


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INDOCHINA

THE IMPERIALIST



Liberation forces storm the citadel in Hué.

DEBACLE

by PIERRE ROUSSET

The puppet president Lon Nol has fled the Cambodian capital, whose liberation is imminent. In South Vietnam, in a period of three weeks the Saigon army has collapsed in the Central Highlands, in the northern provinces, and along the central coastline, abandoning several thousands of millions of dollars worth of military equipment and losing scores of thousands of men. The liberated zones have been vastly extended and now cover 75 percent of South Vietnam, even according to Western estimates; included in the liberated areas are the major cities of the South with the exception of Saigon. Several thousand people have risen up or have joined the zones of the Provisional Revolutionary Government. In face of the rout of their forces, Washington and its local instruments have been struck by a paralysis that is disturbing to those who have placed their hopes in the United States as the "policeman of the imperialist world."

In one month, the Indochinese revolution has won crucial victories that mark a decisive turning point in the regional situation. This turn is opening the

final phase of the fight for the liberation of Indochina from the American imperialist grip.

The suddenness and rapidity of the upheaval that has just occurred have surprised those who had not recognized — or did not want to recognize — the contradictions that were progressively undermining the puppet regime from within. Consequently, a veritable international press campaign, violently anticommunist, is being orchestrated: Thieu's debacle is said to be the result of the weakness of American aid, Hanoi's violation of the Paris accords, and the communist "steamroller" from the North in face of which the South Vietnamese population is fleeing, "voting with their feet" against the red peril.

It is not yet time to draw an initial overall balance-sheet of the offensive now under way. The situation remains too much in flux. But some points can be made about the processes through which the puppet collapse in Indochina is occurring and a response can thus be made to the poisonous campaign being waged in the Western world.

The disintegration of the puppet army

There are four elements that shed real light on the character of the defeat of the Saigon army.

*Contrary to what officials in Washington have tried to make people believe, the material military potential of the puppet army remains vastly superior to that of the revolutionary forces. In principle, the puppet army is invincible — with its more than one million men (on paper), the third-largest air force in the world, a formidable maritime and river fleet, and artillery unequaled on the "other side." Of course, the People's Liberation Armed Forces have been able to improve their materiel, especially in the southern regions. But even according to the estimates of the CIA, quoted by American congressmen, U.S. aid to Thieu since the signing of the Paris accords has been two to four times larger than the aid the Democratic Republic of Vietnam has received from China and the USSR. And the Pentagon has ultimately had to recognize that the Saigon regime has not been strangled by a drop in financial and military supplies: The credits for this fiscal year (already approved by the Congress) have not yet been used up and the available stocks of fuel, ammunition, and spare parts were far from fully utilized. (See *Le Figaro*, March 29-30, 1975.)

*There was not, and there has still not yet been, any PRG military offensive similar to that waged in the spring of 1972. That was a general offensive involving guerrilla forces and regular and regional troops during which long and hard battles took place. During the initial phase of the current fighting (from the taking of the provincial capital of Phuoc Binh in January to the taking of Ban Me Thuot in March), only regional and local troops were used by the liberation forces in their main attacks. During the second phase (after Thieu's decision in mid-March to evacuate the cities of the Central Highlands, Pleiku, and Kontum), regular divisions played an active role in the northern provinces and along the coast. But they hardly had to fight! The Saigon troops disbanded when the first shots were fired, or sometimes simply at the announcement that the liberation forces were about to arrive.

*It was this phenomenon of disintegration of the puppet army that overturned the plans of the Saigon general staff. It appears that the notion of a retreat and a reorganization of the military system had begun to be considered last summer. In any case, the decision to withdraw from the Central Highlands was made on March 14, before any new cities had been attacked. For Thieu, the Cambodian situation confirmed



Shaded areas show liberated zones.

that he could not hope for an increased U.S. commitment. And the fall of Ban Me Thuot illustrated the danger that puppet divisions might be cut off from their rear areas and then destroyed. That had to be avoided; troops had to be regrouped in areas in which their land and water supply lines could not be cut off: the southern part of the country and the coast. The retreat was supposed to stop there; but in reality, that retreat became the signal for a rout, a surprise to all the military experts and advisers.

*The debacle of the puppet army is all the more significant in that it involves "elite" units, such as the ones that had been holding Quang Tri and Hue and were later withdrawn to Da Nang: the First Infantry Division and the Marines. As for the paratroopers, they had already been withdrawn by Thieu to protect the presidential palace from enemies . . . and friends. It was the troops that had been considered the only "good ones" — the only ones that were supposedly well motivated and effec-

tive — who robbed, murdered, kidnapped the wives of their officers, and fought with each other to evacuate the threatened zones as quickly as possible. The rout was so thorough that the PRG was able to seize considerable military materiel intact, notably 200-300 airplanes and helicopters with all their equipment, some of which had been on the runways with full gasoline tanks, ready to take off.

The puppet army was not beaten after hard battles in which the material superiority of the adversary was finally decisive. Nobody tried to defend Da Nang, even after March 26, when Thieu issued a solemn call to his troops to "hold on." And yet it would have been possible to make the battle for Da Nang last for weeks and to try to use such a long battle to rally public opinion in the United States. What happened was that the puppet army decomposed. The problem is political, for that decomposition is the product of the decay of the regime.

The regime undermined from within

What seems very striking today is the weaknesses and contradictions of the policy upheld by Kissinger at the time of the signing of the Paris accords. In a hurry to effect a relative disengagement, Washington sought to carry out a "classical" neocolonialist policy, but was forced to do this after recognizing that its previous strategy of military escalation had failed. That recognition itself amounted to a real deterioration of the relationship of forces in Indochina; at the same time, Washington had to try to rapidly transform the artificial economic and social base of the puppet regime through an industrialization accelerated by injections of foreign capital — and this while Thieu's political future lacked credibility.

The partial success of the policies of "pacification," "forced urbanization," and "Vietnamization, the strength of the military might brought to bear against the Indochinese peoples, and the scope of the means committed to continuing support to the puppet administration and its military and police apparatus all prevented the PRG from being able to achieve victory before first undermining from within the formidable creation of American intervention represented by the Thieu regime. The situation of strategic weakness into which American imperialism had been thrown by the struggle of the Indochinese peoples, the internal contradictions of the Saigon regime, the strengthening of the liberated zones that was made possible by the halt of the bombing, and Washington's international difficulties combined to put the Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian revolutionaries in a favorable position to be able to do this. Such

was the framework of struggle born of the signing of the Paris accords on January 27, 1973.

It took two years for the process then set in motion to reach maturity. In fact, it was a combination of processes: a military process combining the PRG's policies of "fraternization" and graduated responses; a political process challenging Thieu's war policy, denouncing repression, and struggling for democratic rights; an economic process counterposing the reconstruction of the liberated zones to the outbreak of a very serious crisis and recession in the cities held by Saigon; a social process of recomposition of the workers movement and of struggle for economic demands on the part of many sectors of the population. During these two years Thieu demonstrated his inability to win the war he was conducting, to hold back the economic and social crisis, to assure himself of continued U.S. aid, or to prevent the strengthening of the opposition he was savagely repressing. His regime lost its credibility in the eyes of the masses and in the eyes of his own army.

The crisis of the regime prepared the way for the disintegration of the army. This in turn had repercussions on the situation in Saigon. As the political figure that was the keystone of the regime upon which Washington was basing itself, Thieu is no longer in position to survive. Thieu may already have his bags packed in preparation for following Lon Nol into exile. The battle to form a new government has been joined. The right is trying to put forward an alternative that would allow it to maintain at least a minimum control over the situation in Saigon. General Nguyen Cao Ky has formed a Committee of National Salvation. Ky was the strongman of the Americans from 1965 to 1967; then he became Thieu's vice president, only to disappear from the political scene in 1971. He is known for his virulent anticommunism. He is trying to work with some generals, a former minister of foreign affairs (Tran Van Do), a former ambassador to Washington (Bui Diem), the leader of the puppet trade unions (Tran Quoc Buu), and Father Tran Huu Than, a member of the anticommunist Catholic hierarchy and spokesman for the movement against corruption. Washington will probably be led to accept the replacement of Thieu, which had been rejected in September-October despite the cries of alarm from the right-wing opposition. Today the generals, the Senate, and the archbishop of Saigon are asking for the departure of the puppet president.

But the chances for a "Thieu regime without Thieu" are presently very slim. The economic recession in Saigon has deepened sharply. Panic is beginning to overtake bourgeois circles, which are leaving for abroad. The military command is completely disorganized and the troops are probably demoralized. The religious oppositions are not following the right;

on the contrary, they are making overtures to the PRG. The Cao Dai hierarchy, whose "spiritual capital" is Tay Ninh (encircled by the liberation forces), has advised the faithful to remain neutral in the fighting but to stay where they are and not flee toward Saigon. Senator Vu Van Mau, a leader of the Buddhist organization Forces of National Reconciliation (linked to the An Quang pagoda), has stated that his forces have been allowed to keep their committees active in the newly liberated territories. Madame Ngo Ba Than, a leader of the "third force" Popular Movement for the Application of the Paris Accords who was once placed under house arrest, says that she does not intend to participate in the government reorganization, that this is the affair of the "first force," that is, the Saigon forces. Finally, General Minh, one of the personalities most played up by American liberals, who could try to play a Bonapartist role between the factions of the opposition, is taking a wait-and-see attitude and seems not to know which bandwagon to jump on.

Above all, the specific weight of the PRG has been suddenly increased in South Vietnam. To be sure, the PRG has declared itself prepared to negotiate, but only after the overthrow of the present regime and its replacement by an administration that would agree to apply the Paris accords. It is continuing the vigorous offensive, which makes it probable today that the liberated zones now include nearly half (or more) of the population.

And the refugees?

Is this analysis refuted by the flight of refugees and the scenes of panic that television crews have filmed? Not at all. The real character of the flight must be understood.

The March 27 International Herald Tribune, basing itself on interviews taken by reporters of the New York Times, headlined one of its articles "Cause of Refugee Exodus Panic, Not Politics." The article noted that "in the course of recent weeks correspondents of the New York Times have interviewed hundreds of refugees fleeing from various parts of the country." To the question, "Why are you running?" most responded: "Because everyone is leaving." "Nobody answered that it was because he or she hated communism or was afraid of it. Many were afraid that they would be exposed to death and destruction if they stayed behind. . . . fear of the unknown seems to be even greater. . . . For the rich and middle classes, for the merchants and businessmen, there is a special reason for flight. . . ."

The Americans and their puppets have been able to create collective panic in many cities. And panic has surely been created: by the transformation in

past years of every newly liberated zone or locality into a "free fire" and bombing zone, by the psychosis of combat, by direct incitement. In Pleiku it was loudspeaker trucks organized by the army that touched off panic by driving through the city screaming "Flee, flee!" even though no fighting was going on at the time. In Hué Thieu's soldiers entered each house, rifles in hand, to force the civilians to evacuate; otherwise, the soldiers said, "the bombs and mortar will kill you." (An inhabitant of the city who stayed behind recounted this to the NLF press agency. See the Paris daily *Libération*, April 2, 1975.)

