


# unporrecor

international press correspondence



**Spain:**  
**TOWARD**  
**THE OVERTHROW**  
**OF**  
**THE BLOODY**  
**DICTATORSHIP**

fortnightly,  
N° 34, September 25, 1975

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Georg Jungclas  
1902-1975



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# toward the overthrow of the bloody dictatorship

While the moribund Francoist dictatorship is intensifying its repressive measures against the mass movement and its vanguard beyond all limits, a protracted political general strike is going on in Euzkadi (the Basque country) and the solidarity movement is spreading, although unevenly, throughout the territory of the Spanish state. More than ever, the development of solidarity against the bloody Francoist repression, to save the lives of José Garmendia, Angel Otaegui, and the five militants of the FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico — Antifascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front) is a central task of the international workers and revolutionary movement.

We are publishing below an interview, taken September 13, with a member of the Political Bureau of the Liga Comunista Revolucionaria/Euzkadi ta Askatasuna-VI (Revolutionary Communist League/Basque Nation and Freedom-Sixth Congress) analyzing the reasons for the regime's current policy and the development of workers struggles in Euzkadi from the general strike of December 11, 1974, to the general strike of September 11-12, 1975.

We are also publishing the text of the united general strike call issued on a united-front basis by all the reformist and revolutionary organizations in the Basque country. This call was published in the September 10 issue of Combate, central organ of the LCR/ETA-VI, which has just become a fortnightly, despite the difficult underground conditions.

In addition, we are publishing the "open letter" sent by the LCR/ETA-VI to all the workers organizations; it deals with the urgency of developing solidarity with Euzkadi throughout the territory of the Spanish state. Finally, we are publishing a resumé of Spanish solidarity activities in Europe.

1.

# INTERVIEW WITH A COMRADE OF THE LCR/ETA-VI

**Question.** Could you explain the meaning of the recent decree-law "against terrorism" and the political context in which it was issued?

**Answer.** The most immediate reason for the passing of this decree-law lies in the extraordinary political general strike movement of June 11 in Euzkadi, the general strike against the state of exception that was imposed there. The regime, whose fundamental basis is repression, applied the most brutal repressive measures it could muster, and after two months they saw the result: 100,000 strikers against the state of exception during the month of June. This strike marked the failure of the state of exception. So the dictatorship looked for other measures. These repressive measures indicated that the Francoist dictatorship was abandoning what some people had called an "evolution" toward an "opening," a political "recomposition." More and more, the regime's policy boils down to the utilization of the repressive apparatus. Nonetheless, the internal contradictions are multiplying, and today they even affect the army. For instance, opposition to the Francoist dictatorship has been publicly expressed among the officer corps. This opposition is called the Military Democratic Union. It is difficult to say how large this group is numerically (probably it's a few hundred officers), but it has a certain audience and is composed of prestigious officers. These officers have taken political positions that fall within the bourgeois framework, to be sure, but this nevertheless reveals the contradictions that exist within the army.

To these contradictions within the military hierarchy has been added the development of rank-and-file organization among the soldiers, especially in Euzkadi. The emergence of the first soldiers committees is very important.

If you consider that the military war council is expected to hand down about a dozen death penalties during the coming month, you can see how important it is for the dictatorship to make the army come forward as the protector of its power and as the guarantor of the action of the repressive forces. The regime is worried about the contradictions that are beginning to undermine it. In the midst of the state of exception, General Coloma, the army chief of staff, visited the Euzkadi barracks and affirmed: "We stand behind you." He was trying to boost the rather low morale of his troops.

In addition to this situation in the army, you have to add the fact that a sector of the bureaucracy brought up by Francoism has taken an open position in favor of a process of institutionalization; obviously, they want this to take place within the framework of a strong state — but outside the dictatorial framework, which doesn't allow the political forces of the bourgeoisie to function at all.

In this context, the dictatorship is seeking to use the actions of the FRAP and the ETA-V (the politico-military faction) as a pretext to launch a desperate offensive against the mass movement. This offensive is accompanied by a press campaign against "terrorism," the brutality and violence of which have not at all achieved the success the regime had hoped for, and that itself is an expression of the process of decomposition of the dictatorship. There are many instances of resistance to the most repressive aspects of the decrees. There is an ultrarigid censorship which is throwing the news system back to the situation of the 1940s; the response has been large-scale nighttime listening to the CP radio that broadcasts from Paris. The censorship has also led to the widespread practice of circulating information in the form of photocopied articles from *Le Monde*, and so on. A photocopied editorial from *Le Figaro* is considered a leaflet violating the articles, decrees, and laws against terrorism. It is impossible for lawyers to defend people accused of breaking these laws, and the lawyers themselves can be accused of collaboration with terrorism at any time. Finally, this decree-law obviously has a well defined function in repressing revolutionary militants and serves as a pretext for the harshest penalties.

These repressive measures are being used on a mass scale. The right of habeas corpus has been suspended and the legal limit for detention without trial has been extended from three to ten days. And ten days of torture is a very long time. Political prisoners can no longer communicate with their lawyers. Since August 28, lawyers for prisoners in the Basauri prison have been unable to communicate with the prisoners; they no longer receive the special permits needed to visit the prisoners. You can see the violence of these decrees being applied at all levels. One example: a 12-year-old child was arrested by the Guardia Civil because he had telephoned a newspaper in Saragossa saying he was going to plant a bomb. He was accused of

**'If the regime carries out the death sentences, the level of mass response could rise. If it retreats, that would represent an enormous victory. This expresses the impasse and crisis of the Francoist dictatorship.'**

terrorism. Another example, at another level: In Pamplona in the Super-Ser factory an employer who is supposed to be a "progressive" threatened during a meeting of workers that anyone who spoke in an assembly or mobilized would be denounced to the police as having violated the decree-laws. But it should be stressed that there has been direct or concealed resistance to these decrees at all levels. This appears in a distorted way in the front-page articles published in the press. Obviously, the most important thing that has to be pointed out is that even though the repressive arsenal is being utilized at full capacity, a protracted general strike is developing in the Basque country to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui. That is the best expression of the dictatorship's inability to roll back the mass movement.

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**Q.** What is the relationship between the general strikes in Euzkadi on August 28 and 29 and the beginning of September and the preceding strikes of December 1974 and June 1975?

**A.** We have to point out that these three strike movements — December, June, and August/September — developed in Euzkadi, but their influence was felt throughout the Spanish state, in an expanding way among the political and workers vanguard. They expressed the fact that Euzkadi is the key link in the Spanish situation as a whole. We have to take account of the uneven development of the struggle. That is the point of departure, and the important thing is to grasp this fact of life in order to transform the uneven aspect into a combined aspect. In a certain sense, you can say that the strikes in Euzkadi have a decisive importance nationally, but are still limited geographically. But the geographic limitation must not make us fall into a position that would stress only the unevenness of these developments; on the contrary, we have to understand the potential of what is now going on and the crucial role the struggles in Euzkadi can have on a national scale.

**L.S.'s** make a comparison of the three strike movements. On December 11, the thing that was decisive about the political general strike (which is a rarity in the European workers movement) was that it demonstrated that it was actually possible to hold a general strike.

Better yet, it was possible even against the will and actions of the reformists of the Spanish Communist party, for the strike was convoked by the workers commissions. December 11 demolished the CP argument that a general strike is an adventure, that conditions for a general strike do not yet exist, that you have to wait until the Junta Democrática is built before engaging in such a movement. (The Junta Democrática, Democratic Council, is the bloc of bourgeois and workers parties established last year under the aegis of the CP — INPRECOR.) December marked the break with this type of argument.

June 11 represented mass defiance of the state of exception. It was the proof that it was possible to respond throughout the whole Spanish state, even against the toughest measures of the dictatorship.

The meaning of August 28 can be summed up in three points: First, it was a protracted political general strike, the first in the postwar history of the Spanish workers movement. It didn't happen by accident. It was the result of long preparation. Ever since June 12 the vanguard had been working in the neighborhoods and factories to prepare this strike to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui. The second characteristic is that it was initiated by a very broad political front of revolutionary and reformist organizations. The third characteristic is that it developed in a general situation in which the dictatorship was using all its repressive force without managing to break the movement; that is, the strike occurs on the threshold of the fall of the dictatorship.

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**Q.** What are the main features that shaped the strike movement?

**A.** First of all, I should point out that if there was an unevenness in the development of the struggles on a national scale, there was also an unevenness among the provinces of Euzkadi. The highest level of struggle was reached in Vizcaya (Biscay) and Guipúzcoa. The first characteristic was the very large number of strikers. There were about 150,000 on August 28 and 29, about 60,000-100,000 on September 1 and 2 and again on September 11 and 12. The second characteristic, and the most important one at bottom, is the or-

ganization of the movement and the confidence of the masses in the vanguard. This relationship of confidence between the political vanguard and the mass movement is most developed in Guipúzcoa. That is where the prestige of the revolutionary organizations is greatest, as was already demonstrated in December and June.

The vanguard had played a decisive role in the development of these strikes and the relationship of forces in this region between the vanguard and the traditional parties shifted in favor of the vanguard. This relationship of confidence between the political vanguard and the mass movement was reflected in the fact that the call for the general strike issued by the general strike committee of Euzkadi was broadly followed. The general strike committee called for the strike September 3 and raised the slogan for the September 11 and 12 strikes, asking the workers to go back to work between September 3 and September 11. The workers responded very clearly, returned to work on September 4 because the strike committee told them to. And when they returned to work on September 4, they knew that they would go into struggle again on September 11.

The third characteristic, just as important, was the development of forms of self-organization. For instance, the general strike was called by a strike committee that took the form of a united front of workers organizations. This time, it was not the workers commissions that played such an important role, but the united front. Next, we have to stress that wherever there were divisions (because of the existence of workers commissions influenced by various organizations), there was a tendency to overcome this division on the zonal or factory scale through the construction of adequate coordinating bodies. At Naval, for example, the big factory in Bilbao (a city of 500,000) — where there are CP workers commissions as well as workers commissions influenced by the far left and by the UGT (Union General de Trabajadores — General Union of Workers) and where in addition there is a division between temporary and permanent workers — a united committee to develop the movement was formed in order to overcome these divisions. In Valle del Urola this unity was established in the form of interfactory committees. In the Rentería zone (about 100,000 inhabitants, the city itself has 30,000) the unification took place through the establishment of assemblies of "luchadores" (worker militants). In Guipúzcoa there were many "mountain" committees (the name derives from the fact that the meetings were held on the hill-sides). In Guipúzcoa there is something of a tradition of struggle against the dictatorship, which took the form of political "excursions." These "mountain" assemblies emerged as organs to direct the strike, and the strike committee acted as a sort of executive.

In Vizcaya, where the vanguard is weaker and the CP and the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español — Spanish Socialist Workers party, the Social Democracy) are relatively stronger, zonal strike committees emerged to unify the movement. We should stress the absence of rank-and-file assemblies in the factories in Guipúzcoa. This explains the secondary role of the

workers commissions in this strike, despite the fact that the level of mobilization in this region was extremely high; there were no assemblies in the factories, and the organization of the struggle took place through other channels. In Navarra, on the other hand, there were more movements at the factory level even though the overall level of struggle was lower; this was an expression of the more syndicalist-type education that has been conducted in this region by the centrist ORT (Organización Revolucionario de los Trabajadores — Revolutionary Workers Organization). In spite of all the differences, however, it is important to note that there was a general tendency to try to develop unifying instruments associating the maximum number of workers in order to raise the struggle to a very high level. Finally, we should stress the politicization and the extreme combativity. That was expressed in many different ways. I will show you how this was shown in relation to self-defense.

At the Babcock factory in Vizcaya (4,500 workers), the workers met in an assembly, and when they tried to leave they noticed that the plant was being watched by the special police. They then took the benches in the locker rooms, armed themselves with gasoline cans and various other instruments, and left the factory, shouting "Charge!" The cops had to disperse and could arrest only a few workers who were at the rear of the contingent. At Lequeitio in Vizcaya province 1,500 people in a town of 6,000 demonstrated in front of the barracks of the Guardia Civil, who hid inside and pointed their guns at the demonstrators, but remained behind the windows. That is an indication of the level of combativity of the masses.

In Algorta in Vizcaya there were five or six demonstrations of more than 1,000 people. The antirepression committee includes 300 people on a permanent basis. Actions were undertaken and prisoners were released after having been seized by the BPS (the Political Social Brigade, one of the divisions of the political police). Finally, and this is essential for the future, the Rentería strike committee set up a permanent self-defense committee that will prepare demonstrations, assure their defense, and so on.

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**Q.** Could you explain the reasons for the uneven development and the problems that this can pose?

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
**A.** On the scale of the whole territory of the Spanish state, the uneven development must be understood on the one hand on the basis of the historical differences in the training of the working class, the differences in the tradition, and so on, and, on the other hand, on the basis of the forty years of Francoist dictatorship. Hence, uneven development, which was already a characteristic of the period of the rise of the Spanish revolution, continues to be a characteristic today. The essential problem in breaking through this uneven development is to initiate mass solidarity with Euzkadi. The forms of solidarity can be different.

