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international press correspondence

fortnightly, N° 35, 9 october 1975

30 fb, \$.75, £ .30

PORTUGAL: THE SOLDIERS SHOW THE WAY

exclusive interview
with a soldier of
the SUV

SPAIN: vast solidarity



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INPRECOR 76 rue Antoine Dansaert Brussels-1000 Belgium
INTERNATIONAL PRESS CORRESPONDENCE
Fortnightly information organ of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International
published in English, French, Spanish, and German.

Signed articles do not necessarily represent the views of INPRECOR.

SUBSCRIPTIONS: 1 year (25 issues) — US\$17; Can\$17; £7
AIR MAIL TO U.S. & Canada: \$24. TO AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND: US\$30.
SPECIAL SIX-ISSUE AIR MAIL INTRODUCTORY SUB: U.S. & Canada \$5.50;
AUSTRALIA & NEW ZEALAND US\$6.50.
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SPAIN after the murder of five militants a brutal turn

by PACO ROBS



On the morning of September 27, five revolutionary militants in Madrid, Barcelona, and Burgos died under the bullets of the Francoist firing squads. All Europe was stupefied, stunned. Hundreds of thousands of workers took to the streets shouting their hatred and their determination to prevent any new Francoist crimes, while the bourgeoisie nervously watched the Francoist regime sink into a barbarous insanity that may well precipitate its fall.

From the many death sentences to the murder of the five militants of the FRAP (Frente Revolucionario Antifascista y Patriótico — Antifascist and Patriotic Revolutionary Front) and the ETA-V (Euzkadi ta Askatasuna-V — Basque Nation and Freedom, Fifth Congress), from the adoption of the decree-law against "terrorism" to the demonstration in support of the regime, which drew 200,000 people to the Plaza del Oriente in Madrid, the events in Spain have taken a surprising and disturbing turn during these past weeks. The slow decomposition of the dictatorship that seemed to be following its irreversible course under the hammer blows of powerful mass struggles looked like it had been checked.

A trembling and snivelling old man, Franco still holds the levers of power in iron hands. Behind him, the far right is raising its head, while bourgeois circles are bowing in silence. This reinvigoration of the far right is not only the result of Franco himself regaining his vigor. In fact, although there is a social layer that felt the Portuguese events of April 25, 1974, like a blow in the face, there are tens of thousands of functionaries and state employees who constitute the day-to-day repressive apparatus of the dictatorship.

Removed from many of the cogs of power by the very evolution of the regime and traumatized by the disappearance of Carrero Blanco, who represented an essential element for the continuity of the regime, and by the turn taken by Arias Navarro, who they had correctly considered one of their own but who, upon formation of his government, announced his evolutionist intentions in his famous speech of September 12, 1974, these sectors of the state apparatus in which the Francoist old guard is concentrated have for a year and a half been engaged in a battle that is all the more active because their very existence is at stake.

The experience of Portugal showed that the bourgeoisie was prepared to let these people go down the drain when the dictatorship collapsed; it also showed that they would be the first targets of the mass mobilization. For a year now, transfer requests from policemen stationed in the Basque country have been piling up at lightning speed — an eloquent indication of the crisis of consciousness. These sectors of the state apparatus, who can expect nothing from any evolution of the present regime, no matter how controlled and gradual, have found in the recent events material for a counteroffensive the violence of which is surprising.

But the latest events cannot be explained purely by the exasperation of a given social layer whose existence is linked more than any other layer to the survival of the



regime. What really came through during these events was the deep crisis of the leaders of the Spanish bourgeoisie, a crisis that is strikingly illustrated by the bankruptcy of the Arias Navarro government and its inability to develop a coherent political program. Although most of the press was timidly echoing the international pressure in favor of measures of clemency, as soon as the executions actually took place there was an unflinching lineup behind Franco on the part of all sections of the regime, whatever their oppositional inclinations may have been up to then.

The press, radio, and television launched a hysterical campaign to support the regime, to the point that one would have thought it was the 1940s again.

With the exaltation of fanatical nationalism and the ardent denunciation of communism and free masonry, it was the crusade spirit of the war years that marked the barely audible speech the dictator made before the 200,000 people assembled in Madrid's Plaza del Oriente on the occasion of the thirty-ninth anniversary of the Francoist regime. The size of this demonstration resulted above all from the measures that were taken to guarantee its success: systematic tapping of the population within a several-hundred-mile radius of Madrid, shut-down of the factories in the capital, paid holidays for the state employees. But more than an apparently miraculous reconstitution of a new mass base for the regime, the demonstration must be seen as representing the adherence to the regime of still relatively large layers of the traditional petty bourgeoisie, the same layers that have lined up against the revolution in Portugal.

There should be no mistake, what occurred at the beginning of September was a brutal turn in the policy of the regime and not a simple temporary shift to satisfy the hardliners.

The economic recession, with its trail of unemployment and poverty, has only just begun to hit Spanish society full force. Powerless to crush the mass movement of which the Basque country represents the most advanced point, this regime has lost sight of any long-term project and is no longer concerned with anything but survival. It is capable of killing again, but it is incapable of holding off its own fall. The few bridges toward a peaceful evolution of the regime that had been built with such difficulty have now been demolished.

The coming confrontations and the new general strike in the Basque country — a real national mourning in which hundreds of thousands of workers have participated — show how near is the moment when the overthrow of the dictatorship will be on the agenda. By trying to restrict the development of the situation while simply waiting for the death of Franco or a hypothetical initiative by the general staff transferring power to Juan Carlos, the Communist party and the Spanish Social Democracy are only prolonging the death agony of a dictatorship that has sunk into barbarism. ■



EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS REACT

The "legal" murder of five political prisoners by the Franco dictatorship has not only provoked important reactions from the workers and revolutionary movement in West Europe, but has also generated uncommonly strong reactions among various Social Democratic governments in capitalist countries. Most West European governments recalled their ambassadors from Madrid for "consultations," and the Franco regime retaliated by recalling its own ambassadors from most West European capitals. (An exception was the Giscard d'Estaing government in France, which waited until four days after the executions before announcing that the French ambassador to Madrid, who was in Paris for personal reasons, would be delayed in returning to Spain.) Some prime ministers, Joop Den Uyl of the Netherlands and Olaf Palme of Sweden, for instance, denounced the senile Spanish dictator in terms rarely used at the "government" level by bourgeois statesmen. Mexican President Luís Echeverría proposed to expel Spain from the United Nations until the regime is changed.

What is the explanation for these strong reactions, which go well beyond anything that happened when the Basque revolutionary nationalists were condemned to death during the Burgos trials in 1970 or when Salvador Puig Antich was actually executed in 1974?

First, the mass reactions among the organized workers movement and the working class in general were much wider and more universal this time, thus exerting greater pressure on the political establishment in the bourgeois-

democratic countries. The systematic campaign of preparation and mobilization waged by united-front committees animated by far-left organizations, among them the sections of the Fourth International, produced good results and sensitized working-class opinion more than in the past. The West European governments would have had to pay an extremely heavy price for ignoring the wave of revulsion and mobilization that spread throughout the workers movement. They chose not to pay that price.

Second, ever since the infamous "nonintervention" policy of the French Popular Front government (led by the Social Democratic Prime Minister Léon Blum) during the Spanish civil war, the Franco dictatorship in particular and the "Spanish question" in general have represented the "bad conscience" of West European Social Democracy. Spain also offers the Social Democratic leaders a good opportunity to "talk left" without committing themselves to anything. Violent denunciation of a dictatorship in another country is an easy way of diverting attention from their own responsibility in whittling down democratic rights in many Western countries in which they share responsibility for government policies, like the repressive legislation enacted by the Social Democratic government in West Germany or the wage-freeze measures taken by the Labour government in Britain. On this occasion, however, the violence of mass sentiment and mass reaction forced them to make some gestures, to go beyond purely verbal denunciations. Withdrawing ambassadors seemed a good way out, be-

cause it averted more radical mass-action proposals like systematic boycotts by trade unions, halting of all military, financial, and commercial collaboration, an embargo on weapons exports, etc.

Third, the special place occupied by the Basque national movement in the anti-Franco struggle and the participation of many members of the lower ranks of the clergy make the international Catholic workers organizations (which have not insignificant weight in countries like Holland, Belgium, Italy, and France) especially sensitive to the issue. This is a big change from the situation that prevailed at the time of the Spanish civil war, when the international clergy was unanimous in its support for Franco's anti-working-class crusade. This time a significant section of the Catholic labor movement added its pressure to that of the Social Democrats, the Communist parties, and the revolutionary left, thus forcing the West European governments to make some stronger than usual public gestures "disapproving" Franco's crimes.

Fourth, the West European bourgeoisie has drawn some important lessons from the Portuguese experience. It understands that it is a big mistake to allow the organized labor movement a monopoly in the struggle against the Franco dictatorship. It expects this dictatorship to fall, and it wants the fall to take place under conditions in which there are still a maximum of guarantees for main-

taining a bourgeois state and a capitalist economy in Spain and under which powerful bourgeois formations can still emerge within the country itself. By accentuating the international isolation of the dictatorship and doing some damage to the commercial interests of the Spanish bourgeoisie, the Common Market capitalists expect to pressure capitalist circles in Spain to assure a rapid succession for the dictator.

Ironically, the greatest short-term advantage will be gained by that sector of international capital that has been most cynical about Franco's crimes: the U.S. imperialists. The U.S. capitalists remained silent about these crimes while the wave of protest spread across Europe. They were busy quietly preparing the final stage of their negotiations with the Franco regime over the renewal of the U.S.-Madrid military alliance. Because of the momentary isolation of the Spanish regime in Europe, the price the Francoists had hoped to extract for renewing the leases on the U.S. bases in Spain went down.

The hypocrisy of the West European defenders of "democracy" against Franco is indicated by the fact that although many ambassadors were withdrawn from Madrid, no government considered withdrawing from NATO, which, through the U.S. military bases and establishment, maintains the closest military collaboration with the Spanish army. ■

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY

● France

The announcement of the confirmation of the death sentences against five Basque and Spanish militants touched off a powerful wave of protest in the French workers and revolutionary movement. It was a wave that swelled up in face of the total silence, and even open complicity, of the Giscard d'Estaing government.

On Thursday night, September 24, the 2,500 participants in a meeting on Portugal in the Mutualité that had been organized by the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire (LCR — Revolutionary Communist League, French section of the Fourth International) left the hall at midnight and marched through the streets of the Latin Quarter chanting "Franco, fascist, assassin!" On September 26 toward the end of the afternoon, when the news spread that the death sentences had been confirmed, a spontaneous assembly gathered in front of the Spanish embassy, which was heavily guarded by the police of Giscard and Minister of the Interior Michel Poniatowski.

The assembly grew by the hour, as French and Spanish militants arrived. We should note that a small demonstration organized by the CP and the Young Communists dissolved at the Place de la Concorde and never approached the embassy.

Around 10:00 p.m. there were some clashes with the police, who used their tear gas with abandon. Several thousand people marched in a demonstration down the Champs-Élysées and the surrounding area. The demonstrators marched through the streets of the capital until 3:00 a.m., shouting their hatred for the Francoist regime. All the offices of representative bodies of the fascist Spanish regime along the line of march were destroyed. Violent police attacks dispersed the demonstration at about 3:00 in the morning as it was attempting to reach the embassy.