In Nha Trang, Agence France-Press reported, inhabitants took refuge on a nearby uninhabited island during the occupation of the city. They were afraid of rockets. Others fled the gangs of puppet soldiers who were pillaging and murdering. In addition, the poisonous campaign was going on: "The communists will pierce the hands of all young girls," and so on.

The panic and exodus are the final products of the American imperialists' policy of "forced urbanization." But while they have been able to incite panic, they have not created by this means a broad and popular social base for their system in Indochina. And while those who are leaving in the collective moves are not necessarily only those who fear reprisals because they collaborated, tortured, murdered, and profited from the presence of the Americans and their henchmen, it must not be forgotten that most of the inhabitants of these zones have remained behind, or have returned already, or are in process of returning. Nor must it be forgotten that the liberation of the cities was made possible by the combined action of the liberation armed forces and the organized working population. It was also for this reason that Hué, Da Nang, and Nha Trang fell without big fighting. And this leaves aside the massive defection of the puppet army. If this is not the case, how is it to be explained that immediately upon the arrival of the liberation forces the cities were covered with the banners of the PRG? In the April 4 *Le Monde* Jean Thoraval wrote, on the basis of information received in Hanoi, that "intense psychological work had been directed toward the South Vietnamese masses, in particular during the past two years. In many provincial capitals clandestine militias . . . probably came out of the shadows to aid the Liberation Armed Forces." Moreover, the press in Hanoi has reported that in Da Nang it was the workers who were the backbone of these militias. Finally, the photographs coming from the newly liberated cities depict animated streets and not deserted and empty byways.

The American paralysis

One of the keys to the American policy in regard to the Paris Accords was the establishment of "three-

sided peaceful coexistence." The failure of the previous strategy of escalation required the recognition of the People's Republic of China. In turn, this recognition required that sooner or later the United States would have to limit its direct intervention. The support Peking extended to Nixon allowed Washington to hope that the isolation of the Indochinese revolutionaries would be such that they would "moderate" their ambitions.

But the analysis of the regional relationship of forces prevailing at the time of the signing of the accords, the multiplication of the difficulties American imperialism was facing because of the rise of the class struggle internationally, and the economic crisis that was on the agenda made it possible to predict that nothing of the kind would happen.

And, in fact, nothing of the kind did happen. The dialectic of the Indochinese revolution was confirmed. This is especially illustrated by the events of the past several months. We have seen a combined offensive in Cambodia and Vietnam, an offensive unleashed at the beginning of January. By highlighting the American paralysis the impending fall of Phnom Penh, rapidly seen as inevitable, acted as a catalyst to the demoralization of the puppet forces. In like manner, the collapse of the puppet army in South Vietnam will deal the coup de grâce to the Lon Nol regime.

Already, the echo of the advance of the Indochinese revolution can be heard beyond the frontiers of the former French colonies. It is especially perceptible in Thailand, where the (rightist) government of Kukrit Pramoj is asking for the withdrawal of the U.S. forces based in the country and where chronic political instability has succeeded the previous pro-American military dictatorship. The imperialist debacle in Indochina will accelerate the new rise of class struggle throughout the region.

More profoundly, Indochina, along with the Arab East, has revealed the new weaknesses of American imperialism on the international arena. The Indochinese revolution has most certainly been the bridge between the revolutionary wave that followed the second world war and the revolutionary wave that is taking shape today.

The Indochinese socialist revolution

In December 1972, the International Executive Committee (IEC) of the Fourth International adopted a resolution on the signing of the Paris accords (which had yet to take place at the time). After analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of the position of the



Indochinese revolution and the nature of the draft accords being negotiated, the IEC concluded that the signing of the accords would involve "a withdrawal of U.S. armed forces from Vietnam and the halting of bombing of the North and South, (which) would in any event constitute a shift in the relationship of forces in favor of the Vietnamese revolution. . . . but such a withdrawal would not in itself (guarantee) the victory of the permanent revolution in South Vietnam. It would only (imply) that the process of this revolution could develop with a reduced, but not eliminated, foreign counterrevolutionary interference." The motor force of the struggle lay in the maintenance of a "situation . . . in South Vietnam . . . of dual power from top to bottom . . . but dual power that has not yet been extended to the major cities of the country." It was on the basis of this analysis that the resolution predicted the axis of the coming struggles in Vietnam: deepening of the agrarian reform, struggle of the exploited masses in defense of their living standards, struggle for the release of political prisoners and for democratic rights. And it also predicted the probable results of these struggles: the "disintegration of the puppet military and administrative apparatus under the combined impact of the processes we have just described." At the same time, it was stressed that the essential feature would be the maintenance and strengthening of the armed forces of the proletariat and peasantry.

More than two years later, it can be said that the analysis our movement made of the relationship of forces and the process of coming struggles has been confirmed. This does not mean that the victory of the permanent revolution in Vietnam and throughout Indochina has already been completely achieved. The struggle goes on. But the Indochinese revolution has just taken a very big step forward.

That is what we must hail above all!

FOR THE INDOCHINESE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION!

April 3, 1975

A TURNING POINT FOR THE WORKING CLASS?

by WINFRIED WOLF

During the past few weeks, "internal security," the "fight against terrorism," has become the number one theme of the bourgeois press and the parliamentary tribunal in the Federal Republic of Germany. The pretext for the campaign was provided by the kidnapping of Lorenz, West Berlin chairman of the Christlich-Demokratische Union (CDU), which was allegedly carried out by an anarchist group. The West German bourgeoisie has been able to link its new "antiterror campaign" to its earlier, and effective, campaigns during the witch-hunt against the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF — Red Army Faction) and on the occasion of the hunger strike of the RAF prisoners (during which one comrade, Holger Meins, died).

The right has gained ground in West Germany during the past few weeks. It has forced "internal security" on the public as a number one theme, although this theme is not at all the prime one for the broad masses. The central questions of unemployment, short-time work, and factory shutdowns have been successfully shunted to the background.

Four central points

The present state of the West German class struggle can be summed up in four central points (for an overall estimation of the situation, see "The End of West German Stability" in INPRECOR No. 5-6, August 3, 1974):

1. The Social Democratic government headed by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has proven ideal for the

bourgeoisie under the current conditions of the class struggle.

2. The defeats for the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD — Social Democratic party of Germany) during the state parliamentary elections continued throughout 1974 and the first quarter of 1975. Taken together, the election results reflect the fact that while the SPD continues to maintain its electoral base in the working class, a certain part of the working class, along with disillusioned middle layers, is turning away from the Social Democracy.

3. During 1974 and the beginning of 1975 the open conflict between wage-labor and capital remained at a minimum (with the exception of the strike of public service employees in the spring). At the same time, the employers succeeded in pushing through their strategy of shifting the burden of the crisis onto the backs of the working class.

4. The prospect is for a sharpening of the class struggle, especially during the autumn of 1975. This perspective is already becoming apparent in the initial struggles of peripheral sections of the working class and in a few factories that have been directly affected.

The first impression one gets in surveying the West German situation (especially through following the bourgeois mass media) appears to contradict this perspective of sharpened class struggle. The tendencies toward the "strong state," represented above



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all by Franz Josef Strauss, leader of the Christlich-Soziale Union (CSU — Christian Social Union, the Bavarian party linked to the CDU), and his bolstered position within the CDU/CSU parliamentary fraction, have been strengthened. The coalition government of the SPD and the FDP (Freie Demokratische Partei — Free Democratic party, a bourgeois liberal party), under pressure from the right, is moving even further away from its "reform program" and is doing everything possible to build up the instruments of bourgeois repression and to make use of repressive measures against the radical left. Nevertheless, this first impression is a superficial one. It fails to take account of the special situation that provides the groundwork for the present rightist trends. And it fails to take account of factors that must be considered in working out a perspective in this contradictory situation, factors such as the generally increased weight of the working class and the trade unions since 1969, the accumulation of important experiences during the period of the rise of struggles from 1969 to the beginning of 1974, and the important experiences that the working class has had during past months, in spite of the quiescence of the class struggle.

The economic crisis

It is not necessary here to go into a detailed account of the crisis of West German capitalism. (For this, see "The Relative Strength of West German Capitalism, INPRECOR, No.16-17, January 16.) The essential points are these:

*As the above-mentioned article has predicted, the economic crisis has continued into the first quarter of 1975: It has deepened in some sectors and on the whole has become generalized. The approximately 2,000 million DM conjunctural program of the federal government has up to now proven ineffective. The economic growth rate for the first quarter of 1975 is negative.

*The persistent and sharpened international crisis is the essential factor in the persistent crisis in West Germany. The international crisis has caused the sharpening of the crisis in the West German automobile industry and has caused economic branches that are export-oriented and had previously been spared, like the steel, chemical, and electrical industries, to be increasingly gripped by the crisis. (The DIW, German Institute for Economic Research, speaks in its March 18, 1975, analysis of the "dramatic dimensions" of the inroads made by foreign orders.)

*With the passing of the 1975 federal budget by parliament on March 21, 1975, the government provided a striking example of the vicious circle that bourgeois policy finds itself caught in during the current period: The government's policy of economic pump-priming through enlarged state expenditures will simultaneously entail a policy of renewed boosting of the state debt and of inflation (an annual rate of increase of the state debt of more than 12 percent, combined with a probable stagnation of the gross national product and additional debts of 22,800 million DM accumulated through credit borrowing.

WEST GERMANY

*According to official figures, the number of unemployed at the end of February stood at 1.2 million; more than 900,000 workers were on short time. The figures are expected to remain at this level for the month of March. At the same time, there are plans to shut down some large factories, notably the well-known VW/Audi/NSU factory in Neckarsulm, which will affect 10,000 workers directly and another 30,000 indirectly. (There are also plans to close down the Volkswagen factory in Brussels.)

This short summary of the economic situation is of great importance in understanding the state of the West German class struggle, especially its stagnation during 1974 and the beginning of 1975.

Stagnation of the class struggle

In spite of its initial experiences during the 1969-1973 period, the West German working class was not prepared for the new situation opened up by the crisis of 1974-75. Massive unemployment and factory closings required responses and forms of struggle different from those of the preceding period. To this it must also be added:

*That this crisis occurred under a Social Democratic government, that is, under a government led by the party that is still seen by the majority of the West German working class as their political representative;

*That the Social Democratic government and the trade-union bureaucracy worked together as closely as possible to stifle any potential struggles and to push through the low wage agreements desired by the employers. At the same time, the trade-union bureaucracy throttled oppositional initiatives by further restricting trade-union democracy;

*That the employers intervened in the contract battles in a centralized manner through their class organizations; from the outset they had a clear strategy, unlike the trade unions.

Today, a balance-sheet can be drawn: The trade-union leadership capitulated to the employers' offensive all the way down the line. Given their conscious subordination to the logic of seeking bourgeois solutions to the crisis, the trade-union leaders had to fall back step by step and accept on every occasion contracts based on the latest position of the "wage guidelines" furnished by the "experts." Even if it is acknowledged that this leadership, or a part of it (as in the case of Steinkühler, the leader of the metalworkers union in Baden-Württemberg), was prepared to struggle to a certain extent, especially during the most recent phase, any move toward struggle under these conditions was doomed

to failure from the outset: The trade-union leadership had not prepared the working class for such struggles.

