

Fourth International

China After the Second World War

By Li Fu-jen

TROTSKY'S BIOGRAPHY OF STALIN

By John G. Wright

Truman and Second Phase of the Strike Wave
Wall Street and the Philippines
Lessons of French Elections

July 1946

25 Cents

Manager's Column

As we go to press on June 15, the closing day of FOURTH INTERNATIONAL'S two-month campaign for 500 new subscribers, we are proud to report that we have gone over the quota with 551 subscriptions, 110 per cent of the quota! Here is the scoreboard as of June 15:

SCOREBOARD

City	Quota	Subs	Per cent
Milwaukee	5	12	240
St. Paul	10	17	170
Newark	20	24	140
Tacoma	5	7	140
Chicago	50	58	116
Buffalo-Lackawanna	20	23	115
San Francisco	25	28	112
Connecticut	10	11	110
Detroit	40	44	110
Philadelphia	20	22	110
Minneapolis	25	26	104
Akron	10	10	100
Boston	10	10	100
Flint	10	10	100
Pittsburgh	15	15	100
Reading	5	5	100
San Diego	5	5	100
Youngstown	20	20	100
New York	100	89	89
Baltimore	10	8	80
Los Angeles	60	44	73
Seattle	20	13	65
Bayonne	10	6	60
Cleveland	10	6	60
St. Louis	5	3	60
Toledo	10	5	50
Allentown-			
Bethlehem	5	0	0
Portland		3	
General		27	

TOTAL500 551 110

Even more significant than the successful conclusion to this campaign, is the enthusiasm expressed by many of the Campaign Directors to continue this work locally even though the national campaign is closed. Thus, Harold Josephs of Toledo writes: "It is our hope to continue to build the FI subscription lists, although the drive ends shortly. Those who have subscribed to the FI in the past have become quite attached to it."

L. Lynn of Minneapolis which has fulfilled its quota looks forward to the next FI campaign: "I sincerely hope that we go over the top nationally, and that we will have another campaign sometime in the near future. In the course of our FI work, we have discovered some good contacts. We're ahead now 26 new readers to the FI, and we are all for the proposition of putting the FI work on a campaign basis." And Jerry Kirk of Flint comments: "Al-

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CONTENTS

Review of the Month	
French Elections	195
Philippine Independence	197
Japan Today	198
Truman and the Strike Wave	200
China After World War II	By Li Fu-jen 202
British "Socialism" in Action	206
Myth of Full Employment Under Capitalism	
By Warren Creel	207
A Biography of Stalin	By John G. Wright 210
Perspectives of European Revolution	
It Is Time to Grow Up	By Felix Morrow 213
On Comrade Morrow's Reply	By Pablo 218
Condition in Egypt Today	By J. Damien 222

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though we have completed our quota, needless to say, we will continue to send in subscriptions and keep pressing for them."

Among the Campaign Directors who tied up the FI with THE MILITANT campaign which also concluded on June 15, Paul Chelstrom of St. Paul reported immediate success. "We sent out about a dozen letters last week to MILITANT subscribers who had renewed, asking them to subscribe to the FI. We also sent them sample copies of the magazine. One subscription came in right away as a result of these letters, and we will have more to report on this method of obtaining new FI subs-

later on, we are sure."

The spirit of socialist competition was not lacking in the FI campaign. A close race was conducted among Philadelphia, Youngstown and Newark, each with a quota of 20. Newark nosed the other two competitors out of the field with a high score of 24. Similarly, San Francisco outstripped Minneapolis, each of which had a quota of 25, with a total of 28. But Minneapolis generously congratulated its competitor: "We sure hate to admit defeat, but we can't let our pride color our estimation of the situation. . . . Win or lose, the campaign has been very successful."

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The response of young people who are for the first time becoming acquainted with this theoretical magazine of the American Trotskyists is noteworthy of attention. During the FI campaign, Carl Fredricka, organizer of the Los Angeles Socialist Youth Club wrote: "In the near future many more of our members will get subscriptions to the FI, as those who are now reading it find they like it very much."

* * *

One of the main purposes of the FI campaign was to bring this important magazine to the attention of new circles of readers, people who are today troubled and perplexed by the complex economic and social problems posed before them today. How thoroughly the FI answers their questions is expressed in a letter from Jarvis Dusenbery, Perry, New York, who wants all his friends to share his newfound treasure with him.

"Please send me ten copies of the May FI. I have many friends and I wish them to read the article by William Simmons, 'American Imperialism At Home and Abroad;' also 'Full Employment and the Fallacy of Keynes's Economics,' by Warren Creel." Commenting on the latter article, he writes: "Henry Wallace knows almost as much about economics as a cat knows about astronomy. Remember his 'Kill Little pigs and plow under cotton?' Yet some people fall for his bunk. It is too bad that taxpayers have to pay for such things."

Another new subscriber, Jim Seward of Saskatchewan, writes: "My only regret is that I can't find words to express my interest and appreciation not only of the FI but of THE MILITANT as well. You certainly deserve credit for being able to turn out so much valuable information to the working class of the world. The truth was never more needed than it is at the present time, when so much deceit and falsifying is being broadcast throughout the world in order to cloak the unnecessary sorrow, misery and suffering everywhere. . . . Never was there more need for speedy action than now."

From Dublin, Ireland comes an appeal for an FI sub. "I would like to receive your magazine every month, if it is possible, in view of dollar restrictions. I have come into possession of a few copies which I find most interesting. I was especially impressed by the article on Lackawanna: Steel Town 1946." (This analytical article, written by a young steel worker following the great steel strike, appears in the April, 1946, issue of the FI).

FOURTH INTERNATIONAL

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REVIEW OF THE MONTH

*Lessons of the French Elections—Wall Street Grants “Independence”
to the Philippines—The Social Crisis in Japan—The Second
Phase of the Strike Wave in America*

Lessons of the French Elections

ELECTION RESULTS AND SOCIAL TRENDS

Parliamentary results are important for evaluating trends in social processes within a given country, especially in periods of acute crisis. To get a clear picture of the meaning of the recent French elections, it is necessary to juxtapose the latest results with the two preceding nation-wide polls since the “liberation.”

First, let us take the camp of the working class, which in its overwhelming majority desires the introduction of socialism and which has throughout this period supported the perfidious Socialist and Communist (Stalinist) parties in the mistaken belief that they represented genuine working class organizations. The table below gives the total votes cast for these two parties in all three elections:

Character of Election	Date	Vote for SP and CP	Percentage of Total Vote Cast
Constituent	October 1946	9,506,273	49.5
Referendum	May 1946	9,280,386	47.09
Constituent	June 1946	9,337,987	47.03

The total SP-CP vote, it will be observed, has remained more or less at the same level, attaining its peak at the outset and then tapering off slightly. The decline is most noticeable in the relative proportions: whereas in October 1945, the combined SP-CP vote amounted to 49.5 percent of the total number of electors, nine months later it dropped to approximately 47 percent. The drop is slight but it is highly symptomatic nevertheless.

It denotes that moods of disorientation and stagnation are beginning to penetrate the ranks of the workers because of the policies pursued by the old official leaderships. The reciprocal relation between the SP and the CP tends for the moment to mask this trend.

The Stalinists have been gaining votes as against the Social Democrats. For this reason the CP has succeeded in registering even a slight increase in votes. But this gain was made primarily among the petty bourgeois and moreover the most backward layers of the population that have just entered the political arena. Thus, the most striking Stalinist gains have been made in such

traditionally backward peasant regions of France as Vendee, Calvados, Cotes-du-Nord, Illes-et-Vilaine, Maine-et-Loire, etc. Simultaneously the CP suffered losses in many districts of the Seine department which embraces Paris and its “Red Belt” of proletarian suburbs. The CP vote likewise declined from the previous levels in the Nord mining region, in Lyons, Loire, Bouche-du-Rhone and other heavily proletarian districts.

The Socialist Party, on the other hand, appears to have held its ground so far as the absolute number of votes is involved. In this respect it suffered comparatively minor losses. But this is only the appearance. The SP losses, too, are masked by recent accretions from the rural and urban petty-bourgeoisie whom this party predominantly represents. The Social Democrats, at the same time, lost not only to the Stalinists but also to the parties of the French bourgeoisie.

PROLETARIAN CAMP IS STAGNATING

While the proletariat camp is stagnating or even losing ground, the camp of reaction has been scoring steady gains. This camp is represented by the Popular Republican Party (MRP), the avowed reactionary Rightist parties and the splinters of the Radical-Socialists and other discredited bourgeois “left” formations. The support gathered by this camp shows the following growth:

October 1945 Constituent Elections	9,599,950
May 1946 Referendum on the Constitution	10,450,883
June 1946 Constituent Elections	10,427,343

In contrast to the workers’ parties, the growth of the bourgeois camp while not decisive is quite marked. The Right is scoring its gains not only at the expense of the SP, for it is also attracting those backward peasant sections which in the beginning remained apathetic to parliamentary struggle, but who are now resuming their political life.

The resurgence of the political strength of the bourgeoisie is most strikingly illustrated by the growth of the MRP, a party which was built virtually from scratch, with the aid of the Catholic Church.

In the September 1945 cantonal elections this party was able to win only 234 seats out of a total of 3,000 in the country, or

less than ten percent. By October of the same year the MRP rallied enough support to win 143 deputies out of a total of 585 to the Constituent assembly, or almost 25 percent. (The SP-CP had at that time 299, or a working majority). Nine months later the MRP supplanted the CP as the single strongest party in the country, gathering almost 6-million votes and more than 160 deputy posts.

This increasing power of the MRP in particular and of the bourgeois Right in general comes from only one source, namely: from the petty bourgeoisie. A period of nine months has sufficed to prove to the hilt that the bankrupt and treacherous policies of the SP and CP not only fail to rally the support of the middle classes but, on the contrary, *drive them into the arms of reaction.*

In the epoch of the death-agony of capitalism, developments among the petty bourgeois masses are of exceptional importance for understanding given political situations. Caught up by the grave social crisis, the petty bourgeoisie casts about uneasily for new roads. Its development is spasmodic and feverish in the extreme. This is an ABC of Marxism.

In May 1935, in his book *Whither France*, Trotsky wrote:

The political crisis of the country is above all a collapse of the confidence of the petty bourgeois masses in their traditional parties and leaders. The discontent, the nervousness, the instability, the fluidity of the petty bourgeoisie are exceptionally important characteristics of a pre-revolutionary situation. As a sick man, burning with fever, tosses from the right side to left, so the feverish petty bourgeoisie can turn to the right and to the left.

PETTY BOURGEOISIE AND REVOLUTION

The petty bourgeoisie swings readily from one extreme to the other: from hope in the working class to despair and mad fury which can be swiftly turned by bourgeois reaction against the working class. It is only necessary to recall the tragic lessons of the triumph of Fascism in Italy, in Germany and elsewhere in prewar Europe.

It is unquestionable that the French urban and rural bourgeoisie, after the "liberation," either remained watchfully expectant or rallied to the support of the labor movement with its five million organized workers in the CGT (the French Confederation of Labor) and its powerful political parties. The French petty bourgeoisie gave labor the majority in the Constituent Assembly, raising the CP to the position of the strongest party in the country and the SP—the second strongest. What did the CP and SP do with their victories? They prostrated themselves at the feet of the capitalists. They did not raise a single demand that transcended the framework of capitalism. As a matter of fact, the Stalinists came to the forefront as the most rabid agents of capitalist restoration. And the Socialists aided as best they could.

We need only refer to their joint policies which permitted the French bourgeoisie to restore its completely shattered state apparatus, to rebuild its army (with Vichy officers and American equipment), to reconstitute its police and secret service, to organize new political instruments best adapted to the traditions and prejudices of the war-maddened French petty bourgeoisie, etc. etc. We refer especially to the role of the Stalinists in shackling even the elementary urge of the workers to improve their fearful living and working conditions. The CP as a whole and its representatives in the ministerial posts (Air Force, Ministry of State, Labor, Reconstruction, Industrial Production) pressed for increased production and kept wages frozen. Only on the

very eve of the June elections did the CP finally announce that it would come out in favor of wage increases.

The role of the Stalinists as the main prop of French capitalism is so crassly obvious that even such a reactionary commentator as the Republican Walter Lippman affirms with glee:

The Communists have no social program for the reconstruction of France which is more advanced or more radical than that which the MRP or the socialists offer.

Is it any wonder that under these conditions the working class in France finds itself being driven into a state of passivity and stagnation? Is it any wonder that the masses of the French petty bourgeoisie flock in ever increasing numbers to the standard-bearers of the bourgeoisie?

We see the very same process taking place in Italy where the Christian-Democrats (a counterpart of the "Christian-Socialists" of the MRP) likewise emerged as the strongest single party, with the SP next and the CP, third. Nor should it be overlooked that the neo-Fascist *Qualinquist* movement has been able to rally more than one million supporters in Italy. To be sure, we are only in the initial phases of the struggle. But in periods of crisis events move with great rapidity. In such situations loss of time helps reaction. If in a revolutionary situation, a revolutionary policy is not carried through, then the pendulum begins to swing in favor of the counter-revolution.

To be sure, one of the necessary prerequisites for successfully carrying out a revolutionary policy is to gain influence over war veterans, civil service employes, functionaries, artisans, small merchants and small peasants. But only those completely ignorant of the laws governing the movement of revolutionary masses can believe that the support of the middle classes can be won exclusively on the plane of struggle for immediate demands and democratic rights.

PROGRAM OF THE REVOLUTION

The struggle today for immediate and democratic demands has revolutionary significance only as part of the struggle for the program of the proletarian revolution. Such was the course of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917. Any other course kills the faith of the masses in the revolutionary way out and drives them into the arms of reaction, as was demonstrated time and again in the decades before the war.

Trotsky long ago pointed out that no cruder mistake could be committed than to expect the bourgeoisie in our epoch to remain passively dependent for its rule upon the collaboration of the reformist working class parties. On the contrary the bourgeoisie intervenes forcibly at the first opportune moment to free itself of this dependence. This moment arrives when the petty bourgeoisie breaks with parliamentary politics. Such anti-parliamentary tendencies create a favorable situation in which the middle classes may directly and immediately support a *coup d'etat* on the part of the military or neo-Fascist formations.

"The big bourgeoisie," Trotsky reiterated time and again, "does not register passively the evolution of the middle classes, but rather prepares tentacles of steel, with which to seize these tortured and despairing masses at the opportune moment."

There is a profound lesson to be learned, in this connection, from the Italian experience of 1921. The country as a whole then voted against Giolitti's government and against Fascism which at the time of the *coup d'etat* had only 25 out of 500 deputies. In other words, only a small section of the Italian petty bourgeoisie had broken with parliamentarianism, but this minority

expressed the *trend* which was brought to a head and fully exploited by Mussolini and his Black Shirts.

The history of the Spanish revolution from 1931 to 1936 offers no less instructive lessons.

Let us not forget, besides, that under de Gaulle the French bourgeoisie from the beginning moved toward the establishment of a "strong government," i.e., a Bonapartist dictatorship. De Gaulle had to desist. The pressure of the labor movement proved too powerful. The time was as yet inopportune. This shows, among other things, that the bourgeoisie, despite all its long experience and craft, despite its disposing of all the agencies of the state, is not always capable of estimating precisely mass trends and moods. It, too, makes mistakes which it then corrects in practice. At the same time this shows that the bourgeoisie will strike again—with de Gaulle or some other convenient figure—when it judges the moment propitious.

The sharpening of the class struggle in France on the economic plane—with the resumption of strike struggles and with the inevitable further discredit of the parliamentary farce—may precipitate a showdown much more quickly than now appears. The power of Anglo-American imperialism can be quickly brought into play on the side of reaction, especially in the case of Italy. In any case, it is certain that the sharpest and most decisive battles lie ahead.

The unfolding crisis offers the greatest possibilities for the revolutionary vanguard and simultaneously imposes upon it the greatest responsibilities.

TROTSKYISM IN FRANCE

The most heartening demonstration that the fighting capacity of the French proletariat is far from exhausted lies in the fact that the small Trotskyist party, *Partie Communiste Internationaliste* (International Communist Party) found sufficient mass support to run candidates' lists in 11 electoral districts. The Trotskyist program received 45,000 votes, of which over 15,000 were obtained in the Paris area. Thus for the first time in contemporary history, Trotskyism enters the European arena as a political force.

In its growing influence—still small numerically but with vast potentialities—lies the real hope of France and of Europe as a whole.

Wall Street and the Fraud of Philippine Independence

On July 4, America's own Independence Day, the Philippine Islands are to become, by the grace of Wall Street, the habitat of a "free, independent nation." That is what the words say in the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed by the U. S. Congress in 1934 and now about to be put into effect. A 10-year period of transition, of "political tutelage" in the art of self-government, will come to a close. The Philippine Commonwealth will become the Philippine Republic. The U. S. high commissioner will pack his bags and depart. The Stars and Stripes will be ceremoniously lowered and the Philippine flag just as ceremoniously hoisted. The bands will play. Perhaps the crowds will cheer. Wall Street's government, with a cynical smirk, will have demonstrated its "sincere devotion" to the cause of freedom and independence for all the peoples of the world, its moral superiority over the older empires which hold their colonial subjects in bondage without promise or hope of freedom.

WALL ST. DOMINATION OF PHILIPPINES

Beneath all the pageantry and fanfare, and lurking behind the formal grant of independence, is the ugly fact of continuing and even tighter domination of the Philippines by Wall Street and its government. Behind the facade of supposed sovereignty stands the reality of colonial servitude. Only the outward political form is being changed. From a colony, the Philippines are being converted merely into a semi-colony.

Let us take a look at the hard realities. As a condition of putting into force the act of independence on the date specified 12 years ago, the U. S. government last year demanded the right to establish its own military bases in the Philippines and to maintain them in perpetuity. Navy Secretary Forrestal stated that the U.S. will "continue to bear responsibility for the security of the Philippines, and will have to have bases, and strategic areas supporting those bases, to carry out that responsibility." Sergio Osmena, the former Philippine president, readily acceded to this "request." His successor, Manuel Roxas, stands by the commitment. The "independent" Philippine Republic must permit the U.S. to establish air, ground and naval bases in the Islands wherever the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff deem them necessary. A treaty specifying locations, facilities, transit rights and personnel is to be negotiated between the U.S. and the Philippine Republic after July 4. More accurately, Washington will draw up a document and Roxas will sign on the dotted line as directed. The Philippines will thus be brought under more extensive American military control than at any time during the preceding half-century of U.S. rule.

But perhaps there will be real freedom in the economic domain? Perhaps the 18,000,000 Filipinos will be freed from the exploitation of the Wall Street money-changers? Here the reality is as stark as in the realm of military affairs. The Philippine Republic is being compelled, by treaty with the U.S., to grant extensive rights to American capital and American business. By way of return, the Philippines are to receive from the U.S. \$625,000,000 as aid in reconstruction, plus the privilege of staying inside U.S. tariff walls for another 28 years. The Filipinos are not to be permitted, however, to spend the "grant-in-aid" as they wish. Materials and technical services are to come largely from the U.S. Personnel of U.S. agencies will be assigned to the Philippines for planning and administering reconstruction. Moreover, none of the money will become available until the Philippine Government accepts the provisions of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946. This act provides that Philippine exports to the U.S. shall continue to be duty free until 1954. During the 20 years thereafter, or until 1974, exports to the U.S. are to be subject to a progressively increasing tariff until, by 1974, U.S. trade with the Philippines is on the same basis as trade between the U.S. and other countries. In addition, Philippine exports of certain items are to stay within volume quotas during this period.

However, stiff conditions are attached to the 28-year tariff postponement, which is ostensibly intended to give the Islands time for economic recovery and an opportunity to adjust toward the day when they will be outside U.S. tariff walls. The Filipinos are required to amend their constitution so as to permit American businessmen and American capital to enter the Philippines on the same terms and with the same rights as Filipino businessmen and capital. Moreover, Philippine exports limited by quotas are to be allocated, as the U.S. may specify, among Philippine exporters (mostly American) who were in business before the war. Finally, the Philippine currency unit, the *peso*, is to be pegged to the U.S. dollar. The Wall Street carpet-baggers thus

establish a highly favorable position for themselves as investors and traders, and with constitutional guarantees at that. It is not difficult to foresee a period of unbridled economic swashbuckling by these dollar-greedy hogs, who under the guise of granting independence are in reality fastening more firmly the shackles of colonial exploitation on the mass of poverty-stricken Filipinos. On a greater scale than ever, the Islands' riches will be siphoned off by these parasites. All possibility of a rounded economic growth will be stultified, as it was in the past, and development tailored to the specifications of Wall Street. The Philippines will remain a collection of plantations, with a few factories processing profitable export crops. The economy will remain backward, the people poor.

NATIVE EXPLOITERS IN PHILIPPINES

As before, the American imperialists will be joined with the native Filipino exploiters, the *hacenderos* or landed capitalists, in robbing and oppressing the overwhelming mass of downtrodden *taos* or farmers. It is these native exploiters that the Roxas administration represents. The native exploiters are only too eager to be the junior partners of American imperialism. They shouted loudly for Philippine independence all through the years, only in order to retain the leadership and control of the genuine independence movement of the masses. But the kind of "independence" they sought, the only kind of "independence" they really want, is that which is to be formally consummated this July 4.

