

Fourth International

Complete Report:

The Third World Congress Of the Fourth International

Survey and Analysis of

The Final Crisis of World Capitalism

Manager's Column

We take special pride in presenting this issue of **Fourth International** to the American labor and radical public. Taken together, the speeches and documents of the Third World Congress of the Fourth International which have been translated from its press service, provide the most comprehensive analysis of the rapidly changing world situation yet to appear. They are an indispensable guide for a real understanding of the "cold war," the "two camps," of the nature and consequences of World War III if and when it occurs.

At the same time we are not unaware of the difficulties many readers find in following the style used in resolutions which strive more for scientific precision than for popular presentation. The reader will discover, as we have, that the subject matter is so informative, so penetrating into the reality of our time as to make the additional effort required well worth the time. However, we are fortunate in this case in being able to publish the reports to the Congress. These speeches are an elaboration and explanation of the various documents and should provide an excellent introduction to them.

The key resolution is the one called "Theses on Orientation and Perspectives." It seeks to unravel the main trends operating in the world today and thus to determine the nature and direction of the tempestuous developments which are in the making. The resolution on "The International Situation" is a rounded political and economic analysis of present events. Both documents are introduced by the report of Michel Pablo.

The importance of the other three resolutions — on Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia and Latin America — should be self-evident. They probe into the process by which one-third of Europe shook itself loose from capitalism but still remained under the Kremlin's domination; and on the other side how Yugoslavia became a

workers' state, why it broke from Stalin's yoke, and its evolution since the famous split. The two resolutions are introduced by separate reports. The Latin American resolution, which stands by itself, should be of special interest in our country. It represents the most substantial Marxist contribution to a study of the problems of a vast, awakening continent which will soon follow Asia and the Middle East into the worldwide social crisis.

A word about the Fourth International. We do not have the space here to describe the history of the three Internationals which preceded the Fourth, or to discuss the causes for their rise and decline. Those interested in the subject should consult the catalogue of books and pamphlets on the back cover for reading material.

The Fourth International is an organization of working-class parties and groups in some 30 countries on all continents. It was founded in 1938, under the leadership of Leon Trotsky, to champion the program betrayed by the Stalinist-dominated Third International. The struggle against the perversion of the Comintern — scuttled in 1943 as part of a deal between Stalin and his "democratic" capitalist allies — into a tool of the Soviet bureaucracy is one of the most significant chapters in the struggle for Marxism and internationalism in the workers' movement. Despite reaction, war, isolation and persecution, the Fourth International has never wavered from this program.

The material contained herein is reprinted for the information of our readers and does not necessarily reflect the views of this magazine. Although we share in common the same general ideology, the magazine **Fourth International** has no binding or official connection to the organization of the same name. The name was adopted in 1940 when the Trotskyist movement in the U.S. was formally affiliated with the Fourth International. These connections were dissolved when the Voorhis Act vir-

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tually outlawed international ties for anyone except the State Department and the Roman Catholic Church.

The act was another measure of the reactionary decadence of our ruling circles. It was, we are confident, a futile attempt to stop the progress of ideas, which unlike persons and organizations, cannot be stopped at the frontier.

With these words we turn the magazine over to you, its readers.

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Business Manager

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 6th day of September, 1951.
(Seal) REBA G. HANSEN

Notary Public, State of New York
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My commission expires Mar. 30, 1952.

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The Third World Congress Of the Fourth International

The following report of the Third World Congress is a translation from "Quatrieme Internationale," published in Paris by the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International:

The Third World Congress of the Fourth International was held in Switzerland at the end of August and the beginning of September. A total of 74 elected delegates participated in the plenary sessions and commissions which lasted 11 days. Delegates, observers and visitors came from 25 countries and represented 27 organizations. Especially notable was the delegation from the Far East composed of a dozen comrades representing China, India, Vietnam and Ceylon, as well as delegations from Latin America representing Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay.

A representative from the labor movement of Negro Africa participated for the first time in a meeting of the Fourth International. Europe was represented by delegations from all the principal countries. A representative of a Communist opposition movement in the USSR who was to participate as observer at the Congress was prevented from coming at the last moment by material difficulties.

The Congress held its plenary sessions in a hall specially decorated for that purpose. A Vietnamese revolutionary artist reproduced portraits of the principal martyrs of the Trotskyist movement.

The Congress assigned honorary chairmanship to its militants who are at present victims of imperialist or Stalinist repression. Among them are Bolivian, Vietnamese and Greek comrades, notably the recently arrested Guillermo Lora, member of the Central Committee of the Bolivian Section of the Fourth International, Deputy in the Bolivian Parliament and leader of the miners' union, and Comrades Rene and Liu, leaders of the Vietnamese section of the Fourth International, under arrest by the Vietminh authorities.

The work of the Congress was carried on in five languages for which there were concurrent translations in English, French, German, Spanish and Chinese, without taking into account summary translations in other languages.

The Third World Congress opened with a greeting from the Secretary of the International, with the election of an Organization Commission for the Congress and the election of special commissions. The principal reports given were a general political report, a report on the "People's Democracies" in Eastern Europe, a report on Yugoslavia and a report of the activities of the outgoing International leadership.

The political report emphasized the two main features of the present world situation: the accelerated preparations for war by imperialism and the development of the revolutionary upsurge in Asia. It declared that the launching of imperialist war in the present world-wide relationship of forces (which are unfavorable to imperialism and cannot be reversed in the next two to four years) meant that it would tend from the start to become transformed into an international civil war.

The report demonstrated that in the course of this class war the proletariat would free itself from all bureaucratic control by the Kremlin and that the struggle unleashed on a world scale could be terminated only by the victory of the socialist revolution over imperialism and over Stalinism. To achieve this victory it is indispensable for the revolutionary movement to defend the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China and the colonial revolutions against imperialism, while irreconcilably combatting Stalinism which is incapable of unifying and effectively directing the anti-imperialist forces on a world scale.

The political report, together with the documents presented to the Congress (Theses on Orientation and Perspectives and the Political Resolution) were jointly adopted by 39 votes to 3 with 1 abstention after a discussion lasting two and one-half days in which 30 delegates participated.

The resolution on the countries or "People's Democracy," drafted by the International Secretariat, was presented with a report which reviewed the evolution of the countries in the East European buffer zone since 1945 and the corresponding development of the analysis of the International on this question. The report defended the designation of the "People's Democracies" as having acquired, beginning with 1949, a definitive character as "deformed workers' states,"

and envisaged the defense of these countries against imperialism, as well as a program of political revolution against the bureaucracy similar to the Trotskyist program for the USSR. The slogans of independent Socialist Republics for Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Hungary, etc., and their voluntary federation were to remain as previously the central slogans for these countries. The report and resolution were adopted after a day's discussion, by 41 votes to 2.

The resolution on the "Yugoslav Revolution and the Fourth International," adopted by the Ninth Plenum of the International Executive Committee, was presented to the Congress in a report which analyzed the stages of development in the policy of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the reasons for this development and the attitude of the Trotskyist movement toward the shifts in this policy. The report and resolution were adopted by 37 votes with 1 abstention, 4 voters being absent.

All the documents adopted were referred to the incoming International Executive Committee for editing and the incorporation of proposed amendments compatible with the general line of these documents, taking into account the remarks made during the discussions.

The Congress heard the activities report of the outgoing leadership of the International which registered the important advances realized by the Trotskyist organizations since the Second World Congress in 1948, notably in Europe, Latin America, Ceylon, etc., both from the viewpoint of their organizational strengthening as well as the far greater political homogeneity which was reflected in the Congress. It stated that most of the sections of the International have successfully integrated themselves in the mass movement of their countries and have learned to work out an orientation adjusted to the national peculiarities of the working class movement in which they must work.

The discussion following this report in which 18 delegates participated showed through the activities of most sections that solid ties had already been established by the Trotskyist movement with the authentic movement of the masses in the principal countries of the world. The activities report was unanimously adopted.

The Congress elected a new Executive Committee of the International composed of 21 members and 9 candidates.

The Congress adopted different resolutions presented by various commissions dealing with the situation of the Fourth International in several countries (France, Austria, Argentina, etc.). It adopted a political resolution answering the main problems posed by the revolutionary movement in Latin America, granted recognition to a section of the Fourth International in Argentina, and confirmed the election of the Latin-American Bureau of the International Secretariat. It instructed the new International Executive Committee to draw up a concrete plan together with the dele-

gates from the Far East on the composition and operation of the Far Eastern Bureau of the International Secretariat. It instructed the International Secretariat to draft a manifesto to the workers of the whole world in its name.

Before concluding its work, the Congress observed a minute of silence to the memory of Leon Trotsky, since the eleventh anniversary of the assassination of the great revolutionary coincided with the opening period of the Congress. It sent greetings to the widows of the martyrs of the movement and to militants and leaders who were celebrating the 25th anniversary of their participation in the Trotskyist movement.

The Third World Congress marked a

high point in the history of Trotskyism, because of its complete success from the technical standpoint, despite the immense difficulties arising from restricted material means; because of the representation of a considerable number of countries greater than had been present at all the previous assemblages of the international Trotskyist movement, and above all by the remarkable political homogeneity manifested throughout the discussions. The fraternal atmosphere which featured its work as well as the political maturity exhibited by the delegates represented the highest degree of political and organizational cohesion that the world Trotskyist movement has achieved since its beginnings.

A Milestone in Internationalism

AN EDITORIAL

The ideas and problems which fill these pages touch the fate of the human race today. They belong in the same sphere as Lenin's contributions to living Marxism after the outbreak of World War I. The epoch Lenin analyzed, which he so aptly and prophetically characterized as the period of wars and revolutions, marked the *beginning* of the final decline of capitalism as a world system. The epoch—our own—under consideration by the recent Congress of the international Trotskyist movement marks the *last phase* of this decline when wars and revolutions are being telescoped into one cataclysmic struggle, yes, into the final conflict between proletariat and bourgeoisie, between capitalism and socialism.

Lenin's thought was fresh, vigorous, dynamic. It was not rutted in routine, tradition and formal categories. Marxism for him was not a catechism to be memorized and repeated by rote, but a means of penetrating the complexities of the social struggles and of fashioning a strategy that would guide the proletariat to victory and socialism. The virility and efficacy of his method were demonstrated in the Russian Revolution itself.

"Museum pieces" he called the notions so sacred to the entire leading staff of his party only the day before his return from exile. The epoch had changed. The conception of the sequence of revolutions, giving primacy to the advanced industrial countries, was outmoded. Imperialism had swept the world into its vortex. The task of the Russian proletariat was to take the power at once and thus give impetus to the socialist revolution in the West. Thus Lenin rearmed his party. The revolution he made in the ideas of Bolshevism was an indispensable prerequisite to the revolution the Russian workers made in action.

The work of the Third World Congress of the Fourth International is in keeping with the Lenin tradition. Here too there is a rearmament of the revolutionary vanguard for an altered world situation and on the eve of great class

battles. The achievement is unique. No other tendency in the working class movement—be it Stalinist, social democratic or centrist—has met the ideological test of the times. All of them without exception are being dragged blindly, unconsciously by forces beyond their control into the impending showdown. The head of the world proletariat rests on the shoulders of Trotsky's Fourth International. Its ideas precede the inevitable triumph of the world October which will realize the fusion between the program and the movement which carries it to victory.

Past Wars and the Threatening War

What is new and different in the world today?

The character of the approaching war is new. The position of the classes, the circumstances in which the war takes shape and threatens to break out are different from those which surrounded past wars.

The major wars of the past were conflicts between imperialist powers for the redivision of the markets and raw materials of the earth. Not so today. The last two wars have led to the ruin or to the exhaustion and decline of all the important imperialist powers but one, the United States. The emergence of the American capitalist colossus, with its unrivaled productive plant, its extensive domestic market, its huge supply of capital, has driven the other powers from the field of effective competition.

The problem confronting the new imperialist giant is different from that faced by British, German, Japanese, French capitalism in another era. One-third of the area of the world, extending from the Elbe to the China seas and including more than 800,000,000 people, has completely slipped out of the capitalist market. It must be reconquered before capital can safely and profitably be invested in that area again. Irresistible economic forces drive American imperialism to this task.

Without this market for capital and goods, its huge

productive forces are threatened with stagnation and crisis for lack of adequate living space. Without this market, the other capitalist nations cannot achieve any stability; they must pull America down into their own bankrupt condition by their constant need for loans and grants which serve no other purpose than to avert total collapse. More. The very existence of this huge non-capitalist world unsettles existing markets, spurs the colonial and semi-colonial peoples to take advantage of the palpable weakness of their oppressors thus creating new military burdens and further instability in the West.

Survival of Capitalism at Stake

Nothing short of the survival of capitalism as a social system is at stake in this conflict. That is why compromises are so difficult to attain and so short-lived in duration. That is why, despite fears of the devastating character the war will assume, despite doubts and misgivings as to its outcome, American imperialism rushes headlong into the holocaust, beating down hesitation and resistance of its allies and welding together the armed coalition for the counter-revolutionary crusade.

The conflict of two mutually exclusive social systems taking the form of world war means in effect that the class struggle, which has existed from the inception of capitalism as a struggle between proletariat and bourgeoisie, has extended in the decline of capitalism into a struggle between states which represent the interests of the hostile and conflicting classes. This situation was envisaged by Lenin. It was predicted by Trotsky. It is now rapidly becoming the reality of our times.

But it was one thing to accept Lenin's and Trotsky's views when they were merely a prognosis, it is quite another to confront this prognosis face to face. The social climate is charged with nerve-wracking tension. Terrible pressures are bearing down on all men, on all classes, tendencies and groups. This is the unmistakable sign that civilization stands at a turning point, that the people are being called upon to make a fatal, ir retrievable, cataclysmic decision.

Here is the supreme test of revolutionary leadership, which the Fourth International alone of all tendencies in the working class movement has met. It has not submitted to forces far greater than itself, it has not wavered under pressure, it has not deluded itself or others with false hopes. Prepared by its whole past, which embodies the best of the traditions of revolutionary Marxism, it was able to skillfully diagnose the existing reality, to speak clearly of the march of events, to confidently prepare its strategy for the turbulent tomorrow.

War and Revolution

What is this reality? It is not merely the approaching encounter between states with different social systems. *It is the merging of the two big phenomena of our times—war and revolution—into one.* Trotsky wrote prior to the last war that either the revolution would stop the war or the war would produce the revolution. Many, even in the Trotskyist movement, in artificially transferring this correct statement to a greatly altered situation, were led

into error. They visualized the outbreak of war as a sign of the defeat of the workers' movement and a victory for imperialism which, as in 1939, would not dare plunge into war without first settling accounts with the proletariat.

Not the least of the achievements of the Fourth International Congress was its correction of this error. There have been no shattering defeats for the workers' movement anywhere in the world since the last war. Despite all its efforts, reaction has been unable to stabilize itself in any important nation. On the contrary, the revolutionary tide has been moving from continent to continent. Temporarily subsiding in Europe, it swept like a flood over China. Now it swells in the Arab world. Tomorrow it threatens to rise in Africa and Latin America. As if in sympathetic response, France and Italy are again reverberating to its echo and England has plunged deeply into social crisis.

The pitiful results of a year and a half's armed struggle against the Korean people indicate that it is unlikely that imperialism, despite the treacherous policies of Stalinism and social democracy, will succeed in altering this situation before the outbreak of war. It is much more probable that imperialism will seek to settle this problem by and through the war itself.

It is for this reason that the Fourth International envisages the outbreak of civil war throughout the world when hostilities begin. Workers and colonial peoples will seize the occasion to overthrow their former rulers and imperialist oppressors. The fact that imperialism aims to destroy the nationalized property relations in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, to destroy the revolutionary regime in China, to smash the working class and colonial movements, will tend toward the creation of a natural coalition against a common enemy: counter-revolution. Does this mean that the Kremlin will dominate the anti-imperialist coalition and strangle it in a totalitarian vise as it has done in the past?

Marxism and Violence

Before we enter upon this question, it is important to underscore the significance of the estimate made of the dynamics and character of the next war by the Fourth International. There is no doubt that it will be shocking to those who are entirely preoccupied with the horror and devastation created by war and especially of the next one which will undoubtedly be the bloodiest and most destructive in history. It is not the Marxists who should be reproached for the barbarism of war or the violence of social struggles. Their aim is to eliminate the form of class rule which is responsible for these evils and to do it peacefully if possible so that the new socialist society can be brought into being without the added poisoning and distortion of human relations caused by war.

Marxism above all is a science whose function is to know what is, to say what is and to draw the conclusions for action that flow from such an examination of the reality. The analysis cannot be contested because it does not present a pretty picture, because it does not pin its hopes on a "return to reason," on desires for peace or some other miracle. Its significance lies in the fact that it gives conscious men a perspective, that it turns their eyes to

the root of the matter, that is, to the class forces which despite all the atom bombs will decide the future of humanity. The merit of the prognosis of the Fourth International is that it frees men from the paralysis of fright and makes them fit for action.

The Fear of Stalinism

The far more serious obstacle up to now to the thought and action of the socialist vanguard has been fear and confusion about Stalinism. Were all class movements to be dominated by this despotic, ruthless bureaucracy? Would the war lead to its complete domination? These are the problems that trouble thinking revolutionists and it is here that the rearmament of ideas by the Trotskyist world congress is of the greatest import.

It is not surprising that Shachtman, the leaders of the POUM, the Titoites and other centrists should react to this ideological rearmament with cries and accusations that "the Fourth International has capitulated to Stalinism." Part of their venom undoubtedly comes from bad conscience. Most of them at one or another time in their past had promised to defend the Soviet Union against imperialism in case of war. But the threatening war finds most of them either in the other camp or on the way into it, identifying the Stalinist bureaucracy with the Soviet Union as their justification for joining with imperialism.

Their reaction is typical of the "socialists of the world" when confronted with a reality which does not conform to the ideal constructions in their minds. The Russian Mensheviks denounced Lenin as an "anarchist" and a "Blanquist" because he reoriented his party toward the establishment of workers' power in a backward country which had not known an extensive capitalist development and before socialism had triumphed in the advanced countries. What was their alternative? To collaborate in a government of landowners and capitalists, to support the imperialist war, to stall the breakup of the feudal estates and the distribution of the land to the peasants and eventually to intrigue with reactionary generals against the Bolsheviks.

The Soviet Union does not conform to the pattern of workers' power envisaged by the Marxists; the workers' states of Eastern Europe were not brought into being according to classic revolutionary lines, and were then deformed on Russian lines by the Kremlin; the new China is run by a Communist Party which is not as democratic as it might be. Therefore, the modern Mensheviks reject the whole thing, bell, book and candle: the system that demonstrated the superiority of planned economy over capitalist anarchy and has made Russia an industrial nation; the transformation that obliterated private property and the blight of feudalism in Eastern Europe; the revolution that has expelled foreign imperialism from China for the first time in hundreds of years, unified the nation and is in the process of cleaning out the Augean stables of medievalism.

What is their alternative? A "Third Camp" which is already becoming the left wing of the camp which includes MacArthur and McCarthy, Chiang Kai-shek, Franco and Hitler's generals. And these are the wretches who speak

of "capitulation to Stalinism"! By this position, they in effect hand over one-third of the world to the Stalinist bureaucracy because there are precious few of these proletarian masses, with all their hatred for the Stalinist bureaucrats, who will join imperialism in its crusade to overthrow the great social achievements effected in their countries, precious few who will stand idly by if it is attempted. The "theories" of the renegades serve them as a bridge back to imperialism and serve the Kremlin as a weapon against its revolutionary opponents. What is "state capitalism," "bureaucratic collectivism" to the renegades, is the road to socialism, distorted though it is, to millions of people who do not confuse the foundations which have been laid for the new society with the bureaucratic caste in political control.

The Fourth International has remained faithful to Trotsky's analysis and attitude toward the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinism. While unchanged in fundamentals, it has refined its ideas on this question and added a note of realism required by changed world conditions. What it recognizes is that events have changed the relationship between the Soviet bureaucrats and world imperialism, and between Stalinism and the masses it leads and influences.

Stalinism was a product of the reaction that followed the ebbing of the revolutionary wave and the defeats of the workers' movement in the twenties in Europe. It kept its domination by maneuvering between rival imperialist powers and by manipulating the workers' movement to the ends of these maneuvers. Isolated revolutionary developments such as in China, Spain, France, unable to withstand the opposition of their own bourgeoisie in combination with the counter-revolutionary treachery of the Stalinist bureaucracy, went down to defeat. The defeats consolidated the Kremlin's position by freeing it from the pressure of revolutionary masses and by lending plausibility to its defeatist attitude to workers' revolutions.

The Altered Situation

All of this is altered today. Imperialism is no longer divided and heading toward a clash in its own ranks but united under American hegemony it is preparing for war against the Soviet Union. The bargaining power of the Kremlin is thus considerably restricted. Although willing as ever to bargain away the interests of the revolutionary workers and colonial movements it is clear that imperialism requires more far-reaching concessions as the price of any real agreement. Nor is it such a simple matter to sell out these movements as, for example, the New China. Under such conditions it becomes more and more profitable for the Kremlin to attempt to exploit these movements for its own ends, endeavoring all the time to limit their objectives, then to betray them directly. The revolutionary ferment in the world tends today to remain in an active state rather than being dammed up and demoralized as in the past.

Far more important however is that the forces of mass unrest let loose upon the world since the last war are becoming too vast, too uncontrollable for manipulation by the Kremlin or any other bureaucracy. What has hap-

pened in Yugoslavia during the war, and even more significantly in China, is an illustration of this phenomenon and foreshadows the shape of events to come. In both cases the Kremlin attempted to prevail upon the leaderships of these revolutions to come to terms with their reactionary opponents — the Yugoslav Royalist government-in-exile and Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile, as the records prove, the Kremlin made agreements with these reactionary rulers behind the backs of and against Tito at one time and against Mao at another. Stalin's object, in one case as in the other, was to honor his agreements with imperialism and to achieve peace with it at the expense of the revolutionary masses.

But what had been possible in China and Spain before the war was no longer possible in Yugoslavia during the war and in China after it. The great mass movement was too powerful, too irresistible a force to be curbed by secret agreements, supplemented by GPU terror squads. It swept over the Kremlin's head and swept its agreements into the dustbin of history. This is a new development of the greatest political significance and was recognized as such by this Congress of the Fourth International not only because of the light it throws on the past and present but because it can be a dominant tendency in the event of an imperialist war against the non-capitalist world.

Crisis of Stalinism

Basically, this is not a new idea, so far as Trotskyists are concerned. Viewing Stalinism as a by-product of working class defeats and of reaction, we had envisaged its crisis in a period of the upsurge of revolutionary developments. This is precisely what has occurred. Only as so often happens, the reality, while basically conforming to the idea, had its own unique and peculiar expression. The crisis of Stalinism developed within and through the Communist parties in countries where they head great movements, and not in organic breaks from them. Parties, like those in Yugoslavia and China, still Stalinist in all outward appearances, led successful revolutions against the old regime.

But by that very fact, these parties had ceased to be Stalinist, that is to say mere agencies of the Kremlin, pressure instruments for achieving favorable diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist governments. In seizing power they had acted in direct opposition to the main purpose of Stalinism. This was to be confirmed in life itself when it later became clear that Stalin's Politburo had opposed and sabotaged their struggle for power. It was furthermore demonstrated when signs of friction and even open hostility appeared between the new revolutionary power and the Kremlin.

To contest this analysis because it appears contradictory is to ignore the reality which is itself contradictory. The road to socialism is not like a superhighway. Those who are unprepared to take its unexpected turns, its unexplored paths and its detours must inevitably lose their way. In fact, the political woods are full of these wretched wanderers who wail about the omnipotence of bureaucracy at the very moment that proletarians and colonial people are smashing the great empires of the capitalist world and thus creating the conditions for the downfall of Stalinism.

Far from capitulating to Stalinism, the Fourth International, by its analysis and the tactical course it has charted, prepares the penetration of the conscious vanguard into the mass movement as it is and as it will be. That is the greatest danger for Stalinism and assures the ultimate victory of the ideas of Trotskyism which is already indicated by events.

The Fourth International came into existence in an epoch of defeats. It grew up in the blackest years of the working class movement. It was small in numbers and isolated from the masses. Its criticisms of the revisionist, nationalist idea of "socialism in one country," of the pernicious influence of bureaucratism in a workers' state, of the disastrous policy of building a "bloc of four classes" during the 1925-27 revolution in China were generally unknown, and incomprehensible to the limited audience that did hear them.

How different today!

Who dares speak of "socialism in one country" today when the world decision between capitalism and socialism is clearly in the making?

Look at Yugoslavia. Less than two years after the break with the Cominform, the leaders of the regime, who were trained in Stalinist methods and who practiced them themselves for a long decade, found themselves denouncing the entire bureaucratic system in the Soviet Union and advocating ideas and plans for workers' democracy which in many ways paralleled those of Leon Trotsky. (The subsequent evolution of the Yugoslav leaders is treated at length elsewhere in this issue.)

Stalin himself is hard put to justify the reasons for existence of his privileged bureaucracy against critics in the USSR itself who say that with the creation of "socialist" states on the eastern and western borders of the Soviet Union, thus greatly weakening the capitalist encirclement, much of the "need" for an iron-clad dictatorship no longer exists. One swallow does not make a spring. But these are important signs of the times.

Look at China. There the victory of the revolution is officially laid to the fact that the Chinese CP broke with the fatal policy of the 20's of subordinating the mass movement to the Kuomintang. The responsibility for the defeat of that time is shunted off onto scapegoats who had merely applied the line of Stalin's Comintern. But the fact that the victory of 1949 is attributed exclusively to Mao Tse-tung and never to Stalin clearly implicates the latter in the defeat of 1925-27 and indicates that far more is being said in private than appears in the press.

It is the ideas and program of Trotskyism, not in detail, not in all their aspects, but in fundamentals which have triumphed wherever the masses have triumphed over imperialism. The anonymity which still surrounds them can only be transitory. When the scope of the struggle broadens and is posed as a life-and-death matter, the authorship of these ideas will be readily proclaimed and recognized by millions. The fusion between the revolutionary program and the revolutionary movement will become a fact.

While the heavy emphasis of the Congress is placed on the problem of Stalinism, its evolution, its contradictions

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Main Report to the Congress:

World Trotskyism Rearms

By MICHEL PABLO

In our examination before the 9th Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the character of the document which would open the discussion in the International for the Third World Congress, it appeared to us that instead of the traditional political resolution dealing with the international situation and tasks, it would be far more appropriate this time to begin with a more general, more fundamental document tracing the broad lines of objective developments and of the orientation of our movement.

Indeed it appeared to us that in view of the new period which had followed the wind-up of the last war, and more particularly in view of recent developments, of the active preparation of a new world conflict, it would be necessary to arm our movement with an understanding of this period as a whole, of its meaning, its dynamism, its perspectives. It was necessary, we thought, to reaffirm and again trace more precisely the general position of our movement toward the USSR, the Communist parties and the revolutionary movements of the masses which are led by these parties.

All this was needed in order to follow closely the development of the situation without being disoriented by its contradictory features, without weakening under the pressure of imperialism, without yielding to discouragement because of the limited scope of our achievements thus far. That is the way to tie our organizations still closer to the real movement of the masses wherever it arises and whatever forms it may take, with the certainty that this is the best means of consolidating our gains, of deepening the maturity and the roots of our movement in the working class, and of preparing the definitive success of our ideas in the decisive battles of tomorrow.

The period which followed in the wake of the last war has proved to be unique in the whole history of capitalism, causing fundamental changes in the structure of this system, replete with new developments, marked by sharper turns than ever before. In a word, it is the most violent, the most tempestuous expression of all the contradictions and all the characteristics of the imperialist epoch, that of decaying capitalism, that of wars and revolutions, as Lenin and Trotsky analyzed it.

This period of the decomposition of capitalism coincides with the existence of the USSR and of Stalinism; and the fact that the historic development of the proletarian revolution is apparently following a general line of expansion that proceeds from the backward colonial and semi-colonial countries, the weakest links in the imperialist chain, toward the advanced countries and the United States, the last citadel of imperialism. These factors make the processes of revolution more complicated, more contradictory, more unexpected.

A series of questions posed in Marxist theory in necessarily general terms are being illuminated in a new light,

clarified and refined, thanks to the concrete experience of the real processes of the proletarian revolution in our epoch.

Our movement, better than any other tendency in the proletarian camp, has been able to understand this situation and its problems and to integrate this comprehension in its theory as a whole, giving new resilience to its thoughts and its schemas and grasping the reality more closely and more profoundly. In our opinion all this constitutes important, immense progress. Far from frightening us, this necessary rearming should on the contrary persuade us that it is the only road for a genuine revolutionary Marxist movement which wants to survive and to triumph.

Necessity of Marxist Party

The epoch as a whole, and this period particularly, demand a vanguard which can fully rise to the occasion. I say quite bluntly a vanguard more capable than the best of the past, that of the Bolshevik Party when it was led by Lenin and Trotsky.

Contrary to the renegades of all stripes, to the centrist windbags and other "critics" of Bolshevism, we believe, more firmly than ever before, that this period, far from depreciating the value of the Bolshevik Party as Lenin conceived it — as that of preparing, leading and consolidating the revolution — has rather strengthened this concept to the uttermost. For the class struggle is not entering into quiescence. On the contrary. It will attain its climax in the war now being prepared and in the extended period of life-and-death struggle between the forces of the revolution and the counter-revolution from which will emerge the world victory of socialism.

In the times ahead we will require a more tempered world party, clearer and broader in its outlook, firmer and more homogeneous than ever before. And if our personal, individual capacities naturally still remain quite unequal to this task, it is all the more necessary to work collectively toward this aim and to come as close to it as possible.

The first condition of success for us is a clear, correct, profound understanding of the character of the period, of its perspectives and of what our fundamental orientation should be, as free as possible from all episodic and secondary considerations.

It is in this spirit that we have tried to work in the International, particularly since the Second World Congress, and it is in this spirit that we have elaborated and understood the Theses of the 9th Plenum.

Insofar as the Political Resolution which we have recently presented to the sections is concerned, it is fitted into the framework of the Theses of the 9th Plenum. Its special purpose is to analyze more closely the current international situation and to define the tasks which flow from it in the various regions and countries of the world.

It appears to me to be necessary, after the discussion which has taken place in some sections, particularly on

the 9th Plenum Theses, to return in this report to the following points and aspects which are contained either in this text or in the Political Resolution: *the structure and general orientation of the Theses; the war question; the question of Stalinism; the question of our tactics; our tasks in several areas and countries which should specially concern us in the immediate period.*

I. Fundamental Concepts in Analysis

For the purpose of determining our own orientation and our tactics, so as to be able to influence the orientation of the masses toward the revolution and socialism, we have to proceed from a correct appreciation of the fundamental tendencies of evolution of capitalism and Stalinism.

For this reason there is a unity in the Theses between the following three distinct sections: the evolution of capitalism toward a new war, with its precise characteristics and consequences; a general reevaluation of Stalinism in all its aspects (USSR, "People's Democracies," Communist parties, and their relationship with the revolutionary movement of the masses); orientation and tactics of our own movement.

The following ideas are emphasized in the first part:

a) With the Korean war capitalism has entered upon a more precise and more accelerated military and political preparation of a new world war: an armaments economy. Subordination of plans and ideas to military needs. New bases and alliances.

b) This war is directed by imperialism against the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China, the colonial revolutions, the international revolutionary movement.

c) It is being prepared in a relationship of forces unfavorable to imperialism, which in all probability will remain unfavorable for some years to come, imperialism having proved itself incapable of realizing the "optima" conditions for the unleashing of the war and its victorious conclusion.

d) In this case, a war unleashed by imperialism will rapidly become transformed, at least in Europe and Asia, into a civil war with revolutionary implications in the rest of the world, including the USA.

II. Main Tendencies in World Conflict

In relation to our discussions at the 8th Plenum of the IEC on the question of the evolution of the international situation and the perspectives of war, the 9th Plenum made important alterations and refinements which had been made comprehensible and necessary due to objective developments.

It seems to me that our new attitude toward these questions is above all the result of a different appreciation of the real relationship of forces on the world arena and of the importance of the revolutionary changes which we have witnessed since the end of the Second World War. Especially the changes which occurred and are continuing to occur in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, whose emancipation destroys the equilibrium of imperialism as never before.

Up to the 9th Plenum we had, *grosso modo*, envisaged the possibility of a new war along the schema of the wars of

1914-18 and even more of 1939-44. These were wars which broke out and became possible when imperialism succeeded, through a series of decisive struggles, in smashing the resistance of the masses, in demoralizing them, and in installing authoritarian regimes.