Obviously, Barcelona constitutes the key point if this solidarity is to have an impact in mobilizing the heavy battalions of the working class. The CP has an especially great responsibility for the limited development of mass solidarity. But, without being too self-congratulatory, we must say that with the exception of the LCR/ETA-VI nearly all the organizations of the so-called revolutionary left have failed to develop solidarity work to the level that is required by the political conjuncture. The problem of uneven development is tragic on two levels: In Euzkadi the mass movement may quickly begin to feel isolated and could then start to hesitate. At another level, that of the political vanguard, a feeling of powerlessness could arise in face of the inability to develop solidarity. Finally, this problem of uneven development has to be considered in relation to the conjuncturely difficult general situation. In a number of regions the very high rate of unemployment is strengthening the impact of the repression by the employers. The workers are afraid of losing their jobs. The decree-law increases the risks of solidarity action. And finally, the lack of information, which has not been counterbalanced by a systematic effort on the part of the revolutionary organizations, diminishes awareness of the level of struggle that has been attained in the Basque country and of the great defeat that this struggle already represents for the dictatorship. Nevertheless, we have to stress that there has been progress in solidarity over the past several months, and even between August 28 and September 11-12. For instance, in various cities there have been vanguard demonstrations of between 100 and 1,000 people. Propaganda and agitation is going on, despite the weaknesses. Today, in addition to solidarity with Garmendia and Otáegui, we need solidarity with the FRAP militants the dictatorship wants to murder, hoping that there will be a weaker response than there was during the trial of Garmendia and Otáegui. It is essential that we take up solidarity with these comrades, regardless of the political criticisms we may make of the initiatives taken by the FRAP. This movement against the death penalties will be combined with the movements around the renewing of labor contracts, which is going to start in October and end in January. The situation is thus extremely favorable to making a breakthrough in the movement throughout the territory of the Spanish state.

To end with, I would like to add that the level attained by the movement in Euzkadi must be understood on the basis of the long period of preparation that was systematically carried on beginning last June. There has been no similar preparation in the rest of the Spanish state, and you have to take this into account in judging the situation.

**Q.** Could you trace out what has been the policy of the Spanish CP?

**A.** First of all, I want to insist on the fact that the CP, because of its position and influence, could have played a key role in the development of solidarity.



Carrillo

Second, there is a difference between the CP's general position and its practice during the latest mobilizations in Euzkadi. The CP is weaker in these provinces; it doesn't control the movement; the relationship of forces with the far left is different; and because of all this, the CP's tactical adaptation is understandable.

The CP signed the September 11-12 general strike appeal and it pushed for the mobilization. On August 28 and 29, on the other hand, it tried to slow the movement down by systematically supporting the most right-wing positions in the Euzkadi general strike committee. But the most important thing is that in spite of its big statements on the radio elsewhere, within the Spanish state the CP did nothing to develop solidarity. It did nothing to centralize the movement on the scale of the whole state; the only thing the CP tried to do was to grab hold of the tiger in the Basque country so as to be in a good position in case the movement really took off. Also, the CP took positions that can only be called scandalous; these positions were directed more to the bourgeois right than to the workers movement. For instance, the CP declared that terrorism cannot be combatted with the methods of the dictatorship, which means implicitly that there are better ways to fight terrorism, or, for instance, statements like "We are all responsible for what is going on in the country."

Beyond these considerations, perhaps the most important point is that neither the Junta Democrática nor the Convergencia Democrática (a similar body established under the aegis of the Social Democracy — IN-PRECOR) played any role in Euzkadi. The level of the

mass movement exposed the inadequacy of these types of instruments and the CP had to opt for the road of united-front participation in the strike committees.

It was in Barcelona that the CP's responsibility was greatest. It did nothing. This cannot go on without raising problems within the CP. There are already some signs. In Guipúzcoa there was a small split. A tendency developed a position critical of the rightist line adopted by the CP leadership, especially in Barcelona. This tendency accused the leadership of the CP of having entered into a "social pact" and not a "political pact" with the bourgeoisie in the Junta Democrática. Whatever the confusion of these criticisms, this sort of tension is a first symptom.

It is hard to see how the CP will be able to remain inactive very long in the present situation. It is certainly going to try to channel the movement toward objectives of struggle that are linked to the renewal of labor contracts and that involve the trade unions; but it would be false to analyze that in a one-sided way. This type of mobilization can combine with the sort of struggle that is now developing and may lead to a major crisis, whatever Carrillo's intentions may be.

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**Q.** Could you quickly trace out the main perspectives today?

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**A.** First of all, you have to keep in mind three essential facts about the current political situation. First, the promulgation of the antiterrorism law and the sentences handed down against Garmendia and Otaegui and against the militants of the FRAP indicate the extreme state of crisis of Francoism. Second, this crisis is now finding expression within the army (where there is also an ongoing battle in the shadows over control of the decisive repressive instrument of the Guardia Civil) and within sectors that have up to now been tied very closely to the regime. Third, the very rapid fall of the stock market (which necessitated an accord between the banks and the government), like the accusations of "cowardice and lack of patriotism" the minister of industry has made against some capitalists, reflects the growing tension in the relations between the bourgeoisie and the dictatorship. Big capital is beginning to understand that the maintenance of the dictatorship is creating a situation that is rapidly becoming explosive and is generating an impressive increase of activity and consciousness among the masses and a depreciation of the fundamental instruments of domination, especially the army.

Once again I must stress the decisive, fundamental role of the mass movement. We have to insist on the fact that the call for the September 11-12 general strike was issued by all the political workers organizations and that it was not blocked by any wait-and-see

attitude which would have made the calling of the general strike dependent on the result of the legal appeal. This call and the response it received indicated a hitherto unattained offensive capacity in Euzkadi. The mass movement has taken the form of a protracted strike — with a complex and uneven development both in Euzkadi and in the Spanish state as a whole — and this shows that the overthrow of the dictatorship is on the agenda, if the movement that has developed in Euzkadi can combine with a movement throughout the territory of the Spanish state. If all this is placed within the framework of the current crisis of the regime, this combination that would place the overthrow of the regime on the agenda does not require that the level of struggle has to be uniform throughout the state before the regime is brought down.

The overthrow of the regime could take place on the basis of a generalized mobilization, but one whose unevenness remained great, the advanced point being Euzkadi. In addition, it must be understood that with this protracted general strike the theme of the revolutionary general strike is more important than ever, in spite of the lack of homogeneity of the movement on the scale of the whole Spanish state.

If the regime carries out the death sentences in coming days, the level of the mass response could rise another notch. If the dictatorship retreats, that would represent an enormous victory. This expresses the whole impasse and crisis of the Francoist dictatorship. We are not merely going through a repetition of the Burgos mobilizations. (In 1970 mass mobilizations forced the dictatorship to withdraw its death sentences pronounced against militants by the Burgos War Council — INPRECOR.) Revolutionary Marxists must prepare to deal decisive blows against the dictatorship. We must center our efforts on making the mass movement take a leap forward by stimulating all forms of self-organization and by putting the emphasis on the tasks of self-defense, setting the highest objectives. Moreover, all efforts must be made to stimulate the solidarity movement throughout the state by making it go beyond the limits of the restricted mobilization of a vanguard. This is the perspective within which we have addressed our "open letter" to all the organizations of the workers movement. (For the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in Spain, see also "The Death Agony of Francoism," declaration of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, INPRECOR, No.29, June 19, 1975 — INPRECOR.)

In face of this situation, the importance of international solidarity has to be stressed again and again. In 1970, at the time of the first Burgos trials, the international workers and revolutionary movement was able to save the lives of Izko and his comrades. The mobilizations that have to be developed today to save Garmendia and Otaegui and the comrades of the FRAP who have been condemned to death will prepare the way for the even broader mobilizations that will have to be developed in solidarity with the Spanish revolution in the not so far future.



## 2. EUZKADI GENERAL STRIKE CALL

The following is the text of the call for the September 11-12 general strike issued by the Euzkadi Strike Committee, which is composed of the organizations listed below.

The political parties and mass organizations of Euzkadi: Workers Commissions of Euzkadi, Union General de Trabajadores, Socialist Central Committee of Euzkadi (PSOE), National Committee of Euzkadi (ORT), Young Socialists, Liga Comunista, LCR/ETA-VI, Movimiento Comunista de España (MCE — Communist Movement of Spain), Carlist party, Communist party of Euzkadi, Organization of the Communist Left of Spain-Unificación Comunista (Communist Unification), came together today and, after examining the present political situation, arrived at the following conclusions:

Garmendia and Otaegui have been condemned to death. The formidable response of the people of Euzkadi, and especially of the people of Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya, a response that was raised despite the difficult conditions of the Francoist terror, must grow still larger and spread still further in order to succeed in saving them from execution.

Given the convoking of the next Military Council of Ministers (the very body that promulgated the so-called antiterrorist decree), which will decide to murder our two comrades and which has unleashed a brutal repression against the struggle of the Basque people, going so far as to murder Comrade Jesus Garcia Ripalda, and which intends to press on with a long series of trials in which the death penalty has been requested, the assembled organizations considered it opportune and necessary to launch, on September 11 and 12, a general strike throughout Euzkadi that will block the

Francoist government's intention to crush the combativity of our people.

To call on all the political organizations, mass organizations, unitary and democratic organizations, the working class and the people of the rest of the Spanish state to extend their active support, especially on September 11 and 12, so that we may win victory in this difficult battle to which we are committed.

For their part, the assembled organizations pledge themselves to redouble their efforts, to strengthen their unity on the basis of the aspirations for liberty and justice that are so dear to the Basque people, to successfully wage this difficult struggle against the challenge that has been thrown down by the government of murderers.

To call on the workers, students, peasants, fishermen, the liberal professions to the general strike on September 11 and 12.

EVERYONE IN STRUGGLE! EUZKADI UNITED, ON OUR FEET!

ORGANIZE THE BIGGEST AND MOST EXEMPLARY GENERAL STRIKE IN EUZKADI!

EUZKADI, STAND UP FOR GARMENDIA AND OTAEGUI!

September 5, 1975

## 3. OPEN LETTER TO ALL WORKERS PARTIES

Following is the text of the Open Letter sent by the LCR-ETA-VI to all the workers parties.

To the leaderships of all workers parties,

Comrades,

The current political situation, the attack capital is preparing against the living standards and right to strike of the working class, the brutal hardening of the Francoist repression (the "decree-law against terrorism," the many death penalties demanded) and, above all, the events that have been unfolding in Euzkadi during the past week all require urgent and concerted action by all the workers parties throughout the state.

For seven days the whole working class and people of Euzkadi — especially in Guipúzcoa and Vizcaya — have thrown themselves into an open struggle to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui from the Francoist grip. The consequences that this new general strike — the broadest and most radical in the history of the workers movement under Francoism — can have on the development of the class struggle throughout the Spanish state are very clear:

\*First — and this has been expressed by nearly all the workers parties in the Euzkadi Strike Committee — this

fight is not simply a struggle to save the lives of these two revolutionary nationalist militants. Not only within the vanguard, but also on a mass scale, it has become obvious that the confrontation must be centrally directed against the dictatorship that wants to murder these comrades. This consciousness of the necessity of getting rid of Francoism once and for all is also at the center of the aspirations of the working class and all the oppressed people.

\*Second, in face of the test of strength imposed on the mass movement by Francoism's new turn of repressive insanity, the combativity that has been materially expressed in Euzkadi and the solidarity it can awaken throughout the rest of the state urgently and immediately place on the agenda the need for a general strike throughout the territory of the Spanish state, a strike that would be capable of halting the repressive attacks and launching a mass offensive for the overthrow of the dictatorship. The call of the Euzkadi Strike Committee for a new general strike on September 11 and 12 and the necessity of solidarity throughout the Spanish state on those days of strike (solidarity that can be transformed into the broadest possible united struggle, into a general strike wherever possible — and we must try to do this) are only the most immediate manifestations of the possibility and necessity of a coordinated general strike throughout the Spanish state.

\*Third, we must take note of the close relations among the various united organizations that have emerged and their direct influence on the mobilizations now going on. Regardless of the political differences, the workers parties and organizations, the workers commissions, the factory committees, the neighborhood bodies and the bodies of teachers, and the committees against repression have organized in a united manner into strike committees whose structures extend from the Euzkadi Strike Committee to the strike committees of each zone and village. There is a coordination and deepened relationship among them all.

We think that it is now important to integrate all these committees of delegates directly elected by assemblies, as has begun to be done in some zones of Guipúzcoa. But above all we think it is important to note that the working class and people of Euzkadi have for the first time come together with a total and organic unity of the workers parties in order to press for united action; this fact was decisive in the breadth of the mobilization.

It is urgent to make this example known in every corner of the country. And in particular, it is urgent to succeed in forging a united framework of this type throughout the entire state in order to promote solidarity with Euzkadi, to prepare and coordinate the general strike, and to direct the fight of the masses against the dictatorship.