These wealthy Filipino parasites collaborated with the Japanese imperialists, who protected them and their estates and moneybags from the wrath of the landless *taos*. When Japan was defeated the *taos*, long in revolt, rose up in angry rebellion. A tremendous mass movement, still powerful, threatens to topple the whole system of landlord parasitism. The agrarian movement represented by the Hukbalahaps has the *hacenderos* trembling on the great estates. They are glad to have at their elbow a powerful ally and guardian to help them preserve "law and order." For this they have sold out the independence movement, become parties to a brazen fraud, and turned the Philippines over, once more, to Wall Street. Roxas and his government are more than willing to serve as a political facade behind which Wall Street will share with them the exploitation of the Philippines, in the same way that the Indian bourgeoisie and the Indian princes, who have accepted the latest British plan, are content to share in the continued despoliation of India by British imperialism. It costs Wall Street little to exalt the Filipino bourgeoisie, to give them "face," by a formal grant of independence which is empty of real content except continued colonial servitude and poverty for the mass of the people.

The fake independence being given to the Philippines, quite apart from its local significance, is in the nature of a world gesture by American imperialism. The global economic needs of this swollen Colossus require it to smash the colonial monopolies of the older imperialist states. It must break into these closed markets. Already during the war it had begun to elbow its way in. Today these colonial lands are all in revolt against the imperialist violators. Is this not, then, a propitious time to plant in the minds of the colonial bourgeoisie of India, for instance, the idea that American imperialism is liberal and benevolent as compared with British imperialism, which is reactionary and violent? "Look!—haven't we given the Philippines their independence, as we promised we would?" The day may not be far distant when the native Indian exploiters will be looking for a more "generous patron." And what more "generous patron" could be found than Wall Street?

LIBERAL DEFENDERS OF REACTION

The journalistic liberals, those doughty defenders of anything vile and reactionary so long as it parades in liberal vestments, have already extolled Philippine "independence" as a "model" of benevolent political enterprise, as living proof that the United States "keeps its word" (in contrast, for example, with perfidious England), as a conclusive demonstration that America is not an imperialist power.

One thing is certain: The Filipino masses will not be deceived. For 50 years they have fought for their independence, against Wall Street and against Japanese imperialism. Before that they battled to free themselves from the cruel grip of imperial Spain. The fight must and will go on until genuine freedom and a chance to create a better life for the masses is assured.

Japan Today

RADICALIZATION OF WORKING CLASS

Japan today furnishes the most striking example of the process of radicalization which is taking place among the working class all over the world. No sooner had the last shot been fired in the imperialist war than the workers began reforming their trade unions and political parties which had been wiped out years before by the Japanese ruling class. Tremendous popular demonstrations were held. On May Day this year more than half a million workers demonstrated in Tokyo alone. In the country as a whole it was estimated that at least two million workers went out on the streets. International working class solidarity, and the advancement of radical demands, formed the keynote of the gigantic Tokyo demonstration.

Meanwhile, ever since the end of the war, large sections of the workers have translated their revolutionary sentiments into the ringing coin of action. They have established their own control in a large number of diverse industrial plants in order to enforce their demands for higher wages and better working conditions. The Japanese capitalists, like capitalists everywhere, refused wage increases on the ground that the economy could not bear such additional burdens. They sabotaged production in some factories, closed down others, in an attempt to force the workers into submission. The workers responded by seizing control of production. They marketed the finished products and from the proceeds paid their own wages, in some cases raising them by as much as 300 percent. Inflation has hit the standard of living of the workers in Japan as it has everywhere else. Prominent among the demands of these workers is "A Minimum Wage Regulated by Living Costs"—in other words, a rising scale of wages to meet the rising cost of living. This slogan, combined with the seizure of productive control, is evidence of the keen revolutionary mood of Japan's proletariat, one of the most oppressed and poverty-stricken in all the world. It is also remarkable testimony to the objective correctness of the Transitional Program of the Fourth International, in which the slogans of workers' control of production and the rising scale of wages occupy a prominent place. It is doubtful if the Japanese workers, suppressed for so many years by a brutal military-police regime and cut off from all international contacts, have ever heard of the Transitional Program of the Fourth International. Yet here, in the very first stage of the renewed proletarian struggle, these very slogans are shouted from millions of throats and translated into life by direct action.

Still another remarkable manifestation of the leftward trend

is the action of newspaper workers in establishing a large measure of control over the big capitalist metropolitan dailies and preventing them from printing reactionary anti-labor material. This control operates through the Nippon Press and News Agency Employees Union, an industrial union which embraces all the workers, both technical and editorial, in the newspaper business. The three largest dailies, the Tokyo *Asahi*, the Osaka *Mainichi* and the Tokyo *Yomiuri-Hochi* have a combined circulation exceeding 7,000,000. All are held under workers' control.

The militancy, the alertness, the self-confidence of Japan's industrial proletariat, as compared, for example with the relative passivity of the German workers, cannot be explained solely on the basis of their terrible conditions of life, which are certainly no worse than those of the German workers. A most important factor is the remarkable survival of Japanese industry despite the terrible bombings to which the big cities were subjected. Martin Bennett, a consulting engineer of Washington, D. C., who recently visited Japan as a member of the Reparations Commission, declares that Japan still possesses the greatest productive capacity of any country in non-Soviet Asia and cites figures showing the enormous extent of undamaged industry, both heavy and light, and the generally excellent condition of Japan's railroads. The remarkable state of industrial preservation, he makes clear, is "no reflection on the effectiveness of American bombing but rather a testimony to the enormous overdevelopment by which Japan prepared itself for war." Here, then, is the difference between Japan and Germany: In Germany the physical destruction of industry has wrenched the bulk of the workers away from their economic base; in Japan there is a huge intact industrial machine needing only labor and raw material with which to produce the people's needs and the Japanese workers want to operate it in their own interests and those of the masses generally.

U. S. IMPERIALISTS ALARMED

The great fighting spirit of the Japanese workers is the cause of fearful alarm among the Japanese capitalists—and their patrons and protectors, the American imperialists. It was, without doubt, the tempo of class struggle which caused MacArthur to schedule the general elections which were held last April 10. In the *Fourth International* for October 1945, in discussing American occupation policy in Japan, we pointed out that it was the purpose of the conquerors to carry through "a phony half-way revolution as a means of forestalling a thorough and fundamental renovation of Japanese society" by the masses. In the following issue, we detailed all the steps taken by MacArthur in this direction. The April 10 elections were intended as a political safety valve, part of the general plan to forestall revolution.

The election results were remarkable in many ways. Of the 36,000,000 registered voters (in a population of 67,000,000) some 70 percent went to the polls. Women voted for the first time in Japanese history and 38 women were elected to the Diet. Of the 466 members elected, the two conservative parties, the so-called Liberals and Progressives, captured 139 and 91 seats, respectively, the Social Democrats 92, the Cooperatives 16, the Communists (Stalinists) 5, independent candidates 84, and various minor parties 38. The new government has been formed of a conservative coalition.

How is one to explain the apparent rightward movement in the elections, which contradicts so sharply the revolutionary

mood in the country? It may be said, in the first place, that MacArthur decided to hold the elections as an act of political diversion only because he felt assured that the conservatives would come out on top, winning at least sufficient seats to make a bourgeois coalition government possible. Why did he feel assured of the outcome?

For one thing, the Japanese masses have been kept out of the parliamentary arena for long years. With the bourgeois parties coming out under new and deceptive labels, disguising themselves as "Liberals" and "Progressives," a certain amount of confusion and popular disorientation was inevitable. Then, since neither the Stalinists nor the Social Democrats came forward with a bold, consistent revolutionary program, there was no axis around which mass revolutionary sentiment could crystallize and make itself felt. A sign of the general confusion is to be seen in the fact that the Social Democrats, just as perfidious as the Stalinists in their class-collaborationist policies, were able substantially to increase their parliamentary representation. While the Stalinists made a poor showing, the Social Democrats gained 92 seats as compared to the 17 they held in the last freely-elected Diet.

PEOPLE'S FRONTISM IN JAPAN

The Japanese Communist Party emerged from prison and the underground with tremendous possibilities for growth. With a revolutionary class struggle policy it could have mobilized the millions of workers and peasants and become the leading political force in the nation. But while the workers were demonstrating against capitalism on the streets and establishing their own control over production, the Stalinist leaders skulked in secret conclaves. The axis of their policy was the formation of a "People's Front" with the Social Democrats and left-wing independents—to preserve capitalism. The following devastating appraisal of the Stalinists was made by a Scripps-Howard staff writer in a dispatch from Tokyo on March 28, just prior to the elections:

Weakness of the Japanese Communists as a political force is more apparent as the April elections near. Less is heard of their aspirations, and conservatives who were once so fearful of Communist strength are beginning to ignore them. The Communist Party's recent convention itself may have created the feeling that it need not be taken seriously this year. In the first place it disclosed that instead of the once estimated 100,000 adherents the party could claim less than 7,000. . . . The Communist platform is full of generalities, offering nothing of immediate tangible benefit to the Japanese. . . . Sanzo Nozaka (C.P. leader) has shown in party councils and in relations with other groups a willingness to compromise and a tendency to moderation. . . . It has resulted in the alienation of many radical leaders.

Now that a conservative government is installed, albeit on a very unstable parliamentary base, MacArthur has taken the first steps in cracking down on the revolutionary actions of the workers. An edict has been issued against "disorderly demonstrations" and "incitements to violence." The cabinet quickly debated the enactment of new laws "specifically curbing what the Japanese call the 'workers' control of production.'" (*N. Y. Times*, May 28). A new Ministry of Labor is to be set up.

The delicate parliamentary balance in the Diet reflects the unstable relationship of social classes. The masses are seeking a radical solution of their problems. Fierce class battles are in the offing. But without a revolutionary party to lead the masses, the struggle cannot fructify. Such a party is the great need of the hour—the need of needs.

President Truman and Second Phase of the Strike Wave

AMERICAN LABOR SINCE V-J DAY

Since V-J Day the American working class has marched steadily forward. Victories and half-victories have crowned the strike battles involving millions of workers against the mightiest concentration of capital in the entire world. The lightning flashes of the coming storm were already clearly visible as steel workers followed auto workers on the picket lines and electrical, packing-house and mine workers filled in the ranks in quick succession.

In every strike the government intervened on the side of monopoly capitalism. Threats were implemented by government seizures designed to intimidate the unions. Helpless corporations passed the ball directly to the government which used its position to coerce timorous union leaders into accepting wage settlements one-third and more below their original demands. For a brief period the ruling class, grown arrogant and insolent from the feast of gold on which they had banqueted during the war, dreamed of a reversion to their robber-baron days when they had fought and defeated the workers in direct economic warfare. This time, however, there was no Pinkerton Agency big enough to supply strikebreakers to even make a dent in the strike front. Veterans remained generally sympathetic to the labor movement. And without a reserve army of unemployed there were not enough desperate men prepared for the role of scabbing. The use of local agencies of repression by City and State governments proved unavailing in the face of the knitted ranks of the workers who had weaved their forces together to an unprecedented degree of solidarity. General strikes in Stamford, Lancaster and Rochester forced the retirement of City and State police; the threat of a general strike in Philadelphia saved the Western Electric strike from defeat by police nightsticks.

Only one further major weapon remained at the immediate disposal of the capitalist class: The hurling of the Federal government itself against the strikers. The capitalists were fearful of using this weapon because they knew it would reveal in all its nakedness the long-existing but carefully concealed merger of the State and finance-capital. Effective as this weapon might be temporarily in smashing strikes, its unflinching consequence would be to drive the working class onto the political arena and accelerate the movement for an independent working-class party.

The class struggle, it was shown, cannot be fitted into a neat pattern like flowers in a Japanese print; the impact of large-scale battles often has the effect of destroying preconceived charts. The American ruling class, so confident of its power and its methods of exercising domination during "normal" times, was caught off-guard and proved unprepared to cope with the unfolding labor crisis. The railroad strike produced such a major crisis, or more accurately was one of the peaks of the crisis of class conflict which has rocked the country since last winter. Twice before the machinery of national economy was thrown out of gear through the walkouts in auto and steel. Their combined effect was a social crisis of the first magnitude. Reluctantly the bourgeoisie was forced to abandon its labor-crushing plans and acceded to a compromise with Murray and Reuther. But scarcely had the wheels begun to turn again than the strike of bituminous miners produced a creeping paralysis in the machinery of production again. At this point, the railroad workers pulled the switch.

RAILROAD WORKERS NOT UNITED

But the railroad strike, unfortunately, was not part of a general strike of all railroad workers. Only two craft unions were directly involved and they were led by fossilized, arch-conservative leaders. Without second thought the bourgeoisie seized the opportunity created by the exposed and isolated position of the two craft unions. If the railroad strike could be smashed, they calculated, the relationship of forces would be drastically altered, and a new offensive could be mounted against the labor movement. This strategy was immediately embraced by all sections of the ruling class with the unanimity and fervor such as comes from a supernatural revelation. The newspapers clamored for action; the president poured his venom on the railroad workers and mobilized the army to break the strike; Congress, whipped into a frenzy, applauded and howled for blood. Under the white-hot pressure, Whitney and Johnson wilted and ordered the trainmen and engineers back to work.

The first phase, the CIO phase of the strike wave, was concluded with the capitalists forced to retreat before the massive strength and solidarity of the unions and to grant partial concessions to the labor forces. The capitalists threw caution to the winds during the second phase of the strike wave in the case of the badly divided railroad workers. They thought they could recoup their losses and begin to move to clamp labor in an iron vise.

But when the trains began moving again, American politics began running on broader tracks. The proletariat was beginning to consolidate its dispersed trade union battalions into one army, facing the bourgeoisie as a class. This new factor was destroying the whole previous pattern of class relationships.

Truman succeeded in breaking the railroad strike and Congress sought immediately to capitalize on its first victory by passing the Case Bill. They were following, in broad outlines, the example of the British Tories who sealed the defeat of the 1926 British General Strike with the enactment of the vicious Trades Disputes Act. But the parallel was soon shown to be an illusory one; it was a case of wishful thinking. The proletariat was not defeated. Under the whip of government repression it quickly shook off the blow and returned to the fray in greater strength and unity than before. The ranks of the CIO, AFL and the Brotherhoods began to push down the dividing fences to find the protection of unity against the attacks of the class enemy. For the bourgeoisie to continue the offensive under these conditions could have led, step by step, to a military or semi-military dictatorship and to fierce and widespread actions against the state itself.

Frightened by the yawning chasm of class war that opened before it, the bourgeoisie retreated; their anti-labor offensive began to crumble before it had spent its initial momentum. A mood of uncertainty replaced the arrogant assurance which drove the Case Bill through the House in a few hours. The Senate quarrelled and cavilled for days, finally passing the bill without a very impressive majority. The grand anti-labor drama had been turned into a comedy with the President, who had only a few days before called for the most savage legislation, now compelled to write the veto message. Meanwhile Truman's alternative Emergency Bill remains on the calendar. What is lacking is the generating power of an "emergency" to speed it through the legislative mill. The "emergency" could have been created by a strike in maritime, but the bourgeoisie, having witnessed the consequences of its first ventures into government-organized strikebreaking, cancelled its elaborate strikebreaking plans and granted concessions to the maritime workers.

The strike wave has made it clear that the old equilibrium between the classes has been disrupted. Because of the continuing upswing in the economic cycle and because of the absence of revolutionary consciousness among the masses, the crisis has assumed primarily the form of economic struggle. The proletariat does not yet strive for state power; it has not yet broken politically with the two capitalist parties. But the workers' economic struggles have unfolded on such a gigantic scale, rocking the whole structure of the productive system and jeopardizing the world imperialist plans of American capitalism, that the ruling plutocracy has been forced to seek new means to regulate the class struggle. The old laws have become scraps of paper because the old class relationships have disappeared.

LAST CHAPTER OF AN ERA

When the Railway Labor Act received the *coup de grace* in the strike of the engineers and trainmen the last chapter of an entire era of political development was written. The Railway Labor Act was considered the ultimate in class collaboration legislation. In return for concessions, the railroad workers, one of the most privileged sections of labor, virtually surrendered in 1926 the right to strike by accepting an intricate network of conciliation, mediation and arbitration legislation. While such legislation was never extended beyond the railroad industry, other unions were induced to incorporate this class collaboration machinery in their agreements during the 'Twenties. It must be remembered that the union movement at this time was largely restricted to the skilled workers organized in the AFL. Strikes and organization drives among the unorganized mass production workers were put down primarily by the laws of the jungle; the industrialists maintained large private armies, extensive company unions and ramified systems of espionage to counteract any threat of organization. The constant introduction of new machinery and new methods of specialization slowly undermined the privileged position of the skilled workers. When the depression knocked the props from under American capitalism, it likewise undermined the AFL trade union movement. The stormy struggles of the 'Thirties, the great sit-down strikes, the organization of the mass production workers into the CIO shattered the labor relations system of the previous period. All that remained was the Railway Labor Act. Since that time the bourgeoisie has often looked back nostalgically to that simple "peaceful" past. While they could never again hope to persuade the unions to voluntarily accept the shackles of compulsory arbitration, they dreamed of a law that would extend the provisions of the railroad act to all industry. A strike under the railroad act had been considered inconceivable. When the inconceivable came to pass, the field of labor legislation became an uncharted wilderness.

Roosevelt's contribution to the labor code consisted, on the one hand of a recognition of the new relationship of forces created in the class struggle and on the other hand an attempt to enmesh the union bureaucracy in the governmental machinery in return for preserving and standardizing concessions already won on the picket lines. Mass picket lines made injunction laws inoperative; they could only be enforced by such large bodies of armed men as to create the conditions of civil war. Industrial unions broke the power of company intimidation, thereby breaking the backbone of company unionism. A new and widespread militancy among the workers smashed the private armies of thugs, stool-pigeons and spies set up by the corporations. The Wagner Act incorporated these victories into law. But it must

be remembered that under conditions of bitter class warfare, the Wagner Act served not only as a spur but also as a restraint on the workers' struggles. The machinery of the NLRB created many illusions and became an obstacle once union organization was attained. Most of all, the illusions created by the Wagner Act helped immeasurably to regulate the scope and intensity of the class struggle.

It was with the outbreak of the war, however, that Roosevelt began to exact really heavy payment for the concessions given in the previous period. By presidential decree, rubber-stamped by Congress, a system of semi-compulsory arbitration was established under the War Labor Board. This system was made possible only by the voluntary surrender of the right to strike by the trade union bureaucracy. The coal miners' strike in the third year of the war threatened to blow up Roosevelt's labor decrees and their partial victory threatened to set afoot a general movement to overthrow the no-strike pledge. Faced with the possibility that the trade union bureaucrats would lose control over the workers, Roosevelt urged Congress to institute forced labor legislation for "the duration." Congress rejected this proposal but in its place enacted the Smith-Connally Act over Roosevelt's veto. Roosevelt predicted that the measure would prove ineffectual against unions determined to strike. This prediction was confirmed when he invoked the law against the coal miners in 1944.

THIN ARMOR FOR STRIKE STRUGGLES

It was with this thin legal armor that the bourgeoisie entered the great post-war strike struggles. The War Labor Board collapsed with the ending of the war. The Smith-Connally Act encumbered the unions with legal technicalities but it could neither prevent strikes nor break them by government seizures. When Congress awakened to the fact that steel, auto, electrical and packing-houses workers had struck despite the Smith-Connally law, it began to howl for new laws. The Case Bill, first proposed last January, was not a new law but a compendium of the old jungle laws which had either been stricken from the statute books or had been invalidated by other legislation. Just two examples suffice: 1. the revival of injunction proceedings and 2. the right to bring suit against the unions for damages. Why was this law, shelved under pressure of a stormy reaction by the labor movement last January, passed in June on the basis of a setback to one segment of the labor movement? Truman understands why. In essence, his veto message proceeds from the reality that the proletariat as a whole is undefeated and more strongly organized than ever before. As a matter of fact, the setback for the railroad unions acted like a cathartic in purging the working class of many dangerous illusions.

The labor crisis makes plain that American capitalism is still without a fundamental policy with regard to the labor movement. It attempted to tame the unions and drive down the workingman's standard of living by economic warfare and it has failed. It then attempted to throttle this powerful, undefeated labor giant by means of savage legislation and government strike-breaking. That attempt, too, must be put down as a failure. The capitalist class now at last is beginning to understand that its methods of the past have outlived their usefulness; that, despite its great power and wealth, its rule rests on none too sturdy foundations. The American capitalist class will be driven to use the same forceful and barbaric measures against the workers, as were employed by its European counterparts to rescue their decayed rule.

China After World War II

By LI FU-JEN

Civil war is raging in China. Across the plains of Manchuria troops of Chiang Kai-shek's central government are battling for supremacy against the military forces of the Chinese Stalinists. With the generous aid of American imperialism, Chiang Kai-shek succeeded, in May, in capturing the strategic town of Szepingkai. Next, the Stalinists were ousted from Changchun, the Manchurian capital. The fall of Kirin followed. At this writing (early June) Chiang's forces are being deployed for an assault on Harbin, the last important Manchurian urban center in Stalinist hands. All these cities had been invested by the Stalinists when they swept into Manchuria from North China in the wake of withdrawing Soviet troops.

Chiang's easy victories over the Stalinists are testimony to the military superiority of his forces, thanks largely to the supply of modern weapons and munitions furnished by the American imperialists, who, moreover, placed ships and transport planes at Chiang's disposal for the deployment of his troops to Manchuria. The weapons of the Chinese Stalinists, although augmented by arms seized from surrendering Japanese troops, are no match for the war equipment at Chiang's disposal. This disparity of weapons compels the Stalinists to withdraw from the cities to the wide open spaces, to avoid head-on battles, and in general to adhere to the methods and tactics of guerrilla warfare which they have been following for the past 18 years. More important, however, than this unfavorable relationship of military forces is the fact that the Stalinists have no real political base in the urban centers. Moreover, having long ago abandoned their early revolutionary program, they are unable and unwilling to rally decisive masses for an all-out war against the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek.

