiroz and Jose Gomez Rebledo. This report is very complete and unfavorable to the assassin, concluding that he is sane but of a criminal type and a menace to society. It also concludes that he has accomplices and probably understands Russian. The unfavorable conclusions of this report caused the defense to appoint its own psychoanalyst, a Dr. Millan who, of course, must present contrary conclusions.

At the turn of the year, Judge Trujillo was made a magistrate in a higher court and the case passed to Judge Manuel Rivera Vazquez. At about the same time, January 8, 1941, the GPU through intermediaries engaged a clever but unscrupulous lawyer to defend Jacson. This lawyer, Octavio Medellin Ostos, is still handling the case.

Jacson's "defense" presented a well-nigh impossible problem for his lawyer and were it not for the precedent of the Siqueiros case,** one could say with certainty that such a

clear-cut case left no room for maneuvering. The GPU agent got off to a bad start: there was the famous "confession" letter that at least established the fact of premeditation, if nothing more. The criminal had destroyed all his documents—thereby proving that he wanted to hide his real identity; the Stalinist origin of his passport makes this understandable. Jacson himself had confessed the way he deceived Trotsky into sitting down to read something brought by the assassin in order to distract his victim's attention. He confessed he had struck from behind and that Trotsky had made no previous move against him. These points are all important in Mexican law which has various grades of homicide or "califications"; Jacson had all "califications" against him: premeditation, breach of trust, advantage and treason.

The defense embarked on a tactic of delay with two possible escapes in view for Jacson—a "legal" and an illegal one. A "legal" escape might be arranged by maneuvering the case into the hands of some judge amenable to the inducements of a well-stocked GPU treasury. For this it was necessary to create and seize upon every pretext, no matter how small, to accuse Judge Rivera Vazquez of partiality against the prisoner. At the same time the defense had to lay the groundwork for another "version" of the crime which could give the hoped for, more amenable judge a basis for being more "impartial." The illegal escape would be one arranged by corrupting the prison administration into permitting Jacson to walk out the front door. For these two possible escapes there were two prime necessities: time and a "new version" of the crime.

Jacson's New Version

Three months after Ostos took his case and seven months after commission of the murder, Jacson suddenly announced that his key statements had been made while he was under the influence of some mysterious "liquid" with which he was injected and which made him lose consciousness and not know what he was saying. His original statements, besides much material about his earlier personal history, had dealt with his "motives" and his preparations for the crime. He had admitted in these statements that he had resolved to kill Trotsky days before August 20 (actually he started working on the assignment a couple of years before, but days suffice to establish premeditation); he had admitted buying a gun as well as having prepared the pickaxe—the murder weapon—in a carefully planned attack. These previous admissions, he now says, were made while he was drugged. True, Jacson at that time had reenacted the crime during the reconstruction carried out in Trotsky's office. But due to an oversight, Judge Trujillo neglected to make sure that the prisoner's lawyer was present and had signed the court record; therefore this reconstruction (a guarantee to all accused in Mexican law) did not have legal value and had to be repeated.

Under instructions from his new lawyer, Jacson refused to repeat his earlier description. Legally, nevertheless, all requirements for a conviction of murder were fulfilled by Jac-

May 24, 1940. He admitted having participated in the attack and a member of his gang made a full confession. Yet the main charges against him, including the murder of the Trotsky secretary, Robert Sheldon Harte, were dropped. For the whole story read "The Assassination of Robert Sheldon Harte" in the May 1942 *Fourth International*.

*See "The Assassination of Leon Trotsky, Proofs of Stalin's Guilt," by Albert Goldman. Pioneer Publishers, New York, 1940.

**Siqueiros led the machine-gun attack on Trotsky's house on

son's second reconstruction, but the defense claimed that the first description of the crime was "illogical with the statement by the accused" and "is contradicted scientifically by the autopsy certificate." The defense pretends that the direction of the wound shows that the blow could not have been struck from behind. The defendant demanded a new reconstruction based on his "real" version of the crime (a version which he had not yet presented). The judge refused this since the former confession had not been shown false and therefore retained full legal weight in Mexican law.

In the meantime, during the last months of hearings in the case, the GPU's lawyer called in many witnesses who could in reality add nothing to the record. Former secretaries and Trotskyists were called and questioned along a line similar to that followed by Goldman during his interrogation of Jacson: source of their funds, whether they ever used false names on passports, familiarity with Trotsky's writings, their own political history, etc., in an effort to show that Jacson was not the only one who could not answer these questions satisfactorily; in each case these attempts failed miserably and only served to show that it was precisely a GPU agent who had difficulty with such questions.

In addition, these witnesses, as well as the members of the police guard outside of Trotsky's home, were questioned repeatedly about Trotsky's personal characteristics—young or old, strong or weak, agile or slow and clumsy, whether or not he usually went armed, whether he was given to violent outbursts. These questions indicated the future "new version" of the crime: "legitimate self-defense."

Finally, the questions, especially those directed at the Trotskyists, had as their object the preparation for accusing the judge of partiality. Questions were asked involving long answers that had nothing to do with the case. For instance, Ostos would ask them to tell of Trotsky's part in the Russian Revolution and the formation of the Red Army. Whenever the judge ruled out a question as irrelevant, the response was a "protest" from Jacson's lawyer.

Shortly before the trial was closed, *Estampa*, a weekly, presented the defense with a gift from heaven. In an article devoted to an analysis of the case, the author incorrectly quoted Judge Rivera Vazquez as saying some very uncomplimentary things about the assassin. As a matter of fact, in response to a question about his opinion of Jacson, the judge had declined to answer and referred the reporter to the psychoanalytical report. The reporter presented the unfavorable conclusions of this report as though they were opinions uttered by the judge. The defense immediately presented this article as proof of the judge's partiality and will no doubt use it to try to sustain its recent formal accusation that the judge had "professed a manifest hate for the accused."

Nevertheless Judge Rivera Vazquez stood his ground and waited until the year provided by Mexican penal procedure for a trial had elapsed. Then he declared the case closed and ordered the prosecution and defense to proceed with the presentation of their conclusions. This presentation would be followed by the decision of the court and the pronouncement of sentence. On the very last day, after which no more proofs may be presented, Jacson handed in the new "version" of his crime. As was to be expected, it played up the self-defense line. After reading his article, says Jacson, Trotsky turning to him said he had written a lot of stupidities and in a contemptuous tone said, "you are nothing more than a blundering military man." Then, continues Jacson, seeing his hopes of being a writer instead of a saboteur finally dashed to the ground,

he reached the end of his endurance. Grabbing Trotsky by the coat he told him that he was the last man he would ruin—and struck him down. Later on in this document, Jacson writes, "I want to make note that Leon Trotsky began to fight and cry out before the blow in order to free himself from the grip of my left hand on his coat, in order, without doubt, to draw his revolver, but I was quicker than he and for that reason he did not have time to use it." The murderer did not trouble to explain how it happened that he was so well prepared to "defend" himself—with a pickaxe, a knife and a 45. Nor did he say a word about the "confession" letter that shows that he went to the house to kill Trotsky, and was not driven to murder by Trotsky's "insults." This latest version was presented 13 months after the crime and can carry little weight in any just court.

And now, again at the last minute, Jacson's attorney has accused the judge of partiality. After a trial is closed, the prosecution and defense draw up their conclusions. The time allowed for this task is determined by the number of pages in the court record. In this case, the record is unusually long—the psychoanalytical report alone being 1,300 pages. Ostos waited all this time and then, when he should have presented his conclusions, presented his accusation instead. How much time he can gain by this depends upon how quickly the higher court disposes of the issue. At any rate he gains somewhere between one and three months.

Since most confessed criminals believe that their judges are partial against them, there exists a natural reluctance of the higher courts to receive such accusations in good light. It is true, of course, that after being upheld the judge may still excuse himself and turn the case over to another. Given the clear-cut nature of the case there would seem to be little to worry about as long as the judge is at all just.

Nevertheless there is great danger if the case begins to change hands. As Natalia Trotsky wrote in the Mexican press when the "new version" first began to take form: "If there had not been judges to maintain that Siqueiros assaulted our house only to rob two automobiles which he abandoned a few hundred meters away . . . if there had not been judges to maintain that the gangsters of the GPU were not a gang but 'co-thinkers' and that the shots fired over our beds were only for 'psychological' effects, we would say beforehand: the GPU will fail in its attempt. But Siqueiros, assailant, assassin, incendiary and agent in the service of the GPU, is free. Why not Jacson?"

If the Jacson case leaves the court of Judge Rivera Vazquez, it will go to the First Penal Court—i.e., the court that freed Siqueiros. Undoubtedly the judge of that court could be forced to excuse himself also since he clearly is not impartial due to his handling of the Siqueiros case. But the broader possibilities presented to the GPU if Judge Rivera Vazquez is obliged to step aside are illustrated by the route the case will have to take. And meanwhile much time is gained to organize an illegal escape before sentence is pronounced.

It is known that on two different occasions the GPU had a plan laid to get Jacson out of jail. At times very reliable reports told of the extremely friendly relations between Jacson and the prison authorities—to the point of having drunken parties, music, women in his cell. There is also the distinct danger that the GPU will try to liquidate the case by liquidating Jacson; they no doubt would like to kill him and cast the blame on the Trotskyists. There are reports that Jacson is not any too anxious to run out and place himself in the hands of the GPU for precisely this reason. Last year a member of

the police guard around his cell made written propositions to Natalia Trotsky's secretary offering to kill Jacson for 50,000 pesos; after being turned down once he wrote a second letter discussing openly the terms of the deal. The letters were turned over to the authorities but the policeman disappeared. As to all these indications, however, it can only be said with certainty that the GPU must endeavor in some way to liquidate this two-year-old case, preferably by involving a Trotskyist in order to cover their own tracks. The attempt to find ways and means to organize such a provocation could alone explain the delaying tactics of the legal defense.

The Stalinist and Stalinized press has maintained complete silence over the Jacson case. Immediately after the murder, the Communist Party of Mexico washed its hands of the whole matter, not forgetting, however, to take precautions just in case its disagreeable experience with the Siqueiros case should be repeated; in the Siqueiros attack, it will be recalled, various leading C. P. members were exposed and indicted for having participated in or organized the assault. Said the C. P. after Trotsky's murder: "If the investigations should demonstrate that some one or several persons, mem-

bers or sympathizers of the Communist Party—violating our fundamental principles—intervened in the preparation and execution of the attacks against Leon Trotsky, those persons will be expelled from this Party as elements harmful to it, as well as to the working class and to the people of Mexico."

It has not been necessary for the Communist Party to "expel" any members because of their being proved to have participated in the murder of Leon Trotsky. This time the GPU covered its tracks a little better than in the Siqueiros case—using a foreigner unknown in Mexico and resorting to an individual in place of a mass attack. But Stalinism stands many times exposed in the murder of the Old Man. The GPU assassin's passport alone is conclusive proof of his origin. The identity of his lies with the Stalinist anti-Trotsky slanders are a political proof of his connections. His fabricated story of his past was torn to bits by Albert Goldman's interrogation. The abundance of funds at Jacson's disposal for an expensive lawyer and many luxuries remain unexplained. And if his escape is arranged, it will constitute one more proof that Leon Trotsky's murderer is in Stalin's pay.

July 30, 1942, Mexico, D. F.

The Real Situation in Argentina

By TERENCE PHELAN

There is growing increasingly in the U. S. a belief, nurtured by the apologists of Yankee imperialism, that the Argentine Republic is a mere tool for the Axis. It is necessary to scotch promptly this misleading notion, in which oversimplification and downright slander are skilfully blended.

The anti-imperialist struggle in any colony or semi-colony inevitably is directed against the imperialist power or powers which have the greatest stranglehold on its economy. Since, in the case of Argentina, those powers are Great Britain and the U. S., it follows automatically that they are the main targets of anti-imperialist sentiment. All other factors—racial, linguistic, geographical, or even parallelism of internal régimes—though admittedly existent, are secondary and subordinate to the inescapable central relationship: imperialism vs. semi-coloniality.

It is almost equally axiomatic that the semi-colonial bourgeoisie will seek aid against its principal imperialist exploiter from that imperialism's rivals. This is nothing novel: for many years one sector of the Argentine bourgeoisie has sought—and obtained—Yankee imperialism's support against British imperialism. It is, then, only natural that at the present conjuncture Argentina's ruling class sees no advantage in alienating the Axis imperialisms who are potential allies against British and U. S. imperialisms; but rather attempts for the moment, following the fluctuating fortunes of the war, to play one imperialist bloc off against the other. The more so inasmuch as the economy of the U. S. and Argentina (principal exports: beef, mutton, wheat, linseed, oats, maize, rye, barley—of which only linseed is needed in the U. S.) are largely competitive and not complementary—as in the case of certain specialized tropical Latin-American countries. For its rich agrarian exports, it is not at all to the U. S. that Argentina must look, but to Europe; and until the Argentine agrarian oligarchy is certain who is going to be the eventual master of Europe, it has no desire to offend the Axis.

Yet it is only by contrast with the collapse of almost all the other Latin-American nations to the ultimatum of Washington that Argentina's very limited resistance can be made, by interested bourgeois propagandists, to appear even anti-Yankee, let alone pro-Axis. In point of juridical fact, Argentina's status is not even that of a neutral, but of a pro-U. S. non-belligerent. The one practical governmental action taken to date has been the formal declaration opening Argentine ports without time-limit to U. S. war-vessels while closing them to the comparable ships of the Axis. It is a demonstration of the success of Washington propaganda that Argentina's refusal to enter the war at the command of Yankee imperialism is widely considered as "an unfriendly act" toward the U. S., or as a proof that Argentina is a mere Axis tool.

No, the ruling sector of the Argentine bourgeoisie is merely seizing—and with rather prudent timidity—on Anglo-Yankee imperialisms' preoccupation elsewhere to liberate itself as far as possible. How far possible we shall proceed to examine.

Argentina's Industrial Expansion— And Its Limits

The momentary conjuncture is without doubt relatively favorable. The Argentine bourgeoisie shrewdly observes that *el imperialismo yanqui* has its hands so full with the imperialist war that it can for the moment attend only to the consolidation of its hegemony over those Latin-American nations which collapsed under its first offensive, and must postpone a settlement of accounts with the hold-outs, such as Argentina—for whom, however, it is carefully placing some particularly unpleasant rods in pickle. This opportunity the Argentine bourgeoisie is now seizing on, to make what hay it can, while watching with extremely cautious attention the course of the war to see just how long it can get away with it.