The struggle against repression does not stop with the battle to save the lives of Garmendia and Otaegui. The dictatorship intends to murder several militants of

the FRAP, as well as Pérez Beotegui, Eva Forest, and Antonia Durán. The "antiterrorist" law is a grave threat to all workers organizations — including those that are explicitly mentioned in the decree — and to the whole working class, all the oppressed people, and all those who are fighting to put an end to the Francoist dictatorship.

The present hardening of the repressive laws indicates the regime's and its government's total renunciation of governing the country through any other method than open repression. That is why, in the present circumstances, the struggle against Francoist repression takes on a permanent character and becomes one of the major axes of the fight against the murderous dictatorship.

We know that there are deep differences among the workers organizations about the means by which to get rid of Francoism, and, more concretely, about the role played by alliances with sectors of the bourgeoisie in this endeavor. These divisions affect even those organizations that have put such alliances into practice. We think that this is not a good road. We believe that the dictatorship will fall only under the blows of the direct action of the mass movement, blows like the ones now being dealt to the dictatorship by the working class and people of Euzkadi. We are absolutely convinced that these alliances can only impede this direct action of the masses and place the proletariat in the train of the bourgeoisie. That is why we fight for the breakup of all accords with the bourgeoisie, for the exit of the workers organizations from the Junta Democrática and the Convergencia Democrática and from all other interclassist bodies, and for a line of class independence.

We will continue to struggle for all these objectives. But in the present circumstances, we do not think that the breakup of these alliances is a precondition for arriving at united action among all the workers parties. In spite of all the political differences, we believe that united action among us is absolutely indispensable. We think that today the United Front of all the workers parties against the repression and the united action of the United Front through the workers commissions and the organizations of solidarity and the antirepression organizations can and must become a reality. We are in favor of supporting any form of resistance to the "antiterrorist" law and the death sentences. But to halt the current repressive offensive of Francoism and to bring Francoism down requires above all a united and coordinated mobilization throughout the whole state. Every area must follow the example that is being set by Euzkadi today, with the whole working class and the oppressed people. Without neglecting other forms of struggle, it is the united mass mobilization that is the essential way to halt the Francoist repression. The success of this type of mobilization requires the united action of all the workers parties, whatever their current political differences.

Thus, the struggle against repression must occupy first place in the united activity of the workers parties. But that is not all. The anarchy of the capitalist economy

has engendered a deep crisis. The capitalists are now trying to make the working class pay for the consequences of this crisis. For that the capitalists have prepared a basic attack on the workers. The generalization of unemployment and layoffs and the attacks on the workers living standards are the two fundamental manifestations of this offensive. It has an overall character; it is generalized throughout the state and affects all the workers.

Throughout the autumn and winter the workers will mount strong resistance to this capitalist aggression. But it will be impossible to defeat that aggression if the resistance is disorganized and isolated in each factory and each zone. More than ever before, the necessity of a united mobilization against unemployment and the deterioration of the living standards of the workers is the precondition for an effective struggle. In this sphere also, the united action of the workers parties is urgent and indispensable. Only such action will be capable of assuring a sufficient coordination of the mass movement. It alone is capable of forging a united framework for the struggles.

By their nature and composition, neither the Junta nor the Convergencia are capable of providing this united framework for the struggles. The very programs of these organizations offer nothing in this respect.

We are aware of the fact that it is not possible to realize and stabilize an Anticapitalist United Front before the workers parties have broken their agreements and pacts with the bourgeoisie. But we think that this does not mean that it is not possible and necessary to arrive at a united agreement among them for the strug-

gle against unemployment and for the improvement of the living standards of the workers. We believe that such an agreement is possible and that it is even indispensable to assure the united mobilization of the working class.

The preparation and stimulation of a general strike throughout the territory of the state as the backbone of these objectives taken together appears today as the central task of all the workers parties. Carrying out this task requires the united agreement and action of all the workers parties, regardless of the existing political differences.

In the present political situation in our country, this general strike, pushed forward in a united manner, can in fact be transformed into a definitive offensive of the mass movement to put an end to the Francoist dictatorship. That is why just as it is an absolute priority to organize and stabilize a united committee of all the workers parties throughout the territory of the state, it is also indispensable to give this accord a concrete form in each province, zone, and workers center, following the example being set by the strike committees in Euzkadi today.

We therefore propose the immediate calling of a meeting of all the workers parties throughout the state to decide on the concrete forms of our united activity. Attached is an initial proposal for a date and place.

Communist Greetings,  
United Political Bureau of the LCR/ETA-VI

September 5, 1975

4.



Notre Dame cathedral in Paris, occupied last week by militants campaigning to save the lives of Garzandia and Otrategui

# INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY ACTIONS



## London

Since the announcement of the opening of the Burgos War Council against Otáegui and Garmendia, and in spite of the unfavorable date (at the end of August, when the workers are still on vacation), the European workers and revolutionary movement has mobilized to respond in the most massive possible way to prevent the condemnation and execution of the Basque nationalist militants by the Francoist hangmen.

In Britain, many leading trade unionists and Labour party members protested to the Spanish authorities when the death sentences were announced. On the initiative of some leaders of major unions (transport workers, miners, metalworkers) a petition was widely circulated demanding the immediate suspension of the sentences.

On September 10 nineteen revolutionary militants occupied the offices of Iberian airlines in London. They were all arrested for trespassing! There were demonstrations of 500-600 people in London on August 23, August 30, and September 13 (organized by the revolutionary left and the Spain Committee). A permanent picket line was organized in front of the Spanish embassy by the Committee Against the Death Penalty in Spain, a front that includes the FRAP, the LCR/ETA-VI, and the Spanish CP.

In Holland there were demonstrations in Amsterdam on August 29 and September 1 (300 people); they were called by the Spanish CP and other organizations based among the Spanish immigrants and were supported by the Dutch left and far left. There was also a demonstration in Eindhoven on September 13. Militants of the Spanish CP went on hunger strike in front of the embassy when the death sentences were announced. In Utrecht the Spanish House, a sociocultural center financed by the Francoist government, was occupied for several days by a number of revolutionary groups. Other actions have been planned for coming days.

In Sweden there were several solidarity demonstrations and actions in Stockholm and Göteborg. A united demonstration (CP and the revolutionary left) in Göteborg drew more than 500 people on September 3. There were

six demonstrations in front of the Spanish embassy in Stockholm between September 4 and 9, each drawing several hundred people. Spanish immigrants went on hunger strike for several days in front of the embassy.

In Denmark a united demonstration was organized on September 11 in solidarity with the Chilean workers and Spanish political prisoners. The demonstration, which drew 6,000 people, marched from the Spanish embassy to the Chilean consulate. In addition, militants of the Spanish CP and the ETA-V went on hunger strike in front of the Spanish embassy.

In Switzerland there were two demonstrations in Geneva and Zurich on August 28 and 29, each drawing 2,000 people. On August 30 several hundred people marched in Lausanne and Bern. On August 31, a Sunday, churches were occupied in Bienne and Zurich. There was a demonstration in Basel and a second united demonstration (far left, SP, and CP) in Zurich. On September 5 and 6 meetings and united demonstrations were held in Geneva at the call of a committee that includes reformists and revolutionaries. There were also mobilizations in Tessin and Argovie; the cathedral in Basel was occupied by militants of the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire. On September 19, after the announcement of the five death sentences against the FRAP militants, the Spanish consulate in Bern was occupied by anti-Francoist militants.

In France the mobilization grew throughout the week after the announcement of the death sentences against Garmendia and Otáegui.

On August 28 there was a united demonstration of 2,000 in Bayonne. In Avignon the Geneva-Barcelona express train was covered with anti-Francoist slogans. On August 30 there were two demonstrations in Paris, one of 2,000 called by the French CP and one of 3,000 called by the Eva Forest Committee, supported by the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, the Parti Socialiste Unifié, Révolution, the LCR/ETA-VI, the PSOE, the MCE, and others. On September 1 about 150 militants occupied the towers of Notre Dame cathedral, rang the bells, distributed leaflets, and draped signs and red banners over the church. That night there was a new demonstration of 8,000 people called by the Eva Forest Committee and the far left. United initiatives were organized throughout France, especially in the regions of Toulouse and Bayonne. A new demonstration took place September 3 in Paris; it drew 10,000 people, called by revolutionaries. The mobilization is continuing.

In the rest of Europe, in Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Rome, Milan, there were many demonstrations and solidarity actions.

Since five new death sentences have just been handed down against militants of the FRAP, it is more than ever necessary to develop the broadest and most united solidarity with the workers and revolutionaries of Spain and the Basque country.

# portugal:



## a government of order

by C. MICHALOUX & A. UDRY

The sixth provisional government was formed on September 19. It took nearly three weeks to get out of the government crisis and establish an arrangement whose fragility escapes no one. The composition of the government expresses its plans rather well: four ministers of the Socialist party, two ministers of the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD—Popular Democratic party), one minister of the Communist party, to which have been added some representatives of the so-called group of nine, which already holds a majority in the Council of the Revolution.

Pinheiro de Azevedo, the new prime minister, and Costa Gomes, the president, at least have the merit of not hiding their intentions. In his presentation of the political platform of the government, the prime minister declared: "(What is needed is) a strong and firm democratic authority, for peace, order, tranquility, and respect for liberty." Politically, he stressed "the drawing up of severely repressive legislation against the civilian armed groups (which means: against the embryonic workers militias), a halt to abusive purges (which means: purges stimulated by the mass movement), and a return to balanced functioning of the courts." Economically, he announced a "pause: the closure of the phase of nationalizations and the re-animation of the private sector," as well as "the strengthening of economic relations with all countries, especially with the EFTA (European Free Trade Association) and the EEC (European Economic Community, the Common Market)."

During his presentation of the government on September 19, Costa Gomes declared: "Our society is not yet adapted to a new style of life in liberty... Authority, social stabilization, refloating of the economy, peace, security, order, and liberty are the desires of the Portuguese people." (*Diário de Notícias*, September 20.)

Pinheiro de Azevedo, following the president, indicated the keystone of this stabilization: "The cohesion of the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) and the discipline of the armed forces are the basic factors that will determine the success or failure of the revolution."

Such is the outcome on the level of the government and the state apparatus of the process unleashed by the offensive of the Socialist party — which created propitious ground for the reactivation of the PPD — and the officers who signed the Melo Antunes document. (See INPRECOR, No. 33, September 11, 1975.) More than one formula has been directly drawn from the document of the SP secretariat called "Conquer the Crisis, Save the Revolution" and from the document of the nine, formulas about the authority of the state, discipline in the army, and the dissolution of the workers and people's militias. Thus, this government makes no mystery of its plans: The point is to restore the authority of civilian and military bourgeois institutions and thus to push back the mass movement by attacking its democratic rank-and-file organs (the workers commissions, tenants commissions, and popular assemblies), as well as the nascent committees of self-organization of the soldiers (SUV—Soldiers United Will Win).

### Spectrum of support

It is thus no accident that a broad range of national and international forces are offering more or less complete support to this project. The reasons impelling these various forces to do so differ. For the Social Democracy it is a question of stabilizing a bourgeois parliamentary democracy. Thus, Swedish Prime Minister Olaf Palme affirmed in an interview with *Jornal Novo*: "For the solution to your enormous political problems it is indispensable to reestablish the authority of the state as represented by a government of national unity... I think that Portugal is a problem of fundamental importance for all Europe. It is absolutely necessary for Portugal to prove that it is possible to move from fascism and colonialism to conditions of a stable democratic state." (September 16.)

As for the Spanish falange, *Arriba*, its official daily, did not hesitate to write in an editorial: "Portugal's democratic chance is at hand if the language of the

ballot box — which gave a majority to the socialists (the SP and the PPD) — is reflected in the constitution of the government." (September 18.)

The critical support of the CDS (Partido do Centro Social-Social Democratic Center) to the sixth government responds to Arriba's concern and indicates that the CDS sees this government as a first barrier against the tide of the mass movement, a barrier that will better enable it to crush the whole organized workers movement in blood, including the SP.

The rump MFA assembly of September 5 and the massive demonstration of the SUV in Porto September 10 (20,000 people, among them 1,500 soldiers) express, each in its own way, the deep crisis that afflicts all sections of the Portuguese army.

The MFA, torn at the seams, is manifesting its inability to homogenize and draw together the whole armed forces. After initially being driven back, the traditional hierarchy in the military is now taking advantage of its positions of strength to launch a new offensive. The Melo Antuneses, after receiving a boost, are now seeing that the support their document received is a cover for the desires of the hierarchy, which, in addition, does not hesitate to give underhanded support to the paramilitary activities of the fascists.

Both the beginning of an open attack by the military hierarchy and the conscious break of a section of the soldiers with the MFA's framework of unanimity herald future confrontations and divisions within the army, where the banner of the MFA will be up for grabs in a clique struggle that will prefigure the official breakup of the MFA.