Despite the loss of the principal cities, substantial control of Manchuria still rests with the Stalinists, who hold at least three-quarters of this vast area with its 30 million population. Chiang's control scarcely extends beyond the railroad zones. This is the picture in Manchuria, north of the Great Wall. Meanwhile, fighting between Chiang's troops and Stalinist forces is also under way in the extra-mural province of Jehol, which the Stalinists took over by disarming Japanese forces at the time of Japan's surrender. To the south, civil war flares over wide stretches of China proper. There are half-a-dozen fighting fronts around the great northern metropoli of Peiping and Tientsin. There have been battles in the neighboring seaboard province of Shantung. Sporadic skirmishing has been taking place in the central China provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei and Hupeh.

This is an old struggle which has been going on with varied degrees of intensity for 18 years. The Stalinists, leading what is avowedly a movement of agrarian and "democratic" reform in opposition to Chiang's Kuomintang regime, have established a dual power in the interior of China and have rallied large numbers of the peasantry to their banner. There is nothing new in this situation except the intensification and widening of the conflict following upon the conclusion of the imperialist war.

What is new—and this is something the capitalist press has consistently failed to report—is the re-emergence of the working-class movement in the cities. After 18 years of prostration,

the Chinese proletariat is again rising to its feet. A wave of strikes has been sweeping through the big cities. The revival of the Chinese working-class is a fact of transcendental importance. It introduces a new factor in the process of class polarization. During the war, the centrifugal forces tearing at the vitals of decayed Chinese society were kept under control by the Japanese imperialist armies and by the military-police regime of Chiang Kai-shek. With the defeat and surrender of Japan, a political void was created over large sections of the country. Into this void the long pent-up forces of civil war and class strife have rushed like an unleashed torrent and are now spilling over the face of the whole land, drawing in the most diverse strata of the exploited and oppressed. This elemental movement of the masses may well prove to be the preparatory stage of the third Chinese revolution. To understand its nature, and in order to plot a perspective, it is necessary to consider the class forces involved and their present relationship.

The Chinese Proletariat: Between 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek established the dictatorship of the Kuomintang on the ruins of the Chinese revolution, and 1937, when the Japanese invasion of China began, the working-class remained politically dormant. An economic upturn in 1934 gave some impetus to the revival of the trade unions. But considered from the point of view of both organization and political consciousness, the proletariat remained a negligible class factor. If the Chinese ruling class under Chiang's leadership undertook to resist the Japanese invasion in 1937, this must be explained, in part, by the political weakness of the masses as expressed in the quiescence of the proletariat, which was underlined by the grovelling class-collaborationist policies of the Stalinists. Chiang could embark on a course of armed resistance to Japan only when he felt assured that class peace could be substantially maintained in the rear.

In the early stages of the Sino-Japanese war the big coastal cities were lost to Japan after their industries had been pulverized by bombs and artillery fire. This was a serious blow to the working class. At the end of 1937, after Shanghai had been evacuated by Chinese troops, the number of factory workers in that city dropped by 90 per cent—from 300,000 to 30,000. But a degree of economic restoration developed under the Japanese occupation and by December, 1941, on the eve of the Pacific war, the number of industrial workers, in the strictest meaning of the term, had risen to about 250,000. But from then on, with the China coast subjected to American blockade, industry was cut off from raw materials and foreign markets, power output (dependent upon coal) was reduced, and the internal market shrank rapidly. The numerical strength of the industrial proletariat was again sharply reduced. On the eve of the Japanese surrender industrial workers in Shanghai numbered approximately 150,000. Today, according to a report by the Social Affairs Bureau of the Shanghai City Government, there are 500,000 workers in the city's industries. But this figure evidently includes workers in small enterprises and very likely a large number of shop employees. In reality, the number of industrial workers in employment cannot be greater than it was just prior to the Japanese capitulation.

Shanghai is China's greatest industrial center. Its economic

decline mirrored the fate of other industrial centers such as Hankow and Tientsin. However, the decline in the industrial proletariat in these cities was compensated by a growth of industrialization in the southwest following the removal of the military and political centers to that region at the end of 1937. There are no reliable data as to the number of factories established or the number of workers employed in them. But according to the Ministry of National Economy some 20,000 factories, each employing not fewer than 30 workers, were built during the eight years of war. Thus there are now at least 600,000 modern industrial workers in China's southwest. This penetration of the rural interior by modern industry is a fact which will prove of immense political significance in the future. Before the war, Chinese industry was largely confined to the narrow coastal region. The working-class movement was geographically isolated from the peasant movement in the hinterland. Today, a large segment of the industrial economy is planted deep in the heart of the country.

Japan's capitulation resulted in a fresh paralysis of Chinese industry. The great majority of the Shanghai factories closed down and many of the plants in the interior suspended operations. This meant another setback for the Chinese proletariat. Nevertheless, the end of the war created a situation enabling the workers once more to take to the road of struggle. During the war, the workers were deluged with patriotic and chauvinist propaganda by the Kuomintang, in which, of course, the Stalinists joined. In the areas under Japanese occupation, the workers were bowed under the jackboot of the imperialist invaders. But with the end of the war, the patriotic lies of the Kuomintang and the Stalinists quickly lost their force. The workers refused any longer to tolerate the exploitation and misery to which they had been subjected.

The Strike Wave

In the five months, November 1945 through March 1946, despite the desperate economic crisis, more than 1,000 strikes took place in Shanghai alone. The strike movement spread to the most distant and remote places and the most backward branches of the economy. In the course of these struggles the workers in nearly every trade have restored their unions under the leadership of genuine proletarian militants, in contrast to the pre-war situation where the unions were held in tight control by "Special Service" (political police) representatives of the Kuomintang. So great already is the pressure of the fast reviving proletariat that even the reactionary leaders of the former Kuomintang-controlled unions are compelled to appear in more radical guise in their efforts to regain control of organized labor. Chu Hsieh-fan, Chinese representative to the Paris International Labor Conference and notorious throughout China as a "bosses' man" and strikebreaker, has organized a Labor Federation with a distinct anti-Kuomintang coloration, evidently with the aim of dominating the radicalized labor movement. The Stalinists, their activities as yet still confined mostly to the rural interior, have not yet gained control of the reviving workers' movement. Thus far, the workers have not lifted up their heads politically. The strike struggles are economic in character. They gravitate around such questions as wages, conditions of labor, and unemployment. Thus the struggle is in its first, elementary stage. Once production is restored and the currency stabilized, one may expect an elevation of the struggle to the political plane. In this process the peasant struggles in the interior, the countrywide civil war, will play a galvanic role.

The Chinese Peasantry: It was the peasant—"the pack-horse

of history"—who bore the heaviest burdens of the war. The agrarian masses were forced to contribute all they possessed—food, money and cannon fodder. The Chinese village, already bankrupted during the preceding decades, has emerged from the war completely ruined. "Victory" has not brought any lessening of the suffering of the peasants. Chiang Kai-shek proclaimed a land-tax moratorium for one year and decreed a 25 per cent reduction in land rents. These "relief" measures are ironical in the extreme when viewed against the background of actual happenings in the rural areas. In the name of "pacification" and "rehabilitation" a wild orgy of barbarous repression and robbery has been let loose on the villages. A fearful famine is raging in the provinces of Hupeh and Hunan, famed as the granaries of China. Millions of peasants are doomed to die of hunger.

During the war, the process of concentration of land ownership advanced at an accelerated tempo. Small and middle land-owning peasants were bankrupted. Their lands fell into the hands of the big landlords and village usurers, who have close ties with the banking capitalists and the Kuomintang bureaucracy. In the regions dominated by the Stalinists, the concentration of land ownership is not so evident. There the small landlords, especially well-to-do independent peasants, are the predominant elements in the village. But the poor peasants, thanks to Stalinist reforms, are able to maintain themselves and are protected by laws which prevent the big landlords from expanding their holdings without limit.

In 1938, for the sake of an "Anti-Japanese United Front" with Chiang Kai-shek, the hangman of the Chinese revolution, the Stalinists renounced their revolutionary agrarian program and proclaimed themselves the guardians of private property both in land and in industry. In line with this policy, they oppose the expropriation of the big landlords and retard the peasant struggle wherever they can. What the peasants need now, according to them, is not the land itself, but reduced rents, lower interest rates, better order in the village, more discipline in the army, an end to official corruption. This is intended to justify their thoroughly reformist and opportunist policies which are diametrically opposed to the revolutionary policies of the genuine Marxists. The importance of reforms has never been denied by Marxists, but they never substitute reform for revolution, as the Stalinists do. The Chinese peasant indeed suffers from exploitation and oppression in varied forms, but his hunger for land represents the most fundamental of his needs, if not the most urgent.

In an effort to compete with the Stalinist program of agrarian reform, the Kuomintang government has declared its readiness to allot land to demobilized soldiers. At the recent Plenum of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang the old Sun Yat-senist slogan of "The Land to the Tillers" was heard. Needless to say, all these promises and declarations are shameless deceptions. Nevertheless they are proof that land hunger is very real. As a result of the "army reconstruction" program of the Kuomintang, several million soldiers will return to the villages whence they came. These peasant youth, having learned the use of force in the settlement of problems, and influenced by the strike movement in the cities, will play an important role in the coming struggle for the land. When the agrarian revolution surges forward, it will certainly not stop at the artificial limits which the Stalinists seek to set to it by their reformist land program. The peasant hates the big landlord with an abiding hatred. His hatred extends to the Kuomintang regime, which is the political agent of his exploiters and oppressors. Already during the war, in isolated but flaming revolts against

Kuomintang-landlord rule, the Chinese village revealed the revolutionary direction it will inevitably take.

The Urban Petty Bourgeoisie

The Urban Petty Bourgeoisie: This variegated stratum of Chinese society embraces handicraftsmen, commercial employees, government servants, students, teachers, small shopkeepers and professionals of every description. Their situation was exceedingly miserable during the war. With city wholesale prices multiplying 4,000 times as the spiral of inflation mounted, the position of the fixed-income group can be better imagined than described. Their living standards dropped below those of the workers. The petty bourgeoisie, as a class, furnished a strong social support for the Kuomintang throughout the war. Despite all their hardships, they remained patriotic. But the "victory," bringing with it increased difficulties and burdens, quickly brought disillusionment as well. The attitude of this class today, generally speaking, is anti-Kuomintang. Many participate actively in the struggles of the workers. Some incline toward the Stalinists and support the Stalinist slogan for "Democracy and Peace." But as yet there has been no general ideological crystallization.

The Chinese Bourgeoisie: In order to provide a theoretical foundation for their reformist, popular-frontist policy of class collaboration, the Stalinists divide the ruling bourgeoisie into two mutually "antagonistic" sections. One section they designate as "bureaucratic," the other as "national." The former, they declare, is "feudal" and "reactionary," while the latter is "democratic" and "progressive." This conception of a fundamentally divided ruling class, corresponding to the former Stalinist concept of "good" and "bad" capitalists in other lands, is widespread in China today, thanks to Stalinist propaganda. The stratum which the Stalinists designate as "bureaucratic" consists in reality of the finance-capitalists who have close ties with the big landlords, on the one hand, and with Wall Street on the other. They control the whole system of Chinese economy. During the war years, the national wealth became concentrated in the hands of this small coterie of financial magnates, among whom are to be found the leading members of the Kuomintang government. They control the government and its armed forces. In close alliance with Wall Street, and using the four Chinese government banks as their key instruments, these "bureaucratic" capitalists gripped the economy by the throat and indulged in a mad orgy of speculation at the expense of the masses. This financial oligarchy is certainly reactionary, but to designate it as "feudal" means concealing its true character as the ruling summit of the entire bourgeoisie as a single class.

As for the so-called "national" and "progressive" section of the bourgeoisie, this is composed merely of those relatively smaller capitalists who have not found a place in the big financial oligarchy. They are indeed dissatisfied with the unbridled rule of the top magnates. They complain about the arbitrariness and corruption of the government. They prattle about "democracy." But they are no more "progressive" than the financial oligarchy is "feudal." Under the first blows of the revolutionary masses, these "democratic" national capitalists will quickly reveal their reactionary face, their essential class solidarity with the big finance-capitalists at the top.

This brief survey of the classes in China indicates clearly the accelerating process of political polarization. The process is still far from complete. But the direction is unmistakable. The broad masses are being swept, as if by an irresistible current, into opposition to the exploiters and their government.

Class lines are sharpening and hardening. The turbulent tide of class struggle testifies to a profound disruption of the equilibrium of social relationships. Not since 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek grasped the reins of power in a bloody counter-revolutionary coup d'etat, has the Kuomintang regime been so isolated as it is today. Its rule rests exclusively upon the army, the government bureaucracy, the landlords and capitalists—a tiny segment of the population. The little political capital it was able to accumulate during the early period of the war by its resistance to Japanese invasion and its appeals to national sentiment, has been dissipated in the sea of corruption and oppression which has inundated the country.

To some extent Chiang Kai-shek has offset the internal isolation of his regime by leaning ever more heavily on his powerful patron across the Pacific—Yankee imperialism, which has now entered as an integral factor into the oppression and robbery of the Chinese people. During the first four years of the Sino-Japanese war, 1937-41, China fought the Japanese invaders alone. In the last four years, 1941-45, the ruling Kuomintang continued the fight in alliance with, and growing dependence upon, the Anglo-American imperialists. During this latter phase, the American imperialists, in particular, gained commanding positions for themselves in China and forged the closest ties with the ruling summits of the Chinese bourgeoisie. Today more than ever the facade of national sovereignty provides only the scantiest cover for the reality of China's semi-colonial status. At every step the Kuomintang regime reveals its economic, financial, military and diplomatic dependence upon Washington. Thus the end of China's eight-year struggle against Japanese imperialism, fought at terrific cost in human life and treasure, finds the Chinese people still far from their goal of national independence.

This situation was foreseen by the Trotskyist movement. In a thesis entitled *The War in the Far East and the Revolutionary Perspectives*, adopted by the Founding Conference of the Fourth International in 1938, we pointed out that the Kuomintang was conducting a "purely military-defensive campaign" against Japanese imperialism which had already at that time revealed its complete impotence. Fearing to mobilize and arm the masses for genuine all-out struggle, Chiang Kai-shek placed first reliance on the Anglo-American imperialists, who, for their own reasons, were interested in expelling the Japanese invaders from China. The end result of this whole process was clearly forecasted: "If Japanese imperialism should be defeated in China by its imperialist rivals, and not by the revolutionary masses, this would signify the enslavement of China by Anglo-American capital." Only a slight amendment is necessary in this statement: British imperialism, its entire world position undermined and weakened, is in no sense the equal partner of American imperialism, which now seeks to assume the role of sole arbiter of China's destiny.

The Basic Conflict

It is precisely here that the American imperialists come into collision with the Soviet Union, which emerged from the war as a world power second only to the United States. Between these two powers there is deep and irremediable antagonism. Not only is there the immediate, conjunctural conflict which springs from Stalin's expansionist policies (which collide with the world aims and interests of American imperialism). There is the far more profound historic conflict inherent in the contradictory economic structures of the two countries: state and collectivized property in the Soviet Union, together with the

state monopoly of foreign trade, and capitalist private property, the system of profit and "free enterprise," in the United States and the rest of the capitalist world. This conflict can be resolved, in the last analysis, only by war. The American imperialists, together with their junior British partners, are preparing for this war—in Europe, in the Middle East, and in the Far East.

China (including Manchuria) and the Soviet Union have a common frontier which runs for thousands of miles. This fact of high strategic significance, quite apart from the interest of American imperialism in China as a source of exploitation and super-profits, is the strongest possible determinant in the China policy of the Washington administration as it prepares for the third world war. China is viewed not only as a staging ground for the conflict with the Soviet Union, but as one of the principal battlefields of the armed struggle. That is why, in North China, a powerful American military base is now being built up.

So long as civil war rages in China, it is difficult if not impossible for American imperialism to cash in on its victory over Japan. A country torn by armed strife is hardly a safe field for profitable investment. Nor is it easy, under such circumstances, for the Wall Street bandits to proceed smoothly with their plans for converting China into a base for military operations against the Soviet Union. That is why Washington is exerting such strenuous efforts to effect a "compromise" between the Kuomintang and the Stalinists. Its method is two-fold:

1. Pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to "democratize" the Kuomintang regime through the formation of a coalition government with the Stalinists and the Democratic League (a loose federation of small petty-bourgeois "liberal" groups such as the Third Party, the Youth Party, the Village Self-Government Party, the Vocational Education League, the National Salvation Society).

2. Diplomatic pressure, via Moscow, on the Chinese Stalinists to abandon the armed struggle against the Kuomintang and settle all differences by negotiation.

Washington's pressure on Chiang Kai-shek, quite characteristically, is exercised by dangling before him the prospect of a \$500,000,000 loan to fill up the bankrupt Kuomintang treasury. It is also not unlikely that the much larger loan sought by the Kremlin is being used as a bargaining lever by Washington to induce Stalin to force his Chinese henchmen into dropping the fight against Chiang Kai-shek.

Negotiations between Chiang and the Stalinists resulted some months ago in a "truce agreement," engineered by General Marshall. But before the ink was dry on this document fighting broke out again and it has been continuing sporadically ever since. The ulcers of civil war, springing from the acute ailments at the base of Chinese society, will not yield to the balm of the American dollar. The continuing strife, now billowing in waves of class struggle across the whole country, is clear testimony to the fact that the social needs and aspirations of the Chinese masses cannot be reconciled with the continuance of the Kuomintang dictatorship and the regime of capitalist-landlord oppression which it represents. The murderous and foully corrupt Kuomintang government, resting on the small minority of exploiters, is unable to make any serious social or political concessions to the masses. It can neither alleviate the economic plight of the people nor grant them any democratic rights, for this would only open the floodgates of revolution. The Stalinists, on the other hand, could capitulate totally to Chiang only at the price of their own political extinction and perhaps their physical extermination as well. That is why, despite their

abysmal betrayals of the interests of the masses—notably their abandonment of the agrarian revolution and the political support they gave to Chiang Kai-shek throughout the war—they are compelled now, on the basis of their miserable class-collaborationist and reformist program, to continue the struggle against the Kuomintang regime.

With what aim? As they themselves declare, with the aim of "democratizing" China! Alas, there is no example in all history of a reactionary dictatorship being metamorphosed into a democracy. This is a trick that cannot be turned even with the aid of Stalinist political alchemy. The bloody tyranny of the Kuomintang can be ended only by a popular revolution which will sweep away not only the political regime, but the exploiting class from which it derives its power—the capitalists and landlords and their imperialist patrons and backers. What is needed—and nothing short of it will suffice—is the socialist revolution of the proletariat, united with the poor peasantry and all other layers of the exploited and oppressed.

The Stalinists, of course, do not intend to lead any such revolution. On the contrary, they intend to stifle, sidetrack and abort every movement in that direction—if they can. They have made it abundantly clear that they are ready to call off the struggle against the Kuomintang (while, of course, retaining most of the territory they already hold) in exchange for seats in a "democratic" coalition cabinet and a few mild political reforms, including, naturally, their own legalization as a party. If some such basis of agreement can be found, Chiang Kai-shek will be only too ready to adorn his vile rule with a few "democratic" trappings. But he has no intention of yielding power. Nor will he share it with the Stalinists. And so the Chinese people would be given, not real democratic rights, but a democratic farce and fraud.

Stalinist Policy in China

The achievement of such a fraudulent "democracy" represents the sum and substance of Stalinist policy in China today. It is with this policy that they have managed to become the focal point and rallying center of the whole democratic movement in opposition to the Kuomintang. Their leading role is assured, moreover, by the sizeable territories which they control, the considerable armed forces at their disposal, and their long record of struggle against Chiang Kai-shek. The Democratic League, previously described, is a negligible factor on the political scene. The Trotskyists are still too small a group, and too isolated, to play an important role.

It was in 1936, on the eve of the Japanese invasion of China, that the Stalinists renounced their revolutionary agrarian program and proclaimed themselves the guardians of capitalist private property for the sake of achieving an "Anti-Japanese United Front" with Chiang Kai-shek. However, in the rural areas under their control they have reduced land rents and interest rates on loans. It is reforms such as these that have given the Stalinists their popularity among the lower layers of the peasantry. Also, the peasants have been able to observe that the Stalinist administration is clean and efficient, in contrast with the sink of iniquity represented by Kuomintang rule. Additionally, the Stalinist armies are more disciplined than Chiang Kai-shek's soldiery, who, because of their extreme poverty and hardships, go in for looting on a large scale.

However, while reducing rents and interest rates, the Stalinists showed the other side of their political face, by guaranteeing and enforcing payment of the lowered rents to the parasitic landlords and the reduced interest to the village usurers. By

these means they seek to prove to the landlords and capitalists that they are better and more efficient defenders of private property than the Kuomintang. Should they fail to reach an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek, it is their hope to make an alliance with the "national" section of the bourgeoisie on this basis. But this so-called "national" bourgeoisie cannot be wooed so easily. Although they chafe under the economic chaos and the unbridled rule of the Kuomintang, they see salvation from their ills in the pressure and intervention of American imperialism, rather than in the "Communists."

In the present state of political flux and uncertainty, the Stalinists are attempting to restore their influence in the cities, the influence they lost 19 years ago when they abandoned the proletariat which they had led to revolutionary defeat. They aim to plant themselves in the reviving labor movement. This will serve not only to widen their social base. It will at the same time give them opportunity, in a more decisive sector of the economy, to demonstrate to the "national" bourgeoisie their value as guardians of the social status quo and to prove that they, much better than the Kuomintang, can open a road to peaceful capitalist development. We may expect them to display their hand in strikes, by way of showing that they have more ability than the Kuomintang special police to control the workers and insure industrial peace. The end purpose of this policy, which will complement the class-collaborationist line of the Stalinists in the villages, is a coalition government with the "national" bourgeoisie.