Nobody can deny that its efforts are determined and, from Washington's point of view, disquieting. Despite raw material shortages, despite the U. S. unofficial embargo on machinery replacements, Argentina's important light conversion industries are not only making every effort to keep going, but are seizing on Yankee imperialism's momentary absence to steal certain small sectors of its markets in bordering countries. As for heavy industry, for decades one of the "basic" assumptions about Argentina, carefully propagated by British imperialism and its native tools, was that Argentina, the Heaven-blessed land of shoulder-high rich grazing grass and eight-foot deep wheat-growing top-soil, lacked the prime essentials for the development of a heavy industry, coal and iron deposits; and that in consequence it must necessarily import all its coal, iron and steel products from industrial Great Britain, in return for Great Britain's providing a market for its agrarian production. Now that British imperialism can no longer fulfill its half of the bargain, the Argentines have "discovered" and begun feverishly to exploit the rich coal and iron-ore deposits of the Argentine provinces of Salta and Jujuy.

But it is too late. To exploit these "new-found" riches on a capitalist basis, Argentina must either slowly build up its steel and heavy capital-goods industry out of its own production, step by step, as England took half a century to do when industrialism was young; or it must import ready-made the heavy machinery, equipment and special steels for the purpose. The onrush of the historic process grants no time for the first method; as for the second, England is obviously unable today, even if it were willing, to provide its semi-colony with the weapons for winning its own industrial independence; the U. S., if it provided the materials at all, would be willing only on terms of such grossly imperialist exploitation, plus demands for such political concessions—as it has already been forcing on Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela—that Argentina, far from being "liberated," would be more dominated than ever.

Still, the national bourgeoisie, within the limits of its possibilities, is driving hard ahead. "YPF" (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales), the government oil corporation, which already produces 65 per cent of Argentina's oil, is expanding as fast as material can be obtained, though naturally the U. S. government backs its imperialist companies by limiting export of such material or refusing it altogether. An indication of the present spirit of the Argentine bourgeoisie is a recent incident wherein the U. S. oil companies, who had long tried to argue the YPF out of existence, claiming that only corporations of their long experience and technical resources could adequately develop Argentina's petroleum riches, were sharply warned by the government that it was "disgusted with the pretended failure of these companies to profit by the concessions that had been granted them," and ordered them to stop stalling and increase production forthwith—at least to the YPF level of efficiency. Meanwhile, road and rail construction is being rushed to bring in Bolivian oil.

The Argentine government is utilizing its blocked sterling credits in England to repatriate its own bonds or those of nationally-owned companies. Between November 1941 and March 1942 alone, the total of such repatriations reached a sum of more than \$16,000,000, despite all the obstacles placed in the way by British imperialism. A trade treaty with Spain, involving the exchange of Argentine cotton and wheat against a similar amount of "Spanish" (German?) heavy machinery and other industrial products, is now in negotiation. An Ar-

gentine mission is in Chile trying to work out a system, by the reciprocal lowering of customs barriers, to complement and as far as possible fuse Argentino-Chilean economies; meanwhile trade between the two countries has trebled. An enormous program of road building (aimed secondarily at the British railroad semi-monopoly) is now in progress, the new roads leading principally either to fast growing mining and oil regions or to the bordering countries with which Argentina is making a concerted effort to increase its trade. With other Latin-American countries, indeed, Argentina's trade has increased more than 60 per cent in the last year as a result of the government's deliberate policy. Argentina's trade with Brazil is now second only to that with the U. S., the once mighty pace-setting England having fallen to third place. Argentine purchasing missions bid, and sometimes successfully, against Yankee imperialism itself, for the natural rubber from the smaller Latin-American countries. As a sort of saucy maraschino-cherry on this cake, Argentina has been exporting, of all things, machine-tools to the hard-pressed U. S. arms-industry.

The Growing Economic Crisis

But despite these strenuous efforts, Argentina's position is difficult and at moments approaches the desperate. The war, closing markets and lessening shipping, has sown broadcast through the important agrarian sector of Argentina's economy a crisis which contrasts sadly with the boom during the first World War, when the submarine blockade was so much less severe. France and Italy were sure markets and prices ran high and handsome. Then it took all the prudent obstinacy of President Hipólito Irigoyen to hold off the popular demands that the republic throw in its lot with the Allies by an open declaration of war. In this war, the situation is reversed, and the Castillo government's refusal to get sucked into the maelstrom by the U. S. has won widespread support among all classes of Argentines.

The intervening agricultural crisis of 1929-36 the agropecuary bourgeoisie and its finance-capital allies "solved" on the backs of the rural proletariat by slashing to about half the wages of farm-workers—from the simplest oilers and water-tenders of the threshing-machines up to the crack engineer-drivers of the harvester-combines. But in the present crisis, of even greater intensity, cut wages though they may, there is little margin left there. And the banks are in bad shape. Due to a speculative increase which between 1886 and 1929 lifted land values more than 3,000 per cent, the mortgage debt on land had reached already by 1930 the enormous sum of about three and a half billion pesos (about \$900,000,000). This bond structure is beginning to totter dangerously. More and more the government must intervene; and its schemes, such as that for crop purchases at guaranteed prices, have reached a stage where bankruptcy threatens. In desperation the bourgeoisie is trying once again its often-failed attempt to turn the clock of history backward by creating artificially a class of semi-proletarian petty peasant proprietors, whom its advanced large-scale capitalist methods, by the laws of competition, have heretofore wiped out as fast as they were set up.

Meanwhile even the most cursory study of the Argentine price structure indicates the existence of a still small but dangerously increasing inflation, a situation which has been no-wise helped by the "panic capital" which until recently poured in, and is still trickling in, from Europe.

There are serious undercover rifts in the bourgeoisie,

one sector being determined to hold out until the European market for agrarian products is reopened, meanwhile attempting to expand the internal and Latin-American markets; another sector, already terrified of ultimate collapse or reprisal, urging a *modus vivendi* with Yankee imperialism as soon as possible; while a small but noisy third sector, persuaded that the Allies, especially England, are already beaten, wishes to push the government to take measures openly in favor of the Axis, which to date it has prudently refrained from doing.

The National Bourgeoisie Cannot Free Argentina

The growing crisis expresses the established semi-coloniality and dependence of even advanced "independent" Argentina; economic liberation under the leadership of the national bourgeoisie is excluded as a practical possibility.

For a clearer understanding of this fact, it will be useful to point out that imperialist exploitation of Argentina operates rather differently from imperialist exploitation of the Indo-American countries of Latin-America, where imperialism *directly* superexploits both the country's natural wealth and the labor-power of its backward native races. In Argentina, on the other hand, with the vast majority of the national wealth in the hands of the national bourgeoisie, and no backward native races to exploit, it is through public-service companies, conversion industries, the "luxury" trades connected with the living standard of the national bourgeoisie, and complex banking tie-ups, that imperialism operates; and national equivalents either parallel these imperialist enterprises or— even more frequently and significantly—are interlinked with them in so inseparable and complex a structure that it is practically impossible to separate them.

In the abstract, this would be the moment for the Argentine national bourgeoisie to free itself with one bold stroke from *all* imperialisms, while they are elsewhere locked in life-and-death struggle. That stroke—the only real method—would be by expropriation. But—and here is the nub of the matter—the Argentine capitalists cannot bring into question imperialist rights in private property in the means of production without simultaneously bringing into question their own. It is significant that, when one talks to a *frigorifico*-worker at Swift's or Armour's great plants at Berisso about the crimes of Yankee imperialism therein, he is more than likely, without denying those crimes, to expatiate on how much worse conditions

are in the great plants of the Argentine-owned C.A.P. At the time of its rise to power the European bourgeoisie went so far in its purely theoretical thinking as to oppose private property in land and propose the nationalization of the soil but, as Marx pointed out, "in practice, however, it lacked the courage to carry out this measure, since this attack against one form of property would be very dangerous for the other form." Similarly with bourgeois "national liberation," as advocated by the Argentine fascists. The "radical," fascizing sector of the bourgeoisie may launch demagogically anti-imperialist slogans as if there were no class struggle. But the Argentine bourgeoisie cannot expropriate imperialist enterprise without setting in motion a train of action such that they would end by being themselves expropriated by the Argentine proletariat. By their very nature and position, therefore, the Argentine capitalists are condemned to limit their anti-imperialist struggles to teetering, zigzagging maneuvers. An instantaneous flashlight portrait now shows them dramatically tearing off in what seems to be a principled and permanent direction. But another shot, taken a historic moment later, would reveal them equally determinedly off on the contrary tack. It is only those who think such snapshots are a complete portrait of character who can be taken in by the bourgeois apologists who claim that Argentina is unmitigatedly an Axis stooge. Let the fortunes of war take tomorrow a sharply contrary turn, and the Argentine bourgeoisie will be seen scampering back to safe cover under the wing of *el imperialismo yanqui*. It will "resist" as long as it is safe to do so, and not a minute more.

But the Argentine bourgeoisie is, fortunately, not the only factor in Argentina. There is the heartening reality of the Argentine industrial proletariat, a million strong, slowly learning, slowly gathering its forces, groping for leadership. Except for an occasional petty-bourgeois "revolutionary" crank lost in a vulgar rage against everything North American, the genuine revolutionary forces in Argentina look to the U. S. proletariat as their surest ally, for understanding and solidarity. Those American workers who gullibly swallow the propaganda of the journalistic trained seals of the U. S. bourgeoisie to the effect that Argentina's limited-enough resistance to *el imperialismo yanqui* make all Argentines automatically Axis agents, are failing their Latin-American brothers. *Cuidado, hermanos!*

Quito, Ecuador.

July 10, 1942.

Chen Tu-hsiu: Chinese Revolutionist

By LI FU-JEN

Chen Tu-hsiu, a founder of the Trotskyist movement in China and before that of the Chinese Communist Party, is dead. With his passing there has disappeared an important political figure, one of the few remaining revolutionary veterans who survived the turbulent period that succeeded World War I.

According to a United Press dispatch which the metropolitan newspapers did not consider worthy of publication and which appeared in a midwestern sheet, the veteran revolutionist, 62 years old, passed away at Kiangtsin, a small village in Szechwan province, not far from the present Chinese capital of Chungking, on May 24 of this year. The cause

of his death was not stated in the dispatch, but Chen had been seriously ill of a heart ailment for a considerable time and this, it may be presumed, finally brought him to the end of his career.

Though not widely known abroad, Chen Tu-hsiu was a national figure in China, not only because of his prominence as a revolutionist but also because of his great contributions to China's modern cultural advance. The last ten years of his life were spent in comparative obscurity. From 1932 to 1937 he was in prison in Nanking, serving a 13-year sentence for "endangering the safety of the State." Shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war he was released with other

political prisoners. Broken in health, he lived in virtual retirement until his death, but continued his attachment to the Chinese section of the Fourth International. The reactionary Kuo-mintang government denied him the right to engage even in literary work. The bourgeoisie feared him until the last.

Born into a wealthy Mandarin family in the central China province of Anhwei, Chen Tu-hsiu rose to prominence in the troubled years that set in with China's first revolution, the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty and the establishment of the republic in 1911. With a group of radical intellectuals he published at Peking a magazine, *New Youth*, which fought against the decayed ideology of Confucianism and sought to project China's youth along new and revolutionary paths.

Chen's Road to Revolutionary Politics

The essence of the Confucian doctrine, which has a distinct counterpart in the Christianity of the western world (and which, like Christianity, represents an important prop of the social status quo), is that social advance must be achieved through individual regeneration. Chen, while instinctively rejecting this reactionary concept of a bygone age, was nevertheless clearly under its influence in his early activities. He observed the ossification of Chinese society with its cultured, leisured Mandarinate and its illiterate, enslaved and poverty-stricken masses. It seemed to him that enlightenment of the masses was the prerequisite to social progress. He proclaimed the need to substitute "science and democracy" for the way of life then buttressed by Confucian philosophy and ethics. And the immediate task, he believed, was to wrest culture from the palsied hands of an outworn social class and make it the possession of the broad masses.

In the Chinese language itself Chen saw the greatest obstacle to the cultural advance of the masses. With its thousands of intricate characters and arbitrary construction, it required years of intensive study for its mastery. How could the son of a poor family ever hope to acquire more than the barest rudiments for everyday intercourse? Chen set himself the task of simplifying China's written language so that it might become accessible to the common people. After years of devoted labor he produced the *pei hua* and popularized it in North China, where he was a professor at the Peking National University. *Pei hua* means, literally, "northern language," and it derived that name from the fact that it was in the north that it first took hold.

Through the medium of the *pei hua* reading and writing and the general understanding of the language were enormously simplified. It invaded the newer schools, was used by the newspapers and became the choice of popular writers. It looked as if a long step forward had been taken in opening a cultural avenue for the masses. But Chen was soon to discover that he had merely created the vehicle for a broader culture without giving the masses opportunity for boarding the vehicle.

How could the son of a poor peasant family hope to attend school and learn even the simplified language if his parents were just eking out a bare existence on the land and unable to pay for his education? How could a youth born into the home of a poor working artisan ever reach the portals of even an elementary school (all schools were fee-paying)? What hope of mass cultural development was there in a backward country like China, where almost universal poverty was the rule, where tens of thousands of villages and towns had not a single library or newspaper, often no school, and where

the vast majority of families existed on such slender budgets that provision for the purchase of a newspaper, even if one were available, was utterly out of the question?

Posing these questions to himself, Chen Tu-hsiu was drawn into the realm of political ideas and struggles. The October revolution in 1917 exerted its inevitable influence on the idealistic Chen and hastened his development. In backward Russia he saw the European counterpart of China. He came to understand that new life, social progress, cultural advancement could become possible only by overthrowing the landlords and capitalists and establishing the rule of the people. The Russian Bolsheviks had blazed a trail which China must follow.

World War I had brought into being the Chinese proletariat, but it was still immature, its first fiery struggles still lay ahead. By 1919, however, the political ideas unleashed by the Russian Bolsheviks had made their way into the ranks of China's radical intelligentsia and a number of socialist groups had been formed. Their growth and coalescence were given impetus by the great student uprisings in Peking that year, which have gone into Chinese history as the May Fourth Movement.

One of the leading figures in that movement, which was directed against the rotten Peking government of those days, was Chen Tu-hsiu. In 1920, together with other leading figures among China's rebellious intellectuals, Chen joined in the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. In July 1921 the party held its first national conference at Shanghai. Six years later, in April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, political and military representative of the bourgeoisie, slew the Chinese revolution and gave the revolutionary movement its first blood bath. The Communist Party was outlawed and many of its best leaders were captured and executed. Thousands of revolutionary workers and peasants were slaughtered. Chen Tu-hsiu became a fugitive in hiding.