The individual stages in the capitulation of the trade-union leadership were the autumn 1974 contract in the steel industry, the contract in the crisis-racked construction industry, the contracts in the metals industry, and finally, the contracts in the public services. (The steel contract took on special significance because in this industrial branch, which at the time was still on the upswing, the employers' arguments about declining orders, sinking profits, and threatened unemployment were not relevant; the trade union nevertheless submitted to the wage dictates of the employers.) In all these contracts, with the exception of steel, nominal wage increases were less than 7 percent.

As so often in the past, the central position in this round of wage negotiations was occupied by the metals industry and by the policy of the big metalworkers union, the IGM (Industrie-Gewerkschaft Metall), which is led by Eugen Loderers, who likes to boast that he is the chairman of one of the most powerful trade unions in the capitalist world. The employers in this industry had a threefold strategy that led to a humiliating defeat for the trade unions that can have significant effects in the future:

1. In practice, the employers succeeded in attaining their long-sought goal of a central settlement. (Until then, the trade unions had attempted with some success to carry out a regional and branch-based policy aimed at turning to the workers' advantage variations in the economic situation and in the workers' ability to struggle.) Because of the countrywide unity of the metals employers, the agreement calling for 6.8 percent wage increases, which was signed in the state of Nordrheinwestfalen (NRW), led to all other areas more or less taking up this agreement. This happened even in the Unterweser areas (Hamburg, Bremen), where the pace is set by the docking industry, whose order books for the year have already been filled; thus, the employers in the area would have been especially hard hit by a metals strike, because they would have been unable to meet delivery dates. This represented a political victory for the employers.

2. The terms of the contract (nominal wage increases of less than 7 percent) mean at least a freeze in real wages and, for a large part of the working class, a fall in real wages, for the inflation rate up to the time the contract was signed stood at 6 percent, and in the coming period it will certainly reach 7 percent or more. This is the first time in a long while that such agreements have been signed for broad masses of the working class.

It is noteworthy, and also unprecedented, that the trade unions had to completely abandon their initial demands for 11 percent wage increases and settle for something approaching the initial position of the employers. And this despite the fact that the votes of the "impartial" members of an arbitration board had been expected to grant a contract with 7 percent wage increases and some important improvements, and despite the fact that the trade-union leadership carried out a last-minute token strike in NRW in which several tens of thousands of metalworkers took part (partially spontaneously).

This point represented an important political-economic victory for the employers, a victory that will undoubtedly have salutary effects on profit rates in the current situation of crisis and ongoing processes of rationalization and concentration.

3. The employers succeeded in blocking the qualitative demands of the trade unions, which the unions had been attempting to push through ever since the conclusion of an agreement on working conditions in Nordbaden-Nordwürttemberg (the "overall wage agreement"). In those places in which such agreements were renewed, the results were well below that of the Nordbaden-Nordwürttemberg model. This has now led to a dangerous situation in which the employers in Baden-Württemberg threaten during labor conflicts to move the factory to a region in which more favorable conditions of capital investment exist for the employers.

There were other aspects to the employers' victory: The demands of the trade unions for the abolition of Wage Group II in NRW (a classification that serves particularly to maintain lower wages for women) were struck out; and the completely insufficient training compensation for apprentices was raised only 6.8 percent (which entails a relative deterioration in practice).

This victory of the employers represents an important setback for the trade-union struggle, as the content of these demands, put forward under the demagogic but effective formulas "for improving the quality of life" and "for human working conditions," had explosive power, and they were thus thorns in the side of the employers.

New struggles

The preceding year represented an important turning point in the development of a new vanguard of the West German working class. It is as yet difficult to determine what concrete changes and shifts will be produced within the working class and in the factories by the admixture of confrontation, crisis, unemployment, the SPD government, and the failures

of the trade-union leadership. But it is clear that this period, like the period opened in 1969, represents a significant change.

There are already concrete signs that on the one hand the general combativity of the working class has not fallen and, on the other hand, that new struggles and new forms of struggle are arising. The continued existence of general combativity among the working class was proven by the mobilization of the metalworkers during the token strike in NRW (which occurred under the unfavorable conditions of a wage struggle that had in reality already been lost and of trade-union tactics that had previously demobilized the workers) and by the mobilizations that have occurred in cases of big factories directly affected by shutdowns (VFW Focker und Salamander in Speyer, DVA-Druckerei in Stuttgart, automobile workers in Neckarsulm).

*There have been demonstrations against unemployment by the unemployed. Teachers and university graduates, unemployed because of a freeze on jobs in the public school system, also participated in these demonstrations.

*In connection with the Supreme Court's final prohibition of abortion (even during the first three months of pregnancy), the women's movement has experienced a new upswing that has led to many demonstrations and protest actions.

*In Whyll in Kaiserstuhl-Baden the population waged a bitter and militant month-long struggle against plans to construct an atomic reactor. In spite of a massive police occupation, the construction site was retaken by more than 10,000 demonstrators and is still being held. A veiled court order to halt construction underlines the preliminary victory that has been won.

Especially meaningful, however, are some factory struggles in which the West German working class has utilized new forms of struggle. In a series of cases there have been symbolic factory occupations, and in one case, for the first time, an occupation was carried out as an offensive means of struggle against layoffs: In Erwitte bei Paderborn (in Westphalia) 150 workers of a cement-making company occupied the factory on March 10, after which 96 workers were called back and short-time was ordered for the remaining workers. The workers built a strike leadership and discussed the situation in weekly assemblies of strikers. They demanded unconditional rescinding of the layoffs and opening of the company's books. The workers also managed to make contact with other factories in similar situations so as to break down the isolation of their struggle.

The following two factors are worthy of attention: First, the core sectors of the working class in the class-struggle political centers and in the big industrial factories are virtually waging no struggles at all. Even in cases where the workers are directly affected by layoffs and short workweeks or the acute threat of layoffs or short time, such factories find it relatively difficult to mobilize. (Examples of this are provided by Rollei Voigtländer/Braunschweig, VW factories.) Second, the current new struggles are being waged above all by peripheral sections of the working class (immigrants, youth), and the new forms of struggle we have referred to are emerging in small factories in the provinces.

This development corresponds to some of the features that had also appeared during the 1973 wave of wildcat strikes; but above all it exhibits parallels with experiences in other West European countries.

Social Democracy and tendencies toward the strong state

Undoubtedly, the West German Social Democracy has made a turn to the right under the pressure of the employers. As surprising as this may be to many people, the explanation for it is simple: In a period of stagnation of the class struggle, the Social Democracy is only too willing to bow to the strategy of the employers. During the past year this has meant two things: low wage contracts and repression against the left. Only a mobilization of the SPD's rank-and-file supporters and electoral base, the working class, will produce a corresponding reflex in the Social Democratic party, partly in the form of a sharpened process of internal differentiation.

Nevertheless, the present policy of the Schmidt government already heralds the limits of the SPD's rightist retreat, limits that are set by the Social Democracy's drive for self-preservation as a party. It can generally be said that in all the elections of 1974 and in those so far in 1975 the SPD has sustained heavy defeats (losses between 2 and 10 percent); moreover, these defeats were proportionally more severe in the cities. (In some cities, West Berlin for example, the defeats were proportionally even more severe in the working-class districts.) At the least, this means that overall support for the SPD among the working class waned (this was expressed both in abstentions and in shifts to other parties); in some cases there was even a large shift of backward sections of the working class toward the CDU/CSU.

The SPD did everything to contribute to accelerating this process, not only through its practical policies, but also through its whole propaganda. The SPD

never named the real culprit of the crisis, the capitalist profit system, and thus could be tagged by rightist demagoguery as itself being mainly responsible for the crisis. Further, the SPD did all it could to divert attention from the threat of unemployment as the major theme in the elections and instead took up the favored theme of the CDU/CSU, "internal security," with the result that the voters preferred to opt for the CDU/CSU, which offers "better guarantees" of internal security.

With the kidnapping of West Berlin CDU Chairman Lorenz (in which the participation of provocateurs cannot be ruled out at this time) a ready-made excuse was provided for taking a further step in the sharpening of repression. Throughout the preceding period, both in the actual policy of the government and in the parliamentary debate on the question of "internal security," it became clear that regardless of any differences (real or feigned) between the government and the opposition, there was common agreement that repressive legislation should be toughened (with, for example, restrictions on the right to demonstrate and the right to defense in court, the banning of "propaganda in favor of terror and violence"), that the extension of the state's repressive power should be continued (the police, the federal border guard, the army), and that the people should become accustomed to brutal and sweeping raids like those carried out in West Berlin after the Lorenz kidnapping. In its polemic, the CSU went so far as to speak of a so-called "hazy circle" of terrorists (representing an especially dangerous terrorism) that includes the entire left, even sections of the government coalition and thus the left wings of the SPD (the Young Socialists) and the FDP (the Young Democrats).

The SPD and the CDU/CSU are following different tactics under these circumstances. The SPD and a section of the CDU are stressing above all that "solidarity of all democrats" is necessary in the present situation. The majority of the CDU/CSU rejects this all-embracing tactic in favor of an attempt to place the blame on the villains of the SPD. Toward this aim, the right wing of the Christian Democracy, represented by Strauss and the CSU, is pursuing a much sharper tactic that at bottom represents the strategy of establishing a strong state. Strauss's train of thought runs as follows:

1. "I personally have defended the view that we are only at the beginning of the crisis. I think that the ruin of state finances is continuing ceaselessly. . . . The ruin of the home economy is also proceeding step by step, the small and middle areas being most strongly affected."
2. "The crisis must become deep enough that what we hold necessary for the cure can begin on a better

psychological basis than what exists today. Most people are still living beyond their means. Serious readiness for belt-tightening does not yet exist."

"There is not the slightest difference between criminal gangsters and political ones. They are all of them lawbreakers. And if we understand this and clean up properly, none of them will dare to open their mouths in Germany for the rest of this century."

3. "The right tactic today is only indictments and warnings, but not naming any concrete formula." "Better a heavy inflation and a strong increase in unemployment, better to make allowances for the ruin of state finance than to apply what we hold to be the necessary formula. . . . Things must get substantially worse before we have the prospect of our concepts, warnings, and proposals being politically heard."

These excerpts from the "Sonthofener speech," which has since become famous (or infamous), show that Strauss is capable of offering a clear perspective for the class he represents. (The speech was given to a closed meeting of CSU parliament members, but its contents became known through an indiscretion.) They also show that he realistically assesses the current state of the overall relationship of forces in society and therefore proposes the tactic of making destructive criticisms and then lying in wait.

Strauss knows that the time is not yet ripe for the establishment of a "strong state" with a strong executive, muzzling of the parliamentary bourgeois opposition, sharp repression against the revolutionary left (including bans on organizations), and, above all, a palpable weakening of trade-union rights. Furthermore, he wants to remain in the wings as a candidate for the chancellorship, and if he is soon to stand at the head of a federal government, then he must play at being a Strauss that he would actually prefer not to be.

While the overall relationship of forces stands in the way of the establishment of a strong state, it is clear that the present situation represents a threat to the revolutionary left, which is still generally isolated from the working class.

Perspectives

Taking as a basis our foregoing analysis and the shift in the relationship of forces since 1969 generally in favor of the working class, some of the perspectives for the coming period can be enumerated:

*In the short run, the stagnation of struggles by the core section of the working class will continue. Exceptions to this rule will occur in the cases of work-

ers whose jobs are concretely threatened (possibly VW-Audi/NSU Neckarsulm, for example). The May Day demonstrations will in some measure provide an expression of the extent to which the new situation has created the necessary consciousness for fresh class-struggle responses among broad sections of the working class.