The Theses of the 9th Plenum take as their point of departure a more correct comprehension of the revolutionary convulsions which have transpired since the last war and of the revolutionary dynamism of the present period. The Theses affirm above all that the variant of such an evolution of the relationship of forces in favor of imperialism is quite improbable in the coming years. The Theses maintain that as a consequence the eventuality of a war in this period will in a certain sense be the only possible means for imperialism to change this unfavorable relationship of forces and to prevent it from still further deteriorating to its disadvantage.

When we speak of relationship of forces we do not have in mind the material, technical and military forces which are at the disposal of the two coalitions of states — the imperialist states and the states grouped around the USSR — but the global social relationship of forces as it is now developing in the world, counterposing the forces of imperialism to those of the revolution. This is the relationship which is involved. And, let us say in passing, this should set at rest the absurd objections and criticisms which have marked the discussion on the Theses in the French organization.

A second important conclusion flows from this new understanding of the situation in which the perspective of the war must be placed. If in all probability the relationship of forces remains unfavorable to imperialism for the immediate future, the eventuality of war cannot be excluded but on the contrary becomes more certain. This is due principally to the fact that the fundamental base, and by far the most important base of imperialism, in a way lies outside the regions of the world engulfed or threatened by the revolution. It is not in Asia or in Europe, but in the United States.

If the relationship between the classes in the United States were as unstable as it is in the capitalist countries of Europe, and if the strength of capitalism in the United States were comparable to that of capitalism in the other countries, that is, if it were as shrunken and as shaky, it would be correct to reason along the schema of the past and to conclude that a strengthening of the revolutionary struggle would be tantamount to paralyzing the trend of imperialism to war and to imperialism being disarmed by the revolution before it could unleash the war.

But the Theses stress the unequal development of the revolutionary process: the fact that new possible victories in Asia and Europe, far from diminishing the threat of war, can precipitate it, since American imperialism has now decided to stop this process and enjoys a far more stable relationship of forces within the United States than that which exists in Europe. This is a reflection of America's own might which also is far superior to that of the different capitalist countries of Europe.

The third important conclusion which flows from this comprehension is that a war unleashed by imperialism

under such conditions against the USSR, the "People's Democracies" and China, etc., under such a relationship of forces will from the beginning necessarily assume the character of a civil war at least in Europe and in Asia.

This civil war character is the consequence of *the nature of the war*, a war by imperialism against workers' states and against the revolution in all its forms, and of the *social relationship of forces* unfavorable to imperialism (despite the importance of its material, technical and military forces which continue to grow apace).

Merely the *nature* of the war would not suffice to lead us to the perspective of *civil war*. For, suppose imperialism unleashed its reactionary, counter-revolutionary war in a favorable relationship of forces, after crushing the resistance of the masses. Then this perspective would not at all exist from the beginning, or it would be very much weakened.

To speak of *civil war* is to speak of a specific form the class struggle will assume, and not of just any form, and this form is possible only in a given relationship of forces.

III. Strategy Toward Stalinism

The considerations contained in the second part of the Theses on the USSR, the "People's Democracies" and China, on the Communist parties, on the reciprocal relationships between the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs, the revolutionary mass movement, find their justification within the framework of this analysis of the world situation and its perspectives. The war being prepared this time by a united imperialism under the leadership of the USA is the counter-revolutionary war which aims not at the punishment of the Soviet bureaucracy and the crimes of Stalin, but at the destruction of the workers' states, the reconquest of China, the crushing of all the colonial revolutions and of the world revolutionary movement.

It is necessary to begin with this and to basically understand the character of the struggle which is being joined in all its scope and all its consequences.

This time what is involved is the final struggle which brings an epoch to a close.

This struggle must be viewed as extending over an entire period with successive phases and stages. We have to aim at — count upon — what must be and will be the overall outcome which we all desire: the world victory of socialism on the ruins of capitalism and Stalinism.

All the foregoing reasons must make our movement aware that we shall face terrific class pressures, never equaled in the past, in the midst of this apocalyptic struggle with its extraordinary difficulties and dangers. It will demand of us a clear perception of the meaning of the struggle, an unshakable class attitude, and acute understanding of our responsibilities — a complete conviction, born of understanding, in the revolutionary outcome of this period of struggle.

In face of the alignment of socially adverse forces which are now beginning to take their battle positions, it is necessary for us to reaffirm, to concretize our programmatic attitude toward the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China, the Soviet bureaucracy, the Communist parties and the revolutionary mass movements which they influence.

It is necessary to say clearly, plainly, without ambiguity

where we stand, on what side of the class lines, on what side of the barricade we erect our headquarters and plant our banner and how we intend to carry on this struggle within this camp.

And what do we say in this part of the Theses?

On the USSR, we reaffirm its character as a degenerated workers' state; with basic arguments we refute the characterization of "state capitalism" and we refine our programmatic attitude on the question of defense.

We take a position for the defense of the "People's Democracies" and of China against the war of imperialism as we do for the USSR.

On the Soviet bureaucracy, we reaffirm its character as a bureaucratic caste which has usurped the power of the proletariat; its dual role, its world-wide counter-revolutionary activity.

On the Communist parties, we make clear wherein they are different from the reformist parties which are tied to the bourgeoisie; their contradictory nature; their relationship with revolutionary movements of the masses.

Finally, so far as these movements are concerned we make clear our attitude of unconditional support, irrespective of whether their eventual leadership at a given stage is Stalinist or Stalinist-influenced.

On the character of the USSR and of the Soviet bureaucracy, we do not add anything new to what has already been said in the past. We do not alter any of our fundamental programmatic definitions of the past. But we stress the defense of the USSR as well as of the "People's Democracies" and China against the war of imperialism. This defense is to be understood as in the past not as a slogan as such but as a strategic line of our International whose practical application remains subordinate as in the past to the general interests of the world socialist revolution.

Far from the importance of the defense of the USSR against imperialism having diminished in any way whatever, it remains in our opinion more vital than ever, especially when a united imperialism approaches the moment of the final reckoning of accounts.

Faithful to the tradition of our movement on this question, to what was the guiding thought of Leon Trotsky, we declare openly, plainly and without hesitation that we will never and under no conditions confide the overthrow of the bonapartist Soviet bureaucracy to imperialism; that we will defend and that the revolutionary proletariat has the duty of defending the immense conquests which are still inherent in the planned and statified economy of the USSR and of the "People's Democracies," in the conquests won in China. We underscore the immense importance for the final victory over imperialism now represented by the existence of 800 million inhabitants on our planet who have broken away from imperialist control.

Only incurable sectarians, in reality only amateurs and spectators of the class struggle — outside of those in the workers' camp who have already succumbed to the pressure of imperialism and often even agree to serve it (always in the name of "democracy" against "totalitarianism") — can consider this task of the defense of the USSR as unimportant or even as troublesome. Such people dream of ideal conditions for the class struggle; they would like

history to proceed on a straight, smooth road without obstacles, without contradictions, before they will deign to follow it.

We reject such reasoning. We resolutely separate ourselves from such companions. We declare that our movement has nothing in common with such conceptions. Because we want to have our two feet firmly planted on the ground. Because our point of departure is the concrete conditions of the class struggle of our epoch and not ideal conditions. Because we know that only those who are capable of defending and preserving old conquests can gain new victories. Our attachment to the USSR permits us to be in the same camp as the world revolutionary forces opposed to imperialism, permits us to find the road to the teeming revolutionary masses in Asia and in Europe in particular; permits us to be with them today in their struggle against the preparations of imperialism for war, tomorrow in their inevitable assaults against its direct power.

So far as the *anti-bureaucratic* meaning of this defense is concerned, this is clearly explained in the Theses as well as in the Political Resolution and in the amendment we propose to include in the latter with the aim of removing all ambiguity on this question. We want to remove all grounds of criticism from those who are afraid that we are lightmindedly abandoning even a particle of the attitude which Trotskyism has had in the past toward the Soviet bureaucracy.

Our movement has always understood the victory over Soviet bureaucracy as the result of the extension of the revolutionary struggles in the world, as the result of important victories over imperialism, as a result of the extension of the world socialist revolution. To assure the victory over imperialism means inevitably to assure at the same time the victory over the Soviet bureaucracy. For the bureaucracy has no historic future and it maintains itself only on the basis of an equilibrium which has prevailed until recently between the forces of imperialism and those of the revolution, an equilibrium which is now definitively broken.

Contradictions of World Stalinism

Our movement was the first to advance an idea, which is repeated today even by the most perspicacious bourgeois politicians and journalists. Namely, that what was labeled Stalinist expansionism at the end of the last war has at the same time been the beginning of the end for Stalinism; that the equilibrium has been broken for the bonapartist Soviet bureaucracy as well; that the European buffer states, Yugoslavia, China, the colonial revolutions are as much, within varying time intervals, disintegrating elements of the power of the Soviet bureaucracy as the irresistible march to the new war and to new gigantic revolutionary explosions. These events cause this arch-conservative bureaucracy no end of embarrassment and anguish. For, like imperialism, the bureaucracy is incapable very much longer of controlling, of mastering the immense forces which are breaking up capitalism and its own expansion.

This profound comprehension of the period and of the

real nature of Stalinism, i.e., of the policy of the bureaucracy, we have tried to convey to the whole International. This understanding feeds our revolutionary optimism, frees us from all Stalinophobe complexes, boldly propels us to the unconditional support of every revolutionary movement struggling against imperialism, regardless of its Stalinist or Stalinist-influenced leadership at a given stage.

It is this comprehension also which has aided our movement in being the first of all the tendencies in the international workers' movement and, far in advance of all currents of bourgeois political thought, to understand the significance of the Yugoslav affair and of China. Bourgeois journalists are only now discovering the coordination imposed on Stalin by Mao, the disintegrating character of this combination for the future of Stalinism, the dynamics of the Chinese revolution as a mine-sapper of Stalinism.

Between the Second and the Third World Congresses, our movement has achieved a better grasp of the relationships which now exist between the Soviet bureaucracy, the Communist parties, the revolutionary mass movements. These relationships are not static. They evolve with the situation and with the social forces engaged in struggle.

The relationship between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Communist parties is not that of an identity of nature and interests. By taking as a point of departure the analysis of their social base and the exceptional conditions created during and after the last war which have given rise to extremely powerful revolutionary movements in several countries tied to the Communist parties, our movement has been able to explain the Yugoslav case, the Chinese case, and to raise this experience to the level of a theoretical generalization regarding the relationships between the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs, the revolutionary mass movements.

We have made clear that the CPs are not exactly reformist parties and that *under certain exceptional conditions they possess the possibility of projecting a revolutionary orientation, i.e., of seeing themselves obliged to undertake a struggle for power.*

This formula theorizes a concrete experience revealed especially in the circumstances created during and after the last war, and takes into consideration both the scope of its possible application and its limitations.

How should it be understood? Can the Communist parties transform themselves into revolutionary parties? The experience with the CPs does not permit such rash and dangerous assumptions. These parties can in exceptional circumstances (advanced decay of the bourgeois regime, a very powerful revolutionary movement) project a revolutionary orientation, but the question of their transformation into revolutionary parties, especially into Bolshevik parties, has not been answered in the affirmative, not even in the most favorable cases known thus far (Yugoslavia, China). On the contrary.

These instances, Yugoslavia in particular, demonstrate that while these parties can, as a result of exceptional conditions (and in the absence of any other revolutionary organization), be obliged to open up a struggle for power and even to attain this end despite their opportunism;

when conditions change and become difficult they prove incapable of pursuing a consistent, revolutionary policy to consolidate and extend this power. They remain centrist parties subject to new retrogressions. However, the fact that under exceptional conditions these parties can project a revolutionary orientation retains all its importance and should act as a guide in our line toward them.

A good grasp of this question of the CPs and their relationship with the revolutionary mass movement is a highly important matter for us, and not merely for an understanding of the Yugoslav and Chinese cases. It will permit us to follow the evolution of these parties better in the future, not to be taken by surprise by analogous developments, to adopt a correct attitude toward these parties, their members and the masses they influence.

I will return to this latter aspect in the section of my report regarding our tactics, which I am coming to now.

IV. The Road to the Masses

All our analyses should be directed toward integrating ourselves better and more deeply into the real movement of the masses. The most striking feature of our movement today, which differentiates it fundamentally from what it was before and even during the war, is the profound understanding by the great majority of our International of this necessity, and the practical, concrete application of this understanding.

For the first time in the history of our movement, particularly since the Second World Congress, the maturity of our cadres is evidenced by the stubborn, systematic exploration of the road which the real movement of the masses has taken in each country and the forms and organizations which express it the best, and by our concrete, practical steps on this road.

This was not, is not as yet and will not be for some time to come an easy task, both insofar as its comprehension and its realization are concerned.

To understand the real movement of the masses means first of all to be able to correctly analyze the political situation in each country, its peculiarities, its dynamism, and to define the most appropriate tactics for reaching the masses.

What we have understood for the first time in the history of our movement and of the workers' movement in general—for the first time in as thoroughgoing a manner and on so large a scale—is that we must be capable of finding our place in the mass movement as it is, wherever it expresses itself, and to aid it to rise through its own experience to higher levels.

Such an approach makes it possible to hammer out real national revolutionary leaderships, to overcome sectarianism, dogmatism, sterile byzantinism, activism, impressionism, impatience and all the defects inherited from the isolation and petty-bourgeois composition which was an inevitable first stage for many of our leading elements and members. With such an attitude it is possible to create leaderships and proletarian organizations and to shape an ever growing number of revolutionary working-class leaders who can really take hold of the leadership of the movement in their country.

Naturally this task cannot be resolved by formulas and documents. It is a task which flows from a certain degree of maturity acquired in practical experience, often through intense internal struggles such as have marked the history of almost all our national organizations. What is involved is an organic process and not the mechanical application of a catechism: how to shape the leadership and the proletarian party, how to integrate them into the real movement of the working class.

But let us look back at the immense distance our movement has traveled toward maturity in the last years. There is not now one single Trotskyist organization, which either as a whole or in part does not seriously, profoundly, concretely understand the necessity of subordinating all organizational considerations, of formal independence or otherwise, to real integration into the mass movement wherever it best expresses itself in each country, or to integration in an important current of this movement which can be influenced. There is not one single Trotskyist organization which has not found or is not seeking to find a real milieu for work.

I will go even further. What distinguishes us still more from the past, what makes for the quality of our movement today and constitutes the surest gauge of our future victories, is our growing capacity to understand, to appreciate the mass movement as it exists—often confused, often under treacherous, opportunist, centrist, bureaucratic and even bourgeois and petty-bourgeois leaderships—and our endeavors to find our place in this movement with the aim of raising it from its present to higher levels.

This is the case, for example, in Latin America where the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist mass movement often assumes confused forms, under a petty-bourgeois leadership as with the APRA in Peru, with the MNR in Bolivia; or even under a bourgeois leadership as with Vargas in Brazil and Peron in Argentina. To reject these movements out of hand, to label them reactionary, fascist or of no concern to us would be proof of the old type of "Trotskyist" immaturity and of a dogmatic, abstract, intellectualistic judgment of the mass movement. Even in this most backward area, from the viewpoint of the comprehension of our movement up to the present, we are about to overcome this stage, and I am certain that our Congress will know how to view and appreciate this progress in the course of its labors.

Elsewhere, as in South Africa, Egypt, the North African colonies, in the Near East, we understand that the eventual formation of a revolutionary party now takes the road of unconditional support of the national, anti-imperialist mass movement and of integration into this movement.

In various countries of Europe, in Canada, in Australia, in New Zealand, the principal political movement of the masses is in the reformist parties of these countries. We no longer have any hesitations in preparing our entry into these parties so as to develop a left wing, at a pace and in forms stemming from the situation and the peculiarities of these parties. In this domain, the experience of our British comrades remains the most encouraging example of the degree of understanding that we have been able to

attain in this difficult work, and of the gratifying results which this work can produce once this comprehension is acquired.

Finally, there remains that large category of countries in which the mass movement still takes the channel of Stalinist-led or Stalinist-influenced organizations. What is to be done in this situation? So far as concerns that category of countries where there now exists a powerful revolutionary mass movement led by the CPs and a revolutionary situation, as in several countries of the Far East, namely, China, Vietnam, Korea, Burma, the Philippines, it seems to me that there is a more or less general agreement in the International on the tactics we have laid down for these countries: activity directed toward these parties, organizations and the masses they influence, including work within these parties. Such an organizational tactic is not possible without an attitude of support of the anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist struggle which these parties have been obliged to undertake and without active participation in the front ranks of this struggle.

Importance of Communist Workers

Concerning our work in countries like France and Italy, where the majority of the working class and of the peasant poor follows the CP, we have outlined an activity which is essentially directed toward the members of these parties and the masses they influence. And this obliges me, in view of the discussion and the disagreements which have broken out on this question especially in the French organization, to deal with the more general subject of our present attitude toward the workers and the masses still under the influence of Stalinism.

These workers, these masses everywhere, even in countries where the CP represents a minority, and even an infinite minority, have a special interest for us that it would be criminal to neglect for the two following considerations: Because of the quality, the revolutionary inclinations of these masses, who as a general rule are composed of the best, the most active, the most revolutionary elements in each country. Because, on the other hand, of our perspectives on the evolution of the situation toward war which will accentuate the leftward development of these masses and will inevitably impel them into revolutionary struggles, including struggles for power, and in any case into a revolutionary attitude in the event of war.

Above all it is alongside these masses that we will have to carry on the struggle now against the preparation of the imperialist war, and it is on their side that we will have to struggle in case of war more directly against the power of imperialism and capitalism.

From this estimation and from this perspective there flows a double necessity for us to find the means of being as close as possible to these masses, to follow their movements, to benefit from their dynamism and their action which necessarily becomes more and more revolutionary; to win them to our ideas and, in the course of the struggle, to set them against the Soviet bureaucracy.

By taking the present preoccupations and aims of these masses as our point of departure, preoccupations and aims which more and more are going to be clarified in a revolutionary direction and in a will to struggle for power, we

will make contact with them, we will have the possibility of speaking to them, we will obtain increasing opportunities to be heard by them, we will introduce our line of fundamental differentiation with the line of the Kremlin and of their own bureaucratic leadership so far as the methods and the tactics of satisfying their demands and attaining their aims are concerned.

These masses are the most sensitive to the economic and political effects of the imperialists' war preparations; they want to struggle against these conditions and against the war; they want to defend the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China, the colonial revolutions and all the present conquests of the revolutionary workers' movement and they will take a revolutionary position in the capitalist countries in the event of war.

When we address ourselves to them, we must begin with the preoccupations and aims we have in common with them, and seek to find the means of establishing and extending a common front in practice around these objectives. How we write in our press, how we address ourselves to the militants and the masses influenced by Stalinism, how we present and explain to them our fundamental differences with the Kremlin and their leadership must be studied and adapted to the need of making them understand that we have the same revolutionary aims and preoccupations as they have, and to the necessity of creating a climate and a basis for a possible dialogue with these masses.

On the other hand, our activity should demonstrate to them in practice that we are with them, that we really want to struggle at their side.

In this respect, we must admit, there still remains a considerable distance for us to cover; a serious effort still remains to be made to better adapt our tactics toward these masses, to give more attention to the movements and organizations in which they participate. Whether these be "peace" movements or youth organizations (mobilizing a large part of the most dynamic of the working youth) we shall have to overcome the remnants of a doctrinal sectarian attitude in this domain and combat all tendencies that isolate us from these masses.

We must approach them, not with hesitant steps and with a thousand precautions, but firmly and confidently. For these masses are now being set into motion toward the revolution, toward power, toward the decisive struggle against imperialism and capitalism. They can no longer remain in the middle of the road. They are isolated from all their allies on the right. Whether they want to or not, they will come to recognize that there is no choice for them but to enter into struggle, consistent and resolute struggle for power.

Our general duty toward these masses, and our objective is to impel them further in this struggle and to expose the hesitations, the opportunism, the inconsistencies and even the treacheries of their leaderships in the course of this struggle.

What must be understood, let me stress this again, is that our relations and our tactics toward these masses have been and should be modified in a sense which takes into consideration—so as to derive all possible advantage therefrom—the new conditions which these masses face; the

situation evolving toward the war of imperialism against the USSR, etc.; and the inevitable revolutionary response such an evolution will evoke among these masses.

That is why we emphasize this question in the Theses as well as in the Political Resolution. I know that this is a far bigger task in actual practice, as our small organizations in Europe, for example, have still only very limited contacts with these masses. But that does not in any way constitute an argument for minimizing the enormous importance of such an orientation, bearing in mind the perspective, i.e., what we will have to do with these masses not so much in the immediate period but on the morrow.

Rearmament of Movement

I now come to some particular problems of our movement and to the conclusion of my report.

In general, we say in the Theses and in the Political Resolution, our movement will have to struggle from now on against the war of imperialism and attempt wherever possible to itself organize and lead this struggle, to act as the revolutionary leadership of the proletariat in these countries.

Nowhere do we say that we must await the war for our opportunities to materialize. Nowhere do we say that there is nothing to do from now up to the coming of the war but wait.

On the contrary, we say that this period, in which the relationship of forces remains unfavorable to imperialism, is a period of revolutionary struggles and convulsions, of an international revolutionary upsurge which we should exploit to the utmost right now.

The outbreak of the war, we have pointed out in this connection, will not stop this revolutionary process and will not mean a defeat in such circumstances; on the contrary, from a number of points of view, it will push the struggle to its paroxysm.

We have thereby wanted to arm our movement with a longer revolutionary perspective which corresponds to the real character of the period. Such a perspective combats the species of defeatism which takes the form of a "now or never" attitude, which breaks down the organic process of the struggle into two distinct phases—one up to the war, the other that of the war—staking everything on the first period while hanging out the crepe for our perspectives in the second. Such an attitude cannot but distort the objectives of our present work, for there can be no fruitful work without a perspective of the period as a whole and without an orientation which flows from this perspective.

Having said that, it is necessary to point out more concretely our present tasks in a series of key countries for our movement.

In Europe, we will continue to give special attention to our work in England, France, Germany and Italy. Concerning England, our organization is now solid, firm and clear from all points of view in its methods of work. We will aid it to the best of our ability especially in the sphere of education and in a constant improvement of the theoretical and political level of the revolutionary Marxist wing which we want to build in the British labor movement. This movement has always inclined toward empiricism and

activism; and in this connection we will revive the idea of a theoretical organ with a broader circulation.

In France, where our organization in recent years has displayed a very great and in some ways remarkable effort, a difficult task awaits us: that of correcting the line of our organization and integrating it with the perspectives of the International, so that it will be capable of resisting the enormous pressure which is now brought to bear on that country by the national and international class struggle, and of successfully coping with the difficult tests of the future. Our Congress will have to discuss this situation more in detail and to offer its solutions.

In Germany, our movement started almost from zero after the war. But it has developed and now includes an important number of militants who occupy solid positions in the revolutionary vanguard of that country. This is the result of activity which has intelligently exploited the peculiarities of the situation in Germany, the crisis of the CP and the formation of a left centrist tendency following the first favorable developments of the Yugoslav affair and its repercussions in German vanguard circles. We did not hesitate to immediately integrate ourselves in this tendency and to play a major role in its evolution.

It may be that this experience is now coming to an end and that we will once again have to choose our road. One road, if our means permit and if our base is sufficiently large, is that of continuing an independent existence and polarizing around us a large number of those revolutionary elements in Germany who still refuse to follow the social democracy or the Stalinists; another is that of integrating ourselves in the SP.

We do not yet have a definitive position on this question but it is before us now and will be part of the work of the Congress itself. In any case, as in the past the International will accord within the framework of its European activity special attention to Germany, where our opportunities remain great and where once again an important phase of the evolution of the international situation and the fate of the revolution will be at stake.

In Italy, our young organization has achieved remarkable external and internal progress which visiting comrades who attended the recent Congress of the organization had occasion to note with pleasure. We will do our best to aid it in consolidating its gains, in stabilizing its press, in enriching its propaganda means, in perhaps envisaging the reappearance of a theoretical organ.

We shall devote special attention to Spain, where our work has been almost completely dislocated, and we will attempt, despite great difficulties in this sphere, to aid the reorganization and the reorientation of a consistent revolutionary Marxist wing in the Spanish workers' movement.

In the Far East, the situation in Ceylon and in India will particularly occupy our attention.

A situation is developing in Ceylon which opens up the perspective of an important victory for our movement should certain conditions materialize. Our organization is now negotiating with the CP of that country to conclude a united front for the coming elections, which could lead to the defeat of the bourgeois governmental party and open up the practical possibility of the formation of a government of workers' parties. We will attempt to exploit this

situation with a view to its effect on India and on the entire Far East.

Our Ceylonese organization will have to strengthen its structure, raise the theoretical and political level of its members and integrate itself still further in the ideological life of the International. The organization will demonstrate, we hope, that it is conscious of the international importance of such an experience in Ceylon, especially from our point of view, and will spare no effort to succeed.

In India, our movement has made an entry into the SP of that country. But it has not been able to exploit to the utmost the possibility of this tactical turn for reasons which stem in the first place from the lack of preparation for the entry and from lack of leadership. Nevertheless, great possibilities still exist which can be turned to our advantage by a reorganization and a re-orientation of our forces with the active aid of the International.

India is a country where, despite our belatedness, it is possible to contest Stalinism for the national leadership. This is of immense importance for our movement and should be thoroughly understood by all the comrades in India, by all the comrades in Ceylon and by the whole international leadership. On the other hand, with the support of our movement in Ceylon and India, it is possible to envisage giving an impetus to the reorganization of our Chinese movement which is still quite alive, as you will note by the report of our Comrade P, who is present here, as well as of our movement in Vietnam, whose flame has never been extinguished.

The Congress will be a landmark for Latin America. It will make possible, through the discussion opened during its sessions, the settlement of a series of important questions that have been pending up to now for our movement in this area. It will advance the maturity already attained there by the evolution of a number of our cadres on the spot, and give a powerful impulse to our work in the future.

* * *

We will accomplish the tasks assigned to this Congress by the situation if we realize the most solid homogeneity and cohesion of our international movement around common fundamental perspectives and around the same fundamental conception of our work among the masses.

When we examine the progress already achieved, we do not doubt that this aim will be attained by the Congress, for it has already been prepared in this sense. This Congress will make its decisions in a situation for which our movement has been thoroughly tempered in advance by an experience varied in form for our organizations, cadres and militants, but unified in their comprehension of its content.

Some people, disillusioned by our as yet limited progress and impressed by the immense forces now locked in struggle—forces which appear to be regimented in camps under imperialist and Stalinist leadership, both mortally hostile to us—ask themselves whether we have a real chance to break through and where we are going.

The reply that we have striven to give, the reply, in my opinion, which this Congress will give, should be clear, simple and firm: We are going toward war and toward rev-

olution on an international scale. The fate of capitalism and Stalinism will be sealed in the course of these events.

What we predicted before 1939 for the war which came, the war of 1939-44, will now be realized.

We must go forward with patience, firmness, courage, clarity, through the phases and stages of this terrible struggle that has already begun. We must go along with this revolutionary mass movement. As this movement extends and gains victory on an international scale, it will discard all impurities, throw off the old leaderships, their ideas, their schools, and lift itself to a clear consciousness of its mission, of its interests — to revolutionary Marxist consciousness, to Trotskyist consciousness.

Summary Remarks of Reporter

The reporter emphasized the following points among others in his summary:

1) That our special interest in the workers and masses under Stalinist influence does not in any way signify that we should neglect the workers and the masses who are outside this influence.

In a vast category of countries (which have moreover been enumerated in the Theses, in the Resolution, as well as in the Report), our essential activity is not directed toward the Communist parties.

2) That on the question of the defense of the USSR, which is understood as a strategic line and not merely as a slogan, we must naturally keep in mind in its application the particular conditions of each country. An example of this is Germany, where a large body of workers is hostile to the very idea of the defense of the USSR, which they confound with the defense of the Kremlin and of Stalinism. But in no case must we abandon our principled struggle on this question, or yield to pressure, or adapt ourselves to the easiest conditions of work. It is a matter of finding the best tactical means for the presentation of the question of the defense of the USSR by connecting it to the general struggle of the masses. It has to be introduced in a form and at a moment most propitious for raising the level of understanding of the masses on this question.

3) The struggle of the masses against the war preparations, their reactions and their eventual successes, not only in the United States but also in Asia as well as in Europe, will naturally have its influence on the length of the period before the war begins and on the conditions in which it will break out.

The more the masses react against the preparations for war, the more the imperialists will see themselves obliged to reexamine, readjust and even completely alter some of their military plans, and to definitively plunge into the struggle under the worst conditions.

Hence our great interest in the maximum development of the revolutionary struggle of the masses at present.

4) Our comprehension of the inevitability of war, of its transformation into an international civil war, i.e., into revolution, does not mean that we should not take into consideration in our propaganda and agitation, in our press, etc. the aspirations of the masses for peace, their opposition to war. In all our activity toward the broad strata, we should begin with their preoccupations so as to set them

against the war preparations and we should emphasize (especially when we are addressing the masses influenced by Stalinism) that the best means of struggling against the war of the imperialists is to fight now for the power of the workers.

5) We conceive of a war unleashed by imperialism against the workers' states and the colonial revolutions, in a relationship of forces which continues unfavorable to im-

perialism, as transforming itself from the beginning into an international civil war. But this does not mean that the war will be transformed everywhere, at the same moment or with the same intensity into a *civil war*. It means that the fundamental, dominant tendency will be that of its transformation into an international civil war. We should put the accent not on the particular, the exceptional or the secondary, but on the general and dominant feature. There is no other way to elaborate a *political line*.

Report to the Congress:

Evolution of Eastern Europe

By **PIERRE FRANK**

The Soviet buffer zone of Eastern Europe, which came into being after the Second World War, has aroused lively discussions in and around our ranks. Our opinions have evolved and we have rectified errors committed on this question in the past years. Today the evolution of the buffer zone countries on a number of fundamentals has been completed in an irreversible manner. Our ideas have been clarified on several important questions such as the nature of these states and the conclusions to be derived therefrom. The resolution submitted to the Congress registers our progress in this matter. It is not without value to view this problem from as broad a viewpoint as possible, to first of all retrace the road we have traveled.

The History of the Buffer Zone Question

At the end of the Second World War, as a result of the Potsdam agreements, the entire world was confronted with a zone of influence of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The Russian state — which we considered a degenerated workers' state—dominated a series of capitalist states militarily and politically; coalition governments between Stalinists and bourgeois politicians were constituted; the capitalist economies were not fundamentally uprooted, although important changes had been introduced.

Molotov had declared at the first occasion, in the name of the Soviet government, when Russian troops entered Rumanian territory, that his government had no intention of altering the social system of these countries. The only and avowed desire of the Kremlin in these countries was to replace the hostile governments of the past (the *cordons sanitaires* at the end of the First World War) by governments friendly to the USSR. But we understood at that time that what was involved was not the desires of the Kremlin bureaucracy. The workers' state, and not only the bureaucracy, would have its influence on the new territories. What could this lead to?

On the theoretical plane we took as our point of departure our definition of the USSR and Trotsky's succinct remarks in "In Defense of Marxism" on the question of territories occupied by the USSR and susceptible to integration

within it. These remarks have been cited many times in our discussions and are certainly known to all the comrades present here. Let us only refer to this one:

"Let us for a moment conceive that in accordance with the treaty with Hitler, the Moscow government leaves untouched the rights of private property in the occupied areas and limits itself to 'control' after the fascist pattern. Such a concession would have a deep-going principled character and might become the starting point for a new chapter in the history of the Soviet regime; and consequently a starting point for a new appraisal on our part of the nature of the Soviet state."

These lines prove how important the evolution of the buffer zone was for us and for the world workers' movement. Developments in the buffer zone also were of decisive importance for the Soviet Union.

We followed these developments passionately, meticulously. If you assemble everything that has been written in our ranks since 1946 on this question, it can be stated that we have never sinned in the domain of the concrete study of the events. We may have committed errors in theoretical interpretation and in perspectives but our study of the events was always very rigorous. No one ever contested the facts presented by the International as the basis of our discussions. All the discussions took these facts as their point of departure.

We must confine ourselves here to a reference for historical reasons only to the discussions we have had with those who had a different definition of the USSR than ours. These discussions with the theoreticians of "state capitalism" or of "bureaucratic collectivism" never had any bearing on the buffer zone, properly speaking; they were simply appendices to the discussion on the Russian question. Neither the supporters of the theory of "state capitalism" nor those of the theory of "bureaucratic collectivism" contested the facts assembled by the International. The facts had only a minor importance for them. Later on we will mention the discussions between comrades sharing our common theoretical basis.