On Saturday, September 27, after the executions were announced, the Portugal demonstration that had been organized by the far left in northern Paris was transformed into a militant anti-Francoist demonstration. It marched



from the Place de la République to the Gare de l'Est, after which the organizers asked the demonstrators to join with the trade-union contingents that were assembling at that time on the Champs-Élysées. The police launched a violent attack at around 6:00 p.m., dispersing the demonstrators into neighboring streets. The press and the radio put a lot of emphasis on the destruction of 150 shop windows on the Champs-Élysées at the initiative of groups that were not part of the demonstration and in certain cases were directly organized by the police. The regime tried in this way to divert attention from the powerful anti-Francoist mobilization and to cover up its own shameful role as a prop of the Francoist regime.

On Monday, September 29, the trade-union organizations called for a 5-minute general strike, which was broadly followed, and on Thursday, October 2, they called for boycott actions against Spain.

On the night of Monday, September 29, there was a demonstration of nearly 100,000 people called by the parties of the traditional left and by the far left. There again the Giscard regime showed its true face, violently throwing its police against this powerful demonstration while Poniatowski was suggesting that it might be necessary to ban these democratic demonstrations.

● Sweden

The mobilization in solidarity with the Spanish political prisoners began rather belatedly in Sweden, for a special reason: Until September 22 the activity of the revolutionary organizations and the reformist parties was centered around the Chile solidarity demonstration (see report elsewhere in this issue of INPRECOR). There were, however, some small demonstrations as well as a propaganda campaign that paved the way for a much larger reaction later.

On September 27, the day of the execution of the five prisoners, there was a demonstration of about 8,000 in front of the Spanish embassy in Stockholm. This demonstration was supported by eleven political organizations and solidarity groups responding to a call from the España Antifascista Solidarity Committee. The main slogans and banners in the demonstration were: Smash Franco! Freedom for all political prisoners! and Break diplomatic relations! Outside the embassy the five murdered prisoners were honored by five minutes of absolute silence, a silence that even the police did not dare to break by arriving on the scene of the demonstration. The demonstrators adopted a resolution condemning the Franco regime; this was to be delivered personally to the ambassador, but he refused to open the door. This led to an outcry of anger and some clashes with the police, as people tried to get through the police barricades. After that the embassy was forced to open its doors and the resolution could be delivered. One interesting feature of the demonstration was the presence of a large number of older people, which reflects the fact that memory of the Spanish civil war remains strongly rooted; many veterans of the civil war participated.

There were also demonstrations in some other cities: 3,000 in Göteborg and 300 in Malmö.

Throughout the labor movement there has been a big emotional reaction and some direct strike and boycott actions. Many trade unions adopted statements of solidarity with the oppressed in Spain. At Arlanda, the



Stockholm

Stockholm airport, workers and employees went on strike against three Spanish aircraft that had been scheduled to leave for Spain on Saturday. But it was a passive strike that allowed the Spanish crew, including the captains on the flight, to take care of the check-in and baggage loading themselves. A big delay in departure was caused, however.

Some unions planned direct actions. The transport union, the pilots union, and the union of clerks decided on a three-day (October 3-5) boycott of all planes leaving for Spain; this will prevent about 10,000 people from leaving on vacations to Spain.

The leaders of all the political parties strongly condemned the murders. So did all the daily papers in the country. At the congress of the Social Democratic party Prime Minister Olaf Palme made an extraordinarily strong attack on the Spanish government. "The strange thing," he said, "is that these god-damned killers are allowed to go on as they do. After the second world war there was much talk about building a new Europe based on democracy. But Europe still bears this infection of the past." He also attacked the attitude of NATO, saying, "It is strange that they claim to defend democracy by buying military bases from the fascists."

● Holland

On the evening of September 26 there were protest demonstrations in front of the Spanish consulates in Amsterdam and Utrecht and in front of the embassy in The Hague and an official Spanish labor office in Eindhoven. The Eindhoven office was occupied by the demonstrators; the Amsterdam picket lasted all night. The demonstration in The Hague was the largest of these actions, with about 1,000 participants. In general these demonstrations, which were organized nearly instantaneously, were united-front actions in which the comrades of the IKB (Dutch section of the Fourth International), Maoists, members of the CP, left Social Democrats, centrists, and comrades from various other organizations participated.

On the night of September 26 the Social Democratic Prime Minister Joop Den Uyl called for a united mass demonstration on Saturday, September 27, in Utrecht. On the morning of September 27 there was a demonstration of 1,500 in Eindhoven. An ad hoc united-front committee mobilized about 1,000 in Amsterdam. In both cities, the CP opposed calls for participation in the national Utrecht demonstration.

Some 10,000 people turned out to the Utrecht demonstration. But the reformist organizations, which had not expected such large participation, had not prepared any material infrastructure. (There were not even adequate loudspeakers.) Consequently, a united front of the revolutionary organizations, the IKB among them, took leadership over a large part of the demonstration,

shouting their main slogans: Boycott Spain! Their struggle, our struggle! International solidarity! Death to Fascism! and For a Red Spain! When Den Uyl called on the demonstrators to disperse, some 5,000 people refused and followed the revolutionaries in a lively and militant demonstration through the city.

● Germany

The scope of the mobilization, the various protest actions, and the political sentiment expressed during the weekend of September 27-28 stood in the tradition of the big Chile solidarity movement in West Germany. During the weeks preceding the Francoist dictatorship's murder of the five political prisoners, dozens of "committees against the death penalty in Spain" arose, most of them initiated and inspired by far-left groups and by exile groupings of Spanish workers and militants. Beginning with the end of August there were demonstrations, hunger strikes, protests, and the occupation of the Spanish consulate in Düsseldorf, in which the Gruppe Internationale Marxisten (GIM — International Marxist Group, German section of the Fourth International) actively took part.

So there was a certain preparation and organization, although it remained scattered. With the exception of the Spanish exile groups, however, no organization of the far left had made Spanish solidarity the center of its work. The GIM was primarily occupied with organizing in solidarity with Portugal, as were many of the other far-left groups. The KBW, by far the strongest organization of the far left, had launched a sectarian but not unsuccessful campaign against the abortion law and came into the Spanish solidarity work only at the last moment. Thus, most of the Spanish mobilizations were improvised.

On September 26, when the news spread that the death sentences had been confirmed, there were spontaneous meetings and demonstrations in various cities. In Frankfurt 2,000 people marched on the Spanish consulate. A group of Spanish workers and German activists occupied the famous Paulskirche, where the 1848 constituent assembly took place. The demonstrators at the consulate then moved to defend the occupation. The police attacked the demonstrators with tear gas and water cannon. There were fifty arrests; one Spanish comrade was injured.

The mobilizations continued over the weekend. On September 27 a 4,000-strong demonstration in Frankfurt organized in solidarity with the Portuguese revolution was transformed into a militant anti-Francoist demonstration. In Essen a demonstration of 1,000 was held. Some 2,000 demonstrated in Munich (including the local branch of the Young Socialists). About 1,000 demonstrated in Berlin. In Hannover a demonstration of 900 in solidarity with Portugal was partially transformed into an anti-Franco demonstration.

On Sunday, September 28, about 1,000 people demonstrated in Bonn. The Spanish embassy was guarded by tanks! Many churches were occupied (in Hamburg, for example). In Aachen 200 Spanish and German workers and activists occupied the Dom. The Gedächtniskirche was occupied in Berlin. In Heidelberg there was a hunger strike and an occupation of the Heiliggeist-Kirche.

Unfortunately, only a very limited number of industrial workers took part in the mobilization. After the call issued by the International Trade Union Federation in

Geneva, the DGB (the German national trade-union confederation) called for a 2-minute (!) "general strike" at noon on October 2.

In past weeks a group of forty-eight Social Democratic members of parliament had launched a protest against the death sentences. The DGB sent a protest telegram to Franco. Even some bourgeois politicians (CDU Chairman Kohl) and the Bavarian Cardinal Döpfner called for clemency on "humanitarian grounds."

● Italy



The Spanish events had big repercussions in Italy, both before and after the execution of the militants of the ETA-V and the FRAP. In fact, throughout the month of September there were successive demonstrations whose breadth and militant character recalled the Vietnam solidarity demonstrations at the height of that mobilization. Demonstrations took place in nearly all large cities and in many minor towns as well.

In Rome the first demonstration, which drew a few thousand people, was organized by the Communist party on September 4. On September 6 there was another demonstration in Rome, of about the same size, organized by the far left. Speakers at the far-left demonstration included, among others, a member of the national secretariat of the CGIL (the largest national trade-union federation), members of Manifesto-PdUP, and Alain Krivine, of the Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire, French section of the Fourth International, who happened to be in Rome at the time. There was another mass demonstration on September 17 with the participation of the Communist party, the Socialist party, and the organizations of the far left. An estimated 8,000-10,000 attended. Throughout the week preceding the executions the organizations of the far left organized

pickets at the Piazza di Spagna calling for solidarity with the struggle of the people of Spain against Francoism and gathering signatures against the executions.

The three largest organizations of the far left — Lotta Continua, Manifesto-PdUP, and Avanguardia Operaia — along with the Gruppi Comunisti Rivoluzionari (Revolutionary Communist Groups, Italian section of the Fourth International) and other organizations of the far left had previously called for a national demonstration in Rome in solidarity with the Portuguese revolution; it was scheduled to be held on September 27, the day the executions were announced. As it turned out, the demonstration was centered mainly on Spain. For six hours some 30,000 people marched through the center of the city in a mood of great combativity. The demonstration was led by several hundred masked soldiers in uniform.

The leaders of the action condemned the few acts of vandalism committed against some shops that in no way represented political targets (about which there was a big campaign in the radio and television). At the same time, a short distance away, there was a demonstration of the CP and the SP, with the participation of representatives of the PSDI (Social Democratic party), the PRI

(Republican party), and even some representatives of the Christian Democracy. There were about 5,000 in that demonstration. The speaker from the Christian Democracy was roundly booed. At the Olympic Stadium before the start of a football game between Italy and Finland, 60,000 people observed a moment of silence in memory of the victims of the Francoist murders; a large number of spectators shouted "Spagna Libera!" (Free Spain!).

On the same day, September 27, demonstrations also took place in many other cities. Especially important were two demonstrations in Milan — each of several thousand people — one organized by the traditional parties and trade unions, the other by the far left.

On October 2 there was a 15-minute general strike called by the three trade-union federations. There were new demonstrations that afternoon in many cities, the largest of which was in Rome.

The port workers conducted boycott actions against Spanish ships, and there were similar actions at the airports against Iberian Airlines. In Rome and in many other cities some Spanish buses were burned.

●Switzerland

Since August, when the opening of the trials in Spain was announced, a vast solidarity movement has developed in the major cities of Switzerland. Demonstrations and church occupations were organized each week. The Spanish consulate in Zurich and the Spanish embassy in Bern were occupied by anti-Francoist militants during the week before the executions. Wherever it was possible, the Ligue Marxiste Révolutionnaire, Swiss section of the Fourth International, pressed for the formation of the broadest united committees. Where unity could not be forged, the LMR comrades took the required solidarity initiatives themselves.