*If the expected economic stabilization extends through the summer, struggles on a broader level are likely this fall. At that time, beginning from a favorable position of strength, the workers will try to make up for the insufficiencies of the contracts signed earlier.

*In contrast to 1969, the trade-union bureaucracy will be prepared for such struggles and under some circumstances will quickly take up these struggles in the unions. While this implies the danger of these struggles being channeled, it also means that a new rift between the policy of the Social Democratic government and the policy of the trade-union leadership will open up.

*Until that time, the marked development of new struggles and new forms of struggle will continue. This can contribute significantly to new layers being successfully drawn in by the expected struggles, provided that the isolation of such struggles is broken down.

*Within the Social Democracy, there will be a strengthening of tendencies pursuing a demagogic policy of a class confrontation, not as the result of concrete struggles between wage-labor and capital, but rather in the form of manipulating given events, debates, etc. The SPD has already made a start in this direction with its utilization of Strauss's Sonthofener speech. Seen from this standpoint, it is possible that the electoral losses of the SPD in the coming elections in NRW, the most important state of West Germany, the one with the largest working-class base, will be relatively small.

For revolutionary Marxists in the present situation, it is of decisive importance to make full use of this "turning point" situation in the working class, to intervene in the existing class struggles, and to prepare for the anticipated struggles.

March 25, 1975

the political crisis of the bourgeois regime



Miki

Below is an interview with Comrade Saki, a member of the Political Bureau of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, Japanese section of the Fourth International.

INPRECOR. Could you explain the meaning of the cabinet change that took place at the end of last year?

SAKAI. Former Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka resigned on November 26 last year. About ten days later Takeo Miki was chosen as prime minister by the Liberal Democratic party (LDP), of which he was chairman at the time. Miki formed his government on December 9.

This government change has a very important significance in the present Japanese situation. Tanaka represented the will to continue the expansionist policy that had previously guided the development of Japanese capitalism. To do this he had worked out a plan for recasting the economic structure of Japan through such projects as the many ultra-high-speed railway lines. (See *Quatrième Internationale*, No. 14, April 15-May 15, 1974.)

But the Miki government is abandoning this expansionist policy. This change can also be felt in the political arena. When Tanaka was elected he was very popular among the population which had been taken in by mystification. He led one of the most important factions of the LDP. Miki, on the other hand, does not represent a traditionally dominant current in the Japanese bourgeois party. He was the spokesman for a fraction that was a small minority. That the LDP had to name Miki prime minister is symptomatic of the disintegration of the relations that had been maintained between the LDP and the government on the one hand and the Japanese masses on the other.

The Tanaka cabinet will have been the last of the

traditional bourgeois governments. The move to the Miki government represents a deep break with the traditional mode of bourgeois political rule in Japan, a break that reflects the evolution of the general situation of Japanese capitalism and the intensification of the crisis of the Liberal Democratic party, the only bourgeois government party in Japan.

INPRECOR. Can you give details on the causes and nature of this break?

SAKAI. The Japanese bourgeoisie is now confronted with three essential problems:

- *The change that has occurred in the general situation in East Asia;
- *The changes that have gone on in the Japanese economy;
- *A beginning of the deep transformation of the political structure in Japan.

As far as the economic situation is concerned, Japan has left the period of very rapid growth that characterized the preceding decade. It has entered a period of slow growth, and the whole economic situation is dominated by this qualitative decline in the growth rate. In 1974, for the first time since 1945, Japan was effectively gripped by recession. According to the latest figures, the gross national product fell by 1.8 percent in real terms. I don't mean to say that we are heading into a period of decline, but it is certain that growth will be slow.

As far as the regional situation is concerned, the previous equilibrium has been broken. This equilib-

rium had rested especially on the military and political presence of American imperialism in East Asia (Southeast Asia and the Far East). Militarily, Japanese imperialism is very weak. Its intervention in the region is combined with that of the U.S.A.; Tokyo's presence is essentially economic and financial. The crisis of U.S. domination in East Asia — illustrated by the reorientation of American diplomacy in regard to the People's Republic of China and the progress of the Indochinese revolution — is contributing to knocking both Japanese imperialism and the dictatorial regimes in the region off balance. This is aggravated by the economic crisis itself, which explains, for example, the difficulties that have emerged in the relations between Tokyo and Seoul, although these relations remain close.

It is the combination of the changes that have occurred in the economic and international situations that is provoking a beginning of a fundamental change in Japanese political structure.

Since the Korean war, Japanese governments have always been governments of one party, the LDP, which is the only bourgeois government party. It was around this party and this form of government that the Japanese political system established a certain stability from the middle of the 1950s to the 1968-70 period. That is one of the essential characteristics of Japanese bourgeois democracy.

This structure has now entered into crisis, into political crisis. To such an extent that one can say that the Miki government will be the last of the one-party governments. Today, even in leading circles, debates are going on about a future "coalition government." In fact, there are already discussions about what coalition government will be needed: with the Democratic Socialist party (DSP, a right-wing split from the Social Democracy), with the petty-bourgeois Buddhist Komei party, or with a section of the Socialist party.



INPRECOR. One of the examples you gave of the changes that have occurred in the regional situation is the difficulties that have emerged between Tokyo and Seoul. Could you explain more precisely the interaction between the development of the situations in South Korea and Japan?

SAKAI. The current situation in Korea has important implications for Japan. In fact, in view of the mutual relations linking the two countries, the situation in each one cannot be analyzed separately.

The South Korean regime of Park Chung Hee is based on two key international features: U.S. military

and political domination in the region and the economic intervention of Japanese imperialism.

In effect, it is only the regional presence of U.S. imperialism that allows Park to carry out a severe and massive repression and to muzzle any popular expression of the desire of the masses to reunify Korea. The Park regime was an element in the imperialist system aimed at isolating the People's Republic of China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). Likewise, it was one of the countries that sent troops to South Vietnam; these troops gained a reputation for extreme ferocity in the policy of terror.

Finally, the Park Chung Hee regime was established in direct and close relation with Tokyo. Relations between the two countries were formally normalized in 1965, and after 1968 the export of Japanese capital reached such scope that it transformed the South Korean economy into an economy directly dependent on Japanese imperialism.

Militarily and politically, the Park regime depends on the United States; economically, it depends on Japan.

The turn imposed on Washington by the success of the Indochinese revolution involved the recognition of the People's Republic of China. The Japanese did the same and, along with the United States, sought "three-sided peaceful coexistence" among China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Obviously, this new orientation dealt a sharp blow to the South Korean regime. It had to try to readjust its policy just at a time when the Korean masses, perceiving the weakness of U.S. imperialism (that is, the weakness of the international backer of the regime), began to move. During 1972, 1973, and 1974 the youth, above all the students and intellectuals, waged an important campaign against the regime and for the reunification of the country. (See INPRECOR, No. 11, October 11, 1974.) Park was compelled to engage simultaneously in a policy of internal repression and international reorientation. In fact, his representative was compelled to publish a joint communiqué with the representative of the Democratic People's Republic on the very question of the reunification that was being demanded by the forbidden demonstrations in the South.

The repression carried out by the secret police (the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, KCIA) was intensified with the kidnapping in Japan itself of Kim Dae Jung, a candidate in the presidential elections of 1973, and his forced transfer to South Korea. Likewise, two Japanese, a journalist and a teacher, were arrested in Seoul and accused of supporting the opposition to the regime. Finally, on August 15, 1974, an unsuccessful attack on the dictator Park

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was carried out by Mun Se Kwang, a Korean who had frequently lived in Japan. The government then organized anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul.

Since the mass movement was developing, the requirements of political repression imposed a deterioration in the relations between the two governments in question, a deterioration that neither government wants. At the same time, after the kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung, Korean residents in Japan began to mobilize in support of the movement of opposition to the Seoul regime. (There are about 1 million Koreans in Japan, the result of an immigration that often leads to permanent residency — INPRECOR.) Finally, this mobilization of the Korean immigrant community in Japan was in turn directly influenced by the development of mass movements in Japan itself. So you can see how the very fact of the interpenetration of the Korean and Japanese regimes and communities results in the movement of opposition to the Park dictatorship becoming one of the permanent factors contributing to shaping the political face of Japan. This is a new and very important feature in the situation, even if it is still only embryonic.

Under these conditions, the Japanese government could not continue to support Seoul too openly. And Park Chung Hee was in urgent need of economic support from the Japanese bourgeoisie. He therefore adopted a more flexible policy, releasing the two Japanese who had been arrested and, at the end of 1974 and the beginning of 1975, freeing some of the political prisoners, among them the poet Kim Chi Ha. This, it must be stressed, was done under the direct pressure of the mass movement. In this context, Tokyo and Seoul were able to reduce their tactical contradictions and overtly redevelop Japanese political and economic support for Park Chung Hee.

Nevertheless, the situation remains very critical for the South Korean regime. Kim Chi Ha, the student leaders, and the other political prisoners who have been released are waging an active campaign against Park and are vigorously denouncing the tortures they were subjected to in prison by the KCIA. The potential for mobilizing opposition to the regime is enormous; in fact, it even affects the soldiers. Park has sought to maneuver. Nevertheless, it is possible that there will be important political and social explosions of the South Korean masses during the coming year. If that happens, the impact in Japan will be very great. It would be a hard blow for the Japanese bourgeoisie.

This is an example of how the neocolonial policy adopted by Japanese capitalism during the past decade is today being challenged by the new rise of struggles in Southeast Asia and the Far East.



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INPRECOR. Let's go back to the government political crisis in Japan. You mentioned the ways in which leading circles were posing the question of a coalition government. But the same pressure must also be weighing on the opposition formations, and especially the workers organizations. What is the situation here?

SAKAI. First of all, we must recall the structure of the Japanese workers movement. There are two large national trade-union federations. The Domei, right-wing, is based essentially on the big companies in the private sector; the Sohyo, left reformist, is mainly implanted in the public sector (railroads, posts, telegraphs, and telephones, teaching, and so on).

The Democratic Socialist party is linked to the Domei. The Sohyo apparatus is largely controlled by the Socialist party. On the other hand, the SP does not really have a party apparatus of its own. As for the Japanese Communist party, it represents a rather significant minority in the Sohyo. Moreover, it takes advantage of a large national apparatus to wage its electoral and parliamentary campaigns.

The Democratic Socialist party is a very small minority in parliament (holding about ten seats) and is very weak politically. The Socialist party has about a hundred members of parliament, which is ten times as many as the Japanese Communist party. As far as the workers movement is concerned, it is the Socialist party that has the greatest parliamentary influence. But the SP is divided by deep tendency struggles.

Two main currents are emerging within the SP and its youth organization on the question of the composition of a future coalition government. The first is the Kyokai (Socialist Society) faction. Of Kautskyst persuasion, it is dominant in the trade-union apparatus, especially in the post office and the railroads. This trade-union bureaucracy is under direct pressure from the rank-and-file workers in the public sector. The bureaucrats struggle against the CP in the unions, but at the same time they are prepared to accept united fronts with the CP. The Kyokai faction is sensitive to Moscow's conception of "Marxism-Leninism."