Whether such a coalition is ever realized or not, the traitorous role of the Stalinists is apparent. They head the popular movement in order to behead it, in order to lead the rebellious masses back into the stultifying miasma of class collaboration. In China as throughout the world, Stalinism is the deadly foe of the toilers, the greatest obstacle in the path of the revolutionary movement. It is doubtful, indeed, if a Stalinist-bourgeois coalition will ever materialize, so profound is the social conflict underneath. Even if it should be realized, it would at best be an uneasy misalliance, constantly disturbed by erupting class strife and civil war. Such a coalition would have even less stability than the Stalinist-bourgeois coalition in France, because the plight of the masses cannot be relieved, not a single social problem can be solved, without ending the system of capitalist private property and exploitation. Moreover, behind the conflicting reality of Chinese social life lurk the contradictory needs and proddings of the foreign patrons of the Kuomintang and the Stalinists, namely, American imperialism and the Kremlin oligarchy, who pour fresh irritants on the sores of social

unrest. The Wall Street bandits want to stabilize the Kuomintang regime so that China may be converted into a happy hunting ground for American capital and a base for war against the Soviet Union. Stalin seeks to use the Chinese mass movement as a diplomatic pawn in his game of power politics, with the aim of "neutralizing" American imperialism.

The Trotskyist Program

In this new stage of the political struggle in China the Trotskyists must say to the Chinese people: You *can* drive the imperialist marauder from your country; you *can* end the bestial rule of the Kuomintang; you *can* destroy capitalist-landlord parasitism; you *can* cut through the murk of political and diplomatic trickery which threatens to make your country a new battlefield in a third world war; you *can* step forth on the high road that leads to the socialist revolution—but only under the revolutionary banner of the Fourth International. In the unfolding class battles the Trotskyists must tirelessly expose the treachery of the Stalinist misleaders. They must participate boldly in all the struggles of the masses and put forward a consistent program of democratic demands in line with the transitional program of the Fourth International. Among the workers they will agitate for the eight-hour day, a rising scale of wages to meet the rising cost of living, workers' control of production. Among the peasants they will unfurl the banner of the agrarian revolution—"Land to the Peasants!" They will fight for every hand's breadth of legality, in order the better to reach the broadest masses. They will struggle for freedom of speech and press, for the unhindered right of the workers to strike. All these transitional and partial demands, as they are taken up by the masses, must be knit together in the slogan for a plenipotentiary National Assembly, elected on the basis of free, direct and universal suffrage, in order to raise the partial and local struggles to an all-national level. The revolutionary demand for a plenipotentiary National Assembly, combining both legislative and executive functions, must be sharply counterposed to the plans of Chiang Kai-shek to summon a hand-picked, and therefore fraudulent, National Assembly. It must likewise be counterposed to the treachery of the Stalinists in trying to form a coalition government with the bourgeoisie.

By all these means the Trotskyists will succeed in winning to their banner the best proletarian militants, the bravest peasant fighters, the best among the radical intellectuals. Thus will they build the revolutionary party that will lead the tormented people of China to their socialist victory.

BRITISH "SOCIALISM" IN ACTION

Mr. Solley (Thurrock): I have to call the attention of the House to recent events in Cyprus of the utmost gravity, and, indeed, I do not think that I exaggerate when I say that the matters to which I shall have to refer are such as will shock the conscience of every true democrat. I did, in fact, raise the matter originally in a question which I put to the Secretary of State for the Colonies on January 30, 1946. The question was as follows:

Whether he is aware that the law under which the 18 members of the Pan-Cyprian trade union committee were recently sentenced to imprisonment is Fascist and anti-working class in its character; that the substance of the evidence against these trade unionists

was that they were engaged in publicizing the classic works of Socialism; and whether he will take immediate steps to free these trade unionists and alter the law so that it conforms to Socialist principles; and remove from office all those officials who were primarily responsible for instigating this prosecution.

The facts are that after a trial of 34 days, on January 21 of this year, the entire leadership of the Cypriot trade union movement in Cyprus was sentenced to imprisonment. Some received a sentence of 18 months, and others received a sentence of 12 months. They were found guilty of being members of a so-called unlawful association, namely, the Cypriot equivalent to our TUC

—the Pan-Cyprian trade unions Committee. . . .

We find that the entire leadership—18 members of this Committee are now in prison. It would be beyond the limits of the time which I have at my disposal to give the detailed background of this matter. It is sufficient to state that the naked despotism that obtained in Cyprus from 1931 onwards was such to make legal trade unions and political activities at the beginning of 1931 quite impossible. . . .

It is a fantastic state of affairs when Labor rules at Westminster, and Socialism is a crime according to the law of Cyprus. Considerable comments were made at the trial about Marxism. (*Laughter.*) It is all very well for Members opposite to laugh, but when we were discussing freedom a little while ago, for people to indulge in

Fascist activity, they said that that was necessary in a democratic State, and they cannot now logically argue that you cannot give the same rights to the Marxist. In order to show the political nature of this trial I propose to give a quotation from the exchange of questions and answers between the President of the Court and the Solicitor-General of Cyprus:

President: Is Marxist theory a crime?

Solicitor-General: According to Cyprus law, yes.

President: Is the possession of Marxist books a crime?

Solicitor-General: Yes.

When I read that I had in mind the Nazi bonfires of books which they did not like.

The Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies:

I regret that through the indisposition of my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State he is unable to reply to the Debate. I regret further that I have had such short notice in which to prepare a reply. I should like to point out that

the charges made against the trade union leaders concerned were charges which were made under section 46, 60 and 61 of the Criminal Code in Cyprus, which is precisely similar to the law of this country. So there can be no suggestion that this is a law of a particularly onerous kind. It is the law of this country which is the basis of the law of sedition in Cyprus. I regret the rather intemperate language my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock, etc. etc.

(Excerpts from British *Hansard*, equivalent to U. S. Congressional Proceedings.)

The Myth of Full Employment Under Capitalism

By WARREN CREEL

These authors*, Henry Wallace, Secretary of Commerce of the United States, and Sir William Beveridge, economic adviser to the British government, both seek to show that it will be easy for capitalism to eliminate depressions, to provide jobs, high wages and permanent prosperity for all. Each sets forth the same plan, the Keynesian system of controlled government spending. They base their cases on the same trick assumption that capitalism is as rational as modern production can and ought to be.

They exploit the fact that the modern working class has acquired a natural understanding of a cooperative economic system. Workers cooperate with other workers all day long in collective production. To the worker it presents no problem to see how the various industries and branches of production could work as a team for the most efficient production all around, and thereby pour out such a mass of products that there would be plenty for everyone concerned. That is the obvious thing to do with modern machinery.

The difficult thing to understand is the irrational fact that all production can be stalled, and that the millions of mankind can be taken away from their work and forced to stop production, merely because under capitalist ownership the whole of society has to stand still except when it can add to the accumulated riches of a tiny class of capitalists.

This working class understanding of rational economics exists as a firm feeling that modern industry is suited to cooperative production at high efficiency with abundant output assured, and that there is no good reason why such efficient production could not start right now. Hence, the general impatience in the United States, with restrictions or fetters on production.

Politicians seeking mass support, such as Wallace and Beveridge, can no longer base their economic appeal simply on immediate issues like wages, or job protection through tariffs, or even government benefits such as social insurance and relief. Today they must be prepared to answer the more basic demand, that something be done to the economic system to take the fetters off production. Hence these books.

***SIXTY MILLION JOBS**, by Henry A. Wallace. 1945. Cloth, Reynal & Hitchcock and Simon & Schuster, New York. \$2.00. Paper, Simon & Schuster, New York. \$1.00.

FULL EMPLOYMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY, by Sir William H. Beveridge. W. W. Norton & Co., New York. 1945. \$3.75.

Starting with the general knowledge that modern production should bring abundance, Wallace and Beveridge want to assure everyone that modern production *under capitalist ownership* can actually bring abundance. At every turn they hide the fact that capitalist ownership regulates production for capitalist profit. They assume that the system runs as production ought to run, to produce for society. On this basis they have no trouble at all painting a rosy picture of capitalism run according to a plan, with a board of government experts ensuring that everything will run smoothly, with jobs and plenty for all. What they can't account for is the fact that this fine system ever had any crises in the past.

Yet they not only admit the past crises; they pose as stern critics of capitalism's ills. With banners unfurled, they try to put themselves at the head of the marching army of protest, *and lead it astray*. Wallace, for instance, even emphasizes that boasts about the high American standard of living are incorrect:

Before the war one third of all families had incomes of less than \$1000, averaging about \$500; another 40% had incomes between \$1000 and \$2000, averaging \$1400; another 17% had incomes between \$2000 and \$3000; and the final 10% had incomes of over \$3000.

That was before the war, while during the war:

Even with full employment at present wage levels there would still be around 8 million city families getting less than \$1000 a year. These families would not be able to buy enough in the way of meat, eggs, and dairy products either to raise healthy children or to maintain their own vigor. . . . (These 8 million families below the subsistence level amount to more than one-fifth of the total 37 million families in the nation.)

(And in agriculture) For many years, one-half of the nation's 6½ million farm families have been living on marginal and sub-marginal land and on farms too small to make a decent living. They have been producing only about ten percent of all the farm products sold in the market.

Low incomes spell a low standard of living for employed workers. But with unemployment capitalism suffers another waste from lost production. During the twelve years 1930 to 1941, Wallace calculates the total preventable idleness as 88 million man years. In lost production it comes to \$350 billion.

He illustrates the amount thus wasted:

It is enough to pay in full for 70,000,000 homes at \$5000 each—more than three times as many as would be necessary to eliminate all the slums in the United States, both rural and urban.

It is enough to more than double the capital stock of all the private corporations in the United States.

It is enough to build 350 river-valley authorities the size of TVA.

Low incomes are connected with unemployment. Raising living standards will make jobs.

We must conquer the slums; we must rid ourselves of undernourishment; we must raise the general level of health; and we must make it possible for everyone to develop his or her latent capacities for work and profitable recreation. In doing these things we shall continue to multiply job opportunities.

As early as 1943, the Department of Commerce pointed out to us that, in 1946, we could produce the same amount of goods that we produced in 1940 and still have 19 million workers unemployed. All too often we ignore such statistical guideposts. Later on we look around and say, "We were warned. Why didn't we act before it was too late?"

Such guideposts point to this one inescapable fact: if we do not prepare our plans now, with courage and wisdom, we shall eventually experience a loss not of 88,000,000 man-years of labor but of 200,000,000 man-years of labor—a loss not of 350 billion dollars in national production, but of more than 500 billion dollars.

It is anyone's guess what would happen to our free institutions once they were subjected to such joblessness and misery and waste. That's the real worry for Beveridge too:

Free institutions may be imperiled in any country to which mass unemployment returns.

Production and Consumption

What is responsible for this disparity between the steady abundance the workers could produce, and the uncertain pittance that they get? The answer leaps up from the facts, and Wallace and Beveridge have to deal with it. Under capitalist ownership, the capitalists make profits by keeping as much as they can, and paying out as little in wages as they must. They pay the workers the smallest wage they can bargain them down to. On the average, that amounts to a wage which is just enough to get along on, the smallest amount a worker can afford to work for. Even, for a large part of the workers, it amounts to "not enough . . . to raise healthy children or maintain their own vigor." And this is the case even in the most prosperous capitalist country.

Thus, it is the very system of capitalist ownership and wage labor which sets this ceiling on the standard of living. This same system prevents production of abundance.

To force the workers to work for low wages the capitalists need a permanent group of unemployed workers as a threat. Every worker must know that there is a man out of a job that the boss can put in his place if he demands higher wages. This ever-existent unemployed group under capitalism Marx named the industrial reserve army.

It is one of the outstanding absurdities of capitalism that millions of workers must be arbitrarily sentenced to suffer unemployment in order to regulate wage levels for the economic system. The capitalists and their economists usually deny the existence of this industrial reserve army. But when talk of a full employment policy smokes them out they insist that unemployment must be preserved.

Beveridge quotes the London *Times* on this:

Unemployment is not a mere accidental blemish in a private-enterprise economy. On the contrary, it is part of the essential mechanism of the system, and has a definite function to fulfil.

The first function of unemployment (which has always existed, in open or disguised forms) is that it maintains the authority of master over man. The master has normally been in a position to say, "If you don't want the job, there are plenty of others who do." When the man can say, "If you don't want to employ me, there are plenty of

others who will," the situation is radically altered. One effect of such a change might be to remove the number of abuses to which workers have been compelled to submit in the past, and this is a development which many employers would welcome. But the absence of fear of unemployment might go farther and have a disruptive effect on factory discipline. Some troubles of this nature are being encountered today, but in war-time the over-riding appeal of patriotism keeps them within bounds. In peace-time, with full employment, the worker would have no counter-weight to feeling that he is employed merely to make profits for the firm, and he is under no moral obligation to refrain from using his new-found freedom from fear to snatch every advantage that he can. . . .

If free wage bargaining as we have known it hitherto is continued in conditions of full employment there would be a continuous upward pressure upon money wage rates. This phenomenon also exists at the present time and is also kept within bounds by the appeal to patriotism. In peace-time the vicious spiral of wages and prices might become chronic.

What is Beveridge's solution? He has none. He brushes aside the fact that the capitalists not only want profits, but are in a bitter struggle for profits, a struggle in which the loser is destroyed. If there is any surplus the capitalist must spend it on merchandising and advertising to swell the sales of his product. The system doesn't give the capitalist freedom to pay extra wages to the workers, even if he wanted to. On this central problem of his case Beveridge can offer only a little moral advice. Wages, he says, *ought* to be determined by reason, and not by a contest between employers and workers. That is Beveridge's solution.

Henry Wallace similarly offers only another little sermon on this issue. There are some people, he admits, who ". . . would tolerate several million permanently unemployed in the unsound belief that the competition of the unemployed will keep wages down and profits up." What is Wallace's solution to this rotten setup? He does not accept it:

The goal of 60 million jobs is based on the opposite premise—one which doesn't accept the idea that a large part of the citizenry should be denied jobs. This premise asserts that all who want to work and seek work have a right to work.

That ought to take care of the problem!

The Unemployed Reserve Army

When discussion of the Murray Full Employment bill smoked out the American employers they rushed to Congress to fight for unemployment, in terms just as frank as the British capitalists. They testified flatly that full employment would be bad for their industries, that American business needs a permanent reserve army of unemployed to regulate the labor market. Their obedient Congress took the promise of "full employment" out of the bill. American capitalism will not tolerate even a gesture to lessen the workers' "fear of unemployment," which "is part of the essential mechanism of the system." They know they have to keep the reserve army of unemployed, the low standard of living for all employed workers that goes with it, and the low level of production and the chronic crisis that follows from it.

So go the facts of life under capitalism. But on paper, after Wallace and Beveridge have ruled the profit motive out of wage bargaining, they find it easy to move on to a picture of high wages and high production. In 1916 Lenin answered this argument in *Imperialism*:

It goes without saying that if capitalism could develop agriculture, which today lags far behind industry everywhere, if it could raise the standard of living of the masses, which are still poverty-stricken and half-starved in spite of the amazing advance in technical knowledge, then there could be no talk of a surplus of capital. And the

petty-bourgeois critics of capitalism advance this "argument" on every occasion. But then capitalism would not be capitalism; for unevenness of development and semi-starvation of the masses are fundamental, inevitable conditions and pre-requisites of this method of production. As long as capitalism remains capitalism, surplus capital will never be used for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses, for this would mean a decrease in profits for the capitalists, instead it will be used to increase profits by exporting the capital abroad, to backward countries.

Lenin summarizes the facts which sweep away the whole case of these would-be reformers of capitalism. Capitalist employers are in business and must be, to make money for themselves, and not to make goods for society. They can afford to start production only when they can sell their goods and end up richer than they started. If production will not increase their wealth they don't permit any production. It is better to close down and keep what they have, rather than spend money producing what they cannot sell. For sales to increase their wealth they need a market; but they can't get richer by passing out their own money to make the market for their own goods. They wouldn't be ahead a penny. Therefore, they have nothing to gain by paying any wages above the least that they can bargain the workers down to. The more they have to pay the workers, the less is left for profits. "As long as capitalism remains capitalism, surplus capital will never be used for the purpose of raising the standard of living of the masses, for this would mean a decrease in profits for the capitalists."

If the capitalists merely hoarded their profits, the system would run into a crisis at once because all this vast buying power would be withdrawn from the market. To keep the system running the capitalists must be able to keep their profits and spend them too. They do that by spending their increased money-capital for capital equipment, additional machines and factories. Thus their accumulation of wealth can really grow, and only such growth can avoid a crisis for the system. Yet capital investments through the building of new factories is possible only as new markets are found for the increased output. The growth of the home market is soon used up, and the capitalists must look outside, to yet undeveloped countries as fields for growth. Once there is no profitable use for capital at home, "it will be used to increase profits by exporting the capital abroad, to backward countries."

Lenin wrote his Marxist analysis in 1916 against the petty-bourgeois Wallaces and Beveridges of that day. In the thirty years that have elapsed, history has verified the analysis over and over again. Every advance of capitalism has only brought increased pressure for expansion into foreign fields, where profits could be secured. The capitalist nations have fought two imperialist wars for the vital privilege of controlling backward countries, as fields for exporting capital. The capitalist countries with the least fields for expansion have sickened and collapsed economically, one after another, and capitalism as a whole has gone into decline. And still not one capitalist country has been able to cure its crisis by raising the living standard of the masses, because there is no capitalist profit in doing that.

Wallace and Beveridge offer the old recipe with a new sauce, a Keynesian government planning board to create permanent prosperity through government spending. They do not hesitate to claim that the most sweeping cures can be worked by government spending.

Beveridge says:

There are some things of which the state can make certain. It can, by incurring expenditure, raise the total demand for labor to any desired point; that is to say the State can make certain that there

is always a demand for labor quantitatively exceeding the supply of labor.

The fallacy of this Keynesian economics was discussed in my article in the May issue of *Fourth International*. In brief, this is a desperate remedy, which soon destroys itself, and the economic system that tries it. The idea is to furnish the capitalists fictitious growth of wealth. Since they lack opportunities to invest in new factories, issue government bonds to give them an outlet for their funds. Then let the government spend the money building public works to stimulate the market, just as it would be stimulated if the capitalists spent it in building new factories. The capitalists do not accumulate new factories, instead they accumulate boxes full of interest-bearing government paper. The government can even spend the borrowed capital on munitions to be burned up in a war, and still the capitalists accumulate paper wealth, and allegedly all goes well because accumulation is what makes capitalism run.

This easy paper substitute for real accumulation seems too good to be true and it is. Fictitious paper capital is only a parasite on real capital. The interest and principal on these government bonds can be paid only by taxing the production from real capital. Today, a fictitious capital of 300 billion dollars in federal debt seeks to drain income from the real capital, the productive equipment of the nation, which is valued at approximately upwards of 133 billion dollars. Such a drain drives the capitalists to raise prices and cut wages, to leave a surplus to pay the taxes to make good the government paper holdings of the capitalist class and its banking system.

How the War Was Financed

The war was financed by issuing fictitious capital, and the capitalist class is now wrestling with the problem of finding real wealth to make that paper good. For the war they had to take the risk, because it was a war for their own imperialist profit interests, to eliminate at all costs a dangerous imperialist rival. But it saddled the system with a fearful load. The war proved that the capitalists will spend money like water to save themselves, especially when they have hope of collecting it all back with interest, from their government paper. But Wallace and Beveridge try to use the war as evidence that the nation could have the same high level of production in peace time, *under capitalist ownership*.

Wallace, as usual, timidly avoids the main issue. Although at the previous high level, in 1929, the total peace-time production and national income of the United States was about 100 billion dollars, the war doubled the record production and income to 200 billion dollars a year.

We are a 200 billion dollar nation now—and we should never be satisfied with less. To accept anything less would not be merely "Selling America Short." It would be imperiling our American heritage.

True enough, the added hundred billion almost entirely represents government war purchases.

In other words, the Federal government represented in 1929 about four per cent of the total market of the nation for finished products. Contrast this with 1944, when the government expenditures accounted for nearly half of all the dollars spent, and the businessmen spent practically nothing for plant or equipment except at the suggestion of the government on behalf of the war effort. From the standpoint of initiating jobs, the Federal government in 1944 was more than twenty times as important as in 1929.

I believe [italics supplied] that we can have a national budget of 200 billion dollars and 60 million jobs by 1950—and balance our Federal budget at the same time.

Wallace says he believes it, but does not give a word of rea-

son why, here, or any other place in the book. Instead he jumps hastily to the pleasant task of showing a series of "national budgets" which illustrate how conveniently such an abundance could be divided in various ways between industry, agriculture, etc.

To find even an attempt at proof we have to turn to Beveridge:

... the only sovereign remedy yet discovered by democracies for unemployment is total war. Those who use war experience as an argument for the possibility of abolishing mass unemployment in peace often find themselves met by two popular objections; first, that this result is achieved only at the cost of incurring immense public debt; second, that the achievement of war proves nothing for peace, since the full employment of the civilian population depends on withdrawing millions of men and women from useful production to military service. The first of these objections is an objection not to the possibility of abolishing mass unemployment, but to the assumed cost. As is shown in paragraph 198 and in Appendix C, this objection is without substance. The second objection is also without substance, because the distinction suggested by it, between men and women in military service as doing useless things and those in industrial employment doing useful things, is invalid. Those who use arms are neither more nor less usefully employed than those who make arms; both users and makers are engaged in meeting needs of the highest order of priority.