With the confirmation of the death sentences by the Council of Ministers, the solidarity movement responded immediately and the mobilization broadened. Mobilizations were organized everywhere, many of them attracting thousands of people. These were the main demonstrations:

La Chaux-de-Fonds: Demonstration of more than 1,000 organized by the Socialist party, the Parti du Travail (the Communist party), the trade-union organizations, and the LMR.

Zurich: Demonstration of 2,000 people, which ended in front of the Spanish consulate.

Basel: Occupation of the Spanish consulate.

Lausanne: Demonstration of 1,500 people after the occupation of a square in the center of the city during the night of September 26-27.

Lugano: Demonstration of 1,500, occupation of the Spanish consulate, and the burning of all documents.

Geneva: It was in this city that the largest demonstration took place, with more than 5,000 people. After filing through the streets and throwing pots of paint at the facade of a Spanish commercial agency, the demonstrators went to the Spanish consulate, which was guarded by a large number of police. There was a clash, for which the Geneva police bear full responsibility. In Lugano, where the police prudently refrained from intervening, the occupation of the consulate and destruction of the documents took place without clashes.

The mobilizations against the repression in Spain were of unprecedented scope for Switzerland. Even more important, the organizations of the workers movement supported the mobilization in many cases, even though that support was often more verbal than real, particularly as regards the united organization of the mobilization. One thing is clear: The permanent activity and the refusal to bow to wait-and-see attitudes on the part of the various local committees forced a part of the workers movement to support and participate in the mobilizations.

Although the demonstrations were large, they had one essential weakness: They were organized on a purely local scale, without any real national coordination. Today, however, if the solidarity movement is to spread, it is indispensable to strengthen and coordinate the initiatives of the local committees. This must be done around the following axes:

- denunciation of the crimes of Francoism, all frame-up trials, and all death sentences; for the release of all political prisoners, against the state of exception and the "antiterrorist" law;
- support for the struggles of the workers, poor peasants, and all the oppressed of Spain;
- mobilization of all possible forces to demand an immediate break of diplomatic relations with the dictatorship.

The last point is especially important. The Swiss government is one of the few European governments that did not take any public position before the executions. This is primarily a result of the economic interests that link Switzerland to the dictatorship, particularly in the realm of arms exports. Switzerland exports more arms to Spain than to any other country except Iran.

In order to further this extension of the solidarity movement, revolutionary Marxist militants have proposed that a national demonstration be held on October 11 in Bern, and they have set to work to realize the broadest unity in action with all the forces of the workers movement wherever it is possible. But they also understand that the initiatives of the most determined anti-Francoist militants are now capable of drawing in other forces of the workers movement and of thus enlarging the front against the bloody dictatorship.

● Denmark

In Denmark there has been virtually unanimous condemnation of the Franco regime, both before and after the executions. Several demonstrations were held in Copenhagen before the trials. The day before the executions there was a demonstration of 500. On the morning of the day of the executions, several hundred people spontaneously gathered in front of the Spanish embassy. Some of the embassy's windows were broken by the angry crowd. In general, the murders met with a violent response. Social Democratic Prime Minister Anker Jørgensen condemned the actions of the Franco regime in a very strong statement and recalled the Danish ambassador from Madrid. Some of the bourgeois press even proposed a total boycott of Spain.

On September 29 the harbor workers in Copenhagen refused to handle any ship coming from or destined for Spain. The leadership of the national transport union decided to heed the call of the international transport union federation for a forty-eight-hour total blockade of all connections with Spain — ships, trains, trucks, and airplanes.

The widespread sentiment in favor of a boycott of Spain is now centered around two goals:

1. All the tourist trips to Spain. More than 10,000 Danes make trips to Spain every year, organized by the big Danish travel agencies. A boycott on this field would be an effective blow against Francoism.
2. A football match is scheduled for October 12 in Barcelona between Denmark and Spain. A Danish refusal to play would be widely publicized in Spain and would be seen as an act of protest and solidarity.

● Lisbon, Portugal


● Britain

The execution of five antifascist militants in Spain touched off an important wave of solidarity actions in Britain, as elsewhere in Europe. On the day of the execution itself some 800 Spanish and British militants mounted an immediate demonstration in London.


On the following Monday (September 29) the Labour Party Conference unanimously adopted a resolution stating its "total abhorrence and condemnation of the death sentences." It did not, however, call for any practical solidarity action. Speaking to the conference Jack Jones, the leader of Britain's largest trade union, the Transport and General Workers Union with one and a quarter million members, called for "the maximum harassment" of the Franco dictatorship. He explained that this meant "stopping and delaying the loading and unloading of Spanish ships, the loading and unloading of Spanish lorries, the loading and unloading of Spanish aircraft."

A mass meeting of 2,000 dockers at the port of Hull voted to boycott all Spanish trade "until the Franco regime is ended." At the main London airport of Heathrow, shop stewards voted to boycott the Spanish airlines, Iberia, "indefinitely." Night telephonists at London's international telephone exchange have decided to boycott all calls to or from Spain.

Other transport workers have announced their support for the 48-hour boycott of Spanish goods called by the International Transport Workers Federation for October 2 and 3. They include workers at the Stanstead airport, the main railwaymen's union (the National Union of Railwaymen), and the Transport and General Workers Union, which controls the docks and road transport.



PORTUGAL



the army that says NO

by C. MICHALOUX & A. UDRY

At the time of his inauguration ceremony, Portuguese Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo announced with great assurance his intention to restore authority and discipline in the army.

On September 26, seven days later, he renewed his appeal, this time with some apprehension, in these terms: "Only the discipline and cohesion of the armed forces and their alliance with the progressive parties and laboring classes can isolate our enemies so as to defeat them more easily." In the name of the struggle against reaction and the "defense of the revolution," the Portuguese prime minister wants to halt the independent organization of the soldiers and restore respect for the military hierarchy!

The Socialist party daily *A Luta* revealed the real meaning of these appeals: "Things are very serious; the armed forces have been eroded by politics, from the simple soldiers up through the generals. Instead of being

a factor of order in society, they are taking the most contradictory positions, without inspiring among citizens the indispensable confidence and minimal security that every community must possess in order to do effective and productive work." (Editorial in the September 26 issue.)

The growing crisis in the Portuguese army is breaking down the whole project of the sixth government, which looks more and more provisional. Nevertheless, this government tried to accelerate the pace of its decisions and make itself look firm and effective. Because of the extreme difficulty involved in using the Copcon as an instrument of repression, the government created the AMI (Military Intervention Group). In face of the development of the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão — Soldiers United Will Win), it ordered the arrest of two soldiers and the drawing up of a list of "ringleaders." In face of the demonstration of the ADFA (Association of Wounded Armed Forces Veterans), the government

ordered the intervention of the shock troops of the Amadora commandos.

But the government has suffered failure after failure. The majority of the units assigned to the AMI refused to participate. The two arrested soldiers were liberated by a demonstration of soldiers and workers on the night of September 25-26. The already massive support for the ADFA took a leap forward after the attempt at repression.

The army, cornerstone of the government's project, is crumbling. The movement of soldiers, which arose out of the interaction of the rise of struggles, the movement of self-organization, and the crisis of the hierarchical structure, and which initially lagged behind the civilian mobilization, is now outstripping the workers and people's mobilizations. The very existence of this movement can facilitate a new workers upsurge. In such a situation, the lack of a revolutionary leadership capable of presenting a political road out of the crisis and of unifying broad sectors of the working class is now being directly felt by significant layers of workers.

Hands off the SUV!

The general staff understood the danger it was facing after the September 10 demonstration in Porto. (See the interview with the SUV member published in this issue of INPRECOR.)

It was not enough simply to place the problem of the SUV on the agenda of the Council of the Revolution or even to draw up a list of all the soldiers who had marched in the Porto demonstration. It was decided to strike at the soldiers, to make an example of them. The two soldiers were arrested under the flimsy pretext that they were in possession of SUV leaflets. The general staff had chosen to make its move in a barracks in which the level of mobilization of the soldiers was relatively low.

But this tactic failed completely. The very day after the arrest of the two, Corporal Pinto and Sergeant Figueiredo of the EPI (Infantry Training School) in Mafra, the soldiers of the barracks assembled in the courtyard and shouted "Free our comrades!" and "Reactionaries out of the barracks!" Not knowing that their two comrades had been transferred to the Trafaria fort near Lisbon, they advanced toward the barracks stockade to turn Pinto and Figueiredo loose. The officers who tried to stop them felt the determination of the soldiers — physically. They were thrown out of the way. The commander had to convoke a general assembly of the barracks; he was met with chants of "Fascists out of the barracks!"

The solidarity with the two arrested soldiers soon spread beyond the walls of Mafra. Support motions were voted in many barracks and telegrams were sent to the general staff and the Council of the Revolution demanding the immediate release of the arrested soldiers. In Moscavide-Sacavem, a region where Figueiredo was well known as an antifascist militant, a demonstration organized by

the workers and tenants commissions in collaboration with the soldiers was held in front of the EPSM (Practical Service and Matériel School of Sacavem). The soldiers of the EPSM and the workers called for the immediate release of Pinto and Figueiredo. The EPSM commander asserted his solidarity with this initiative. Nevertheless, several days later, he circulated a motion among the career officers calling for the removal of the radicalized militia officers and noncoms and for the restructuring of the regiment. When the soldiers heard about this motion, they demanded that a general assembly be held; then, right in front of the commander and the officers, they tore up the motion! The commander then began to understand the limits of demagogy.

The SUV has won, the SUV will win!

In face of this solidarity movement and the reaction of the Mafra soldiers themselves, General Fabião, the chief of staff, supported and justified the decision of the EPI commander to arrest Pinto and Figueiredo. In so doing, he revealed his real objective: the liquidation of the SUV. Fabião declared, "The SUV is an organization foreign to the organs that structure the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) in the military units. The punishment inflicted by the EPI commander on the two soldiers of this unit falls within the disciplinary norms of the armed forces. This sanction was motivated by the fact that these soldiers were carrying on propaganda and distributing leaflets in the barracks, leaflets of an organization foreign to the structures of the MFA within the unit. The cohesion and discipline of the armed forces are indispensable elements in the existence of the armed forces and their capacity to operate in the service of a truly socialist revolution."

The 4,000 soldiers and 40,000 workers who marched through the streets of Lisbon on the night of September 25 in response to the call of the SUV showed Fabião what they thought of his line. They proclaimed loud and clear that it is the MFA and not the SUV that is foreign to a truly socialist revolution. There was no reference to the MFA among the slogans of this demonstration. The slogan inscribed on the front banner, which was symbolically carried by workers, peasants, and soldiers, read: "Workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors, united we will win." That slogan replaced the habitual "People-MFA Alliance."

When the demonstrators arrived at the Edouard VII Square, a SUV speaker asked them to go to the gates of the Trafaria fort (about ten miles away) the following day to demand the release of the two soldiers of Mafra. But there was a spontaneous and unanimous response: "Today! Right now!" The SUV speakers then asked the bus drivers of the Carris company, who were at the demonstration, and the military truck drivers to come forward to take the wheels of some buses that the demonstrators requisitioned from a nearby depot. Several thousand demonstrators were then driven to Trafaria. At 2:30 in the morning, Otelo de Carvalho had to sign an order releasing the two soldiers, an order that was met by the chant, "The SUV has won; the SUV will win!"