(Continued on page 213)

Yugoslavia: Review and Outlook

By HAROLD LIVINGSTONE

The three years which separate the Second from the Third World Congress might well be called the "Yugoslav Period" of the Fourth International. The phrase is used advisedly. It represents our contact with a living revolution; our participation in its defense; our utilization of its progressive features to deepen the crisis of Stalinism; our analysis of its course of development. It represents a signal triumph of the Trotskyist program over sectarianism and opportunism.

Yet the paradox of this period is symbolized by the fact that while the delegates to the Second Congress finished their labors without an inkling of the decisive events then in the offing, the delegates today are called upon to draw up a balance sheet of the events and of the theoretical and practical work accomplished, rather than to formulate new tactics for positive opportunities—no longer provided by the Yugoslav affair.

The Yugoslav revolution is not dead. The workers' state still stands. But its progressive influence on the world labor movement—in deepening the crisis of Stalinism and in giving new impetus to the forces of revolutionary Marxism—is now a thing of the past. It remains to be seen whether this is a permanent or temporary phenomenon. In any case, contrary to the preceding period, our possible influence on the course of developments is greatly restricted, depending far more on objective factors outside of our control than in the past.

Yet we come to this Congress without the slightest regrets. Our policy and tactics have been entirely correct, and moreover completely vindicated by the events which have transpired. To be sure all of our hopes have not been realized, and the practical results, although not inconsiderable, have been less than we expected. One might say that if anything our fault was an excess of optimism. But that has always been the fault of revolutionists. Here we are in good company. The Russian Bolsheviks, to cite one instance among many, seized power in October 1917 on the optimistic perspective that they would soon be joined by successful proletarian revolutions in the advanced countries of the west and especially Germany.

What is more decisive is that Trotskyism alone of all tendencies in the workers' movement has successfully coped with the test of the Yugoslav events and the problems posed by them, both on the theoretical and the practical domain. Through them, and through the rich discussion which ensued, we have enriched our ideological arsenal; we have come to a fuller and more mature comprehension of our epoch, of the forces in motion, and of the many and varied problems presented by it; we have corrected much of the formalism and rigidity of thought that was present in the past. Above all, it is thanks to the Yugoslav events and to the lessons learned from them that we have been enabled to elaborate a strategy for the great revolutionary developments on the horizon.

In Yugoslavia we were confronted with the complicated and seemingly contradictory forms of the revolutionary process that has characterized the post-war era. A semi-Stalinist party, still basing itself on a Menshevik program and still partly linked with the Kremlin, successfully guided a revolution to the conquest of state power by the proletariat. It was part of the same process, although different in form, from that which had occurred in the rest of Eastern Europe.

We did not predict the forms of this development, but basically it occurred as a result of a situation which we had correctly analyzed, although interpreted in a one-sided fashion.

The principal causes can be attributed in the main to four factors: 1. the general belatedness of the socialist revolution; 2. the advanced decay of capitalism; 3. to revolutionary victories occurring first in the more backward countries; 4. to the lack of a conscious and consistent revolutionary leadership.

An analysis of the developments has demonstrated, however, that the Yugoslav revolution did, in fact, follow *specific laws* and has confirmed our basic conceptions. And it is precisely in the analysis of this revolution, and in corollary questions, that the Fourth International has made its most important contribution to living Marxism since the death of Trotsky.

Permanent Revolution in Yugoslavia

We discover first of all in these events a confirmation of the theory and the dialectics of the *permanent revolution*.

1. The struggle against national oppression in Yugoslavia during the war quickly gave rise to the hegemony of the proletariat, in the form of the leadership of the CP over the resistance forces, to the formation of proletarian combat units as the decisive forms of struggle in the partisan war and to dual organs of power which steadily assumed more scope and authority. On the other hand the native bourgeoisie demonstrated that it was thoroughly incapable of representing the progressive and historic interests of the nation, being completely aligned with all the reactionary forces of imperialist oppression. This led inevitably to the unity of all the oppressed forces in the nation behind the proletariat and the Communist Party.

2. Once in power, although it had assumed it only with the professed aim of resolving the national and democratic task, the Communist Party of Yugoslavia was quickly obliged to eliminate all vestiges of the old regime such as the monarchy, to break up its coalition with representatives of the former ruling bourgeoisie, and to pass over to nationalization and planning, i.e., the socialist tasks of the revolution.

3. The beginning of socialist reconstruction posed the question of the international character of their revolution

before the Yugoslav communists—whether they understood this consciously or not—both on the economic and political plane. The survival of their revolution required a completion of the process of social transformation in Eastern Europe and its integration into a common economic unit or federation—and they became directly affected by the fate of the revolution in Greece, Italy and to a lesser extent Austria.

It is symbolic that the Soviet bureaucracy, which began its existence in struggle against the *theory* of the permanent revolution, came into bitter conflict with the permanent revolution as it manifested itself *in life* at each of its stages in the course of the Yugoslav developments.

The Kremlin Meets a Revolution

From this conflict there emerges the second important aspect of the Yugoslav affair: *the light it sheds on the role of the Soviet bureaucracy.*

If there was ever any question that the Kremlin is an essentially counter-revolutionary force, and not an active, conscious generator of social revolutions, or even of "bureaucratic revolutions," as Shachtman would have us believe, it was definitely set at rest by the deliberate and criminal sabotage of the partisan struggles led by a party completely loyal to the Russian bureaucracy. Tito could swear on a stack of bibles that he remained an undying enemy of Trotskyism, but to Stalin "proletarian brigades," "people's committees" and the refusal to collaborate with Mikhailovich smacked of "permanent revolution," precisely because such measures engendered and extended the revolution and sharpened the conflict with world imperialism.

What is more important is that it demonstrates again, if demonstration is needed, that the bureaucracy is no omnipotent power, that its propensities for counter-revolutionary forces far stronger than itself, that the sweep of a revolutionary movement of the masses is more powerful than the police measures of a Bonapartist regime. For us this aspect of the question is far more decisive even than the fate of the Yugoslav regime itself, which in the final analysis will be determined by the ebbs and flows of the world revolutionary process.

The bureaucracy proved incapable, with all its threats and cajoling, of persuading the Yugoslav communists to follow a "Kuomintang" line. It was unable to deliver the partisans to the arms of reaction as it had done with the Warsaw insurrectionists. It was in fact unable to honor its agreement with the imperialists for a division of influence in Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, had the Kremlin been able to control the Yugoslav regime it would certainly have found a way to live with it. The question of the internal regime, of bureaucratic methods was not basically involved in this period. Nor was the question of the plunder and exploitative economic methods of the Kremlin the most decisive one, as Yugoslavia had the least to offer economically of the Eastern European countries and suffered the least from the Kremlin's depredations.

What was involved was the dynamism of the Yugo-

slav revolution itself. From the beginning the Yugoslavs were under greater pressure from imperialism, and in constant conflict with it precisely because of the definitive character of their revolution. This was an intolerable situation for the Kremlin which sought to live in peace with imperialism, to honor its agreements regardless of the cost.

The difficulties were further aggravated by the effects of the Yugoslav revolution on the communist cadres of the other Eastern European countries and its demands for the completion and coordination of the social revolution in these countries. Such a policy could only have led to a greater conflict with imperialism and to the undermining of the Kremlin's power in the buffer zone.

As it turned out, it was the left turn of the Kremlin in Eastern Europe, their definitive break with the native bourgeoisie which began with the Prague events of February 1948—under pressure of the Marshall Plan and its threat of an economic invasion by imperialism—that forced the Kremlin into its rupture with the Tito regime. Understanding and fearing, as always, that a left turn could favor the independent revolutionary forces, the Kremlin as always in the past struck immediately at these forces, i.e., at the Yugoslavs.

Limits of Kremlin's Power

Here again we have another example of the limits of the counter-revolutionary possibilities of the Kremlin, which stopped short of direct military action against Yugoslavia, although the years 1948-49 were the most favorable time for such an attack. Yet it was precisely in these years that the Kremlin had its hands full in a major struggle against the remaining forces of capitalism in Eastern Europe, a struggle which tended to bring forward the independent elements in the Communist parties of those countries. A major diversion against Yugoslavia in that period could easily have had disastrous consequences for the Soviet bureaucracy in one or more of the countries of Eastern Europe. The fact that Stalin was obliged to confine himself to half measures—to the political excommunication of the Tito regime, to threats and to economic blockade—gave the Yugoslav revolution a respite of three years and, under more favorable world conditions, could have led to a decisive rupture of the Stalinist movement on a world scale.

That this situation was no accident, no "Balkan eccentricity," is demonstrated by the fact that at the very same time Stalin was having similar troubles, at the other end of the world, in his relations with Mao who was preparing to take the power against Stalin's advice and despite his compromises and agreements with Chiang Kai-shek and imperialism.

Evolution of "Titoism"

The third important aspect of the Yugoslav experience can be summarized in this question: How was it possible for a workers' party and leadership which overthrew the rule of the bourgeoisie and conquered state power to identify itself with the imperialist camp, to oppose the colonial revolution, to justify social patriotism in the capitalist countries, to revise Marxism to the point where

they see an organic evolution of American monopoly capitalism to socialism and see only the worst features of centralized, regimented capitalism in the nationalized property relations and planned economy of the Soviet Union?

How was this possible without a fierce internal struggle in the party and a major split in the leadership? The contrast with the Soviet Union is striking where this transition from Bolshevism to Menshevism required a 15-year struggle, practically a civil war which ended with the extermination of the entire Bolshevik wing of the party, in fact, of the party itself.

The explanation is lodged in the nature and history of the CPY and its leadership and the manner in which it came to power. The phenomenon of the CPY is summarized in the Theses when speaking of the possibility of a Stalinist party joined to a real mass movement and under its constant and revolutionary pressure, and amidst favorable conditions—i.e. extreme weakness of the native bourgeoisie and divisions in the imperialist camp—going beyond the aims set for it by the Soviet bureaucracy and even projecting a revolutionary orientation.

What is the significance of this statement? It is not at all, as our enemies would like to attribute to us, that a Stalinist party can, by some automatic process, without a thoroughgoing reevaluation of all its basic conceptions and without altering its leadership, become a revolutionary, a Bolshevik party.

Centrism and Bolshevism

To be sure the party ceases to be a brake on the proletariat as it was in the past, it becomes more susceptible to the program of Bolshevism, but that does not yet mean it has become the conscious master of the objective forces in society. When we say that such a party ceases to be Stalinist, i.e. primarily a frontier guard, a pressure instrument and a tool of the Soviet bureaucracy, and becomes centrist, we say in effect that while it continues fundamentally to remain one of the blind and unconscious objective factors of the class reality it has become more sensitive to the progressive impact of the proletarian masses who at a certain point attempt to utilize this party as the vehicle for the realization of their revolutionary aspirations.

The masses do not demand that the party change its revisionist theoretical conceptions or its class collaborationist program; they demand merely that it give leadership in the armed struggle against the bourgeoisie, that it create the class organs of power to serve that struggle. Under certain fortuitous conditions, as existed above all in Yugoslavia, this proves sufficient to guarantee the success of the revolutionary struggle.

The importance of these *fortuitous objective conditions* must be emphasized because centrist parties have many times in the past been confronted with revolutionary situations, and because Stalinist parties have shown traits of centrism when thrust into revolutionary situations. Yet precisely because the relationship of forces was more unfavorable, as for instance in the Chinese revolution of 1925-27 and in the Spanish civil war, the centrism of the Comintern and the Chinese CP in the one case, and the

POUM in the other, proved itself totally insufficient for and, in effect, one of the barriers to the victory of the revolution.

Thus if the Yugoslav development helps to provide us with a better understanding of the role and evolution of Stalinist parties under specific conditions and to formulate a realistic strategy for our movement in such eventualities, it gives absolutely no justification whatever for those who draw the conclusion that the organized communist vanguard, basing itself on a revolutionary Marxist program, has no longer any role to play. The entire history of the CPY itself proves the contrary. Precisely the centrism and opportunism of the CPY leadership has exposed the Yugoslav revolution to the greatest dangers.

Roots of Yugoslav Centrism

Not only was their revolution carried through without consciousness of its real character, but theoretically they still clung to the conceptions of Popular Frontism, which in effect have remained part of their ideological baggage to this very day. It was a matter of good fortune for them that Anglo-American imperialism, occupied with Greece and lacking the strength to intervene more directly, could not exploit the occasion provided by the coalition government of 1945.

The policy of the Yugoslavs in the world labor movement today is in direct continuation, and is based on the same general Stalinist class collaborationist conceptions, as those they held during the war. Only now, because the situation is more unfavorable for them and the pressures of world capitalism stronger, their deeds are more in accord with their theories than they were during the years of the partisan wars.

Second, their treacherous and capitulatory policy to world imperialism today has its ideological roots in their essentially social patriotic position in the Second World War which they considered a war of "democracy" against "fascism"—a position they have never reconsidered—so that it is merely necessary for them to pin the "fascist" label on the Soviet Union today in order to justify their lining up in the imperialist camp.

Third, their failure to understand the class nature of the Soviet Union, the reasons for its degeneration and the role of the Soviet bureaucracy, which almost resulted in disaster for the revolution between 1945 and 1948, has facilitated their adoption today of an anti-Soviet position which opens the country to the danger of capitalist restoration or of conquest by the Soviet bureaucracy. As in the past they continue to identify the Stalinist caste with Soviet society, the only difference being that today they consider it "reactionary" and "fascist," whereas yesterday they considered it "progressive" and "socialist."

Fourth, their unchanging adherence to the theory of "Socialism in one country" has given rise to the historical absurdity that it is not only possible to build a national socialist society but even for the state to "wither away" in Yugoslavia alone. This theory—i.e. this opportunist lack of confidence in the forces of the world revolution—led them, as it did the Stalin wing of the Russian Bolshevik party, to prefer an alliance with imperialism regardless

of the cost than with the international working class and the colonial peoples.

Yugoslav centrism has reacted in almost chemically pure fashion to objective conditions. They were to the left as regards imperialism between 1945-48, when the relationship of forces was favorable to them. Then after a brief interim of an intermediary position they moved sharply to the right after the outbreak of the Korean war when the relationship of forces was reversed. Similarly as regards Stalinism: *left* when the crisis in the buffer zone was at its height, immobilizing the Kremlin; and then *right* after the attainment of a form of stability there freed the Kremlin's hands to a certain extent.

We do not mean by this to overlook the effects of the blockade and of the drought. But where the regime of Lenin made many tactical maneuvers and concessions under such conditions but never changed its basic orientation, the Yugoslavs fundamentally revised their strategy under these pressures.

The final test of Yugoslav centrism is now before it: unlike the years of the partisan wars and the years immediately following, the internal relationship of forces has now become more favorable to the capitalist elements than at any time since the end of the war. Although other factors enter into the picture here, it remains to be seen how Yugoslav centrism succeeds in coping with this situation. We shall return to this problem later.

Loyalty to Principles First

But before leaving this question, it is necessary to say a word regarding those who believe we have been too harsh in our criticism, too inconsiderate in our understanding of the problems and difficulties faced by the Yugoslav regime. We must reject this criticism first because it is false: we have reiterated time and again that no revolutionist could object to the widest maneuvers, or even to extensive economic concessions on their part provided they remained within the framework of loyalty to class principles.

Second, this argumentation appears to us to be of a similar type to the rationalization that has often been made in defense of Russian Stalinism for its abandonment of the world revolution. The task of the October Revolution was to help generate the revolution in the west. Stalin's dereliction in this regard constitutes his first and basic betrayal.

The task of the Yugoslav revolution, once it broke with the Kremlin, and became at least partly conscious of its role, was to generate and aid in the precipitation of the crisis of Stalinism in a revolutionary direction. On this path also lay the real salvation of the Yugoslav revolution. Tito's betrayal consists in his abdication of this task which, as with Stalin under different circumstances, has led to the road of least resistance, i.e., accommodation to imperialism.

The rejection of such rationalizations is in line with the whole tradition of our movement, in line for instance with Trotsky's break with the POUM, with Sneevliet, etc., and, in fact, with the entire course of our movement itself which has suffered persecution and isolation despite the thousand siren calls that have beckoned it to opportunism and away from its intransigence to principles.

The Kremlin's break with Yugoslavia, its political warfare and military threats and provocative mobilizations on its frontiers, its economic blockade increasing Yugoslavia's dependence on world capitalism, has set into motion two important trends within the country which have been at work in the whole last period and are still in evolution today. On the one side, the regime was obliged to seek a more solid base of support among the proletariat. The peasantry, it knew, in a struggle with the Kremlin, would quickly shift its allegiance to the side of imperialism.

In the struggle for the support of the workers, it ran into conflict with the competition of the Cominform which was making its own bid for their allegiance. The Cominform propaganda, demagogic and hypocritical, consisted in the main of an attack on the bureaucratic and police state features of the Tito regime, on its lack of democracy, etc., etc. But even if the Yugoslav workers didn't believe a solitary word of this propaganda, the regime was obliged to provide material reasons which would dispose the Yugoslav proletariat to defend the regime despite the hardships that would result from expulsion from the Soviet bloc. They had to see a difference between a regime of Kremlin puppets and that of Tito in order to make the sacrifice that they would be called on to make.

Still we know, the centrists faced the situation empirically, seeking all sorts of expedients and compromises to the point where Tito himself admitted that the regime had almost foundered because of the predisposition of the leadership to take the road of least resistance. For more than a year their chief reply to the Kremlin was a defensive one, accompanied by futile attempts at reconciliation, by reiteration of their loyalty to the basic precepts of Stalinism and mortal enmity to Trotskyism—and of course by wholesale arrests and imprisonments. When the struggle against bureaucracy was finally launched and the first steps towards workers' democracy taken in 1950, we greeted this as a great event for the world proletariat. We were correct in our emphasis because of the historic importance of these measures, and because of the revolutionary weapon it placed in the hands of revolutionary militants in the struggle against Stalinism.

But still it is necessary to look the facts coldly in the eye. Yugoslav workers' democracy—extending as far as self-management—was still not of the same calibre as that which existed in the first years following the October Revolution growing up in struggle against the Russian capitalists and consciously promoted and encouraged by the Russian Bolsheviks. Workers' democracy in Yugoslavia was granted by decree by a regime which had a long record of stifling criticism and repressing independent actions by administrative measures. The workers had to be convinced by experience that the regime was sincere. Many reports at the outset indicated the general scepticism and incredulity of the masses. Only one year has passed since that time—not too long a period—but unfortunately that period has run straight across the Korean war and the rightward turn of the CPY leadership.

How much of a reality has this workers' democracy today? And how solid as a consequence is the loyalty of the Yugoslav proletariat to the regime? The evidence needed

for the answers to these questions is not yet completely available or clear. Although on the answer to them depends much of the outcome of the sharpening class conflicts maturing in Yugoslavia today. This much can be said: that a rightward political turn accompanied by an extension of workers' democracy is a contradiction in terms and completely contrary to the Russian experience. More likely is the fact that the continued arrest of "Cominformists" and the failure of any revolutionary tendencies to develop in opposition to the policy of the regime indicates that the tender plant of workers' democracy in Yugoslavia has not had a very vigorous growth.

Retreat on the Economic Front

The second tendency set into motion by the Kremlin break has been that of retreat on the economic front and the beginning of a period not only comparable with the NEP but with that which followed between 1923-28 in the Soviet Union. The expulsion from the Soviet bloc and the consequent greater dependence of Yugoslavia on the capitalist world for trade, loans, raw materials, capital goods, machine tools—and even for foodstuffs for a certain period—has led to a slowing down of industrialization, to a drastic and constant downward revision of all plans, and to an inevitable weakening of the socialist sector of the economy in a predominantly peasant country.

The question that remains to be answered is whether such complete dependence on the capitalist market, given the unfavorable trade arrangements that Yugoslavia must make because of the backward state of its economy and industrial technique, given the reluctance of imperialism to provide the type of loans and capital goods that will favor real socialist construction, given the present world shortage of raw materials which in any case are being allocated to the important capitalist countries for their rearmament programs, and above all given the narrow and limited material base of Yugoslavia itself — the question remains as to whether this dependence will not compromise, if it has not already done so, the very possibility of planning. Certain moves which have thus far been made indicate the beginnings of a certain breakdown in planning which provide a breach for the entry of capitalist property relations.

Approximately a year and a half ago, a move toward the decentralization of economic controls was instituted by the state. The principal object of this move was to cut down on the heavy overhead charges of bureaucratic management. Under favorable conditions this measure might have acted as a stimulus to production and augmented the efficiency of the plan. However, one of the recent aspects of this decentralization program is the right granted to the individual trust, corporation or enterprise to enter into direct contact with the consumer and to enter into business arrangements with him, which in effect means the peasantry for the most part. These arrangements have still to be ratified by higher organisms, but the possibility of deceit or evasion must be counted on as a strong possibility in such a system.

This situation is precisely one that Trotsky warned against as the result of blind, bureaucratic methods in the

Soviet Union—one whose only consequence must be the development of separate interests apart from the needs of the economy as a whole, and hence the breakdown of planning and the entry of new capitalist elements into the economy.

In line with this dangerous innovation, and even more serious in character is a decree of last July which goes by the name of "The Democratization of Foreign Trade." According to this decree, separate branches of industry and agriculture, with the exception of non-ferrous metals still remaining under centralized control, can make their own trade arrangements with foreign importers. These Yugoslav concerns are permitted to retain a certain percentage of the foreign currency resulting from such trade which they can freely use to import not merely capital goods, raw materials, etc., but also consumer goods. The consequences of this move should be clear enough not to need further elaboration. Suffice it to say, if carried to its logical conclusion, without active and serious restriction by the state, it can not only lead to the complete breakdown of planning but to the invasion of cheap capitalist goods and the destruction of the nationalized economy of Yugoslavia.

Danger of Capitalist Restoration

The second and more important danger spot to the Yugoslav economy is the agricultural sector. Primarily a peasant nation, the alliance of the proletariat and the peasantry is indispensable for the survival of the workers' state, an alliance that can only be maintained in the last analysis by steps leading towards the socialization of agriculture.

In the past the Tito regime has moved with commendable caution in collectivizing agriculture, waiting until it could provide a proper machine basis for the collectives and thus avoid the tragic mistakes of Russian Stalinism. This policy provoked one of the most violent attacks of the Kremlin, which had hoped that Tito, by reckless bureaucratic methods, would come into head-on conflict with the peasantry and thus become completely dependent on Russian support. But precisely the contrary occurred. After the break with the Cominform, Tito became even more cautious in his peasant policy. The rate of collectivization has been constantly slowed down until today the slogan is merely to preserve those collectives that already exist.

At the same time, because of the lack of consumer goods and the inability of the state to minister to the needs of the peasantry, further concessions have been made. Forced deliveries of peasant crops to the state now occupy a much smaller place than before, while the free market for peasant trade has been widely extended. Obviously this process is closely linked with the much slower pace of industrialization and with the difficulties encountered in planning.

The result, however, is unquestionably to give rise to a new stratum of rich peasants, whose position becomes more and more powerful vis-a-vis the state, resembling that of the Russian kulak in 1928. Like his Russian counterpart, the Yugoslav kulak is using the threat of starvation against the cities, deliberately refusing to plant or harvest a full

crop, in order to force his will on the regime. With this strengthened economic position come inevitably increased economic demands for the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade (to permit the entry of cheap and plentiful consumer goods), and it is not unlikely that the decree on "Democratization of Foreign Trade" may be a concession precisely to such demands. Equally serious is their growth as a political force, their undoubted contacts with the old bourgeois politicians and with western imperialism.

This tendency has been favored by the diplomatic alliances of the regime and its capitulatory foreign policy, by the anti-Soviet campaign of the CPY leadership and by its embellishment of "democratic" capitalism. All of this has not been lost on the rich peasantry, which is not satisfied to view the right turn as a temporary maneuver but is pressing to go the whole road.

The danger for Yugoslavia today, a greater danger than ever before, is the *danger of capitalist restoration* from within, indirectly supported by the imperialists at least in the first stages—and imperialism would certainly go the whole way were it not for the possibility that in the chaos of the ensuing struggle it might lose Yugoslavia as a military base. Thus far the only program of the regime to ward off this danger is to demand larger loans from the imperialists, which increase the country's economic dependence—such as the projected entrance into the European Payments Union—and solve nothing fundamentally except to temporarily assuage the rich peasantry.

A Program of Struggle

In the best case, the situation is a difficult one and offers no easy solutions. But the danger can only be fought by the revolutionary mobilization of the Yugoslav proletariat, the organization of the poor peasantry for sharpened class war on the countryside, by vigorous economic measures to curb the power of the kulaks, and above all by a turn to a policy of revolutionary internationalism on the world arena.

Such a turn depends now first of all on the rise of a revolutionary opposition within the CPY and among the Yugoslav masses. And this in turn, because of the multitude of problems which beset the country, complicated above all in the eyes of the masses by the hostile and bellicose attitude of the Kremlin, depends more and more on external forces, on a new upsurge of the masses in the capitalist countries, on new developments within the buffer zone countries and on the maturing of the crisis of Stalinism. Only such a development can check the present rightward course and the treachery of the CPY leadership. And in a more pressing sense than in the case of the Soviet Union, only such a world development can save Yugoslavia from capitalist restoration.

Yugoslavia and the War

It may be however that none of these problems will reach their climax before the outbreak of the war, and it remains for us here to resolve our attitude toward Yugoslavia—towards *this* Yugoslavia, the one which exists today with its *present* leadership, its *present* policy and the direction in which it is moving, and not the one we hoped would exist—in the event of war, and not any war, but a spe-

cific war, i.e., a world counter-revolutionary imperialist attack on the USSR with all the revolutionary consequences it will bring in its train.

The ineradicable lesson driven home by Trotsky in the 1939-40 struggle with the petty-bourgeois opposition in the SWP was that our attitude in a war was determined not by the political character of the regimes but by the class nature of the states involved. This position, mind you, was not a new one, but one he found necessary to reiterate even before the USSR became involved in the general war and when it was merely engaged in a local—but reactionary—encounter with Finland.

We were confronted with a somewhat different question when the danger arose of a possible Kremlin attack on Yugoslavia. Obviously our position could not be determined by the mere class criteria regarding the class nature of the states because two workers' states were involved. Nor could it be determined by the progressive internal nature of one of the regimes as against another. We were entirely correct in our defense of Yugoslavia before there were any measures for the establishment of workers' democracy and when its leaders still stoutly defended their bureaucratic regime and police measures.

What determined our position then was the fact that Yugoslavia by its struggle against Stalinist domination and for the right of national autonomy for its workers' state, represented the interests of the world revolution to which our defense of the Soviet Union has always been subordinated. But in saying this we are saying that our attitude was determined by class criteria—that is, a Kremlin attack on Yugoslavia would represent objectively an act favoring world imperialism and hence also a blow at the Soviet Union.

We were not long in waiting for the confirmation of our analysis—and this while the Kremlin's war remained only in the preparatory stage. The results are only too plain: the Kremlin's cold war against Yugoslavia has given imperialism at least the promise of military bases in Yugoslavia in the event of war, it has helped liquidate the Greek partisan war, strengthened the position of imperialism in Greece and Turkey, and provided it with a foothold in Albania.

Tito, Imperialism and the USSR

The *likelihood* however is not of an isolated war between the Kremlin and Yugoslavia but one that will occur within the framework of an imperialist assault on the Soviet Union. Nor do we have to await the outbreak of war to see this configuration of events. It was already indicated by the fact that Yugoslavia was forced to line up politically in the Western camp in the Korean war. Since then the political and military contacts of the Yugoslav leaders with the State Department and the Pentagon have become more frequent and their commitments more definite. It is frankly and freely acknowledged that Yugoslavia's abstention from participating in the military alliances is now more a matter of expediency than of principle.

Our amendments to the resolution take cognizance of such a possibility—a Yugoslav line-up with imperialism in a

war with the USSR—and establish our position toward it. Here again, despite the evident intention of the Kremlin to crush Yugoslavia's independence, to destroy all measures aimed at establishing workers' democracy, our position must be determined by class criteria first of all.

The nature of a common military struggle of imperialism and the Yugoslav regime against the Soviet Union would not be determined by the desire of the Yugoslav communists to preserve their workers' state but by the overwhelming predominance of imperialism in this alliance and by its aim of crushing the Soviet Union.

The defeat of the Soviet Union would naturally strengthen reaction on a world scale and would result in the speedy extinction of the Yugoslav workers' state provided it was able to survive the crushing embrace of its more powerful capitalist ally during the war itself. That would be the greater evil to a victory of the USSR in which the bureaucracy would be obliged, in any case, to preserve the non-capitalist property relations in Yugoslavia. To be sure, the counter-revolutionary character of the Stalin regime will pose many complicated problems for revolutionists seeking to preserve the independence of the workers' movement or of workers' states during the war and will require great adroitness and ability to maneuver.

But there are limits to this maneuvering—class limits. An alliance of a workers' state with one group of capitalist states to protect itself from the attack of another group was envisaged by Lenin and was recognized by Trotsky as justified even when practiced by the Stalin regime. But under no conditions is it possible to justify the alliance of a workers' state with capitalist powers against another workers' state. That belongs in the same category with social democratic support of their own imperialism against the Soviet Union. And it is thus not by accident that the Titoists in the capitalist countries are now unanimous in their social patriotic positions.

It is not easy to draw up a strategy for the Yugoslav communists; their position is by no means an enviable one. But in the event of an open betrayal of their leadership permitting their country to become a military base for the imperialist armies, which inevitably means a loss of both their independence and of their social gains, we must counsel them to overthrow their leadership, to organize their forces independently for the common struggle against imperialism, but to remain ever vigilant, ever prepared to fight against possible bureaucratic repression by the Kremlin. There is no other road for revolutionists.

Balance Sheet of Events

The evolution of the Yugoslav government and the CPY has proceeded with breathtaking rapidity. Within the past three years they severed all ties with the Kremlin, dropped a good deal of their Stalinist baggage, came within breathing distance of Trotskyism with which they concluded an informal alliance in the European workers' movement, beginning at the same time a searching criticism in words and deeds of the process of bureaucratic degeneration—only at the very height of the process to veer sharply to the right allying themselves objectively with the imperialist camp against the USSR and the colonial revo-

lution, while politically taking the road back to social democracy. It has been a dizzy pace. And it is understandable that some comrades have been thrown off balance.

There are those for whom the break with the Kremlin was so precipitate, so inexplicable that they have lacked the time to shake off their original scepticism and adapt themselves to the new development. They are now in the strange position of the Yugoslav events catching up with them without their having moved an inch. The only trouble is that a whole historic epoch passed them by in the interim.

There are others who took much longer in appreciating the progressive aspects of the Yugoslav affair but by this time Tito and Co. had already turned to the right. Here the tables are turned. Where only a relatively short time ago they considered our attitude too uncritical, they now find themselves reproaching the International for being too harsh and intransigent. It is not a serious tendency, but even where it exists, if it is not checked in time it could lead to an opportunist adaptation to the Yugoslavs—and that would be a real disgrace for our movement. It is difficult to think of anything more contemptible.

The International has every reason to be proud of its record. We alone correctly analyzed and understood the development in all its stages. From the beginning we called attention to its historic importance not for the sake of self-justification but for the purpose of aiding the progressive evolution of Yugoslavia and of mobilizing a movement in its behalf.

By our correct tactics and prompt action, we prevented the rise of a new centrist current competing with us for leadership of the advanced revolutionary workers. In most of the maneuvers with them it is we, with our principled line, who have gained despite all the machinations they learned in the Stalinist school.

Perhaps even more important have been the ideological consequences of the affair, providing a serious corrective to tendencies to Stalinophobia which were imperceptibly developing in our ranks but also indicating how wretchedly incompetent are the centrists and opportunists, even those who have successfully blundered through a revolution, in solving the great problems of our epoch and how vitally necessary is the role of world Trotskyism.

Finally, the Yugoslav revolution, in the course of its development, gave a crushing refutation to those who conceive of bureaucratic degeneration as a normal process and indicate the enormous power that can reside in a conscious proletarian leadership in combatting such trends. It was a vindication in life of conceptions only the Trotskyists have held and of the program for which the Russian opposition fought from its inception.

We do not put a cross on the Yugoslav revolution. The workers' state still stands. The traditions of the partisan struggles still live in the consciousness of the masses, the progressive measures taken since 1948 can have their own logic which the Yugoslav leaders may yet have to reckon with. But it is clear that a chapter is closed—that must be recognized. The next stage of the development of the Yugoslav affair can only be opened under the impact of vast revolutionary struggles on a world scale.