Against the Kyokai faction a bloc has been formed that amounts to the embryo of a possible center-left tendency in the SP. The two leaders of this bloc are Kozo Sasaki and Saburo Eda. Eda represents an openly right wing within the party. Sasaki, on the other hand, is one of the leaders of the left tendency in the SP, a tendency that was formed against Eda; he is pro-Chinese. But now they are making a bloc to oppose a coalition with the CP and are seeking to obtain a center-left government. It should be noted

that Peking had supported the Tanaka government (which caused some Japanese Maoists to refuse to advance slogans calling for the government's overthrow) and today would like to see a center-left coalition of the LDP, the Komei (Buddhist), and the SP, with the CP excluded. The Eda-Sasaki bloc is very weak in the trade-union movement in the public sector. It is now seeking to develop its influence among the bureaucracy of the trade-union movement in the private sector (that is, among the right wing of the trade-union apparatus).

As for the line of the Communist party, it has a classical popular-front orientation. It calls for the formation of a national democratic coalition government. This is the way the CP is reacting to its exclusion by the SP, the Eda-Sasaki bloc, and the Komei. The present proposal of the CP is for a CP-SP-Komei-DSP government. But it would accept a place for a bourgeois party in its so-called socialist coalition government. That is the general line of the CP.

This orientation must be understood in the framework of a particularly right-wing overall line. The Japanese CP has drawn the lessons of the Chilean coup in the following way: The army was provoked by the "radicalization" of the Socialist party. Consequently, the CP is more and more committed to defending the civil order of bourgeois democracy. This problematic dominates the whole of its policy.

Here are a few examples:

*In the trade unions the activity of the Japanese CP is further right than that of the SP bureaucracy in the Sohyo. The bureaucracy is prepared to organize some economic struggles, while the CP is very hesitant on this point. During the spring 1974 strikes, the Socialist bureaucracy was speaking of a general strike. At the same time, the CP was breaking the strike of the teachers. In doing this the CP explained that the teachers are not workers like the others, that they are responsible before the masses, and that they have to take account of the children, the parents, and the communities, and therefore cannot go on strike like that. You couldn't imagine a more conservative line! It was new for the Japanese CP.

*Another example: The CP is now waging a very vehement campaign against the Buraku Liberation League. (The Burakus are a *la, se* that was artificially excluded from the caste system when it was created in precapitalist Japan. They live together in the same villages and are confined to jobs that are considered "impure" by Buddhism, such as work in tanneries. In spite of the dissolution of the castes and the fact that no ethnic or religious difference separates them from other Japanese, the Burakus remain a minority that suffers discrimination, oppression, and superexploitation — INPRECOR.)

The Buraku movement has created its own radical and combative wing: the Buraku Liberation League. It has carried out many actions during the past ten or fifteen years, essentially in the municipalities and local areas, the "communities," as they are called in Japan. They have won important concessions in many municipalities. Recently, the movement took on a militant character. For two or three years the CP has been constantly denouncing the movement.

On several occasions the CP has divided the League and has formed blocs against it with traditional bourgeois currents in Japan. Today it explains that the League was formed by a gang of adventurers, that it is a violent group and that it is placing in question the gains that the League had previously won in the municipalities. This provoked the temporary breakup of the CP-SP municipal coalition in Tokyo, which backs up the present governor of the capital, Ryokichi Minobe. This coalition has been ruling in Tokyo for eight years. Its breakup meant the almost certain victory of the conservatives in the next elections. It took the intervention of French SP leader François Mitterrand, who passed through Japan three weeks ago, to pick up the pieces. But he didn't resolve the basis of the problem. Finally, in its government program the CP accepts the maintenance of the Self-Defense Forces, behind which the bourgeoisie is recomposing its army, disbanded after its defeat in the second world war.

At bottom, in face of the economic and social crisis and the consequent financial difficulties of the municipalities, the CP is asking the masses to accept a rationalization of the capitalist economy so as not to place in danger the "national unity" of the population. The CP has drawn the most rightist possible lessons from Chile. The Communist party represents a serious obstacle to the deepening of the class struggle in Japan.



INPRECOR. How does the coming campaign of struggle for wage increases look for this spring?

SAKAI. In 1974 inflation was the key question for the Japanese working class. During last year's spring labor offensive we saw a de facto general strike of several million workers (see INPRECOR, No. 7, September 5, 1974). Today the question of the economic recession has been added to that of inflation. Unemployment is becoming massive. According to official figures themselves, it is reaching 1 million and going even higher (in March the figure will reach 1,270,000), that is, about 2 percent of the work force. And these figures conceal a very high level of underemployment. Trade-union sources put

the number of unemployed at 2 million and the number of partially unemployed at between 2 and 4 million.

Layoffs and reductions of the workweek are above all affecting women, workers of the medium-sized factories, and temporary workers in the big companies (in which many workers benefit from the principle of "employment for life"). Overtime has been eliminated, and that deals a sharp blow to wages that have already been eroded by inflation.

The bourgeoisie is waging a very hard campaign against the coming mobilizations in defense of wages. And the CP is vehemently blocking the development of economic struggles. The traditional trade-union leaderships offer no solution to this problem. In the working class, the general tendency is toward an increase in combativity. But there is no alternative national leadership independent of the SP, CP, or DSP. The bourgeoisie is exerting pressure to make the trade-union apparatus accept the conditions to make the capitalist economy profitable, and the CP has already folded. The Sohyo is now preparing a special congress to discuss the spring struggles. There is little chance that the bureaucracy will be completely united.

We have to help in the development of uncompromising struggles against the bankruptcy of the traditional bureaucratized leaderships and against the popular-front line of the CP. An independent tendency has to be launched. We can predict that the trade-union right wing will increasingly run into difficulties, even in the backward sector, the private sector. We must thus prepare an intervention in this sector as well.

It is delicate to try to predict what will happen during the next spring campaign. But what must be noted is that the campaign will mark the opening of a new period of workers struggles dominated by the new national and international economic situation. It is in this context that we must understand the rightist evolution of the traditional leaderships and the importance that devolves on the struggle against the CP's orientation and for the establishment of an independent class-struggle tendency during the next two or three years. The political differentiation within the working class is going to accelerate. In fact, we are probably entering into a period of regroupment and recomposition of the workers movement.

We must intervene in this in an active, political, and internationalist way, not only with a view to forming a national class-struggle tendency, but also to closely linking the fight of the Japanese workers to the struggle being waged against Japanese imperialism in the entire region.

INPRECOR. To conclude, could you tell us something about the work of the Japanese section of the Fourth International?

SAKAI. In a short space it is impossible to describe all of our activities, which are very numerous today. And I have been out of Japan during the most recent actions we have waged. But I can give you an idea of the main themes of our intervention. I gave some examples of our activity in the factories and an analysis of our electoral campaign in the last interview (see INPRECOR, No. 7, September 5, 1974); so here I will mention some other areas.

We have just held a conference unifying the three revolutionary youth organizations that had existed previously (students, high-schoolers, and young workers). That was the founding conference of the Communist Youth League. (See "News of the Workers Movement" in this issue of INPRECOR for an account of the conference.)

We are also preparing the formation of a new socialist organization for women. Both the men and women militants of our movement are carrying on constant and growing work with women workers and with housewives in the popular neighborhoods, in the localities, and in the unions in order to unify their struggles in the same class front.

We have developed important work in solidarity with the movement against the Park dictatorship in South Korea. And we have begun work in solidarity with the battles being waged by the peoples of Southeast Asia against the neocolonial regimes. (See INPRECOR, No. 8, September 19, 1974.) We are participating especially in the Information Center on Asian Political Prisoners, while also continuing our own anti-imperialist work in East Asia.

Likewise, we are concretely manifesting our solidarity with the Buraku movement, especially around the trial of Kazuo Ishikawa, a young Buraku victimized by discriminatory "justice" and sentenced first to death, later to life imprisonment. On October 31, 1974, tens of thousands of people massed in front of the court in which the trial was going on. For its part, the Japanese CP held its own meeting, a very small one, and refused to join in the big demonstration because of the role played in it by the Buraku Liberation League. We are also continuing our activity in solidarity with the peasants of Sanrizuka in their decade-long struggle against the construction of the new international airport in Tokyo. (See INPRECOR, No. 7, September 5, 1974.) On October 10, 1974, some 5,000 people responded to the call of the Sanrizuka Peasant Union and met near the airport. We brought around 900 militants, the largest contingent of any organization. This assembly was a success; its function was to prepare

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the coming confrontations that will take place if the government tries to tear down the tower that the peasants have built on the runway to prevent the airport from being used. Some of our militants were arrested during the demonstration that followed the assembly. We now have excellent fraternal relations with the Sanrizuka Peasants Union.

We are also involved in antimilitarist activity, particularly around the trial of two soldiers who, along with three others, were discharged from the army for denouncing the U.S. and Japanese military occupation of Okinawa (in the Ryukyu Islands, where the Americans have built an immense base). The decision to discharge the soldiers is being appealed so that they can continue to work in the barracks. This campaign is not limited to antimilitarist propaganda; it also affects sections of the trade unions and mobilizes workers.

In a general sense, our situation is objectively favorable today. At the end of the 1960s there were nearly a dozen far-left groups. But during the years

1971-73 the explosion of student activities died out, and so did the activity of many other groups — or at least they declined markedly. Some of the largest organizations involved in this process are now engaged in internecine physical warfare — the "uchig-cha," which have already claimed many victims.

We can say that we are the only far-left organization that is nationally based and is really functioning politically in the present situation. This is the result of a process of degeneration of the Japanese far left which we have been able to escape.

We are now in position to try to win political hegemony in the far left during the coming two to three years. At the same time, the process of developing our organization must be carried on in an internationalist fashion. That is why we are intensifying our efforts to participate fully in the building of the Fourth International.

Paris, March 10, 1975

FOUNDING OF THE JAPAN COMMUNIST YOUTH LEAGUE



The founding conference of the Japan Communist Youth League was held in Tokyo January 31-February 1. Previously, there had been three youth organizations under the leadership of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League (JRCL), Japanese section of the Fourth International: the International Labor Committee, the Internationalist Communist Students League, and the Front of Internationalist High-Schoolers. For the past several years, the Japanese Trotskyists had been trying to form a single, unified communist youth organization of young workers, students, and high-schoolers. The founding of the Japan Communist Youth League marked the successful culmination of that attempt. The new organization has about 1,000 members, of which about

65% are young workers, 30% students, and 5% high-schoolers.

The founding conference was attended by more than 100 delegates and many observers coming from thirty cities throughout Japan. Solidarity messages were received from the comrades of the Daily Combatting Bulletin Group (Hong Kong), the Young Socialist Alliance (United States), and the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (France). The conference discussed and adopted an organizational report, a political report, and statutes. Ken Ishimari was elected national chairman, Kenichi Okado and Masaru Yokoi were elected national vice-chairmen, and Katsu Yasuda was elected national secretary.