This first victory inevitably had deep repercussions — in Mafra in the first place. On October 1 a general assembly of soldiers discussed a proposal to exclude all reactionary officers from the barracks, remove the commander, and elect a new commander. Thus, the slogan of the SUV "Reactionaries out of the barracks," first taken up by the Mafra soldiers on September 23, moved a step closer to actual realization.

This trend is already being felt in other barracks. At the RPM (the Military Police in Lisbon), a unit in which many officers are very radicalized, a general assembly was held on September 24 and voted a resolution containing the following point, among others: "The assembly accepts, with full satisfaction, the proposal to oust reactionary officers who are desperately trying to provoke division in the army." The revolutionary soldiers and officers of the RPM thus responded to the charges of divisiveness that had been made by Fabião and Carvalho.

Wounded veterans sequester the government

On September 29 the prime minister decided to send troops to occupy Portuguese Radio-Television (RTP), Rádio Renascença, Rádio Clube Português, and Emissora Nacional.

Officially, this was the major reason for the military occupation: "What began by presenting itself as a simple movement for demands and which deserved to be treated justly, ended up by culminating in the occupation of the installations of the national radio station (the official broadcasting station) and in an attempt to sequester the government itself, which was meeting in a working session in the residence of the prime minister. In the wake of this escalation, it was planned, according to the statements of the spokesmen of the movement itself, to paralyze all life in the capital." Here the government was alluding to the struggle waged by the soldiers and officers of the ADFA, an association that includes 30,000 veterans wounded in the Portuguese colonial wars. These veterans, exasperated by the lack of any social measures on their behalf, launched a movement for their own demands on September 13.

The only way open to these seriously wounded veterans in making themselves heard was to resort to spectacular actions that would alert the population. For example, they used their wheelchairs to block off the three toll gates on the highways leading into Lisbon and let all the cars go through free. Then they occupied Emissora Nacional. The workers of this radio station allowed them to speak and drew them into the process of editing news bulletins on a regular basis. Finally, they decided to occupy the São Benito palace, the seat of the Constituent Assembly and the government. Throughout their struggle, the ADFA militants received support from many military units, and they got special material assistance from the

military police (cars, food, clothing, lodging). Thus, it was these seriously wounded war veterans, most of them amputees, who "sequestered" the government and threatened Lisbon with paralysis!

In reality, Pinheiro de Azevedo, Melo Antunes, Fabião, Zenha, and company were afraid that the forms of propaganda used by the ADFA would be taken up by other sectors in struggle. Until recently, the radio — under the pressure of the station employees — had been extensively informing the population about these various struggles. With the ADFA, however, a threshold was crossed: Those in struggle were speaking in their own names, with the collaboration of the workers of the radio stations.

That sort of development could step up the impact of struggles and prevent them from becoming isolated at a time when the government is planning on restoring social peace. Today it is the ADFA. Tomorrow it could be the soldiers of the RALIS (the Lisbon light artillery regiment), the RIOQ (Operational Intervention Regiment of Queluz), the Mafra EPI, or the SUV who would take the floor and speak over the airwaves to hundreds of thousands of workers. That was the sequestering that the government was afraid of.

The active solidarity of the military police with the ADFA heralded that possibility. So it was no accident that the second major reason the government advanced to justify the military occupation of the radio stations referred to the armed forces: "In all these events, a common denominator could be detected: The intention to undermine the foundations of discipline and order, especially at the level of the armed forces, which constitute the moral reserve of the nation. A country in which the information organs permit the destruction of the civil and moral foundations of a multiseular social pact ceases to exist." These statements, worthy of a de Gaulle, had to be made in the name of defense of "the socialist revolution"; that was because of the social situation. "Socialism and social justice, the inviolable duty of the MFA and the government, cannot be built on anarchy," the government claimed. The juxtaposition of these two assertions says a lot about the forms that can be taken by the conservatism of the ruling class during a period of revolutionary upsurge.

Occupation: to keep people quiet or let them speak?

As soon as the occupation order was announced, resistance began to be manifested in the army — and on a national scale.

At the CIAAC (Anti-Aircraft Intervention Center of Cascais) an officer rejected an order to move against Rádio Renascença. When the commander offered this officer the choice of prison or obedience, he answered: "I am going to join the popular defense pickets defending the radio station." On the afternoon of September 29 the soldiers of the CIAAC solidarized with the workers of Rádio Renascença. They refused to be replaced

by the PSP (Public Security Police) or by any other troops who "did not share the same ideas" as they did.

On October 2 they again defended the "revolutionary radio station in the service of the workers, peasants, and soldiers" — side by side with the popular pickets. In order to achieve its objective partially, the government had to call in the Amadora commandos, who occupied the Bucara broadcasting station and prevented the Radio Renascença workers from going on the air. The soldiers of the CIAAC gave a good lesson to all those who, in the name of democratic rights, had been calling for the return of Radio Renascença to its former owners: the reactionary, Salazarist Catholic church.

The paratroopers of the DGFA (General Air Force Division), who were sent to occupy Emisora Nacional, also solidarized with the workers of the station, who refused to apply government censorship to the political communiques of the organs of "popular power."

At the Radio Clube Português the RIOQ (Operational Intervention Regiment of Queluz), the military police, and the RTA (Train and Auto Regiment) refused to prevent broadcasts that did not submit to the censorship decree. When the government threatened to replace the RIOQ soldiers with policemen in whom the government had confidence (even though it is dangerous to use the police because of their fascist connotations), the RIOQ soldiers declared: "Only other soldiers from the RIOQ will take our place."

At the RTP (the national radio station) the soldiers of the EPAM (Practical Military Administration School) assured the workers of their support. But the influence of the Communist party prevented the establishment of a workers commission functioning on a regular democratic basis. The trade-union delegates did not take any initiative to draw the soldiers into a response against the government censorship, even though the soldiers were prepared for this. It would have been totally possible to produce a special radio broadcast turning the microphones over to the delegates of the workers commission and to the delegates of the soldiers, as was done at Radio Clube Português.

Sons of the people

In Porto the movement of resistance to the government measures was also felt, even though the government had not decided to occupy the stations in the Porto region.

The reaction of the soldiers of the general headquarters of the northern military region was exemplary. The initiatives taken by the soldiers and the militia officers and the debate that took place between them and the reactionary officers expressed the radicalization and politicization of the most advanced sectors of the anti-militarist movement.

The soldiers of the general headquarters were ordered consigned to barracks. The soldiers then learned that the officers, meeting in the salão nobre (noble salon) were listening to a report from the commander about the reason for this order. The 150 soldiers, sergeants, and militia officers decided that they should also go to the salão nobre to discuss the report of the commander, a Major Maia. Just as the soldiers entered, one soldier scolded the commander: "We are not animals. We also want to know why we have been confined to barracks." The major replied magnanimously, "I don't know why. I think it's because of the situation in Lisbon. . . . The occupation of the radio stations is correct. The radios were bothering a lot of people and disturbing social peace."

A soldier stood up: "Now listen to him. Since some people are pissed off about the radio you have to occupy the stations, shut people up, and cut off the voice of the workers. RR (Radio Renascença) and the other stations let the proletarians speak. Tomorrow, when some people, like an employer or a capitalist, get pissed off about a strike, then the army is going to have to occupy the factories. The next day, when the reactionary officers get pissed off about the occupations of the salões nobres they'll arrest the soldiers."

Another soldier: "We are here, as sons of the people, to tell you that we will never fire on the people."

Major Maia: "You are sons of the people! What am I, a son of a bitch?" Then, turning to a militia officer, he shouted: "I know you've already accused me of being privileged."

The militia officer took that one on the fly: "Not only you, but all the career officers and even us, the militia officers, we're privileged. You can see that all kinds of ways. When we walk into the barracks the soldiers have to salute. In the courtyard they call us 'mister' and we call them 'hey you.' They get 250 escudos a month and we get at least 4,700. And 10,000 is not so unusual. But as my comrade soldiers tell me, they don't put all of us on the other side of the barricades. But we're not going to show them we're with them just by making some so-called revolutionary and socialist speeches. We have to prove it in real life, mainly by opposing any kind of militarist repression against the soldiers' struggle."

For a while the debate went on like that. The soldiers solemnly declared: "Just so Maia does not make a mistake like Carvalho did, we state right now that we will refuse to carry out any sort of measure against the workers." Maia, who was getting depressed, walked off into the corridor, muttering, "I'm transferring to the reserves. I just can't take it any more. I just can't take it."

A first test

September 29 was the first time the sixth government made a practical test of the possibilities of actually carrying out its program. They failed in this first test,

not so much because of a popular reaction as because they were unable to make use of the instrument that is needed for any repressive policy, the army. There just is no other instrument.

In fact, the measures the government took actually stimulated the radicalization in the army and pushed the army to take a qualitative step forward both in the trend toward self-organization and in the trend toward establishing links between the organs of the workers and the organs of the soldiers. This is especially important since this battle — this almost complete defeat for the government — took place around the mass media, which are decisive in a revolutionary crisis. Radio and television could become instruments for centralizing a workers offensive instead of being instruments for centralizing the energies of the counterrevolution.

Even the RIOQ, a regiment where the majority had voted in favor of the Melo Antunes document, is now holding a general assembly to discuss the election of a "soldiers commission." On September 30 in the barracks of the RALIS (Lisbon light artillery regiment) there was a meeting of delegates from Lisbon military units to set up a coordinating body assigned to "protect the gains of the workers." (A Capital, October 1, 1975.) The meeting was attended by delegates from the RALIS; the military police (RPM); the Coastal Artillery Regiment (RAC); the Paratroopers, Riflemen, and Sailors of Alfeite; the Research and Transmissions Brigade (BRT); the Infantry Regiment of Setúbal (RIS); the General Depot of War Matériel (DGMG); the Air Force Detection, Alert, Control, and Interception Group (GDACI); the Practical Transmissions School (EPT); the Aeronautics Matériel Service (SMA); the Almada Fort; and the sailors.

The government had trouble assembling the troops that were supposed to form the AMI, commanded by Brigadier General Nuno Víriato Tavares de Melo Egídio, a general who was widely known as a torturer in Mozambique. In fact, the RIOQ, the EPI of Mafra, the paratroopers, and the sailors have already refused to join the AMI. On the other hand, coordinating bodies of the units of the Lisbon region are now beginning to be set up successfully, outside the normal structures of the army.

Nevertheless, all this must not give rise to complacent optimism. First of all, the establishment of the SUV in the Lisbon region is still only in its beginning stages. The only guarantee for its continuation is the emergence of "soldiers commissions." And the trend toward the development of these commissions, while certainly visible, is far from generalized. So long as that trend is not fully realized, the danger of sectarian divisions according to political loyalties exists. When the SUV arose, the Communist party, while not openly opposing it, launched its own appendage: the ARPE (Revolutionary Association of Infantry Soldiers). The UDP (União Democrática Popular — Popular Democratic Union) is exhibiting more or less declared opposition to the SUV.

The creation of "soldiers commissions" may take place in various ways (transformation of the SUV, emergence of struggle committees against repression, emergence of committees built around material demands), but it



**we tell
you
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as sons of the people,



remains an objective that must be attained if broad layers of soldiers are to be won away from the grip of the military hierarchy and its many maneuvers.