Orientation and Perspectives

I. Having failed in the many attempts it has made since the last war to arrest the disintegration of its world system and to restore its equilibrium, and finding itself threatened by a new crisis of overproduction, imperialism has plunged anew into accelerated military and political preparation for a new world war.

II. This tendency to war, inherent in the capitalist system in its imperialist phase of decadence and decomposition, naturally was present since the conclusion of the Second World War and the beginning of the "cold war." However, what essentially characterizes the course recently embarked upon in the policy of the imperialists is the passage from a primarily ideological preparation of the new war (by means of a general anti-Soviet and anti-communist crusade) to more pronounced military and political preparations for war.

This turn is concretized by the essential orientation of the economies of the principal capitalist countries towards armament and war economies, and the subordination of the political character of all their "plans" and ideas ("Marshall Plan," "Schuman Plan," "Unification of Europe") to military needs.

III. To this development of imperialist policy the Soviet bureaucracy counterposes the acceleration of its own armaments program and military plans, the more complete integration of its European satellite countries into its economic and political orbit, efforts to prevent an autonomous development of the Chinese Revolution in order to utilize it for its own ends, and a policy of obstruction by the Communist Parties of the anti-Soviet plan of the bourgeoisie, a policy of harassment and pressure aimed at forcing them into a compromise which would postpone the outbreak of the war.

IV. For fundamental reasons which are inherent in its very nature, the Soviet bureaucracy, despite appearances, fears an abrupt rupture of the equilibrium, dreads the rise and the world triumph of the revolutionary forces even if, in the first period, they are led by the Communist Parties, and it pursues an essentially conservative and defensive policy concentrated above all on the economic, diplomatic and military strengthening of its bastion, the USSR.

From this point of view, the attempt to place the inherently aggressive and expansionist character of imperialist policy, of which war is only an inevitable consequence, on the same plane as that of the Soviet bureaucracy and to speak of similar aspirations on the part of the USA and of the USSR for world domination is to become mired in theoretical confusion from which flows a whole series of basically erroneous political conclusions.

Unfavorable Relationship of Forces

V. Despite the now reinforced orientation of imperialism toward war, the perspective of temporary compromises between the USSR and the USA continues to remain open.

Imperialism is aware that the relationship of forces at the present stage is unfavorable for winning a war against the USSR, its European satellites and China, a war which will necessarily be transformed from the beginning into an international civil war. Although this does not mean that the war will necessarily assume the form of civil war in all countries, or simultaneously or from the beginning in all countries, *its dominant general tendency will be that of an international civil war.*

Imperialism cannot yet count upon any very effective support from any of the capitalist countries in Western Europe which, in case of war, run the risk in their totality of coming rapidly under the control of the Soviet armies, the Communist Parties or the revolutionary masses.

In an equally brief period, all of Asia can experience a similar fate.

Consequently, in the event of a war unleashed in the present period by imperialism, it would have to envisage a situation where in practice, American imperialism, partially seconded by British imperialism, would have to face a coalition of all of Europe and Asia which had passed under the control of the opposing forces.

The events in Korea have already partly demonstrated that a major war will, in the course of its development, provide a powerful impulse to the radicalization of the American masses by destroying their confidence in the bourgeois parties and the state and by opening the road to revolutionary developments on a gigantic scale.

With such a relationship of forces, the victory of world imperialism would become problematical in view of the universal chaos.

VI. For this reason, it is much more probable that imperialism will prolong the period of its preparation until it exhausts its ability to avert the economic crisis and to maintain its control over the American masses.

On the other hand, it will be all the more possible for imperialism to pursue this course since the Soviet bureaucracy, for its own reasons, is also anxious to avert the outbreak of a general war and will lend itself to the conclusion of limited or even more extensive partial compromises and to the policy of the division of zones of influence and of mutual concessions.

War Preparations and Effects

VII. The progress that is made in the stabilization of the economy and class relationships in Western Europe, of several key positions in Asia and in the current armaments program will decide, in part, in the years to come the degree of preparation of imperialism for unleashing and winning a general war. If imperialism succeeds in the coming years in stabilizing and seriously rearming the "Atlantic community" (by integrating Western Germany) and in establishing certain important bases in Asia (Japan, Philippines, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, Indonesia, Middle

East) and in firmly maintaining its control over the American masses, one could then conclude that there would exist a relationship of forces which would permit imperialism to envisage its victory in a world war as very probable.

VIII. However, these preparations of imperialism will inevitably run up against the resistance of the masses of Western Europe, the Asiatic countries and of the United States itself to a new deterioration of their standard of living, and to the destruction of their rights which the bourgeoisie will require to effect its armaments and war program.

IX. The orientation of capitalism toward a war and armaments economy could, for a certain period, avert a deepening of the crisis of overproduction which has already become a general threat, maintain economic activity at 1950 levels and even surpass them in some instances.

But at the same time, it will set into motion a new inflationary pressure and the debasement of the standard of living of the masses, an important part of their purchasing power being necessary to finance the armaments program of the bourgeoisie.

However, the margins of the unstable equilibrium, so painfully attained by the bourgeoisie in the capitalist countries, are so narrow as to threaten their rapid disappearance in the new conjuncture.

American imperialism itself this time runs the risk of reaching the limits of its capacity to combine, as it has done up to now, a "Welfare State" policy at home with preparations for war and with the support of other capitalist countries.

X. In reality, if the bourgeoisie persists in pursuing its colossal armaments program, which is necessary to temporarily avert the precipitation of an economic crisis, and if it confidently continues to envisage a general war, it will be forced to abandon all pretense of combining a policy of "social justice" with intense preparation for war and will be obliged to lower the standard of living of the masses everywhere, including the United States.

It will only be able to succeed in this task by smashing the inevitable resistance of the masses in the course of a series of far-reaching struggles which will definitively decide what possibilities the bourgeoisie have of conducting the war.

Despite the Stalinist and reformist leaderships of the workers' movement in the countries of Western Europe, and despite the treacherous role of the trade union bureaucracy in the U.S., no section of the bourgeoisie is yet able to envisage its success in the years immediately ahead in inflicting a series of decisive defeats upon the proletariat and in establishing "authoritarian," dictatorial or fascist regimes which would be capable of conducting the war.

That holds especially true for Western Germany, Italy, France and England. *The reactions of the American masses would of course have a special importance and could produce deepgoing changes in the world situation, in the pace and preparations for war.*

XI. For the movement of the Fourth International to fulfill its historic task, in the future as it has in the past, to successfully penetrate the mass movement and adopt

a correct attitude on the perspectives of war, it must reaffirm and refine its programmatic positions on a series of questions, among others that of the USSR and of Stalinism.

The positions taken by anti-Stalinist tendencies in the workers' movement other than the Trötskyists, and the evolution of the policy of the Yugoslav government and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia on the Korean war, have once again demonstrated that, in face of the evolution of the international situation and the perspectives of war, it is impossible to adopt a correct class attitude without a correct evaluation of the USSR and of Stalinism, of their character and of the perspectives of their development.

Evolution of the USSR

XII. Despite the extreme degeneration of the Soviet bureaucracy, the USSR has not become a capitalist country, and the structure of its statified and planned economy has been maintained. This economic structure, made possible by the October Revolution and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, is not subject to the laws of finance capital as defined by the Leninist theory of imperialism. It is fundamentally, qualitatively different from capitalism, even in its most developed form. Tendencies toward statification and economic planning exist in the capitalist system but they are never completely realized and they remain subordinated to the interests and antagonisms of private monopoly groups. On the other hand, these tendencies are constantly undermined by a multitude of small and medium entrepreneurs who daily reproduce private capitalism and stand in the way of all real planning.

The statification of all the means of production and the planned economy which distinguish the USSR and, to a lesser degree, the "People's Democracies" where the process has begun, are not the result of an organic evolution of the former capitalist regime into state capitalism but the product of a specific class struggle — although deformed in the case of the "People's Democracies" by the militaro-bureaucratic intervention of Stalinism — which has culminated in the overthrow of the possessing classes and of imperialism.

The changes in the social and economic structure of these countries result from abrupt changes in the relations of class forces following a struggle, and not as the climax of a general evolution of capitalism toward state capitalism.

Despite the extremely parasitic character of the Soviet bureaucracy, which has become a major brake on economic development, it cannot be said that the productive forces in the USSR are stagnating or have ceased to progress.

This is a supplementary proof of the possibilities of the statified and planned economy which the bureaucracy has not yet been able to destroy completely.

XIII. The Soviet bureaucracy has not become a capitalist class nor is it a new type of class. In its major section, it remains attached to the present economic structure of the USSR, of whose advantages it is aware and from which it derives its privileges. It is subject to pressures, struggles and differentiations in its ranks, produced by the heterogeneity of its strata, the pressure of the Soviet

masses and the pressures of the international proletariat and of imperialism. It continues to embody and to express in its policy the dual and contradictory elements, in their dialectic unity, of its present position as a privileged caste raised to power in a state that is a workers' state in its origin and anti-capitalist in its structure. It cannot surrender to imperialism without disappearing as such in the USSR. On the one hand, it cannot rest on the proletariat and on the extension of the world revolution which would stimulate the struggle of the Soviet masses to overthrow it. This extension would on the other hand, by the organization and rapid development of the world productive forces, remove the objective reasons for the existence and especially for the omnipotence of any bureaucracy. The Kremlin pursues a policy of balancing itself between imperialism and the proletariat, utilizing one against the other in order above all to preserve its positions in the USSR.

Nature of the Communist Parties

XIV. The domination of the Soviet bureaucracy over the leaderships of the Communist Parties was realized through the degeneration of the Third International, whose rank and file remained profoundly attached to the October Revolution and the USSR.

Manipulating these leaderships as it wills, the Soviet bureaucracy utilizes the Communist Parties as instruments of its international policy. The leaderships of these parties lend themselves to this game because they are themselves composed of bureaucratized elements deriving their influence over the masses and their privileges above all from the fact that they appear to the masses as the chosen representatives of the October Revolution and the USSR, "the socialist fatherland."

However, wherever the Communist Parties remain mass organizations, still embracing, especially after the last war, the most revolutionary section of the working class and the poor peasants in numerous countries of Europe and of Asia, they cannot allow themselves to be reduced to being, under all conditions, mere agencies for the transmission and execution of the orders of the Soviet bureaucracy.

It will not be possible to adopt a correct policy toward them nor will it be possible to explain the case of the CPY and other analogous cases which have presented themselves and will inevitably present themselves in the future, particularly in the perspective of a war against the USSR, if the dialectic of the Communist Parties and their relations with the movement of the masses is not thoroughly understood.

XV. Neither in the leaderships bound to the Soviet bureaucracy, nor in their base, nor in their relations with the working class and the masses of the poor in general are the Communist Parties exactly reformist parties. They embody contradictory elements which have been clearly revealed since the German-Soviet Pact of 1939.

Between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy they invariably line up — without notable desertions — on the side of the Soviet bureaucracy, even in its sharpest zigzags.

On the other hand, insofar as they are tied to a real revolutionary movement of the masses, they are subject to its pressure and may, under certain favorable conditions,

go beyond the aims set for them by the Soviet bureaucracy and project a revolutionary orientation. This specifically means that parties placed in such favorable conditions may possibly see themselves obliged to undertake a struggle for power against the possessing classes and imperialism.

It would be anti-Marxist not to recognize this possibility, proved by the experience of the CPY and in part by that of the CP of China, and to affirm that the weight of the bureaucratic apparatus will prove more decisive under all conditions than the pressure of the movement of the masses.

In the long run objective conditions determine the character and dynamics of the movement of the masses which, raised to a certain level, can overcome all subjective obstacles on the road to the revolution. This conception continues to be the basis of our revolutionary optimism and clarifies our attitude toward the Communist Parties.

In the event of powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses, like those which occurred during the war in Yugoslavia, in China, and recently in Korea, and like those which will inevitably occur in the perspective described above, it is not excluded that certain Communist Parties with the bulk of their forces can be pushed out of the strict orbit of the Soviet bureaucracy and can project a revolutionary orientation.

From that moment on, they would cease to be strictly Stalinist parties, mere instruments of the policy of the Soviet bureaucracy, and would lend themselves to a differentiation and to a politically autonomous course.

In the event of new revolutionary uprisings led by the Communist Parties, the Fourth International cannot permit itself a repetition of the errors of evaluation committed in the past regarding Yugoslavia or China. On the contrary, conscious of the gigantic struggle which will unfold under conditions of a general war — so long as the relationship of forces in Europe and in Asia is not seriously altered in favor of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism — and of the struggle already going on in several colonial countries, it should give increased attention to the evolution of the Communist Parties of these countries and find the means of penetrating the mass movement and of influencing the ranks of these parties.

Stalinist "Expansionism"

XVI. If one correctly understands the character of the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs, their interrelationships and their relations with the mass movement, one cannot conclude that Stalinism, i. e., the Soviet bureaucracy, has any historic future whatever. Those who speak of the possibility of a world expansion of Stalinism and of a possible era of the rule of "bureaucratic capitalism" or of Stalinist "bureaucratic collectivism" proceed from fundamentally erroneous theoretical considerations regarding the USSR and Stalinism. They deduce Soviet "expansion" and its so-called tendency toward world domination either from a "monopoly capitalist" structure of the USSR which, as in other countries dominated by big finance capital, impels it to an imperialist policy, or from the "totalitarian" character of this policy. On the other hand, they consider that the socio-economic premises for a bureaucracy like the one

in the USSR already exist in the movement of the Communist Parties allowing for the establishment everywhere, if these parties are victorious, of a political power similar to the one in the USSR.

In reality the Soviet bureaucracy does not at all pursue a systematic policy of "expansion," and every enlargement of "Stalinist" power in the world introduces, on the contrary, along with a transitory strengthening of Stalinist prestige, the elements of the disintegration of this power.

XVII. The extension of the influence of the Soviet bureaucracy into the East European "buffer zone" is not a proof of the systematic policy of "expansion" to which the Soviet bureaucracy, just like imperialism, found itself driven. The Soviet bureaucracy took hold of these countries only as a result of particularly favorable conditions created by the war, thanks to the agreement it was able to conclude with "democratic" imperialism and thanks to the extreme decomposition of the capitalist regimes in these countries which did not require any large-scale revolutionary struggles for their overthrow.

Even under these extremely favorable conditions, the bureaucracy proceeded prudently in these countries, still showed itself ready at the outset to make concessions to imperialism, and consolidated its absolute control over the masses by stages before deciding to hasten the integration of these countries into its economic and political orbit.

In all other capitalist countries, which it considered in the imperialist sphere of influence, and even in countries like Yugoslavia, Greece and China where the movement of the masses had already progressively destroyed the direct power of the bourgeoisie, the Soviet bureaucracy sabotaged the revolutionary development and the seizure of power.

Afterwards, the integration now being effected by the bureaucracy in the "buffer states" required in several cases, especially where the CP represented a real force connected to a real mass movement (as in Bulgaria, in Czechoslovakia and partly in Poland), the destruction of the native apparatuses of the CP and their replacement by GPU-type functionaries, directly managed from the Kremlin.

The Struggle Against Stalinism

XVIII. By its very nature, the Soviet bureaucracy is fundamentally opposed to the development of the revolutionary forces in the world, and it is excluded, even in the case of a general war against the USSR, that the bureaucracy can impel the CPs to take power in areas of the world that it will not be able to control, among others, for example, the USA, which, however, is the citadel of imperialism.

While the counter-revolutionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy remains unchanged, either as concerns the betrayal of a workers' revolution or the stifling of an independent proletarian movement, its possibility of successfully performing this role is determined not by its subjective desires and intentions but by an objectively revolutionary situation, which because of its vast scope and intensity becomes increasingly difficult to destroy or to maintain within rigid bureaucratic channels and police

controls. The developments in Yugoslavia and China are only a prefiguration of the events to come in the course of the coming international civil war.

It is only from such a profound understanding of the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy that one can get rid of the specter of "Stalinist domination," expose the world counter-revolutionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy, grasp and exploit the concrete contradictory relationships which exist between the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs and the movement of the masses, and fundamentally support every revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist movement which still further restricts the base of imperialism in the world even if, in the first stages, this movement is led by a leadership of Stalinist persuasion.

It is on this basis and through this tactic that the revolutionary proletariat will overcome Stalinism.

XIX. Against the attempts of imperialism to re-establish an equilibrium and to temporarily resolve its crisis by reintroducing the markets of the USSR, the "People's Democracies" of Europe, Yugoslavia, China, the Asiatic areas in revolt into its orbit, the Fourth International will counterpose the defense of all these countries and of the colonial revolutions. (This conception of defense does not apply to Eastern Germany and the Soviet occupation zone in Austria.) The task of overthrowing the Soviet bureaucracy and of breaking its grip on the workers' movement cannot in any way be confided to imperialism.

On the other hand, the defense of these countries and of the colonial revolutions in Asia, which are no longer under the direct control of imperialism, not only signifies working to maintain and aggravate the disequilibrium and the crisis of imperialism and, therefore, to strengthen objective revolutionary possibilities. It signifies at the same time in the long run undermining the power of the Soviet bureaucracy from within the revolutionary camp, for only the broadening and the strengthening of the world revolutionary crisis will weaken the power of the bureaucracy and will open perspectives for its elimination in a progressive way.

XX. The choice for the proletarian and colonial masses is not between the mutilated and disfigured bourgeois "democracy," which still exists in several metropolitan countries, and the yoke of the Soviet bureaucracy.

In order to survive, imperialism is obliged to constantly lower the standard of living of its own masses in the metropolitan countries and to steadily destroy their rights; it condemns the proletariat and the colonial masses of the countries it controls to a starvation regime and to open police dictatorship, like that of Franco, Tsaldaris, Chiang Kai-shek, Bao-Dai, Syngman Rhee.

Under such regimes, Stalinist propaganda can find a response, and in the absence of another force and a genuinely proletarian solution, the masses of these countries will continue to be influenced by the CPs.

Strategy of Revolutionary Proletariat

XXI. To be effective and to really contribute to the march of history, the policy of the revolutionary proletariat should begin not from what ought to be but from what is;

it must know how to pass from one situation to a higher stage while preserving all the gains of past revolutionary struggles. It should be able to exploit the contradictory and transitory elements of a complex, devious development which has been made even more difficult by the degeneration of the USSR and by Stalinism.

The defense of the USSR, of the "People's Democracies" of Europe, of Yugoslavia and of China does not mean the defense of the Soviet bureaucracy or of the policy of the Stalinist leaderships of the CPs. The defense of the USSR is a *strategic* line (for the Fourth International) and not a "slogan" as such (Resolution of the 2nd World Congress on the "USSR and Stalinism") and its *tactical* applications remain subordinate to the free development of the movement of the masses against all attempts by the Soviet bureaucracy, the Russian army and the Stalinist leaders to strangle and to smash it.

Nowhere in the Soviet orbit does the proletariat govern directly and nowhere in this orbit has the overthrow of the capitalist regime and of imperialism opened the road to a free development toward socialism and communism. The political expropriation of the proletariat principally by the Soviet bureaucracy constitutes a major brake on such a development and keeps the proletariat under conditions of growing inequality and heightened bureaucratic and police oppression, more onerous than under certain "democratic" forms of the bourgeois regime.

However, in order to overcome this situation in which the overthrow of capitalism and of imperialism was followed by the political expropriation of the proletariat, it is necessary to combine the struggle against the bureaucracy with the preservation of these achievements: the overthrow of the capitalist regime, the expropriation of the bourgeoisie, of feudalism, of imperialism, the statification and planning of the economy.

Only the revolutionary proletariat is capable of carrying on such a combined struggle imposed by the dialectic of evolution, while the victory of imperialism over the USSR, the "People's Democracies," Yugoslavia, China and the colonial revolutions would signify a defeat of the world revolution, a historic step backward for the whole revolutionary process of our epoch.

Socialism and Bureaucracy

XXII. The Fourth International has not and will not cease to work for the overthrow of the Soviet bureaucracy and its agents in the buffer zone by the revolutionary proletariat as well as to combat and unmask the myths of the Soviet bureaucracy and of Stalinism in general concerning the "victory of socialism in the USSR" and "socialism on the road to realization" in the "People's Democracies."

These myths monstrously distort the reality of the conditions of the proletariat in these countries.

The Fourth International struggles so that the proletariat can lead the fight for power and direct the revolution so that the conquest of power can take place effectively in the name of the entire class, by its direct class organs: party, trade unions and soviets, against all bureaucracy.

It declares that free socialist development is possible only on this basis.

On the other hand, the proletariat will succeed in this task and will completely avoid the bureaucratic deformation of its institutions and especially of its power, only insofar as the revolutionary camp is broadened in the world and the revolution conquers more and more of the industrially most advanced countries.

"Socialism in one country" is not only a petty-bourgeois utopia; it also implies an eventual bureaucratic and inevitable opportunist degeneration of the proletarian power.

A proletarian revolution in the USA, for example, bringing to bear the weight of the tremendous American productive apparatus in the interests of world socialist development, will greatly ease the transition period of backward countries and provide an important corrective against inevitable tendencies toward bureaucratic deformation.

Tasks of Fourth International

XXIII. In the great struggles which will inevitably be induced by the concrete preparations of imperialism for war, resulting in new sacrifices for the masses and serious blows to their liberties, the task of our movement is to penetrate much deeper into the mass movement. It must do this in order to facilitate a revolutionary outcome and to occupy the best possible positions with a view to the role it will have to play especially in the gigantic revolutionary crisis which will arise in the event of a general war — so long as the relationship of forces in Europe and in Asia is not profoundly changed in favor of the bourgeoisie and of imperialism.

In a series of countries where Stalinism and reformism do not constitute major obstacles, our movement will strive in the next years to become the principal revolutionary leadership.

In countries where the reformist parties by far outdistance all other working class formations and are the polar force for the great majority of the proletariat (England, Belgium, Australia) our movement should attempt to integrate itself in these organizations, to organize and develop a conscious left wing in their ranks.

In countries where the majority of the working class still follows the CP, our organizations, necessarily independent, should orient toward more systematic work among the ranks of these parties and the masses they influence.

In the countries of the "People's Democracies," our supporters who are not known should try to integrate themselves in the CPs and to remain there, as well as in every proletarian mass organization, in order to take advantage of the revolutionary possibilities which will develop above all in the event of war.

In China, our forces, wherever possible, should try to enter the CP and to elaborate a concrete program which can favor a proletarian and anti-bureaucratic orientation of this party, or at least the formation of a broad tendency along this line within the party and among the masses it influences.

In all other Asian countries in revolt where the CP

heads the mass movement, our movement should also be oriented toward work in the CPs and the organizations which they influence, so as not to cut ourselves off from the movement of the masses and to be able better to exploit the events of the war.

Intermediary forms, imposed by the peculiarities of the workers' movement in each country, will naturally be necessary here and there. However, the general line remains that of the penetration of the general movement of the class as it actually is.

XXIV. The inevitable aspect of civil war which a war unleashed against the USSR will acquire, at least in Europe and Asia under the conditions described above, emphasizes the special interest work among the CPs should have for us as well as the need for a clear and unequivocal position on the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPs, the defense of the USSR, of the "People's Democracies," of China and of the colonial revolutions against imperialism.

Only our movement, thanks to its position and to its entire past, is able to envisage the realization of its junction with the revolutionary forces which will arise in the CPs and with the masses they influence in this crisis, to impel them into a resolute struggle for the overthrow of capitalism and, at the same time, against the Soviet bureaucracy.

For the same reasons, only our movement will be able from now on to exploit the crisis of Stalinism in a manner favorable for the building of a new revolutionary leadership.

New Course of Trotskyism

XXV. Between the Second and the Third World Congresses, the aim set by the Second Congress of penetrating

the real movement of the masses has in large part been realized.

Because of this, the whole physiognomy of our movement has been transformed: the maturing of the leaderships, the proletarianization of the organizations, a real knowledge of and effective exploitation of the peculiarities of the workers' movement in each country.

The new course of Trotskyism is a reality and the best pledge of its future as the vanguard of the revolutionary proletariat and as the conscious expression of the communist movement of our epoch.

The problem now is to consolidate and to amplify this process with the aim of successfully participating in the decisive battles to come and of aiding to the best of our ability with maximum effect the objective revolutionary process in a crumbling world.

The question of the creation of a new revolutionary leadership resolving the present crisis of the workers' movement and of all humanity has always been envisaged by our movement as being closely linked to the existence of objectively favorable conditions for the propulsion of powerful revolutionary mass struggles. In contrast with the period of prostration of the workers' movement which we experienced in the years preceding the last war, these conditions now exist and give rise to struggles unprecedented in the past so far as their scope and globality is concerned. It is through this period and its struggles that a new revolutionary vanguard will be forged as well as the selection of a new revolutionary leadership which will make its own the ideas and the program of the Fourth International.

Resolutions of the Congress:

The International Situation

--- AND TASKS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST IMPERIALIST WAR

The international situation is characterized by the accelerated preparations of imperialism for war; the almost consummated rupture between the imperialist bloc on the one side, and on the other side, the USSR around which are grouped the "People's Democracies" and China, to which it is allied (despite the possibility of a limited compromise before the outbreak of the general conflict); the sharpened polarization of the social forces in all countries; the spread of the anti-imperialist and revolutionary movement in the countries of the Far East and the Near East, in the African colonies and the semi-colonial countries of Latin America; and the new upsurge of the workers' movement in the metropolitan centers under the impact of the anti-imperialist victories of the colonial masses and of the implementation of the armaments program of the bourgeoisie.

The unfolding period is a period of the alignment of opposing social forces engaged in partial struggles which will tend to spread into a decisive general encounter.

The quickening of the march of imperialism to war is the result of the defeats of all its attempts to establish a new equilibrium, to halt the process of its own decomposition, to checkmate the powerful movement of emancipation of the colonial and metropolitan masses, and to conjure away the threat of economic crisis.

Underlying this evolution is the exacerbation of the fundamental contradiction of the capitalist system: increased production and productivity in a market which is constantly narrowing due to the loss of a series of essential colonial reserves and of the Soviet European buffer zone and to the constriction of the buying power of the masses because of the continual rise of the cost of living, which has assumed a universal character during and after the Second World War. Above all, it is due to the swollen apparatus of production of American imperialism which is choking within the already too narrow boundaries of the capitalist world and which can find no other

solution for its contradictions than the conquest of the entire world.

The armaments economy and the war itself are envisaged by imperialism as its last resort for eliminating the threat of the economic crisis, for recuperating lost territories and for crushing the revolutionary movement of the masses, which is the precondition for a real stabilization.

1. The Evolution of World Economy

Between 1948 and June 1950, when the Korean war broke out, world capitalist economy was threatened with a depression to the degree that production attained and surpassed its pre-war levels without a compensating enlargement of markets.

Above all it was the capitalist economy of the United States, with its faltering and even frequent declines of production, which most clearly foreshadowed during this period and especially in 1949-50 the approach of a depression.

European capitalist economy, which continued to benefit from massive American aid, seemed to follow an ascending course. However, the rhythm of the increase of production was everywhere diminishing. Production reached a plateau in certain countries (Belgium, France), while in some important sectors (steel and coal) it had already attained the saturation point. Unemployment developed in many countries. On the other hand there was a world overproduction of agricultural products and of certain raw materials.

The reconversion into armaments economies, begun with the Korean war, has upset this tendency in all spheres.

It has imprinted on raw materials, which are sought in all markets and stockpiled with frenzy, a firm upward curve which has simultaneously revived and inflated the previously depressed economies of the producing countries, particularly those of South East Asia, Latin America, Australia and Africa.

It has permitted American economy a considerable expansion of its production whilst it has arrested the first declines of production in Europe.

But at the same time, new contradictions have arisen counter-balancing these favorable effects, which also aggravate the disequilibrium as well as the social crisis of the system.

Inflation, somewhat slowed down between 1949-50, has revived everywhere and assumed a universal character. This is developing due to the combined effects of the rise of the price of raw materials, the unproductive character of the armaments economy, the constriction of civilian production, and the lowering of the buying power of the masses as a result of new taxes and of a tendency to freeze wages.

It has already led to a notable reduction of the living standard of the masses, including to a certain degree that in the United States itself, even though the implementation of the armaments program is still only at its beginning.

To the degree that this program is realized, civilian production, including that of the United States, will necessarily be constricted, while on the contrary the expenses of the state will rise to the detriment of the buying power of the productive population, an ever larger part of this buying power going to finance the armaments sector.

Within this general evolution, the different constituent elements of capitalist economy describe varied trajectories and often in the inverse sense. The United States which, during and after the Second World War, had acquired a crushing preponderance in world capitalist economy, now exercises a more rigorous control than ever over the whole of world capitalist economy.

If the development of production in other capitalist countries, as well as the first phase of the new economic conjuncture accompanied by the drainage to the United States of all raw materials originating in these countries and their colonies, has reduced their deficit in dollars between 1949-50, American monopolization and the stockpiling of these indispensable raw materials have resulted in a greater dependence than ever of the rest of the capitalist world on the U.S.

Naturally this concerns above all the industrialized countries of Western Europe. On the other side, the colonial and semi-colonial countries producing raw materials are experiencing a revival of economic activity but must once more sacrifice all hope of industrialization to the intensified production of raw materials.

The United States is becoming the storehouse of raw materials, the factory and the bank of the entire capitalist world to the detriment of the colonial and semi-colonial countries.

Thus the bloated development of American imperialism, far from easing the internal contradictions of the capitalist system and leading to a kind of inter-imperialist planning, which has been the dream of the apostles of "super-imperialism," is leading on the contrary to the aggravation of the contradictions of world imperialism.

The very logic of this new orientation of capitalist economy toward an armaments economy carries within itself an ineluctable drift toward a pure and simple war economy. On the other hand, once this orientation becomes a fact and is put in operation it creates an irreversible process; its cessation would inevitably cause a fall of prices, unemployment, economic crisis rebounding from the United States to the entire capitalist world.

Economic Trends in the Soviet Orbit

Contrary to these parasitic tendencies, predominantly those of unproductive investments of the capitalist economy, the statified and planned economy of the USSR and of the European "People's Democracies" have experienced an important and more balanced development, despite the burdens imposed by armaments, by the upkeep and the waste of the bureaucracy and by the absence of conscious and willing participation of the masses in the functioning of the economy. This is the proof of the intrinsic superiority of this economy despite its bureaucratic management.

In the USSR, the industrial goals of the five-year plan have been attained and surpassed, bringing industrial production well over the level attained in 1940. For the first time, on the other hand, since the years 1936-38, the living standard of the masses, especially of the urban masses, is beginning to show some improvement due to the stabilization and even the lowering of prices, the increase of buying power and the greater supply of consumer goods like foodstuffs and clothing. On the contrary, the agricultural goals of the plan do not seem to have been realized, and the problem of increasing agricultural production, to provide for the heightened needs of industrial and civil consumption, continues to remain an acute one.

The reforms undertaken in the sphere of the collective farms with the aim of centralization and a more advanced mechanization of agriculture, have as their economic purpose, on the one side, an increase of agricultural production and, on the other side, the furnishing of a needed labor supply to industry. Moreover, they will cut the peasant's ties with his old land and will represent a new stage in the stabilization of collective farm property.

The European "People's Democracies" have made notable progress in repairing the destruction of the war, in their industrialization which has already begun to considerably alter the economic structure and the social composition of these countries. The short-term plans, whose goal was to restore the economies of these countries to pre-war levels, have in general attained this limited objective. The new long-term plans, now in operation, are progressing and in some cases extending their initial objectives, especially in the domain of industrial production.

However the international conjuncture which makes obligatory an enhanced armaments effort, the exploitation of a part of the resources of these countries by the Soviet bureaucracy, as well as by their own bureaucratic rule, impose

heavy sacrifices on the masses and have led to a lowering of the standard of living varying according to the country and to the different categories of the working masses. The removal of these countries from the world market, in the absence of effective aid from the USSR, acts as a brake on their industrial development while accelerating the integration of their economies into that of the Soviet economy.

Progress is the slowest and difficulties the greatest in the agricultural sector. That is because effective and harmonious collectivization depends above all on an important previous rise in industry and on education by example of the peasantry and not on administrative measures and bureaucratic and police pressures.

Pressures on Yugoslavia

In Yugoslavia, the Kremlin blockade, the onerous conditions imperialism has imposed on its limited aid, the high objectives initially fixed by the CPY and the government, have resulted in repeated changes and limitations of the plan. Although re-adjusted, the plan is being realized amidst constant difficulties and delays, and its very existence is now at stake. The living conditions of the masses have suffered much, while the concessions the government was forced to make to imperialism and particularly on the countryside have strengthened the tendencies of primitive accumulation of the peasantry and of the speculators, disorganizing the economic planning as a whole, which is translated into a growing pressure by alien class forces on the political and social plane.