On February 2 a mass rally attended by 1,400 people was held to celebrate the founding of the new organization. Speakers included Yoshii Iwasawa of the Sanrizuka-Shibayama Peasant Union Against the New International Airport, Eiichi Yamanishi, the oldest Trotskyist cadre in Japan, and others. Kazuo Ishikawa, a Buraku youth who has been imprisoned for many years, sent a solidarity message. Comrade Jiro Fujiwara, a representative of the Japan Revolutionary Communist League, gave a speech entitled "Let's fight together for our world revolution and the communist future." Comrades Anitar Cheng of the Daily Combatting Bulletin, Rich Finkel of the Young Socialist Alliance, and Leonard Olivier of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire also spoke to the rally. The final speaker was Comrade Ichiro Endo, the JRCL candidate for

Sendai municipal parliament.

The founding of the new youth organization marks a big step forward for the Japanese Trotskyist movement, a clear expression of the fact that the internal crises of the 1960s have been definitively overcome. All the other far-left and left-centrist tendencies and groups have proven politically bankrupt in the wake of the explosion of student radicalization of 1968-69. The Japanese section of the Fourth International, however, made impressive gains between 1971 and 1974, and the Japanese Trotskyist movement has now entered a new period of growth. The young worker, student, and high-school militants of the Japan Communist Youth League will fight to double and triple the size of their new organization during the coming period. ■

CAPE VERDE

FACING INDEPENDENCE

by C. GABRIEL

While Guinea-Bissau is independent today, the Cape Verde Islands are independent only on paper. For some time, the Portuguese government exerted pressure to make sure that the UPCV (Union of the Populations of Cape Verde), a puppet group composed of a few notables and prepared to accept the Spínolista principle of a "Portuguese-speaking Africa," would be represented in the government of the future state. One of the consequences of the events of September 28 in Portugal was the disappearance of Spínola and with him his claims on Cape Verde. The archipelago will attain independence on July 5; in the meantime, a government of transition has been set up composed of equal representation from Portugal and the PAIGC.

In conformity with the viewpoint of the PAIGC, the process now under way will include general elections to a national constituent assembly.

Two main concerns are animating the leadership of the PAIGC during this period of the final phase of colonialism: its political implantation and the process of unification with Guinea-Bissau. We will see further on how these two questions actually encompass the debates on the Guinean and Cape Verdian revolution as a whole.

For a number of objective reasons, the armed struggle did not develop in the Cape Verde Islands (inauspicious terrain, repression, low population, large emigration, etc.). Given the backdrop of these difficult conditions, the PAIGC for a long time groped

for a strategy for the liberation of the archipelago. Preparation for a military invasion, clandestine mobilization, and various other alternatives were considered.

In face of such conditions, the PAIGC found it very difficult to gain a base in Cape Verde before the overthrow of the Salazarist regime on April 25, 1974. This fact was indissolubly linked to the social structure of the islands and to the strategic responses that flowed from that structure.

The social structure of Cape Verde is more heavily differentiated than that of the Guinean countryside. (See INPRECOR, No. 14-15, December 12, 1974.) There is a class of local landed proprietors, a multitude of semiproletarianized small farmers, and sharecroppers, who represent the majority of the peasantry. Of 36,309 agricultural establishments, 10,937 are worked by their owners, 8,385 are worked by tenant farmers paying rent, and 16,987 are run by sharecroppers (the figures are pre-April 25). In addition, there are a significant number of agricultural wageworkers on the large estates, and there are also large- and small-scale traders, a petty bourgeoisie based in civil service and education, a tiny industrial proletariat, and a very large layer of lumpen born in the bosom of colonial rotteness.

The bulk of the proletariat emigrated from Cape Verde, generally going to Portugal, where there are now tens of thousands of Cape Verdian workers.

Such a social structure made very hazardous the sorts of precepts advanced by the PAIGC in Guinea according to which social differentiations were insufficient to "speak" of class struggle.

The PAIGC, with its multiclass conceptions, appealed pell-mell to the "toilers of the countryside and the cities, students, landowners, lawyers, functionaries and employees in commerce, doctors, engineers, teachers and instructors in high schools." The symbolic affirmation that "the land belongs to those who till it" was swamped in an appeal to all "high functionaries and well-to-do farmers and merchants," who have "the duty (?) to serve our people, the humble, anonymous Cape Verdian, our brother." (From the call to armed struggle in Cape Verde issued during the first few months of 1969.) More recently, in the "report on the situation in Cape Verde" presented to the United Nations by the PAIGC in March 1974, no reference is made to the question of an eventual redistribution of land after independence.

The PAIGC and the mass movement

The present situation must thus be viewed through the prism of the nationalist political line of the PAIGC, the catastrophic economic situation of the islands (which are permanently threatened by famine), and the spontaneous spirit of the mass movement.

After April 25, 1974, the PAIGC was faced with the imperative necessity of rapidly gaining political hegemony against the right-wing Spinoist currents, whose favorite ideological weapon was denunciation of "Guinean imperialism" on the islands. By all evidence, the PAIGC was victorious on this field and forced the Portuguese army to put a stop to the subversive activities of the Spinoist grouplets. Today the political hegemony of the PAIGC on the islands is an accomplished fact, although it is asserted unevenly.

The island of Santiago is especially well controlled and constitutes the nucleus around which the life of the party throughout the islands is organized. However, some islands where the PAIGC seems less well organized, São Vicente for example, have benefited from a more rapid rise of the mass movement because of the social problems that are posed there. The movement has taken the most diverse forms on the various islands: In Santiago land has been occupied; in Saint Nicolau the customs and police offices have been occupied; in Santo Antão the local offices of the administrator were seized and transformed into a crèche; in São Vicente a private radio station was occupied.

In this framework, the relations between the PAIGC and the Portuguese forces within the coalition government are determined by the relations between the PAIGC and the mass movement. Does the PAIGC seek to strengthen the mobilization of the masses, politicize it, and provide it with anticapitalist strategic objectives; or, on the other hand, does it "instrumentalize" the movement by retaining the idea of "national reconciliation" in order to utilize the movement tactically against the Portuguese?

It definitely seems that the leadership of the PAIGC has chosen the second attitude. For the most part, the PAIGC is refusing to counterpose itself to the mobilization of the masses, because establishing the relationship of forces it wants to achieve before July 5 can be carried out successfully only by gaining a deep popular base for the party. But also for the most part, the PAIGC is assigning a narrow function to this mobilization: to "support the party."

At the Sal airport, for example, the party proposed and organized people's control of outgoing travelers so as to prevent the flight of currency. It was also on the proposal of the party that the São Vicente radio station was occupied and that the dockers there organized vigilance pickets. But when the workers of a construction tool firm wanted to go on strike, the leadership of the PAIGC asked them to give up the idea because the government could not satisfy the request for wage increases. In fact, colonialism had established curious contracts between the state and the owner of this factory. It was stipulated that in the event of wage increases being granted the workers, the public treasury and not the employer would pay the supplementary wage bill. The attitude taken by the party was not to denounce this contract, to open the company's books, and to nationalize the enterprise if the owner refused to pay up. It preferred to guarantee "national reconciliation" by aborting the strike.

Contradictory relationships between the mass movement and the leadership of the PAIGC have also grown up around the agrarian question. Although an agrarian reform project is still awaited, the masses have initiated a movement of occupation of lands, setting up elected committees charged with sharing out various functions. Little by little in various areas there has spread a refusal to pay rent in kind to the "Morgados" (large landed proprietors). The PAIGC, it appears, has supported and even led these movements. It launched the beginning of a purge by calling for the imprisonment of some reactionaries. For example, in the Santa Cruz region of Santiago the banana plantation of Almeida Henriques, a Portuguese, was occupied, and Henriques was thrown into prison. But the mass movement did not at all stop in midstream; one Jorge Querido, a large landed proprietor and former leader of the

PAIGC before April 25, owes his salvation to the intervention of the PAIGC national leadership.

Finally, in certain areas, like Orgaos (Santiago), the peasant masses are more backward and impose a more flexible approach on the PAIGC militants. But for all that, there is no coherent PAIGC policy basing itself on the slogan of an agrarian reform that aims at drawing the poverty-stricken peasant masses into a social revolution. In the absence of such a line, the party's policy remains empirical, motivated by tactical considerations, and very often heterogeneous, depending on the local "sensibilities" of the existing structures. This is true in regard to the agrarian question and the question of economic development as well.

Economic aid

In face of the catastrophic economic situation, the leadership of the PAIGC has had to settle down to a twofold task: developing an emergency plan of financial and food aid, and developing a plan for industrialization in the medium term.

Portugal is extremely reluctant to aid Cape Verde while its own balance of payments is already grossly unbalanced; the direction of the international turn of Sylvinio Daluz in Cape Verde has been to diversify aid sources and to knock on all available doors.

It remains to be seen what implications this aid will have on the independence of the future Cape Verdian regime. Food aid from imperialist countries is known to rapidly become an effective weapon used to achieve the goal of political and economic domination. One can quote, for example, the director of the Food for Peace program, who stated that "the rapid arrival of American planes loaded with food after the earthquake disaster in Chile in 1960 did more for relations between Chile and the United States than any other American action taken during recent years." For the American administration, there is a constant and deliberate intent to use food aid as a vehicle for commercial penetration. "Those we aid today will be our customers tomorrow," said MacGovers, director of Food for Peace in 1960 and 1961.

Although the emergency plan is inevitable, and although aid must be requested from anyone, even from the devil himself, it is nonetheless tragic to see the leadership of the PAIGC asking for imperialist aid at the same time as it is resolutely (!) non-aligned. "Nonalignment" has never prevented the economic laws of the imperialist market from exerting themselves over all the contradictions of a transitional economy emerging from colonialism and devoid of a real anticapitalist program.

The Cape Verdian nation, like the Guinean nation, is today the target of the most sordid blackmail. All sides, whether it be the Stalinist leaderships or the imperialist states, are throwing themselves into trying to take advantage of the difficulties of the PAIGC in order to block any process of radicalization. The Arab oil-producing countries are proposing loans at 1 percent interest — but they are demanding to know in advance the economic or industrial project toward which the aid will go. Other proposals have come from the United States, France, Japan, West Germany, and even South Africa. The Belgian Petrofina company has proposed a refinery for São Vicente, with the state receiving 10 percent of production and having to purchase an additional 10 percent. This agreement is waiting to be signed, but it had already been concluded before April 25 — with the colonial regime.

This small archipelago is continuing to stimulate imperialist appetites. Its geographical position is of top importance for NATO. But the stakes go well beyond the strategic role of the Sal airport. In fact, in the uneven development of the liberation struggle in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, it has become obvious that during the past few months the masses of Cape Verde have been able to rapidly catch up to, and even go beyond, the level of mobilization, and above all the level of consciousness, of the Guinean masses. Such a turn is explained both by the social structure of Cape Verde and by the essential contribution made by the rapid politicization of Cape Verdian youth, especially the petty-bourgeois intellectual youth that attended universities in Portugal. This is very different from the situation prevailing in Guinea, where the party had its base essentially among peasant masses outside the urban centers.

The question of unification

This new uneven development of the political process in the two countries has in a certain sense blown away the fog and thus conferred on the Cape Verde Islands a role that is much more decisive than that conferred on them simply by their location in the Atlantic Ocean. Consequently, it is the development of struggles and debates in the party in Cape Verde that will rebound on the Guinean situation and that will partially orient the unfolding of events in the latter country. This is quite important in broaching the question of unity between Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

For a whole period the PAIGC leadership was content to justify the goal of unity solely on the basis of the historical ties between the two populations, especially the ties developed in the process of the struggle waged by the PAIGC itself. This is perfectly

AN ATTEMPTED COUP IN GUINEA

Six nights of curfew have enabled the PAIGC to stop an attempted coup organized by a group of former officers of the African commandos, Manuel Gardete (a former Guinean deputy), and Fernando Luna (former president of the Guinean colonial legislative assembly).