The fact that the deep radicalization in the army and the overall mobilizations of the toiling classes are out of phase is a characteristic feature of the present conjuncture. Some groups that fail to see this and lend too much weight to the existence of the radicalization in the army are tending to develop adventurist and militarist positions. The PRP-BR (Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias — Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades) has gone so far as to say that "insurrection is on the agenda." This is combining with the position of the Gonçalvist sectors, for whom the struggle against reaction is above all a military struggle; they leave aside the organization of self-defense, which has to be combined with the development of the organs of "popular power."

In the bourgeois camp, the recent defeat will accelerate decisions aimed at consolidating a military striking force that is reliable even if restricted. The only gain that has been made by the government so far has been the shutdown of Rádio Renascença, which was done by occupying the Bucara broadcasting station with troops of the Amadora commandos, directed by the reactionary Jaime Neves.

For the bourgeoisie, this points to the road that must be followed. The precipitous return of troops from Angola (a contingent of 5,000 soldiers is supposed to return to Portugal during the next few weeks) may enable the government to construct the skeleton of such a striking force and restore the confidence of the officers in many units. The government still has 20,000 troops in Angola; in principle, they are supposed to be withdrawn before November 16, when Angola becomes independent. These troops could be combined with the police, within which there have been some shakeups.

Among the officer corps the intensification of the crisis of the hierarchical system will stimulate a right-wing crystallization among the large majority, which may make certain government decisions easier.

These measures may be combined with civilian mobilizations, a new rise of paramilitary activities by the fascists in the North, and an increase of terrorism in the Lisbon region, where the "pied-noirs" of Angola will provide a reserve army. Confrontations on a higher level, with more decisive social violence, are drawing closer. The crisis in the army already indicates that the soldiers will stand on the side of the workers.

Lisbon, October 2, 1975

PS. On October 3 the hierarchy went over to the offensive. On that day a general assembly in the CICAP (Instruction Center for Vehicle Drivers in Porto) voted unanimously (312 for, 0 against, 6 abstentions) to oppose a purge measure against two lieutenants and five soldiers. The general staff in Lisbon responded by dissolving the CICAP. When the soldiers resisted, Copcon commandos were sent against them.

an interview with a member of the SUV

The following interview with a member of the secretariat of Soldados Unidos Vencerão (SUV — Soldiers United Will Win) was taken in Porto on September 23.



INPRECOR. The SUV made its first public appearance during a press conference in Porto. That was the conference that issued the call for the September 10 demonstration. Can you tell us how the SUV originated?

SUV. The SUV emerged in the northern military region for reasons that are peculiar to this area. In the North it was quite clear who the enemy was; the rise of reaction was obvious. That enabled us to develop unity of action in the barracks as a response to the reactionaries. Thus, in the beginning, unity in action was established among the militants of the Portuguese Communist party, the far-left (that is, the MES, FSP, PRP-BR, LCI, and LUAR), and the UDP.*

The first steps in this movement go back to mid-July, when the political-military crisis broke out full force. Some soldiers, sergeants, and militia officers began to get together to organize exchange of information about the growing counterrevolutionary activity of the officers among various units in the North. Essentially, these officers were trying to get the soldiers and militia officers who had distinguished themselves in struggle thrown out of the barracks.

This purge, for which the reactionary officers were not even bothering to look for disciplinary pretexts, was directed against what they called "partisan and divisive elements," which means revolutionary militants. This is what happened, for example, in the CICA (Instruction Center for Vehicle Drivers), the RIP (Infantry Regiment of Porto), and the CIOE (Instruction Center for Special Operations) in Lamego. When this offensive broke out, it became clear that the soldiers were not organized to oppose it.

*MES: Movimento Esquerda Socialista — Left Socialist Movement; FSP: Frente Socialista Popular — Popular Socialist Front; PRP-BR: Partido Revolucionário do Proletariado-Brigadas Revolucionárias — Revolutionary party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades; LCI: Liga Comunista Internacionalista — Internationalist Communist League, Portuguese sympathizing organization of the Fourth International; LUAR: Liga de União e Acção Revolucionária — League of Revolutionary Union and Action; UDP: União Democrática Popular — Popular Democratic Union.

The first initiative was to draw up a complete list of all the instances of repression in order to work out how to respond.

Brigadier General Corvacho became the target of the right. He was the commander of the northern military region. The right accused him of being a communist. In fact, he had supported the organs of "popular power" more consistently than most of the leftist officers in the MFA (Armed Forces Movement).

For example, he had protected the Porto Municipal Council, which in reality is an organ of control of the Administrative Commission (the mayoralty). It is composed of representatives of the workers commissions, tenants commissions, trade-union representatives, and delegates of the ADUs (Assemblies of Unit Delegates in the army). In addition, Corvacho had set up a vigilance apparatus within the army that was linked to the workers commissions and tenants commissions; its task was to struggle against the fascist commandos of the ELP and MDLP, which are rather active in the North. (The ELP, Portuguese Liberation Army, and MDLP, Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal, led by Spínola, are rightist paramilitary outfits — INPRECOR.)

Thus, by taking aim at Corvacho the reactionaries were actually taking aim at the autonomous popular organs and the struggles of the soldiers. They understood that the presence of Corvacho made this task more difficult.

The coordinating body that we set up enabled us to gather information; we thus became totally convinced that reaction had set up a real parallel command center, which included secret meetings of career officers. We found out that in the course of one of these meetings (in which almost all the officers of the region had participated) it had been decided to remove Corvacho from the military region; this had been decided by a majority of around 80 percent.

The career officers presented this decision as coming from all the units of the North. To show their opposition to Corvacho and put pressure on the general staff they decided to confine seven northern units to barracks while Corvacho was in Lisbon to participate in the Council of the Revolution. Now, according to the rules,

such an order cannot be given except by the commander of the military region, that is, by Corvacho himself.

We immediately reacted against their claim to be speaking in the name of the military region when 95 percent of the forces of the region (soldiers, militia officers, and sergeants) had not been consulted in any way — and for good reason! Also, we were aware that the order consigning troops to barracks could have led to confrontations for which the soldiers would have borne the costs. Because of all this, we had to organize on a higher level. We had no intention of serving as cannon fodder in settling dissension among cliques of officers, the partisans and stakes of which had been hidden from us. We rejected the idea of the officers speaking in the name of the military region without having gone before the unit general assemblies or a general assembly of the military region, which is the only body that could have expressed the position of the military region and made decisions.

It was around this theme that the first SUV leaflet appeared. We emphasized the fact that one of the objectives of reaction was to establish discipline in the army by concentrating its offensive in the North, which it considered as a solid base. You have to remember that along with the purge measures a reactionary wave was also developing; it was getting social support from various layers of the petty bourgeoisie, the small-holding peasantry among others. These fascist attacks were hitting the CP, the revolutionary organizations, the trade unions, and the organs of "popular power" too. In Braga, for instance, the fascists attacked the peoples' market, which is where the self-managed factories sell their products.

In other words, reaction was developing a real strategy on a regional scale. The reactionaries were totally determined to reintroduce iron discipline in the barracks in order to be able to more easily use the soldiers against the workers and even against their own organizations.

INPRECOR. How did the soldiers react to this fascist wave during the summer?

SUV. At the time, the reaction of various units was far from positive. For example, the soldiers of the RIB (Infantry Regiment of Braga), who the fascists were inciting by telling them that the communists wanted to confiscate the peasants' land, marched behind the fascist ringleaders, sacked the headquarters of the CP, and even attacked some CP militants. I want to stress that on the one hand the recruitment of troops for this was done on a regional basis (that is, most of the soldiers are sons of the peasants in the region) and on the other hand at that time the training of the soldiers, including of the militia officers, was strongly reactionary in character.

The Braga barracks of the RIB was commanded by an officer who stood at the heart of the reactionary conspiracy against Corvacho. His name was Colonel Soares. In addition, the soldiers coming from the northern peas-

antry have no tradition of struggle, unlike the peasants of the Alentejo. Finally, after April 25, 1974, the lot of the peasants and their families hardly improved and even got worse in some cases.

Nevertheless, many of these soldiers participated in the September 10 SUV demonstration in Porto.

INPRECOR. How do you explain this change? I can understand how the most radicalized and politicized soldiers immediately took up the struggle against reaction, but how can you explain the rapid radicalization of these nonpoliticized soldiers who are strongly influenced by reaction, like the soldiers at Braga for example?

SUV. Since April of last year the soldiers have made their gains in a very uneven way. These gains have been made practically on a barracks-by-barracks basis. In some barracks, for example, where the soldiers are proletarian in composition and have a tradition of struggle and organization linked to the workers movement, things went pretty far toward a real transformation of the internal life of the barracks. Especially in Lisbon the soldiers were even able to impose their own forms of organization. But that sort of development is still strongly limited.

In the North and in the interior of the country there has been no substantial change in most of the barracks since April 1974; sometimes there has been no change at all! Braga represents one of these types of barracks. The differences among various barracks are enormous.

At first, the SUV was linked to the initiative of vanguard elements who were often militants of the revolutionary organizations and did not have an immediate mass influence.

The radicalization took place on the basis of the soldiers' need to respond to the oppression resulting from militarist discipline and from a hierarchical system inherited from fascism, as well as the miserable material living conditions. The SUV became established as a mass organization because of its ability to express these aspirations in terms of concrete demands and to link them to the struggle against reaction.

Up to the beginning of 1975 it was the workers commissions and the tenants commissions that held the initiative in struggles. In a certain sense, the soldiers were lagging behind. In large part that was due to the misleading prestige of the MFA. This was expressed, among other ways, in the myth that "all of us, MFA officers and soldiers, are revolutionaries and have to respect discipline, for that is our strength." This prestige was an obstacle to the movement of the soldiers in favor of their own demands.

But the soldiers began to get tired of this "revolutionary" phraseology, which was preventing them from develop-

ing their own instruments for advancing demands, and expressing themselves within the army, and from putting forward their own positions on the main political questions on the agenda.

Thus, demands came up around pay increases and free transport. In fact, for many soldiers a single trip to see their family was enough to almost completely wipe out their pay. Also, demands were raised about the quality of the food, the differences between the food eaten by the soldiers, noncoms, and officers.

On the basis of such demands, the struggle and the methods of combat of the workers were able to penetrate the army, taking advantage of the generalized crisis of authority. The officers then began talking about "agitation" in the army.

This type of radicalization set the stage for challenging the MFA — and that was essential.

INPRECOR. Why and how did this break with the MFA take place?

SUV. When we soldiers raised demands, we found ourselves running up against the officers, some of whom were members of the MFA. These officers were not only frequently applying militarist discipline; they were also proving to be incapable of satisfying our demands.

This resulted in the soldiers in uniform taking some distance from the MFA; this was not felt so clearly by the civilian workers, who had moved into struggle earlier on.

All this made our task easier and increased our audience among broad layers of soldiers in the region (in the North). This distrust was also built up around the theme: "We have been wronged; the officers are speaking in our name, but we were never consulted." This was important in denouncing the attempts of the right to use the soldiers against the workers and against other soldiers. These explanations were combined with propaganda about the need to respond to the conspiracies of reaction.

INPRECOR. You have talked about the basis for the creation of the SUV. But how was the threshold crossed from a sort of coordinating body of militants exchanging information to a real mass movement?