Certainly fighting with arms is exactly as useful or useless as making arms. But capitalism can organize spending for imperialist war because it is useful, in any "order of priority," to the capitalist imperialists, and to them only. Yet Beveridge dares claim that capitalism can and will give jobs by spending for the workers, by providing good homes, better food, a Na-

tional Health Service, and other things that conquer no empires for the capitalist class. Beveridge merely tries to cover over the difference between spending useful to the capitalists and to the workers.

His other point, "paragraph 198," etc., gives the standard case from John Maynard Keynes for the cure by government borrowing and spending, previously discussed.

* * *

The demand to take the fetters off production and for full employment is a social demand on a very high level, far beyond the ordinary immediate demands in the economic struggle. Today, just as other social demands are taking shape as mass demands, this too has become a mass demand. These two books take the demand for granted. The anti-labor U. S. Congress passed the Murray Full Employment bill because it understood very well that the still-confused demand for "some change" in the economic system was too widespread to be ignored. A large number of labor and farm organizations petitioned Truman to sign the bill, even with the "full employment" promise out, as a step, in their opinion, toward corrective regulation of the economic system.

The social demand which has called forth the Congressional maneuvers and these two books, is far more important than these books themselves. The workers know what full production can accomplish, they know that the fetters on production must be removed, and they are searching for the program that will do it. The working class as a whole is voicing this demand, a demand which cannot be satisfied except by socialism, because only socialism can take the capitalist fetters off production.

A Biography of Stalin

By JOHN G. WRIGHT

STALIN, An Appraisal of the Man and His Influence, by Leon Trotsky. Harper & Bros. New York. 516—xv pp. \$5.00.

No other contemporary biography has assumed such political significance as Leon Trotsky's biography of Stalin. For years it has been the source of international intrigue and struggle.

The Kremlin dictator had determined to murder the author long before the latter began working on this book in 1938. In each of the Moscow frame-up trials Leon Trotsky and his son Leon Sedov had figured as the main defendants and had been condemned *in absentia*. Stalin's handpicked judges passed the death sentence; its execution was entrusted to his even more carefully selected assassins who redoubled their efforts when news came of the projected biography.

In May 1940, Trotsky's home in Coyoacan, a suburb of Mexico City, was assaulted at night by a machine gun squad led by the Mexican painter Siqueiros. Failure attended this attempt to kill Trotsky and simultaneously to destroy his archives and manuscript by means of incendiary bombs. A few months later, on August 20, 1940, another hired assassin of Stalin did finally succeed in striking Trotsky down while the latter was at work on the manuscript.

Although the book was not completed, the text was in a form readily suitable for publication. Nevertheless the publication was deliberately delayed. After it came off the press in 1941,

Harper and Brothers withdrew it, recalling even the review copies. It is no secret that this action was taken at the behest of the U.S. State Department, which accorded many other similar diplomatic favors to the Kremlin during the war-time alliance.

Political motives underlie its release today to the public just as was the case in its suppression five years earlier. With the sharp worsening of relations between Washington and Moscow, the propagandists of American imperialism hope to use the crimes of Stalin in order to besmirch the October Revolution and further turn public opinion against the Soviet Union. But they will be sadly disappointed. None of Trotsky's writings have ever served the ends of imperialist reaction, but on the contrary have unfailingly dealt the latter the heaviest blows.

Superficial observers and philistines have from the first tried to belittle the struggle between Stalin and Trotsky as a personal duel for power. In reality it was throughout an implacable conflict of two diametrically opposed systems of ideas: the ideas of progress and proletarian revolution *versus* those of reaction and counter-revolution.

In his 1937 summary speech before the Dewey Commission of Inquiry into the Moscow Trials, Trotsky explained as follows the respective roles of the two main protagonists in this struggle:

Neither Stalin nor I find ourselves in our present positions by accident. But we did not create these positions. Each of us is drawn into his drama as the representative of definite ideas and principles. In their turn, the ideas and principles did not fall from the sky, but

have profound social roots. That is why one must take, not the psychological abstraction of Stalin as a "man," but his concrete, historical personality as leader of the Soviet bureaucracy. One can understand the acts of Stalin only by starting from the conditions of existence of the new privileged stratum, greedy for material comforts, apprehensive for its positions, fearing the masses, and mortally hating all opposition.

These lines provide at the same time the criteria that guided Trotsky in writing "Stalin." Prominent individuals in history, their role and character, can be correctly understood and analyzed primarily in terms of the social forces they serve, and, in the final analysis, personify. Trotsky, the foremost, most authoritative exponent and continuator of orthodox Marxism, rejected as false any other approach.

It is indeed impossible to comprehend Stalin's role, particularly his meteoric rise to power, without understanding the exceptional and unrepeatable combination of historical factors that cleared the path for the future dictator.

As a politician Stalin belongs to a type by no means uncommon: Men of action, organically inclined toward adventurism and careerism. The most highly developed traits in such individuals are: An insatiable craving for power, strong will, perseverance and cunning coupled with a complete disregard for ideas, principles and loyalties.

These qualifications have sufficed for many a political career. But as a rule such individuals attain only subordinate positions except during periods which give rise, so to speak, to an unlimited social demand for political gangsterism. This demand arises during breaking-points in the historical process, periods of great historical transitions when rival social systems—the one outlived, the other about to be born—are engaged in mortal combat. The breed of political thugs becomes especially prolific in these periods of transition. This was the case, for example, during the transition from feudalism to capitalism (in particular, as Trotsky points out, the Renaissance era). We witness the same phenomenon in the epoch of the death agony of capitalism.

But even during transitional periods, political adventurers and thugs require additional qualifications to attain topflight prominence, namely: they must qualify as mass leaders. Here we touch one of the peculiarities in Stalin's rise to power. While he belongs, generally speaking, to the same political type as Mussolini or Hitler, Stalin lacks a number of their unquestionable gifts, being neither an initiator of a mass movement, nor a talented agitator. As a matter of fact, Stalin's most deeply rooted personal traits—"distrust of the masses, utter lack of imagination, short-sightedness, an inclination to follow the line of least resistance"—are precisely those which disqualify him for the role of mass leader. His rise, therefore, as Trotsky correctly points out, "is not comparable with anything in the past." It is unique.

Its secret lies in the difference between the social base on which the reaction led by Stalin unfolded and the social base of the reactionary movements headed by Mussolini and Hitler. It was this that enabled Stalin to rise to power "not with the aid of personal qualities, but with the aid of an impersonal machine. And it was not he who created the machine, but the machine that created him." The very traits in Stalin's personality that rendered him unfit to lead the masses transformed him into an ideal leader of the rising counter-revolutionary Soviet bureaucracy.

The metamorphosis occurred not in full public view but behind the scenes: nor did it take place at a single stroke but in a number of stages over a period of years.

The pre-history of the Kremlin dictator is shrouded in deepest secrecy. Concurrently there is almost a quarter of a century's encrustation of distortions and falsifications without parallel. Most of the material—original and counterfeit alike—remained in the Soviet Union, either in the Kremlin's vaults or long ago destroyed. Compelled to work abroad, in exile, Trotsky was obviously limited both with regard to his source material and his available staff of collaborators. For this reason he had to rely on his memory as eyewitness and participant in the decisive events, a course which he eschewed in his other historical writings.

This should not be taken to mean, however, that "Stalin" is based in part or as a whole on reminiscences. On the contrary, few contemporary biographies can match it in point of thoroughness, variety and richness of documentation. Let us note in passing that in this case as in all others, not one anti-Trotskyist reviewer has been able to refute a single reference or point to an instance of misuse of source material by Trotsky.

In marked contrast to the conditions under which this work was written is its great objectivity. We have here an almost detached view of a great mind analyzing step by step the process whereby human clay, not unmixed with dross, became converted into a prodigious idol—the idol in the Kremlin.

Joseph Djughashvili—the future Stalin—was the son of a peasant shoemaker from Didi-Lilo, a little village in the Caucasus. The child's earliest years were poisoned with hatred of his drunken, shiftless, despotic father; the predominant childhood influence was the young peasant mother who dreamed of her son's rising in the world as a priest. This traditional aspiration of poor peasants, brought the adolescent Djughashvili under the sway of petty clerical despots of the Tiflis theological seminary. Family and school instilled in the future dictator hatred of all authority. He rebelled.

His rebellion flowed initially into nationalist channels, a progressive development for a member of an oppressed nationality. The young theological student was thereupon swiftly caught up by the powerful revolutionary undertow in Czarist Russia, where not only anti-feudal but also anti-capitalist moods and ideas prevailed among the intellectual circles. The industrialization of a backward country and the rapid rise of a young proletariat created very fertile soil for the spread of Marxist ideas which penetrated the bleak seminary walls many years before Joseph Djughashvili enrolled there. That he accepted these ideas is evidenced by the severance of his connections with the seminary and his entry into the revolutionary movement. It is highly dubious, however, that he began as a Bolshevik, as the latter-day mythology claims. Early Czarist police records list him as a Menshevik. On such questions Czarist spies seldom erred.

In any case, there is no doubt whatever that Bolshevism attracted him and that he remained connected with Lenin's party after once joining it. But what attracted him was not so much the consistency, Marxist orthodoxy and political intransigence of Bolshevism as the effectiveness and power of its organizational structure and methods.

This youth, even as a revolutionist, placed supreme confidence not in the masses but only in the machine. He lays bare his soul in one of his early appeals, broadcast in the province of Georgia during the 1905 revolution. The appeal concludes as follows:

Let us hold out our hands to each other and rally around our Party's committees. We must not forget even for a minute that only the Party committees can worthily lead us, only they will light the way to the Promised Land. . . .

Committees remained his native element to the end.

Hatred and envy of the powerful turned Stalin into a revolutionist. He accepted the ideas of Bolshevism but never learned to feel them. They remained a sort of implantation, never penetrating into his blood and marrow. He could no more be in harmony with them than with the masses whose age-long struggles, aspirations and hopes these ideas, in the last analysis, express.

Trotsky demonstrates irrefutably that each time the masses entered the political arena, this provincial committeeman found himself completely out of his element, incapable of orientation, uneasy, unsure, groping blindly and straying time and again politically into the camp of the ideological opponents of Bolshevism. Concurrently, he found himself shunted aside not only by individuals of greater stature but also those with far lesser abilities.

Conversely, periods of reaction, when the masses ceased to lead political lives, became the major signposts in his career. During these periods he advanced most rapidly, landing finally in 1912 on the top Party committee. The specific weight of a political machine grows in proportion with the weakening of the mass movement. Trotsky demonstrates how closely Stalin's career parallels the operation of this political law, until it finally propelled him to undreamed-of heights.

For Stalin to rise to undisputed power two conditions had to be fulfilled: first, the revolutionist in him had to be killed; second, he had to destroy Lenin's party. This is precisely what happened.

Trotsky writes:

If Stalin could have foreseen at the very beginning where his fight against Trotskyism would lead, he undoubtedly would have stopped short, in spite of the prospect of victory over all his opponents. But he did not foresee anything.

Trotsky said virtually the same thing at the very beginning of the struggle against Stalinism in 1923.

The social base of the counter-revolution in the Soviet Union dictated that it be led by an individual with a reputation of an old revolutionist. Stalin possessed this deserved reputation. But his personal shortcomings prevented him from ever playing a leading role in Lenin's lifetime. This deficiency had to be remedied at all costs.

Hence a new biography was supplied by an army of liars and counterfeiterers. According to these forged credentials Stalin appears as the co-builder of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin's right hand man in the period of October, chief figure in the Civil War, savior of Petrograd and Tsaritsin (renamed Stalingrad after Lenin died), etc., etc.

Trotsky demolishes this monolithic lie by restoring some of the salient historical facts. (To restore all would have required a score of volumes.) To cite a few:

Stalin played a dismal role during the 1917 revolution. Together with Kamenev he flirted with the Conciliators, advocated unity with the Mensheviks, supported the Provisional Government. He reoriented himself with difficulty only after Lenin's arrival in Petrograd.

He played no important part whatever in the Petrograd insurrection, for which he himself once gave the credit to Trotsky.

His record during the Civil War was likewise less than heroic. His fraudulent claim to having "saved" Petrograd rests on the flimsy coincidence that he happened to be in that city in May 1919 when Yudenich launched his first sally with negligible forces and was easily repelled. The real threat to Petrograd came in October of the same year, when Yudenich

attacked, for the second time, in force and was repelled. This event is connected with the name of Trotsky and not of Stalin who was hundreds of miles away at the time.

Similarly the "epic" of Tsaritsin will hardly withstand close scrutiny. Stalin did spend several months there in 1918 while on a mission to secure badly-needed food-stuffs (which he failed to obtain); his military activities were of such a nature that he had to be removed (on the categorical insistence of Trotsky).

Stalin's chief operations during the Civil War consisted of behind-the-scenes intrigues, with the aim of inciting the so-called Military Opposition (proponents of guerrilla armies and guerrilla warfare) against Trotsky's program of systematically building the Red Army and utilizing the former Czarist officers.

The number of similar facts and episodes can be extended almost indefinitely.

Stalin's Rise to Prominence

Stalin's rise to prominence began in 1923 when Lenin lay on his deathbed. Trotsky adduces weighty evidence in support of his conclusion that Lenin was given poison by Stalin. The latter moreover, had ample motives for so doing: Lenin had broken all personal relations with him, and was preparing to crush him politically.

Despite the somber and sometimes sinister subject, the biography is by no means wholly negative. Its main setting is the background of the development of the Russian revolution. Entire sections of the book are devoted to an exposition of the different phases through which the revolutionary movement passed. Among the invaluable material there is data, most of it available for the first time in English, relating to the history of the Bolshevik Party, the period of the October Revolution, the Civil War, the building of the Red Army, etc. Throughout the book, Trotsky gives brilliant and intimate sketches of many outstanding personalities in the Bolshevik movement, Lenin's collaborators and disciples.

Even the fragmentary sections in the supplement ("The Thermidorian Reaction" and "Kinto in Power") will greatly aid the reader who is interested in understanding the social process and moods that accompanied the initial phases of the degeneration of the Soviet Union.

Contained in the appendix is an exceptionally important theoretical document, "The Three Concepts of the Russian Revolution." It is Trotsky's definitive exposition of the differences between the views of Bolshevism and Menshevism on the development of the Russian Revolution and his own points of agreement and disagreement with Lenin on this question. Involved here is the application of the famous theory of the permanent revolution to the peculiar Russian conditions. Trotsky originally intended to include it in his work on Lenin which he began during his exile in Norway but was never able to complete.

It is necessary to briefly comment in passing on the scandalous conduct of Charles Malamuth who figures as "editor" of the book. He had been hired solely as translator of the book. Instead of preparing the uncompleted text for publication as the author had left it, he arbitrarily proceeded to interpolate passages directly counter to Trotsky's own ideas, among them the cynical contention that Stalinism is the inevitable outcome of Bolshevism. It goes without saying that one of the main objects of the author was to demonstrate just the contrary.

The reviews accorded this book by the bourgeois press were without exception hostile. The favorite method was to belittle it as "intensely personal." To be sure not a single one of these impartial gentlemen bothered to adduce an instance of Trotsky's

alleged subjectivity, let alone challenge any of the factual material in the book.

Trotsky, of course, is not passionless. His book is one of the most annihilating indictments in history of an individual. It is at the same time an impassioned defense of the struggle for socialism.

Although the author is dead, Wall Street and all its apologists still fear his fundamental ideas. They are afraid, because in this book as in all his writings, Trotsky presents his analysis

of the crisis in the world today and points to the revolutionary way out for the masses. They are afraid of the bright light this book sheds on the building of the revolutionary party.

What makes these creatures recoil in horror should attract every serious worker and youth interested in revolutionary socialist ideas.

This book will take its place among the great Marxist classics not simply as a brilliant biography but as a powerful weapon in the struggle for the communist future of man.

Perspectives of European Revolution

It Is Time to Grow Up

The Infantile Sickness of the European Secretariat

By FELIX MORROW

The "Reply to Comrade Morrow by the European Secretariat of the Fourth International" (March, 1946, *Fourth International*) is only a small chip from the workshop of its authors. Its full implications will not be readily apparent to readers until they study the two main recent products of its political line: the European Secretariat's "Report for an International Discussion" and the "Majority Report on the Political Situation" to the French party congress. After they are published here, I shall attempt a comprehensive analysis. Here I can only as yet deal with the "Reply."

The appearance of the latest documents confirms many times over, alas, the fears I expressed last year concerning the disorientation of the French majority and the European Secretariat. In the intervening year I was led to hope, by letters from Comrade Patrice, Secretary of the European Secretariat, that the comrades were re-orienting themselves; as late as a letter of October 27, 1945—long after receipt of my letter of July 10, 1945 to which the "Reply" is an answer—he was still assuring me that the European Secretariat and the SWP minority were in "75 per cent agreement" and that the European Secretariat was in "100 per cent disagreement" with the SWP majority. Now, however, it turns out that the European Secretariat is 100 per cent in disagreement with the SWP minority and 100 per cent in agreement with the SWP majority.

I think that, basically, the present line-up is not the result of maneuvers, though maneuvers have played their part, but accurately represents the difference in tendencies in the world Trotskyist movement. The previous opinions of the European Secretariat concerning the majority and minority in the SWP were the results of a misunderstanding. Traces of this misunderstanding still remain in its "Reply." Thus it writes: "In our opinion the chief merit of the American minority lay in its drawing attention to the importance of democratic slogans." But in the very next sentences it shows that it has not the faintest understanding of the importance of democratic slogans. Much more consistent has

been the attitude of its present ally, the SWP majority, which has never conceded to the minority this "chief merit" or any other merit. Another remaining trace of past misunderstandings is the statement in the "Reply" that the SWP majority "has at times distorted the reality of the European situation." The SWP majority can with justice claim that in endorsing the latest documents of the European Secretariat it remains essentially true to the line which it has followed since the October, 1943, Plenum. No, the European Secretariat and the SWP majority belong on the same side in the great cleavage of political lines which is developing in the Fourth International.

This is not to say that the French majority and the SWP majority are political groupings of the same type. On another occasion I shall explain in detail how different are their physiognomies and why they must eventually part company. For the moment it is enough to point out that the European Secretariat is sectarian in theory and in practice. Whereas the SWP majority is sectarian in its propaganda about the rest of the world and especially for Europe but in actual practice in the United States scarcely rises above the level of trade unionism.

The first thing to call attention to in the "Reply" is that it fails to answer most of the points of criticism contained in the letters to which it states it is an answer. One, my "Letter to All the Sections of the Fourth International" of November 15, 1945, it does not answer at all. Of the other, my letter to the European Secretariat of July 10, 1945, it answers arbitrarily what it chooses. One has the right to expect that a "Reply" will reply. It is high time to call a halt to such polemics which do not come to grips with the opponent. Otherwise the discussion in the Fourth International will educate nobody.

Below are listed some 12 points raised in my letter of July 10, 1945 and entirely ignored by the "Reply." I repeat them not merely to indicate the character of the "Reply" but in the hope of eliciting an answer to these very important issues.

1. The European Secretariat declared that "the

large scale use of the Red Army as a counter-revolutionary force is excluded." This was a mistake, was it not? Where are the theoretical roots of this error?

2. The European Secretariat said the Soviet bureaucracy will be unable "to control the revolutionary movements which the occupation and even the approach of the Red Army will unfurl in the countries of Central and Western Europe." I made the same error earlier but began to correct it at the October, 1943, Plenum. One source of this error, as I explained in my letter of November 15, 1945, was our erroneous perspective that the fate of the Soviet Union would be decided in the war—either regeneration or capitalism; another source was our mistaken idea, derived from the 1939-40 events in Poland, that Red Army occupation and nationalization of industry necessarily requires a rising of the masses in the occupied countries. This certainly didn't happen in Eastern Europe. Even more certainly it didn't get out of the control of the Soviet bureaucracy.

3. I wrote: "We are not repeating 1917-1923. We are in a far more backward situation. At that time the October revolution made all the difference. . . . It meant that under the inspiration of the example of the Russian Bolshevik Party, there could be established very quickly although starting from very little, mass revolutionary parties in Germany, France, etc. Now, however, we cannot expect such a process." Correct or not?

4. I wrote: "I am positive that in Italy, where the Socialist party disposes of considerable masses, our comrades should never have formed a party but should have gone into (in the case of most of them it would have simply meant, I believe, to remain in) the Socialist party." Correct or not?

5. I wrote: "I am also positive that it would be a terrible error if our German comrades attempted immediately to form a party of their own in Germany; their place is in the Socialist party." Correct or not?

6. I wrote: "In Belgium, the Labor Party is still the party of the masses. I am sure that in

the rosy hue of the days of liberation, our Belgian comrades could have gotten in and established themselves as a faction, with their own paper, etc." Correct or not?

7. I wrote: "I would like to know why the Belgian party's program of action was silent on the monarchy." No answer.

8. I wrote: "The European Secretariat's theses went on at great length about Italy but neither there nor in the resolution is there any reference to the demand for a democratic republic." Why?

9. I wrote: "But even the democratic demands which you do mention, you do so in such a way that I cannot help but consider perfunctory. For example, you mention the demand for the constituent assembly but hasten to add: 'On the other hand, to launch such demands in the midst of a revolutionary crisis, when there are actually in existence elements of dual power, would be the most unpardonable of errors'."

10. I wrote: "In another paragraph you say 'that in the present period the economic and democratic "minimum" program is very rapidly out-distanced by the very logic of the mass struggle itself.' I will venture a prediction, dear comrades: that the 'minimum' program will not be outdistanced in France until you have won the status of a legal party and *La Verite* is a legal newspaper." Was I right or wrong?