The story of how the fatal opportunist policies of Stalin-Bukharin led to the terrible defeat of the Chinese revolution has been told many times and there is no occasion to repeat it here. The executive committee of the Comintern sought, as it had done earlier in the case of the abortive German revolution, to saddle the exclusive responsibility for the disaster on the national leaders of the revolution, principally Chen Tu-hsiu, although it was the Stalin-Bukharin policy, faithfully executed by him, which had brought on the debacle.

At the conference of the Chinese party in August 1927 Chen was deposed from leadership to the accompaniment of loud condemnations of his leadership from Moscow. He retired from active work while the new, and part of the old, leadership switched under Moscow orders from the previous policy of opportunism to the equally disastrous course of adventurism whose high point was marked by the abortive Canton insurrection in December 1927. Chen wrote several letters to the central committee of the party, opposing the new adventurist course. In August 1929 he reiterated his opposition in a lengthy letter to the central committee and demanded a re-examination of its policies. Shortly thereafter he and about 100 others were expelled as Oppositionists. In February 1930 the Comintern invited him to Moscow, where many political penitents, under pressure of Stalin's machine, had confessed their "errors." Chen, to his everlasting credit, refused the "invitation" and demanded that the issues of the defeated revolution be thrown open to full discussion within the Comintern and the Chinese party.

That refusal and demand severed the tenuous thread still holding Chen to the Stalinists. He solidarized himself with one of several groups of Left Oppositionists which subsequently united to form the Communist League of China, section of the Fourth International, and was a leading figure in Oppositionist activity—all conducted from the underground—until his arrest by the Kuomintang in 1932.

On trial before a military court in Nanking, Chen defended his revolutionary Trotskyist views and generally conducted himself in the best traditions of the revolutionary movement. Becoming the accuser, he hurled defiance at the Kuomintang military régime, condemned its frightful terrorism against the people. The picture of this slight figure of a man in his faded Chinese gown, surrounded by gendarmes in a heavily guarded courtroom, a possible death penalty in the offing, yet hurling defiance at his captors in the name of the persecuted and downtrodden masses, is one which can inspire our comrades everywhere as they prepare to face the great ordeals which revolutionary activity exacts in these terrible times.

Chen's Political Limitations

Chen Tu-hsiu embodied in his political personality a remarkable, though by no means unique, contradiction which set the severest limitations on his career as a revolutionist—the fact that he became a revolutionary fighter and leader, a champion of the oppressed, a Communist, *without ever becoming a Marxist*. Chen's life, particularly the closing years of it, should serve as an object lesson and a warning to would-be revolutionary leaders who sneer at dialectics and consider themselves amply educated politically after they have read a few popular pamphlets on Marxism.

He had absorbed some Marxist ideas piecemeal, without consistency, on the wing so to speak, while engaged in the tasks of the revolutionary movement, but he never became a consistent Marxist. The fact that he so readily accepted the opportunist policies of Stalin-Bukharin in the 1925-27 revolutionary period—though admittedly with occasional misgivings and sometimes contrary to his own better judgment—was due in large part to the deficiency of his Marxist education. As a thinker he was inclined to be empirical, and bourgeois philosophy, against which he rebelled while a professor but which he nevertheless had absorbed into his system (largely via John Dewey), stood as an obstacle to the further development of his mental powers. It was his misfortune, too, that he did not have the opportunity to study the lessons of the Russian revolution, for these were suppressed by the Moscow bureaucracy and Trotsky had not yet written his monumental history of the great upheaval. Chen was limited, moreover, by his lack of knowledge of foreign languages and few of the Marxist classics were available in Chinese.

Charged with "endangering the safety of the State," Chen demanded of the prosecutor (I paraphrase his remarks, not having the text available): "How can I be accused of endangering the State? Is not the State the people? In what way am I endangering the State when I fight for the rights of the people?" It was evident that Chen had either not read, or had failed to understand, the writings of Marx on the question of the state—or even Lenin's "The State and Revolution." The Marxist conception of the state as a political instrument of the ruling class was to Chen a seemingly unknown idea.

At the beginning of his political career, Chen had proclaimed "science and democracy" as the needed substitute for

Confucianism if China were to advance. Democracy was here posed, not from the point of view of the struggle of social classes, not in the political context of revolutionary materialism, but as a more or less abstract concept, a non-class "ideal" to be striven for by people of good will. That, of course, was in the days of Chen's political immaturity. It is doubtful, however, whether in his thinking Chen ever really envisaged his "ideal" democracy—a subject to which he returned over and over again in the later years of his life—in the political form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, even if he accepted that idea formally. To Chen, democracy was something of a fetish. His early life as a liberal-radical professor who had to oppose a dictatorship (the old Peking government) in order to disseminate his new cultural ideas; the later consolidation of the Kuomintang régime which systematically polluted the libertarian atmosphere which had developed during the revolutionary years; finally, the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union and the Stalinist suppression of all democratic liberties—all these factors contributed to Chen's fetishistic conception of democracy.

The circumstances of his life, as well as the factors already named, played their part in stopping short the development of Chen Tu-hsiu as a revolutionary leader. I have mentioned his lack of knowledge of foreign languages, especially serious in a country like China. This he tried to make good during his five years of imprisonment and I know that he made sufficient progress in English to be able to read some of Trotsky's more important works. The five years spent in prison, however, had the corresponding disadvantage that Chen was denied close contact with his comrades in one of the most crucial periods of modern revolutionary history: the final decline and degeneration of the Communist International and the rise of the Fourth International. Such isolation from the live current of events is always unfortunate, but particularly in the case of a revolutionist well past middle age who has not had the benefit of a thorough grounding in Marxism.

Chen's knowledge of the international movement was sketchy, gleaned from books, pamphlets and articles. Unlike most of the outstanding revolutionists, he had never gone abroad. His entire life was spent within the borders of China and his only contact with comrades from foreign lands was during the Chinese revolution when functionaries of the Comintern (Borodin, Roy, et al.) were in China to give commands to the central committee of the Chinese C. P. Lack of any personal knowledge of the outside world had limiting effects on Chen's mental horizons and bred in him a certain provincialism. His contacts with the Comintern functionaries, incidentally, engendered in him an ill-concealed and quite irrational hostility and suspicion toward revolutionists from other lands.

Two years after his release from prison the second imperialist world war broke out to reveal the reactionary content of Chen's democratic concept. As an advocate of democracy "in general" without reference to social classes, he rapidly developed his thought to the point at which he considered it necessary for revolutionists to support the "democratic" imperialist camp against the fascist camp and urged this policy upon the Chinese section of the Fourth International. A lengthy polemic ensued in which Chen even went to the length of declaring that India should at least postpone its struggle for freedom in order not to jeopardize a "democratic" victory by hampering Britain's war effort. This polemic, which was carried on by correspondence between the remote Szechwan village where Chen lived and the central committee in Shang-

hai, left Chen in a minority of one. The polemic was often interrupted or suspended by Chen's more and more frequent lapses into illness. His views never became publicly known, since the discussion was confined within the organization. He did not break with the organization, and the latter, for its part, saw no reason to use harsh measures against an illustrious comrade who took no public stand against its policies.

In Chinese intellectual circles Chen throughout his life was the object of great esteem—not because of his politics but because of his scholarly attainments and his impeccable integrity. While Chen hewed to the hard revolutionary path, most of his former academic associates and likewise most of his former pupils went the way of most petty-bourgeois flesh, preferring to feed at the troughs put out by the ruling régime. Among them was Dr. Hu Shih, the present Chinese ambassador in Washington, who liked to consider himself a disciple of Chen Tu-hsiu, but spoke not one public word for Chen when he was jailed by Chiang Kai-shek.

Among the intellectuals Chen was esteemed mainly as a philosopher and as a rare master of the Chinese language. He was renowned as a calligrapher and specimens of his writing, exquisitely executed with deft strokes of the brush or pen, are the prized possessions of many of his comrades, friends and acquaintances. Some of his former academic friends who through all the phases of his life continued to hold him in high esteem came to his defense in Hankow in 1938 when the Communist Party, shortly after Chen's release from prison, conducted a slander campaign against the aging man, accusing him and the rest of the Trotskyists of being agents of Japan. They published a statement recalling Chen's career as a fighter for social justice, his record in the long battle for China's emancipation from imperialist control; they cited his incorruptibility, as evidenced by his readiness to suffer persecution for his ideas, to prove it was impossible that such a man could be an agent of Japan. This defense was not political, but it sufficed for a time to put the Stalinists to such public shame as to silence their slander campaign.

Chen's failure to mature politically was a reflection, in

its way, of the backwardness of China. He came to the revolutionary movement as a man of mature years. The younger comrades had many advantages denied to Chen, among them the opportunity to devote themselves to the study of Marxism and the works of its most distinguished continuator, Leon Trotsky. How far the Chinese revolutionary movement has advanced beyond the political level which Chen represented is evidenced most strikingly in the fact that he could not find in the Chinese organization a single supporter for his later political ideas. Personal regard for Chen because of his high integrity the comrades kept until his death, but they never allowed his personal prestige to influence their political judgment.

Despite his serious limitations, Chen Tu-hsiu displayed most of the personal qualities of a great revolutionist. His single-minded devotion to the cause of the oppressed could not be questioned. He abandoned a comfortable and honored academic career for the life of a revolutionist and never looked backward. With his comrades he shared all the vicissitudes of that life, including drab poverty and the dangers of underground activity. Never was he known to flinch or complain. His entire political life was one of personal renunciation. Before the court of the hangman Chiang Kai-shek he bore himself heroically. Had he been prepared, like many of the Stalinist capitulators in the worst period of the Kuomintang terror, to disown his revolutionary views and bend the knee to the ruling despot, he could have had almost anything within the despot's gift. He preferred prison—death, if need be—to such dishonor and he remained an exemplar of revolutionary conduct.

For his steadfastness Chen Tu-hsiu will always remain an honored figure in the gallery of revolutionary fighters. The revolutionary youth of present-day China will make good his deficiencies in preparing themselves for their own revolutionary rôles. They will carry to fruition the great work in which he strove with a valiance that overshadowed his shortcomings.

What the Soviet Press Reveals

By JOHN G. WRIGHT

The official Moscow press continues to arrive in this country only after long delays. The files are far from complete. The material now available consists of scattered issues covering the months of January, February, March and April of the current year.

The most striking thing about the propaganda for home consumption is the emphasis placed upon the year 1942 as the year of victory. In its leading editorial on January 1, *Pravda* solemnly pledged:

"The new year must become—and it will actually become *the year of the complete annihilation of Hitlerite Germany.*" (Emphasis in the original.)

"In 1942 we shall strangle, we shall tear to pieces and finish off the bloody beast that attacked us so vilely."

The same issue carries a letter to Stalin from the citizens of the Sverdlovsk region in the Urals. This letter bears the signatures of 1,017,237 individuals "engaged in enterprises, collective farms, machine and tractor stations, and state farms." It strikes the same keynote:

"For Hitler the year 1942 is the fatal date, it is the year of ignoble doom, of obscure death."

This promise of definitive victory as an immediate perspective has been incessantly reiterated. On April 24, *Pravda* declared:

"The fighters of the Red Army have whipped the enemy in the winter and they will continue to whip him during the spring and summer; our troops will continue to drive out the invaders from the Soviet land and they will not allow the initiative to slip from their mighty hands right up to the complete annihilation of the Hitlerite bandits."

These boasts of impending victory were accompanied by a renewed campaign in the press designed to deify Stalin. The central formula throughout this period reads as follows:

"The leader of our army, Comrade Stalin is confidently leading the Red Army to the annihilation of the invading enemy—forward to the emancipation of all the peoples enslaved by German fascism." (*Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1942.)

Stalin's name, assures *Pravda*, is "the symbol of victory."

Stalin's speeches are invested with magical military properties, especially his speeches of November 6 and 7, 1941:

"On November 6th the whole world heard Comrade Stalin's report . . . to the effect that whoever stepped on our soil to occupy it must be and would be annihilated. Twenty days after the historical speech of Comrade Stalin the German received the first crushing blow beneath Rostov." (*Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1942.)

In the next day's leading editorial, *Pravda* revealed that in his speeches of November 6 and 7

"Stalin, the genius, already foresaw the signs of the coming breaking point in the course of the war." (*Pravda*, Jan. 6, 1942.)

Here are some of the ritualistic paeans published in praise of the "great leader of the Soviet people and director of all the armed forces of our country":

"Stalin—the farsighted helmsman of the Soviet ship of state."

"Stalin—this is the Lenin of today."

"Stalin—the living incarnation and embodiment of the strength and greatness of spirit of the Soviet people."

"The glorious leader of the Red Army, its Commander-in-Chief, the father and friend of the peoples—Great Stalin."

"For the Fatherland! For Stalin! With these words on their lips the defenders of the fatherland go to meet the enemy, surround them, annihilate them."

The New Year's letter from Sverdlovsk, already cited above, contains this declaration:

"Everyone knew that Stalin is with us, and this caused privations to be forgotten, lightened all hearts, made the marksmen shoot straighter and sped all work."

The letter concludes:

"Forward for the Fatherland! For Stalin! Forward with Stalin! For Freedom! For Victory! For Our Happiness!"

The successes of the Red Army last winter were thus utilized by the bureaucratic régime primarily to bolster up its prestige. The Kremlin sought to cover up its responsibility for the previous terrible defeats and losses by assurances that the war had reached a breaking point, that only victories lay ahead. Stalin's sadly tarnished reputation as "organizer of victories" had likewise to be restored. Drunk by temporary successes, the Stalinists apparently threw all caution to the wind.

The question naturally arises: What will the effect be of the latest terrible military reverses? Once again the Soviet masses have been caught unawares, if they believed the promises of the Kremlin. Instead of the victories promised them, they are suddenly confronted with new disasters. Stalin has once again dealt the most fearful blows to Soviet morale.

His latest campaign of self-glorification will have consequences just the opposite of those he sought. Through it he has succeeded in further compromising his régime in the eyes of the masses. Having taken credit for all the winter successes, he cannot now evade the full responsibility for all the defeats that followed.

The New Officer Corps

Among the important developments of the war is the rise of a new officer corps. Kharitonov, Remizov and Lopatin, the generals credited officially with the recapture of Rostov last November, are three recent appointees. Also newly appointed are: Lieutenant-General I. S. Konev, commander of the Kalinin front; Lieutenant-General P. A. Kurochkin, commander of the northwestern front; Colonel-General A. I. Yerenko and Lieutenant-General M. A. Priskayev.