SUV. We quickly noticed that the soldiers were sensitive to the themes we were raising. But we did not offer any organizational guarantee assuring them that our movement could really take up these demands and defend them against the hierarchy. It was therefore necessary to work out some way to express this latent combativity, something that would give the soldiers confidence in their own strength and their own capacity for self-organization.

A central demonstration in Porto capable of tapping all the forces of the military region seemed to be the most effective way to do this. We organized the demonstration over a two-week period.

The call for the demonstration was not restricted to the barracks. We directly addressed the independent organizations of the workers, calling on them to support our movement. The response we got from these organizations indicated how much they had been hoping for this kind of initiative. They were waiting for a response to the reactionary danger, which they saw was coming closer and closer, apparently without any opposition. A certain fear began to spread among the workers. The September 10 demonstration in Porto altered this atmosphere, and the soldiers would no longer act as they had in Braga!

You have to understand that in two months, after June, the atmosphere in the North changed very fast. Whereas previously the members of the PPD (Partido Popular Democrático — Popular Democratic party, the largest bourgeois party in Portugal — INPRECOR) and especially of the CDS (Centro Democrático Social — Democratic Social Center, a rightist party — INPRECOR) had found it difficult to publicly demonstrate their political adherence to reaction, in August they were promenading through the streets of Porto openly wearing the insignia of their parties. In order to hang up their posters, the militants of the workers parties had to organize to defend themselves against attacks by rightist goons; literature stands of the CP and the MDP (Movimento Democrático Popular — Popular Democratic Movement — INPRECOR) were burned in Delgado Square, and provocateurs were trying to prevent sales of newspapers in the city itself.

The response of the soldiers has broken this reactionary offensive, at least for the moment.

After our press conference on September 7, the workers commissions naively went to the general headquarters and said, "We heard the SUV appeal on the radio and we've come to support the demonstration and to find out what we can do to help prepare it." They were going to say that to reactionary officers!

INPRECOR. Had you planned on getting such a massive response from both the soldiers and the workers?

SUV. It was the biggest demonstration in Porto since the first of May 1974. The response went considerably beyond what we had hoped for. There were around 30,000 workers; many people thought it was even more than that. There were about 1,500 soldiers. That made it the largest demonstration of soldiers in all Portugal. Seventy-one soldiers came from Coimbra. About thirty soldiers came from Braga, even though we had not carried out any propaganda activity in the barracks there because of organizational weaknesses. These soldiers came fifty miles to attend the demonstration; they left at 5:30 p.m. after they were off duty, even though they

had been ordered to return to the barracks before 10:30 that night. That was one of the greatest victories of the demonstration. Delegations came from all the barracks within a fifty- or sixty-mile radius of Porto; sometimes they requisitioned military vehicles for transportation to the demonstration. (That happened in Lamego, for instance, fifty miles from Porto.) Mandated delegations from Lisbon came to support us from the RALIS (the Lisbon light artillery regiment), from the military police, and from the BRT (Research and Transmission Brigade). The demonstration did not have simply a regional impact; it affected the whole national situation.

Confidence among the soldiers grew rapidly after the demonstration. They came from all barracks to make contact with us and discuss the problems of organizing a SUV in their own barracks. We then moved to set up a real mass organization capable of organizing the soldiers in the barracks and enabling us to coordinate and distribute material there. Obviously, this is only the beginning. Our weaknesses are still great and the hierarchy is already moving against us, as could have been expected.

INPRECOR. What were the consequences of the demonstration in the barracks?

SUV. At the CICA 1 in Porto, where we had been unable to respond to the purge measures only a few weeks before and where the officers were very reactionary, there was a really beautiful demonstration in support of the Chilean workers on September 11.

At 1:45 in the afternoon 300 soldiers and draftees went to get some arms from the arsenal and assembled in the courtyard of the barracks with these arms, without authorization. They formed up in ranks and held a moment of silence in honor of the Chilean workers, and then they shouted, "Long live the Chilean workers!" The commander then ran up, accompanied by his officers. One of them shouted to the soldiers, "You are now going to go on maneuvers." Then, all together, the soldiers took up one of the slogans of the demonstrations: "Reactionaries out of the barracks!" In the general headquarters of Porto there were three separate mess halls, one for soldiers, one for noncoms, and one for officers. Three days after the Porto demonstration, some soldiers calmly walked in and sat down to eat in the officers' mess. The next day all the soldiers occupied the officers' mess. Since that day there has been a struggle to eliminate the separate mess halls and unify them.

The reactionary officers were strenuously opposed to this, just as they are opposed to common living quarters. These reactionaries are unable to think up any argument to support this attitude; it was the officers that call themselves leftists who provided the arguments, which said: "These officers must not be shunted to the sidelines; that is very dangerous. We need good tactics. We have to give up these demands, otherwise you're going to definitively push these officers into the camp of reaction."

INPRECOR. How do the structures that have been set up by the MFA, like the ADUs (Assemblies of Unit Delegates), relate to the "soldiers commissions" that the SUV is seeking to set up and stimulate?

SUV. The ADU is a body of representation that exists in all the barracks; it's compulsory. This body is composed as follows: 50 percent rank-and-file soldiers, the other half noncoms, militia officers, and professional noncoms and officers. The presence of the commander is compulsory. Inasmuch as these bodies are composed 50 percent of soldiers, and inasmuch as it is often the most combative soldiers who occupy these posts (in most cases, they are not elected), the ADUs are a thorn in the side of the officers. They throw the hierarchical system out of balance. Because of this, we are working within the ADUs. We fight within them for pushing forward the demands of the soldiers, and through this experience we are able to make the soldiers understand that these ADUs cannot fully carry out the task of defending the soldiers.

Many political currents had big illusions about the possibilities of the ADUs. Today the emergence of the SUV marks a widely understood break with this type of organ; the SUV is struggling for the formation of independent "soldiers commissions," to use the term used by the workers in the factories and neighborhoods.

These commissions must represent the will of the soldiers as expressed in general assemblies; they must be elected and recallable.

In Lisbon the links between the soldiers and the workers commissions and tenants commissions had been established, and are still maintained, through the vehicle of the ADUs. There is some ambiguity to this. But because of the combativity of the workers and the very deep crisis of the hierarchy in this region, the linkup between the independent organs of the workers and the ADU nevertheless goes beyond the project of the MFA. In the rest of the country, on the other hand, the ADUs have tended to become instruments for reestablishing discipline. For example, the officers have sought to get the ADUs to take disciplinary measures and they are becoming disciplinary councils. Hence, under these circumstances, they can become channels through which to integrate the workers commissions, tenants commissions, and popular assemblies, in counterposition to the independence of these bodies. It is thus very important to struggle for the creation of real independent bodies of the soldiers.

INPRECOR. But don't you risk driving away a layer of officers who have already demonstrated their solidarity with the soldiers? Do you think you can actually win these officers to your project?

SUV. Practice has already proven that by appearing as a clear alternative to the hesitations and concessions of the MFA the SUV can convince a not insignificant number of officers to come over to the side of the sol-

diers and workers. To reach this goal we emphasize the rejection by the officers of any measures of repression against the soldiers and the affirmation that the struggle against reaction can only be the work of the soldiers and workers united. To the extent that the officers respond to these criteria in practice, they offer sufficient assurances to be integrated into our actions, we believe. Dozens of officers have already joined us.

INPRECOR. The sixth government has openly asserted its will to restore discipline in the army. What measures are being taken against you?

SUV. When the first SUV leaflet came out, an order was given by the chief of staff, General Fábão, calling for the seeking out and compiling of lists of SUV "agitators." After the demonstration, a similar message, addressed to all unit commanders, called for the listing of all the participants in the Porto demonstration. Lists are already circulating in the barracks — lists of potential "ringleaders."

In face of the development of the SUV, and especially the creation of a SUV in Lisbon, the Council of the Revolution immediately put the question of the SUV and the crisis in the army on its agenda. The Council of the Revolution has already indicated what its line of attack will be: The SUV divides the army and serves reaction. We know, for example, that the intelligence branch of the general staff in the North has just made investigation of SUV members its top priority. Investigation of members of the ELP and of their links with the CDS has been dropped to second priority.

In Mafra two comrades were imprisoned because the officers had found SUV leaflets in their footlockers. They were sent to the Trafaria fort near Lisbon. We have already organized a response to free them. That very morning the soldiers of the Mafra Infantry School assembled in the courtyard of the barracks. There was a real pitched battle between the soldiers and the officers, among them the commander, who tried to prevent the soldiers from demonstrating for the release of their two comrades, a sergeant and a soldier. (The SUV demonstration in Lisbon on September 25, just two days after this demonstration in Mafra, liberated the two imprisoned soldiers. The September 25 demonstration was attended by 40,000 people, who marched behind 4,000 soldiers in uniform — INPRECOR.) Even though the SUV is a very recent creation, the strength of the response expresses both the soldiers' sensitivity to the demands that have been advanced and their will to defend the SUV. For example, the soldiers of the Coimbra Center came to the North to get leaflets in order to organize the defense of our two comrades. Identical initiatives were taken in a whole series of barracks where we didn't have any contacts.

At the general headquarters in Porto the SUV has already begun to respond to the accusation that it is divisive. We have demanded that a general assembly be held

around the essential point: "Why are they drawing up lists of the SUV?" The answer is given in the SUV leaflet that is now being distributed: "They are drawing up lists of the SUV because it is a 'partisan' organization. But the officers are allowed to express themselves endlessly; they can organize, as has been proven in the North. If no accusations are made against them, it is simply because they are members of the top brass. We also demand the right to organize, as workers in uniform."

INPRECOR. One of the slogans in the call for the SUV demonstration in Lisbon on September 25 is: "Workers and soldiers, popular self-defense!" Why?

SUV. The government wants to restore discipline in the army at any price, because it is already thinking of using the army against the workers so as to restore order in society as a whole and stabilize capitalism.

We tell the soldiers that our own organization, the response that we can organize against the government's policy of reestablishing discipline in the army, is possible only if the workers are also capable of resisting on the military level. Our propaganda around self-defense puts the stress on the central role of the workers' commissions and tenants commissions and their linkup with the soldiers. This task of self-defense is one of the most pressing questions.

INPRECOR. What are your immediate plans?

SUV. For the immediate future the main thing is to set up a national structure for our movement. The Lisbon press conference of September 21 and the demonstration of September 25 should enable us to make this leap forward. Everything suggests that the Lisbon demonstration will be even bigger than the Porto demonstration.

If the SUV emerged first in the North, the reason for that is simple: The need to struggle against reaction was felt more directly in the North. The development of the SUV in the South will allow us to raise the level of the demands, to clarify our overall political positions on the question of a confrontation with the regime, and to utilize and generalize the very advanced experiences of struggle in the barracks of the Lisbon region. ■

PORTUGAL SPAIN

TOWARDS THE IBERIAN
SOCIALIST REVOLUTION



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The SUV Manifesto

1. The SUV (Soldiers United Will Win) is a united anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist front that arises at a time when fascist reaction is organizing again, making use of the hesitations and divisions introduced among the workers as well as the policies of governments that are neither willing nor able to defend the just demands raised in the struggles of the workers and peasants, of whom we, soldiers, are a part.