## Necessity and possibility of unity

"The activity of the members of the Portuguese Communist party in the sixth government will be especially complex," noted an editorial in the September 18 *Avante*, weekly of the CP. "As in the previous governments, especially the first one, which was tightly controlled by Spínola, the members of the CP will have to wage a difficult battle against the predominant tendencies, specifically against a practice that tends to reabsorb the revolutionary process into a Social Democratic practice."

For the CP, the failure of its investments in the MFA and the state apparatus has to be seen in relation both to a (geographically limited) development of the mass movement toward self-organization and to the offensive of the social and political forces trying to restore the authority of bourgeois institutions and push back the rise of the workers. That is where the basic reason for the CP's oscillations during the month of June lies.

Today these oscillations are concretized in a position of semi-opposition to and semi-participation in the

government. For instance, in a communiqué published at the time of the formation of the sixth government, the CP central committee affirmed that "the CP has given its party members authorization to participate as ministers and state secretaries, although not as official representatives of the CP." (*Diário de Notícias*, September 20.) Without doing so officially (!), the CP hopes to offer evidence of its desire for conciliation and above all to maintain its positions within the state apparatus.

Nevertheless, the pressure the CP is feeling even within its own ranks also compels it to take some distance from the government and to make a show of opposition, which includes participating in mass mobilizations and even giving an impetus to them.

In the Alentejo, for example, the CP, responding to the maturation of the combativity of the agricultural workers, stimulated the organization of a general strike (September 16) for the defense of the gains of the agrarian reform and to promote its extension.

The CP even has to take account of the weight of the workers commissions, tenants commissions, and popular assemblies and of the dynamic of the movement of soldiers and the audience of the revolutionary organizations. At the very moment when he was explaining the CP's participation in the government, for example, Cunhal was forced to assert: "We are sincerely interested in strengthening the links and forms of unity of action with the parties and groups of the left oriented toward revolutionary action (that is, the organizations of the FUR, Front of Revolutionary Unity: the FSP, LCI, LUAR, MES, and PRP-BR\*). We are sincerely interested in promoting, strengthening, and supporting united rank-and-file bodies like the workers commissions, tenants commissions, vigilance committees, and popular assemblies, the richest forms of mass organization, whose role in the revolutionary process is increasing day by day as the expression of the unity of the working class and popular masses." (Speech by Cunhal at the Campo Pequeno meeting in Lisbon, reproduced in *Avante* September 18.)

Hence, the CP, walking a tightrope, will continue to negotiate a turn, which will heighten the contradictions in its own ranks and consequently increase the effective possibilities for revolutionaries to successfully apply a united-front tactic.

The SP is not completely free of problems either. The obvious organization of the fascist offensive and the

\* FSP: Frente Socialista Popular—Popular Socialist Front. LCI: Liga Comunista Internacionalista—Internationalist Communist League, sympathizing organization of the Fourth International. LUAR: Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária—League of Revolutionary Unity and Action. MES: Movimento Esquerda Socialista—Left Socialist Movement. PRP-BP: Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado—Brigadas Revolucionárias—Revolutionary party of the Proletariat—Revolutionary Brigades.

reactivation of the right, developments that were lurking behind Soares's anticommunist demagoguery, are now provoking disquiet among leadership circles of the party and resistance, and even limited fissures, among the rank and file.

For the first time since April-May 1975, the question of unity is beginning to be posed, even among the ranks of the SP. It is important to note that the secretariat of the demonstration for Garmendia and Otaegui called in Lisbon by the SP and the Young Socialists for September 18 (the same day as the demonstration of the workers and tenants commissions in the industrial belt) canceled this demonstration in order not to "break up unity." Concurrently, the secretariat of the demonstration of the workers commissions declared itself prepared to support the mobilization of solidarity with the struggle of the Spanish workers against the Francoist dictatorship. For its part, the Socialist youth proposed that all organizations join in a united campaign for the release of the prisoners in Spain.

Once again, this modification in the attitude of the reformist organizations, still limited of course, sharply underlines the possibility and necessity of unity in action.

## The coming test

The relationship of forces between the classes is far from assuring the government project any real chance of success. The economic and social crisis is continuing to fuel the movement for workers demands. The metalworkers, for instance, have announced a general strike to demand that contracts be respected. In many sectors there is a proliferation of assemblies of workers to discuss various demands and to demand an extension of the measures of nationalization, economic reconversion, and so on.

This prefigures the possibility of a rise of the workers this autumn centered around demands for the generalization of workers control and socialist planning. Concurrently, a tendency toward the unification of the organs of rank-and-file workers democracy is taking shape on a local and regional scale. Of course, these processes are often marked by the divisions introduced by the reformists and the Maoist currents (the UDP and the MRPP\*), which are seeking to make instruments of the workers and tenants commissions. Nevertheless, the extension and centralization of these organs is increasingly on the agenda. This dynamic will be capable of being accelerated to the extent that revolutionaries coordinate their efforts in the twofold direction of a unification and a centralization of the structures of self-organization.

\* UDP: União Democrática Popular—Popular Democratic Union. MRPP: Movimento Reorganizado do Partido do Proletariado—Movement for the Reorganization of the Party of the Proletariat.



This conjunction between the rise of the mass movement and the crisis in the army has given rise during the past several weeks to the emergence of structures of self-organization of the soldiers outside the controlling framework of the MFA. The SUV demonstration in Porto was symbolic in this respect, because of the linkup that was made between the soldiers organized in the SUV and the workers commissions, tenants commissions, etc. The extension of the SUV to the Lisbon region and a clarification of its programmatic basis — which puts the emphasis on the formation of soldiers committees independent of the MFA — constitute a decisive step in breaking through the projects aimed at restoring order in the army. The self-assertion of the workers and tenants commissions and the emergence of the soldiers committees of the SUV provide the development Portuguese revolution with the two features common to every revolutionary upsurge.

If the constitution of the sixth government reflects a clear turn to the right and an accentuated attempt to consolidate and restore the authority of the bourgeois state, it nonetheless remains the case that the working class has not suffered any defeat up to now. In addition, the cornerstone of the Azevedo-Gomes operation may continue to be chipped away. Discipline and unity in the army will be very difficult to restore in the short run.

Finally, the translation of the government's options into action requires a confrontation with the workers vanguard. But the combination of the economic and social crisis and the reaffirmation of the movement for economic and political demands among broad layers of workers could create a situation that would facilitate the fusion of this well organized workers vanguard with the bulk of the working class.

Coming weeks will permit the relationship of forces between the classes and the real value of the hopes of the sixth government to be tested in practice.

September 20, 1975

## CORRECTION

An error of translation appeared in the "Text of the August 25 Accord" published in the last issue of INPRECOR. The meeting, obviously, did not take place on May 1. May 1 is the name of one of the participating organizations.


# arab east:



# interim peace... permanent capitulation

by JON ROTHSCHILD





1. Position of American surveillance station between Giddi and Mitla Passes. 2. Israeli surveillance station. 3. Egyptian surveillance station. 4. Limited forces zones. 5. Zone under Egyptian civilian administration.
- (From the official map of the accords, as reproduced in Le Monde. ONU: United Nations.)

According to the terms of the interim accord, all Egyptian troops will be stationed west of line E. The area between lines F and E is the Egyptian limited-forces zone. Line A indicates the position of the old Egyptian front line. All Israeli troops will be stationed east of line J and its southern extension, line M. The area between lines J and K is the Israeli limited-forces zone. The area between lines E and J is the buffer zone occupied by the troops of the United Nations.

The latest Egyptian-Israeli "interim agreement" was initialled September 2 in Alexandria by representatives of the Egyptian government; the Israelis had initialled it the day before. After the signing, and in the presence of Henry Kissinger, Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat made a little speech. After reciting a few of the platitudes that are expected of statesmen on such occasions ("After twenty-seven years of blood, hate, and war, the essential thing is to establish a new atmosphere," and so on), Sadat made a rare, to-the-point remark: "The United States," he said, "holds 99 percent of the cards in this conflict. Because of that, and because it is a superpower, the United States is responsible for peace in the Middle East." That is an accurate commentary on the content and meaning of the agreement. The terms of the accord place U.S. imperialism in charge of the "peace process" in the Arab East. The secret aspects of the agreement, contained in a number of "memoranda" exchanged among the various parties, provide for major new steps in Egypt's evolution into the orbit of U.S. imperialism. In a speech to the leadership of the Arab Socialist Union, Egypt's sole legal political party, Sadat alleged that through a diplomatic strategy that he was duty-bound to characterize as brilliant he had succeeded in transforming the United States from a participant to a referee in the "Arab-Israeli conflict." It would be more accurate to say that U.S. imperialism had transformed itself from the partisan and guarantor of one side into the mentor and supervisor of both sides. An examination of the accord demonstrates that the Sadat regime thoroughly capitulated to the demands of U.S. imperialism. Militarily and politically, Sadat conceded on every important point. The agreement represents another step toward the imposition of the Pax Americana that has been sought for more than four years now by the Egyptian ruling class, American imperialism, and the Israeli ruling class. Whether such a "peace" will actually be established in the region, however, remains an open question. There are other interested parties aside from the three proponents of Pax Americana.

### Terms of the accord

From the purely military standpoint, Israel made no important concessions in the accord. The Egyptian front lines will advance eastward only about 10 kilometers. The Israeli front lines will retreat some 20-50 kilometers, depending on the sector. The "buffer-zone" occupied by the 4,000-odd troops of the United Nations Emergency Forces will thus be wider than before. It is true that the Israeli army will now be stationed east of the Mitla and Giddi passes, the strategic passes through which the Egyptian army would have to move if it attempted to advance eastward. But the Israelis will be posted near the eastern outlets of the passes and will continue to dominate the high ground around the passes. It is thus simply false to claim (as has been done by the far right in Israel and by some U.S. military experts) that the Zionist army is in a weaker position than before to respond to an Egyptian attack of the sort that opened the October War. Even if there were no UN buffer zone and no limitation on the troops

and weaponry that can be stationed on the front lines, the new Israeli positions would be equally as "defensible" as the old.

But the Israeli position is further strengthened by the clauses of the accord limiting the forces that can be committed to the front. The published protocol imposes the following limits on troops and weapons within the areas designated "limited-forces zones": eight normal infantry battalions; sixty-five tanks; seventy-five artillery pieces, including heavy mortar, the range of which is not to exceed 12 kilometers; in addition, the total number of troops is to be less than 8,000; neither side will introduce into the limited-forces zones any weapons capable of reaching the front lines of the other side; neither side will construct fortifications in the limited-forces zones capable of accommodating more than the indicated number of troops and weapons.

Further, there are limitations on weaponry even outside the limited-forces zones: Neither side will install any weapons capable of bringing the front lines of the other side within range; neither side will place anti-aircraft missiles within a sector 10 kilometers east and west of the borders of the limited-forces zones.

In sum, not only are the new Israeli lines easily defensible against any Egyptian attempt at eastward advance, but in addition the Egyptian army is barred from moving sufficient troops and weapons east of the Suez Canal to threaten the Israeli lines, to wage a war of attrition, or even to conduct any of the small-scale military actions that had occasionally been engaged in by the Egyptian regime in the past.

Three intelligence stations equipped with the most modern electronic devices will be set up in the buffer zone to make sure that both sides respect the terms of the agreement. One will be staffed by Egyptians, one by Israelis, and one by Americans. The Americans will have free access to the stations staffed by the Egyptians and Israelis. United Nations forces will remain in the buffer zone, and their mandate will be renewed on a yearly basis, instead of a quarterly basis as in the past. It has been widely reported that in one of the secret clauses of the accord Sadat promised to renew the mandate of the UN forces for at least three consecutive years.

If the military aspects of the Sinai accord are implemented — and there is not the slightest sign that they will not be — the Egyptian-Israeli front will be effectively frozen. It will be virtually impossible for the Egyptian army to engage in combat with the Israelis, for to do so would involve breaking the agreement and facing a direct confrontation both with U.S. imperialism and with the UN troops in the buffer zone. And this confrontation would have to take place before any clashes with the Israeli army, which, as we shall see, not only retains an excellent strategic position, but will also expand its military capacities at a much faster pace than Egypt.

But even more important than the military arrangements are the political concessions the Sadat regime has made. Article I of the agreement opens by stating: "The conflict between them (Egypt and Israel) and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means." Article II states: "The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other." Article VII states: "Nonmilitary cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal." Article IX states: "This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the protocol and remain in force until superceded by a new agreement."

The statement of nonbelligerency is unprecedented since the establishment of the state of Israel. In making it, the Sadat regime promises not to wage war on the Israeli state. The actions taken by the Egyptian government that led up to the October War would be prohibited by the current agreement. And the renunciation of violence is unconditional and virtually definitive, for the agreement is to remain in effect until a new accord is signed and there is no provision for unilateral renunciation of the agreement. Also renounced by Egypt is any attempt to blockade Israeli passage through the Bab el-Mandab (the southern entrance to the Red Sea) and the Gulf of Aqaba (the approach to the Israeli port of Elat). Israeli-bound cargoes have never been permitted to pass through the Suez Canal; even last March, during Kissinger's previous attempt to negotiate a Sinai agreement, Sadat refused to make that concession.