11. My letter dealt at some length with ways and means of fighting for legality. "Neither from *La Verite* nor other sources do I get an impression that the French party is making a really systematic fight for legality," I wrote (July, 1945). The "Reply" says not a word.

12. "Instead of continuing, let me refer you to the Program of Action of 1934 for France, practically all of which is apropos today." Is it apropos, yes or no? No answer.

Had the European Secretariat replied to these criticisms and questions, the issues would have been greatly clarified. Let us take but one of them—No. 11—and see what the "Reply" failed to tell.

The Struggle for Legality in France

In words, sectarian propaganda appears to be an impatient eagerness to push forward to revolutionary struggle; in actual practice, it invariably leads to passivity in which radical talk is a substitute for serious action. This is the charge made against the European Secretariat by the minority of the Central Committee of the French party and proved to the hilt, as comrades will see for themselves when the French minority theses are published.

The terrible tragedy in France, as in most other European countries, is that the older Trotskyist cadres were destroyed in large part during the war. The Gestapo caught up with Marcel Hic and his associates in the leadership in France in October, 1943. The substitute leadership was composed of young inexperienced comrades and emigres isolated from French life. Physically courageous, it played safe politically, retreating into abstentionism and abstract propaganda. It abandoned the previous leadership's policy of integration into the national resistance movement and isolated itself from the rising of the masses. And it insisted on staying underground when the Allied armies arrived.

Mistakes are inevitable in the movement, and especially in the terrible conditions in Europe; what I condemn the European Secretariat for is its evading facing up to its errors, as in its failure to answer me on the question of the struggle for legality. In France, where the facts are well-known, it has to say something in answer, but its answer is less than altogether honest. In the French majority theses it says: "It is beyond doubt that the leadership didn't know how to move rapidly to the question of the legalization and the building of a press, but this is a matter of tactical faults of a sectarian character and not of political errors flowing from an erroneous political orientation."

This Pickwickian distinction between tactical faults and erroneous political orientation may seem plausible until one learns the actual facts. The European Secretariat, on the eve of the arrival of the Allies, expected a speedy development of the organs of dual power—factory committees, worker-militias, etc. When instead things went the other way, it took the position that, fascism being near, it is useless and even dangerous to try to emerge out of illegality; the period of bourgeois democracy being of very short duration, to utilize all the legal possibilities of expression would only be a waste of time. Not until nine months after liberation, after the French minority leaders—who are the public leaders of the party because of their moral authority—returned from the concentration camps, in May, 1945, not until then was a turn toward legality made.

Those who will recall the SWP minority's struggle against the theory of the impossibility of bourgeois democracy in Europe will now perhaps realize the tremendous practical significance of that issue. But the European Secretariat learns nothing from its past mistakes and hence adds new ones. To these we shall now turn.

The Nature of This Period

"More and more" the European Secretariat says it has come to realize that the difference between us is not limited to the question of the tempo of events—on which it concedes we were right—but to "the nature of the period into which we have entered." As to the European Secretariat's own conception of the nature of the period, its "Reply" apparently explains it: "What is actually involved today is the prelude to a lengthy revolutionary period. . . ." etc., etc. But as to what it thinks the SWP minority stands for concerning the nature of the period, the ES doesn't tell, so that its fears about us remain nameless on this question.

I shall therefore make one more effort (without any illusions that many more will not have to be made) to explain that our differences concern not the lengthy revolutionary period ahead but the present "prelude."

There is no difference between us as to the economic and other objective factors in this "prelude." The difference is concerning the state of political consciousness of the proletariat.

On this question there is a clear-cut difference between the Belgian, Dutch, Italian, British parties and the French and American minorities on one side, and on the other the SWP majority, the French majority and the European Secretariat.

The SWP majority has denied again and again that there has been a revival of democratic illusions in Western Europe. Less categorical because too close to the scene, the European Secretariat has at times evaded the question, at others stated that at any given moment whatever democratic illusions there are will disappear. Thus for example in one and the same breath in its January, 1945 theses it accepted the slogan of constituent assembly but warned that it would be the most unpardonable of errors to use the slogan "in the midst of a revolutionary crisis"—a warning presumably necessary because such a revolutionary crisis could arise before the next year's theses.

There is certainly a possibility of a crisis soon which might well be termed revolutionary. Before this winter is over there may well be profound political crises in France and Italy over the lack of food. The European Secretariat is wrong, however, in thinking that such crises will do away with the slogan of the constituent assembly or the republic, etc.

If there is a struggle in France this winter against the policy of the present Constituent Assembly, and if this struggle rises to a high-enough political plane, *it will be in the name of a more radical Constituent Assembly*. For (as the French minority says) the French masses today accept parliamentarism more than they did 25 years ago. For a whole period—the "prelude"—the struggle of the European proletariat is destined to remain within the framework of parliamentary democracy, even though the masses are already demanding of that parliament essentially socialist tasks such as nationalization of industry. Our task is to shorten that "prelude" by arousing the masses to demand *everything* from the parliament.

As our Belgian comrades write: "Correctly understood, the basis of the problem is simple. In the face of the general crisis of the bourgeois regime, large working masses and petty-bourgeois aspire to profound political and social transformations. But at the same time, the regime of Nazi occupation in Europe, and the long years of open dictatorship have developed again in the masses a powerful current in favor of parliamentarism. It is a case of having the masses make again their own experience with the treacherous character of parliamentary democracy. But at the same time it is a matter of profiting from the profound but confused revolutionary aspirations of the masses in order to call into question—on the electoral terrain which remains for the moment the only terrain on which the masses understand these problems—all the fundamental bases of the bourgeois state and private property." (*L'Avant-Garde*, December, 1945.)

The European Secretariat and the SWP majority, in denying or evading this decisive fact about the present "prelude" in Europe, are thereby launched on sectarian policy which is wreaking havoc in the International. The masses want socialism, they say, pointing to the dominance of the Communist and Socialist parties. They leave out the detail that today, disoriented and worn out by the terrible ordeals since 1939, the masses hope to get their socialism through parliamentarism.

The Importance of Democratic Demands

Once one understands the attitude of the west European masses toward parliamentarism, it becomes possible to understand the extraordinary importance today of democratic demands. But only then. If one does not understand that the masses want a parliament which will be absolutely free to do the bidding of the masses, it is impossible to understand the profound depth of the desire of the masses to rid themselves of the kings who directly or potentially bridle parliament. It is impossible then to understand that great masses can be brought out of the factories into the streets, into mass demonstrations, into general strikes, into insurrections, under the slogan of the republic in Belgium, Italy and Greece. It is impossible then to understand that the workers' militias and committees of action may well arise in Italy this Spring in answer to a reactionary attempt to postpone the convening of the Constituent Assembly.

Under the pressure of the French minority which understands this question, the French majority has been compelled to attempt to link its political slogans to the masses' support of the Constituent Assembly. It has therefore advanced as one of its principal slogans the call for Committees of Defense of the Constituent Assembly. Under actual French conditions the slogan is not a little absurd since nobody is assaulting the Constituent at this stage; nevertheless the slogan is an implicit admission of the real situation today.

But that the slogan is advanced without any comprehension is clear when its authors, in the "Reply" of the European Secretariat, write: "Comrade Morrow, who counsels us in his letter of July 10, 1945: 'not to be afraid of making *La Verite* appear entirely as an organ fighting for nothing more than real democracy. That is fighting for a great deal today!' will perhaps be astonished to learn that the party in the course of the last few months has gained influence above all thanks to its campaign for the CP-SP-CGT government, for the sliding scale of wages, and for the independence of Indo-China."

Why should I be astonished? My letter gave, immediately after the sentence about fighting for nothing more than real democracy, two examples of what I meant:

(1) "Call upon the workers' organizations to inspire the workers to rally to the polls in the elections, by an agreement among the workers' organizations that they will elect a workers' representative as Provisional President of France." What was this but the best way of raising the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government, best because it was on the plane on which the workers would see it as realizable today, *i.e.*, on the parliamentary plane. I was trying to end the incomprehension of *La Verite* which was then raising the slogan of a CP-SP-CGT government without linking it to the elections for the Constituent.

(2) "Take up the resistance's perfunctory demand for democratization of the army, and really explain its profound necessity, the lesson in this connection of Petainism, gather together all the horror tales about Petainists still leading the army, royalists, etc., etc. Explain the urgent need for political meetings of the soldiers, their need

to protect themselves by having delegates. Give it a legal handle, by urging that the workers' delegates in the coming Assembly include it in the new constitution."

Soldiers' delegates, political meetings of the soldiers—isn't this, though still nothing more than real democracy, at least as radical as the sliding scale of wages? Isn't the European Secretariat a little less than conscientious when it quotes to horrify the inexperienced comrades the sentence about fighting for nothing more than real democracy but fails to admit that the content I put into fighting for democracy is at least as radical as any of its own slogans?

And finally, the "Reply" crushes me and my preoccupation with democratic demands by telling me the French party has gained by demanding independence for Indo-China. I rub my eyes and read it again. Don't the comrades of the European Secretariat, not the oldest comrades in the movement but still, don't they know that the demand for independence of Indo-China is a classical example of a *democratic* demand?

They have not taken up my proposal to demand that the new French constitution provide for election of soldiers' delegates. They have not made, indeed, a single proposal of any kind for inclusion in the constitution. All France, first of all the proletariat, has its eyes fixed on the Constituent Assembly, which they look upon as their own because it has a workers' majority, and the business of the Constituent is to draw up a constitution. But the one party in France which has not presented a draft of a constitution to the masses is our French party. Isn't that one fact enough to show the political bankruptcy of the French majority (European Secretariat)?

Democratic Demands ARE Transitional

A monumental blunder has taken root in the movement, repeated so often by the SWP majority that it has been absorbed by the all-too-willing European Secretariat: that democratic demands are less radical than "transitional demands." Thus the "Reply" says: "In our opinion the chief merit of the American minority lay in its drawing attention to the importance of democratic slogans. But it is also necessary not to exaggerate the importance of these slogans and above all to know how to tie them up with transitional slogans. . . ."

". . . slogans of a transitional character touch the masses . . . even more directly and contribute to their mobilization still more definitively than do the democratic slogans, namely such slogans as: the sliding scale of wages and of working hours, workers' control of production, nationalization without compensation, Workers' and Peasants' Government concretized in the formula: Workers' Parties to Power, independence of the colonies. Our sections in Europe have gained successes in France, in Belgium, in Holland and England and elsewhere above all thanks to the struggle conducted by them for these slogans. . . ."

It would be impossible to dig the European Secretariat out of this swamp of its own making in short order. Here one can only indicate a few points:

1. Vital democratic slogans, *i.e.*, those im-

perative for revolutionists to advance, are themselves transitional slogans. Not all transitional slogans are democratic ones, but all *correct* democratic slogans become transitional ones. The Transitional Program of 1938 says this plainly: "Insofar as the old, partial 'minimal' demands of the masses clash with the destructive and degrading tendencies of decadent capitalism—and this occurs at each step—the Fourth International advances a system of *transitional demands*, the essence of which is contained in the fact that ever more openly and decisively they will be directed against the very bases of the bourgeois regime." The most that one can say, therefore, is that some transitional slogans are in their implications more destructive of capitalism than some other transitional slogans. But this division is not one between democratic slogans on the one hand and the rest on the other. Democratization of the army would at the least be no less destructive of capitalism than the sliding scale of hours. Independence of the colonies would at the least be no less destructive of capitalism than the unfreezing of wages.

2. Even more important, the radical consequences of a slogan are not to be derived from its logical implications but from (a) its effect on the bourgeois state and (b) the extent to which it mobilizes the masses for struggle against the bourgeoisie. Abstractly abolition of the monarchy is compatible with the bourgeois state. *Actually*, in Belgium, Greece and Italy proclamation of the republic would immediately shake the bourgeois state to its foundations, and create the most favorable opportunity for proletarian revolution. That is why, for example, Trotsky was so sure as late as January, 1931 that the Spanish bourgeoisie would never permit the abolition of the monarchy but would prefer to hold on to it until both together were overthrown by the socialist revolution. Two months later, however, the monarchy was overthrown. Trotsky's error in calculation was nevertheless not a great one: it is an indubitable fact that the overthrow of the Spanish monarchy left the state power literally lying in the streets. The same thing would happen with the end of the monarchy now in Belgium, Greece or Italy.

3. Less than accurate is the claim of successes in Europe "above all thanks to the struggle conducted by them for these slogans" other than democratic ones. The Belgian party itself testifies that its greatest successes came from the slogan of the republic, and its entire attitude to democratic slogans, now embodied in a thesis which deserves speedy publication here, is completely in agreement with the SWP minority. The same is true of the Italian party. In Holland, the principal slogans of *De Rode October* (*viz.*, the January, 1946, *Fourth International*) have been the democratic slogans of independence for Indonesia, immediate elections and against annexation of German territory. In France, despite the false policy of the leadership, the party finally began to revive only thanks to the struggle for legality, the demand for the Constituent and participation in the elections; above I have already indicated the democratic character of the French party's own slogans.

4. The accusation that we of the minority advance democratic slogans at the expense of other

slogans is an artificial one, invented by the SWP majority to cover up the glaring fact that this dispute began because they failed to advance *any* democratic slogans. We of the minority in no way counterpose democratic slogans to other slogans. We advance those slogans which are necessary, in whatever combination of democratic and other slogans which is indicated. That's all there is to this question.

At bottom, however, there is nothing artificial about this dispute. The European Secretariat and the SWP majority do not understand that Marxism has always insisted that the struggle for socialism is the struggle for democracy. They do not understand a point especially emphasized by our Italian comrades—in the first program of the new party, which they wrote in the Isoli isolator—that we must never permit the reformists to appear as better defenders of democracy than we. This point is especially important today.

In 1917-1923 the European proletariat had seen with its own eyes the way in which the proletarian revolution had been prevented by bourgeois democracy. But today nobody can seriously say that bourgeois democracy has prevented the imminent proletarian revolution in the sense of 1917-1923. On the contrary—as the Belgian party says very well—whereas in 1917-1923 bourgeois democracy was imposed by the bourgeoisie on the proletariat which was fighting for sovietization, today bourgeois democracy has been imposed by the proletariat on the bourgeoisie which seeks dictatorship. Under these real, existing conditions, more than ever before the struggle for socialism *must* take the form of the struggle for more democracy, for real democracy.

Democracy and Socialism

But isn't this democratic charlatanism? It would be easy enough for comrades to continue the game of that ardent supporter of the SWP majority, Pierre Frank (January, 1946, *Fourth International*), who finds a quotation in which Trotsky condemns as democratic charlatanism any mixing of the forms of bourgeois power with the forms of proletarian power. Frank has the effrontery to use the quotation to condemn the slogan of the republic which Trotsky himself advocated before and after the quotation.

Real democracy is unattainable under capitalism. Precisely for that reason we ask the workers to fight for it. If Frank's charges were true that "the republic" impermissibly blurs the line between bourgeois and proletarian state power, it is even more true of what Trotsky wrote in the Program of Action for France: ". . . we demand from our class brothers who adhere to 'democratic' socialism that they be faithful to their ideas, that they draw inspiration from the ideas and methods, not of the Third Republic, but of the Convention of 1793.

". . . Deputies would be elected on the basis of local assemblies, constantly revocable by their constituents, and would receive the salary of a skilled worker.

"This is the only measure that would lead the masses forward instead of pushing them backward. A more generous democracy would facilitate the struggle for workers' power." (October, 1942, *Fourth International*, p. 318.)

Deputies elected by local assemblies, recalled at will, receiving wages of a skilled worker—these provisions are very familiar to us, for they are those we propose for *soviets*. Yet Trotsky advanced them for a bourgeois Assembly. He did so precisely in order to teach reformist workers what they need so that, when they find it impossible to attain within bourgeois democracy, they will seek workers' democracy.

The Relation of Objective and Subjective Factors

The "Reply" concentrates mainly on this question, finding it unnecessary to answer most of my points because "Morrow's manner of conceiving the relationship between the objective and subjective premises of the revolution renders spurious, in our opinion, his criticism as a whole."

I said the "Reply" concentrates mainly on this question. More accurately, it devotes its space to a yard of quotations from Lenin. Please note that the quotations are from 1915 and 1916. They have nothing to do with the relationship between the objective and subjective premises of the revolution, for the good and sufficient reason that the subjective premises for revolution didn't exist in 1915 and 1916: the masses were still submerged in chauvinism. What Lenin was saying was then something very new in the world, namely that the world war had created "the objective conditions for the revolution," *i.e.*, that with 1914 the world entered the epoch of wars and revolutions. Perhaps our clearest expression for this—it is in the Transitional Program—is that the objective prerequisites for the proletarian revolution have matured. But Lenin was saying something very new, and new things are not immediately said in the best and most precise way. In the quotations in the "Reply" and much of Lenin's other work of that period he seemed to be insisting that war and its consequences "lead up to a revolution of the proletariat." Even more crassly, Zinoviev wrote that war "leads necessarily to civil war, it cannot mean anything else except civil war." As we all know, however, revolution did not follow the war in most countries, not to speak of successful revolution. The question was so troubling to the minds of many Communists that, at the third Congress of the Comintern (and elsewhere) Lenin and Trotsky were compelled to explain. Trotsky restated more precisely the essential meaning of the previous formulations:

"When we spoke of the revolution resulting from the World War, it meant that we were and are striving to utilize the consequences of the World War in order to speed the revolution in every way possible." (p. 179.)

And he also made clear the source of the original error: "In 1918-19 it seemed to us (and there was some historical justification for it) that in the period when the bourgeoisie was disorganized this assault could mount in ever-rising waves, that in this process the consciousness of the leading layers of the working class would become clarified, and that in this way the proletariat would attain state power in the course of one or two years. . . . But the revolution is not so docile, nor so domesticated as to be led on a leash, as we once imagined. . . .

". . . Class maneuvering was far from always

skillful on our part. The reason for it is twofold: In the first place, the weakness of the Communist parties, which arose only after the war, which lacked the necessary experience and the necessary apparatus, which were without sufficient influence and—what is the most important—didn't know how to pay sufficient attention to the working masses." (*First Five Years of the Comintern*, pp. 219-21.)

Presumably the Fourth International stands or should stand on the shoulders of Lenin and Trotsky. Their mistakes had the justification of being the inevitable overhead of path-breaking. The European Secretariat did not have this justification when, in February, 1944, and again in January, 1945, and even later, it repeated the crassest formula of Zinoviev: "With an inexorable necessity, the imperialist war is developing toward its inevitable transformation into civil war." Now it insists on continuing to defend this formula by . . . 1915 and 1916 quotations from Lenin! It is time to grow up, comrades.

Bewitched by its theory of "inexorable necessity" of the war being transformed into revolution, the European Secretariat in January, 1945, and even later confirmed its earlier prediction about Germany: "The German proletariat, stronger than ever in numbers, more concentrated than ever, will from the first play a decisive role. Soldiers' committees in the army and workers' and peasants' councils in the rear will rise to oppose to the bourgeois power the power of the proletariat. The revolutionary crisis, more profound than that of 1919. . . ." Then and much later the SWP majority wrote in the same vein, and an article to the contrary by Albert Goldman, explaining the obstacles to the German revolution, looked strange indeed in that setting.

It was necessary openly and honestly to correct the error. The sources were clear; as I wrote to the European Secretariat: "You wrote all this without a single reference to the fact that the German proletariat would begin its life after Nazi defeat under military occupation and without a revolutionary party; and without the slightest attempt at appraising the state of class-consciousness of the German proletariat after eleven years of Nazism. Is this not a clear example of assuming a revolutionary development purely on the basis of objective factors without any regard for the subjective factors? And even then you did so by leaving out the objective factor of military occupation."

The "Reply" refuses to acknowledge the real source of the errors. Hence the yard of quotations from Lenin, and a few perfunctory phrases about the fact that exact predictions must inevitably be corrected afterwards: ". . . it was impossible for us to have foreseen in 1944 the consequences of the havoc caused by the war greatly speeded up in the course of the last few months in a highly developed country like Germany where a part of the material and human premises for all large-scale mass actions have been eliminated. Nor could we have foreseen the far-reaching extent and consequences of military occupation of Europe by the imperialists and the Red Army." To savor the full absurdity of these sentences one must add one from the previous page: "It is a fact that the situation was objectively revolutionary in almost all the European

countries during the period which elapsed between the debacle and the departure of the German troops and the arrival of Anglo-American and Russian troops." It seems, then, that the European Secretariat's assurance about the German and other revolutions was due to its lack of knowledge concerning the speediness of the tanks and jeeps of the victors. In its refusal to face the real source of the errors it made the European Secretariat get itself into an even worse absurdity.

The real source of the errors was its failure to consider not only the consequences of military occupation—which were easily to be foreseen in advance—but, still more important, its failure to consider at all, much less to estimate correctly, the state of class-consciousness of the German proletariat and the absence of a revolutionary party. The European Secretariat was too small to say what Trotsky, with infinitely less reason to say it, had said in 1921: "We didn't know how to pay sufficient attention to the working masses." To put it bluntly: all the phrases in its prediction about the German revolution—that the proletariat would from the first play a decisive role, soldiers committees, workers' and peasants' soviets, etc.—were copied down once again in January 1945 by the European Secretariat from the 1938 program of the Fourth International. Seven years, and such years, had passed by but the European Secretariat did not change a comma. Exactly the same piece of copying had been done by the SWP majority in its October 1943 Plenum resolution in spite of the criticisms of the minority.