In January, 13 other generals were singled out and decorated: 1) Belov; 2) Boldin; 3) Govorov; 4) Lelyushenko;

5) Rokossovsky; 6) Sokolovsky; 7) Beloborodov; 8) Vlasov; 9) Golikov; 10) Golubev; 11) Yefremov; 12) Zakharkin; 13) Kuznetsov. All of them are likewise new to the roster of Soviet general officers.

Wholesale new appointments have apparently become the rule. On January 2 there were four lieutenant-generals and 16 major-generals appointed; on January 3—one lieutenant-general and six major-generals; on January 6—four rear admirals and two major-generals; January 10—nine major-generals; January 19—six major-generals; January 22—one colonel-general, one lieutenant-general and seven major-generals; January 25—one lieutenant-general and six major-generals. For the space of these three weeks alone the total amounts to four rear-admirals, one colonel-general, seven lieutenant-generals and 52 major-generals.

This process continued throughout the following months. Thus, on March 25 *Pravda* reported six new major-generals; on March 28—four lieutenant-generals and 13 major-generals.

To the hundreds of new generals must be added thousands and tens of thousands of lower ranking officers. The old officer corps, which has been in this way superseded, owed its rise entirely to bureaucratic connections. It was hand-picked from top to bottom after the blood purges of 1937-38. A considerable number of the new officers, especially from among the lower ranks, appear to have gained their posts on an altogether different basis, i.e., through ability and merit demonstrated in the very heat of battle. The future will tell to what extent this has weakened Stalin's stranglehold on the army.

The Condition of the Communist Party

The Bolshevik Party of Lenin and Trotsky drew in hundreds of thousands of new fighters into its ranks during the Civil War of 1918-20. One might naturally expect that the enormous mass upsurge in the Soviet Union would find its reflection in the growth of the only legal political party in the country and moreover the party which is supposed to wield the power. But that is not at all the case. The party is stagnating in the regions behind the lines. Those new recruits that have been added come predominantly from the ranks of the administrative and governmental apparatus. *Pravda* cites as an example the situation in the Chelyabinsk *oblast*:

"For the entire past year and for the two months of the current year the party organization of this *oblast* has accepted as candidates of the party 660 workers, 289 collective farmers and 2,025 government employes. From among the candidates there have been accepted as members into the party 903 workers, 389 collective farmers and 3,515 government employes. The figures show that the growth of the party organization has occurred primarily at the expense of government employes: more than 70 per cent of the comrades accepted as candidates and members of the party are—government employes. Even in such an organization as that of Magnitogorsk the workers constitute only 35 per cent of the total number accepted into the party." (*Pravda*, April 22, 1942.)

After painting such a picture of "growth," *Pravda* immediately adds:

"The party district committees in Karakulsk, Mishkinsk, Uksyansk and Shatrovsk have accepted only a single individual each into the party during January and February of this year; the Galkinsk and Dalmatovsk regional committees did not accept a single individual."

The bulk of the party has for a long time consisted of functionaries. The war has apparently reinforced the deter-

mination of the bureaucrats to permit entry only to those from their own caste. The resulting bureaucratic shell is completely isolated from the masses. *Pravda's* statistics for Chelyabinsk graphically reveal this isolation which is further emphasized by figures released by *Pravda* on January 18 relating to the numerical strength of the party organization in the city of Rostov. After the unprecedented mass upsurge of last November, when the German armies were swept out of Rostov by the joint struggle of the civilians and the Red Army, the Stalinists were able to claim only 5,000 members of the party in the entire area. The population of Rostov alone is more than half a million. This means that less than one per cent are enrolled in the party.

In most areas close to the front lines the conditions are far worse. *Pravda* is compelled to report "serious changes" in the ranks of the party even in the central Moscow region where the membership has dropped sharply. The official explanation offers two reasons:

"In connection with the mobilization into the army and the evacuation of industrial enterprises the number of party members has decreased." (*Pravda*, Jan. 14, 1942.)

There is, however, a third reason for the drop. An inkling of it is given in the report of a party committee of an unspecified region recaptured from the Germans during the winter. The report states:

"The regional committee of the party decided that it was first of all necessary to call together the cadres of the activists and to reestablish the organs of Soviet power in the liberated localities. Not all of the people returned to their former posts. Among them were to be found also those who revealed in the critical moments the souls of grafters, cowards and traitors. . . . New and tested cadres of party and non-party Bolsheviks were advanced." (*Pravda*, Jan. 16, 1942.)

Two things are admitted by this report: first, that the party ceased to exist and function the moment the Germans conquered the region and had to be reconstituted *from the top* after reoccupation by the Red Army; and second, that the party ranks are riddled with unreliable and corrupt elements who either run away or desert to the enemy. *Grafters, cowards, traitors*—this is how Stalin's own organ characterizes an obviously considerable part of Stalin's party!

It is of course impossible to estimate the actual proportion of this human scum. But it is in any case clear that part of the losses in party membership in the areas near the front cannot be accounted for in any other way than by the readiness of a section of the Stalinist bureaucracy to desert the field of battle or to go over to the side of the victorious enemy.

Not so long ago the Kremlin sought to justify its monstrous blood purges by the claim that in this way the "Fifth Column" had been destroyed. Now comes the official admission that the murder of the whole generation of Bolsheviks who together with Lenin and Trotsky made the October Revolution has only facilitated the entry into the party of "grafters, cowards and traitors." By all his policies, above all his strangulation of the party, Stalin has promoted rather than retarded the development of a "Fifth Column" in the USSR.

The Bureaucracy Behind the Lines

In our previous articles we have already reported that a section of the bureaucracy behind the lines refused to make any sacrifices or to adjust itself to the necessities of the war in the initial period of the struggle. The same situation prevailed throughout the winter. After more than six months

of war, in the midst of the winter successes of the Red Army, *Pravda* still continued to reason with this gentry and to plead with them to mend their ways.

In a leading editorial we find the following almost incredible statements:

"It is necessary to live more modestly than has been the case. By renouncing all sorts of superfluties not only in the country's economy but also in day-to-day life, it is possible to give greater means to the front. In time of war it is necessary to economize in everything; it is necessary to expend raw materials and supplies, fuel and foodstuffs with exceptional zealousness. A regime of rigid economy can save enormous resources for the front." (*Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1942.)

But in addition to refusing to live "more modestly," the bureaucracy utilizes the war in order to cover up its arbitrariness, inefficiency and mismanagement. The same editorial immediately adds:

"In the meantime it is to be observed that here and there some people are hiding their poor work, their incapacity and lack of management, and at times even their crimes behind the pretext of war difficulties. The dining rooms are filthy. . . . What has the war to do with this? The streets are covered with snowdrifts. . . . What has the war to do with this? There is fuel in the warehouses but the regional soviet does not take the bother to deliver it to the dwellings—what has the war to do with this? There are not a few facts relating to the worsening of services supplied to the population not because, let us say, products are lacking, or fuel, or the means of city transportation but on the contrary because the local party and soviet organizations forget about their perpetual Bolshevik duty—to be concerned daily about the needs of the population."

Throughout the month of January, *Pravda* kept reminding these forgetful bureaucrats about their duty. They "forgot" to provide the population with food, fuel and transportation. They "forgot" to clean the snow from the streets. "For several days in Kazan the car-lines have not functioned (on account of snow-falls). These car-lines unite the center of the city with the periphery and hundreds of people have been coming daily late to work." (*Pravda*, January 5, 1942.) They "forgot" to keep the dining rooms clean. In some places they "forgot" even to provide spoons! "Many factory committees of the Ivanovsk *oblast* . . . interest themselves either little or hardly at all with the functioning of factory dining rooms. . . . In the factory Balashavo, the dining room functions unsatisfactorily . . . it has been without spoons for a long time." (*Pravda*, January 16, 1942.) They "forgot" about the public baths, the sole means whereby the workers can keep clean and avoid infection. "In Chelyabinsk the baths were not fixed up for the winter. It is necessary to stand in line for hours in order to get a bath." (*Pravda*, January 5, 1942.)

Pravda reports with alarm the attitude of the authorities in the Novosibirsk *oblast*:

"The most dangerous thing is that the agricultural organs of the *oblast* are little concerned about the fate of the next harvest." (*Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1942.)

It appears that some of these people are so absent-minded that they have simply forgotten that the war is on:

"And there are still among us," complains *Pravda*, "not a few backward enterprises; not a few leaders who have succumbed to the inertia of peace-times—leaders who are carefree and negligent. A firm working regime has still not been established in all the collective farms, machine and tractor stations and soviet farms." (Jan. 10, 1942.)

In the vital sphere of railroad transportation the situation is no less ominous. With characteristic understatement the

January 25 *Pravda* says that "It is impermissible to say that all the railroads are supplying industry as they should."

Speaking about industry in general, *Pravda* has this to say in a leading editorial on January 11:

"There are in the meantime still some administrative workers in industry who do not approach the fulfillment of military orders from the point of view of the state. . . . Administrative workers who supply a different product from the one now needed by the front are cheating the country."

It is clear that the war has not had the effect of bridging the abyss between the bureaucracy and the people. On the contrary, the bureaucracy is brought by the war into an increasingly sharper conflict with the army and the mass of the population. Admonitions or threats from above have little effect. Each local bureaucrat is law unto himself. He is immune from any pressure from below, because the mass is not permitted to criticize or intervene in any way. That is why individually and collectively, the bureaucrats "forget" and cheat and continue to commit all their abominations and crimes. It is hardly necessary to point out how this hits at the front and at the morale of the entire population.

The only remedy for the situation is to restore the democracy in all organizations which used to prevail in the USSR under Lenin and Trotsky. Only in this way could effective control be exercised over the direction of the industry, the army and the country. The restoration of workers' democracy in the Soviet Union is now a life and death issue for the embattled workers' state. But the bureaucracy, beginning with Stalin, resists all tendencies toward democratization.

Among the gravest crimes of the bureaucracy is its treatment of the evacuated millions. The world has been told a great deal about the alleged miracles performed in the evacuation of industries. It goes without saying that in this sphere the Soviet masses have been able to accomplish with nationalized property feats inconceivable under a régime of private property. But under the bureaucratic rule of Stalinism the cost and the waste have been frightful.

The plight of the evacuated millions had by January of this year become so desperate that *Pravda* was compelled to take official notice of it:

"In a number of eastern districts and *oblasts* of our country there has arrived a great number of people evacuated from the territories temporarily occupied by the enemy, and also from the zones closest to the front. The party and the government are extending great assistance to the evacuated population. But not all of the city and regional executive committees of the local soviets have done everything that is necessary and possible in the way of providing the arrivals with working conditions, in

the way of securing them with shelter, fuel, medical aid and food. It is possible and necessary to build quickly dwellings of a temporary type for the workers of the evacuated enterprises, but in a number of regions this construction is being done, slowly, badly." (*Pravda*, Jan. 5, 1942.)

Here is an official admission that "in a number of regions" where the evacuated population came for refuge it has had to live without adequate food, fuel and medical supplies. They lacked even temporary shelter. And this in the midst of winter! How could they have operated the evacuated factories under these conditions? How did they survive the winter?

On January 15, *Pravda* carried a special section headed: "It Is Necessary to Take Concern About the Needs of the Evacuated Population." Cited under this title are "facts of bureaucratism and unconcern towards people."

"In certain localities," admits *Pravda*, "there has been evinced a spirit of formalism and at times even a heartless attitude toward the evacuated population."

A group of workers evacuated to the Murashinsk region, Kirov *oblast*, writes:

"The evacuated comrades are working in a furniture factory. Nobody bothers here about the living needs of people. There is no dining room in the factory. Some of the comrades have not been supplied with living quarters. Just what are the trade union organizations busy doing in this factory?" (*Pravda*, Jan. 15, 1942.)

Another letter in the same issue reports:

"Not all of the local organizations show the necessary attention to the evacuated population. Some of them limit themselves to taking care only of the native population, and behave towards the new arrivals as if they were aliens. Such manifestations are absolutely intolerable. The party organizations must eliminate the inadequacies existing in this connection and do everything that is necessary as quickly as possible." (*Idem.*)

Even bureaucrats and their families upon being evacuated suffer such treatment. That is one of the reasons why *Pravda* was forced to make a public issue of the situation.

It is impossible to reconcile the contradiction between the immune, arbitrary, greedy and self-seeking bureaucracy and the needs of the country in war time. The two clash in every sphere of activity. The graver the military situation becomes, all the sharper grows the conflict.

The war has incontestably demonstrated that the Stalinist bureaucracy is the greatest internal obstacle, both in its war policies and its conduct at home, to the victorious defense of the USSR.

China in the War

By FELIX MORROW

China's war of national liberation against Japanese imperialism entered its sixth year on July 7. The "China Incident" Japan's militarists contemptuously called it when at last, under the pressure of the masses and faced by the prospect of complete subjugation, the Chiang Kai-shek government embarked on resistance. But, despite its vast superiority in equipment, despite its capture of the principal cities and practically the entire seacoast, Japan has been unable to terminate the incident. Japan's perspective of a short war in China was based on an accurate enough analysis of the weak-

nesses of the reactionary Chiang Kai-shek régime and its isolation from the Chinese masses. The error in the Japanese analysis, which may yet prove the undoing of the Japanese Empire, was its failure to realize that China's masses would fight on despite their lack of confidence in Chiang Kai-shek and despite Chiang's conservative and timid conduct of the war.

If they hoped that their exhausting war would be eased after December 7, when Japan clashed with its Anglo-American imperialist rivals, the Chinese people were soon dis-

illusioned. The white man's prestige was quickly destroyed in all Asia, as he was driven out of Hongkong, Malaya, Singapore and the Indies. Disappointed and bitter indictments of British and American strategy were voiced by Chiang Kai-shek's press—the bitterness exacerbated undoubtedly by the thought: And these people treat us as inferiors! Typical of Chungking's comments was this in Chiang's daily, *Ta Kung Pao* on January 13: "There are two vital Allied mistakes. First, failure to carry out a true scorched-earth policy, and second, failure to accomplish mobilization of native populations, resulting in most effective fifth-column activity." Chungking called these mistakes; but no doubt understood very well that imperialist greed made impossible both a scorched-earth policy and winning native support. Far from easing China's burden, the entry of its Anglo-American allies into war with Japan brought China its worst disaster in five years, when the Burma Road fell to Japan. As the sixth year of the war began, all China knew that China's salvation depended primarily on itself.