Taken together, all these provisions amount to the establishment of a separate peace between Egypt and Israel.

That much is open and clear from the text of the accord itself. But there is more yet. In a memorandum that is to be kept secret, Sadat offered Washington a series of "assurances," which are widely reported to include a promise not to intervene in the event of a war between Israel and Syria, a promise to moderate anti-Zionist propaganda emanating from Egyptian territory, and a promise to ease the boycott in Egypt of U.S. companies that do business in Israel. (There is no provision for a similar adjustment in the cases of European companies that deal with Israel.)

## Into the U.S. orbit

The capitulationist accord is merely the latest of Sadat's steps toward the tutelage of U.S. imperialism. The October War was launched precisely in order to force American imperialism to intervene in the Arab East to impose a settlement on Israel that would provide for an Israeli withdrawal from most of the territory occupied in the 1967 war in exchange for Arab recognition of Israel, the entire arrangement to be concluded at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs, who might possibly be thrown the crumb of a Bantustan-like ministate on the West Bank of Jordan. At the

same time, the deepening social and economic crisis in Egypt required that the bourgeois Egyptian regime seek massive aid from the imperialist powers, primarily the United States. This in turn required that two adjustments be made in Egyptian policy: First, that Israel be recognized and a settlement be reached that would leave the Zionist state and its army as the most powerful counterrevolutionary force in the Arab East. Second, that the Egyptian economy be denationalized, that restrictions on foreign investment be lifted, and that the country be drawn more closely into the American orbit politically, economically, and diplomatically.

From that standpoint, the Sinai accord makes perfect sense. Sadat will try to claim that a great victory has been won because Egypt has forced Israel to withdraw from the Mitla and Giddi passes and has regained possession of the Abu Rudeis oil fields, from which the Israelis will withdraw as part of the new agreement. That much is for internal consumption. For the rest, Sadat will achieve a series of economic advantages for the Egyptian ruling class: The United States will offer Egypt a \$650 million aid package for the current fiscal year; the state treasury will be boosted by the income from the Abu Rudeis oil fields; with the Suez Canal out of range of Israeli artillery, traffic through the canal should increase, and with it the state revenue derived from tolls; the increased confidence in the durability of "peace" will stimulate investment by imperialist capital, which has hitherto been reluctant to commit itself to an unstable situation; the freezing of the Sinai front for a period of at least three years will allow the government to shift credits from military expenditures to investment in economic development.

There is little doubt that the sequels to the Sinai agreement will provide important benefits both to American imperialist capital and to the Egyptian bourgeoisie and state bureaucracy. But there is equally little doubt that the infusion of imperialist capital will be unable to solve the Egyptian economic crisis, which is marked by inflation, unemployment, and a constantly declining standard of living for the workers and peasants. (See the manifesto of the Egyptian Trotskyists of the Mustafa Khamis Revolutionary Communist Group in INPRECOR, No.14/15, December 12, 1974.) The social and political measures the Sadat regime will have to take in order to realize the potential advantages of the Sinai accord will only intensify the Egyptian social crisis even further. And the intensification of that crisis will in turn continue to fuel the new rise of the Egyptian workers movement. Sadat and the Egyptian bourgeoisie may have achieved a modicum of peace with the Zionist state, although at the price of capitulation. They will not, however, capitulate to the Egyptian workers and peasants, and on that front they will find no peace, but an escalation of struggle, as the Egyptian workers movement reasserts its role as vanguard of the Arab revolution.

## The Israeli objective

The results of the October War of 1973 created a new objective situation within which Zionist policy had to function. From the standpoint of the Israeli ruling class, the main elements of this new situation were these: 1) U.S. imperialism, realizing that its new penetration into the Arab world would require some concessions to the Arab ruling classes, had decided that these concessions would be made not by the United States but by the Zionist state; that is, the costs of the American operation would be borne by Israel in the form of territorial concessions to the Arab states, primarily Egypt. 2) Israel's life-and-death dependence on American arms supplies, both revealed and exacerbated by the October War, had strengthened Israel's dependence on the United States and thus reduced Tel Aviv's ability to resist U.S. pressure. 3) Israel's international isolation on the diplomatic field had worsened, with the European imperialist powers and many states in the semicolonial world withdrawing diplomatic support for Israel in such bodies as the United Nations. 4) The Israeli army's failure to annihilate the Arab forces in the war generated a domestic political crisis (generally known as "the earthquake") and shifted the relationship of forces between Israel and the Arab states to the benefit of the latter. (This occurred despite the fact that in the purely military sense, the October War was a clear victory for Israel. See INPRECOR, No.3, July 4, 1974.)

The Zionist ruling class recognized that this new objective situation would inevitably compel some territorial concessions. There was simply no way to resist effectively. One of the basic objectives of the Israeli rulers then became to force U.S. imperialism to pay heavy compensation for any Israeli territorial concessions, that is, to shift the burden of the costs of the American offensive in the Arab world back onto the shoulders of U.S. imperialism itself. Specifically, this meant: 1) Make the United States pick up the tab for the Israeli economic crisis. 2) Extract sufficient new military aid to once again widen the gap in military capacity between Israel and the Arab states. 3) Extract U.S. guarantees against a deepening of Israel's international isolation. 4) Yield as little territory as possible. A corollary of the fourth point was that whatever territory had to be given up should be yielded on the Egyptian front. There were a number of reasons for this. For one thing, the Sinai is the least valuable of the occupied territories. It is virtually uninhabited; no Israeli civilian settlements have been erected there; with the exception of the Gaza Strip (which Israel has shown every intention of holding onto), there are no Palestinians in the Sinai, and the ceding of territory there avoids raising the "Palestinian problem," which is to say, the Zionist denial of the rights of the Palestinian part of the Arab nation.

Examined in the light of those overall aims, the Egyptian-Israeli agreement is a clear success for the Zionist state.

When the negotiations for the accord were in the early

stages, Israel reportedly requested \$2,500 million in American aid as compensation for the agreement. The "slogan" in Israel, as the American weekly *Time* put it, was "You ask for a lot and hope for a little." As it turned out, however, Israel got the full \$2,500 million and will very likely get even more before the game is finished. "After all," one unidentified official in Jerusalem was quoted as saying, "Rabin (the Israeli premier) is taking this ugly bride called Miss Interim Agreement. If he doesn't get a nice dowry from Papa Washington, he is going to be in trouble."

The dowry is certainly adequate. Israel has given up 20-50 kilometers of empty desert that has not the slightest value to the Israeli state. The only real material concession is the Israeli evacuation of the Abu Rudeis oil field in the southwest Sinai. There are about a hundred wells in the Abu Rudeis fields. Total production as of 1972 was 5,400,000 tons. Israeli experts estimate that the fields will be exhausted by 1980 in any case. Production of the wells had covered 55-60 percent of Israel's consumption needs, which stands at about 7,000,000 tons. As compensation for the Abu Rudeis fields, the United States has agreed to pay Israel \$300-350 million a year to buy oil on the international market. Further, Washington has undertaken to guarantee Israel's oil needs in the event that Tel Aviv has trouble finding international sources. So the ceding of the oil fields is no loss.

In addition to the compensation for Abu Rudeis, the U.S. will shell out \$150 million to pay for dismantling Israel's current front line and establishing the new one. Of the rest of the aid package, \$1,500 million is said to be for military equipment. "Our negotiating position at this point," an Israeli politician said, "might better be described as a shopping list." The August 25 issue of *Time* reported that the shopping list included the following items: at least two squadrons (thirty-six planes) of the U.S. F-15 Eagle fighter; several squadrons of the latest U.S. "remotely powered vehicle," an unmanned jet aircraft that can be used either in combat or for reconnaissance; new versions of the U.S. M-60 tank; "smart bombs," the laser-guided bombs used by the U.S. air force against the Indochinese people; electronic "black boxes," which jam enemy radar and anti-aircraft missile guidance systems; a helicopter launcher for antitank missiles; and last, but far from least, an undisclosed number of Lance surface-to-surface missiles. The Lance has a range of seventy miles and can deliver conventional or nuclear warheads; it is supposed to be five-times as effective as the Soviet "Scud-B" surface-to-surface missiles in Egypt and Syria.

It has also been reported (*Washington Post*, September 15, 1975) that the United States has promised to supply Israel with the Pershing surface-to-surface missile, which has a range of 460 miles (about 735 kilometers) and can be armed with nuclear warheads of up to 400 kiloton strength. (The American bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki were rated at about 20 kilotons.) The big increase in military aid, the stationing

of Americans in the UN buffer zone, the U.S. sponsorship of the agreement, and the various political promises made by Washington to Tel Aviv amount to a de facto security pact between Israel and the United States, as was remarked by a high Israeli official.

On the diplomatic field, the United States has promised Israel to use its influence to prevent moves to expel Israel from the UN. Moreover, Kissinger seems to have gotten Sadat's agreement to cooperate in this endeavor, and it can be assumed that in the future Egypt will also throw its weight behind American attempts to ward off such moves.

It is clear, then, that the Israeli ruling class achieved all its major objectives and then some. With the Egyptian front stabilized indefinitely and with its military supremacy assured for years to come, the Israeli ruling class can now afford to move to a position of extreme intransigence with regard to its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights and the West Bank of the Jordan River. Immediately after the agreement was signed, Sadat claimed that Kissinger had pledged that the United States would put pressure on Israel to negotiate a similar accord with Syria. But the Israeli regime was not long in indicating its unwillingness to do so. On September 6 Israeli Premier Rabin said in an interview: "There is virtually no possibility of an interim accord between Israel and Syria." And he listed the reasons why. First of all, the existence of Israeli civilian settlements on the heights: "These population centers were not established in order to be evacuated," he said, an implicit admission that Israel intends to occupy Golan permanently. Second, "because of the topographical situation in Golan, because of the extremism of the Baath party in power in Damascus, and because of the strength of the Syrian armed forces, there is hardly any 'maneuvering room' for an interim accord in the Golan Heights, unless you want to talk about 100 or 200 meters in this or that sector." Asked what he would do if the United States asked him to open negotiations with Syria, he replied: "We will wait two or three months and see what they propose, then the cabinet will have to make a decision."



Sadat (left), Chase's David Rockefeller

On September 10 an official Israeli communiqué declared that no negotiations with Syria could take place until a cabinet decision had been made; no such decision was expected for several months.

The real reasons for Israel's reluctance to reach an accord with Syria (apart from the general determination to hold onto the occupied Syrian territory, of which the civilian settlements are a symbol) relate to the weakened position that the Syrian regime now finds itself in. With the Egyptian front frozen, the Damascus regime is deprived of any serious option of reopening military activity to bring pressure to bear against Israel. There is little doubt that if the Syrian army initiated any actions, the Egyptian armed forces would be ordered to stay out of the fighting. That is part of the Egyptian-Israeli deal, and Sadat has no reason to break it. And Syria is simply incapable of waging war against Israel without aid from Egypt, even if the Syrian government were inclined to take such a step. Thus, unless the internal situation in Syria becomes so critical that the survival of the regime is threatened, the Baathist regime will have no choice but to restrict its efforts to the diplomatic terrain. And since Israel has no desire to seize more Syrian territory at the present time, the Zionist ruling class has no interest in trying to provoke Damascus into any hasty action. Consequently, Tel Aviv will simply sit and wait, refusing to make any concessions on the Golan Heights until Washington comes across with some serious incentives. The agreement with Egypt has thus significantly strengthened Israel's bargaining position on the Syrian front.

## Syrian opposition

Recognition of that fact is what accounts for the Syrian government's opposition to the agreement. The ruling Baath party officially condemned the accord on September 3, calling it a "grave defeat for the Arab cause." Several demonstrations were organized at the Egyptian embassy in Damascus to denounce the agreement. Zuhair Mohsen, the leader of el-Sa'iqa, the pro-Syrian-Baath Palestinian organization, was outspoken in his denunciation of the accord.

For the Baathist regime, however, the rhetoric about defeats for the Arab cause is simply left cover for the real complaint: that Sadat had made a separate peace with Israel, thus leaving the Syrian regime no leverage to work out a capitulationist agreement of its own.

In an exclusive interview with Newsweek senior editor Arnaud de Borchgrave (published in the September 15 International Herald Tribune), Syrian President Hafez el-Assad took a rather different tone. Asked why he had characterized the Egyptian-Syrian agreement as "jeopardizing" peace in the Middle East, el-Assad replied, "Because the agreement is a step backward from peace and will precipitate the next crisis. It closes the doors which might otherwise have led to real peace." El-Assad expressed a good deal of bit-



Assad

terness at the conduct of the Sadat government. "Egypt says negotiations for a new Golan agreement will start within one month and that all parties know this," de Borchgrave said. "Israel says this is not so and that there is no commitment to do anything beyond Sinai. Who's right?" To which el-Assad replied: "There is no agreement with anybody to start any negotiations."