Progress and Difficulties in China

Concerning the economic situation in China, the stabilization of prices, the stopping of inflation and a better provisioning of the market with agricultural and industrial products should be written down to the credit of the Mao Tse-tung government. These results are the more remarkable if one takes into consideration the condition China was in after the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, the war effort undertaken more than one year ago to support the Korean people in their struggle against imperialism, the blockade which has been erected against China, and the minimum material aid thus far granted the Peking regime by the USSR.

The international conjuncture since the Korean war has naturally upset the plans for the economic revival of China and has also drained a large part of the resources of the country into the war effort. The realization of agrarian reform south of the Yangtse which has led to the resistance of the bourgeoisie allied to the landed proprietors against this measure, implies a slower general economic revival for southern China than the one experienced by northern China and especially by Manchuria, which has had a full industrial revival. The role of the state, because of its economic trump cards (statification of important sectors of industry) and especially because of its political trump cards, has proved, to a great degree, to be that of controller, regulator and stimulator of all the economic life of the country which is moving by stages toward a statified and planned economy.

Naturally in China, this problem proves to be infinitely more difficult than in the European "People's Democracies" because of the very low level of the productive forces and the existence of a still very vast domain of agricultural and urban economy which functions on the basis of private property and which the state is trying to control.

II. The Evolution of International Relations

The new element in international relations which has become more and more manifest since the Korean war is the aggravated rupture between imperialism and the Soviet bloc allied to China, which removes and renders improbable the prospect of any really durable general compromise between the two camps.

This trend is the reflection of the absence of a basis for

such a compromise, the relationship of forces having evolved to the disadvantage of imperialism whose decomposition is so far advanced that it is impossible for it to stabilize itself even if the Soviet bureaucracy were disposed to respect the line of division of influence in the world established after the last war and to prevent the collapse of capitalism in other parts of the world. The status quo is not only an impossible situation for imperialism but it is not a viable one. On the other hand, the Soviet bureaucracy can no longer reopen the European "People's Democracies" to imperialist exploitation without gravely compromising its own security, and even less can it conclude a compromise at the expense of China and of the colonial revolution (which is developing according to its own logic) without encountering resistance from the regimes established in these countries, and especially from that of Mao Tse-tung.

This resistance would lead to a break with the Kremlin and to its isolation within its own camp. The Korean war itself reveals how mightily the colonial revolution comes into conflict today directly with the armed forces of imperialism. The Soviet bureaucracy has been unable to openly betray a movement of such scope without placing its own existence at stake, and it has taken care to intervene as little as possible in the conflict while favoring the exhaustion of both the imperialist and the revolutionary forces.

There remains the possibility of an extended compromise on Germany, once again the pivotal point of all Western Europe. This compromise was possible before the Korean war and the implementation of the gigantic imperialist armaments plan with all its consequences. This possibility now appears less and less likely, with each of the two camps proceeding in practice to speed up the integration of the German zone under its control.

Behind a camouflage of attempts to revive diplomatic talks between the two camps, "peace" proposals and "pacifist" chatter each side derives various advantages in gaining time and in propaganda, while in reality both sides push their military preparations to the utmost. Both proceed fundamentally from the point of view of an inevitable war in the near future.

Korea and Possibilities for a Compromise

It is because there is no longer a basis for an extended compromise that the war in Korea has degenerated into a war of attrition and the Big Four Conference has failed. However, this does not exclude the possibility of a limited compromise but one which will not in any way alter the fundamental and inexorable march of events.

The cease-fire negotiations in Korea occur within the framework of such compromises which are still sought by both sides. In Korea, backed by almost the entirety of the capitalist world, American imperialism has committed the largest part of its existing military establishment which has been more and more powerfully reinforced as its colossal armaments program takes shape.

It has thus brought to bear an inordinately heavy preponderance of military force against the Korean masses and the Chinese forces which joined the latter in their struggle against imperialism, while the assistance of the Soviet bureaucracy has been dispensed only in doses, deliberately calculated to permit the war to continue but insufficient for victory.

On the other hand the inability of imperialism to achieve any decisive result in Korea, despite the very important forces it has committed to the war, has divided its ranks on the problem of how to extricate itself from this blind alley: the MacArthur wing of imperialism proposing the immediate extension of the war to China; the more important wing represented by the Democratic Administration and leading European circles seeking for the moment to circumscribe the Korean conflict and to limit the effort brought to bear on this secondary point of the world front.

China on its side will not be able to continue the struggle in Korea without a total effort of the country or substantial aid from the USSR.

The Soviet bureaucracy which has profited during the entire first period of the conflict by a simultaneous weakening of imperialism and of the young Chinese revolution, finds itself between the double danger of an extension of the war and the threatening pressure of Peking, and is thus also in favor of a truce. That a truce, a pause, before the resumption of the struggle in Korea itself or elsewhere, is what is involved becomes clear by the maintenance of the opposing armed forces on a war footing and by the difficulties of arriving at a "peace" settlement for Korea, as well as by the uninterrupted war preparations of imperialism, which have been accelerated precisely during the truce negotiations, by the creation of new American bases in Africa and in Europe, by the preparation of the peace treaty with Japan, the resumption of discussions for the rearmament of Germany, the projected inclusion of Greece and Turkey and indirectly even of Spain in the Atlantic Pact and finally by the more intensified prosecution of the armaments program.

Over and above the growing tension caused in international relations by the conflict in Korea and the situation in the Middle East, the rearmament of Japan, the principal base of imperialism in the Far East, and even more the rearmament of Western Germany aggravates this tension still further and will force it to the breaking point. Insofar as the rearmament of Germany in particular is undertaken on a large scale, which is now the intention of the whole "Atlantic community" — the American point of view on this question having definitively overcome the resistance of the French bourgeoisie — this will constitute the sign of a speeding up of the pace toward war and of the consummation of the rupture between the two camps. In this case, one cannot completely exclude the eventuality that the Kremlin, driven to the wall, despite its sincere and tenacious efforts to do everything possible to prevent such an outcome, will risk a preventive action.

Submergence of Differences

The imperialist camp, within the framework of this trend, is becoming more and more homogeneous around and under the leadership of the United States. This is not to say that all inter-imperialist antagonisms have disappeared, but rather that the still existent antagonisms are being more and more subordinated to the common struggle in prospect, to the significance and the gravity of this struggle for the very existence of the capitalist system as a whole.

On the other hand, the disproportion between American imperialism and the other capitalist powers has now reached that point where all resistance to Washington ends in capitulation.

British imperialism, which has not ceased to nourish the hope of playing the rôle of a brilliant second, tries on every occasion to preserve the appearance of independence. But even London has now so limited a base and is assailed with such difficulties in its still remaining colonial domain that it is impossible for it to offer the slightest effective resistance to the invading protection of its American ally.

The capitulation of London to Washington on Chinese and Korean policy in order to be able to obtain the help of America in coping with the dangers which have arisen in Iran is symptomatic of the manner in which the antagonisms and passing frictions between the two allies are finally settled and of the real relationship of forces between them.

This tendency toward homogeneity is also proceeding within the ranks of each bourgeoisie, bringing together the points of view of the different factions of the class and establishing a stricter discipline over it as a whole. This tendency breaks down as a result of struggles and frictions but it is reasserted again by the rallying to a common, fundamental line as the chances of war become greater.

Thus, for example, in the United States, the "Great Debate"

which took place within America's ruling circles has clarified the scope of the differences among them as to the time element of the outbreak of the war and as to the principal front (Asia or Europe), but at the same time it has permitted the working out of a more considered and better formulated strategy for the whole of the American and world bourgeoisie, to which the principal nucleus of this class has now rallied.

Only the strongest reactions of the masses, and especially a strong reaction of the American masses, can once again endanger the cohesion of the bourgeoisie, as well as the concrete military plans of imperialism, their timing and their implementation.

Kremlin Hegemony Tightened

An analogous centripetal process to the evolution of inter-imperialist relations has occurred in the Soviet camp allied to China. As a result of the "cold war," the Kremlin's control over the European "People's Democracies" has been tightened in the sense of a growing isolation of these countries from the rest of the capitalist world, including in the economic sphere. The governments of these countries have been led to tighten their economic ties with each other and with the USSR and to elaborate a common program of military preparation strictly controlled by the Kremlin. Hence, the Kremlin's grip on these countries, which for a long time was thwarted by an undercurrent of opposition among the masses and even among a section of the indigenous apparatus of the Communist parties, has been temporarily reinforced by the international evolution toward war.

The pro-imperialist turn of the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party and of the Belgrade government has also considerably aided this process.

This does not at all signify that the opposition of the masses to the Soviet bureaucracy and to the native bureaucracy has been weakened or that the crisis even within the apparatus of the Communist parties has been overcome. It signifies merely that the factors favoring the broadening and the deepening of this crisis in the masses and in the party have been modified, and that the perspective for the development of a substantial "Titoist" opposition in this period or in the early future are no longer justified.

In China also, the aggravation of the international situation tends in the direction of maintaining ties with the Kremlin. Insofar as China is isolated from the world market by the imperialist blockade and is drained by its war effort in Korea of a large part of its resources to the detriment of a rapid economic revival, it is obliged to temporize with the Kremlin even if the latter's attitude toward China, determined by the self-interest of the Soviet bureaucracy, becomes ever clearer and ever more intolerable in the eyes of the militants of the Chinese CP and even of a section of its leaders.

III. Evolution of Social Struggles and Situation in the International Workers' Movement

The Asian Revolution

The anti-imperialist and revolutionary movement of the colonial and semi-colonial countries is at the center of the present upsurge of the international movement of emancipation of the exploited masses and is favored by the accentuated crisis of the capitalist system. Far from experiencing a lull, this movement is spreading and winning new territories.

While the conquests of the revolution are being consolidated in China and while the war in Korea, accompanied by the imperialist blockade, is imposing a more leftward course on the Mao Tse-tung regime both on the economic and on the political planes, the armed struggle of the masses against imperialism and its native agents is being continued in Korea, in Vietnam, in Malaya, in Burma, in the Philippines and no stabilization favoring imperialism is in prospect.

The workers' movement in Japan is now being subjected to the combined pressure of the native ruling classes and of the imperialist occupation which has used all means to arrest the stormy upsurge of the proletariat at the conclusion of the last war.

But above all it was the Stalinist and reformist leadership which curbed its general development and prevented the consummation of a broader unity of action against the offensive of its class enemies.

Nevertheless the process of the radicalization of the Japanese masses continues, far surpassing the pre-war level, and remains the most powerful obstacle to the war preparations and the war plans of American imperialism and its Japanese allies.

In India, Ceylon and Indonesia, countries where imperialism was obliged to cede power directly to the native bourgeoisie, there prevails a pre-revolutionary situation containing highly explosive possibilities. This is the expression of the organic incapacity of the bourgeoisie, closely tied to imperialism, to accomplish the democratic, economic and political reforms which would attenuate the extreme misery under which the peasant and worker masses live in these countries and would satisfy their profound aspirations for freedom and self-government.

Near East Enters Ferment

The Near East, up to now the private preserve of imperialism supported by the native feudal-capitalists, has entered the ferment. The anti-imperialist movement of the masses is growing in scope and is obliging the most farsighted elements of the propertied classes to project an anti-imperialist policy. These circles thereby hope on the one hand to moderate the financial crisis which rages in these countries, through expropriating imperialism of a part of the wealth which it derives from the exploitation of their resources, and on the other hand to prevent the development of a revolutionary leadership of the national movement of the masses.

In the French North African and equatorial colonies, the strengthening of administrative oppression has not succeeded in crushing the profound liberation movement of the native masses. For identical reasons to those existing in the Near East, this movement draws behind it a more and more important section of the feudal capitalists and the petty-bourgeoisie, government employees, small businessmen, native intellectuals. The so-called concessions and reforms of the administration have shown themselves to be illusory and once again push the native propertied circles, who had wanted to collaborate, into opposition. This is a result of the extremely narrow base of French imperialism and because its general impoverishment obliges it to engage in an intensified exploitation of its African colonies and in a more severe policy of repression than ever.

In the semi-colonial countries of Latin America, the attempts of American imperialism and of the collaborationist ruling circles — which are once again profiting from the international conjuncture of war preparations — to dragoon the masses into a common "defense" of the Western Hemisphere and the anti-Soviet war is encountering very strong resistance as is illustrated by the struggles which have recently taken place in all of these countries as well as by the significant results in the elections in Brazil and even more in Bolivia.

In Australia and New Zealand, countries where there has grown up a more and more numerous and vigorous proletariat without a past of defeats, widespread struggles have demonstrated its resistance to the war policy of the bourgeoisie and its effects.

New Upsurge in Western Europe

In Western Europe great struggles have pointed to a new upsurge of the proletariat in the wake of the victories won in Asia and because of the implementation of the armaments

program of the bourgeoisie with all its consequences on the already very low standard of living of the masses.

In England, the proletariat shows an unremitting resistance to this war policy which finds its expression not only in a series of struggles conducted under an independent leadership against the bourgeoisie and its reformist agents in the trade unions but also in the ferment which is taking place in the Labor Party and in the development of a left wing in its ranks.

Bevan's resignation and his new "socialist" program, by means of which he hopes to refloat the Labor Party in the next elections and to appease the discontent of a large part of its rank and file, is a culminating point in the differentiation towards which events are moving within the Labor Party.

This is only the beginning of a process which will be speeded up as the execution of the war policy of the English bourgeoisie and its increased difficulties in the colonial domain demonstrate the incompatibility of such a policy with the maintenance of a social, let alone a "socialist," program.

In France, the recent great strike struggles have demonstrated what the reaction of the masses will be to the strong inflationary pressure in that country. Under the combined effect of economic developments, difficulties in the colonial domain and the strengthening of reaction in the new parliament which emerged from the June 1950 elections, the class struggle in France is moving toward a climax.

In Italy, the elections have demonstrated a new strengthening of the workers' parties and a notable decline of the principal bourgeois party, that of de Gasperi. This contrasts with the strengthening of the right wing in the French parliament with its massive presence of Gaullist deputies.

In Western Germany, the workers' upsurge, induced by the pressure of inflation, unemployment and the reactionary policy of the imperialist occupation and the collaborationist bourgeoisie, is still circumscribed in nature. The speeded-up integration of Germany into the "Atlantic community" and its war policy will not fail to intensify the resistance and the reactions of the German masses who are more than ever opposed to a new carnage.

In Belgium, Austria, Holland, in the Scandinavian countries, in Greece, the war policy of the bourgeoisie is giving rise to similar reactions in varying degrees among the masses who do not feel themselves in any way beaten or demoralized.

But it is especially in Spain that the new upsurge of the European proletariat has shown itself in all its actual scope. Twelve years of ferocious repression have not been able to prevent the rebirth of the resistance of the Spanish masses who from one end of the country to the other, in imposing formations, have mightily demonstrated their will to struggle and their indomitable opposition to the Franco regime. A new revolution is now maturing in Spain and its outbreak should cause no surprise. It can occur as the result of certain fortuitous internal conditions, or as a result of new extensive struggles in Western Europe, or through new anti-imperialist victories. In any case, its outbreak from the very beginning will impel the present upsurge of the workers' movement of Western Europe to a very high pitch and will profoundly alter the situation, particularly in France, Italy, England and Germany.

Armaments and American Workers

In the United States and in Canada, the workers' reactions, being stirred up again by the inflation which is developing in these countries, still remain at a relatively low level, both of these countries benefiting from exceptional conditions. The buying power of the masses in a period of full employment has not yet been seriously affected by the process of inflation. On the other hand, the violent reactionary offensive of the bourgeoisie, the anti-communist witch-hunt, the drastic measures of regimentation and the accelerated militarization of the life of these countries, particularly of the United States, weighs on the masses who do not yet fully realize the meaning and the end-result of the new conjuncture.

Nevertheless, the first effects of the armaments program have produced a sharp reaction from the reformist bureaucracy which is concerned with safeguarding its own privileges and its base in the mass movement. More important reactions will arise in the United States only at a more advanced stage of the execution of the armaments program and the militarization of the country.

Although with a more important and inevitable delay than in the other capitalist countries, the United States is moving nonetheless inexorably toward a profound transformation which will undermine the standard of living as well as the way of life of the masses, and will make them taste the bitter fruits which rotting capitalism is now dispensing in abundance everywhere else: abysmal pauperization, long years in the barracks, police terror, repression.

Degeneration of Reformism

The situation within the workers' movement itself is characterized by the disproportion which now exists between objective revolutionary possibilities, the more and more widespread struggles of the colonial and metropolitan masses and the constant policy of betrayal, cowardice and opportunism of the traditional reformist and Stalinist leaderships.

Reformism shows itself to be incapable of detaching itself in any decisive way from moribund capitalism, which drags it down into its own decadence, even in those countries where the masses accord it a powerful support and demand from it daring measures as in England, Belgium, Austria, Germany, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and to a lesser degree in India, Japan, Palestine. With minor reservations here and there, it has consented to serve the armaments and war policy of the bourgeoisie against the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China, the colonial revolutions, the international revolutionary movement. In its propaganda it uses the same "ideological" arguments as the bourgeoisie in order to drag the masses into the war.

The recent revival at Frankfurt of the defunct Second International has, according to its own declarations, no other aim than to give a certain measure of coordination to this propaganda which is designed to once again chain the masses behind the war effort of imperialism and to drag them into the war itself, and to attempt to disguise it behind a "left" cover.

As the effects of the war preparations of the bourgeoisie weigh more and more heavily on the masses, this policy of the social democracy will result in the loss of a section of its workers' base in those places where it has been able to maintain it or to reconquer it from Stalinism, and will give rise to even more serious internal ferment than that which has thus far manifested itself, as for example in England.

In cases where the discontent in the ranks of the reformists assumes important proportions and where the resistance of the masses runs the risk of being polarized by other parties or tendencies, it is not excluded that the reformist leaders will go into temporary opposition to the policy of the bourgeoisie and carry their parties into this opposition. In certain cases the bourgeoisie itself would like to rid its governments of their presence which is often the source of obstruction and of latent opposition to a firm preparation for war.

For these reasons, the evolution of each reformist party should be specially studied by our movement in order to formulate the tactic to be followed toward it.

Contradictions in Stalinist Movement

As far as Stalinism is concerned, it is necessary to point out and to insist upon the following considerations:

The fundamental policy of the Soviet bureaucracy at the present time is determined by its fear of the revolutionary consequences which would arise from a world war with imperialism, shattering all equilibriums, embracing immense masses and uncontrollable forces. For this reason and not mainly out of fear of the military strength of imperialism, the

Soviet bureaucracy abstained from exploiting the unfavorable relationship of forces for imperialism and its evident lack of military preparation. At present, for this reason as well as because of the fear induced by the growing military potential of imperialism, the Soviet bureaucracy is oriented toward delaying the outbreak of war by means of a compromise; and it assigns to the Communist parties as their fundamental task the campaign for "peace" through a conference of the "Big Five." But on the other hand, the Soviet bureaucracy, faced with the obvious and accelerated preparations of imperialism for war and with the revolutionary reactions of the masses, is obliged to carry on a real struggle against these preparations through the medium of the CPs and to a certain extent to take into account the reactions of the masses. Hence the combined character of its present policy, which is a mixture of pacifist, petty-bourgeois opportunism and of "anti-imperialist" and "anti-capitalist" leftism leading to class actions against the preparations for war.

On the other hand, in countries where objective conditions impel the masses to an open revolt against capitalism and imperialism, and to armed struggle, as is now the case in the Far East, the Soviet bureaucracy, despite the dangers that it runs in its relations with imperialism and by the extension of the revolution in the world, is obliged not to purely and simply sabotage these struggles but rather to try to use them to its best advantage.

The situation imposes this dangerous and contradictory game on the bureaucracy which like capitalism is in the grip of inextricable contradictions and is swept along by forces it cannot rigidly control.

Thus the Communist parties, although subordinated by their leaderships to the Kremlin, and although acting basically as agents of the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, are thrust into new conditions and are in turn affected by them. They are obliged, while insisting on a compromise, to struggle against the war preparations of the bourgeoisie, and feeling the effects of the pressure of the masses they become the vehicle for a revolutionary potential which can drive them beyond the intentions of the Kremlin and of their own leaders — a situation which is not without its dangers for bureaucratic conformism.

Policy and Influence of CPs

In general, the present conjuncture of accelerated preparations for war favors a revival of the influence of the Communist parties, varying in degree in a series of countries. This is clearest in the colonial and semi-colonial countries. The attraction of China and the war in Korea has first of all made itself felt in the Far East and in all of Asia where the indigenous nationalist parties have shown themselves incapable of any effective struggle against imperialism and against the native propertied classes.

In Italy, France and Greece there has been a slight revival of the Communist parties, which either have maintained their positions or have even made moderate gains as against the decline of their influence prior to the accentuation of their leftist course, and especially before the implementation of the armaments program of the bourgeoisie. In the rest of Western Europe and in the Anglo-Saxon countries, the Stalinist parties continue to decline for the same reasons which caused their weakening since 1947-49.

The limits of this leftist course are now quite clear. Given the fact that an extended compromise with imperialism is more or less excluded and given the fact that the war preparations of the bourgeoisie will continue in its accelerated pace, this course will persist in its basic form. Nevertheless, it will undergo oscillations from left to right and vice versa, but always on the base of this fundamental line and in keeping with the possibilities of limited and ephemeral compromises and in conformity with the "peace" offensives the Soviet bureaucracy will continue to launch up to the outbreak of the conflict, as is now the case with the truce negotiations in

Korea. This results not in the disappearance of the crisis of Stalinism but in a transformation of its form. The possibilities of important splits in the CPs, which existed before the Korean war and during the progressive evolution of the Yugoslav affair, are replaced by a leftward movement within the Communist parties among its rank and file.

This evaluation of the present course of the policy of the CPs is not without significance for the development and the tactic of our movement in the countries where there is a strong Stalinist influence insofar as the immediate future is concerned.

Centrism in Present Epoch

Besides reformism and Stalinism, the two still fundamental currents of the international workers' movement, the old centrist formations of the London Bureau variety have either completely disappeared or are stagnating. They have shown themselves completely incapable of any revival through the assimilation of the experience of events and thus vitiate their possibilities of playing an important role in their own country.

Between 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean war, the Yugoslav CP gave the appearance of being able to head a regroupment of revolutionary forces independent of capitalism and of the Kremlin and of playing a major role in the formation of a new revolutionary leadership. This possibility, however, was soon bungled under the combined pressure of the turn in the international situation, the internal difficulties in Yugoslavia and the deepgoing opportunist training of the Yugoslav leadership in the school of Stalinism. The progressive repercussions of the Yugoslav affair made themselves felt in several European countries and gave rise to a regroupment of certain elements of the revolutionary vanguard, particularly of former Stalinists. It was particularly in Germany and to a lesser extent in Italy, Spain, France and Sweden that this new centrism manifested itself. But thus far it is practically only in Germany that this tendency has found an important base, due to the crisis of Stalinism which is more acute there than anywhere else in Europe. In a period of extreme tension of the class struggle, of an equally extreme polarization of social forces, centrism has less place than ever before and all attempts to recreate it are doomed to rapid and miserable failure.

Only the movement of the Fourth International, rooted more seriously than ever in important circles of the international revolutionary vanguard, and in several countries even in the real workers' movement, has maintained and augmented its forces and is preparing to exploit to the utmost the chances offered by the present revolutionary period for the construction of a new revolutionary leadership which will assure the final victory of world socialism over the ruins of capitalism and Stalinism.

IV. Orientation and Tasks of the Fourth International

In its orientation as well as in the definition of its immediate political tasks, our movement should proceed from the immense revolutionary perspectives opened by the crisis and rapid decomposition of capitalism which has proved incapable of changing the present relationship of forces in its favor and this holds true for the present period as for the one approaching.

On the other hand, in the concrete conditions in which this decomposition occurs, with the USSR and Stalinism exploiting part of this crisis for their own benefit, the role of our organizations in the rising revolutionary movement varies according to the influence of Stalinism in the areas involved.

In the second case, which includes countries such as the USA, England, Germany, Spain, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, the Scandinavian countries, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, all of Latin America, Africa and even India, Indonesia, the

Middle East, our movement must act in the years ahead with the determination to become the revolutionary leadership of the masses whose task will be to organize the struggle for power in all of these countries. Unless this role is performed audaciously and unless preparations for it are begun now, there is the danger that the inevitable spread of the crisis of capitalism into these countries will benefit centrist or even Stalinist organizations which are now in a state of stagnation and even of decay in these countries.

Penetration of Stalinist Movement

In all other countries where the revolutionary mass movement still remains mainly in the channel of Stalinist or Stalinist-influenced organizations, our essential preoccupation should be to keep from being cut off from these masses, to seek to intermingle with them and to profit from the common struggle against capitalism and imperialism in order through this struggle to set them against the Soviet bureaucracy and Stalinism. The fate of Stalinism is at stake in the global encounter now joined, an encounter which will go through a series of phases and stages before its inevitable denouement.

Our movement will not be able to take advantage of the present revolutionary period unless it succeeds in finding its way to the masses wherever the really essential class movement — or important currents of this movement — exists. On the other hand it must combine this organizational and tactical flexibility with a solid ideological cohesion of its cadres and its militants, the reflection of their profound comprehension of the concrete conditions in which the struggle for socialism is now unfolding. Only such an organization of cadres and members will not under any conditions be isolated from the masses, and will not waver either under the pressure of imperialism or under the pressure of Stalinism.

In a general sense, in the immediate future, the essential political task of our movement will be to impel, organize and lead, wherever conditions permit, the struggle of the masses for the defeat of imperialism in its war preparations, and in the war if it breaks out by the joint action of all the revolutionary masses opposed to it.

Our movement aims, wherever it is able, to head the movement of the masses against the war of imperialism and for its disarmament by the revolution and the workers' power.

War and the USSR

Our movement will denounce the counter-revolutionary character of the war being prepared against the USSR, China, the "People's Democracies," the other colonial revolutions, the international revolutionary movement. It will summon the masses to the defense of these conquests and will explain the progressive meaning of this defense which is both anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist and against the Soviet bureaucracy.

Our conception of the defense of the USSR naturally remains as in the past subordinated to the defense of the general interests of the world socialist revolution. This is impossible without the free deployment and the broadest revolutionary mobilization of the toiling masses in the world against their own bourgeoisie and against imperialism in general, a mobilization which reaches its peak in armed insurrections.

Because, in the final analysis, it is this mobilization which will decide the outcome of the world war and the fate of the USSR in particular, we will, as in the past, oppose any attempt of the Soviet bureaucracy to suppress, restrain or divert such a mobilization of the proletarian and colonial masses, and we will organize their resistance against such measures, up to and including their armed resistance, even independently of the effects this could have on the purely military conduct of the war, provided they do not compromise the final result of the war and the victory over imperialism.

For the same reason the Bolshevik-Leninists in the USSR, while fighting in the front lines against imperialism and while subordinating the moment of the overthrow of the Bonapartist

bureaucracy to the question of the military security of the country and to conditions which will not compromise the victory over imperialism, will not interrupt their political struggle for the overthrow of Stalin and for the whole of the program of the political revolution which we put forward in the USSR.

On the other hand, the defense of the European "People's Democracies" is conceived by us in a similar spirit.

Defense of Colonial Revolutions

Insofar as the defense of China and the colonial revolution against imperialism is concerned, these precautions, limitations and reservations as regards the military actions of these revolutions are not generally applicable. The possibility of a counter-revolutionary action and a counter-revolutionary mobilization of these armed forces is naturally not completely excluded as long as these colonial revolutions are led by non-Bolshevik-Leninist parties. But this possibility occurs within an entirely different framework from the military action of the Soviet bureaucracy. This is because the military action of these revolutions against imperialism, even when these parties have conquered political power but have not yet cut all their ties to the Kremlin and are not genuinely Bolshevik-Leninist parties, is essentially directed against imperialism in a war with the latter for the defense and the extension of the revolution.

From this point of view, this action differs fundamentally from that of the Soviet bureaucracy which is mortally frightened by the extension of the revolution and is prepared to oppose this extension of the revolution whenever the relation of forces between it, imperialism and the movement of the masses permits.

The Fourth International cannot but give its unconditional support to the military action of all colonial revolutions against imperialism.

As against the pacifist propaganda by means of which the Stalinists and the bourgeoisie seek to paralyze the masses, our movement everywhere will unfold the perspective of the seizure of power and of the proletarian revolution, more necessary than ever before. At the same time, and within the framework of this perspective, it will put forward the appropriate slogans, varying according to the country, of struggle against the economic and political consequences of the preparations of the bourgeoisie for war.

Tactics Toward the "Peace" Movement

This conception of our struggle against the war of the imperialists offers us both the possibility of fundamentally delineating ourselves from Stalinism and its "peace" campaigns and of finding a favorable echo among the masses it still influences by joining them in the struggle with a clear strategy and appropriate tactics.

The problem of the tactical approach to the masses and the movements under Stalinist influence should become a preoccupation of those of our sections in accordance with the importance and peculiarities presented in this domain in these countries.

Our fundamental demarcation from Stalinism, including that on the question of "peace," should be presented tactically to the masses under its influence by beginning with a recognition of their preoccupations and aims in such a manner as to demonstrate to them that we share their revolutionary preoccupations and aims.

Our organizations should explore the means of contacting these masses wherever they are, in their "peace" campaigns and demonstrations, and should guard against the adoption of a purely negative attitude.

On the other hand, special attention should be given to the Stalinist youth organizations which incontestably influence the most dynamic section of the laboring youth in a number of European countries and especially in Asia.

Within the framework of these considerations our various organizations and the Trotskyist forces should attempt to accomplish the following specific tasks:

Western Europe

In England, the Trotskyist forces should work for the strengthening of a broad tendency in the English workers' movement organized in the Labor Party against the war policy of the bourgeoisie and its agents, the reformist leaders. Above all it will attempt to influence the proletarian ranks of the left wing of the Labor Party.

They will adopt a flexible tactic toward the Bevan tendency so as to assure it as broad a development as possible. On the other hand, they will seek to avert the crystallization of this tendency on a centrist position as is expressed in the platform "One Way Only" by counterposing to it a positive criticism which, while introducing our principled point of view, will unfold the real socialist perspectives of England in economic collaboration with China, the "People's Democracies" and the USSR.

In France, our independent organization will pay special attention to our propaganda and our action among the workers influenced by the CP. It will develop a systematic campaign especially addressed to the ranks of the CP and the SP with the aim of realizing extra-parliamentary proletarian unity of action against the otherwise inevitable and more and more reactionary orientation of the policy of the bourgeoisie and its new parliament, which is heavily weighted with a mass of Gaullist and other reactionary deputies. It will promote this campaign around the program of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. On the other hand it will accord a central place to the defense and the freedom of the peoples of North Africa, Negro Africa, Vietnam and Madagascar; it will also seek to establish close ties with the North African workers residing in France.

In Italy, our organization must concern itself primarily with consolidating its organizational structure and its bases among the workers in the factories and the unions. It will develop a campaign for unity of action and a Workers' Government similar to that in France directed toward the members of the CP and the Socialist parties. On the other hand it will accord the same attention as in France to systematic, patient work among the workers and peasants influenced by the CP and the PSI (Socialist Party of Italy) in particular.

In Germany, key country for the future of the European proletariat, our forces will have to boldly take advantage of the opportunities which present themselves, and especially those created by the decomposition of the CPG, toward the end of building a revolutionary leadership. While consolidating their ideological cohesiveness, they will not hesitate to make any organizational turn with this end in view. They will seek to win solid positions in the unions and to regroup the new generation of leaders of the workers' struggles who are now coming forward. They will unfold before the German proletariat the grandiose perspective of a unified socialist republic after the withdrawal of the occupation forces, and of the extension to the entire country of the economic and social reforms achieved in Eastern Germany on the basis of workers' control and the establishment of a genuine workers' democracy. They will conduct a campaign against the rearmament of their bourgeoisie, imposed on the German masses by international and German capitalism, and for the arming of the proletariat as the best means of defense against the war plan of the imperialists and against the counter-revolutionary plans of the Kremlin regarding Germany.

In Holland, our organization will continue the work of consolidating its positions among the workers and in their organizations while at the same time attentively following the evolution of the Labor Party (social democracy) in order to be able to exploit in time any possible development of a broad left-wing current in this organization.