On top of the military disasters of the Anglo-American forces came Britain's refusal to make any concessions to India, toward which China was frenziedly building the Indo-China Road to replace the lifeline lost in Burma. Despite the collapse of the white man's prestige, despite the consequent new note of national self-confidence to be heard in India and throughout Asia, Britain would not surrender an iota of its control of India. The widespread sympathy of the Indian people for China was thus deprived of the means to come to China's aid. This latest lesson as to the real attitude of British and American imperialism toward the peoples of Asia has scarcely been lost on the Chinese people. Sharing the new national self-confidence of India, China's masses now know more than ever that only they can win freedom for China.

The Program of the Fourth International

As its struggle for national independence continues under the new conditions, China's war justly continues to receive the wholehearted support of the Fourth Internationalists of China—who met and confirmed this policy once again last fall when the outbreak of war between Japan and the Anglo-American imperialists was clearly imminent—and of the Fourth International throughout the world. This continued support of China is not a position hastily formulated after the events, but was prepared for in advance. Our attitude toward the various countries involved in the present war was formulated most authoritatively in September 1938 at the Founding Conference of the Fourth International. The program there adopted, entitled "The Death Agony of Capitalism and the Tasks of the Fourth International," formulates this attitude in the following words:

"The imperialist bourgeoisie dominates the world. In its basic character the approaching war will therefore be an imperialist war. The fundamental content of the politics of the international proletariat will consequently be a struggle against imperialism and its war. . . .

"But not all countries of the world are imperialist countries. On the contrary, the majority are victims of imperialism. *Some of the colonial or semi-colonial countries will undoubtedly attempt to utilize the war in order to cast off the yoke of slavery. Their war will be not imperialist but liberating.* It will be the duty of the international proletariat to aid the oppressed countries in war against oppressors. The same duty applies in regard to aiding the USSR, or whatever other workers' government might arise before the war or during the war. The defeat of

every imperialist government in the struggle with the workers' state or with a colonial country is the lesser evil.

"The workers of imperialist countries, however, cannot help an anti-imperialist country through their own government, no matter what might be the diplomatic and military relations between the two countries at a given moment. If the governments find themselves in temporary, and by very essence of the matter, unreliable alliance, then the proletariat of the imperialist country continues to remain in class opposition to its own government and supports the non-imperialist 'ally' through its own methods. . . .

"In supporting the colonial country or the USSR in a war, the proletariat does not in the slightest degree solidarize either with the bourgeois government of the colonial country or with the Thermidorian bureaucracy of the USSR. On the contrary it maintains full political independence from the one as from the other. Giving aid in a just and progressive war, the revolutionary proletariat wins the sympathy of the workers in the colonies and in the USSR, strengthens there the authority and influence of the Fourth International, and increases its ability to help overthrow the bourgeois government in the colonial country, the reactionary bureaucracy of the USSR. (*Founding Conference of the Fourth International, Program and Resolutions, 1939, pp. 34-35. Our italics.*)

When the war broke out and unfolded, this unambiguous political conception motivated our opposition to all the imperialist powers and our support of the USSR and China in the sense indicated in the program. This is the course that all sections of the Fourth International without exception have followed.

Shachtman's New Theory

Among those who voted for this policy in 1938 at the Founding Conference was Max Shachtman who, indeed, wrote an introduction to the program in which he—true to form—called for "sticking doggedly to the principles" of this program. A year later the same Shachtman—again true to form—abandoned the defense of the USSR and split from the Fourth International on this question. Now—still true to form—the dogged fighter abandons the defense of China against Japan. Naturally, he pretends that our defense of China is a new policy unwarranted by the doctrines of the Fourth International. It will not be difficult to refute this impudent subterfuge.

The Founding Conference program, quoted above, clearly says: "Some of the colonial or semi-colonial countries will undoubtedly attempt to utilize the war in order to cast off the yoke of slavery. Their war will be not imperialist but liberating." Semi-colonial China was engaged in attempting to cast off the yoke of slavery of Japan at the time the imperialist war was extended into the Pacific. Since then China has attempted to utilize the war—i.e., the conflict among the imperialists—to cast off the yoke of slavery, accepting aid from and entering into an alliance with Japan's imperialist rivals—an alliance which the program termed "temporary and, by very essence of the matter, unreliable." The program declared that we would support a semi-colonial country like China in spite of such an alliance, and that our aid in such a just and progressive war would increase the ability of the Fourth Internationalists of China to help overthrow the reactionary régime of Chiang Kai-shek. All this Shachtman agreed with in 1938 and signed his name to it. But his signature was not worth much.

Shachtman does not present any facts to justify his change of position. All that he does is put a minus now where

in 1938 he accepted the plus of Trotsky and the Fourth International. The program of the Founding Conference—with Shachtman's vote—said that it was correct to support a colonial or semi-colonial country which would "utilize the war" in its struggle against its principal imperialist oppressor (China against Japan, India against Britain), *despite* the fact that the leadership was in the hands of the colonial bourgeoisie, and *despite* its alliance with imperialist powers. Shachtman now blithely renounces all that. Now he says:

"Is there then no future for China's struggle against imperialism? Is the struggle for freedom of the colonial countries and peoples in general a hopeless one, at least while the World War is on?"

"Yes, the struggle of the colonies for freedom is utterly hopeless during the present World War *if they continue the course of serving one imperialist camp against the other*. That is today the course of the bourgeoisie in every colonial and semi-colonial country. . . .

"The Second World War, imperialist to the marrow, is total and all-dominating. In its first stage, at least, it was inevitable that it draw into the grip of its iron ring . . . all the isolated national wars and struggles for national freedom. . . .

"Yes, the struggle for national emancipation of the colonies has been deserted—by the Chiangs and the Nehrus and the Boses and the Wangs, by the people who led and directed it and then, at the showdown, brought it into the imperialist war camp. . . .

". . . only the leadership of the proletariat can re-launch the just wars of the colonies against imperialism." (*New International*, July 1942, pp. 171-2. Shachtman's italics.)

Thus Shachtman says that a progressive struggle of a colonial or semi-colonial country led by its bourgeoisie is impossible during an imperialist war. During the war Shachtman will support only that colonial country in which the leadership of the proletariat has been established—of course a proletariat already under revolutionary and not reformist leadership. This revelation has nothing in common with Lenin and Trotsky's reiterated and reiterated position that revolutionists should support a colonial struggle against imperialism even if the colonial bourgeoisie leads it.

The False Analogy with China in 1914

Let us attempt to come to grips with Shachtman's theory, such as it is. He learned from Trotsky that the second World War is a continuation of the first on the part of all the imperialist powers. Shachtman's grasp of the Marxist concept of imperialism as a stage of capitalism is extremely tenuous, as he showed when he suddenly announced that the Soviet Union is "imperialist." Shachtman perverts Trotsky's conception to mean that the second World War is a continuation of the first on the part of *all* the countries participating in it. After that he needs only to repeat: "as in 1914." So, in the case of China, Shachtman writes:

"In the concrete situation, today as in 1914, the immediate rulers of China, Chiang and his national bourgeoisie, *prevent* the masses from fighting the main enemy, imperialism. Chiang makes the Chinese masses fight one imperialist power in behalf of another imperialist power—which is an altogether different thing from fighting *imperialism*. (*New International*, June 1942.)

What in "the concrete situation" today in China is identical with the situation in 1914? Shachtman does not tell us and cannot tell us. For there is no analogy between China's rôle in the two wars, as we shall easily establish by the facts.

In 1917 a dismembered China which was not resisting *any* imperialist power entered the war on the side of her principal

oppressors who then constituted a form of international trust dominating China—Britain, the United States, France, Japan—and proclaimed a formal state of war against Germany, a power then without holdings in China and without any forces in the Pacific. In December 1941 a semi-unified China which had conducted a war of national liberation for four and a half years against its principal oppressor, Japan, continued this war when the conflict among the imperialist powers extended to the Pacific, and accepted supplies from and an alliance with Japan's imperialist rivals. Where Shachtman invents an analogy between 1917 and 1941, there is actually a decisive contrast.

The difference between China's rôle in the two wars is worth describing at length, quite apart from refuting Shachtman's preposterous analogy. For the contrast illumines the significance for today of our 1938 programmatic statement that "Some of the colonial or semi-colonial countries will undoubtedly attempt to utilize the war in order to cast off the yoke of slavery." To utilize the war is only possible where there is war. But in 1914-18 the war—except for the very secondary fighting in Palestine and Mesopotamia it was fought on European battlefields—*did not extend into the Pacific*. China and India are today for their own ends able to utilize the war—i.e., the contradictions among the imperialist powers at the stage of armed conflict—precisely because *this* time the Pacific has become one of the chief areas of conflict. Yet, in Shachtman's world of shadows, China's and India's struggles are transformed into mere appendages of imperialism by just this extension of the war into the Pacific! China's and India's opportunity to win freedom while the imperialists are fighting among themselves becomes for Shachtman their chain of slavery!

In 1914-18 all the Pacific powers and oppressors of China were ranged on one side in the imperialist conflict. Hence the colonial and semi-colonial peoples of Asia and Africa had little or no opportunity to take advantage of the imperialist conflict to free themselves. The power of the Allied imperialists remained unshattered in the Far East, in no way challenged there by Germany and her allies. Britain therefore remained undisputed master in India. China likewise experienced no lightening of the pressure of her imperialist masters. Peace in the Pacific meant a continuation of the "normal" oppression of Asia and Africa.

In 1917 China was compelled, under pressure of the Allies, to break off diplomatic relations and then declare war against Germany. The war was far away and the Chinese people were indifferent to it; so far as they had opinions about it they were for Germany for, as the great power with the smallest holdings in China, Germany had appeared to the Chinese people as the more friendly power. Germany's holdings—treaty ports in Shantung province—had been seized by Japan in 1914 without consulting China. China's participation in the war consisted primarily of "permitting" the hiring of about 200,000 coolie laborers who were sent to France. Despite pressure and threats from its "allies," China was extremely reluctant to close German banks and sequester German ships in China, for German business offered China more favorable terms than the other powers. It was not until March 1919—nearly five months after the end of the war—that China finally deported all Germans—obviously a step not dictated by war necessities but solely designed to provide Britain, Japan, France and the United States with the business formerly conducted by Germans.

When the United States "invited" China to join it in

breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany, Sun Yat-sen telegraphed to Lloyd George on March 10, 1917, protesting against the Allied move to drag China into a war which did not concern her. Sun's action was extremely popular in China. The first president of the Republic of China, set up in 1911 when the Manchu dynasty was overthrown, Sun had been replaced by the northern militarist Yuan Shih-kai in 1912, but had a majority in the impotent Parliament. Yuan convened the Parliament on May 10, 1917, and tried to force it to vote for war, but it refused. Only by dispersing the Parliament and putting an end to the pretense of representative government, setting up a pro-Japan government in the capital at Peking, was China declared in the war on August 4, 1917. Sun Yat-sen and the nationalist Kuomintang refused to go along, and with the help of the southern war-lords set up their own government in the south, in Canton in Kwangtung province. The China which formally participated in the war thus merely consisted of the northern war-lords. The break with the south over the war question served to clarify the fact that the revolution of 1911, in toppling the dynasty, had not created a united China; on the contrary, the provincial militarists now ruled, more openly than ever, as the agents of the imperialist powers. The principal spheres of influence were: Yunnan and southern Kwangsi—France; the great river valleys economically controlled by Hong Kong and Shanghai—Britain; Manchuria and the north—Japan; with the United States pushing its way in everywhere.

With no hostilities in the Pacific, far from finding the war period an opportunity to push back imperialist pressure, China found it a period of further imperialist inroads, especially by Japan, which had the backing of a secret agreement with Britain. Japan served its 21 Demands on China and followed it up with an ultimatum; on May 25, 1915, helpless China was forced to sign an agreement granting many of the demands. The pleas of a Chinese delegation for a reversal of this situation got short shrift at the Peace Conference at Versailles. The Allies decided in favor of Japan and the rest of themselves, and the Chinese delegation refused to sign the Versailles Treaty.

Under the conditions of the first World War, then, the idea of armed resistance to any of the imperialist powers was beyond the thought of China's leaders. When Sun Yat-sen became president, his attitude was one of cringing servility to the great powers, promising them that their perquisites and privileges would remain intact. Even after the disappointment at Versailles, Sun saw hope for China only in some form of benevolent cooperation among the powers, for which he pleaded in his book, *The International Development of China* (1922).

Such, in brief, is the picture of China in the first World War. Let Shachtman try to draw an analogy between it and the present—not one of his empty generalities, but a concrete analogy. Let him show the identity between Germany of 1914 and Japan of 1941 in relation to China!

Basing himself on the writings of Trotsky and our Chinese comrades, Shachtman proves irrefutably that Chiang Kai-shek's régime is reactionary; that it has led the fight against Japan largely under the pressure of the masses, etc., etc. All this, however, was also true before Pearl Harbor, yet then Shachtman conceded that China's struggle was progressive despite the Chiang Kai-shek régime. He is under the obligation, therefore, to prove that the character of the war now being conducted by the régime is decisively different than it was before Pearl Harbor.

For the most part Shachtman does not venture beyond empty generalities about China's "complete capitulation to Anglo-American imperialism"—which is precisely what is incumbent upon him to prove. One proof he does venture to give that China is now being "directed by" the imperialist powers: "The Chinese Army is . . . already fighting on Burmese soil to maintain the imperialist rule of the British bourgeoisie. . . ." (*Labor Action*, March 6, 1942.) Very well, then, let us examine the events in Burma.

The Test of the Events in Burma

If it is correct to defend China at all, then there is no reason why the Chinese army should not have defended the Burma Road, including the section of it in Burma and the port of entry for Chinese supplies, Rangoon. No doubt British imperialist interests would have been aided as against the Axis powers by China's successful defense of the Burma Road, but the same thing might be said about every Japanese or German soldier killed by China or the Soviet Union. The irrefutable fact is that the maintenance of the Burma Road, including its outlet in Burma, was vital both for supplies and for the defense of China in general, as has been proven since by the deadly inroads Japan has made precisely through this backdoor into China. Shall China, a non-imperialist country, leave undefended a vital area extending beyond its borders, simply because some imperialist rival of Japan would also benefit by its defense? This is the logic of the madhouse of petty-bourgeois radicalism. It has nothing in common with the real interests of non-imperialist China.