"Did Egypt make a commitment to Syria that there would be no second-stage in Sinai unless it was

directly linked to another withdrawal on Golan and some progress on the Palestinian issue?" de Borchgrave asked. Assad answered: "When I met President Sadat in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia), we agreed that we would not take any steps without close coordination among ourselves. Coordination means an exchange of opinions and reaching a joint position. On this understanding we formed a coordinating committee. Its brief was to study every major topic and submit its conclusions to the two presidents. We were also to meet whenever necessary. However, the committee did not discuss anything relating to the Sinai agreement. There was no exchange of opinion, no common position on the agreement. In other words, no coordination."

The Baathist regime is not concerned about any "defeat for the Arab cause." What it is concerned about is that it has been left out of the deal by Egypt and that it has thus been put in an extremely weak position. Despite all the rhetoric, however, the Baathist regime has little alternative but to continue its previous policy, which is not substantially different from the Egyptian one. El-Assad will play the U.S. card as well. He will offer political and economic concessions to U.S. imperialism in exchange for Washington's putting pressure on Israel to make some concession to Damascus. But el-Assad will not find it easy to achieve success in such a policy. He is subject to pressure from the Palestinian movement and from his own population much more than Sadat; he has less to offer American imperialism in the way of economic benefits than does Sadat; and, most important, the position of the Israeli regime toward Syria will remain far more intransigent than it was toward Egypt. Consequently, there is little prospect for an early agreement on the Golan Heights. At the very least, the Israeli regime will stall until the new front lines in the Sinai are established (probably around February 1976) before moving seriously to discuss with Syria.



The opposition of the PLO leadership to the Sinai accord is similar in nature to the opposition of the Syrian Baath. The political turn made by the PLO after the 1973 October War was aimed at participating in the settlement that has been sought since the war. (See INPRECOR, No.13, November 28, 1974, No.14/15, December 12, 1974, and No.19, February 13, 1975.) The apparatus of the PLO has become a state apparatus in search of a state. Having renounced in practice the armed struggle against the Zionist state, the PLO leaders have set their sights on the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank after an Israeli withdrawal. But an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank — the most populated and economically most valuable of all the territories occupied during the 1967 war — could be achieved, according to the PLO strategists, only through the combined pressure of Egypt, Syria, the other major Arab states, and U.S. imperialism. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat, like el-Assad, recognizes that given the stabilization of the Egyptian front and the de facto separate peace with Egypt, the Zionist rulers will not come under the diplomatic pressure required to force them to negotiate with the PLO, let alone withdraw from the West Bank. If the Sinai accord pushes back an accord on the Golan Heights for several months at least, it pushes the question of the West Bank state into the indefinite future.

The PLO reacted quickly to the signing of the agreement. On September 2 it released a statement denouncing the accord, saying, "In spite of all the assurances provided by Egypt, the accord is in no way limited to military clauses but quite clearly constitutes a political document that explicitly puts an end to the belligerence that exists between the two countries." On September 10 the Central Council of the PLO issued a communiqué saying: "The Egyptian-Israeli accord constitutes an offense to the dignity of the Egyptian people and their army as well as to the dignity of the Arab nation as a whole. This accord is a genuine political settlement, suspending the state of belligerence with the Zionist enemy on one front alone and opening the road to collaboration with the enemy."

On September 6 the PLO launched a demonstration of about 1,000 people at the Egyptian embassy in Damas-

cus. But the demonstration, one of the slogans of which was "The Palestinian people proudly salute the attitude of General Hafez el-Assad," was clearly intended more to bolster the position of the Syrian government than to actually mobilize Palestinians against the accord.

The fact is that the PLO is in an extremely difficult position. Its own endorsement of the overall "peace process" in the region has politically disarmed it in organizing against the Sinai accord. The PLO apparatus is far too closely linked to the Saudi Arabian regime to risk a direct confrontation with the Saudis, who quickly expressed their full support to the Sinai pact. In addition, the policy the PLO has consistently followed in separating the Palestinian struggle from the broader revolutionary struggle throughout the Arab world leaves it with little or no base in Egypt with which to confront Sadat. Sadat's response to the PLO's criticism of the agreement showed that he is aware of the relationship of forces. On September 4 he gave a speech strongly and openly denouncing the PLO. On September 11 the PLO radio station in Cairo, "Voice of Palestine," was taken over by the Egyptian government. The name was changed to "Palestine Radio" and the personnel of "Voice of Palestine" were barred from entering the premises. The station has continued broadcasting on the same frequency and on the same schedule, but the speakers are Egyptian and the texts they read consist largely of Egyptian government communiqués and statements. At the same time, a counterattack against the PLO was launched in the Egyptian press.

Given the existing relationship of forces on the diplomatic field, the only way the PLO could engage in a test of strength with Sadat and the Saudi regime would be to mobilize the workers and peasants and Palestinian refugees throughout the Arab East in a mass struggle against the peaceful solution as a whole. There is no doubt that a mass base exists for such a campaign, as has been demonstrated by the response received by the organizations that compose the Palestinian "Front of Rejection" (among them the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and the Popular Front-General Command). But the PLO leadership cannot wage such a campaign without renouncing its own political position and without breaking with the forces that subsidize the PLO bureaucracy. It is thus likely that the PLO will avoid a test of strength and eventually acquiesce in the Sinai agreement.

### A temporary peace?

Although the Sinai accord is aimed at establishing a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, it does not at all guarantee that peace will actually take hold. If no accord is reached on the Syrian front and if the mobilizations of the Palestinian, Syrian, and Lebanese masses continue, the position of the Baathist regime in Damascus could become intolerable. In that event, Damascus could be compelled to launch some military

action against the Israeli occupation in an effort to get the diplomatic process off dead center again. And in that event, the Sadat regime would face its deepest crisis ever. It is one thing to end the state of war with Israel on the Egyptian front and allow the Zionist state to continue its occupation of more than 80 percent of the Sinai peninsula. It would be quite another thing, however, actually to stand by passively during a full-scale shooting war between Israel and Syria. Faced with such an eventuality, Sadat would have a choice between breaking the Sinai agreement, which would entail a direct clash with U.S. imperialism and, very likely, another major military defeat at the hands of a vastly strengthened Israeli army, or adhering to the agreement, which would almost certainly involve an unprecedented confrontation with the Egyptian masses and even the threat of a full-fledged revolutionary explosion. The choice would not be a happy one, either for Sadat or for American imperialism.

If, on the other hand, the Syrian front can be stabilized as thoroughly as the Egyptian front has been, the question of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank could be dealt with at leisure. With the threat of war with Egypt and Syria eliminated, the Zionist regime would be under no compulsion to make concessions and the PLO would be entirely marginalized. At that point, any long-term West Bank negotiations that did take place would be between Israel and the Hussein regime in Jordan, and not between Israel and the PLO.

It follows, then, that the next item on the agenda of U.S. imperialism (and of el-Assad and of Sadat) is to arrange a new accord for the Golan Heights. As we

have pointed out, because of the relationship of forces created by the Sinai accord, it will not be easy to achieve a Golan accord. But it can be safely predicted that the Syrian regime will follow Sadat's path of capitulation. Most likely the accord will take the form of a partial or total demilitarization of the Golan Heights, probably with the establishment of a larger UN buffer force, combined with a Syrian renunciation of war along the lines of Sadat's.

The continuation of the U.S.-orchestrated negotiations will entail a big increase in repression throughout the Arab East. The Palestinian masses, the vanguard throughout the Arab East, and even the PLO leadership itself, will understand the stakes



involved in the Pax Americana that is being negotiated. There will thus be resistance, and the regimes in Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt will meet that resistance with all the severity at their command. Closer coordination among the repression apparatuses of the various Arab countries has already begun (the case of the Arab Communist Organization, for example) and will undoubtedly intensify. The Israeli occupiers can be counted on to step up the repression in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. For all the Arab regimes concerned, capitulation to the Zionist state and to U.S. imperialism inevitably requires repression of the Arab vanguard.

Even apart from the specific question of the "settlement" of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the attempt to establish Pax Americana in the Arab East will entail an increase in repression. The Sadat regime's attempt to solve the social and economic crisis in Egypt with massive injections of American capital has been a complete failure so far and will fare no better in the future. The problems of unemployment, inflation, and declining living standards in Egypt have already led to a reawakening of the Egyptian working class and to the re-emergence of a political vanguard based among this most decisive sector of the entire Arab proletariat. Even if there is no immediate mobilization in Egypt against Sadat's latest capitulation, the rise of workers struggles, some of which have taken on very advanced organizational forms, will continue. For several months now, Sadat has been waging a campaign of repression against the Egyptian vanguard, most recently arresting twenty revolutionary Marxist militants. (See INPRECOR, No.33, September 11, 1975.) Mobilization in defense of revolutionary militants in Egypt and the other countries of the Arab East therefore becomes a crucial task for revolutionaries throughout the Arab East and for the whole international workers movement. Defeating the repression is one of the keys to defeating the capitulationist settlement.

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# ARGENTINA: *the union bureaucracy & the crisis*

by JEAN-PIERRE BEAUVAIS

Isabel Perón's "transfer of powers" for a thirty-five-day period to Italo Luder, the recently elected president of the Senate, is not just an anecdotal incident, but a new phase in the political crisis in Argentina and in the development of solutions aimed at alleviating that crisis. The departure of the president, even if it is only temporary, indicates to what extent her role had been reduced to that of a "figurehead" buffeted among forces that are trying to share out power today: the armed forces and the trade-union bureaucracy.

The departure of Isabel Perón indicates the desire of these forces to maintain the present institutional facade, at least for the moment; basically, that means respecting the electoral calendar, which calls for elections in 1977, with or without Isabel Perón. Given that she has been shown to be incapable of even playing the role of a figurehead, it was necessary to break

in the person who will be charged with taking her place, according to the constitutional rules. Hence this interim step, the first in a "painless" replacement process. But these ridiculous masquerades cannot conceal the depth of the economic, social, and political crisis now racking Argentina. Nor can they ameliorate this crisis, not even partially.

## The Rodrigo plan

The economic situation, which is at the origin of the current crisis, is chaotic. Inflation is accelerating from week to week, and even from day to day. No one among Argentine economic circles ventures to predict what the inflation rate will amount to by the end of the year. Based on what has already happened, it should be at least 200 percent for the year 1975 as a whole.



Argentina's dependent economy is now being hit full force by the international recession, which is reducing to zero the already modest maneuvering room upon which the Peronist regime (and behind it the Argentine bourgeoisie) had relied to impose the policy of the "social pact," with the aid of the trade-union bureaucracy and with a few minimum concessions to the workers thrown in.

Exports of agricultural products, the main traditional resource of Argentina, have suffered from the crisis now racking the European countries, which are the major importers of Argentinian agricultural produce. Concurrently, the rise in the sales prices of Argentine industrial products has rendered them uncompetitive just at the moment when the conquest of new markets was becoming much more difficult because of the world conjuncture.

The total value of exports suffered a sensational decline that took on catastrophic proportions during the first few months of 1975 (decreases of 30-35 percent, according to various estimates).

The Argentine authorities, in panic, decided to take radical, although classic measures: Make the workers pay for the economic crisis and for a potential economic upturn.

Such was the meaning of the "Rodrigo Plan," named after the minister of economics, Celestino Rodrigo.

Apart from a new and important devaluation of the peso (an attempt to boost exports), the plan called for a massive increase (100-150%) in rates for public services. But it was aimed mainly at limiting wage increases (to about 40%), as a prelude to a future wage freeze, despite the fact that in June 1975, when the plan was announced, the cost of living increase was estimated to be 150% during the period in which the wage increases of 40% were supposed to occur.

It is easy enough to make some calculations based on these figures. And all the workers did so: The Rodrigo plan aimed at reducing the purchasing power of the workers by about 50%. That is a reduction of the same order as the one achieved by Pinochet on the other side of the border, by means that are well known.

The plan was thus a real declaration of war on the working class. In this sense, it revealed the political stupidity of the team around López Rega, the regime's strongman at the time. Celestino Rodrigo was a member of that team. To believe that such a plan could be imposed without provoking a massive response from a working class as combative as the Argentine proletariat revealed political blindness of rare dimensions.

But above and beyond the "López Rega Clan," the reactions of the Argentine bourgeoisie were also quite revealing: Up to a few days before the enormous workers mobilization that was to sweep away the Rodrigo plan and force its author to resign from his ephemerally held ministerial post, the essential body of bourgeois

forces supported the plan, with the exception of some sectors of the CGE (Confederación General Económica — General Economic Confederation, an employers organization including small and medium-sized companies). They did so, of course, out of well understood class interest. But the fact that the Argentine bourgeoisie had supported proposals whose chances of being applied were so slim showed how great was the disarray of the ruling class.

## Initial workers response

The announcement of the Rodrigo plan coincided (and this was why it was published so hastily) with the annual meetings of the national parity commissions charged with negotiating labor contracts for whole sectors of workers (especially in the metal industry, public services, the banks, and construction).