In Switzerland, our forces will continue and amplify their

recent turn toward broad and open activity, and the formation of the revolutionary party of the Swiss proletariat with all revolutionary elements who are oriented in the same direction.

In Greece, forced to operate in conditions of illegality, our organization should make every effort to find the possibility of breaking out of its isolation and of taking advantage of all forms of legal activity within the organizations influenced by the CP or even by the SP.

In Belgium and Austria, the Trotskyist forces should remain within their respective SPs and work to strengthen the left wings of these parties.

In Spain, our reorganized forces will advance the tactic of the overthrow of Franco by The Workers and Peasants Alliance to the exclusion of all bourgeois formations; they will propose the elaboration of a program for this Alliance to all tendencies of the Spanish revolutionary vanguard and will unfold the perspective of a government of this Alliance, the only possible alternative for the masses to the Franco government or to any other bourgeois government.

In all European countries, the propaganda campaign for the Socialist United States of Europe should be constantly promoted in opposition and as a concrete proposal for the defeat of bourgeois unification plans, and against the militarization and the reduction of Europe to the status of vassal and of enhanced dependence on American imperialism, as well as the best means of nullifying any chance of success by the Soviet bureaucracy among the masses of these countries.

Eastern Europe

In the European "People's Democracies," our forces, on an individual basis, will seek to avoid exposing themselves to Stalinist repression and will work in the mass organizations where they will develop their activity in line with the possibilities and the level of understanding of the advanced worker elements. Our organizations, which are obliged to function underground in these countries, while being for the defense of their conquests against imperialism and the remnants of the former ruling classes, will have the same program of political revolution and proletarian democratization of these countries as in the USSR.

In Yugoslavia, where the workers' conquests are now doubly threatened by the Kremlin and by imperialism, which is exploiting the prostration of the CPY leadership and the government toward it in order to attain its aims, we will work for the creation of a Bolshevik tendency in the CPY against the policy of surrender and capitulation of its leadership and for its removal. This is the precondition for a genuine defense of Yugoslavia.

In the event that the leadership of the CPY and the Yugoslav government, in the imperialist war against the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China and the colonial revolutions, by ranging itself on the side of imperialism opens the country to imperialist troops or transforms it into a military base of operations against these countries, thus at the same time creating an immediate mortal peril to the existence of the Yugoslav workers' state itself, we will call upon the masses to overthrow this government by arms and to join in the world struggle of the anti-imperialist forces.

In the eventuality of such a treacherous attitude of the Yugoslav leaders, and before the masses of the country can overthrow them, it is possible that the armies of the USSR and the neighboring "People's Democracies" will come to grips with the imperialist armies and the forces remaining loyal to the Yugoslav leaders on the soil of Yugoslavia itself.

In such a case we will be for the defeat of the imperialist forces and their auxiliaries, while at the same time summoning the masses to have the utmost vigilance, up to and including armed resistance against the armies of the USSR and the "People's Democracies." If the relationship of forces permits, they will attempt to abolish the conquests realized by these masses, which have given them some control and even some direct self-management of the economy and the policy of the

Yugoslav workers' state, and to establish a régime of national oppression over the Yugoslav masses.

Latin America

Generally speaking, in all of these countries the essential task of our organizations and our forces in the period ahead is to advance from the stage of propaganda groups to that of the revolutionary leadership of the masses, to become able to impel, organize and lead their struggles for all their anti-imperialist, national, democratic and economic demands, and to unfold the perspective of the Socialist United States of Latin America. This requires a prior political clarification (in which considerable progress has been made since the Second World Congress) as well as a serious and effective organizational structure. Our forces should consider themselves as the nuclei of genuine proletarian parties in their respective countries, and henceforward act as such. It is only by taking this road that they will surmount the remnants of sectarianism, opportunism and confusion and will find their way to the broad unorganized and leaderless masses of Latin America. In this way they will neutralize the existing petty-bourgeois parties whose congenital incapacity leads all progressive mass movements to defeat.

Insofar as the particular situation in Argentina is concerned, our forces will seek to develop still further their roots in the rapidly evolving working class of the country and to create a class current among the organized workers influenced by Peronism with the aim of isolating this reactionary government of the industrial bourgeoisie — which opposes the domination of American imperialism — from its principal base in the masses.

In Bolivia, the inadequate demarcation of our forces in the past from all political tendencies exploiting the mass movement, the lack of clarity in our aims and our tactics as well as the absence of systematic, patient work among the workers, and the loose organization structure have brought on a certain decline of our influence and a crisis of the organization. Our reorganized forces should remedy all these defects without however slipping into sectarianism or isolating itself from the masses and their movements which are often ideologically confused and under the leadership of the petty-bourgeoisie (MNR: National Revolutionary Movement). Special tasks for the other Latin American countries are indicated in the 3rd World Congress resolution on Latin America.

Africa

In the French North African Colonies, as well as in those of French Equatorial Africa, our forces should integrate themselves into the national movement and into those organizations which are its best expression in order to develop a consistent Marxist wing within them and to prevent their exploitation by Stalinism.

In South Africa, our forces, which are already seriously rooted in the national movement, should strengthen their ideological cohesiveness while guarding against any possibility of loosening their ties with the rest of our international movement.

In Egypt, our reorganized forces should envisage the best means of integrating themselves into the national movement and especially of attaching themselves to the organizations of the young Egyptian proletariat in the workshops and factories.

Australia and New Zealand

The Trotskyists will persevere in the task of strengthening a revolutionary left wing in the respective Labor Parties of these countries and in the unions under their influence.

Asia

In China, our reorganized and reoriented forces will give unconditional support to the struggle for the defense of the

Chinese revolution against imperialism, against the native reactionary forces and against the maneuvers and pressures of the Soviet bureaucracy which is seeking to reduce China to a state of dependence. They will have to clearly define their line in relation to the victory of Mao Tse-tung, i.e., our line in the past and as regards the present regime. They should find the means of working in the mass organizations under the influence of the Chinese CP, including the CP itself, with the aim of aiding a more radical development of the militants of these organizations and of organizing them against all bureaucratic measures of their leadership. They will accord critical support to the Mao Tse-tung regime and will center their main opposition on the character and organization of the government. They will call for all power to the democratically elected people's committees. They will develop a more concrete program of economic and political demands and for the reconstruction of China, with the chief aim of satisfying the needs of the workers and poor peasants of the country.

In Vietnam, our reorganized forces will also attempt to work in the organizations influenced by the Stalinists, naturally including its armed formations. They will grant critical support to the Ho Chi-min regime in its struggle against imperialism, while distinguishing themselves from it on the goal of this struggle and the best means to lead it to victory.

In India, the Trotskyists, conscious of the pre-revolutionary situation which prevails in the country and of the crisis now raging in the Congress Party as well as in the Socialist Party and of the danger potentially presented by Stalinism in the absence of any other effective revolutionary leadership, should very carefully follow the evolution of the situation in the country and should determine to play the role of revolutionary leadership of the masses. This calls for a clear, firm and bold political and organizational orientation.

In Ceylon, the constant progress of our forces, which goes hand in hand with the disillusionment and rising discontent of the masses toward the government and the satellite bourgeois parties of British imperialism, opens the perspective for great coming victories. The condition for this victory is that our forces have confidence in the masses, organize and lead their daily struggles, avoid tactical errors especially as concerns our immediate rivalry with the CP and boldly affirm their will to power. The trend in this country can enormously influence the revolutionary process in India, as well as the powerful rise of Trotskyism there.

In Japan, the Trotskyist forces will integrate themselves into the SP.

In Indonesia, where there is a situation similar in several aspects to that of India with the considerable difference that the bourgeoisie is not as influential and the organization and spirit of the masses are better, our forces will work for the creation of a consistent Bolshevik tendency within the Partai Murba with the aim of influencing the party as a whole and of avoiding its disruption by Stalinism.

In Israel, the Trotskyists will explore the possibilities of work in Mapam.

In Cyprus, our reorganized forces will try to adopt a more positive attitude toward the national movement of the masses and their right of self-determination. At the same time they will fight against the prevailing illusions regarding the unification they are demanding with Greece by putting forward a program of economic and political demands, by the struggle against war and for self-government.

In the Middle East, our available forces will integrate themselves into the powerful national movement of the masses and will attempt to create a revolutionary tendency within it.

Resolutions of the Congress:

Class Nature of Eastern Europe

The evolution of the European countries in the Soviet buffer zone since 1949 *has unfolded along the line of an accelerated integration of these countries into the economic and political orbit of the USSR.*

Economic Transformation

On the *economic* level this evolution has taken the fundamental line of a beginning of coordination and effective planning among their economies and with that of the USSR on the one hand, which has, on the other hand, considerably diminished their dependence upon the international capitalist economy and market.

Since 1949 we have observed the putting into effect of a series of long-range plans (five to six years) which, to the degree of their realization, detach these countries from a part of their ties with the external capitalist market and progressively fuse their economy into a whole which is more and more organically bound to the planned economy of the USSR.

These plans follow upon the actual statification of almost the whole of heavy and light industry, of foreign trade as

well as important sectors of domestic trade, of transportation, and of a series of restrictive measures on property and on the private agricultural market, and following the generally successful execution of the first short-range plans (one to three years) which permitted the restoration of the economy to pre-war levels and the repairing of the destructions caused by the war.

From then on the statified economy has been governed by the necessities of the plan as in the USSR.

These developments have already effected a reversal of the previous tendency which marked the trade of these countries with the international capitalist market.

At present the trade of these countries amongst themselves and with the USSR accounts for more than half their foreign commerce and this trend is becoming more pronounced.

New State Apparatus Created

On the *social* level, the state apparatuses of these countries are more and more coming to resemble that of the USSR with the creation, especially since the end of 1949,

of bureaucratic People's Committees and by the more marked installation in all spheres of "reliable" elements who enjoy the confidence of the Soviet bureaucracy and are steadily replacing the old bourgeois elements.

The recruitment of these elements is now being stepped up from among the new workers' aristocracy which is favored by the regime by its methods of payment for labor and by the Stakhanovist movement, etc.

The state apparatus is thus "sovietized" both in its form as well as in its social composition by imitating the forms proper to the state apparatus of the USSR and by recruiting its functionaries among the new privileged sections. On the other hand, it is being "Russified" by placing in the most decisive posts of command in the civil, political and economic administration as well as in the police and in the army, elements directly manipulated by the Kremlin, and often actual Russian functionaries assuming the appropriate nationality.

Outcome of Political Struggle

Finally, on the *political* level, if in a *historical sense* the fate of these countries has not yet been decided, the same cannot be said insofar as their *immediate fate* is concerned.

It is clear that the evolution of the international situation has not taken the line of a prolonged compromise between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy which could place the status of these countries in question, but rather on the contrary the line of accelerated preparation for war, wherein each seeks to consolidate its present sphere of influence.

The only possible exception is the case of the Soviet zone in Austria, which for the time being still remains an integral part of the Austrian state and on which a compromise involving the withdrawal of the occupation troops is not yet excluded.

On the other hand, the entire recent evolution of Eastern Germany, its structure and the execution of its five-year plan, and the deep-going modifications introduced into the state apparatus rather constitute an indication that Moscow, having lost hope of a general compromise particularly in regard to Germany, is passing over to the decisive integration of this area into the rest of the buffer zone. However, it is no less true that the political and economic structure of this area still remains quite different from that of the rest of the buffer zone.

On the other hand, the whole of the economic, social and political overturns which have occurred in the buffer zone have now acquired such a scope that the reintegration of these countries into the capitalist orbit can no longer be envisaged as possible by "*cold methods*" but only through a veritable capitalist counter-revolution (with the possible exception of Eastern Germany).

The example of the civil war now going on in Albania, by far the weakest link in the entire buffer zone, between the forces in the pay of native reaction and imperialism and the forces bound up with the present regime is conclusive on this point.

End of Intermediate Status

Taking into account all the modifications effected since 1949 in the economy as well as in the state apparatus of the buffer zone countries, within the framework of a new trend in the international situation, *the structural assimilation of these countries to the USSR must be considered as having now been essentially accomplished and these countries as having ceased to be basically capitalist countries.*

The taking into tow of all these countries by the Soviet bureaucracy after the last war, the influence and decisive control it exercised over them contained the *possibility* and even the *inevitability* of their structural assimilation to the USSR because of a certain internal and external relationship of forces between the Soviet bureaucracy, the native bourgeoisie, imperialism and the masses.

For a long period — approximately between 1945 and 1948 — the Soviet bureaucracy maintained these countries in an *intermediate status* of varying degrees because it was not yet ready to consider its break with imperialism as final and because of the necessity imposed on it by its own nature of eliminating the native bourgeoisie by cold methods, without genuine revolutionary action by the masses over which it tried at the same time to exercise a rigorous control.

This intermediate status corresponded *sociologically* more and more to a regime of *dual power* both on the economic and the political planes, the economic structure remaining fundamentally capitalist. Beginning with 1949 this duality manifestly gave way to regimes which stabilized a structure essentially characterized by *property and productive relations* qualitatively assimilable to those of the USSR, that is to say, characteristic of an essentially *stabilized and planned economy* (except for the Soviet zone in Austria, where, because of the occupation, certain elements of dual power are noticeable).

Parallel with this process, the political power, which for a long time had been assumed by different combinations between the Stalinist leaderships and the representatives of the former bourgeois and petty-bourgeois parties, now passed exclusively into the hands of the Stalinists and was thus transformed in its form as well as in its social composition.

Deformed Workers' States

The form of political power still remains marked by important differences from one country to another and in their entirety with that of the USSR, as is likewise the case so far as the form of political power in the capitalist system is concerned. But it is above all by virtue of their economic base, of the structure essentially common to all the countries of the buffer zone, characterized by new *production and property relations proper to a stabilized and planned economy, essentially like those of the USSR*, that we have to consider these states as now being *deformed workers' states*. These states have arisen not through the revolutionary action of the masses but through the military-bureaucratic action of the Soviet bureaucracy, thanks to

exceptional circumstances created by the last war, and they are not administered directly by the proletariat but by a bureaucracy. The bureaucratic deformation of these states is of the same magnitude as that characterizing the USSR, the proletariat being totally deprived of political power just as in the USSR.

Consequently, as in the USSR, there is likewise posed as the task of the revolutionary vanguard of these countries a *political revolution* to overthrow the bureaucracy and open the road for the free development of socialism.

The further evolution of these countries and their immediate future are now bound to the fate of the conflict being prepared between imperialism on the one side and the USSR; these countries, China, the other colonial revolutions and the international working class movement on the other.

Unconditional Defense

Taking into account the class character of these countries and the reactionary war aims of imperialism, the Fourth International is neither neutral nor indifferent so far as the defense of these countries against imperialism is concerned. Just as in regard to the USSR, the Fourth International is for the *unconditional defense* of these countries against imperialism. It considers their structure of statified and planned economy as a conquest which must be safeguarded against imperialism, regardless of the policy followed by the governments vassalized to Stalinism in these countries.

That does not in any case signify the abandonment of our political opposition to these governments nor the subordination of our struggle for the world revolution to this defense. The contrary remains true. The Fourth International, within these countries, makes common cause with the proletarian and poor peasant masses who struggle against their exploitation and against the national oppression imposed by the domination of the Soviet bureaucracy and it stands for the total independence of each of the countries in the buffer zone and for their organization into a freely agreed-upon federation.

Examination of Past Position

In all the positions formerly taken on the question of the class nature of the countries of the Soviet buffer zone in Europe, the Fourth International pointed out the tendency of structural assimilation of these countries to the USSR and the *transitional state* in which these countries found themselves.

The Fourth International, on the other hand, indicated from the first that, under a certain correlation of forces between the Soviet bureaucracy, imperialism and the masses, the bureaucracy could even accomplish this assimilation.

During an entire period (1945-48) it was really impossible to conclude that such a relationship of forces favorable to the bureaucracy had been established and consequently to consider the fate of the countries in the buffer zone as decided for the entire immediate future.

Nevertheless it must be recognized that the International was kept from having a precise evaluation of the evolution in the buffer zone, of the speed and the scope of assimilation, because of a series of restrictive considerations like those set forth in the Second World Congress "Theses on the USSR and Stalinism" which asserted that "the genuine destruction of capitalism (in the buffer zone) is possible only through the revolutionary mobilization of the masses and the elimination of the special forms of exploitation introduced by the bureaucracy into these countries." On the other hand, in the Resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the International Executive Committee (May 1949) on "The Evolution of the Countries of the Buffer Zone," where there was more positively envisaged the possible perspective of a structural assimilation accomplished by the action of the Stalinist bureaucracy itself, it still insisted on "the abolition of frontiers which it could effect through the incorporation of certain or all of these countries into the USSR, or that it could accomplish through the constitution of a Balkan-Danubian federation formally independent of the USSR but a genuine unified framework for the planning of the economy."

Process of Bureaucratic Change

It has turned out that the revolutionary action of the masses is not an *indispensable condition* needed by the bureaucracy to be able to destroy capitalism under exceptional and analogous conditions and in an international atmosphere like that of the "cold war." That does not mean that the bureaucracy completely deprives itself of mass action in destroying the bourgeoisie. It mobilized the masses *bureaucratically*, varying in scope from country to country and according to the given conditions, organizing them, for example, into "committees" of various kinds which played a certain role in disarming the bourgeoisie and in its economic and political expropriation. This bureaucratic mobilization of the masses, which is still proceeding in the struggle against the remnants of the possessing classes and especially against the well-to-do peasantry and the Catholic Church, is necessary because the bureaucracy is not an independent social force, a class, but supports itself partly upon the proletariat to struggle against the bourgeoisie even while lacing the masses at the same time into the straitjacket of its bureaucratic and police control.

It has turned out on the other hand that in such conditions and on the basis of an actual statification of the means of production, it is possible to initiate the process of a planned economy without formal incorporation into the USSR, without formal abolition of the frontiers and despite the special forms of exploitation that the bureaucracy still maintains in these countries which remain an ever-present obstacle to the planning and free development of their economy.

Regarding the theoretical significance of the evolution of the buffer zone and the conclusions that can be drawn concerning the role of Stalinism, the Fourth International still firmly stands on what has been said on this subject in the above-mentioned resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the IEC which is incorporated in the present resolution.

(Extract from the Resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International, April 1949)

Theoretical Significance of the Development

The appearance of *new transitional regimes*, as in the case of the buffer countries, regimes of transition between capitalism and the USSR, is not the result of chance nor the effect of negligible historical accidents. Only incurable doctrinaires can conceive of capitalism and socialism as fixed entities, established once and for all, to which a living historic process must conform, a process contradictory and rich in the crystallization of ever new combined forms. In reality, the appearance of mixed transitional regimes and their combined character is the clearest expression of our historic epoch, which is defined by:

- a. an ever more advanced disintegration of capitalism;
- b. the conditions of extended delay of the world revolution, essentially the result of the counter-revolutionary Stalinist leadership of the world labor movement;
- c. the existence of the USSR not only as a power continuing to polarize the revolutionary aspirations of an important part of the world proletariat, but also as a state power having a military-political weight of its own, and with a logic of expansion of its own.

Only in the light of these three factors can the appearance and the development of a new and combined phenomenon like that of the Soviet buffer zone be understood and the limits of its real historic import be defined.

Role of Stalinism

Ascertaining the existence of such transitional regimes does not at all upset our evaluation of the counter-revolutionary role of Stalinism nor our evaluation of Stalinism as a disintegrating force in the USSR and as a force organizing defeats of the world proletariat:

a. An evaluation of Stalinism cannot be made on the basis of localized results of its policy but must proceed from the entirety of its action on a world scale. When we consider the state of decay which capitalism presents even today, four years after the end of the war, and when we consider the concrete situation of 1943-45, there can be no doubt that Stalinism, on a world scale, appeared as the decisive factor in preventing a sudden and simultaneous collapse of the capitalist order as a whole in Europe and in Asia. In this sense, the "successes" achieved by the bureaucracy in the buffer zone constitute, at most, the price which imperialism paid for services rendered on the world arena — a price which is moreover constantly called into question at each new stage.

b. From the world point of view, the reforms realized by the Soviet bureaucracy in the sense of an assimilation of the buffer zone to the USSR weigh incomparably less in the balance than the blows dealt by the Soviet bureaucracy, especially through its actions in the buffer zone, against the consciousness of the world *proletariat*, which it

demoralizes, disorients and paralyzes by its whole policy and thus renders it susceptible to some extent to the imperialist campaign of war preparations. Even from the point of view of the USSR itself, the defeats and the demoralization of the world proletariat caused by Stalinism constitute an incomparably greater danger than the consolidation of the buffer zone constitutes a reinforcement.

c. In the buffer zone itself, where objective as well as subjective conditions were ripe for an immediate overthrow of capitalism in 1943-44, Stalinist policy has led to the temporary strengthening of the anti-proletarian forces, created a thousand new obstacles in the way of the abolition of capitalism and thus caused the whole painful and jerky process of assimilation, dragging this process out over a number of years and rendering the proletariat in the main apathetic and even hostile, whereas the revolutionary movement of the proletariat could have achieved the liquidation of capitalism in these countries in a much shorter time and with a minimum of overhead charges.

d. As a result of the very expansion of the Soviet bureaucracy under the concrete conditions noted above, the objective contradictions in the situation of the buffer zone tend to penetrate into the midst of the bureaucracy and of Soviet economy itself, multiplying the already numerous tensions and antagonisms which exist within them, and preparing the ground for the development of various types of centrifugal tendencies (Tito tendency on the one hand, Gomulka-Akerman tendency on the other).

Role of Soviet Bureaucracy

Historically, the above-mentioned conditions not only indicate the reasons for the appearance of transitional regimes but also circumscribe the limits of the viability of the Soviet bureaucracy:

- a. On the *social* plane, the overthrow of the Soviet bureaucracy remains certain within the framework of a world decision in the class struggle, which is inevitable one way or another in the long run.
- b. On the *military-political* plane, this overthrow remains equally inevitable if the world proletariat does not succeed in crushing imperialism in time, with such an eventuality also entailing the downfall of the bureaucracy.

The appearance of transitional regimes of the buffer zone thus merely gives expression to the *interlude* character of the historic period from 1943 to the present: an interlude between the low point of the world-wide decline of the proletarian revolution and the new world revolutionary upsurge, which has thus far only appeared in its rough outlines; an interlude between the Second World War and the final clash between imperialism and the USSR. Only within the framework of this limited interlude, do the buffer zone and all the phenomena associated with it appear in their true light as provisional and temporary. And in this framework, the real nature of Stalinism appears more pronounced than ever in the sense indicated by the Fourth International.

Resolutions of the Congress:

The Yugoslav Revolution

1. The victorious proletarian revolution in Yugoslavia is fundamentally the product of two historic factors: the revolutionary upsurge of the toiling masses expressing itself in the movement of the armed partisans, and the specific policy followed by the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in the important turns of the objective revolutionary process.

The movement of the masses of workers and poor peasants against the imperialist occupants, in conditions of extreme sharpening of social contradictions, swelled the cadres fighting for national emancipation, broadened it into a struggle against the Yugoslav exploiters, took the first steps toward their expropriation and, in the very course of this struggle, destroyed the old state apparatus on the largest part of Yugoslav territory. *The specific policy of the CPY*, distinguishing itself from that of all the other Communist parties of Europe, primarily under the pressure of the masses, successively accepted, then took over the leadership in the destruction of the old bourgeois state apparatus; legalized, then generalized the construction of a new proletarian state apparatus; consolidated, then broadened the conquests of the proletarian revolution, by refusing to capitulate before the Soviet bureaucracy and by engaging in a resolute struggle against the bureaucratic deformations of the Yugoslav workers' state.

Three Stages of Yugoslav Revolution

2. (a) The first decisive stage of the Yugoslav revolution was crossed on November 29, 1943 at the meeting of the second session of the AVNOJ (Yugoslav Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation) at Jayce. On this occasion a provisional government was constituted which exercised its authority over all the territories occupied by the partisans which soon embraced the major part of Yugoslavia. The constitution of this government, basing itself on *people's committees* of national liberation, which came into existence in 1941, signified that the dual power, which had existed* in Yugoslavia from the beginning of the partisan insurrection, was being overcome. From this time on, there can be no further question of the existence of a centralized bourgeois state apparatus in Yugoslavia; there remained only the ruins of bourgeois power, just as the successive measures of expropriation and confiscation left only the ruins of bourgeois property. The new centralized state apparatus, based on the people's committees, which the AVNOJ began to construct, was a preponderantly proletarian state apparatus. The CPY having in fact conquered power in the liberated territories, this part of Yugoslavia ceased to be a bourgeois state; under a workers' and peasants' government it advanced toward the final accomplishment of the proletarian revolution.

(b) The second decisive stage of the Yugoslav revolution was crossed in October 1945 *with the withdrawal of the two last bourgeois ministers from the central provisional government*. The very constitution of this government in 1944 was only an episode in the unfolding of the Yugoslav revolution and was imposed by the joint pressure of imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy. While retarding the complete victory of the proletarian revolution, this episode, however, did not interrupt its progress. During the very period of the coalition government, the new state apparatus based on the people's committees was extended over the whole Yugoslav territory. During this period all the remnants of bourgeois political power were eliminated. The withdrawal of the two bourgeois ministers from the central government was only the final expression of the fact that the bourgeoisie as a class had lost power and that the new state apparatus was of a socially different character than that of prewar Yugoslavia. *Beginning with this time, the transition between the workers' and peasants' government and the dictatorship of the proletariat was being completed and Yugoslavia became a workers' state*. That was manifested by the fact that the conquests of the Yugoslav proletarian revolution were generalized and legally consolidated in 1945-46 by the law on the people's committees, the law of nationalization of the means of industrial production, the mines and the banks and by the law on the confiscation of property, the law on agrarian reform and the annulment of peasant debts, etc.

(c) The third decisive stage of the Yugoslav revolution was crossed on June 28, 1948 by the split which occurred between the Kremlin and the CPY. After the consolidation of the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution, the CPY proceeded to their extension by the nationalization of wholesale trade and a considerable part of retail trade; the establishment of a monopoly of foreign trade; the beginning of the collectivization of agriculture and the five-year plan of industrialization and electrification of the country. At the same time bureaucratic deformations of the proletarian power developed in Yugoslavia both as a result of the backward character of the country and of the Stalinist policy of the leadership of the CPY, imitating the institutions of the bureaucratized USSR. *The split between the Kremlin and the CPY, the expression of the refusal of the CPY to subordinate the interests of the Yugoslav revolution to those of the Soviet bureaucracy, opened the road to the struggle against these bureaucratic deformations*. The principal measures taken within the framework of this struggle were: the constitution of workers' councils and the beginning of workers' management of the enterprises; the democratization of the cooperatives; the abolition of the privileges of the functionaries of the party and the state; the decentralization of the directing apparatus of the economy; the beginning of the democratization of cultural and ideological life, etc.

Permanent Revolution Confirmed

3. The dynamics of the Yugoslav revolution confirms the theory of the permanent revolution on all points:

(a) It confirms the point that the struggle of the toiling masses for national liberation against imperialism can only be victorious if it is transmuted into a proletarian revolution. This transmutation in Yugoslavia was not due to particular or conjunctural factors but constituted the application of the general strategy formulated by the Fourth International for all countries occupied by imperialism in Europe during the Second World War. If this strategy was successfully applied only in Yugoslavia, that is due to the specific character of the CPY which headed the movement of the masses.

(b) It confirms the point that a backward country can resolve the historic tasks of the bourgeois revolution (solution of the agrarian question, elimination of semi-feudal survivals in the state power, conquest of genuine national independence, etc.) only by the conquest of power by the proletariat which, in such conditions, finds itself compelled to grapple simultaneously with the solution of the historic tasks of the proletarian revolution.

(c) It confirms the point that the development and broadening of proletarian democracy after the consolidation of proletarian power is both possible and necessary to effectively combat the anti-socialist and bureaucratic tendencies which exist and develop in the workers' state. In this, it represents a confirmation and a *positive* historical justification of the entire struggle of Leon Trotsky and the Left Opposition in the USSR between 1923 and 1927, just as the degeneration of the USSR constituted a justification along *negative lines*.

(d) It confirms the point that a victorious proletarian revolution in a backward country, in the midst of a hostile world, necessarily develops through growing difficulties and contradictions which are reflected in economic crises and successive social tensions within the workers' state. Only an international extension of the revolution and the aid given to the Yugoslav revolution by the victorious proletariat of several advanced countries can assure a real and harmonious solution of the problems posed by industrialization and the voluntary collectivization of agriculture.

At the same time the dynamics of the Yugoslav revolution confirms the analysis made by the Fourth International of the questions of the USSR and of Stalinism. It confirms the character of the Stalinist parties as degenerated workers' parties, an indispensable explanation in understanding the new course taken by the Yugoslav revolution since the break between the CPY and the Kremlin. It especially confirms the fundamental thesis of the Trotskyist movement which maintains that Stalinism is a phenomenon characteristic of a period of ebb in the revolutionary struggles of the masses, and that it can be overcome only by a new rise of revolutionary struggles. In Yugoslavia, the first country where the proletariat took power since the degeneration of the USSR, Stalinism no longer exists today as an effective factor in the workers' movement, which however does not exclude its possible reemergence under certain conditions.

Relationship of Class Forces Internally

4. *The perspectives of the Yugoslav revolution are fundamentally determined by the relationship of forces between the classes on the national and international arenas.*

In Yugoslavia, the workers' state is confronted with growing pressure from the peasant proprietors who seek to pass from simple commodity production to capitalist accumulation by means of the private appropriation of the means of production. This tendency develops automatically and necessarily on the basis of the present economic and technical development of the country and coincides with the tendency of the kulaks to effect their fusion with the international capitalist market.

At present this is being held in check as follows:

(a) By the slow modification of the relationship of social forces resulting from the industrialization of the country, from the numerical increase of the proletariat, of its cohesion, its political consciousness and its growing cultural progress, thanks to the beginning of the development of proletarian democracy, etc.

(b) By the differentiation within the peasantry itself, resulting from the support given by the workers' state to the poor peasants and to the development of agricultural cooperatives.

(c) By measures of coercion taken by the workers' state hindering the development of this automatic economic process: prohibition of the sale and purchase of land over 30 hectares; dual price sector; progressive quotas of forced deliveries of farm products (tax in kind); etc.

Nevertheless, so long as the industrial production of objects of consumption does not assure to the peasants a real growing return parallel with the growth of agricultural production, and so long as the mechanization of agriculture is not able to create a healthy economic base for the collectivization of agriculture, industrialization will be carried on amidst the hostility and resistance of a section of the peasantry. Under these conditions only the conscious participation of the proletariat in the exercise of power can protect the conquests of the revolution in the immediate period. Only a considerable extension of the present measures of democratization and of the struggle against bureaucratism can assure the conscious support of the proletarian masses for the workers' state.

However, the measures of democratization introduced in 1950 have only very slowly altered the attitude of the industrial proletariat, as a result of its justified past distrust toward this course of the CPY, as a result of the pressure of famine and poverty upon the workers and as a result of unfavorable objective conditions for a broad revolutionary mobilization of the masses. The needs of the industrial proletariat also began to come into conflict with the inherent logic of the rightward course and the official ideology of the government and the CPY. Because of this fact, the relationship of forces between the classes within Yugoslavia have begun to alter beginning with 1951 to the disadvantage of the proletariat. The workers' state has been obliged to make a series of concessions to the class enemy consisting notably of the following:

(a) the removal of controls from prices and trade,

permitting an accelerated private accumulation on the part of rich peasants and tradesmen-speculators.

(b) The halting of agrarian collectivization and the permission granted to the peasantry to withdraw from certain types of agricultural cooperatives.

(c) The decentralization of foreign trade which threatens to rapidly undermine the state monopoly of foreign trade.

Under Imperialist and Kremlin Pressure

5. On the international plane, a growing pressure is being brought to bear upon the Yugoslav revolution by its two mortal enemies—world imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy:

(a) World imperialism seeks to destroy the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution, the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the collectivized property in the means of production in industry and in the mines. It reckons on succeeding by stages in this game: first by the utilization of political and economic pressure, then by an open or camouflaged armed intervention. Its objectives at the present stage are: the inclusion of Yugoslavia in the imperialist diplomatic front and in its Mediterranean military alignments. With that beginning, it seeks to obtain at a later stage the right to supervise Yugoslav economy, the right of investment in the mines and industry, the legalization of the bourgeois and petty-bourgeois political parties, the virtual destruction of the monopoly of foreign trade, etc.