In INPRECOR No. 14/15 we wrote: "Those who were in the Portuguese military have been disarmed and sent back to their native villages. The pay they had been given (up through December) constitutes a small piece of capital that will allow them to take up agriculture again. Nevertheless, they are a potential counterrevolutionary force that must not be ignored." In face of these dangers, we counterposed to the PAIGC's "national reconciliation" a class analysis of urban Guinean society and the necessity for a popular mobilization around anticapitalist objectives. There is nothing to be gained from hiding from the masses the fact that the collaborator petty bourgeoisie will remain a reactionary social force for a long period; if it is hidden, there is a risk that the masses will not take to the streets when the confrontations with reaction come.

And yet, all this seems to astonish Victor Maria Sande, who stated in Dakar on March 24: "In September, when the PAIGC took possession of the zones that had not yet been under its control, it decided not to implement a general policy of purges and to exclude reprisals—in order to move in the direction of national reconciliation. In the long run(?), such a policy will inevitably create some problems."

valid and must constitute the principal argument. Nevertheless, to respond to reactionary maneuvers aimed at exacerbating racist prejudices between the two populations it is not sufficient simply to harp on Portuguese-speaking unity and unity in the party.

First of all, it must be recognized that a significant portion of the petty bourgeoisie of the Guinean towns is Cape Verdian and that the expression of anti-Cape Verdian racism against which it is necessary to fight partially masks an opposition to privileged layers among the poverty-stricken population. On the other side, it would be a serious mistake to ignore the Cape Verdian national question. That is why it is quite positive that some leaders of the PAIGC have for some months publicly affirmed the existence of two nations and their respective rights to self-determination in deciding the question of unity.

The only way to block imperialism's attempts to sow division is to take Cape Verdian national rights into consideration within the context of educating the masses in internationalism. This implies taking into consideration the interests of the Guinean and Cape Verdian popular masses, and not at all the interests of "all classes and layers." Unification must not allow a Cape Verdian merchant to exploit the workers of Bissau. What we want to speak about is an internationalist unification of the two peoples in struggle. But in that event, it is possible that a Mandjaque peasant in northern Guinea will not understand why

he is being spoken to about the common interests he has with the Cape Verdian peasant while he is not being spoken to about his Mandjaque cousin who lives only fifteen miles away on the other side of the Senegalese border.

In offering a partial response to the question of unification, the PAIGC is avoiding the question of strategic tasks in regard to the whole African revolution. The process of unification of these two countries must be saluted — but without blurring the essential point: The isolation of the Guinean revolution does not end with that unification; ending the isolation depends on the struggles of the whole region.

That is why it is perfectly irresponsible of the PAIGC to sign a communiqué with the Senegalese regime in which the two parties ". . . consider that there are no fundamental reasons (!) justifying a different international policy for the two countries, especially in the African sphere." The two countries being "conscious of the responsibilities incumbent on them in the maintenance of peace and security in conformity with the principles of the charters of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity." (Bissau, January 9.)

Further, it is important not to have any illusions about the solidity of unity between Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde in the framework of a nationalist state already marked by the stigma of bureaucratism and in which the most diverse tendencies are little by little moving toward confrontation.



The question of unification is also of great importance in stabilizing the authority of the Bonapartist state that is now taking shape. Since a significant part of the national leadership of the PAIGC is of Cape Verdian origin, its credibility among the urban masses of Guinea-Bissau requires that anti-Cape Verde chauvinist prejudices be broken down.

In Cape Verde, it will be necessary to define the type of army that will be set up; similar definition will be needed for the building of a trade-union movement. The same will be true in determining whether the trade unions will be independent of the party and the state. Unifying Guinea and Cape Verde will be all the more delicate for the leadership of the PAIGC in that the trade-union movements in the two countries have attained different degrees of organization and independence of the state apparatus. It will be necessary to choose between allowing one to be "contaminated" by the other or trying to force one to retreat to the level of the other.

The political life of the PAIGC in Cape Verde can only be very different from its political life in Guinea-Bissau. The political outlook of the young petty-bourgeois elements who went to Portuguese universities, where they have had contact with Portuguese revolutionary youth, has been broadened considerably. They have to reconcile their attachment and devotion to the nationalism of the PAIGC with a search for answers to political questions raised within the workers movement. Such a need can easily lead to pro-Chinese attractions — a petty-bourgeois attraction to the victories of the Chinese revolution over underdevelopment. But such a path, which makes great concessions to gradualist concep-

tions, adapts to, rather than confronts, the prevailing nationalism.

Warnings have already appeared in the PAIGC bulletins published in the Cape Verde Islands against "left and right opportunism"; there have also been long dissertations explaining that the demand for people's power can only mean strengthening of the party.

There will be imperialist plots against the nationalist Cape Verdian leadership. There will be many reactionary intrigues aimed at sweeping this archipelago back into the camp of neocolonialism. Preparation to meet such tests cannot be made by tactically manipulating the mass movement; rather, preparation must be made by systematically developing and politicizing the mass movement, by putting an end to the myth of national reconciliation, by formulating an anticapitalist program in the framework of an integrated strategy for the class struggle in the whole region.

But the PAIGC is already strongly committed to what it calls "nonalignment," and for many months African diplomacy has been weaving its net, fostering the line of the strongest inclination of the PAIGC's nationalism: opportunism.

It is very important for revolutionary Marxists to follow the situation in Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau, for the problems that are posed there, the question of unification, for example, must be at the center of our own political strategy in the African continent.

February 8, 1975

MOROCCO

THE PALACE FACES A CRISIS

by ABBAS TARIQ



HASSAN II

We are publishing below the second installment of "The Palace Faces the Crisis." The first installment appeared in INPRECOR, No. 21, March 13, 1975.

Response of the reformists

In Morocco, unlike a number of other colonial and semicolonial countries, popular mobilizations were never taken over by the so-called opposition parties. No sector of the bourgeoisie or the middle bourgeoisie was even in position to act as a transmission belt for the demands of the masses or to press the dynamic of these mobilizations through to the end. It is a historical fact that the bourgeoisie in the colonial countries is incapable of really and completely carrying out the bourgeois-democratic tasks of national liberation; but the Moroccan bourgeoisie was never even in power. The state power in Morocco is not the expression of a balance among the ruling classes (the petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie), but rather is a monarchy that has up to now been absolute. Hence, the bourgeois-democratic and nationalist movement, even though hybrid in character, has sought since 1956 (when formal independence was won) to develop a program of bourgeois political independence and order within the framework of the state institutions of the monarchist regime.

Thus, in the cases of the Istiqlaal party, the UNFP, and even the PPS, it was not only that they restricted themselves to a legalism bordering on fear and opportunism; they also sought state mediation with the crown in order to arrive at the application of the bourgeois program necessary for the historic development of the interests of the bourgeoisie and its allies.

All these formations regard the structural crisis of the regime as an opportunity to realize this perspective in the short term. Their response to the "openings" of the regime could only be positive: insofar as the regime is prepared to integrate them politically, their regroupment on the basis of a minimum program in the framework of a homogeneous national front is for them the best way to achieve the progressive democratization of the regime.

1. It is in this general framework that the Istiqlaal party held its ninth congress, the resolutions of which reflected the changes that have occurred. These resolutions called for:

- *The liberation of plundered territory; democracy and egalitarianism.
- *National unity around a common program.
- *Popular sovereignty, separation of powers, delimitation of responsibilities.
- *Democratic rights.
- *Sliding scale for wages and prices; institution of a law on the control of the amassing of wealth.
- *Arabization, Arab unity.

And, in the economic field, the conference demanded:

- *Nationalization of the banks, insurance companies, credit agencies, and steel, mining, and pharmaceutical industries.
- *A plan of industrialization, co-management, and agrarian reform.

In short, the consistent program of a national bourgeoisie that favors the constitution of an anti-imperialist national front in the purest tradition of the Latin American bourgeois movements of the Perons and the Belaundes.

2. The Stalinists echoed this program when, on the occasion of the legalization of their party, the PPS, which wants to be "a revolutionary vanguard party of the working class," they made public their own demands. The PPS, while calling for the liberation and recovery of plundered territory, will work "for respect for the rights of citizens, the expansion of democratic rights, the release of all political prisoners, and the return of all exiles. Nationalization of the key sectors of the economy, a vast industrialization program, modernization of agriculture, and an agrarian reform. The struggle against inflation, injustice, and inequality, Moroccanization, Arabization and generalization of education, and the establishment of a vast social program. The PPS supports the Palestinian, Arab, African, and international struggles."

Thus, the PPS remains faithful to the line of revolution by stages and interclass alliances. Ali Yata had clearly said so as long ago as 1958, when he said: "In the present phase of the formation of the state and of national society, we must consider that the consolidation of independence and unity takes priority over any other concern and that the prestige of the sovereign is now the best guarantee of both. Hence our support, which is based on a community of interest and objectives with monarchist and bourgeois nationalism. Capital has a historic role to play in our country."

Today, nearly twenty years later, given the fact that the democratic tasks have still not been carried out, the Stalinists cannot but consider even more firmly that capital and the monarchy yet have a

historic role to play. Their response to the crisis is fully in consonance with bureaucratic logic: a national front and a common program of government.

3. Between the bourgeois pole represented by the Istiqlaal party (and, recently, by the new Progressive Liberal party, a structure that unites technocrats, industrial managers, and shopkeepers) and the Stalinist-reformist pole represented by the PPS, there is the petty-bourgeois pole of the UNFP. This formation, which emerged out of the heterogeneous nationalist magma of the 1950s, grew up within the Istiqlaal party and left this party along with the partisans of the mass movement of Ben Barka, Abdullah Ibrahim, and Bouabid. The charter of the UNFP, written in 1959, asserts: "There are no contradictions among the interests of the various social layers of the Moroccan people; only their unity can defeat the aims of the imperialists and assure the realization of the national objectives."

The UNFP remained within the limits of a bourgeois program, although it broke with the priests of the Istiqlaal party and developed a genuine mass base among the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie (small functionaries, middle-level managers, teachers, professors, students). Except during a "left" phase opened in May 1962 by Ben Barka, who was influenced by the Castroist current (a phase that was brought to a quick end), the UNFP has consistently been racked by many contradictions, which are above all the expression of the various currents within it.

The UNFP went through a number of turns ranging from the "foco" conspiracy to the legalist tactic of the National Opposition Front with the Istiqlaal party; it was under constant centrist pressure from its student ranks. Finally, in July 1972 the party broke into two wings: the Rabat branch, led by Bouabid, which is now the USFP, and the Casa-

TABLE OF ORGANIZATIONS

<u>UNFP</u>	Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (National Union of Popular Forces), result of a split from the Istiqlaal party. Principal leader: Ibrahim.
<u>USFP</u>	Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (Socialist Union of Popular Forces), arose in 1972 from the Rabat branch of the UNFP. Principal leader: Bouabid.
<u>UMT</u>	Union Marocaine du Travail (Moroccan Union of Labor), trade union whose apparatus is under the influence of the UNFP. Principal leader: Ben Sedik.
<u>PI</u>	Parti Istiqlaal (Independence party).
<u>PPS</u>	Parti du Progrès et du Socialisme (Party of Progress and Socialism, formerly the Communist party). Principal leader: Ali Yata.