The Chinese army's crossing the frontier into Burma is the sole evidence offered by Shachtman in accusing it of serving British imperialism there. Shachtman has always had a queasy attitude toward frontiers. He once conducted a bitter fight against comrade Cannon because Cannon had declared, when Hitler became Chancellor, that the Red Army should be mobilized. The idea of a degenerated workers' state violating the German frontier horrified Shachtman; in the same spirit he now condemns the Chinese army for crossing the border into Burma. A war of national defense, according to Shachtman's logic, can be fought only by sticking within one's own frontiers; to sally out beyond them changes the character of the war. Of a Shachtman of his time who in a war of national defense disapproved an offensive into enemy territory Marx wrote that he "confuses a defensive war with defensive military operations. So if a fellow falls upon me in the street I may only parry his blow but not knock him down, because then I should turn into an aggressor! The want of dialectic comes out in every word these people utter. . . ."

So much we could say before the events in Burma. Now we must add the facts as to the actual relations between the Chinese and the British. General Alexander, the British commander, appears to have been abysmally ignorant of the fact, so well known to Shachtman, that the Chinese wanted to enter Burma merely to serve British imperialism. On the contrary, Alexander refused to let Chinese troops into Burma except in token numbers. Not until after the fall of Rangoon did he finally agree to a "closer military understanding" reported in an AP dispatch from Chungking, April 24, which added that "there now is no limit to the number of Chinese troops which may be sent into Burma." This dispatch, declared the April 25 New York *Herald Tribune* editorially, "confirms the suspicion that China has not been able or permitted to throw her full strength into the struggle for Burma." But that "closer

military understanding" was not observed by the British, we now learn from a letter (*New York Times*, July 19, 1942) of Lin Yutang who speaks unofficially for the Chinese government. "China wanted to defend Burma at all costs, but was not permitted to do so," he writes. He gives the astonishing information that "the Chinese mechanized units"—apparently all that China had—were waiting at Kunming during the Burma campaign while the Chinese vainly sought British agreement to let them into Burma. In the end, the British authorities refused to agree to provide the mechanized units with oil to operate with in Burma.

Why did not the British permit Chiang to send as many Chinese troops as he could into Burma? The British sent as many *Indian* troops as they could transport—why not Chinese? For a simple reason: the Indians came as vassals of British imperialism, the Chinese would come as representatives of Free China. Every Chinese soldier would be proof to the Burmese that there *are* peoples of Asia who are freeing themselves. A victory for Chinese troops in Burma would have been understood everywhere as a victory for the colonial peoples and not for British imperialism. That is why, for example, the anti-British masses of India are wholeheartedly pro-Chinese. And that is also why the British preferred to lose Burma to Japan, with the hope of winning it back later, than to let China hold Burma against Japan. The line of demarcation is so clear that the backward peasant in India understands it as well as does General Alexander from the opposite side of the class line. But Shachtman does not understand the class line, as he already showed by his position on the Soviet-Finnish war.

The events in Burma demonstrate that China, far from "complete capitulation to Anglo-American imperialism," is feared and thwarted by its imperialist "ally." The events bear out the Fourth International's estimation of such an alliance between non-imperialist and imperialist countries as "temporary and, by very essence of the matter, unreliable."

Apart from his unhappy reference to the Burma events, Shachtman offers no proofs of his position. For the rest he offers such resounding generalities as this: "When the World Imperialist War broke over its head, the Chinese bourgeoisie did not waver for a moment. It took out a commission in the camp of imperialism and brought its 'national struggle' along with it as useful camouflage." These generalities are safer for Shachtman than his reference to Burma only in the sense that they are irrefutable because they are empty of content. No one could reasonably ask Shachtman for a copy of the commission which China took out in the camp of imperialism.

It is a literary metaphor which is enough for him and which, Shachtman hopes, he might some day exchange for facts.

We work to prevent such facts from coming into being. Our comrades in China, fighting in the front ranks in the armed forces and seeking to arouse the workers and peasants to the greatest possible effort for the defense of China, are striving to make impossible what Shachtman insists has already happened. If China can maintain its own front against Japan then there is the possibility of a *Chinese* victory over the oppressor. But if China's war effort collapses, or is so weakened that in the end the land front in China is dominated by Anglo-American troops, then victory over Japan would not be a victory for China. It would be a victory for those who would simply replace Japan as the imperialist oppressor of China. The Chinese Trotskyists, and the entire Fourth International with them, struggle against such an outcome. Shachtman, as in the case of the Soviet Union, abandons the struggle, proclaiming it already lost.

Perhaps the most important factor weighing in China's favor today is the Indian revolution, now in its opening stages. Were India soon to free itself from imperialist domination, the weight of its 400 millions would be added to and would galvanize the 450 millions of China—together they constitute nearly half the human race!—against imperialist domination by either warring camp. It is obviously the duty of every revolutionist to support India's fight for freedom. We must support it even if the Indian bourgeoisie leads the struggle at present, and no matter what imperialist powers find it expedient to aid India. By all means it is correct for India to utilize the war to throw off the yoke of Britain. But in the Indian struggle, as in China, we are separated from Shachtman by an unbridgeable gulf. We support the struggle; he brands it as "serving one imperialist camp against the other." That is today the course of the bourgeoisie in every colonial and semi-colonial country." (*New International*, June 1942, p. 171.)

Thanks to the existence of the first workers' state and China's armed resistance to imperialist domination, we have new immediate tasks and possibilities in this war which the revolutionists did not have in the first World War. We look forward to the task of defending the Indian revolution. These three gigantic tasks—the defense of the Soviet Union, of China against Japan, and of India against Britain—have no place in the wretched literary scheme of Shachtman and his kind. Their veto will nevertheless not interfere with the revolutionary struggle of the Fourth International to carry out these world historical tasks.

Patents and U. S. Monopolies

By C. CHARLES

The public exposures of the Nazi-U. S. patent pools have for the first time focussed widespread attention on the present rôle of patents. Since the lid first blew off in March, in connection with the Standard Oil-I. G. Farbenindustrie patent exchange agreements, the public has had the opportunity to learn a good deal about the ways in which the American monopolies use patents to restrict production.

It is well to emphasize at the outset that patents are only a subsidiary means of achieving the formation of monopolies

and cartels. The most important and basic force making irresistibly for monopolies and cartels is the "normal" functioning of the capitalist system with its constant accumulation and centralization of capital. Theoretically, anyone is free to manufacture aluminum for the basic aluminum patents have expired; yet it would be folly for any small capitalists to hope to enter the industry for Alcoa could easily crush any competition. Patents play no part, or very little in steel, ship-building or locomotive building, yet the capital needed to enter

these fields is so large that it remains limited to gigantic concerns. The patents on artificial rubber held by the Standard Oil Company are not operative for the "duration," yet the initial investment to manufacture artificial rubber is so huge that this industry from its birth will be part of the domain of large-scale monopoly capital.

Still, patents are an important subsidiary method of hastening the process of monopolization. Lenin names three subsidiary sources of monopoly: control of raw material, the banks and colonial policy. To these today must be added the control of patents by the monopolists, above all in America and in Germany.

The competitive period of capitalism is today half a century irrevocably behind us. In the process of competition, capitalism destroys competition. Competition is turned into its opposite: monopoly. A point is reached in each industry where only one firm remains: an absolute monopoly; or so few remain that they are able to form a cartel: for long periods of time to come to an agreement to cease their competition, fix prices, limit production, allocate exclusive regional and international markets, and keep out any newcomers who would enter the business. Decadent capitalism no longer faces an expanding market, but one that is limited. This market must be divided, either by agreement, such as in a cartel, or by economic or military force when one group of capitalists no longer is satisfied with the existing division of the market. The methods are used alternately.

The Role of Patents Under Monopoly

The rôle of patents has undergone a radical transformation. In form the patent system is much the same as it was during competitive capitalism when its purpose was to encourage invention and thereby aid young capitalism win the world market with cheap goods. Each stage of capitalism has placed a different content into the patent form. The main function of patents today is to bolster the monopolies of the large corporations.

The patent is a legal monopoly and as such is an admirable instrument for the purposes of modern capitalist monopoly. Powerful concentrations of capital and monopolies of today, such as the Aluminum Company of America, the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, General Electric, Westinghouse, Western Union, the United Shoe Machinery Manufacturing Company and International Harvester, had their start in patent control and today rest strongly on patent control.

Patents are weapons of defense and offense in the hands of monopolies. They use patents to strike down would-be competitors. The life of a patent grant is 17 years; upon expiration anyone can use the process. Therefore every concern which is founded on patents is interested in securing a supply of supplementary patents to extend the life of the monopoly. Even though the basic patent would be available for general use, the improved version in the hands of the original patentee enables it to maintain its dominant position.

Monopolies are constantly invading other industries, particularly related industries. The automobile industry dominates the aircraft industry; General Motors manufactures electric refrigerators, oil burners and air cooling devices; the telegraph industry attempted to subjugate the young telephone industry; the American Telephone and Telegraph Company attempted to secure hegemony over the radio industry and sound motion pic-

tures*; General Electric is interested in machine tools; Standard Oil in chemicals that can be derived from petroleum.

For all these reasons the monopolies must make sure that all possible patents are kept in their hands—not necessarily for use, but as we shall see, also to keep competitors out.

To attain these ends the monopolies set up huge industrial research laboratories. Only incidentally are these laboratories centers of science and technology. Above all they are patent factories; they produce the raw material of monopoly.

About 1905 the large industrialists began to understand the monopoly uses of industrial research laboratories. Previously the great majority of the large capitalists were content to let the government bureaus and universities handle this work. But the products of government and university research laboratories are not patented. The monopolies therefore—especially when they realized that this provided a new means of evading the Sherman anti-trust law—began developing their own laboratories.

The Industrial Research Laboratory

In 1921 there were 500 industrial research laboratories spending \$25,000,000 annually and employing 6,600 persons. In that year only about three per cent of the patents issued went to large corporations. In 1938 there were 1,700 industrial research laboratories, with 32,000 workers, spending \$200,000,000 a year. In that year the percentage of patents issued to large corporations increased to 17 per cent, while those issued to individuals dropped from 72 per cent in 1921 to 43 per cent in 1938.

Eighty-five industries maintain research facilities through trade associations. The product of these industrial research laboratories are available to all members of the association.

There are 170,000 manufacturing plants in the country. About one per cent of these have laboratories. Those that have laboratory facilities are of course the largest concerns.

Among the largest, if not the largest, industrial research enterprise is the Bell Laboratories, which is a unit of the A. T. & T. It employs over 4,600 workers. General Electric, Westinghouse, duPont, General Motors, Chrysler, RCA, International Harvester, Standard Oil, Union Carbide and other concerns have comparable institutions.

In these patent factories, the inventor is no longer the individualist artisan of the period of competitive capitalism, but a proletarian. The product of his toil belongs not to him but to the capitalist. The equipment used in the manufacture of patents are huge aggregations of expensive scientific equip-

*The A. T. & T.'s Bell Laboratories' research work in radio produced patents which led to a clash and stalemate between A. T. & T. and the RCA, then a subsidiary of the General Electric Company. The prize was control of the rising radio industry. Subsequently the two made a series of patent pooling agreements whereby each granted the other an exclusive territory within which to exploit the patents owned by both.

RCA received exclusive rights to wireless telegraphy, broadcasting, photo, facsimile reproduction and television while A. T. & T. secured wire and wireless telephony, wire photo, facsimile and television service.

A. T. & T. research in sound recording and reproduction for motion pictures brought it again into conflict with the RCA. After a bitter struggle, the two contending forces saw the light and agreed to divide the industry between themselves, with A. T. & T. receiving the lion's share. A. T. & T. is today an important financial factor in the motion picture industry.

ment, without which the researcher would find it impossible to work.

At the same time the very nature of invention has been transformed. The work of invention has become cooperative in character. No longer does an inventor make a whole new product by himself—just as the shoe worker no longer produces the entire shoe. The labor of invention has been now subdivided into specialties. In the production of a patent, a number of specialists cooperate: the metallurgist solves his problem, the physicist his, the mechanical engineer his, the time and motion study man his, etc. The finishing touches are put on the work by the patent attorney and the end result of this cooperative labor is a patent, owned by the corporation.

Invention has lost its apparently accidental character and has become planned and predictable.* Startling inventions are no longer expected. The problems of invention are no longer the sweeping and basic ones of the past, which often founded entire industries. The aim of the research laboratory is the minute accretion of improvements over preceding processes. It is no longer the discovery of the steam engine, but the improvement of a screw in some hidden part of the machine.**

The entire new situation of the modern inventor and the new organization of invention was admirably summarized in the following dialogue at the Hearing of the TNEC on Patents:

Question: Are your research workers under obligation to give the company the patents which they may derive on the discoveries they make?

Mr. Baekland (Vice-President of the Bakelite Corporation): Oh, yes. We supply them with the equipment, we direct what work they are to do. . . . The great technical advances that we have witnessed have been the results of research work, either by individuals or by organized research in the laboratories of large companies. . . . New products, new useful things, new ways of doing things, can only come from carefully applied work done in research laboratories. . . .

Question: In other words, we couldn't make the advances which are being made without the extensive and expensive equipment which is supplied by these large laboratories?

Mr. Baekland: That is true.

Question: It is the collective and cooperative enterprise rather than the enterprise of individuals which is bringing the greatest returns to civilization?

Mr. Baekland: Very likely.

The remaining "independent" inventors have an independence far more apparent than real. The only market for the invention of the "independent" is the monopoly, the patent cartel or the large corporation. He cannot hope to go into business for himself as in the days of competitive capitalism. Since his invention is nearly always an improvement over some patented process, those who control the basic patents dominate the independent inventor.

For example, if the United Shoe Machinery Manufacturing Company, which has a complete monopoly of the field, does not take the independent's improvement in the method of manufacturing shoes, the inventor's market is exhausted.

The fact that the research laboratories have become the

most important sources of inventions and patents and that the independent inventor is forced to sell his patent to the corporations is reflected in the following figures on the concentration of patent ownership:

<i>Distribution of Ownership of Patents in Percentages As Issued</i>		
	1921	1938
Individuals	72	42.9
17,571 Small Corporations	23*	34.5
Foreign Corporations	2*	5.4
493 Large Corporations, Including Subsidiaries (\$50,000,000 or over)	3*	17.2

*Approximation, very close.

Source U. S. Patent Office.

In the above figures a number of facts must be noticed. "Small" corporations include any running up to capitalization of \$50,000,000; the firm capitalized at \$49,999,999 is a "small" concern! The patents belonging to "individuals" are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, on some unimportant trinket. The important patents generally belong to the corporations, above all the large corporations.