(b) The Soviet bureaucracy seeks by all means to bring about the destruction of a regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat independent of the Kremlin, a mortal threat to the influence of Stalinism over the international workers' movement, and in the long run also to the power of the bureaucracy in Eastern Europe and in the USSR itself. The destruction by imperialism of the conquests of the Yugoslav proletarian revolution represents a lesser evil to the Kremlin than the independent development of proletarian Yugoslavia. Up to now, the entire policy of the Kremlin toward Yugoslavia (economic blockade, provocative military demonstrations, propaganda campaigns, etc.) is aimed at forcing this country into the imperialist camp. This policy, however, is only a preparation for another stage of the counter-revolutionary strategy of Stalinism toward Yugoslavia which would consist in an attempt to include Yugoslavia in the sphere of influence of the Soviet bureaucracy by means of military intervention.

In the long run, this hostile, twofold pressure brought to bear on the Yugoslav revolution can only be successfully counteracted by the conscious support of the world proletariat and the international victory of the socialist revolution. For the present, the situation of unstable equilibrium between imperialism and the Soviet bureaucracy accords a certain respite to the Yugoslav revolution. But this respite occurs, especially since the outbreak of the war in Korea, within the framework of an *increased parallel pressure* brought to bear upon Yugoslavia, a pressure which is not neutralized by a sufficiently extensive international proletarian action for the aid of Yugoslavia. In these con-

ditions the Yugoslav state has found itself constrained to make a series of concessions to its enemies on the international plane. It has led to an opportunist deviation in its foreign policy and especially that of the CPY (idealization of the UN, neutralism, petty-bourgeois concept of aggression, pacifist conception of class collaboration in the struggle against war, etc.).

Without a radical alteration of the relationship of forces between the classes on the international arena, this tendency threatens to deepen and to hurtle the Yugoslav revolution to its doom. The contradiction between the progressive evolution of the Yugoslav state itself in 1950 and the rightward evolution of its foreign policy which, at the present stage, is the expression of the crisis of isolation of the Yugoslav revolution, will find a solution at a later stage in one of two ways: either the Yugoslav socialist revolution will fuse with the revolutionary movement and with the international revolution, or international concessions to imperialism will be followed by concessions within Yugoslavia itself.

But despite the right deviation of its foreign policy and despite all the concessions which it has already been obliged to make to the class enemy in Yugoslavia itself, the leadership of the CPY and of the Yugoslav workers' state cannot itself peacefully abolish the material bases of this state without destroying itself. American imperialism and the rich peasantry of Yugoslavia have only a transitory interest in dealings with the CPY and in wresting concessions from it; their fundamental interest requires the destruction of the workers' state and the return to power of the bourgeois politicians who are already raising their heads. That is why the policy of the CPY in the period ahead, *a period of sharpened social struggles in Yugoslavia*, will be characterized by its *vacillating centrist* character which can abruptly change its rightward course to an adventurist struggle against the kulaks and an attempt to keep the power by all means. Fundamentally, the question of whether the CPY will be obliged to deepen workers' democracy, a step which cannot fail to have its repercussions on the foreign policy of the party, will depend on the degree of the *real activity* of the Yugoslav proletariat in the workers' councils and the people's committees, or whether in the absence of a real mobilization of the masses, the regime will take more and more bureaucratic forms.

Character of Yugoslav Communist Party

6. It is impossible to determine the dynamics and the perspectives of the Yugoslav revolution without at the same time defining the character of the CPY. *If Stalinism can be defined as the subordination of the interests of the workers of every country to those of the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPY, beginning with 1941, outlined an orientation which was to lead to the break of 1948 and, because of this fact, it ceased to be a Stalinist party in the full meaning of the word.* The difference in orientation between the CPY and that followed by the other CPs of Europe was effected in the first place under the pressure of the masses. But that does not suffice to explain the evolution of Yugoslavia. In other countries, where the revolutionary upsurge, at least at the beginning, was as powerful as in Yugoslavia

(Spain 1936, Greece 1944) the CPs took a diametrically opposite course to that of the CPY. The difference in orientation between the CPY and those of the other CPs of Europe could result only from an *interaction* between the revolutionary pressure of the masses and the changes of strategic conceptions which they produced in the leadership of the CPY under favorable conditions, to which should be added the absence of a Kremlin control apparatus operating on the scene.

In the first stage, these changes expressed themselves by an attempt of the leadership of the CPY to *conciliate* the interests of the Yugoslav revolution with those of the Soviet bureaucracy (1941 to early 1948). For this reason, while remaining within the international framework of Stalinist policy and while publicly and unreservedly accepting the internal and external policy of the Soviet bureaucracy, the CPY nevertheless differentiated itself at the time from Stalinist policy on the following points:

(a) The creation, 1941, of "people's committees of national liberation" and of "proletarian brigades" in the partisan movement.

(b) The refusal to collaborate, in 1942, with Mikhailovich's Chetniks and with the bourgeois government-in-exile.

(c) The orientation, in 1943, towards the actual seizure of power by the CPY and the constitution of an apparatus of a new state, of a proletarian type.

(d) Elimination, in 1945, despite the agreements of "the Big Three," of the last vestiges of bourgeois power in the country and the completion of the proletarian revolution.

(e) The pursuit of a foreign policy and an economic orientation more independent from the Kremlin than that of the other countries of the buffer zone.

The accumulation of all these actions, accompanied by an initial private criticism of the whole of Stalinist policy (notably: criticism of the more exorbitant privileges of the top functionaries of the USSR; criticism of the relations of economic plunder imposed on the buffer zone countries by the bureaucracy; criticism of the policy of the French, Italian and Greek CPs, at the time of the "liberation," etc.), led the Kremlin to the *preventive split* with the CPY. *This split was inevitable because of the irreconcilability of interests between the Yugoslav revolution and the Soviet bureaucracy.*

Beginning with this split there opened a second stage of differentiation between the CPY and Stalinism. Progressing in a purely empirical fashion, the CPY has successively emphasized:

(a) The subordination of the international communist movement to the interests of the Kremlin and the defeats to the workers' movements of several countries caused by this subordination.

(b) The total political, economic, military, cultural grip of the Soviet bureaucracy on the countries of the buffer zone and its horrible consequences for the toiling masses of these countries.

(c) The fundamental orientation of the Soviet bureaucracy toward a division of the world through the establishment of a *modus vivendi* with imperialism and the

utilization of the workers' movement as barter for this purpose.

(d) The degeneration of the USSR as a result of the isolation of the first workers' state and of its backward character and the formation of a privileged bureaucratic caste which has usurped all power in the USSR.

(e) The danger of bureaucratism in every proletarian revolution, a danger which can be combated only by increasing proletarian democracy.

(f) The necessity of reconstructing the workers' movement in several countries.

Centrist Policy and Ideology

Beginning with this time, the CPY ceased to be a semi-Stalinist party and evolved as a centrist party, carried to power by the revolutionary masses. On the other hand it is characterized by right-opportunist deviations, the most important being:

(a) The empirical character of its ideological development which has still not grasped the full Leninist conception of the nature of our epoch.

(b) The pragmatic and unprincipled character of the foreign policy of the CPY, tending to justify the diplomatic maneuvers of the Yugoslav state.

(c) The underestimation of the international workers' movement and the lack of understanding of the theory of the permanent revolution as a whole.

(d) The absence of the right to form tendencies within the CPY.

(e) An opportunist conception of the construction of revolutionary parties in the world (generalization of the Yugoslav experience, underestimation of the importance of program, etc.).

(f) Since the right turn in Yugoslav foreign policy, the pragmatic elaboration of a theory of "State Capitalism" on the USSR joined to neo-reformist conceptions on "new forms" of capitalism, etc.

Only a modification of the international relationship of forces between the classes, a rise of the world revolutionary movement, assistance and fraternal criticism from this movement and a growing understanding on the part of the leaders and cadres of the CPY, will enable it to avoid crystallizing on false positions which would lead to the liquidation of the progressive effects of the Yugoslav affair.

Already, the positions taken as a result of the war in Korea have in part vitiated the effects of the Yugoslav affair on the international crisis of Stalinism; in these conditions and in the absence of a sufficiently strong revolutionary international leadership, it is not excluded that Stalinism can regain a foothold in the ranks of the CPY.

In this connection, the positions and the attitude the CPY takes toward Trotskyism—whether openly or by attempting to ignore it—acquires considerable political importance. What is involved is not merely a historical rectification of the past; *it is the test of whether a workers' current which has emerged from Stalinism has succeeded in linking-itself with the tradition and program of Bolshevism*, and thereby in definitively and decisively surmounting Stalinism.

Tasks of the Fourth International

7. The tasks of the Fourth International toward the Yugoslav revolution are established within the framework of its general strategy, conforming to this analysis of the character of the Yugoslav state and the CPY:

(a) *The Fourth International unconditionally defends the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution against world imperialism and against the Soviet bureaucracy.* It conceives of this defense both as a strategic task—the junction of the international revolution with the Yugoslav revolution—and as an immediate tactical task: mobilization of the international revolutionary vanguard and of the proletarian masses of all countries for concrete actions in defense of the conquests of the Yugoslav proletarian revolution.

This defense cannot enter into collision with the interests of the world revolution of which the conquests of October form part. The Fourth International will likewise assure the defense against any attempt by internal forces to utilize Yugoslavia against the interests of the world revolution.

(b) In the event of war by the Soviet bureaucracy against Yugoslavia, the Fourth International will be for *the defense of Yugoslavia against the counter-revolutionary action of the Kremlin.* This policy, based on the interests of the world revolution, will be pursued regardless of all material aid Yugoslavia may eventually receive from capitalist countries. In event of an extension of the conflict this position will be reexamined in each specific case.

(c) The Fourth International will attempt to involve the CPY in *united front* actions for specific objectives. Each of these actions presupposes our principled agreement regarding the objective to be attained, and cannot in any case eliminate the right of the international revolutionary movement to criticize the policy of the Yugoslav government and the CPY. The practical possibility of realizing such actions is extremely limited because of the present rightward course of the CPY.

(d) The Fourth International believes that one of its principal contributions to the consolidation of the conquests of the Yugoslav revolution consists in a frank and uncompromising criticism of all the political errors and opportunist deviations on the part of the CPY. These criticisms should take as their point of departure the concrete experiences of the international workers' movement which must be communicated to the CPY as well as of the peculiar experience of the Yugoslav revolution; they should tend to impel the Yugoslav communists to replace their present opportunist leadership by a revolutionary leadership which in practice applies a policy corresponding both to the interests of the international proletariat and the safeguarding of the Yugoslav revolution: a break with the imperialist diplomatic front, a halting to the economic and political concessions to imperialism, an effective mobilization of the workers and poor peasants against the kulaks and speculators, a deepening of workers' democracy, freedom of discussion, assembly and press for all the currents of the workers' movement basing themselves on

proletarian power in Yugoslavia, support to the international workers' movement and genuine support to a real international revolutionary regroupment.

A Critique of Past Positions

8. It is the duty of the Fourth International to critically reexamine, in the light of the events which have occurred since 1948, its past analysis of the Yugoslav revolution and the dynamics of this revolution which events have placed in a new light.

From 1942 on, the Fourth International had in general, correctly estimated the movement of the Yugoslav partisans and the civil war which unfolded as a consequence. This analysis continued along correct lines up to the beginning of 1946. From that time and until June 28, 1948, the International committed serious errors of evaluation regarding the Yugoslav revolution; they consisted notably in an identification of the Yugoslav developments with those of the other buffer zone countries; in confounding the CPY with the Stalinist parties in the buffer states; in the erroneous hypothesis that the revolutionary movement of the masses had been arrested by the CPY and that the new centralized state apparatus constructed by the CPY was a bourgeois state apparatus in its structure, despite the elimination of the bourgeoisie from the political and economic life of the country which had been noted by the International.

After the break of the Kremlin with the CPY, the Fourth International was the only tendency of the international workers' movement to immediately understand the progressive significance and the historic import of this event and to undertake an international campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia; it linked the analysis it made of the causes of the break with the analysis it had made before 1946 of the depth of the revolutionary mass movement in Yugoslavia. The campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia was, however, partly hindered by the delay of the International in recognizing the character of Yugoslavia as a workers' state. This delay was due fundamentally to a false appraisal of the nature of the centralized state apparatus set up in Yugoslavia in 1945.

These various errors of evaluation were caused by:

(a) The absence of precise information on Yugoslav events and institutions beginning with the years 1945-46.

(b) The absence of all public differentiation by the CPY in relation to the Soviet bureaucracy and to Stalinism before June 28, 1948.

(c) The fact that the correct general analysis of the primarily counter-revolutionary role of the Soviet bureaucracy in the buffer zone led the International to identify *a priori*, without separate analysis of each case, the policy of the CPY with that of the bureaucracy (which was not only wrong for Yugoslavia, but also for China).

The lesson to be drawn from these errors of evaluation is the imperious necessity of *concrete and precise* analyses of the national peculiarities in the development of the workers' movement of every country. However important in our epoch are the laws of development for sectors of the world or for the entire world, these laws can never be

substituted for the particular analysis of each country in the determination of a correct day-to-day revolutionary policy.

The rapidity and the unanimity with which the Fourth International was able, on the morrow of June 28, 1948, to make a turn for the defense of Yugoslavia, as well as the concrete manner it has followed and appraised the evolution of the CPY since then, prove that these errors of

evaluation were not at all due to an erroneous general conception, but rather occurred despite the correct evaluation made by the Fourth International of the nature of Stalinism and its dialectical relationships with the mass movement. It is only in the light of this appraisal that the Yugoslav revolution becomes comprehensible and assumes its full significance as an important stage in the world crisis of Stalinism.

Resolutions of the Congress:

Latin America: Problems and Tasks

I. Character and Structure of the Latin American Countries

A. General Considerations

Almost all the countries of Latin America, with the exception of a limited group (such as Puerto Rico, British Honduras, Guiana) belong in the category of *semi-colonial* countries.

The development of these countries, which takes a combined form, varies from country to country, and consequently varies also in the degree of penetration of capitalist relationships of production and in the ratio between native and foreign capital.

In the course of the first imperialist war, the great crisis of 1929-33 and the second imperialist war, which provided a favorable opportunity for the accumulation of capital and the industrialization of these countries, capitalist relationships of production have become dominant in several of them, especially in Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile.

At the same time, the ratio between native and foreign capital has changed in these same countries strongly in favor of native capital, but nowhere however, not even in Argentina, has this development attained a point to enable us to conclude that the preponderance of native capital has liberated these countries from their dependence upon imperialism and thus, in this sense, to permit us to characterize them as capitalist countries.

The semi-colonial structure of these countries, even among the most advanced, is expressed in the fact that their economy is still fundamentally turned toward agriculture based upon one crop and raw materials production.

Entangled on a more and more dominant foundation of capitalist relationships of production are the remnants of the most varied modes of production in the most unique combinations: islets of primitive barbarism, peculiarities of Indian communities, modes of slavery, feudal forms of property and cultivation of the soil, and modern forms of capitalist exploitation.

All this varied and combined material foundation has a corresponding superstructure in the modes of life, culture,

dress which vary strongly from country to country and often within each country.

B. The Historic Causes of This Structure

This combined and varied structure is the result of the concrete conditions under which capitalist relationships of production penetrated into these countries which were under the domination of feudal, clerical Spain and of Portugal (Brazil) until the beginning of the last century.

The Spanish conquest broke up the primitive economy of Latin America into a series of regional groups into which it introduced strong feudal barriers to the free development of trade and of artisan industry. It thus retarded the formation of a relatively important native bourgeoisie and enabled the landed Creole oligarchies and particularly the imperialists to exploit the native revolts for independence against the Spanish Empire, which marked the 19th century.

It was British imperialism, at the apex of its power in the 19th century, profiting from the antagonisms of the native oligarchy against Spanish absolutism and amongst themselves, which succeeded in penetrating into most of the Latin American countries and in dominating them. It was determined that the outcome of the struggle against Spanish domination would not result in the unification of Latin America but in its Balkanization. These conditions retarded the development of Latin America and facilitated imperialist domination.

In the 20th century and particularly since the First World War, but especially during the recent war, the penetration of Yankee imperialism has gone a step beyond that of British imperialism, which was obliged to cede a series of important positions to the U.S. in this part of the world.

Since then, almost all of the Latin American countries have come within the orbit of American imperialism which is trying to maintain the Balkanization of Latin America and to retard its industrial development.

However, the process of development of different countries in the imperialist epoch does not follow a uniform course but is rather combined and contradictory.

The effect of the two world wars of this century as well as of the economic crisis of 1929-33 on the countries of Latin America has been that of an increased penetration of capitalist relationships of production and even of an enhanced industrialization.

Capital accumulated by the production of these countries themselves, to which has been added the mass of capital which sought refuge in Latin America as well as the needs of an autarchic economy between the periods of war, has speeded up the penetration of capitalist relationships of production in all spheres of economic life and in the industrialization of these countries. The enriched bourgeoisie grew numerically and in influence and in some areas mingled more and more with the landed oligarchy to the point where in some cases the distinction between these two dominant layers no longer has any practical, fundamental significance.

At the same time there developed a numerous, combative and dynamic proletariat whose growing weight is making itself felt particularly in Argentina and in countries with a mining industry such as Bolivia, Chile, Mexico. However, because of the still inadequate capitalist development of these countries, even the most advanced of them, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie (small traders, artisans, intelligentsia) constitute the social mass which predominates numerically and which plays a first line role in the political life of these countries.

C. The Character and Tasks of the Revolution in Latin America

The *historic character* of the revolution to be accomplished in the Latin American countries as well as the *combined character* of the tasks of this revolution flow from the character and the structure of the semi-colonial countries of Latin America.

No part of the *bourgeois democratic* phase has been completed, and the *bourgeois democratic tasks*, notably *anti-imperialist liberation* and *agrarian reform*, still remain to be resolved to one degree or another for all of the Latin American countries.

On the other hand, certain aspects of the national question, some of the artificial boundary lines between countries, as well as the self-determination of various ethnic groupings can only find a solution within the framework of a *Latin American federation*.

The native bourgeoisie in the imperialist epoch is incapable of completing the bourgeois democratic phase of the revolution as has been demonstrated by everything that has happened in this century not only in Latin America but on a world scale and especially in the other colonial and semi-colonial countries of the world.

Only the proletarian revolution under the regime of the dictatorship of the proletariat will complete this phase and will link it organically to the socialist epoch proper and to the solution of strictly socialist tasks.

The material base for the beginning of this second phase is actually very limited in most of the Latin American countries. But this should not stand in the way of the struggle of the proletariat at the head of all the other exploited masses of these countries and should not prevent

its revolutionary party from beginning and from leading the struggle in each of these countries separately.

In each country the struggle should tend toward the seizure of power by the proletariat of each country and toward beginning the solution of the combined tasks of the revolution on a national scale.

The completion of these tasks can naturally only be envisaged within the framework of the *Federation of Socialist Republics of Latin America*.

The economic unity of Latin America is necessary for the achievement of this objective but this unity will only be achieved through the struggle and the victory of the proletariat in each country separately and then by the voluntary federation of the countries of Latin America which will respect the peculiarities of ethnical development of each country and of each people.

The perspective of the Federation of Socialist Republics of Latin America should not become a kind of paralysis for the struggle for power in each country and particularly in the big Latin American countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina) nor must it appear as a sacrifice of distinct national and democratic aspirations to the need of economic centralization. This perspective must illuminate the road to be traveled, must serve to coordinate to the maximum the struggle of the masses in the different countries and must educate them in this sense. These considerations do not in any way diminish the primary importance of the slogan of the Federation of Socialist Republics of Latin America.

D. The Class Struggle and the Motive Forces of the Revolution in Latin America

The class structures, the importance of their strata, their reciprocal relationships, their dynamics vary considerably from country to country in Latin America.

Within the dominant class of most of the Latin American countries there is a strong stratum of large landed proprietors alongside of more or less important groupings of a commercial and industrial bourgeoisie.

There is no clear separation or rigid division between these strata but rather an interpenetration which is becoming more marked in the most advanced countries.

On the other hand the relationships of these sections with imperialism vary and depend especially on the importance of the industrial bourgeoisie.

It is especially this stratum in countries where conditions have favored it by a particularly important development, such as in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, which nurtures notions of independence from complete imperialist domination and even projects a certain resistance to imperialism.

On the contrary, in countries where this stratum is almost non-existent, the dominant but impotent native strata play a still more direct and completely *compradore* role in the service of imperialism.

In countries like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela and Guatemala the anti-imperialist struggle of the masses expresses itself through a movement which is especially swelled by the peasant masses and the urban petty bourgeoisie and is led by the spokesmen and the parties of the urban radical petty bourgeoisie and "intelligentsia."

In countries where the bourgeoisie has already experienced an important development and where, under the supplementary pressure of the masses, it (Cardenas, Peron) has been led in its own interests to resist imperialism or where it (Vargas) has tried to give the masses the impression that it wants to resist imperialism, the masses, peasant, urban petty bourgeois as well as proletarian, have given their support.

This support is in effect necessary for the bourgeoisie if it is to project a resistance to imperialism and this explains its concern in basing itself on the masses, even on the proletarian masses and their class organizations, the trade unions.

But on the other hand, because of its very limited national base and because of its inherent inability to give real satisfaction to the multiple economic, democratic, national, cultural, anti-imperialist demands of the doubly exploited masses of its own country, the bourgeoisie is obliged to lace the masses as tightly as possible in the straitjacket of a powerful military-police and bureaucratic apparatus.

This disproportionately strong apparatus in all of the Latin American countries has often the tendency to play an autonomous role and to place itself at the service (depending on the relationship of forces which exists between the classes within each country, between the strata of the ruling class itself, and between the internal forces and imperialism) either of one dominant stratum against the others and against imperialism or of imperialism allied to this or that native stratum, or even allied to the entire dominant class against the masses.

Hence the varied forms of *bonapartist power* in the Latin American countries and the preponderant role of the *army* and of *pronunciamentos*. The experience of attempted bourgeois resistance (Cardenas, Peron), supported by the masses, as well as the kind of resistance seen in the radical petty-bourgeois anti-imperialist movements of Betancourt in Venezuela, of the APRA in Peru, of Grau San Martin in Cuba, of Villarroel and of the MNR in Bolivia demonstrate that neither the bourgeoisie nor the petty bourgeoisie are capable of achieving the bourgeois democratic revolution.

This role falls upon the young Latin American proletariat and on a revolutionary Marxist party whose program adequately combines the economic, democratic national, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist demands of the peasant masses, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the peoples of the native communities; it alone will succeed in uniting all these masses in the struggle against imperialism and the bourgeoisie, for the proletarian revolution in each country, for proletarian power in each country, and for the voluntary Federation of Socialist Republics of Latin America.

In the course of such a struggle the proletariat and its party may see the need of concluding temporary alliances with this or that anti-imperialist movement of the petty bourgeoisie for concrete and limited ends of common action — and sometime may even be obliged to do so — provided it safeguards its independent class character, its program and its distinct organizations. Some form of support to the bourgeoisie of these countries can only be granted, in conditions which are becoming more and more

exceptional, when this class is obliged to project a real resistance to imperialism and to its eventual attacks.

A new stage of the class struggle of the masses of Latin America, which will obliterate the present impotence and defeats, will only be opened by the independent political organization of the proletariat taking the role of leadership through its revolutionary party in all the mobilizations and struggles of the masses.

II. The Present Situation in Latin America and the Tasks of the Revolutionary Proletariat

The upswing experienced by Latin American countries during the last war as suppliers of raw materials and agricultural products to "democratic" imperialism began to come to an end with the end of the war and the reconversion of world economy into a peacetime economy.

However, because of the continued shortage of raw materials and especially of agricultural products, particularly in Europe, the prosperity of the Latin American countries did not suddenly come to an end in 1944 but was extended due to the demand and to the higher prices which these products continued to command.

It was beginning especially with this date that the re-establishment of agricultural production in other countries to pre-war levels reversed this tendency in Latin America and threw the shadow of crisis over them.

The price of native products began to fall on foreign markets at the very moment that the price of imported industrial products continued to rise. Inflation began to sweep over the Latin American countries, trade balances became very unfavorable and in the offing was a real crisis, aggravated among other things by the situation of one-crop agriculture.

However, before this tendency could come to a head, it was again overturned after the Korean war in 1950 and the new reconversion of capitalist economy into armaments economies.

The metropolitan imperialist countries and above all the United States began their frenzied chase for raw materials for the purpose of stockpiling and controlling their use and distribution; leading to a new rise of the price of raw materials from which all the producing countries and naturally the countries of Latin America benefited.

But far from benefiting all sections of society in these countries, this upswing, accompanied by a parallel accentuation of inflation, resulted in steady deterioration of the living conditions of the peasant and urban petty-bourgeois masses and the working masses of these countries at the very time when fabulous fortunes are being amassed by the large producers, exporters, and native industrialists.

Hence there has been an aggravation of the class struggle in all these countries which expresses itself both in the resistance of the masses and in the offensives of the dominant reactionary strata, especially of those who serve Yankee imperialism in order to control and exploit these countries.

At the end of the war the radicalized masses of Latin America were mobilized in a series of movements which,

despite petty-bourgeois and sometimes even bourgeois leadership, expressed their anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist aspirations. The power of these movements smashed a series of dictatorial regimes and achieved important conquests on the economic plane as well as on that of democratic rights.

But the dominant reactionary strata, often propped up by Yankee imperialism and benefiting from the weakness of the petty-bourgeois leadership of the masses, from the impotence and the opportunism of Stalinism and from the absence of a genuine proletarian party, quickly regained the offensive and, between 1947 and 1950, militaro-police dictatorial regimes were reestablished almost everywhere in these countries.

However the resistance of the masses did not cease for long. On the contrary, stimulated by the international crisis of imperialism, by the victories of the revolutionary anti-imperialist movement in Asia, and by the general inflationary process in all Latin America, it again revived in several of these countries taking diverse forms: the recent great strikes in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay; civil war in Bolivia and Colombia; elections in Brazil and Bolivia construed by the masses as anti-imperialist and democratic victories; opposition to all political aid, to the sending of troops, etc. demanded by imperialism for its reactionary, colonial, anti-revolutionary war in Korea.

This resistance will tend to mount in the present period which is dominated by the accelerated preparations of imperialism for war.

The Latin American countries are facing growing difficulties which neither imperialism nor the native possessing strata will be able to remedy. On the contrary.

Yankee imperialism which practically dominates these countries, with the exception of Argentina which still resists its grip, is trying, as in the past, to monopolize all their production for itself, to dictate the most advantageous prices, i.e., the lowest prices and to make them conform to its needs.

This means that U.S. imperialism will deliberately sacrifice all industrial development of these countries as well as a more harmonious, more balanced development of their economy and will maintain their dependence upon it in financial means and industrial products.

This tendency of Yankee imperialism — each time it manifests itself and becomes more insistent, as has already been the case in all international and Pan American conferences and institutions which have been held since the end of the war and especially since the Korean war — gives rise to the resistance of the national bourgeoisies, particularly the strongest of them (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico), who demand a larger share in the exploitation of these countries and who hope to create a broader basis of independence and industrial development.

But these bourgeoisies, on the other hand, are incapable in the present international conjuncture of halting the current inflation and of accumulating otherwise than by a super-exploitation of the native masses.

Hence flows the perspective of a continued deterioration of the standard of living of the masses who, as in the rest of the capitalist world, have to suffer the disastrous

effects of the preparations for the new war, along with what this means especially for countries with a semi-colonial structure.

Hence also flows the perspective of an increased resistance of the Latin American masses, whose forms and scope will depend on the class character of their leadership in the future: petty-bourgeois or proletarian revolutionary Marxist.

III. General and Specific Tasks of the Revolutionary Marxist Proletarian Movement in Latin America

A. General Tasks

The question of the formation of genuine Marxist revolutionary proletarian parties is the key question for the future victorious development of the class struggle in Latin America.

Only the present nuclei composed of elements who adopt the discipline of the Fourth International are capable of promoting such parties in Latin America.

The Social Democracy, in general non-existent or very weak in these countries, has no chance of any further development, its road being blocked by its own reformist program, by its cowardice and attachment to decaying imperialism and consequently by its organic incapacity to satisfy the profound anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist aspirations of the Latin American masses.

On the other hand, Stalinism (also non-existent or weak in the Latin American countries), the expression on the international field of the strict interests of the Soviet bureaucracy, which does not dream of the overthrow of imperialism and of capitalism on a world scale by a revolutionary mobilization of the masses, but of a compromise with imperialism and of peaceful coexistence with it, has no longer any chance for an important development in these countries.

Far from aiming at a constant and consistent development of the autonomous and independent class movement of the proletariat, Stalinism as in the past will speculate on the possibility of alliances with the Latin American petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, which may temporarily be in opposition (and even there, in a very limited fashion) to Yankee imperialism and it will be ready to sacrifice proletarian leadership in favor of any other broader, more "popular" leadership.

Only a prolonged absence of genuine revolutionary Marxist proletarian parties can favor a certain development of Stalinism in these countries, the living conditions of the masses under the present regime irresistibly impelling them to polarize around the party which appears to them most left.

However, in order for the present nuclei of the Fourth International in these Latin American countries to fulfill this role they should begin to conduct themselves in the sphere of program as well as in that of action, in the multiple mobilizations of the masses, as real embryos of the mass proletarian parties of tomorrow.

This means that their program, free from all sectarianism and all dogmatism, should take into consideration the real aspirations of the different exploited layers of the Latin American masses, workers as well as peasants, urban petty bourgeois as well as the peoples of the indigenous national communities.

Only insofar as the proletariat and its revolutionary party proves able to express the aspirations and demands of all the other oppressed and exploited classes in its program and of demonstrating in action that they are the best and only real defender of these masses, will it succeed in becoming the genuine revolutionary leadership of these masses and definitively eliminate all other petty-bourgeois or bourgeois parties from this leadership.

The program of the proletarian party should combine anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist, democratic and national slogans, and, depending on the country and the time, take into consideration the importance to be given to this or that problem: anti-imperialist, agrarian, democratic, national.

This broad conception in the program should manifest itself practically by participation and activity, free from all sectarianism, in all mass movements and all organizations which express, even in an indirect and confused fashion, the aspirations of the masses which may, for example, take the channel of the Peronist trade unions or the Bolivian MNR movement, or the APRA in Peru, the "laborite" movement of Vargas, or Democratic Action in Venezuela.

To succeed in the elaboration of such a program and in this type of participation and activity in the ranks of the real movement of the masses as it now expresses itself in Latin America, our forces must proceed everywhere in the following concrete manner:

In each country they should define their principal sector of work, the forms in which the question of the united anti-imperialist or anti-capitalist front will eventually be posed, trade union tactics, the transitory forms in which the question of power will eventually be posed.

On the other hand, special attention should be given in most if not in all of the Latin American countries to the agrarian question, to the system of property and exploitation of the land, to the various strata of the peasantry, to their special demands and above all to the organization of the demands of the numerous agricultural proletariat and of the masses of the free or semi-serf poor peasantry.

Generally speaking, the principal political task now of all our sections and organizations in Latin America is to impel, to organize and if possible to lead the struggle of the masses against the preparations of imperialism for war and against the support of this policy by the native possessing strata.

Against all alliances with imperialism, for the revocation of all treaties and agreements which tie the Latin American countries to the war chariot of imperialism. Against the institution or extension of the term of military service. Against the sending of troops and all other forms of aid to the war theaters of imperialism. For the defense

of the USSR, the "People's Democracies," China, Korea, and all the colonial revolutions against imperialism. Against the economic effect of the war preparations; against the high cost of living, for a guaranteed minimum wage and a sliding scale; against all military expenditures, new taxes; against the stopping of investments intended for the industrial and social equipment of these countries. For trade union and political rights. For the expropriation of the imperialist enterprises and companies without compensation or the right of repurchase. For an agrarian revolution. For the nationalization of the banks, the big industries and transportation.

For workers' and peasants' governments.

For a socialist republic in each country.

For the Federation of the United Socialist States of Latin America.

B. Specific Tasks

In ARGENTINA, the militants who adhere to the Fourth International, grouped in the official section which the Third World Congress has just recognized, will seek to still further develop their roots in the rapidly maturing working class of the country and especially to create a class tendency among the organized workers in the trade unions influenced by Peronism for the purpose of isolating this reactionary government of the industrial bourgeoisie, which is resisting the grip of imperialism, from its principal support in the masses.

They will propose a proletarian united front of all trade union militants on the basis of a concrete program of economic demands, which is capable of mobilizing the masses against the high cost of living. It is by means of such a mobilization that the question of the democratization of the trade unions, dominated by the Peronist bureaucracy, can be posed with effectiveness and can pass from the stage of propaganda to that of agitation without becoming a brake upon the preparations for struggle. This is possible in effect only by beginning with the most immediate and the most intimate preoccupations of the masses, a great majority of whom still remain influenced by Peronism.