As these negotiations went on, the mobilization was organized. Initially uneven according to sector and region, the movement very soon became generalized, revealing an extraordinary combativity of which the Villa Constitución strike two months previously had been an advance indication. Sectors of workers who for years had been considered uncombative participated in the mobilization alongside the workers of the metal industry, the automobile industry, and the graphic arts and printing industries, traditionally the most combative layers. For the first time, the movement was not limited to one or two provinces, like Córdoba or Santa Fe. It was a national mobilization, and the industrial suburbs of Buenos Aires participated totally, which was something new.

Local or branch-wide coordinating bodies sprung up almost everywhere, made up of rank-and-file delegates or members of the "internal commissions." Products of the fact that the bureaucratic apparatus of the CGT (Confederación General del Trabajo — General Confederation of Labor) had been outflanked, these coordinating bodies began to play the role of real alternative leaderships. This very quickly became the case in Córdoba and Santa Fe, but it also happened in Buenos Aires, especially in the banking sector and in the Matanza zone.

Under these conditions, and after resorting to all the means at its command in attempts to slow down the movement, the bureaucracy was forced to give ground. To frontally oppose such a mobilization would have resulted in a rapid loss of the control the bureaucracy still exercises over a good part of the working class.

Thus, the bureaucracy and the employers, who several days before had been hailing the government projects, agreed during the meetings of the parity commissions, which were going on concurrently with the mobilization, to enact wage increases that went well beyond the limits set by the Rodrigo Plan. The average increase was close to 100 percent, in some sectors going as high as 130% or even 140%. If the percentages seem large

at first glance, they must be compared with the estimated cost of living increase of 150%.

In face of this situation, the Isabel Perón-López Rega government had only two alternatives: Either yield to the pressure of the workers and ratify the contracts, which would throw the Rodrigo plan into the trashcan only a few days after it was announced, or engage in a test of strength not only against the working class, but also against the trade-union bureaucracy. The bureaucracy, although it is a pillar of the Peronist regime, could hardly have backed down and repudiated the contracts it had signed only the day before without totally discrediting itself and losing exactly what it wanted to preserve by signing the contracts in the first place: its control over the majority of the working class.

That is a vital question for any trade-union bureaucracy, no matter how corrupt or bought-off it may be. For Isabel Perón-López Rega as well, to opt for a confrontation with the workers and the trade-union bureaucracy would have meant to opt for breaking the Peronist movement, because of the decisive role that this bureaucracy plays in the Peronist movement.

Such a choice amounted to political suicide. Nevertheless, that was the road that was taken.

## The general strike

The mobilization redoubled as soon as Isabel Perón announced in a provocative and hysterical speech that no wage increase above 50% would be accepted and that consequently all the parity accords that had already been concluded and went beyond this limit were null and void. A spontaneous general strike immediately paralyzed several provinces in the interior, notably Mendoza, Córdoba, and Santa Fe. And, very quickly spilling over these initial limits, the mobilization spread to nearly the entire country.

During these massive mobilizations, the interfactory coordinating committees proliferated and increased in strength; their character as alternative leaderships for the movement was accentuated, a character they had already begun to acquire during the first phase, that is, after the announcement of the Rodrigo plan and before the government's decision not to recognize the new labor contracts. Completely outflanked, the bureaucracy, which was still trying to gain time and resolve the crisis through negotiations, finally found itself compelled to jump on the bandwagon. It proclaimed a forty-eight-hour general strike for July 7 and 8 for the recognition of the contracts and for the resignation of López Rega, the strongman of the Peronist regime and symbol of its political line.

From that point on, events moved rapidly. On the government side, there were petty maneuvers and diversionary operations such as rumors that this or that min-

ister would be replaced. But with no effect. The crisis was too violent and too deep to be resolved by a simple patchwork job. Beyond the government, the whole political edifice that had been erected by Perón was shaken and threatened to collapse entirely.

## Peronism and the union bureaucracy

The Peronist party was in total confusion, torn between the López Rega clan, which up to that time had been all-powerful because it was the "regime," and the trade-union bureaucracy, which in the light of the events appeared as the last and sole recourse for the Peronists in their efforts to maintain power.

But more serious and fundamental than the crisis that was shaking the political apparatuses was the sudden sharpening of tension, difficulties, and breaks between Peronism and the Argentine masses and between Peronism and the Argentine working class, a fear that lies at the center of the concerns of all the owning classes, all the defenders of order.

For each party, sector, and faction of the bourgeoisie, whether it be allied with Peronism like Arturo Frondizi, or in "measured and complicit" opposition like Ricardo Balbín (the leader of the Radical party), or even the fiercely anti-Peronist far right (like Manrique), the crisis was not simply a crisis of Peronism, but a crisis of the entire system of bourgeois rule, of which Peronism is an essential component because of its influence over the Argentine masses, even though that influence is on the wane. This was exactly the analysis made by the great majority of military officers during the crisis. In theory at least, power was never so easily available for the taking as during those weeks when the mass mobilization was receding and the government was completely falling apart. But the officers did not take power, even though their role had been and remains decisive.

This attitude on the part of the officers was not the result of the traumatic experience they went through with the failure of the 1966-72 military dictatorship. If the Argentine army today wants to be a "professional" one, as the military commanders ceaselessly repeat, it is by deliberate and calculated will. They think that it is better to remain in reserve to intervene in case of a new aggravation of the situation.

For them, this potential aggravation of the situation means essentially an even more accentuated loss of control over the working class by the trade-union bureaucracy.

Thus, it is better to maintain an institutional framework that, even if it is only a ramshackle facade, at least gives the trade-union bureaucracy the greatest possible weight and maneuvering room.

It is from this starting point that the new features of the Argentine situation must be analyzed, new features

that emerged, although in a confused manner, just after the general strike of July 7-8.

## Victory of the workers, victory of the bureaucracy

In effect, this strike can be considered both the culminating point of the crisis opened by the announcement of the Rodrigo plan and a radical turn in the unfolding and dynamic of that crisis.

By placing itself at the head of the movement the CGT effectively succeeded in bringing it under control, although not without difficulties and problems. But above all, this control enabled the bureaucracy to appropriate the fruits of the victory, a victory that was nevertheless fully the product of the massive and spontaneous mobilization of the Argentine workers.

For the Argentine workers, the victory was twofold: On the one hand, Isabel Perón had to retreat and accept the wage increases called for in the contracts. This meant that the bourgeoisie had to abandon the Rodrigo plan. On the other hand, after some new and unbelievable catastrophes, López Rega had to leave first the government and then the country itself. That was the first step in the liquidation of his "clan" within the state apparatus and the Peronist movement. One after another, all the ministers who were politically linked to López Rega had to resign, even his son-in-law Raul Lastiri, the president of the Chamber of Deputies and vice-president of the Justicialist party.

Cleverly utilizing the victory in order to convince the less combative workers to go back to work and by intensifying the repression (hand in glove with the employers; there were several hundred "political" layoffs in Buenos Aires alone), the CGT step by step regained control of the situation within the workers movement.

Within the Peronist movement and its apparatus, the trade-union bureaucracy made sure that López Rega and his clan would be eliminated. The policy of López Rega, with its fascist projects, was a short-term threat to the union bureaucracy. Moreover, the constantly increasing power that he and his henchmen had been accumulating within the Peronist movement at the expense of the union bureaucracy was also eliminated. The time for confrontations and settling of accounts was drawing nigh. Nothing was easier, more clever, and more natural for the union bureaucracy than to appropriate the workers victory and utilize it in this sphere. But this does not mean that the policy of repression and terror of which López Rega was the symbol was going to be abandoned. Rather, it was to be more selective against the revolutionary organizations and combative workers, and it was to avoid the marginal "screw ups" to which some trade unionists had fallen victim. At first sight, then, the trade-union bureaucracy appears to be the big winner in the crisis.

Within the Peronist movement it became the essential and uncontested power. Its weight there had never been so great and decisive. In face of all the forces of the bourgeoisie, including the armed forces, the trade-union bureaucracy had proven that despite all the difficulties and even if it had to make important concessions, it was a genuine and indispensable power instrument against an increasingly combative and mobilized working class. But therein lies its great contradiction and weakness in the new political period that has now opened in Argentina.

## Limits and contradictions

The strengthening of the positions of the trade-union bureaucracy is the product of two basic features of this new political period: On the one hand, the spectacular new rise of the combativity and mobilization of the workers; on the other hand, the acute crisis of the entire system of bourgeois rule and of Peronism in particular. It is on that basis that the limits and weaknesses of the strengthening of the bureaucracy can be understood.

If the new rise of workers struggles continues to develop (and all available information suggests that it will), then these struggles, even though they served the interests of the bureaucracy conjuncturally, will be a direct threat, especially in the specific Argentine situation. Because of the acuteness of the economic crisis, the big bourgeoisie's margin for granting concessions within the framework of its own system is much reduced. The withdrawal of the Rodrigo plan does not mean that the objectives set in the plan have been abandoned. Only their methods and pace of application will change.

The bureaucrats' capacity for negotiation and maneuver against the working class will thus be very weak. They risk being massively outflanked again, especially since in the current crisis, outflanking the bureaucrats has already proven to be quite advantageous to the workers. Even more fundamentally, however, the spontaneous and generalized strikes and struggles of June and early July cannot be reduced to a simple temporary outflanking.

New sectors of the proletariat broke with the bureaucracy in struggle, accelerating and broadening a process that has been under way since the first Cordobazo in June 1969. That is what explains the basic fact that for the first time alternative leaderships arose in the course of the mobilization in all the major industrial concentrations of the country — and all at the same time. Without underestimating the very uneven character of this phenomenon, we can say that the breaks with the trade-union bureaucracy had a mass character throughout the country, which was never the case in the past.

Of course, the absence of an actual recognized alternative leadership capable of centralizing and system-

atizing such a process slowed down the dynamic. Likewise, the oscillations and opportunism of most of the revolutionary left facilitated the task of the CGT. But on the whole, a new and important step was taken by the Argentine proletariat in its struggle for political independence. In this sense, the "victory" of the bureaucracy cuts two ways, and it is very precarious.

But the victory is precarious and double-edged also for other reasons, ones that relate to the crisis of Peronism.

## The Peronist project orphaned

If the CGT has now become the essential component of the Peronist movement, it is because there is not much alternative. What remains of the Bonapartist and populist character of Peronism is mired in crisis. And the trade-union bureaucracy, which was a privileged instrument of this Bonapartist and populism, obviously cannot hope to fulfill that role alone and on its own account.

This is a problem that Perón had well understood under other circumstances. For him, the trade-union bureaucracy was essential for the Bonapartist project. But he always took care, especially when he was in exile and preparing for his return, not to hitch the Peronist movement solely to the union bureaucracy, not only in order to avoid becoming a prisoner of the bureaucracy, but also in order to preserve the credibility of his project, particularly in the eyes of important sectors of the Argentine bourgeoisie.

But for the trade-union bureaucracy today, the end of Peronism as a populist Bonapartist means the end of the political project that gave the bureaucracy its force and cohesion.

That is a problem that has been posed ever since the death of Perón, given the evolution of the regime under López Rega. But it has acquired its full dimensions during the past several months, and the symbol of this was the fact that the bureaucracy placed itself at the head of a strike that was clearly directed against the Peronist government.

The masquerade of "supporting Isabel Perón" even while the strike was going on did not change matters, and nobody paid much attention to that masquerade anyway.

It was not only because it spoke in the name of the Argentine workers that the CGT moved from strength to strength under the successive military dictatorships of Onganía, Levingston, and Lanusse. It was because the bureaucracy had integrated itself into the Peronist political project. It was not only because it made itself the defender of the immediate interests of the workers that the CGT was able to dominate, control, and line up the immense majority of Argentine workers. It was also because the bureaucracy offered them al-

ternative political objectives, through the vehicle of Peronism and its mirages.

Peronism's mirages have now evaporated, and the political project General Perón represented has become decrepit; those are very hard blows for the trade-union bureaucracy. Even more than during the past few years, the bureaucracy will have trouble maintaining its influence over important sectors of the workers movement; it will be much more difficult to prevent more and more massive and significant breaks by workers previously dominated by the bureaucracy.

This will be especially true in that the bureaucracy's own internal coherence will inevitably be affected by these new facts.

Perón and Peronism as a political project were factors of cohesion and homogeneity for the trade-union bureaucracy. Since these factors have disappeared, relations between the bureaucratic apparatus and the masses are much more tense and the conflicts among cliques with divergent interests, already numerous, will multiply.

Divergent orientations are already beginning to take shape on various questions: relations between the bureaucracy and the state apparatus, relations with the armed forces or certain sectors of the armed forces, the problem of a political expression proper to the trade-union apparatus and distinct from the Justicialist party — all these questions are at stake.

The apparent "victory" of the trade-union bureaucracy is thus strictly relative. The all-powerful position it has acquired within the Peronist movement in the midst of the crisis is the product of factors that will soon turn against it, from the growing mobilization of the working class to the crisis of the Peronist movement.