Each technical contribution, no matter how small, is awarded a monopoly by the patent office. To manufacture an item, for example, the vacuum tube, may often require a large number of these patents. As the ownership of the patents necessary in the production of the item may often be dispersed into many and not seldom opposed hands, the atomization of patents handicaps and sometimes paralyzes production. One of the methods of overcoming this barrier is the patent pool. This is a device for the exchange of patent rights among those participating. From the patent pool it is a short step to an agreement to "stabilize" the industry by establishing non-competitive monopoly prices, by keeping out interlopers through refusing them membership in the pool, by restricting production and dividing the market either on a technological or territorial basis, nationally and internationally. Or the companies coming together to set up a cartel may use a patent cross-licensing agreement or pool as a camouflage to avoid the anti-trust laws. Thus a cartel is brought into being.

A classic example of how the patent pool operates is offered by the glass container industry. This industry is dominated by the Hartford-Empire Company which owns all patents on glass container machinery. This concern does not manufacture machines but carries on research and experimentation. Its capital is represented mainly by its 700 patents. Its entire income is derived from license fees and royalties received for allowing manufacturers to use its patents. The Hartford-Empire uses its patents as a weapon to "organize" the industry by establishing non-competitive prices for glassware, keep out intruders and divide the market among its licensees. In the testimony before the TNEC a "policy" letter of the Hartford-Empire was introduced. It stated:

"Consequently, we adopted the policy . . . of restricted licenses; that is to say (a) we licensed the machines only to manufacturers of the better type, refusing any licensees who we thought would be price cutters; and (b) we restricted their field of manufacture in each case to certain specific articles with the idea of preventing too much competition. . . ."

GE, through the International General Electric Company, has entered, according to the U. S. Tariff Commission, into "numerous agreements with foreign companies which provide for the exchange of patent licenses and manufacturing information, and for the establishment of territorial limits to competition between the parties of the agreement."

By an international patent exchange agreement with the

***Mr. Oliphant:** Inventions can be nearly made to order. In terms of engineering ability?

Mr. Farley (Patent Counsel, Ford Motor Company): We feel so. (*Temporary National Economic Committee Hearings, Part 2, p. 280.*)

****Mr. Kettering** (Head of Research Division, General Motors, in answer to a question: . . . we don't work on inventions, we try to solve some industrial problem; try to make a new piece of apparatus. (*Ibid.* Part 2, p. 341.)

Krupp Company of Germany, General Electric obtained the right to the Krupp patents on tungsten-carbide, used in hardening machine tools. It secured the agreement of Krupp not to invade the American market and not to license any other company in the United States to use the German concern's patents. In return, the GE agreed to recognize Krupp's right to dominate the tungsten-carbide market abroad and use GE's patent. As a consequence of its monopoly the GE subsidiary, the Carboloy Company, was able to raise its price on tungsten-carbide from \$48 to \$453 a pound. The price was subsequently reduced to \$205. The Carboloy Company granted patent licenses to five small producers only on the condition that they would not undercut GE prices.

Do Monopolies Suppress Inventions?

The question has often been asked: Do monopolies suppress inventions? When this question is put to representatives of monopolies it evokes indignant denials. But the facts give the lie to the spokesmen of Big Business. It is true that certain inventions are used immediately after being discovered, but others are put into use only after a long intervening period, if at all.

The chronic conditions of the modern market is overproduction (apart from war time). This was evidenced by the 11-year depression. Why produce more with the market glutted; why introduce better machinery? The share of the market already allocated to each concern has been fixed by the cartel, where a monopoly does not exist. Secondly, large scale capital has money invested in its equipment and methods of production. This equipment might be made obsolete by new patents. For these reasons, there is plenty of cause for the capitalists to look with hostility at putting new inventions into use.

The attitude of monopoly capital to new inventions is suggested by the following testimony before the TNEC:

Mr. Cox: Is it your policy to take out patents to block the development of machines which might be constructed for the same purpose as your machines?

Mr. Smith (official in Hartford Empire): Only insofar as to protect our own machines. . . . If we think that a new idea might be developed over a course of the year by someone else, and we think the idea may affect our machinery and our licenses we may from time to time try to protect that idea. . . .

The Chairman: So in order to protect the inventions you now have it is naturally in your interest to secure whatever hold you can upon any competing idea or competing machinery?

Mr. Smith: Correct.

Mr. Cox: Not always with the view to using those ideas immediately, Mr. Smith?

Mr. Smith: Yes and no. Sometimes, yes, we use them; sometimes we don't.

The Federal Communications Commission Investigation of the Telephone Industry reported (1934):

"The Bell System has at all times suppressed competition in wire telephony or telegraphy through patents. . . . Moreover the Bell System has added to its telephone and telephonic appliance patents any patent that might be of value to its competitors. The policy resulted in the acquisition of a large number of patents covering alternative devices and methods for which the Bell System had no need."

Words have lost their meaning if this does not mean patent repression.

Through patent agreements with American and foreign corporations, GE has achieved a dominant position in the coun-

try over the fluorescent lighting industry. According to a suit brought against the GE by the anti-trust division of the Department of Justice, because fluorescent lighting uses less electrical energy as compared to incandescent lighting the General Electric "has suppressed the use of fluorescent lighting. This policy has been carried out for the purpose of aiding the principal utility companies."

Fluorescent lighting which gives a much better quality of illumination than the incandescent lamps used at present consumes about one-third of the quantity of electric power. What this would mean to the income of the power utilities is easily seen. General Electric has financial interests in various power concerns. There are interlocking directorates between General Electric on the one hand and the Consolidated Edison of New York, Edison Company of Illinois, Public Service Company of Northern Illinois, Southern California Edison and the Consolidated Gas and Electric Corporation on the other hand. To protect the income of the utility companies GE suppresses the use of fluorescent lighting and of course also suppresses the patents for fluorescent lighting.

Magnesium is much lighter, stronger and cheaper than aluminum, and for these reasons is looked upon by Alcoa as a dangerous competitor. The patents for the extraction of magnesium are held by the Dow Company. However, the patents for the alloys of magnesium with other metals is held by the Magnesium Development Company, a joint subsidiary of the IG Farbenindustrie and Alcoa. Unalloyed magnesium has but few uses; for wide use magnesium must be alloyed. According to the terms of the agreement between Alcoa and IG Farbenindustrie, the German concern recognizes Alcoa's right to control the American market not only for aluminum but also for magnesium, while the IGF receives from Alcoa similar rights to dominate the German markets.

Alcoa imposed a limit on the production of magnesium to 4,000 tons a year and used its power to keep the price 33 per cent higher than that of aluminum. Only the needs of the war has forced a certain expansion of the production of magnesium.

It is true that monopoly does not suppress or curtail the use of all inventions. Those labor-saving technical improvements that would lower wage-costs are welcomed by monopoly. GE hesitates to introduce on a large scale fluorescent lamps, but if a new lathe that cuts labor costs is offered, it will be grabbed at once.

The economic effects of patent monopolies and cartels can only be considered by looking at the effects of monopoly as a whole. Through the monopoly the capitalists are able not only to exploit the workers, but also to victimize the consuming public by monopoly prices. The highly competitive industries, such as farming, are made to pay tribute to monopoly capital. To secure their machinery, power and raw materials, they are forced to pay monopoly prices, but they sell their commodities for prices fixed by competition. Thus the position of the middle class is further weakened.

Capitalism, by developing the research laboratory has developed the form of the future technology. To attain the full and unrestricted use of the research laboratory and modern technology it is necessary first to remove the capitalist control over the laboratory. This can be achieved only by the abolition of the capitalist ownership of all the means of production and the establishment of socialism.

From the Arsenal of Marxism

The Second World War

By LEON TROTSKY

EDITOR'S NOTE: One of the last interviews on the war situation given by Trotsky was that to Julius Klyman, staff correspondent of the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* in January 1940 and again in March. The interview was published in three sections in the *Post-Dispatch* issues of March 10, 17 and 24 of the same year.

As usual, Trotsky did not content himself with informal verbal answers to the list of broad questions presented by Klyman. He dictated his answers to a secretary and carefully revised them. They are a remarkable example of the bold and yet unpretentious way in which Trotsky analyzed the course of events while they were still transpiring. We publish his answers in two parts, the second of which will appear in our next issue.

QUESTION: What is your opinion of the German-Russian alliance? Did Stalin have to make it? If so, what could he earlier have done to avoid it? Russia, in going into the Baltic states and Finland, contended it was compelled to do so to properly defend itself against aggression. Do you believe there was any likelihood of Nazi aggression? Do you believe there was any likelihood of an attack by the capitalist democracies?

ANSWER: Foreign policy is an extension and development of domestic policy. In order to understand correctly the Kremlin's foreign policy, it is always necessary to take into account two factors: on the one hand, the position of the USSR in capitalist encirclement and, on the other, the position of the ruling bureaucracy within the Soviet society. The bureaucracy defends the USSR. But above all it defends itself inside the USSR. The internal position of the bureaucracy is incomparably more vulnerable than the international position of the USSR. The bureaucracy is merciless against its disarmed adversaries inside the country. But it is extremely cautious and sometimes even cowardly before its well-armed external enemies. If the Kremlin enjoyed the support of the popular masses and had confidence in the solidity of the Red Army, it could assume a more independent position in relation to both imperialist camps. However, reality is different. The isolation of the totalitarian bureaucracy in its own country threw it into the arms of the nearest, the most aggressive and therefore the most dangerous imperialism.

Already in 1934 Hitler said to Rauschnig: "I can conclude an agreement with Soviet Russia whenever I wish." He had categorical assurances on this account from the Kremlin itself. The former chief of the foreign GPU agency, General Krivitsky, revealed extremely interesting details of the relations between Moscow and Berlin. But, for the sensitive reader of the Soviet press, the Kremlin's real plans have been no secret since 1933. Above all Stalin was afraid of a great war. In order to escape it, he became an irreplaceable aid to Hitler.

However it would be incorrect to conclude that the five-year campaign of Moscow in favor of a "united front of the democracies" and "collective security" (1935-39) was a

pure swindle as is represented now by the same Krivitsky who saw from the quarters of the GPU only one side of the Moscow policy, not perceiving it in its entirety. While Hitler spurned the extended hand, Stalin was compelled to prepare seriously the other alternative, that is, an alliance with the imperialist democracies. The Comintern naturally did not understand what was involved; it simply made "democratic" noises, carrying out the instructions.

On the other hand, Hitler could not turn his face toward Moscow while he needed the friendly neutrality of England. The specter of Bolshevism was necessary; above all, in order to prevent the British Conservatives from eyeing with suspicion the rearmament of Germany. Baldwin and Chamberlain went even further; they directly aided Hitler in forming Greater Germany as a powerful base in Central Europe for world-wide aggression.

Hitler's turn toward Moscow in the middle of the past year had a substantial basis. From Great Britain Hitler had received all that was possible. One could not expect Chamberlain to grant Hitler Egypt and India in addition to Czechoslovakia. Further expansion of German imperialism could be directed only against Great Britain itself. The Polish question became a turning point. Italy stepped cautiously aside. Count Ciano explained in December 1939 that the Italo-German military alliance, signed ten months before, excluded the entrance of the totalitarian allies into a war within the next three years. However, Germany, under the pressure of its own armaments, could not wait. Hitler assured his Anglo-Saxon cousin that the annexation of Poland was on the road to the east and only to the east. But his conservative adversaries grew tired of being duped. War became inevitable. Under these conditions Hitler had no choice: he played his last trump, an alliance with Moscow. Stalin finally attained the hand-shake of which he had dreamt unceasingly for six years.

Frequent assurances in the democratic press that Stalin deliberately sought to provoke a world war by his alliance with Hitler, are to be considered absurd. The Soviet bureaucracy fears a great war more than any ruling class in the world: it has little to win but everything to lose. Counting on the world revolution? But even if the thoroughly conservative oligarchy of the Kremlin were striving for the revolution, it knows very well that war does not begin with revolution, but ends with it, and that the Moscow bureaucracy itself will be thrown into an abyss before the revolution comes in the capitalist countries.

During the Moscow negotiations of the past year, the delegates of Great Britain and France played a rather pitiful rôle. "Do you see these gentlemen?" the German agents asked the rulers of the Kremlin. "If we divide Poland together, they will not so much as move their little finger." While signing the agreement Stalin, with his political limitations, could

expect that there would not be any great war. In any case, he bought himself the possibility of escaping for the next period the necessity of involvement in a war. And nobody knows what is beyond the "next period."

The invasions of Poland and of the Baltic countries were the inevitable result of the alliance with Germany. It would be rather childish to think that the collaboration of Stalin and Hitler is founded on mutual confidence; these gentlemen understand each other too well. During the Moscow negotiations last summer, the German danger could and had to appear not only very real but also quite immediate. Not without Ribbentrop's influence, as was said, the Kremlin supposed that England and France would not make a move against the accomplished fact of the subjugation of Poland and that consequently Hitler might gain a free hand for further expansion toward the east. Under these conditions the alliance with Germany was completed by material guarantees taken by Russia against its ally. Quite probably the initiative even in this sphere belonged to the dynamic partner, that is Hitler, who proposed to the cautious and temporizing Stalin that he take guarantees by force of arms.

Naturally, the occupation of eastern Poland and the formation of military bases in the Baltic did not create absolute obstacles for the German offensive: the experience of the last war (1914-18) testifies sufficiently to this. However, the moving of the border to the west and the control over the eastern Baltic coast represent indubitable strategic advantages. Thus in his alliance with Hitler and on Hitler's initiative, Stalin decided to take "guarantees" against Hitler.

Not less important were the considerations of internal policy. After five years of uninterrupted agitation against fascism, after the elimination of the old guard Bolsheviks and of the general staff for their alleged alliance with the Nazis, the unexpected alliance with Hitler was extremely unpopular in the country. It was necessary to justify it with immediate and brilliant successes. The annexation of western Ukraine and White Russia and the peaceful conquest of strategic positions in the Baltic states were designed to prove to the population the wisdom of the foreign policy of "the father of nations." Finland upset these plans a bit.

The Question of the Seized Territories

QUESTION: Do you, as the former head of the Red Armies, feel it was necessary for the Soviets to move into the Baltic states, Finland and Poland, to better defend themselves against aggression? Do you believe that a socialist state is justified in extending socialism to a neighbor state by force of arms? ANSWER: It cannot be doubted that control over the military bases on the Baltic coast represents strategical advantages. But this alone cannot determine the question of invasion of neighboring states. The defense of an isolated workers' state depends much more on the support of the laboring masses all over the world than on two or three supplementary strategical points. This is proven incontrovertibly by the history of foreign intervention in our civil war of 1918-20.