That one could do better if one looked instead at the reality was shown also to the European Secretariat in the days when it was still repeating this nonsense. A German comrade wrote in the March 1945 *Quatrieme Internationale*: "It is certain that, tomorrow in Germany, after such a bloodletting, profound apathy and equally great fatigue will reign. . . . If we seriously reflect on all this, one cannot have a short perspective so far as Germany is concerned. . . . After the fascist dictatorship the masses in Germany are looking for a democratic way out. The question is to help them overcome as quickly as possible certain vague illusions about the possibility of creating under the imperialist yoke something that would be a true democracy." Typical of the confusionism of the European Secretariat is that it prints this refutation of its resolution without in any way trying to relate the one document to the other; the SWP majority does likewise, reprinting the German comrade's article in the November 1945 *Fourth International* merely with the comment: "It is interesting to note how accurately the author predicts the ensuing events. His broad outline of the tasks facing the German proletariat retains all of its importance today." But as to the profound difference in political method which enabled the German comrade and the SWP minority to predict more accurately while the European Secretariat and the SWP majority wrote nonsense—of this not a word.

Such, then, were the real issues which I raised in my letter. The "Reply" instead pretends we have a big difference as to whether or not this is the epoch of wars and revolutions and whether or not within it there can be objectively revolu-

tionary situations independently of the existence of the revolutionary party. I grant all that the ES restates from Lenin on these questions, they were not what we were disputing.

The European Secretariat condemns the following proposition, written by me in my letter of July 10, 1945 which was not written as a public polemic but in an attempt to get my comrades to see a point. I wrote: "The absence of the revolutionary party—and it is absent—changes the whole situation. Instead of saying, 'Only the revolutionary party is lacking,' we must instead say, *at least to ourselves*, 'The absence of the revolutionary party transforms the conditions which otherwise would be revolutionary into conditions in which one must fight, so far as agitation is concerned, for the most elementary demands.'" *At least to ourselves*. In other words, condemn as much as you please the Stalinists and Social-Democrats for not making the revolution when it could be made. But do not let that blind you yourselves to the fact that what *they* could do you cannot do. Instead of summoning the masses to take the power, get down to the serious business of winning legality for the party and press.

The ES does not like my formulation? It considers it a false way of describing "the relationship between the objective and subjective premises of the revolution"? I withdraw it and put in its place the same thought said better by Trotsky: "But as soon as the objective prerequisites have grown to maturity the key to the whole historic process is handed to the subjective factor, that is, the party and its revolutionary leadership. . . . In all these cases, as well as in others of lesser importance, the opportunistic tendency expressed itself in the fact that it relied solely upon the masses and completely neglected the question of a revolutionary leadership. Such an attitude, which is false in general, operates with positively annihilating effect in this epoch."

Entrism: Is It Now Excluded?

I stated positively that before or at the time of the liberation the comrades could have and should have entered or remained in the reformist parties in Italy, Belgium and Germany. About France I was not at all sure but asked whether the Malraux wing of the *Mouvement de Liberation Nationale*—which published *Franc-Tireur* with a larger circulation than the Stalinist *L'Humanite*—did not offer an entrism tactic possibility. I regretted raising the question in July 1945—two years too late. *As for the present*, I wrote: "I don't claim that entry is imperative and can be achieved in every single country I have named. Investigation by you and those in each country will have to determine the facts. But what I demand is a real recognition of the problem and a serious investigation without reservations in advance. . . . I leave further comment until I can grapple concretely with your objections, if any."

Instead of practical objections, the European Secretariat answers with a full-blown theory that the nature of this period excludes entry as a general tactic. In its International Report it goes further, branding such "liquidationism" as the main danger to the building of the Fourth International! To buttress this typically ultra-leftist

theory it has to do violence to our past, dealing terrible blows to what one had hoped were the most secure foundation-stones of our rich theoretical heritage.

Thus it dares to write: "Trotsky advocated the 'entrism' policy with respect to the Social-Democracy in a period of the general ebb of the labor movement following a long series of defeats and on the day after the victory of German fascism which sounded the tocsin for world reaction and accelerated the outbreak of the war."

This one awful sentence is enough to dictate reprinting for the new generation of Trotskyists the principal documents written by Trotsky explaining the reasons for entry in France and elsewhere.

He called for entry first of all because there was a powerful current in the Social-Democracy *moving sharply to the left* precisely because it was seeking to learn the lessons of the defeat in Germany. This left turn in the Social-Democracy was one of the principal factors which made possible instead of the victory of fascism in France the June 1936 seizure of the factories and in Spain the long civil war. In America we entered the Socialist party amid the rising wave of the CIO. Trotsky, in a letter to the Spanish comrades dated April 12, 1936, begins: "The situation in Spain is again revolutionary" and therefore proposes . . . entry. This is the process which the European Secretariat profoundly describes as entry "in a period of the general ebb of the labor movement."

Let the European Secretariat re-read (or read) the old documents. It will find all its arguments there, in the documents of the anti-entrists. The European Secretariat writes: "A total 'entrism' policy with respect to the Social-Democracy is at the present hour equivalent to sure political suicide. These elements are moving away from the reformist parties. . . . These elements are seeking a different banner for revolutionary regroupment and struggle and it is our duty to show them this banner." Not very original: Naville in France, Nin in Spain, Vereecken in Belgium, all said it first and it hasn't improved with age. Trotsky answered them: Why can't we show these moving Social-Democratic workers our banner inside their own party?

Why was it necessary to show them our banner inside their own party? Because our forces were too small to show it to them from outside. When workers did come outside, it was usually to leave the workers' movement altogether; hence we had to go in to win them before they were lost. The European Secretariat tells us that "more and more important layers are splitting away from these reformist parties. . . ." To do what? To "seek refuge either in the movements of the right or in demoralization and apathy, *in the absence of any other pole of regroupment.*" The italics are mine, to underline the question, why these masses don't consider us a pole of regroupment, since we are where the ES wants us to be, outside, independent, with our own banner, etc. The very facts adduced by the European Secretariat mutely but eloquently indicate that there *is* a problem here. Discontented workers are leaving the traditional workers' parties and passing us by. Doesn't that pose sharply to us the question of entering the mass reformist party to win such

workers while there is yet time to save them?

The question concerns above all France, key to the European continent today. (In England nobody would dream of talking such nonsense; well-nigh everybody understands that our party must enter the Labor Party at the next opportunity). One is happy to see signs that the French party is not stagnating today as it was a year ago, but it is still a tiny organization which gives no real indications of growing appreciably in the next period—especially with its present leadership. The opportunity of growth through integration in the national resistance movement was missed, likewise the opportunity to fuse with, enter or win some of the centrist elements—such

as the group around *Franc-Tireur*—in the fluid situation of August 1944. These centrist elements have meanwhile in large part disintegrated—as in America the American Workers Party and the left wing in the Socialist Party would have speedily disintegrated if we had not grabbed hold of them in time. One cannot at will make new opportunity for entry. None appears to exist at present in France. But *La Verite* reports significant indications of workers in the Paris region and the industrial North turning back from the Stalinists to the Socialist party; a serious increase of the proletarian composition can well soon lead to opportunities within. First of all, however, it is necessary to get rid of the mill-

stone put around our necks by this new version of the theory that entry into the Social Democracy is political suicide.

As Trotsky wrote on November 18, 1935 to the ultra-leftist Vereecken: "Organizational tactics, turns and maneuvers—there are still many of them before us, in case of war as well. It is not at all excluded that precisely during the war the Bolshevik-Leninists of this or that country will find themselves obliged to temporarily enter a reformist party. Must we every time, in illegality, renew the arch-abstract discussion on 'capitulation to the Second International'? We do not want to do this. It is time to grow up." February 24, 1946.

On Comrade Morrow's Reply

By PABLO

The indefatigable Comrade Morrow concentrates his ammunition against the ES and its "Theses," among which he generously includes all the political documents collectively and responsibly drawn up by international gatherings such as the European Conference of February, 1944, and the European Executive Committee of January, 1945, which were attended by qualified representatives of numerous sections of the International.

Does Morrow—who seems generally to consider himself thoroughly informed on events and persons in Europe—know for example that it is impermissible for a serious comrade to attribute to the ES either the "Theses" of February, 1944, or the resolution of January, 1945?

Does he know that the February, 1944, "Theses" were drawn up by the European Conference which was attended by representatives of five Sections of the International, that in their broad outlines they were unanimously adopted (with the exception of the left opposition of the French comrades of the ex-CCI), and that several parts were drawn up by comrades whom Morrow today considers his political friends in the International (Comrade Hic, the Belgian comrades)? Does he know also that the January, 1945, resolution is not a resolution of the ES but a document adopted by the European Executive Committee at its session of January, 1945? Does he know, finally, that the ES as a body was reconstituted several times, and that there finally remained only one comrade of those who were elected at the European Conference of February, 1944?

The document of Comrade Morrow, which bears the modest title "The Infantile Sickness of the ES" and which pretends to be a reply to the document of the ES of January, 1946, is an example of the unprincipled combinationism which Comrade Morrow has been devoting himself to lately with special zeal in his painful and, it might be said, not very successful attempt to bring together the most disparate elements of the International against the ES and the SWP majority.

In these combinations his purpose is not political clarity but a *bloc* at any cost with all the currents and all the various malcontents, first of all against the leadership of the SWP and later

against all those whom he considers to be allies of the SWP.

For our part, we categorically refuse to regard the life of our International solely through the internal struggles within our American section.

Morrow cannot forgive the ES for its "treachery" toward him, and speaks over and over again of the letter of Comrade P., "secretary of the ES," assuring him "that the European Secretariat and the SWP minority was in 75 per cent agreement."*

It would perhaps be helpful for Morrow in order to be—and if he really wants to be—a little better informed on the development of the political life in the International in Europe, to learn under what conditions Comrade P. was led to send him this letter.

It is perfectly true that at that time there was general agreement in the ES that the first critical documents of Comrade Morrow and especially his criticism of the resolution of the December, 1943, NC Plenum of the SWP, contained some correct observations on the tempo of development of the revolutionary situation in Europe, the importance of democratic slogans, and the dangers of sectarianism in our International. All the more is this so because the ES and the then majority of the leadership of the French section were engaged in a struggle, already begun in part at the time of the European Conference and followed through very sharply afterwards, against the leftist tendency represented by the French comrades of the ex-CCI, a struggle around precisely the same questions brought up by Comrade Morrow.

This struggle—which lasted more than a year and gave rise to a series of documents proving incontestably that the errors committed at the time of the February, 1944, European Conference had been in great part corrected through the initiative of the ES and of leading members of

*Why does Morrow insist so on this first testimony of the "political sympathy" that a member of the ES showed him, and not mention the second letter of Comrade P. who wrote him in November 1945 after having taken into consideration Morrow's letter of July 10 and the new positions developed in it? Comrade P. gave him to understand then that he was embarking on a false course and that he thus risked losing all the sympathies he had won among the European comrades at the time of his first documents in criticism of the December 1943 Plenum resolution.

the French majority—is completely ignored by Comrade Morrow.

Should we conclude from this that his sources of information in Europe omitted to tell him about it, or that it is he himself who considers it preferable to pass over in silence this important chapter in the internal life of the International in Europe—a chapter which would make difficult for him his task of defaming and completely misrepresenting the policy of the ES?

In any case, it is not too late for Comrade Morrow to condescend to consult the documents of this period which would throw a new light for him upon the political physiognomy of the different tendencies which developed in the International in Europe during the war.

We advise him at the same time to read all the documents drawn up by the comrades of the present French minority on the national question, as well as the files of *Verite* of 1942 to November, 1943, and to compare the political line of these documents with the line he himself defended on the national question when, for example, he replied to the "Three Theses."

Has Morrow now changed his position on this question also, a position which he defended during the war up to the December, 1943 Plenum and including the criticism which he made of the resolution of that Plenum?

Because if anyone has changed and keeps continually changing his position under the pressure of opportunist currents with whom he is now forced to make a bloc, it is, alas, Comrade Morrow.

It is he who, far from abiding by the agreement established by the Political Committee of the SWP in May, 1945 (see *Fourth International*, May, 1945) between the minority and the majority of the SWP on all the important political questions, has moved over since then to a different political standpoint, no longer bringing forward the question of the tempo of development of the situation in Europe, the importance of democratic slogans, the influence of the Stalinists and the reformists, but the nature of the period into which we have entered, the character of the program we defend, the tasks which flow from it.

Drawn into the whirlpool of the factional

struggle against the SWP majority, Morrow has begun to make a series of concessions to all the opportunist currents outside and within the International, concessions the general line of which now follows the line of the Shachtmanites who have already won him over ideologically before having won him also organizationally. We will speak of this later.

The Struggle for Legality in France

Morrow, from the information given him by his political friends in France, speaks with great assurance of what has happened in that country and of the "sectarian" policy of the ES in regard to the legalization of the French section.

We refuse to admit that it is the French comrades who could have distorted the real situation to such an extent.

In any case, at the time of the last Congress of the French party not a single voice (and all the leaders of the French minority were present) protested when the ES had occasion to mention the role it played from the very outset in the legalization of the French party.

It is absolutely false that the ES expected "on the eve of the arrival of the Allies, a speedy development of the organs of dual power—factory committees, worker-militias, etc."

The ES did not exclude such a possibility; but at the same time, in its struggle against the assertions of the comrades of the ex-CCI it emphasized that the extent of such a development would be limited by the fact of the influence of the Stalinists and the reformists and by the fact of the new occupation of Europe by the Anglo-American armies.

The struggle in the French party which preceded and followed the days of the "liberation" of Paris in August, 1944, was exactly along these lines, and all the documents of the period prove this completely.

That the possibility of a certain development of organs of dual power nevertheless existed in the situation, was entirely proved by the establishment of genuine factory committees and militias in most of the large factories of the Paris region and of other cities in France around the end of August and the beginning of September, 1944.

It is impermissible for Morrow to ignore or to neglect this extremely important experience of the French proletariat in which our party played a front-rank role.

It is furthermore an absolute falsehood that the ES ever put forth the hypothesis that "fascism being near, it is useless and even dangerous to try to emerge out of illegality."

Such ideas were set forth, though very timidly, by certain comrades of the French majority, against the position of the ES. The ES, on the other hand, had already, at the time of the landing of the Allied forces in Europe, drawn the attention of the French comrades to the legal reappearance of the workers' movement and the urgent need of adapting ourselves to the new conditions.

Several months before the return from concentration camps of certain French comrades—to whom Comrade Morrow generously attributes the initiative for legalization—the ES had sharply posed the question of legalization of the party and had used every effort to push the French

comrades toward achieving this end rapidly and boldly.

It is now extremely painful to have to defend ourselves against attacks which are as unjust as they are stupid, and which tend to completely distort the real situation. Morrow, generally so well and so honestly informed, should at least know that from the first Congress of the French party up to just recently, the agenda of almost all the sessions of the ES has included the question of the French party; and this question was considered from the point of view of the political, practical and financial aid which the ES gave to the party leadership to help it achieve complete legalization of the party, readapt its structure to the conditions of legal life, forcibly push through the legalization of *Verite* by an unflagging political mobilization of the entire party, and to help the party adopt a program of concrete action, take part in elections, etc.

For no other section has the ES expended such efforts to aid it in moving toward the masses, and we believe that this fact has been unanimously recognized by the French organization.

The Nature of This Period

Morrow, who complains that the ES has avoided replying to him on a series of questions contained in his documents of July and November, 1945, finds a way of skipping over all the essential sections of this reply of the ES regarding the basic conceptions for the drawing up of a program and for the defining of the tasks, of the "objectively revolutionary situation," and of the relationship between the objective and the subjective factors.

He states that "there is no difference between us as to the economic and other objective factors . . . the difference is concerning the state of political consciousness of the proletariat."

And he finds that on this last question there is a "clear-cut difference between the Belgian, Dutch, Italian, British parties and the French and American minorities on one side, and on the other the SWP majority, the French majority and the ES."

We are very curious to see what this "clear-cut difference" consists of, between the line defended up to now by the ES and the line of our Belgian, Dutch, Italian and British comrades, from whom the gifted tactician Morrow tries to distinguish us (and to separate us).

The essential difference between us and them, he says, concerns "the state of political consciousness of the proletariat."

"The ES," he writes, "and the SWP majority, in denying or evading this decisive fact about the present 'prelude' in Europe, are thereby launched on a sectarian policy which is wreaking havoc in the International. The masses want socialism, they say, pointing to the dominance of the Communist and Socialist parties. They leave out the detail that today, disoriented and worn out by the terrible ordeals since 1939, the masses hope to get their socialism through parliamentarism."

Morrow makes this thought, which constitutes the base of his whole present policy, still more precise when he writes: "For a whole period the struggle of the European proletariat is destined to remain within the framework of parlia-

mentary democracy, even though the masses are already demanding of that parliament essentially socialist tasks such as nationalization of industry. Our task is to shorten that 'prelude' by arousing the masses to demand *everything* from the parliament."

First of all, it is false to begin *chiefly* with the "state of political consciousness of the proletariat" in order to elaborate a program of action and to define the slogans and tasks of a given period.

The ES in its first reply to Comrade Morrow was compelled precisely to explain to him that from the Marxist point of view one does not determine a program by starting *chiefly* from the "political consciousness" of the proletariat, but by starting *chiefly from the objective conditions* which characterize the situation.

Morrow reverses the problem, as he reverses it when he says that it is the existence of the revolutionary party which determines the revolutionary character of a situation.

Starting from this consideration of the "political consciousness" of the proletariat, one can arrive at the most opportunist conclusions. Thus Morrow, reasoning from the "political consciousness of the proletariat" which according to him is dominated at the present time by democratic and parliamentary illusions, limits our program essentially to democratic demands and places our activities chiefly in the parliamentary field.

He would proceed entirely differently if, in order to outline a program from an analysis of the objective situation, he began from the starting-point of the situation that capitalism in general and European capitalism in particular finds itself in after the liquidation of the second imperialist war—from the living conditions of the masses, from the objective possibilities of a policy of reforms, of democracy, etc.

Trotsky, commenting in June 1938 on the working out of the Transitional Program, wrote: "Make our program fit the objective situation or the mentality of the workers? And I believe that this question must be put before every comrade who says that this program is not fit for the American situation. This program is a scientific program. It is based on an objective analysis of the objective situation. It cannot be understood by the workers as a whole. It would be very good if the vanguard would understand it in the next period. . . ." And to the question, "Isn't the ideology of the workers a part of the objective factors?" Trotsky replied: "For us as a small minority this whole thing is objective including the mood of the workers. But we must analyze and classify those elements of the objective situation which can be changed by our paper and those which cannot be changed. That is why we say that the program is adapted to the fundamental stable elements of the objective situation and the task is to adapt the mentality of the masses to those objective factors. To adapt the mentality is a pedagogical task. We must be patient, etc. The crisis of society is given as the base of our activity. The mentality is the political arena of our activity. We must change it. We must give a scientific explanation of society, and clearly explain it to the masses. That is the difference between Marxism and reformism."

"The reformists have a good smell for what the audience wants—as Norman Thomas—he gives them that. But that is not serious revolutionary activity. We must have the courage to be unpopular, to say 'you are fools,' 'you are stupid,' 'they betray you,' and every once in a while with a scandal launch our ideas with passion. If it is necessary to shake the worker from time to time, to explain, and then shake him again—that all belongs to the art of propaganda. But it must be scientific, not bent to the moods of the masses. We are the most realistic people because we reckon with facts which cannot be changed by the eloquence of Norman Thomas. If we win immediate success we swim with the current of the masses and that current is the revolution."

Morrow rejects this conception of the program and speaks to us of the "political consciousness" of the proletariat which is so to speak hypnotized by parliamentarism. This assertion of Morrow is, furthermore, quite without foundation and does not correspond in any way to the real conditions of the situation in Europe.

When one speaks of the latter, one cannot make an identity between the various conditions which reign in the different countries of the continent, and forget that there are sometimes enormous differences between what characterizes, for example, the situation in the countries controlled by the USSR and the countries of western Europe, between the situation in Greece and Italy and the situation in France and Belgium, etc. . . . *In a general way we can say that for all of Europe the present applicability of the Transitional Program as a whole is enormous.*

But the emphasis on the different slogans is different according to whether it is a question of this country or that, whether a country characterized by a more or a less full and rapid maturing of the situation. In France, for example, we still have a situation which is less advanced than that of Italy and even less than that of Greece. But even in France, to say that the masses "today accept parliamentarism more than they did 25 years ago" and that "all France, first of all the proletariat, has its eyes fixed on the Constituent Assembly, which they look upon as their own because it has a workers' majority, and the business of the Constituent is to draw up a Constitution"—to say this is to become a laughable victim of illusions which are far less prevalent among the masses.

Because of the close three-party collaboration between the so-called Workers' parties and the MRP (the moderate right of the bourgeoisie), the Constituent Assembly has lost all special attractiveness for the masses. It is precisely this change which has erased the importance of the slogan of *Committees of Defense* of the Constituent, which was launched at a moment when de Gaulle's presence and his hostility to a Sovereign Constituent had pushed the Communists [Stalinists] into a kind of momentary opposition which was able also to attract the masses. It is the same thing with the new Constitution; according to several statistical samplings, the debates on the Constitution have not been followed by more than 20% of public opinion.

Morrow, starting from the "political consciousness" of the proletariat, confines the meaning of

all our slogans within the "democratic" and "parliamentary" framework. Thus even our central slogan of a Workers' and Farmers' Government, concretized in France in the formula "CP-SP-CGT government," should be regarded, Morrow tells us, solely on "the parliamentary plane" because "the workers would see it as realizable" only on that plane.

What is probably involved here is a new concession of Comrade Morrow, this time to the French minority which has become the champion of this opportunist interpretation of the foremost anti-capitalist and revolutionary slogan of our Transitional Program.*

Morrow generously attributes to us a complete lack of understanding of the importance of democratic slogans because we refuse to confine the meaning of all our present slogans within the "democratic" and "parliamentary" framework, and because we maintain the distinction between the essentially democratic slogans and the transitional slogans.