More than ever, the bureaucracy finds itself associated with the crisis-ridden regime of the bourgeoisie, with its state apparatus and its government, while at the same time the only way out for this bourgeoisie is to whip the working class into line. And this while the catastrophic economic situation makes the bourgeoisie's maneuvering room ridiculously narrow, if not nil; while the repression against the vanguard and the most combative workers is continuing and even intensifying, as is proven by the massacres of these past weeks; while military operations against the guerrillas, as in Tucumán, are on the rise. More than ever, the bureaucracy is in the position of occupying the forward posts in the battle to whip the working class into line while at the same time attempting to appropriate the advantages and fruits of the immense workers mobilization that occurred scarcely a month ago; the bureaucracy's character will thus become ever more violently contradictory, and class antagonisms will sharpen.

More than ever, the events of these past months place on the agenda the necessity of the independent mobilization of the workers movement, the struggle for the

independent organization of the workers. More than ever, any opportunist policy toward the trade-union bureaucracy, any policy that places confidence in the bureaucracy's so-called plans of struggle, in its "proposals for getting out of the crisis" put forward in the trade-union structures it controls, is a brake on the mobilizations of the workers and on their development of consciousness.

More than ever, (and the possibilities are much greater than they were only a few months ago), Argentine revolutionary Marxists must press for the constitution of independent bodies to direct the struggle, as was done during the mobilization of June-July: coordinating bodies, interfactory mobilization committees, local and regional coordinating bodies.  
September 16, 1975

## *SOLIDARITY WITH THE PST*

In our last issue (No. 33, September 11) we announced that five militants of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST — Socialist Workers party) in Argentina had been murdered. Since then, we have learned that three more militants of this organization have been killed by fascist gangs. Our comrades of the PST are thus added to the long list of victims of political assassinations in Argentina, nearly 300 since the beginning of the year. Acting under the cover of the Peronist government, the fascist gangs are striking with impunity at the workers movement and its militant vanguard. The murdered comrades had been engaged in supporting the struggles at the Propulsora steel factory in the suburbs of Buenos Aires. During the funeral for the victims a delegate from this factory explained: "In face of the events of La Balandra (where the mur-

ders took place—INPRECOR), we have the moral duty to repudiate them. The mercenary bands that have made victims of these eight comrades won't stop here." He called on the workers to respond to the attacks.

In face of the intensification of violence against the workers movement on the part of fascist gangs in the service of the exploiters, it is becoming ever more clear to the Argentine workers that self-defense has to be organized on all levels, in the factories and in the neighborhoods.

**SOLIDARITY WITH THE PST AND THE ARGENTINE WORKERS!**

**AGAINST FASCIST VIOLENCE, WORKERS SELF-DEFENSE!**

The PST's weekly newspaper, *Avanzada Socialista*, published biographical sketches of the murdered comrades. Below are excerpts.

### **ROBERTO LOSCERTALES**

Thirty-one years old, Roberto Loscertales, known as "Laucha," was a member of the PST leadership in La Plata. He joined our organization in 1967 when he was a student; he founded our university groups in La Plata. In 1972 he left the university to join the groups of comrades who were travelling around the country to win legalization of the party.

Later he worked at Astillero Rio Santiago, where he was a leading militant of the Marron list until being fired for having helped organize solidarity with the Propulsora struggles. Since then he had been active in struggles at Propulsora, Astillero, the meat trust, and South American Petrochemicals.

### **HUGO FRIGERIO**

He was 30 years old and leaves a one-and-a-half-year-old son. This comrade joined the PST in 1973 when the big demonstrations of state employees were going on; he was a leader of those demonstrations. He entered the Internal Commission (rank-and-file workers organizations) of the Ministry of Public Works in La Plata and quickly became a member of the leadership commission of the Association of Public Works Personnel. In 1973 he was a candidate of our party in the municipal elections. He was also a member of the Partisan Front of the State Employees in La Plata. He had escaped two assassination attempts in the past.

### **LIDIA AGOSTINI**

In 1975, having finished her studies, she joined our organization as one of the first militants of the Front of Liberal Professions. At the age of 27 she was work-

ing in her profession in a dispensary of the La Plata municipality.

#### ANA MARIA GUZNER LORENZO

She had been a delegate of the Association of University Workers in La Plata. She worked in the university offices for eleven years. She joined our party in 1973. A denunciation issued by the "Ivanissebich Mission" caused her to lose her job. She then entered the Council of Economists in the province of Buenos Aires.

#### ADRIANA ZALDUA

She had joined our party in 1971 when she was a student in architecture. She played an important part in the mobilizations in solidarity with the Bolivian workers. Later, she participated in the struggle that drove the fascist groups out of her university. In 1974 she was active in Quilmes among the youth and teachers. This year she returned to activity in the school of architecture. She was 22 years old.

#### PATRICIA CLAVERIE

She had been linked to the party in Bahia Blanca as a militant in the student movement. She then came to

La Plata, where she entered the school of natural science. At the same time, she worked in the provincial senate.

#### CARLOS ENRIQUE POVEDANO

In 1971 Carlos Enrique Povedano, called "Dicky" by his comrades, joined our tendency as a student in economic sciences. For a while he withdrew from activity. He became active again in the summer of 1974, seeking the support of the party in organizing his comrades of the delegation of social security workers. A member of the Internal Commission in his work place, he was the best known leader of the social security workers in La Plata during the past several months. At the time of his death he had just entered the leading committee of the La Plata region of the PST.

#### OSCAR LUCATTI

He joined the party in the middle of 1972, when we were preparing our activities in the electoral campaign. He worked to build the PST youth group in the Ensenada area. He also worked at the Ministry of Public Works in La Plata, where he was a delegate.

# GEORG JUNCLAS 1902-1975

by **PIERRE FRANK**

Our comrade Georg Jungclas, who was a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International from the end of the second world war until the Tenth World Congress (1974), when he was elected to the International Control Commission, died in Cologne on September 11. The entire Fourth International mourns the loss and shares the grief of his companion, Leni.

Georg's life embodied the so-tormented history of the revolutionary vanguard of the German proletariat during the past sixty years. Georg was born in a family of Social Democratic convictions that was hostile to the policy of the Social Democracy during the first world war; at the age of 14, he joined a branch of the Socialist Youth in Altona (a suburb of Hamburg) that opposed the imperialist war and the betrayal of the German Social Democratic party. During this period he was active in illegal groups and joined the Spartakusbund,

which had been founded by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. He participated in all the revolutionary struggles going on in Germany at the time; most especially, he took part in the Hamburg insurrection of October 1923. Because of his revolutionary activities, he was compelled to live underground in 1921-22 and again in 1924-26.

Until 1933, Georg lived most often in Hamburg. A member of the German Communist party, he was part of the left wing led by Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and Hugo Urbahns, the Communist leader of Hamburg. Expelled from the Communist party in 1928, Georg defended the positions of Leon Trotsky within the Leninbund, founded by Urbahns. In 1930 he participated in the founding of the German Left Opposition, affiliated to the International Left Opposition led by Trotsky, which was later to become the Fourth International. He partici-

pated in the international meeting held in Copenhagen when Trotsky visited that city in November 1932.

After Hitler came to power in 1933, Georg lived in Germany illegally for several months and then emigrated to Denmark. There he was active in winning German emigrés and Danish revolutionary militants to Trotskyism. Thus, he was at the origin of the Danish section of the Fourth International. He met Trotsky once again in 1936 in Hønefoss, Norway.

After the invasion of Denmark by German troops, Georg remained in the country clandestinely and participated in the resistance, particularly by contributing to saving the lives of Danish Jews; after the war his work was officially recognized by the Danish authorities. Arrested in May 1944, Georg was transferred to Hamburg, then to Berlin, and then to Bayreuth in prison freightcars bearing the notice: "Communist, degenerate dog to be slaughtered in case of flight." Georg escaped death only because of the Nazi collapse. "Liberated" by American troops in April 1945, he was detained until 1946 by the Czech Communists who had taken over direction of the prison in which he was being held.

With his release from prison, Georg again contacted the leadership of the International, a leadership that had been reconstituted that same year at an International Conference held in Paris. He represented the German section at the World Congress of the Fourth International held in 1948. From then on he participated very actively in the leadership of the International and its German section.

In 1946 Georg was virtually the only member of the prewar German section who had survived the repression and had not been politically destroyed by the years of exile. Germany was then in ruins. But while the economic recovery of the country was to take place with prodigious rapidity, the political recovery of the German working class and, even more so, the reconstruction of a revolutionary vanguard, have occurred so slowly that even today only a few steps forward have been taken. Georg devoted the best of his strength to the difficult and often thankless task of reconstructing the Trotskyist organization in Germany. For years he travelled throughout West Germany seeking out militants one by one, working on the elaboration of the policy of the German section and of the International, assuring the appearance of Trotskyist publications, and collaborating with publications in which he expressed the positions of the Fourth International. This was a labor conducted against innumerable difficulties. In spite of all the adverse circumstances, revolutionary Marxism attracted people who wanted to prepare the overthrow of the capitalist system; but the stifling, apolitical atmosphere in Germany during that time contributed to breaking a good number of those who turned toward revolutionary Marxism.

It was during this period — one which was not as tragic as the one that preceded the war, but which nevertheless did not offer fertile soil for revolutionary Marxism

— that Georg gave proof of the greatest tenacity; he never despaired. He was able to take advantage of the smallest opportunities that opened up in his country. Furthermore, he was one of the first to try to organize the immigrant workers in Germany and to draw the German workers movement toward this task. Finally and above all, he made an exceptional contribution to the support of the Algerian revolution. His house practically served as a political and organizational center for this work, and he particularly collaborated in the Fourth International's establishment of an arms factory in Morocco for the FLN.

Georg carried out all this intense and difficult activity, only a faint idea of which is offered by the dryness of such a brief account, with much modesty and humor, even in especially difficult moments.\*

During recent years, when Georg's capacity for work was reduced by age and ill health, he had the joy of seeing the emergence of young forces, even in Germany, who took up the fight and gave unprecedented growth and impetus to the Fourth International. In his eyes, these young forces justified all the years of struggle and his unshakable confidence in the world socialist revolution, which he had maintained ever since his adolescence. In 1971 he participated in the Congress for a Red Europe, held in Brussels, where the breakthrough of the International was demonstrated for the first time.

Georg was able to preside over the founding of the *Gruppe Internationale Marxisten* (GIM — International Marxist Group), German section of the Fourth International, with its forces that, while still insufficient, are greater than ever before. He could say that he had genuinely built this section, in the sense that it could continue to live and develop even after he was gone.

I would like to conclude this short biographical sketch with a few personal words. I first met Georg in Berlin almost forty-five years ago; we saw each other again in Copenhagen in 1932 and again in Paris during his years of exile. During the postwar years great ties of profound friendship were forged between him and me. I think I can say that we were the oldest and best friends in the International. I saw him for the last time a few months ago; he was lying on a hospital bed. He was happy about the victory that had just been won by the peoples of Indochina and was as eager as ever to hear about the activities of the Fourth International. Georg's life was a life of revolutionary combat. In this combat, which the Fourth International is waging, Georg will continue to live.

September 12, 1975

An interview with Georg Junclas giving details about his activities before and during the war appeared in *Quatrième Internationale*, No. 3, July 15, 1972.

# INTERNATIONAL FORUM

## for a revolutionary marxist daily

In December 1974, the first congress of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International, voted to publish a daily newspaper beginning in January 1976. Since then, the whole organization has launched a campaign to raise the funds needed to set up this indispensable political instrument.

In fact, in a situation marked by the rise of workers and revolutionary struggles since 1968 (victory of the Indochinese revolution, rise of the revolution in Portugal, intensification of struggles against the dictatorship in Spain, development of workers struggles in Italy, Britain, and France), a daily newspaper capable of offering day-by-day accounts of the struggles of the working class and all sectors of society, of developing militant solidarity with the struggles in Europe and throughout the world, and of stimulating the debate among the various revolutionary forces, becomes a necessity.

In the context of the campaign for launching the Quotidien Rouge (Daily Rouge), an international forum is being organized in Paris, at les Halles de la Villette on October 18 and 19. This forum will be both an artistic festival and a vast discussion among the LCR, the European sections of the Fourth International, and the various French and European revolutionary organizations. The idea is to give a concrete picture of the workers democracy for which we are fighting. A whole series of central discussions are planned: the economic crisis, Marxism today, the oppression of women, the Portuguese revolution, the press and information, the city and revolution, socialist democracy, the army, show business and revolution, etc.

In addition, several hundred stands have been planned, grouped into areas around various themes: international questions, workers struggles, independent women's movement, soldiers, youth, culture. Specific discussions will be held in the framework of these clusters of stands. Everything must be done to stimulate discussion and the most democratic possible confrontation around the problems that concern the whole revolutionary movement.

Help launch the Quotidien Rouge; come to the International Forum in Paris October 18 and 19.

To support the "operation daily" financially, send contributions by international money order or bank check payable to:

Mlle. P. Chenot  
10 Impasse Guéméné  
75004 Paris, France