Robespierre said that people do not like missionaries with bayonets. Naturally that does not exclude the right and duty to give military aid from without to peoples rebelling against oppression. For example in 1919 when the Entente strangled the Hungarian revolution, we naturally had the right to help Hungary by military measures. This aid would have been understood and justified by the laboring masses of the world. Unfortunately we were too weak. . . . At present the Kremlin

is much stronger from a military point of view. However, it has lost the confidence of the masses both inside the country and abroad.

If there were soviet democracy in the USSR; if the technological progress were accompanied by the increase of socialist equality; if the bureaucracy were withering away, giving place to the self-government of the masses, Moscow would represent such a tremendous power of attraction, particularly for its nearest neighbors, that the present world catastrophe would inevitably throw the masses of Poland (not only Ukrainians and White Russians but also Poles and Jews) as well as the masses of the Baltic border states on to the road of union with the USSR.

At present this important pre-condition for revolutionary intervention exists, if at all, in a very small degree. The strangling of the peoples of the USSR, particularly of the national minorities, by police methods, repelled the majority of the toiling masses of the neighboring countries from Moscow. The invasion of the Red Army is seen by the populations not as an act of liberation but as an act of violence, and thereby facilitates the mobilization of world public opinion against the USSR by the imperialist powers. That is why it will bring in the last instance more harm than advantages to the USSR.

The Soviet-Finnish War

QUESTION: What is your opinion of the Finnish campaign from the military standpoint: as to strategy, equipment, leadership, both military and political, the matter of keeping up communications and the general training of the Red troops? What is likely to be the result of the Finnish campaign?

ANSWER: As far as I can judge, the strategical plan abstractly considered was sufficiently correct; but it underestimated Finland's power to resist and it ignored such details as the Finnish winter, conditions of transportation, supplies and sanitation. In his satirical verse on the Crimean campaign of 1855 the young officer, Leon Tolstoy, wrote:

"Easily written on paper,
But the gullies forgotten.
And we had to march in them."

Stalin's decapitated and demoralized general staff repeats textually the strategists of Nicholas I.

On November 15 I wrote to the editor of one of the most widely read American weeklies: "During the next period, Stalin will remain Hitler's satellite. During the coming winter he will in all probability make no moves. With Finland, he will conclude a compromise." Facts showed that my prognosis was incorrect on this final point. The error was provoked by the fact that I ascribed to the Kremlin more political and military sense than it demonstrated in reality. Finnish resistance, it is true, placed the prestige of the Kremlin at stake not only in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, but also in the Balkans and Japan. Having said A, Stalin was compelled to say B. But even from the point of view of his own ends and methods, he didn't have to attack Finland *immediately*. A more patient policy could never have compromised the Kremlin as much as have its shameful defeats in the course of 11 weeks.

Moscow discovers now that no one expected a rapid victory and makes references to the frost and blizzards. Astonishing argument! If Stalin and Voroshilov cannot read military maps, they can, one should expect, read the calendar; the Finnish climate could not have been a secret to them. Stalin is capable of utilizing energetically a situation that has

ripened without his active participation, when the advantages are without question and the risk at a minimum. He is a man of the apparatus. War and revolution are not his element. When foresight and initiative are necessary, Stalin knows only defeat. Such was the case in China, Germany and Spain. Such is the case in Finland.

Not the physical climate of Finland is decisive, but the political climate of the USSR. In the Russian Bulletin edited by me, I published in September 1938 an article in which I subjected to an analysis the causes of the weakening and direct decomposition of the Red Army. It clarifies sufficiently, according to my opinion, both the present failures of the Red Army and the growing difficulties in industry. All the contradictions and defects of the régime always find a concentrated expression in the army. The enmity between the laboring masses and the bureaucracy corrodes the army from within. Personal independence, free investigation and free criticism are no less necessary for the army than for the economy. Meanwhile the Red Army officers are put under the control of political police in the form of careerist commissars. Independent and talented commanders are being exterminated; the others are destined to constant fear. In such an artificial organism as the army where preciseness of rights and duties is inevitable, nobody in reality knows what is permissible and what is tabu. The thieves and chisellers operate behind a patriotic front of denunciations. Honest people become disheartened. Alcoholism spreads more and more widely. Chaos reigns in the military supplies.

Parades celebrated on Red Square are one thing, the war is quite another. The planned "military stroll" into Finland converted itself into a merciless accounting of all aspects of the totalitarian régime. It uncovered the bankruptcy of the leadership and the inadequacy of the high commanding staff appointed because of its servility rather than for its talent and knowledge. Besides the war uncovered an extreme lack of proportion in the different branches of Soviet economy, in particular the poor state of transportation and various kinds of military supplies, especially of provisions and clothing. The Kremlin constructed, not without success, tanks and planes but neglected sanitation, gloves and boots. The living man who stands behind all machines was completely forgotten by the bureaucracy.

The question of whether the defense of "one's own" from foreign invasion or an offensive against another country is involved, has an immense and in some cases decisive importance for the mood of the army and nation. For an offensive revolutionary war a genuine enthusiasm, extremely high confidence in the leadership and great skill in the soldier are necessary. Nothing of this was shown in the war Stalin undertook without technical and moral preparation.

The final result of the struggle is predetermined by the relation of forces. The half million of the Red Army will

strangle the Finnish army in the end if the Soviet-Finnish War does not resolve itself in the next few weeks into a general European war, or if Stalin does not find himself forced to compromise, i.e., to retreat through fear of British, French, Swedish intervention. Possibly the shift in the military situation will come about even before these lines appear in the press. In the first case the Kremlin, as has occurred already during the ephemeral successes in the beginning of December, will try to supplement the military aggression by a civil war inside Finland. In order to include Finland in the framework of the USSR—and such is now the obvious aim of the Kremlin—it is necessary to sovietize her, i.e., carry through an expropriation of the higher layer of landowners and capitalists. To accomplish such a revolution in the relations of property is impossible without a civil war. The Kremlin will do everything in order to attract to its side the Finnish industrial workers and the lower stratum of the farmers. Once the Moscow oligarchy finds itself compelled to play with the fire of war and revolution, it will try at least to warm its hands. It will undoubtedly achieve certain successes in this way.

But one thing can be said now with assurance: No subsequent successes can blot out from world consciousness what has happened so far. The Finnish adventure already has provoked a radical re-evaluation of the specific weight of the Red Army which had been extraordinarily idealized by some foreign journalists devoted—we suppose disinterestedly—to the Kremlin. All partisans of a crusade against the Soviets will find in the military failures of the Kremlin a serious argument. Undoubtedly the impertinence of Japan will increase and that may create difficulties along the road toward a Soviet-Japanese agreement which actually constitutes one of the main tasks of the Kremlin. Already one can assert that if exaggeration of the *offensive* capacities of the Red Army characterized the former period, now begins a period of underestimation of its *defensive* strength.

It is possible to foresee also other consequences of the Soviet-Finnish War. The monstrous centralization of the entire industry and commerce from top to bottom, such as the compulsory collectivization of agriculture, was determined not by the needs of socialism but by the greed of the bureaucracy to have everything without exception in its hands. This repugnant and by no means necessary violence against the economy and the man, that disclosed itself clearly enough in the Moscow "sabotage" trials, found its cruel punishment in the Finnish snow drifts. It is quite possible, consequently, that under the influence of military failures the bureaucracy will be compelled to make an economic retreat. It is possible to expect the reestablishment of a kind of NEP, that is, of the controlled market economy on the new, higher economic level. Whether the bureaucracy will succeed in saving itself by these measures is another matter.

INTERNATIONAL NOTES

Yugoslavia

Resistance to the German armies of occupation in Europe has unquestionably reached its highest form so far in Yugoslavia where it has become half-revolt, half-war. The government-in-exile claims to be leading it, but that is at least doubtful.

It is important to understand that Yugo-

slavia, established at Versailles in 1919, had to start building an army from scratch. Although Yugoslavia was nominally a federation of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the Serbian ruling class from the first ruthlessly oppressed the other nationalities. A predominantly agricultural land, impoverished by a series of wars, Serbia had no native aristocracy—as recently as 1865 the founder

of the present dynasty was a swineherd in the mountains of Montenegro. The upper classes centered mainly around the royal court and a few pioneer capitalists representing native and foreign interests. Under these conditions the officer caste for the new army had to be recruited chiefly among the peasants. Most of the officers remained keenly suspicious of the court camarilla. The officers corps was known to be deeply infected with radical ideas—the only one in Europe, perhaps in the entire world.

The present "army of Yugoslav patriots" is in reality composed of two main elements: (1) the Serbian nationalists led by the highly chauvinistic organization of Chetniks, waging a struggle for national liberation without any changes in the pre-war social structure and presumably as faithful as ever to the dynasty; (2) peasant groups, with a few representatives of the relatively small city proletariat, fighting not only against Nazism but also against their own exploiters.

This second grouping appears to be led chiefly by radical young intelligentsia, who emerged only recently and are still rooted in the people; the same young men and women who before the war made the Belgrade and Zagreb universities strongholds of Communism and who, very much like their Russian prototypes of pre-revolutionary days, have stood in the forefront of the fight against dictatorship and oppression ever since the founding of the country.

It is notable that Serbian resistance has already attracted active sympathy in other countries. The Hungarian government recently announced arrests of an important group in the Hungarian army that was transmitting war materials and information to the Serbian fighters. Anti-Nazi Germans are also reported fighting with the Serbians against the German and Italian armies; some units are commanded by veterans of the Spanish civil war.

The bourgeois press, which would like to portray the Yugoslav struggle as purely one in favor of the United Nations, nevertheless recently reported the establishment of a Soviet regime in the mountains of Montenegro under the leadership of the former professor of history at Belgrade University, the well-known progressive Dr. Slobodan Jovanovitch. Clashes between "Communists" and Chetniks have been admitted several times, followed by reports of truces.

This conflict seems to have grown recently. On July 18 a dispatch from Turkey announced that "General Mikhailovitch had launched a campaign against Communist partisan bands accused of marauding Serbian and Bosnian villages in the territory controlled by the loyal Yugoslav armies." Shortly after, the Communist partisan bands were called "bandits and looters"; this was followed by a rather cryptic dispatch that General Mikhailovitch had begun anti-Communist repressions "following assurances from Moscow that the partisans were operating independently and without the authorization of the Soviet." Had it been really a question of "bandits and looters" Mikhailovitch would scarcely have asked for authorization from Moscow to proceed against them.

The real class character of the conflicting forces is clear. The "Communist" partisan bands represent the poor elements of the villages, while the Chetniks are the elements in the villages approximating Kulaks. With the destruction of the Yugoslav state the

class struggle between the two develops, wherever the German oppression is even slightly lifted by Serbian resistance. As could be expected, Stalin allowed, if not suggested the repressions launched by Mikhailovitch against the poor peasant bands.

The Serbian movement shows us, though in limited scope, the revolutionary implications of the movement of resistance against the Nazis in the occupied countries. As a purely national struggle it has no independent value amid the battle of the imperialist giants. But it plays its part, in Lenin's words of 1916 about the national movements of that time, "as one of the ferments, one of the bacilli, which help the real power against imperialism to come to the scene, namely the socialist proletariat."

England

A comrade returning from England brings much interesting information about the leftward development of the workers and the consequent growth of the Trotskyist movement. One of the most significant facts he reports is the "loosening up" of the British army. Soldiers are participating in political life, both in the army and when on furlough, in a manner impossible two years ago.

The soldiers have begun to develop civil rights for themselves on a considerable scale. Political study groups and discussions in barracks and messrooms are quite common. Through the study classes quite a few soldiers have learned the revolutionary point of view and accepted it. Bundles of the *Socialist Appeal* are sent by mail regularly to soldiers. In certain situations comrades are publicly known as Trotskyists in their regiments. One case in particular of which the British comrades are very proud is that of a former scholar known in his regiment affectionately as the "Red Professor" and openly the revolutionary leader and idol of the regiment.

On furlough a number of soldiers enthusiastically participated in a Trotskyist May Day rally in Hyde Park. Soldiers as a matter of course buy socialist literature from sellers on the streets.

It must be understood that this situation in the British army is a reflection of the prevailing leftward turn of the great masses and would be impossible without it.

* * *

The following paragraphs are from a letter just received from a member of the Workers International League, a group adhering to the program of the Fourth International:

"Progress in all fields continues. The *Socialist Appeal* sales are being extended — mainly in the industrial field. The paper has had a wonderful reception from the miners—some of whom (all leading elements) we are bringing into our organization. Our position in some of the leading factories is very good."

India

A few scant words have arrived, but heartening in their implications. A comrade from another country arrived in one of the principal cities and made contact with the party of the Fourth International of India. Like the Lanka Sama Samaja of Ceylon (the Ceylonese Socialist Party, section of the Fourth International), the Indian party has been driven underground by the British imperialists. But it lives and functions as the moment arrives for its great historic task of providing the Indian independence movement with a revolutionary socialist program.

The latest resolution of the All-India Congress declares that "all power belongs to the workers and peasants." For Gandhi and Nehru this is no more than bait to keep the masses within the confines of bourgeois leadership. It is the task of the Trotskyists of India to turn those words into reality.

Poland

Amid the bestial repressions of the Nazi occupation, the Trotskyists of Poland are growing into a major force of the Polish and Jewish proletariat. That is the inspiring fact reported in a letter received by *The Militant* (published August 1) from a German underground worker who was recently in Poland.

He reports a conversation with two Polish socialists, who declared that it would not take long before the forces of the Polish Socialist Party would unite with the Trotskyists. "The Trotskyists," he said, "still believe that the former nationalist tendencies rule our party. But these tendencies died—along with the Polish Republic. We have broken completely with the old (nationalist) school of Daszynski."

The German underground worker adds:

"The Trotskyists wield a strong influence on the workers of Poland. And they too believe that the time is nigh when they will be united with the Polish socialists who support completely a Soviet republic in Poland."

He was told by the two Polish socialists:

"When the proper moment comes, we will have a government which will be elected by the Polish and Jewish proletariat. And this will be a Soviet government—without the errors made in Russia."

The letter also verifies the fact that the groups resisting the Nazis in Poland have no association whatsoever with the Polish government-in-exile in London, and likewise that the Polish socialists have no connection with the pro-British Polish "socialists" who in London assume to speak for the Polish proletariat.

When the writer returned to Germany and conveyed to the League of Revolutionary Socialists of Germany the greetings of the Polish comrades, a collection was sent to the Polish revolutionists.