One can play with words if one wishes, and fill entire pages with sterile and puerile terminological slavishness.

It is the Transitional Program itself which points out the distinction between the purely democratic slogans—concerning either the demands for political democracy (freedom of association, of the press, overthrow of the monarchy, etc.) or the demands for the democratic program in backward countries (national independence, Constituent Assembly, land to those who cultivate it, etc.)—and the more specifically transitional slogans: "The relative weight of the individual *democratic* and *transitional* demands in the proletariat's struggle, their mutual *ties* and their order of presentation, is determined by the peculiarities and the specific conditions of each backward country." (Transitional Program). Further: "Of course, this does not mean that the Fourth International rejects democratic slogans. . . . On the contrary, such slogans at certain moments can play a serious role. But the formulas of democracy (freedom of press, the right to unionize, etc.) mean for us only incidental or episodic slogans in the independent movement of the proletariat and not a democratic noose fastened to the neck of the proletariat by the bourgeoisie's agents (Spain!) *As soon as the movement assumes something of a mass character, the democratic slogans will be intertwined with the transitional ones . . .*" (Transitional Program).

Democratic slogans are included in the Transitional Program, and to the extent that they are tied to the rest of the program they are themselves also transitional slogans.

Furthermore, it is Morrow himself who constantly makes this distinction between democratic slogans and transitional slogans, as for example in his criticism of the December 1943 Plenum resolution in which he writes: "Democratic slogans are subordinate to transitional slogans and to programmatic fundamentals; democratic slogans must be constantly connected in our agitation to transitional slogans and programmatic fundamentals!"

We have never said otherwise, and we have never minimized the importance of democratic

*We will devote the June issue of *Quatrième Internationale* to an article covering this entire question.

slogans placed in this framework. But where does Morrow now stand in relation to this conception? Has he sacrificed this also to his need for a bloc with tendencies which openly reject it?

With a cleverness which does not exactly command admiration, Morrow, in his attempt to refute the entire section of the reply which the ES made to him on this subject, answers, completely beside the mark, as we have already indicated, with a quotation from Trotsky who explains the reason why the *objectively revolutionary situation* which followed the first imperialist war did not result in the triumph of the revolution. The reason was the lack of experienced revolutionary parties. We have tried to explain patiently to Morrow that an objectively revolutionary situation, where the masses, urged on and driven by the objective conditions, prepare to engage in revolutionary action, is independent of whether or not a revolutionary party exists. Morrow now admits it, but he draws from it no conclusion regarding his own orientation. Such situations have existed and will exist, and it is through them that a revolutionary party will have the opportunities to grow, to educate itself and finally to conquer.

We have already explained to Morrow that the second imperialist war, like the first, has also been transformed in more than one country into civil war, into revolutionary action of the masses. We have cited for him the specific examples of Italy, Greece, China, Indo-China, Indonesia, and almost all the countries of Europe—including Germany—during the period between the departure and defeat of the German troops and the arrival of the Anglo-American and Russian armies. In all these countries where the masses engaged in revolutionary actions, spontaneously formed committees and militias, occupied the factories, *objectively* attacked through their whole struggle the bourgeois power, and objectively posed the question of their own power—they began in a certain sense the revolution.

Wasn't it Morrow himself who greeted the fall of Mussolini in August 1943 in the following terms: "At the beginning of the war, Trotsky wrote the Manifesto of the Fourth International on 'The Imperialist War and the Proletarian Revolution.' For four years we have had the imperialist war. Now, the first stage of the proletarian revolution is beginning, as the Italian events demonstrate. Trotsky was murdered by Stalin before he could see his prediction come true. On the third anniversary of his death we are already permitted to see that his revolutionary optimism was based on the most scientific analysis of the course of events." (*Fourth International*, August 1943.)

What has become of this revolutionary optimism? Looking for a stronger vantage point, Morrow returns to "our" erroneous perspective on the German revolution. This was, we repeat, the perspective, up to the end of 1944, of the entire International including that of Morrow. We have searched in vain in all of his writings up to the end of 1944 for a different perspective. In his criticism of the 1943 Plenum resolution he says not a word against this perspective.

The resolution of the November 1944 Convention of the SWP took up and developed this perspective, and we know of no document of Mor-

row's which takes a position against it. It is only in 1945 that Morrow begins to be fully aware of the "error" of this perspective,—that is to say, when it is no longer a question of predicting but of asserting an actual fact, and when various comrades in the International were already asserting the same fact.*

Morrow modestly agrees to replace the obviously opportunist formulation of his letter of July 1945 to the EEC, by a quotation from Trotsky which means nothing else than this elementary truth: The triumph of the revolution, the ending of an objectively revolutionary situation in a victorious outcome, is impossible without the existence and the leadership of the revolutionary party. When and where have we denied this necessity? Morrow by a sleight-of-hand removes the problem and again avoids answering the questions which we have clearly put to him: *Does he or does he not admit that the program, the slogans and the tasks of the Party flow chiefly not from the "political consciousness" of the proletariat and from the strength of the party, but from the objective conditions; and that in this sense, at least today in Europe, in spite of the influence of Stalinism and of reformism and the weakness of our forces, our program can be nothing else than the Transitional Program in its entirety?*

Does he or does he not admit that the objective conditions for the growth of our parties are not much more favorable than they were before the war?

Does he or does he not admit that the perspective for building our parties can be outlined only within the framework of a revolutionary upsurge and that this upsurge exists objectively at present?

All the rest and the so-called underestimation on our part of the importance of the party is nothing more than puerile verbiage. In order for the party to function and have influence, it must first of all exist as a force of some importance; and for it to exist and become a force, the objective conditions must be favorable, the masses must be moving into struggle in large part by themselves, they must enter, on their own motion and through their own experience, into conflict with the treacherous leaderships and come to understand our program.

We say today that such conditions exist and that our parties can grow by making intelligent application, according to the situation in each country, of our Transitional and Socialist Program.

Entrism: Is It Now Excluded?

Morrow is a great tactician. He has a sense "of organizational tactics, turns and maneuvers."

*Morrow mentions the case of a German comrade whose article was published in the March-June issue of *Quatrième Internationale*, the issue which also contains the resolution of the EEC of June 1945 correcting the perspective on Germany and with which Morrow at that time said he was in agreement. The broad outlines of this resolution had been established some months before by the ES as a whole.

Carried away by his polemic against the ES, Morrow furthermore commits some inexcusable excesses. Thus he confuses the February 1944 Theses of the European Conference with the January 1945 resolution of the EEC to which he attributes the perspective on the German revolution.

The same is true with Morrow's unfounded statement regarding the observations on the slogan of the Constituent, which he attributes to the January 1945 Theses instead of to the Theses of the February 1944 European Conference. No such sentence exists in the January 1945 resolution.

Situated in the United States, with no previous investigation and no precise knowledge of actual conditions, he knows "positively that before or at the time of the liberation the comrades could have and should have entered or remained in the reformist parties of Italy, Belgium and Germany."

On France, he now says, he was more cautious: "About France I was not at all sure but asked whether the Malraux wing of the MLN—which published *Franc-Tireur* with a larger circulation than the Stalinist *l'Humanité*—did not offer an entrism tactic possibility."

The ES, it is true, did not make the rapid decision of Comrade Morrow. It believed that in such a situation each section should give its own responsible opinion and that the final decision belonged to the European Executive Committee, on which there were representatives of various European sections. Morrow ignores the fact that the ES has asked each section, after thoroughly analyzing the situation in its country, to point out the best tactic, in its opinion, for its development.

For Italy, the question could not have been seriously posed because relations with the Italian section still remained very difficult. For Germany no final decision has been taken, because our work in that country was completely disorganized. This does not mean, however, that even in these countries we would necessarily in any case adopt the total entrism policy recommended by Morrow.

With regard to Belgium and France, no one in these two sections has considered or proposed their dissolution in another political formation. No one in France has given any thought to what Morrow calls the "Malraux wing of the MLN" and its paper *Franc-Tireur*, and one really had to be in America to discover this extraordinary milieu of work for the development of our movement. In Belgium as well as in France the comrades have always been *unanimous* in asserting that at the present stage our growth was through a combination of independent work and of fraction work in the CP and the SP.

As for England, where Morrow states that "everybody understands that our party must enter the Labor Party at the next opportunity," it is not the ES but the comrades of our English majority (whom Morrow wrongly believes we consider as his political friends) who are most strongly opposed to immediate entry into the Labor Party. Morrow knows this well, but faithful to his tactic of making blocs indifferently with no matter who in the International against the SWP and now against the ES, he prefers to skip over the difficulty by the equivocal formula "at the next opportunity."

Furthermore, it is significant indeed of the "sectarian" policy of the ES that on its own initiative the European Executive Committee in October 1945 adopted a resolution on the unification of the Communist and Socialist Parties, which reads:

"However, under the present conditions of the ideological retreat of the workers' movement and in spite of the extreme maturity of the objective conditions for revolution, the unification of the Communist and Socialist Parties into one single party could under certain conditions constitute a relatively favorable step in eliminating for the masses the distinction between two

political formations which hardly differ at all in their present reformist policy, in strengthening the regroupment of the working class and especially in allowing, through the establishment of an internal democratic regime such as the Stalinist bureaucracy can never accept in its own party, the development of revolutionary tendencies.

"This consideration may, in certain countries, have an influence on the tactics to be adopted by the sections of the Fourth International for the building of the revolutionary party.

"That is to say, it may be that, in face of the accomplished fact of the unification of the Socialist and Communist Parties, or during the process of unification, and under conditions which can be established as favorable (important progressive centrist currents, favorable internal democratic atmosphere, extreme weakness of our forces, etc.)—it may be that tactical considerations may indicate to certain sections of the Fourth International the abandonment of their own organizational independence.

"However, no such decision may be taken by any section without the formal assent of the leadership of the International."

Morrow, fully armed, launches into a violent attack against what he calls the distortions of the reasons which led Trotsky between 1933 and 1938 to call for the policy of entry into the Social Democracy. In its first answer to Morrow the ES wrote:

"Trotsky advocated the 'entrism' policy with respect to the Social Democracy in a period of the general ebb of the labor movement following a long series of defeats and on the day after the victory of German fascism which sounded the tocsin for world reaction and accelerated the outbreak of the war.

"*Social Democracy which had still retained considerable influence among working class circles, was capable under the menace of fascism of again passing through a healthy reaction and of permitting, thanks to a more or less democratic internal atmosphere, the development of revolutionary tendencies (and this was only a hypothesis to be verified).*"

Morrow in his reply selects only the first paragraph, makes no mention of the second, and cries triumphantly: "Trotsky called for entry first of all because there was a powerful current in the Social Democracy moving sharply to the left precisely because it was seeking to learn the lessons of the defeat in Germany."

The ES has not denied the marked radicalization at that time within the Social Democracy, but it has not failed at the same time to emphasize that this radicalization was a sign of the crisis which the Social Democracy was entering and which reflected the general crisis of bourgeois democracy after the victory of fascism in Germany and the approach of the new war.

Since 1923 and especially since 1933, the successive defeats of the proletariat have determined, in spite of temporary leaps, a *general line* of retreat.

Does Morrow deny this truth while he cites "the old documents"? Let us examine these documents. In 1933, after the German defeat, in the theses in which he outlined the necessity of the new orientation towards building the Fourth International, Trotsky wrote:

"How explain the fact that our grouping, whose analysis and prognosis has been verified by the entire course of events, is growing so slowly? The cause must be looked for in the general course of the class struggle.

"The victory of fascism seizes tens of millions. Political prognoses are accessible only to thousands or tens of thousands who moreover feel the presence of millions. A revolutionary tendency cannot serve stormy victories at a time when the *proletariat as a whole is suffering the greatest defeats*.

"But this is no justification for letting one's hands hang. Precisely in the periods of revolutionary *ebb-tide* are cadres formed and tempered, etc. . . ."

In 1938 Trotsky, taking up this idea again, wrote in his article, "A Great Achievement," on the Founding Conference of the Fourth International:

"The working class, especially in Europe, is still in *retreat*, or at best, in a *state of expectancy*. Defeats are still too fresh, and their number far from exhausted. They have assumed their sharpest form in Spain. Such are the conditions in which the Fourth International is developing. Is it any wonder that its growth proceeds more slowly than we should like?"

We say today that the period we are entering with the liquidation of the second imperialist war, differs precisely from the preceding period in the fact that the war and its consequences have recreated the revolutionary potential of the proletariat, have wiped out the impression of former defeats, have created objective conditions which greatly favor our development.

We say also that the Social Democracy no longer finds itself in the conditions which between 1933 and 1938 caused its crisis, the de-

velopment of leftist tendencies and the enlargement of its internal democracy.

We say, finally, that to carry out in general at the present stage a total entrism policy in regard to the Social Democracy, such as Morrow calls for, without even having the possibility of an organ and of developing our program, would be political suicide.

When Trotsky called for the entrism policy he based this on a theoretical analysis of the whole situation, and he justified the choice of the Social Democracy from the fact that "the crisis of the democratic state of the bourgeoisie signifies of necessity the crisis of the Social Democratic Party." (*Verite*, August 17, 1934).

From this assertion he then drew two conclusions: (a) That while the parliamentary democracy of the bourgeois state disappears the internal democracy of the Socialist Party on the contrary becomes an ever-greater reality," and (b) "At the same time as the state becomes bonapartized and as the fascist danger approaches, the majority of the (Socialist) Party must inevitably become radicalized, and the internal differentiation, which is as yet far from complete, must enter a new phase."

Nor did Trotsky fail to point out that if the tendency toward transformation of *reformism* into *centrism* could only be a *general* one in the period of the approach of fascism and of the crisis of bourgeois democracy, what remained decisive for the practical and especially the organizational conclusions, was "*how* this tendency is reflected—at a given stage of development—in the Socialist Party of a *given* country." And he mentioned in this connection the difference which existed at that time between the situation in the French Socialist Party (moving toward the left) and the situation in the Belgian Socialist Party (moving toward the right).

What theoretical analysis of the present situation leads Morrow today to call for a general policy of entry into the Social Democracy?

We have not been able to discover it.

Where Does Morrow Stand Now?

We have tried to follow the arrangement of Comrade Morrow's answer, and to give him satisfaction at least on the most important questions which he has posed.

But it is now our turn to ask him: Our line, correct or incorrect, is clear and we have always clearly explained it and defended it. But where does Morrow stand now? Does he now believe that his differences with the SWP majority, which he still admitted in May, 1945, were not "fundamental in character," have since then developed into principled differences?

Does he still have the same position on the national question which he defended from 1940 to 1943 against the "Three Theses" and against the Shachtmanites?

Is he still for the Trotskyist position on the question of the USSR, against "bureaucratic collectivism," "Russian imperialism," "Russian totalitarianism" and the other revisionist and confusionist formulas of Shachtman?

In what way, for example, does he distinguish himself from the French minority on the national question and on its present policy, and from the English majority on the question of entry into the Labor Party?

For to carry on a struggle by making a bloc with heterogeneous political tendencies and with those who have evaded all discussion that might throw a light on the differences which exist—that in our language is called unprincipled combinationism.

April 15, 1946.

Social and Political Conditions in Egypt Today

By J. DAMIEN

Cairo, April—During the past ten years Egyptian society has been affected by a succession of very decisive changes. In short these changes took the following aspects: 1) *economically*, the rapid expansion of local industries; 2) *socially*, the growth of the working class; 3) *politically*, the disintegration of the WAFD, the traditional nationalist party.

In the economic field Egyptian industries were confronted with a considerable task. They had to supply an immense demand during the six years of war. Textile plants were expanded and a number of new companies were formed, which payed huge profits a year or two after they were founded. The sugar industry gave to its maximum. Oil refineries had to supply the whole of the Mediterranean fleet and worked on a very impressive scale. Furthermore, the British army workshops employed no less than 300,000 workers.

Egypt has not even begun to exhaust its industrial potential; it is only at the beginning of the road. The more farsighted among the Egyptian capitalists are aware of the dangers arising from the reconversion of the world economy. Home made articles cannot compete, either in price or quality, with their American, English, French or Czech equivalents. But yet, enterprising millionaires like Ahmed Abbud Pasha and Ali Emine Yehia Pasha are seeking new ways for reinvesting their huge profits. It is probable that a major crisis will be averted and that within four or five years Egypt's economic structure will be strengthened by new plants, new oil refineries and chemical industries. Such a growth of the productive forces has brought with it a prosperity which is artificial—since Egypt is tied to Britain's economic system. Measured in terms of gold, Egypt's credit is very high—but the gold is in London.

In 1935 there were 250,000 workers in Egypt. The working class number now over a million. A fitter, whose salary before the war varied between 12 and 15 piastres a day (1 piastre = 4 cents), earns now between 40 and 50 piastres a day. Whatever the corresponding rise in the cost of living, there is no doubt that the Egyptian worker lives better than before the war. And living better he has time and money to educate himself, to participate in union activity, to buy magazines, etc. This growing consciousness of the working class has a direct bearing upon the tactics of the Egyptian political parties. On the one hand, they endeavor to win the confidence of the workers and to collect their votes; on the other hand they attempt to stem the natural trend of the working class towards independent class action.

Of the first aspect we can give many examples: for instance, all bourgeois parties are intriguing and double-crossing each other in order to have one of their leading personalities (generally a lawyer) designated as a "legal counsellor" in every important union. This "legal counsellor" when elected to parliament is supposed to represent the interests of the workers. His only function, in fact, is to persuade the workers that the "social laws" passed by his Party are the most progressive legislation they could dream of. The Wafd, presenting itself as the "Party of the People" has been far ahead of the other parties in this peculiar competition. It even succeeded in 1943 in having its "number 2" leader, Fuad Serag el Dine Pasha (one of the richest landowners) elected as "honorary president" *ad perpetuum* of all existing unions. But the farce was too obvious to last. The day following the Wafdist Cabinet's fall, Fuad Serag el Dine was unanimously dismissed from his ephemeral dignity.

Objectively speaking, it is clear that the period of bourgeois infiltration in the upper cadres of the workers' unions has come to an end. This conclusion leads us to the second aspect of the situation: the action of the working class as a new and independent force.

As early as April 1942, when the Wafd came to power and organized general elections, different unions expressed their will to see the working class constituencies represented no longer by lawyers or bourgeois candidates, but by real workers. Delegates were sent to the Wafd for the purpose of negotiating so that three seats, at least, would be left to the workers candidates. But at the time the pressure of the ruling class was still too great and the unions had to retreat. It was not the same in the General Elections of January 1945. Then the workers didn't seek anyone's permission. They presented two independent working class candidates: Fadaly (from the textile union) and Mohamed Mustafa (from the truck-drivers union). The whole machine of repression and slander was mobilized against these two candi-

dates. If it had not been for the terroristic intervention of the authorities both of them would have triumphed. Nevertheless, Fadaly got 820 votes and Mustafa 906, a result, felt by the Left groups, to be very promising indeed. An important consequence of the electoral campaign was that all advanced workers began to discuss the need of building a proletarian party. The danger of this was in 1945-46, one of the major reasons why the ruling class decided to switch the energies of the nation towards the struggle for independence and to call for a truce between the parties and classes. But still in December and January the textile workers of Shubra-el-Kheima, whose union was dissolved for its militant stand, formed a semi-illegal "Workers' Committee for National Liberation" which issued a series of daring appeals. During the wave of strikes in the textile industry all the proclamations of the strike committees included firm demands of a political character—democratic rights for the workers, etc.

The dynamic element, therefore, of Egypt's political future is the proletariat. Let us add that the static element is none other than the Court, which acts as a political party, or more correctly, as the compass and regulator of all political parties except the Wafd. The Court has its semi-official political organs (the Arabic weekly *Akhbar el Yom*, the French daily paper *Le Journal d'Egypte*, its own secret police, its widespread demagogic slogans ("Let's go to the people," "Rescue the Fellow," etc.). Its one concrete aim is to fight Bolshevism. In this respect it is probable that the Court will, one day or another, find the existing parties too inconsistent and unreliable and will play the card of the Moslem Brotherhood.

What is the Moslem Brotherhood? It is the most backward organization in Egypt. It is supposed to group together about 300,000 disillusioned, very fanatical petty-bourgeois. It has no program except to overthrow the Constitution and replace it with the Koran. It has no political experience so that, for the time being, it can be maneuvered by the Court's agents. The American and the Russian propagandists in the Middle East have shown great interest in the Moslem Brotherhood and seem to consider it as a possible winning horse. The Russians have made a fuss of their Islamic policy in their Moslem Republics. But there are no indications for the moment that the youth and the proletariat are ready to follow the MB, which is definitely too backward even for the British. Apparently the MB will be used as a sort of pending menace and instrument of blackmail in the hands of the Court's politicians. Whether it will free itself from such hands or not is a question that cannot be answered now.

The forces of the left are in the making. Since 1940 the Socialist idea has been successfully infused into the proletariat. One advantage of the situation is that there is no such thing as a social-democratic party in Egypt. Trotskyism and Stalinism face each other without intermediate parties. Numerically the Stalinists are stronger, but extraordinary as it may seem, they are not united. There are three Stalinist movements, one of them on the verge of an open split with Stalinism (the Trotskyists have repeatedly offered the Stalinists to form a "Left Front" against the Moslem Brotherhood and the imperialists). A regrouping of the forces of the Left—one of the Stalinist groups detaching itself and collaborating with the Trotskyists—is not excluded for the near future.

The task of the Left in Egypt is immense. Its cadres are still tiny. Even if the Left is too weak to guide the Egyptian workers to victory within the next few years, it is already strong enough to shake the actual instruments of the people's servitude; religious prejudice and political ignorance.

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