Paris demonstration for the release of Moroccan political prisoners.

blanca branch, led by Abdullah Ibrahim and Ben Sedik, which still controls the trade-union apparatus of the UMT. Both wings claim allegiance to scientific socialism. The USFP, theorizing its own impasse and right-wing orientation, states: "The active presence of our organization and its growing combativity have made it the principal partner to which the regime has recourse in calling for dialogue every time it has to confront crises." (Bouabid.)

The dialogue is open and its backdrop is known.

The USFP has chosen the PPS as its special partner, without always following the PPS completely in its political myopia. Nevertheless, the USFP, conscious of the crisis of imperialism, does not at all rule out a third attempted coup by the army.

For the moment, the strategy of the USFP is centered around the notion of flexible unconditional negotiation with the regime along with the other political forces; but should the process of democratization be aborted, Bouabid thinks, the army may well take the reins of power, "not necessarily in order to hold onto it," he says, "for there are also 'Portuguese' in the Moroccan army."

4. As for the UNFP, because of its proletarian base (in the UMT) it is seeking to capture the radicalization of a number of sectors by making use of the trade-union apparatus it commands; hence its differentiation from the other political currents.

The UNFP presents itself, or tries to present itself, as an alternative radical pole that, while it remains within the framework of the negotiations now going

on, does not want to become the goat of the farce by placing itself completely in the tow of the bourgeoisie (the Istiqlal party). In the last instance, everything will depend on the relationship of forces between the classes. A favorable relationship of forces could accelerate the revolutionary dynamic; in the event of a defeat for the mass movement, an unfavorable relationship of forces could assure the maintenance of the monarchist dictatorship and its bourgeois and petty-bourgeois allies.

Today, regardless of the tactical divergences among the various political formations, all of them, from the Istiqlal party to the UNFP to the USFP to the PPS, are aiming at gaining access to governmental responsibilities. The possibility of the political parties' gaining such access results from the elements described in the first part of this article. The classical opponents of the regime, represented by these parties, are now trying through the crudest and most demagogic behavior to raise themselves above the reality of the class struggle and to speak in the name of the entire Moroccan "nation."

Thus, the role of these parties today is that of a contributing force, a "constructive opposition" offering advice and lending support to the "positive aspects" of the government's policy, trimming on the analysis of the period, imperialism, and the character of the regime. Class collaboration and unprincipled alliances are the gifts these parties are offering the regime in exchange for their economic and political integration into the state apparatus. None of these political formations has initiated any process of mass mobilization or de-

manded the restoration of democratic rights. As paradoxical as it may seem, their role is that of flatterer of the royal power; they portray King Hassan as the champion of the "national" cause, the champion of democratic rights. It is a sad masquerade that only strengthens the rotten regime and sanctions its policy of theft, exploitation, and repression.

Response of the revolutionaries and its limits

The recent developments in the colonial revolution (Vietnam, Palestine, the Arab-Persian Gulf), the current rise of revolution in the world, and the crisis of Stalinism compounded by the crisis of the world capitalist system, have not failed to have effects on radicalized youth in Morocco. The new left in Morocco emerged in the context of the rise of the Arab revolution and the development of the pole of attraction constituted by the Palestinian resistance. Having gone through the experience of and having often paid the price for successive betrayals by the reformists of the UNFP and the Stalinists, some militants broke ideologically and politically with these two tendencies and left the UNFP and the CP in 1969 and 1970 to organize themselves in the Progressive Front.

The Marxist-Leninist revolutionary left has expressed itself continually on the field of social and political struggle ever since its emergence, particularly through the vehicles of the two best-known organizations: Allal-Aman (Forward), which arose out of the CP, and the March 23 Movement (named after the March 23 events in the UNFP). The objective of the revolutionary left is to transform itself into a revolutionary instrument, which the working masses now lack. The existence of this revolutionary force, its analyses and its struggle, illustrates the gigantic gap both between the masses and the regime and between the masses and those who falsely claim to represent them.

The repression that is hitting these revolutionary militants is easier for the regime to carry out in that it comes at a time when "National Unity," sacred union, is beginning to become the watchword. The revolutionary left has risen courageously against the national chauvinist position of the bourgeois, petty-bourgeois, and Stalinist parties on the question of the Sahara. It has posed the problem of "Spanish" Sahara and its solution in the framework of the common struggle of the Moroccan masses and those of the Sahara against both the monarchy and direct or indirect colonialism and for national and social liberation. The other, no less important, aspect of the struggle of this Marxist-Leninist left is the fight against the class collaborationist policy of the parties that claim to be in opposition to the palace.

For us, the revolutionary Marxists of Morocco, the emergence of this revolutionary force is a historic event that we salute; its struggle is ours and we will work side by side to lay the real programmatic political bases necessary for the construction of a revolutionary party. We can say right now that whatever other differences may separate us, no progress can be made in the realm of developing a strategy unless it falls within the strategic framework of the Arab revolution. Our programmatic, strategic, and tactical initiatives should not be confined to the narrow framework of the "Moroccan state," nor should they be oriented solely toward the construction of a national democratic and popular "Moroccan" regime.

Arab Trotskyist militants have drawn the lessons of the Algerian and Palestinian revolutions. There is no bourgeoisie throughout the Arab countries that is in position to lead a bourgeois-democratic revolution in each country or each state. If the democratic and bourgeois tasks have not yet been carried out (agrarian reform, national unification, consistent anti-imperialist struggle), this does not mean that there must be a distinct stage of the revolution devoted to the accomplishment of these tasks and divorced from a second, socialist stage. There is a link between the bourgeois and democratic tasks and the socialist tasks, but they are not at all separated in time, nor is there any necessity to form an "alliance of different blocs." For us, revolutionary Marxists, these tasks are not only not limited to the borders of a single Arab country, they are also manifestations of the form of domination imperialism exerts over the Arab peoples and the bourgeoisie presently in power. This poses the necessity of viewing the realization of the democratic tasks within the overall strategy of the Arab socialist revolution, whose social forces are and will remain the proletariat allied to the poor peasantry. In our Arab-wide strategic conception this is concretized through the Bolshevik slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

For all the Arab peoples, the only alternative in the era of imperialism remains: socialist revolution or gorilla dictatorship. It is within the context of this strategic axis that the unity of the Arab nation can be attained, which means the unification of the Arab market by nationalizing all foreign trade and centralizing distribution and by carrying out a radical agrarian reform based on the mobilization of the masses of poor peasants.

The Arab revolution will be socialist or there will be no Arab revolution. It will triumph throughout the whole Arab region by unifying the great geographical units of the Arab nation (the Maghreb, the Arab East, the Nile Valley) within the framework of a socialist federal Arab republic. It is in this framework and around this program that the Moroccan militants are struggling. ■




*news of the
workers movement
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REVOLUTIONARY MARXIST JOURNAL IN HUNGARIAN...

For the first time, a revolutionary Marxist publication has begun to appear in Hungarian. It is called *Levegot* and will appear in the form of regularly published collections. The first issue is devoted to documents related to the December 1970 strikes of the Polish workers in the Baltic ports and to the movement of Polish students in 1968. The "open letter" of Kuron and Modzelewski was also published in the first issue.

U.S.A.

UNIONS CALL RALLY FOR JOBS



The AFL-CIO has called a nationwide "Rally for Jobs Now" to be held in Washington on April 26. The rally is being sponsored by the Industrial Union Department of the labor federation, a subdivision that includes fifty-eight AFL-CIO unions with about six million workers. The rally is the first such action planned on a national scale by the AFL-CIO.

The fact that the reactionary leadership of the national trade-union federation has called for workers to demonstrate in large numbers testifies to the depth of anger developing in the American working class as a result of mounting unemployment. Official government statistics, which understate the case considerably, place unemployment at more than 8%,

with more workers listed as unemployed than at any time since the 1930s — 7.5 million. If one also includes those who are not counted in the government's statistics — workers who can only find part-time work and workers the government classifies as having stopped "actively" looking for work — the total number of unemployed is in the range of 12-13 million. And the prospect ahead is not very hopeful: Ford's own budget foresees an official unemployment rate averaging 8.1% in 1975 and 7.9% in 1976. Only by 1980 is it projected to fall to 5.5% — a level politically acceptable to the ruling class. And this is an optimistic projection!

The most exploited sectors of the working class — women and oppressed nationalities — have been hardest hit by unemployment. The unemployment rate for Black workers is twice as high as for whites. Among Black teenagers, the official unemployment rate stands at more than 35% — and it is even higher in some areas!

Workers in some industries such as construction and automobile manufacturing have also been affected far more than the average. In construction, the unemployment rate is more than 15%. In Detroit, where 300,000 workers are employed in automobile manufacturing in peak periods, the official unemployment rate has reached 23%. The situation in Detroit has also affected Black workers especially severely, since they comprise a relatively high proportion of automobile workers in the city. In some areas of the Black community in Detroit unemployment has reached levels of 36-62%.

In this situation demonstrations demanding jobs have been held in several cities under the auspices of the trade unions. In New York City some 12,000 angry construction workers marched on City Hall on February 27. (Out of 95,000 members of the building-trades unions in New York, there are 21,000 unemployed.) It was a very militant demonstration, despite the attempt by the union bureaucrats to dampen the possibilities for the workers to express their rage. In California, where a million workers are unemployed, the California Labor Federation (AFL-CIO)

sponsored a march of 2,000 people on the state capitol in Sacramento on March 8. And on February 5, about 10,000 unemployed auto workers marched on Washington demanding jobs.

These demonstrations, although small in comparison with the potential, nevertheless represent a positive step in beginning to rally the tremendous strength of the organized trade-union movement in a fight for jobs. So far, the trade-union bureaucrats have hesitated to call for mass actions, or have organized such actions in a very timid fashion. But if any serious effort at all were put into the April 26 rally, there would be little trouble in gathering a crowd of 50,000 to fill the seats of Kennedy Stadium in Washington. Whether this effort will be made remains to be seen. Some large unions, such as the International Union of Electrical Workers and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, are organizing buses in several cities to build the rally. In New York City, several unions that had already been planning for a march on Washington have thrown their efforts behind the April 26 call and are expected to contribute significantly to the turnout. The Washington rally has also received the enthusiastic endorsement of the Coalition of Labor Union Women and the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists.

Peter Camejo and Willie Mae Reid, Socialist Workers party candidates for president and vice-president in 1976, issued a statement giving full support to the April 26 rally for jobs. They called for "independent action by the labor movement, mobilizing in a vast show of strength, to force the government to act. April 26 can be the beginning." The SWP has made the fight for jobs a major theme of its propaganda campaign. Popularly written campaign literature — particularly "A Bill of Rights for Working People" and "Why Can't Everybody Have a Job?" — is being distributed on a wide scale. Among the key demands being raised in this campaign are calls for a shorter workweek with no reduction in pay, a massive public works program by the federal government, and union-scale wages for all unemployed workers. ■

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