On the question of political power, our section will develop its propaganda for the slogan of the *Workers' and Peasants' Government*

In BOLIVIA, our past inadequacy in distinguishing ourselves from the political tendencies in the country which exploit the mass movement, sometimes the lack of clarity in our objectives and in our tactics, the loose organizational structure as well as the absence of patient, systematic work in working class circles has caused a certain decline of our influence and an organizational crisis. However, possibilities exist that our section, basing itself on powerful revolutionary traditions, can develop as the genuine revolutionary leadership of the masses in this country. Our reorganized and reoriented forces will have to remedy all the above faults without however slipping into sectarianism or isolating themselves from the masses and their movements which are often ideologically confused and led by the petty bourgeois (MNR).

Our section should concentrate its work especially in working class circles and organizations, particularly that of the miners.

On the other hand it will attempt to influence the left wing of the MNR which is based precisely on these circles.

They will propose a tactic of anti-imperialist united front to the MNR on precise occasions and on a concrete program, which revives in essence and still further concretizes the demands contained in the Pulacayo program of 1946.

These united front proposals to the MNR will have a progressive effect when advanced at propitious moments for the effective mobilization of the masses and are aimed precisely at achieving such a mobilization.

On the other hand, in the event of the mobilization of the masses under the preponderant impulsion or influence of the MNR, our section should support the movement with all its strength, should not abstain but on the contrary intervene energetically in it with the aim of pushing it as far as possible up to the seizure of power by the MNR on the basis of a progressive program of anti-imperialist united front.

On the contrary, if in the course of these mass mobilizations, our section proves to be in a position to share influence over the revolutionary masses with the MNR, it will advance the slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government of the two parties on the basis, however, of the same program, a government based on committees of workers, peasants and revolutionary elements of the urban petty bourgeoisie.

In *CHILE*, our section, which should seriously reform its methods of work in organizations — especially in its leadership — will above all be active in the trade unions influenced by the Communist Party, and especially in the decisive sectors of the Chilean proletariat (mines, transportation, textile). It will accord special attention to the workers influenced by the CP. It will try to promote a national trade union tendency which will struggle for the unification of the divided trade union movement into a united federation and united unions and will demand that the Stalinist CGT in particular take the initiative for such a step by means of a unification congress.

On the other hand, it will give special attention to the movement of the socialist youth as well as to the trade union cadres eliminated by the CP. It will proclaim the necessity of a united front of all working class, political and trade union organizations to struggle effectively against the policy of the reactionary Gonzales government, against the high cost of living and for democratic rights. It will develop its propaganda for the slogan of the Workers' and Peasants' Government which will eventually be concretized in this country as a government of parties claiming to represent the working class, notably the Communist Party and the Popular Socialist Party.

In *URUGUAY*, our section will broaden its activity among the organized workers and especially among the workers organized now outside of the control of the Stalinists and of the pro-imperialist reformists.

It will promote a national trade union tendency calling for the unification of the trade union movement into one federation by means of a democratic convention. It will grant special attention to the cadres and militants who are breaking with Stalinism, as well as to left elements in the SP. It will carry on a campaign for the creation of a mass revolutionary workers' party, which, on the basis of a revolutionary Marxist program, will unite all the presently unorganized elements of the proletarian vanguard of the country, ex-Stalinists or ex-reformists. It will carry on propaganda for the slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government.

In *BRAZIL*, our reorganized section (which should be aided by the International) should concentrate its attention especially on trade union work by taking advantage of the impulse now being given to trade union organizations of the workers by the "Laborite" movement of Vargas. The agricultural proletariat, numerous, unorganized and doubly exploited on the plantations, will especially occupy its attention.

It should fully utilize all the real opportunities which exist for open and legal activities, especially in the field of publication. On the other hand, it will give its attention to the masses influenced by the CP even though this influence has now undergone a decline.

In *PERU*, our reorganized section should study its tactics toward the APRA within the framework of very similar considerations to those related to our tactics toward the MNR in Bolivia with the aim of influencing its most radical and anti-imperialist wing, and it should be ready to impel the mass movement as far as possible against the Odría dictatorship, a movement which will very probably move in the channel of this party (APRA) on the first occasion. It should extend and consolidate its points of support in the essential working class circles of the country, particularly among the mining proletariat.

In *MEXICO*, our reorganized section should try to capitalize on the widespread influence which Trotskyism has always had over important sections of the proletariat, the peasantry and the "intelligentsia." It should concentrate its main activity in the trade unions, and promote a tendency for the unification of the trade union movement. It should further interest itself in the demands and in the movement of the poor peasants of the country, which is characterized by the revolutionary tradition of their past struggles, with the aim of linking these masses to the perspective of the socialist revolution and to the revolutionary Marxist workers' party. It should carry on propaganda for a Workers' and Peasants' Government.

In *CUBA*, our reorganized and reoriented section should resume consistent and sustained activities in the working class circles of the island, in the cities and the plantations, and give special attention to the workers influenced by Stalinism. It should become a real revolutionary Marxist proletarian tendency which will manifest itself as such, especially by the clarity of its program, free from the centrist confusion and deviations of the past, as well as by its real activity in the working class.

Evolution of Eastern Europe

(Continued from page 176)

Our movement took a position on the question of the buffer zone for the first time at the Preconference (March 1946) and at the 1st Plenum (June 1946). The resolution adopted by the Preconference noted:

"The introduction of a series of militarily and politically controlled countries into the economic sphere (of the USSR);

"The plundering and politically reactionary, conservative and capitulatory nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. . .

"The granting of governmental powers to the leaders of the Communist Parties regardless of their real strength;

"The elimination of oppositionist elements, the expropriation of foreign concessions, the acceleration of economic reforms by encouraging organs of dual power (committees of control of production, trade committees of poor peasants which carry out the agrarian reform)."

This resolution declared itself in favor of the progressive reforms, for the right of the peoples to self-determination, for the free development of the workers' movement.

The 1st Plenum dealt especially with the occupation of numerous territories by the victor armies. The resolution said the following concerning the territories occupied by the Soviet armies:

"The Fourth International demands the withdrawal of all foreign armies, including the Soviet army, from all occupied territories. . .

"The Fourth International does not in any way abandon its slogan of the unconditional defense of the USSR. The Fourth International is likewise for the defense of the progressive measures which have been realized in the territories occupied by the Red Army. . .

"Wherever reactionary movements appear and, with the support of the imperialists, attempt to overthrow the more or less statified economy and to re-establish landed private property. . . we will oppose these movements and fight on the side of the Red Army for the defeat of the imperialists and their agents until the workers of these countries are strong enough to confront the bourgeois counter-revolution alone.

"In all the occupation zones our militants should defend our policy in such a manner so that it cannot be utilized against the Soviet Union to the advantage of imperialism."

We see then that in the first two positions, we clearly formulated our position on the defense of the USSR and the reforms carried out in the buffer zone against imperialism, and on the defense of the workers' movement of these countries against the bureaucracy, but that there is not a word on the nature of these states and their economies, nor on the tendencies of their development.

The first general theoretical position taken was formulated in the theses written by comrade Germain on "The USSR on the Morrow of the War" which appeared in the *International Bulletin*, September 1946. It was said that in a general way this study expressed the position of the International Secretariat, and it opened the discussion on the USSR, the buffer zone and Stalinism for the 2nd World Congress. Here is its essential part concerning the buffer zone question:

"Inherent in the system of production brought into being by the October Revolution is the tendency to break out of the frontiers of the USSR especially because the productive forces on a world scale cry out for collectivization. . .

"Taking as our point of departure the tendency of the bureaucracy to 'structurally assimilate' the countries where it maintains its occupation over a whole period and which it wants to integrate into its economic system; taking likewise as our point of departure the impossibility of achieving this assimilation without the action of the working masses, it can be stated that the countries occupied by the Soviet bureaucracy can be divided into three zones:

"a). . . all the territories incorporated into the USSR, there structural assimilation has been completed. . .

"b) In Poland, in occupied Germany, in Yugoslavia and in Czechoslovakia, the beginnings of structural assimilation correspond to a very strong revolutionary impulsion or to an exceptional situation involving the physical disappearance of the propertied classes. . . The nature of the economy and of the state remains bourgeois in these countries. However, the relationship of forces are such that for the moment the bourgeoisie is at the mercy of an action of the proletariat. It is only the bureaucracy's fear of the proletariat of these countries as well as of imperialism which keeps it from delivering a coup de grace to the native capitalists.

"c) In Finland, Austria, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria the state and the economy remain fundamentally bourgeois."

This long quotation needs no comment. In the discussion which occurred at the time, Marcoux, who had assembled a very important documentation on the question, examined the question in a static manner and even denied the existence of a tendency to structural assimilation; his point of view was rapidly outmoded by the march of events. On the other hand, comrade E. R. Frank, who was in agreement with the analysis, defined what was developing in the buffer zone as a tendency toward the establishment of a "state capitalism" based on a mixed economy (state capitalism and private property) and not toward the installation of a workers' state.*

At the 2nd World Congress (April 1948) which took place some weeks after the Prague coup, the discussion did not go beyond the positions previously taken by the International in 1946. In the Theses adopted by this Congress, the part dealing with the buffer zone describes the policy of the bureaucracy, there also verifying its dual character; it shows that due to the development of the international situation the bureaucracy despite itself found itself obliged to adopt a series of economic and political measures against the native bourgeoisie. It underscored the sharpening of the tendency toward total structural assimilation, but viewed this as possible only through a revolutionary mobilization of the masses in opposition to the bureaucracy. The Theses of the 2nd World Congress declared that the situation was transitory, but also that the economy of these countries remained capitalist and that the state remained a bourgeois state in its structure as well as in its function.

Politically the Congress confirmed our position of struggle against the restorationist tendencies and our support of the struggle of the masses for which it formulated a program of transitional demands. Finally, the state and the

* It should be pointed out, however, that when the discussion resumed at a later stage E. R. Frank was one of the first to make clear that capitalist property relations had been destroyed in the buffer zone, the process of "structural assimilation" having been completed.

economy being characterized as capitalist, the Theses came out in favor of revolutionary defeatism in these countries in the event of war.

Viewed with hindsight, the discussion then was marking time as a result of the situation itself. It was necessary that the situation itself become further clarified for us to make further progress.

Some months after the 2nd World Congress, the split between the Yugoslav CP and the Cominform occurred. In the period which followed, important economic and also political developments began to occur in the buffer zone countries which transformed them considerably. All these events renewed the discussion and placed it on a new plane. On the other hand, the events in China were also to contribute in the clarification of our thoughts on a whole series of problems, including those of the buffer zone.

The 1949 Resolution

The discussion led to the adoption of a resolution by the 7th Plenum in April 1949.

The 7th Plenum resolution described the developments which had occurred in the buffer zone since 1945, namely the period of agreements between Washington and the Kremlin, marked by agreements with what remained of the native bourgeoisie in the buffer zone countries, and then the period of "cold war" marked by a struggle against the economic and political positions of the native bourgeoisie, which was waged primarily with bureaucratic methods.

The 7th Plenum resolution concluded with a study of the theoretical significance of the evolution of the buffer zone countries. This latter part explains the transition regimes of the buffer zone countries as the resultant of the action of several factors: the decomposition of capitalism having attained a very advanced stage in these countries, the belatedness of the world revolution, and the role of the USSR as a workers' state but acting under the leadership of the bureaucracy with the methods peculiar to this caste. We have nothing essential to change on this point and that is why we have incorporated this part of the 7th Plenum resolution in the resolution submitted for adoption to the 3rd World Congress.

But a part of this same 7th Plenum resolution showed itself to be inadequate or ambiguous or false and the discussion immediately reopened. It was the part of the resolution dealing with the social nature of the buffer zone states which reactivated the debate. The resolution recognized that structural assimilation had reached a very advanced stage, it noted that the bourgeoisie was no longer in power as the ruling class. But it refused to say that the "leap" to workers' states had been made. The resolution considered these states as bourgeois states of a special type, something like "degenerated bourgeois states" although their structure—in the words of the resolution itself—was closer to that of the USSR than that of normal capitalist states. As a reason for this definition the resolution mentioned "the historic origins of the present situation and . . . the still indecisive social physiognomy" of the buffer zone countries. It indicated "the elimination of national frontiers between the buffer zone countries" as the "decisive and fundamental" factor for the completion of structural assimilation.

One year later, at the 8th Plenum, the discussion still

continued in our ranks, and besides the adoption of a brief resolution on the class nature of Yugoslavia, two resolutions were submitted for a consultative vote of the Plenum, one by comrade Pablo, the other by comrade Germain, differing in the premises on which they based their definition of the Yugoslav state and in which the problem of the nature of the buffer zone countries was in fact inferred.

The developments which have occurred in the buffer zone since then have enabled us to overcome the differences which existed at the time and to evolve a very precise position, with an equally clear understanding of the reasons which caused the delay and the errors of our movement on the question of the buffer zone.

The Social Nature of the Buffer Zone States

We believe that the buffer zone states are no longer capitalist states and that, like the USSR, they are fundamentally, i.e. in the domain of the relations of production and property, workers' states. The changes which were made in their economies, the extension of nationalization and planning to all spheres of the economy, fundamentally distinguishes them from capitalist states.

What has happened in these countries is *not a quantitative increase* in nationalizations as has taken place in certain capitalist countries, *but a qualitative transformation of the economy*. It is not only heavy and light industry which is nationalized and planned but also the banks, all of transportation and all trade, foreign and domestic, wholesale as well as retail (in large part at least).

It is true that the land is not formally nationalized. This is not a negligible question, but it is not fundamental from the standpoint of a sociological characterization, in view of the considerable restrictions on the purchase and sale of land, and the introduction of collectivization on the countryside.

The relationships of production and property have been upset from top to bottom in these countries, and this transformation is continuing and involving spheres which have not as yet been affected (with the exception of agriculture with which we have already dealt). A return of these countries to a capitalist type structure will only be possible through a counter-revolution, which is obviously linked to the outcome of the coming war.

These are the fundamental changes of the economic structure which make us characterize these states as workers' states. There are, to be sure, important differences on the political and even on the economic plane among these states and between them and the USSR. That is not surprising. The evolution of varied human societies, among them workers' states, toward socialism cannot help but be affected by a whole series of factors. The march from capitalism to socialism will certainly give rise to very diverse social forms.

What is happening in the buffer zone countries is rather the obverse. The reactionary intervention of the Moscow bureaucracy tends to impose forms approximating those in the USSR upon these countries and also to Russify an important part of their state apparatuses for the purpose of assuring Kremlin control.

We are also witnessing on the plane of social relations in the buffer zone countries the imposition of a policy

modeled on that of the Soviet bureaucracy which is directed towards the creation of an apparatus and socially privileged stratum in relation to the mass of the workers.

But all of these elements, which have a very great importance in determining our policy in these countries, are not decisive so far as the sociological characterization of these states is concerned.

Exception is made, in the resolution submitted to this Congress, in this sociological characterization of the buffer zone countries, for the Soviet zone in Austria which has not undergone any of these fundamental transformations.

Deformed and Degenerated Workers' States

The resolution submitted to the Congress designates the buffer zone states as deformed workers' states. What do we mean by this designation?

We did not use the term degenerated workers' states because of the fact that this designation should only be applied (as in the case of the USSR) to a workers' state which was born in the revolutionary struggle of the masses and which subsequently deteriorated as a result of the bureaucratic seizure of power to the detriment of the working masses.

The buffer zone states are not the product of the revolutionary action of the masses but of the action of the bureaucracy, to which question we will return later. The defects they now have were present from the beginning. We do not mean "deformed" in the sense of workers' states marred by bureaucratic deformations as was the case with the USSR in the first years of its existence. In this context the word deformed means that these states have primarily the same fundamental defect as the USSR, i.e., the complete elimination of the proletariat, on the economic as well as the political plane, from the leadership of these countries.

In saying that we have been belated in characterizing these states as workers' states, we do not believe that we were wrong on this point in 1946 and at the time of the Second World Congress. We still believe that up to 1949 these states still retained a fundamentally capitalist structure, although it was considerably damaged from the capitalist point of view. The descriptions and analyses made by our movement up to 1949 were correct as a whole. We had correctly emphasized the principal tendencies of development. We were hesitant on the possibility of the realization of these tendencies under existing conditions or at least as we interpreted these conditions.

The transformation of bourgeois states (decayed) into deformed workers' states under the conditions it has occurred has raised a series of theoretical problems which should be dealt with.

For us, the norm in such a transformation is the revolutionary action of the masses, their armed struggle destroying the old apparatus of the bourgeois state and substituting a new state for it. The manner of the transformation in the buffer zone countries does not correspond to the norm. Essentially it was the result of the action of the bureaucracy of the USSR and its agents. Does this call for a revision of Marxism? We do not think so at all.

From what happened at the beginning of the Second World War and from the deductions Trotsky had drawn

from these events, we were ready to grasp the tendency toward structural assimilation, to understand these phenomena as they occurred. But we hesitated in our theoretical generalizations. Why?

The bureaucracy is not a class, it has no fundamental role in history, it does not make history, on the contrary it seeks only to cheat history. But it has demonstrated an undeniable power, for reasons we well know, to deform and disfigure the march of the historic process. Stalinism falsifies past history, but it employs the same methods—and they are not without their consequences—on the present. We have seen Stalinism distort fundamental ideas in the minds of communist workers; we have seen it manipulate workers' organizations and their policy. The Kremlin bureaucracy, with all the material and political power it derives from the Soviet state, has been able to manipulate phenomena to the point of rendering them momentarily more or less unrecognizable, without however derailing the fundamental social forces and the laws of history. One of our primary weaknesses was that of not always being able to rapidly disentangle the profound nature of phenomena from the disfiguration they had suffered at the hands of the bureaucracy.

On the other hand, we ourselves did not exactly appreciate the conditions under which the bureaucracy had to operate. It is true that it acted in quite an empirical manner; in the beginning it did not dream of going beyond its agreements with imperialism. It merely wanted to convert the buffer zone states into zones of military protection and not into a belt of workers' states on the borders of the USSR. Molotov's declaration when Soviet troops entered the territory of a capitalist state for the first time, the theory of people's democracy (1st edition), was not contrived to deceive the bourgeoisie. The Kremlin bureaucracy had been obliged to go further than it intended. But we have only recently begun to appreciate more exactly the conditions under which the Kremlin acted. It is only approximately one year ago that we have begun to appreciate the grandeur of the revolutionary forces in all their scope let loose by the decomposition of capitalism. The discussion on the political report at this Congress has permitted an understanding of the full scope of these forces.

It is the decomposition of capitalism which has spoiled all the calculations of the bureaucracy as well as of imperialism in their search for a compromise which was also to include the buffer zone countries. We were especially cognizant of the bureaucratic character of the measures taken by the Kremlin but we were insufficiently appreciative of the forces which impelled the bureaucracy to reluctantly take the measures which in turn more and more barred the road to a compromise with imperialism and created a fundamentally different situation particularly in the buffer zone countries.

Among the causes of error on our part was the absolute juxtaposition of the action of the masses and that of the bureaucracy. We said: A workers' state is not the creation of bureaucratic action, but only of the revolutionary action of the masses. The bureaucracy, as we well know, never or almost never eliminates the action of the masses in its interventions; what it seeks to suppress is the action of the masses which it cannot rigorously control; but it is very

well able to utilize the action of the masses which it can control in order to attain its own objectives at a given moment.

That was also true in the buffer zone countries. It placed the workers' movement there under its tutelage, it proceeded from purge to purge, it destroyed all initiative of the masses, all independent action to a considerable degree, but it nevertheless mobilized these masses in a form it completely controlled for the purpose of being able to proceed to the important changes it deemed necessary in the buffer zone countries. We did not believe that it could carry out an operation of such scope in the buffer zone countries without losing control of the mass movement.

Because we were not always capable of analyzing the deformative effects of bureaucratic action on the historic process, because we did not have an extremely precise estimation of the forces let loose by the decomposition of capitalism and because we did not always understand the utilization of the masses by the bureaucracy, we committed errors on the buffer zone question; and we became involved in a problem which was not the real one, because there was no real solution for it, namely that of the criterion which determines the moment when the "leap" takes place. We were not faced with a relatively normal process. History had gone through bureaucratic channels in these countries and the endeavor to apply rigorous norms there was not without its dangers.

It goes without saying that in recognizing the character of the bureaucratic action in the buffer zone countries we not only do not attribute any progressive character to it, not only do we continue to consider it as counter-revolutionary as a whole, but we underscore the limits of bureaucratic possibilities. They were brought to bear on bourgeois countries in full decomposition where social relations had already been very unstable before the war and where the bourgeoisie had been considerably undermined during the war.

It also goes without saying that the evolution of the buffer zone countries since 1945 does not provide the slightest justification for the theory of "people's democracy" (1st edition) which imitated the old social democratic revisionist conception of a possible gradual passage from capitalism to socialism. This theory has been a lamentable failure in Western European capitalist countries. In Eastern Europe, the bureaucratic intervention which was substituted for the revolutionary action of the masses had nothing whatever in common with gradual, organic evolution.

The buffer zone situation has also demonstrated several facts to us which lead to important theoretical or political conclusions.

The buffer zone situation demonstrated that the coming to power of Stalinist parties under bureaucratic conditions (contrary to those in Yugoslavia or China) had similar although less marked consequences on these parties. The contradictions of society were reflected in these parties with growing acuteness. The pressure of the masses made itself strongly felt in opposition to the demands of the Muscovite bureaucracy. The apparatus, even the leadership itself of these parties, is sensitive to this pressure. Thus far the tendencies expressing or reflecting this pressure have shown themselves extremely weak in face of the

GPU apparatus, but one cannot exclude a different development in objectively different conditions.

Another very important point. The buffer zone experience has revealed—and even bourgeois observers have testified to this—that the working masses of these countries, although very hostile to the bureaucracy, are very attached to the transformations in the system even though they were achieved bureaucratically. Trotsky wrote in the definition of the USSR which he gave in *Revolution Betrayed*: "The social revolution betrayed by the government party still lives in the property relations and in the consciousness of the toilers."

In the buffer zone countries as well, the social transformations not only live in the existing property relations but also in the consciousness of the toilers although these social relations occurred not in a revolutionary but in a bureaucratic way. That is a very important element for a proper appreciation of the buffer zone countries.

What we have learned on this point from the Ukrainian independence movement is also very significant. As a result of the division of the Ukraine before the Second World War, the Ukrainian nationalist movement in Poland had contributed in bringing independence tendencies into being in the Soviet Ukraine. But on the other hand, the difference in social system between these two sections of the Ukraine had led to the evolution of the Ukrainian nationalists in Poland toward the adoption of the social forms of property of the Soviet Ukraine. This is a phenomenon which should not be forgotten, especially in the case of present-day Germany.

Policy Toward the Buffer Zone Countries

Our policy for the buffer zone countries, given the conclusion we have arrived at on their class nature and also the place they will have in the coming war, does not raise any moot problems. The discussion on the political resolution has clarified the problems posed by the buffer zone countries.

We are for the unconditional defense of these workers' states against imperialism in the war now being prepared. It is fundamentally the same problem as that of the defense of the USSR. We defend these states as working class conquests, regardless of the bureaucratic means which were used to bring them into being and regardless of the policy followed by their governments. Our defense of these states in no case, at no time, implies a limitation of our criticism of the policy followed by the governments of these states.

We have designated these states as deformed workers' states specifying that their deformation has been identical to that of the USSR principally in the expropriation of the proletariat from the administration of these states. It follows therefore that, as for the USSR, *our political program for these countries is that of political revolution* having as its aim the elimination of the bureaucracy from power and its resumption by the working masses. This point does not raise especially different problems from those of the USSR. Let us merely observe that there is not a native bureaucracy in these countries possessing a strength comparable to that of the Soviet bureaucracy; in truth, it is the Soviet bureaucracy which constitutes the principal prop, the principal strength of the native bureaucracies.

As in the case of the USSR, it is obvious that the defense of these countries does not exclude but on the contrary implies our support to movements of the worker and poor peasant masses against the bureaucracy. In the case of these countries, as in that of the national minorities in the USSR, we are also in favor of supporting mass movements for national independence from the yoke of the Soviet bureaucracy. In the buffer zone countries we are for the independence of these countries and their organization into a voluntarily organized federation.

All these points present no difficulties. They have long been the common property of our movement acquired on the question of the USSR in the past years by following step by step the evolution of the first workers' state. The only difference is that these countries suffer even more severely from their unequal relations with Moscow than do the nationalities of the USSR. Over the decades the national question has always been a very sensitive point in these countries. Finally the question of their federation has had a long tradition in the workers' movements of these countries, it having figured in the programs of socialist parties of these countries even before 1914.

* * *

In conclusion, we see that the buffer zone question has, in fact, been the extension of the Russian question which has so often been discussed in our movement, and not the point of departure for a new chapter in the history of the Soviet regime. But it is an extension which has taken its own peculiar course.

Our definition of the USSR, our comprehension of the dual role of the Soviet bureaucracy has permitted us to orient ourselves in a generally correct manner in the study of what has happened in the buffer zone countries and in understanding their fundamental tendencies. At bottom this was decisive.

But on the other hand, various inadequacies on our part have made us mark time, have led us into secondary problems and even into error. Today the situation has largely contributed in permitting us to overcome our weaknesses without great internal difficulties. It permits us to basically understand the buffer zone countries, their development, their contradictions.

We believe that the discussion based on the resolution presented by the International Secretariat will enable our movement to acquire all necessary clarity on this question and to seriously arm our militants for the political problems they will be faced with in the coming years.

* * *

Summary Speech by Reporter

After speeches by 15 delegates, the reporter made the following points:

The buffer zone was a relatively new phenomenon for which our only terms of reference were the occupation of territories by the Soviet army at the beginning of the Second World War. The term we employed in 1946, that of "structural assimilation," corresponded to our comprehension of this phenomenon at the time and of the perspectives of development we were then able to envisage. In light of what has occurred, a definition more closely approximating

the phenomenon might possibly have been contrived. However, that did not appear necessary to us then, provided that more was not read into these words than was actually intended.

The words "structural assimilation" in the resolution do not mean that the buffer zone states have been incorporated in one or another form into the USSR or that their economies no longer have any independence in relation to that of the USSR. This term simply means that these states have fundamentally the same structure, the same fundamental relations of property and production as that of the first workers' state, the USSR. It is true, as the resolution points out, that the economic relations of these states with the USSR have been extended but that does not mean "structural assimilation" to us.

We live in a period of uninterrupted convulsions and that is why our theory should more than ever be a guide to action and not be transformed into rules which become abstractions when confronted with the reality. As is indicated in the report, one cannot apply the "norm," i.e. in this case, to demand to know the date on which the "leap" occurred. We will not repeat the explanation given in the resolution on this point. Let us only add that in a number of countries one would seek in vain for the "date" on which they passed over from feudalism to capitalism.

A comrade has mentioned the absence of nationalization on the land to prove the formation of new bourgeois strata in the country, thus creating dual power and an accumulation of dangers for these countries. We have pointed out in the report that the absence of nationalization of the land was an important question but not at all decisive for a characterization of the sociological nature of these countries.

It is true that tendencies toward the restoration of capitalism manifest themselves on the countryside in these countries because of their economic backwardness. But to proceed from there and to speak of new bourgeois strata is stretching the point too much; it is even less valid to speak of dual power. The facts do not support such statements. Tendencies are not yet a bourgeois class or dual power.

It is true that there are dangers to the non-capitalist structure of these states in possible developments on the countryside. That was the case with the USSR from the NEP up to 1928; although in this instance it must also be recognized that the danger was in nowise removed by nationalization of the land. The danger is also to be seen in Yugoslavia, which will be discussed on the next point of the agenda. But it is already possible to say that what makes these phenomena on the countryside dangerous in Yugoslavia is the considerable pressure now being brought to bear by imperialism on the country. The dominant pressure on the buffer zone countries at the present time comes from the opposite direction.

A comrade has raised the question of the application of the term "exploitation" to the Soviet bureaucracy. It is not a class, he says, and therefore its role in production is not that of exploitation in the Marxist sense of the term. Agreed. But if I am not mistaken the 2nd World Congress used the term "exploitation" for the mixed companies which the USSR had then imposed on the buffer zone countries. The Soviet state, in fact, played a capitalist role in these

companies as is also the case with certain workers' organizations which engage in businesses associated with their general activity. The Soviet state acted as a capitalist in the case of the mixed companies and thus we have actually a case of exploitation.

The more complex question with which comrade Pablo has dealt is the one raised by several comrades on the completion of structural assimilation. We noted tendencies to structural assimilation beginning with 1945-46. From that time on, there existed potentially the possibilities of transformation which subsequently occurred. But its completion was the result of national and international factors.

The scope of nationalizations is not enough for an appreciation of the developments in the buffer zone countries. In 1946, there remained not only a capitalist economic structure, but the reconstructed states also had a capitalist political structure. With a different relationship of forces, another situation might have resulted in some of the buffer zone countries.

As a consequence of the "cold war," the Soviet bureaucracy was not only obliged to adopt a series of economic measures fundamentally transforming the economic structure of these states, but it also had to embark on a series of measures fundamentally transforming their political structure in order to align them with the structure of the USSR. The period in which these transformations occurred, bringing to completion the tendencies to structural assimilation which had existed from the beginning, dates clearly from the start of 1949, extends through that year and into 1950.

We also have to rectify what is erroneous in the draft document on the question of Albania. It is quite accurate that during the Second World War a development very much like that of Yugoslavia occurred in that country.

The question of the buffer zone has not only served to better arm us politically on the subject of Eastern Europe and of Asia but in general to help us better understand the period of transition from capitalism to socialism as we know it in its first stages.

A Milestone in Internationalism

(Continued from page 167)

and its eventual downfall—*constituting an indispensable guide for conscious Marxists to the complicated, turbulent events of today and tomorrow*—its work was broader in scope extending to all the main phenomena and problems of the working class movement. A careful reading of these pages will show that there is no attempt to draw a simplistic, rigid, one-sided pattern. Animated by profound realism, which is the exclusive property of the Marxist method so far as sociology is concerned, the Congress was able to appraise the movement of the masses as it actually is—under social democratic leadership in Great Britain, Germany and in other important countries in the capitalist world, without independent political organization as in the United States, under petty-bourgeois and even bourgeois leadership as in parts of the colonial and semi-

colonial world—and to formulate its policy and attitude toward these movements.

It is only fitting and proper to conclude this editorial by giving the floor to those who were fortunate in participating in the world Trotskyist Congress for a brief description and appreciation of its work and significance. The following lines are translated from *Quatrieme Internationale*, organ of the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International:

"An extraordinary feeling of deep community of thought, especially on the character of the period in which we live, on the perspectives which are unfolding and on the tactics required for victory, prevailed among the delegates and participants at the Third World Congress of the Fourth International.

"Never in our past have we known such an atmosphere of confidence, conviction, optimism, of the real homogeneity of the Trotskyist movement which was founded by the best men of the Russian Revolution and of the Third International of Lenin's time and which for more than a quarter-century has waged a titanic, unequal struggle against the most reactionary forces in history: capitalism in its epoch of imperialist decline and decomposition and the Soviet bureaucracy.

"All those who participated in the Third World Congress had the feeling of standing on solid ground and successfully resisting the terrible pressure which is brought to bear by the exacerbation of the world class struggle. They were ready to face the oncoming revolutionary tempest with a redoubled optimism in the final outcome.

"They had the feeling that, profiting from the richness of our program, from our traditions, from our successes in penetrating the movement of the masses, rearmed Trotskyism was a solid reality, swimming with the historic current.

"The Third World Congress was the most striking and most convincing expression of the maturity of the international Trotskyist movement enabling it to effect a fusion with the revolutionary forces of the working class.

"When an ideological movement, in conditions such as exist today, reaches this degree of maturity there is no force which can destroy it because there is no force which can destroy the organized, systematic, thoroughgoing expression of the consciousness and the interests of a revolutionary class. And at every decisive stage of history for a quarter of a century Trotskyism has proved itself to be this expression of the consciousness and the interests of the revolutionary proletariat...

"The Third World Congress did not underestimate the very great difficulties our movement will have to face nor the important obstacles it will have to overcome. The Congress at all times was keenly aware of the still crying disproportion between our subjective forces, our means and the heavy tasks to be accomplished. But, keeping all these considerations in mind, the Congress was convinced that the ideological preparation and the practical work done by the international Trotskyist movement had attained its maximum at this Congress."