2. Already on several occasions we have made concessions to the bourgeoisie, particularly by subordinating our struggle to the alliance with the MFA (Armed Forces Movement), a movement of officers which, because of its contradictions and hesitations in the past, serves a counterrevolutionary policy today. This has cost us not only the abandonment and hostility of important layers of the population (notably among our peasant brothers), but also the demoralization of many fighters in our own ranks and has resulted in sluggishness in face of the reactionary offensive inside and outside the barracks.

The SUV sets itself the task of unleashing an independent offensive on a class basis:

— To struggle for a democratic life in the barracks by imposing the election and democratic functioning of the ADUs (Assemblies of Unit Delegates), the free circulation of the workers and people's press and

propaganda, and the holding of general assemblies of soldiers each time that we call for them;

— To struggle for the formation of soldiers commissions — organs of power of the workers in uniform in the barracks — elected and recallable at any time by general assemblies of soldiers;

— To stimulate and deepen the liaison with organs of popular power (workers commissions, village councils, tenants commissions) strengthening the power of the exploited through Popular Assemblies.

— For the expulsion of reactionary officers;

— Against all attempts to purge progressive military men;

— For the improvement of the living conditions of the soldiers (against the poor pay, for free transport, for common quarters and mess halls, against militarist discipline).

3. The SUV struggles with all the workers for the preparation of conditions that will permit the destruction of the bourgeois army and the creation of the armed forces of the workers power: the revolutionary people's army.

ALWAYS, ALWAYS AT THE SIDES OF THE PEOPLE;
THAT IS OUR WATCHWORD!

WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS, AND SAILORS,
UNITED WE WILL WIN!

SUV APPEAL TO WORKERS & SOLDIERS OF EUROPE

We Portuguese proletarians are now going through some particularly difficult moments in our revolutionary struggle against the bourgeoisie, capitalism, and imperialism.

A year and a half after the fall of the fascist dictatorship, capitalist reaction is redoubling its attacks in the factories, the fields, the neighborhoods, and the barracks, utilizing either insidious demagoguery or open terrorist violence, but always with the same goal: to stop the progress of the alliance of workers, peasants, soldiers, and sailors, an alliance leading to the establishment of workers power; to prevent at any price the abolition of the class privileges it has won through exploitation and oppression; to prevent its disappearance as a ruling class.

The bourgeoisie and the capitalists still have powerful weapons; two of these are especially threatening, unless we are able to fight back in time. The first is our disunity, our inability to push our independent offensive through to the end on a real class basis. On many occasions we have made this concession to the class enemy, notably by subordinating our struggle to the alliance with the MFA (Armed Forces Movement), a movement of officers whose contradictions and hesitations have cost us the abandonment and hostility of important layers of the population (especially the rural population), the demoralization of many fighters in our own ranks, and sluggishness in face of the reactionary offensive inside and outside the barracks.

We have to be able to counter this danger with our own

class organization by breaking down the militarist hierarchy and raising an overall challenge to the power of the state apparatus of the bourgeoisie, of which the army is an integral part. The creation of the SUV and the demonstration the SUV organized on September 10 represent important steps in this direction, especially when it is recalled that this formidable response of 50,000 workers (among them 1,500 soldiers and sailors who marched in uniform in spite of the escalation of militarist maneuvers and repression) took place in a region that has been the center of the terrorist offensive and of reactionary demagoguery.

The second powerful weapon in the hands of our class enemies is undoubtedly the broad international support from which it benefits. That is the result of the common interests that link the exploiters throughout the world. Recent history shows us how powerful and terrible this weapon is, this counterrevolutionary potential of imperialism. It is up to us, proletarians of Europe, to determine the forms of battle, which can be waged only

through our class solidarity, through the organization of our national struggles into a single international battle to make sure that any attack by imperialism receives the response it deserves: the indestructible force of the entire international workers and people's movement.

Today it is Portugal. Tomorrow it will be Spain, France, Italy, and others. Difficult battles are approaching. Against the common enemy our common solidarity is urgent and necessary; it is for this that we address you.

LONG LIVE MILITANT AND COMBATIVE PROLETARIAN INTERNATIONALISM!

PORTUGAL SHALL NOT BE THE CHILE OF EUROPE!
WORKERS, PEASANTS, SOLDIERS, AND SAILORS,
UNITED WE WILL WIN!

Soldados Unidos Vencerão (Soldiers United Will Win)
September 12, 1975

*the sixth
government*



*the
first
defeat*

by C. MICHALOUX & A. UDRY

The military occupation of the radio and television stations in Lisbon has failed completely. On the military field, the soldiers of the units ordered to carry out the occupation declared their solidarity with the news workers. (See the article "An Army That Says No.") On the political field, after three days the government was compelled to officially rescind its application of censorship and to fall back on the decree-law on the press, which has never been respected before anyway.

Thus, the weekly *O Jornal* could write in its October 3 editorial: "The new government is now approaching the second week of its existence without having yet been able to apply the minimum program it originally announced." The daily newspaper of Raoul Rego (former director of *República*) indicated, in its own way, the essential reason for this incapacity: "The soldiers are paid by the people, all the people, both conservative and revolutionary, to give us all a feeling of security (sic). If they are to carry out their duty as citizens and if they are not to simply demand revolutionary rights, then they must carry out the mission that has been assigned them, which is to maintain security. By standing with folded arms during the raging of a fire that dishonors the community (the reference is to the refusal of the Lisbon light artillery regiment to protect the Spanish embassy in Lisbon — INPRECOR), they are defaulting on their obligations as military men and they become counterrevolutionaries (sic), for they are then leaving the community at the mercy of any adventurer or criminal." (Editorial in *A Luta*, October 2, 1975.)

For the moment, all the projects that were announced with great fanfare by the sixth government boil down to a single concern: regain a grip on the army in order to remedy what the reactionary monthly *Economia e Finanças* calls an "original situation: the soldiers are destroying the army." There are more and more meetings of the general staff. Commanders who have been

thrown out by their soldiers are descending on Lisbon seeking ways to restore the military hierarchy.

In two weeks this government has been exposed before broad masses as a rightist government. The stinging defeat inflicted on the government by the soldiers has played a decisive role in throwing its political character into relief. In this sense, the resolute action of the soldiers has trapped the CP on a tightrope because of its policy of critical support to Pinheiro de Azevedo.

But although this defiance and opposition exists, the mass movement as a whole has not achieved a level of initiative comparable to the movement of soldiers. Several contributing factors are responsible for this still largely wait-and-see attitude among the masses. One of these factors has been the capitulation of the Communist party and the Intersindical (the trade-union federation). Another is the inability of the far left to present concrete objectives that would allow the broad vanguard to draw larger sectors into action. But these factors are topped off by a complex phenomenon. The first important initiative of the government was broken by the response of the soldiers. Hence, the bourgeois offensive is not seen by the masses as a concrete threat that strikes at them directly. Because of that, the bourgeois offensive has not stimulated a counteroffensive enabling the masses to take decisive steps in the realm of self-defense or in the realm of generalized and coordinated mobilizations.

Thus, the genuine fermentation that does exist is not leading toward a centralization of the organs of "popular power," although a tendency in this direction is now appearing in local areas.

The reconquest of discipline

On September 30, speaking to a demonstration of the Socialist party, the Partido Popular Democrático (PPD — People's Democratic party) and the PCP-ml (Portuguese Communist party-Marxist-Leninist), Prime Minister and Vice-Admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo shouted, "The reconquest of discipline is our major objective." President and General Costa Gomes echoed those thoughts from Moscow, where he was visiting: "Our independence is important, but discipline, order, and respect for authority are even more important today." (Diário de Notícias, October 3.)

The vice-admiral and the general are obsessed by their soldiers. On the eve of the September 25 Lisbon demonstration of the SUV (Soldados Unidos Vencerão — Soldiers United Will Win), twenty-four commanders of military regions gathered under the leadership of Chief of Staff Fabião. They thought they could still fire up the MFA (Armed Forces Movement) for one more attempt to control the ranks of the army. They decided that "the organs of the MFA on the unit and military-region levels shall be revitalized, amplified, and made more dynamic so as to guarantee the necessary discipline and cohesion of the armed forces and thereby avert the



creation of parallel bodies in the barracks." Since they believe in the miraculous power of false information, they set up a "press cabinet" to initiate "activity clarifying military decisions before public opinion."

The officer corps today is trying to recentralize its energies and rediscover its cohesion in order to create the preconditions for a firmer response, apart from the great exhortations about the "dynamization of the MFA," which is supposed to "avert the creation of parallel bodies." Moreover, at least for now, the officer corps is no longer aiming at reconquering the army, but instead wants to separate out the troops that are still under the control of the authorities. On October 2 Pinheiro de Azevedo met with the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the armed forces, the commanders of the AMI (Military Intervention Group), Copcon (Continental Operations Command), the PSP (Public Security Police), and the GNR. The discussion centered around their concern for achieving success in their attempts to regroup the "reliable" units and to work out new tasks for the PSP and GNR in the realm of maintaining order. The Council of the Revolution accepted these measures. That same night, a "general assembly of delegates of officers in the navy" — officers whose "leftist" reputation had seemed well established — approved by a large

majority a motion supporting the measures of the prime minister. The "considerations" section of the motion stated that: "The recent eruption of excessive demands, parallel to the systematic incitement both to insubordination within the armed forces and to generalized civil disobedience, constitutes a frontal challenge to the ability of the MFA and the government to lead the country toward socialism." The text continued, "The actions decided on up to now by the prime minister and president of the republic, with the approval of the Council of the Revolution and the government, can produce lasting and positive effects only if total support, confidence, and agreement of views among their comrades in arms, regardless of where they stand in the hierarchy, are extended to the higher-ups responsible for these decisions."

It is not hard to see how much the growth of independent activity among the soldiers is accelerating the process of recomposition of the hierarchy and how much these professional officers, supposedly "revolutionaries," understand the necessity of taking a homogeneous attitude toward the decisions of the government. The demand of this assembly that this motion be distributed by the news media illustrates the exemplary value that the navy officers, hitherto considered black sheep by the military hierarchy, attach to their position.

This movement of recomposition of the hierarchy carries a dynamic that could rapidly escape the control of the supporters of a "socialistic" MFA and could thus leave the initiative in the hands of those who have always been advocates of a strict military discipline that roots out all political debate among the ranks of the army. Those people are now moving to the attack. On October 2 in the Monsanto GDACI (Air Force Detection, Alert, Control, and Interception Group) Captains Sobral Costa and Sousa Ferreira were kicked out by the commander. Sobral Costa was a signer of the Melo Antunes document. His purge was correctly understood by the soldiers as a reactionary initiative. In a general assembly they supported these officers and refused to join the AMI, the new repressive military body, of which their unit was supposed to be one of the components.

The leadership of the Socialist party, in the midst of its campaign for law and order, went so far as to organize a demonstration in support of the Amadora commandos, the only shock troops on which the government can still rely in Lisbon. The SP declared that the Amadora commander, the reactionary Jaime Neves, was "the victim of an object slander campaign. . . . This campaign is part of the maneuvers aimed at sowing indiscipline and confusion in the armed forces with the objective of destroying certain military units and placing others in the service of a minority group of putschists. The commandos are not reactionary, they are with the people and the revolution. . . . It (the revolution) needs disciplined armed forces like the commandos." (A Luta, October 3.)

Let us hope that the militants of the SP will not some day find themselves pondering that sort of stupidity in

the Campo Pequeno — under the surveillance of united and disciplined commandos.

Long live the fearless admiral!

The Socialist party is frightened of the crisis in the army and the impotence of the government. In order to counterbalance the immediate mobilizations of the far left against the military occupations of the radio stations, a demonstration was convoked to support Pinheiro de Azevedo. The PPD, of course, supported the demonstration. So did the CDS (Centro Democrático Social — Democratic Social Center, a rightist party), but the CDS concealed its party insignia, unlike the PCP-ml, whose contingent of 150 militants marched under the banner "Not a single social-fascist in the state apparatus!" The PPD is no longer content simply to participate in the government. Now, for the first time since the Palma Carlos operation in 1974, it is fully supporting the government in the streets as well. One of the slogans chanted by all the demonstrators was "Pinheiro de Azevedo, forward, fearless!"

The SP emerged as the force most capable of mobilizing people for this. In fact, however, its ranks were smaller than they had been during the demonstrations called after the resignation of the fourth government: 30,000 people at the most. It is true that these 30,000 were easily transformed into 150,000 for the SP leaders. The petty bourgeoisie and civil service employees accounted for virtually all of the SP troops. For this kind of demonstration the SP finds it difficult to draw in workers, either in Lisbon or Porto. Those workers who voted for the SP or are members of it follow the SP in trade-union activity, where the emphasis is put on "union democracy" against the bureaucratic control of the Intersindical by the CP; but they will not come out to support the vice-admiral.

The SP's mobilizing capacity stands out both because the far left has shown itself incapable of utilizing its potential strength, which is significant, in responding concretely to the government measures and because the CP ordered its members not to participate in the September 29 assembly in front of the ministry of information protesting the military occupation of the radio stations.

After noting that the admiral had been unable to apply his policies in spite of the support of the "people in struggle" (who were supposedly represented by the SP demonstrators), the Soares leadership sought to turn the tide by creating out of whole cloth a sufficiently dramatic reason for the SP militants, demoralized by the ineffectiveness of their leadership's proposed solutions, to mobilize again. On the night of October 1-2, the SP leaders issued a series of calls for people to block the road, with barricades if necessary, against a mysterious far-left coup d'etat and a fictitious march on Lisbon by the peasants of the Alentejo. That was the SP's own July 18! The workers of Porto and Lisbon did not budge.

The links between a section of the working-class rank and file of the SP and the party leadership are getting very tense at the moment. For many, this government seems prepared to challenge their gains. The government's refusal to meet the demands of the ADFA (the association of wounded veterans — see the article "An Army That Says No") "because that would lead us to having to meet the demands of other sectors of society" (that's how the Socialist minister Almeida Santos put it) has played a role in stirring up doubts among the working-class ranks of the SP about the policy of this government, the majority of whose members are Socialists.

Here again the sectarianism of the far left acts to prevent these fissures from being widened. In fact, the major axis of the policy of the FUR (Frente de Unidade Revolucionária — Front of Revolutionary Unity) consists of asserting that "to crush fascism it is necessary to defeat Social Democracy." The FUR is incapable of understanding the contradictions that exist between the SP's project of stabilizing a formal bourgeois democracy (along with the repressive tasks that flow from this and along with the rapid outflanking of the SP on the right) and the largely working-class composition of the Socialist party on a national scale. The sectarianism of the FUR, like the CP militants' ostracizing of SP workers, does not allow for transforming the doubts of these SP workers into a radical defiance of the government and the Social Democratic leadership.

Military occupation for democratic order

The CP reacted to the occupation of the radio stations by sitting back with folded arms. In a communiqué dated September 29 the CP declared that "measures of such gravity and repercussions on the present complex and dangerous political situation have been taken without any consultation of the CP, which commands influential political strength and holds certain government responsibilities." The CP very quickly backed away from a central test of strength. It scurried to squelch the moves toward a general strike that were brought up by some sectors of the Intersindical on the morning of September 29. The CP raised only one slogan for its militants: "Don't go out!" Although the radio and television workers had obviously not called on the troops to occupy the station, the CP declared in abstract and ambiguous terms: "Measures of military intervention can be justified in the defense of the revolution (the universal theme of Azevedo and Soares) and of the democratic order."

The essence of the CP's policy lies in the twofold assertion of the necessity for the unity of the MFA, where the Gonçalvesists have their place, and a redistribution of ministerial posts that would allow for redoubling "the authority of the organs of power" and would lead to "a real broadening of their base of support."

An editorial in the CP paper *Avante* affirmed: "In order to establish real authority and discipline in the armed

forces, the structuring of the MFA requires not the consummation of a break between sectors that are all part of the revolutionary process in spite of their differences, not a position of hegemony for this or that tendency and a repudiation of the others accompanied by a purge of the left, but instead the rapprochement and reunification of the major tendencies with a view toward defending liberties and constructing a democratic system, toward fighting together against the danger of fascist counterrevolution." (October 2.)

With such a line, it is not surprising that a consensus should be achieved in the general assembly of navy delegates between the right-wing sectors and the ex-partisans of the Gonçalves government or that the SP should be thrilled with the "progress" that has been made by these sailors.

The CP adopted an identical attitude about the creation of the AMI: "An intervention force to guarantee the democratic order must necessarily be a force in the service of democracy; that is the essential characteristic that will enable it to accomplish its mission."

The CP does not want to contribute to touching off any central mobilization that would lead to a confrontation with the government, the bourgeoisie, and the military hierarchy — not at any price. Nevertheless, the CP has to take account of the independent movement of soldiers. To respond to this pressure and to answer the SUV, the CP launched the ARPE (Revolutionary Association of Infantry Soldiers), whose first manifesto declared: "What are these gentlemen afraid of? They fear that the revolutionary soldiers and officers will definitively take the degradation of the bourgeois army in hand and create a democratic and revolutionary army in the service of our people."

In the Intersindical as well, faced with challenges to its line by left-wing currents, the CP militants are constrained to call for "workers control in all sectors of the economy, the initiation of revolutionary activity which has nothing to do with the measures that have already been taken, but which must be placed in the service and under the control of the soldiers, sailors, and organs of popular power."

At the same time, in his speech to a meeting celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Intersindical, Jaime Macado called for "the broadening of the government toward the popular forces," which is the dominant orientation of the CP. In the most recent period, the CP has especially raised its voice in the *Alentejo*, in order to demonstrate its ability to mobilize people and at the same time to avoid taking any risks on the central political field.

When the sixth government was formed, the CP leadership had great difficulties pushing to get its line of semi-participation and semi-opposition accepted by many of the members. Some worker militants had even begun to see an alliance with the FUR as the embryo of an alternative policy in face of the oscillations of the CP leadership.

But the adventurist policy of some of the organizations of the FUR, which to some extent is also the policy of the FUR itself, allowed the CP leadership to make a counterattack and to seek to reestablish its authority among its own rank and file. Denunciation of the leftists even reappeared in the editorials of Avante: "The counterrevolution and the pseudorevolutionary provocateurs are using mercenaries and adventurers who are setting themselves up in Portugal outside any control."

Missed opportunities

The FUR reacted immediately on the morning of September 29 when the military occupation of the radio was announced. Unfortunately, it adopted an alarmist position doomed in advance to failure. The leaflet distributed by the FUR described the situation in terms of imminent counterrevolution, of virtual coup d'etat: "Alert! To the working class, to the toilers, the soldiers and sailors! Let us mobilize to crush the counterrevolution! The counterrevolution shall not pass!"

In the same leaflet it was announced that "this aggression by reactionary sectors was led by the paratroopers, the CIAAC troops, and the RIOQ"! The population exhibited quite understandable hesitation, justified by subsequent events (see "An Army That Says No"), when they were asked to believe that such groups were willing to become the driving lance of "counterrevolutionary aggression." The alarmism of the FUR led to a demonstration of about a thousand people on the Rossio at 1:00 in the afternoon of September 29. It was this group of 1,000 people, according to the FUR, that was supposed to "crush the counterrevolution."

This alarmism was topped off by a total absence of any appeal or initiative toward the SP and CP, whose working-class forces are far from useless in defeating counterrevolutionary aggression. This is an illustration of the dominant conception of the FUR, which is that the unity of the revolutionary organizations not only amounts to the unity of the broad workers vanguard but is itself a sufficient factor to draw, in the heavy battalions of the working class — over the heads of the SP and the CP (that goes without saying).

Nevertheless, there was a mass desire to mobilize alongside the soldiers to transform the government-ordered occupation into its opposite. But the leaflet of the FUR did not even allude to this necessary linkup of the workers and soldiers around this precise objective.

Furthermore, the September 29 assembly in front of the Ministry of Social Communications expressed the determination of thousands of people — among them the workers of the major factories of the Lisbon industrial zone, who came in contingents — to make the government yield and to actively participate in a different sort of occupation of the radio and television stations, the sort of occupation that the ADFA had carried out during its struggle. (See "An Army That Says No.") In any case, there was a real possibility of acting in

an exemplary manner to hand the radio stations over to the workers instead of over to the minister of social communications.

Once again the FUR failed. The September 29 press conference given by the third stockholder of República, Minister A. Santos, and Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho (held in the Ministry of Social Communications) turned into a real farce. A delegation from the demonstration — composed of workers from Lisnave, Setnave, and ENI — burst into the conference hall. The minister paled; Carvalho began stammering; the demonstrators broke up the chairs and broke down the doors of the library. The leadership of the FUR did not take this opportunity to make Carvalho go out onto the balcony of the Ministry and force him to respond quickly and openly, before everybody, to the one important question: If we occupy the radio and television stations, will you give the order to fire on us? Instead, they gave Carvalho the floor to make a demagogic public confession about the contradictory spiritual state of the "revolutionary" Copcon command, which respected the orders of the president of the republic, and about his own "lack of booklearning" which prevents him "from being the Fidel Castro of Europe." (That's what he said, in his own words.)



After a few minutes, the demonstrators started expressing their disdain for Otelo; on the other hand, they greeted the soldiers from the military police regiment with cries of "SUV has won, SUV will win!" Carried away in triumph, the soldiers responded with raised fists.

At that very moment, the leadership of the FUR was sitting in the salon of the Ministry engaged in an interminable discussion with the Copcon commanders trying to convince them to march at the head of a demonstration that would skirt the radio stations and wind up at Belem. At midnight, eight hours after the beginning of the assembly, there were only about a thousand people left. Everybody else had headed for the radio stations. At 4:00 in the morning, without Otelo, the secretariat of the FUR met Pinheiro de Azevedo to listen to his claims that the military occupation had been carried out against the counterrevolution.

The secretariat of the FUR did not even succeed in compromising Otelo. He understood the limits of the divi-

sion in the military hierarchy better than they did. A third failure.

All was not yet lost, however. A series of initiatives were still possible. On September 30 the soldiers stood everywhere at the sides of the workers, occupying the radio stations along with the popular solidarity pickets and passing motions asserting their will to defend the right of the workers to use the radio. The national radio station was the only station where this did not happen. The soldiers of EPAM, who had been sent to occupy the station, declared themselves in solidarity with the workers; but the workers, under the influence of the Communist party, did nothing to broadcast that solidarity over the airwaves. A common initiative with the workers commissions of the other stations and the delegations of soldiers could have changed the situation radically and paved the way for the utilization of the television station to inflict a total defeat on the government. But nothing was done in that direction.

Workers democracy and bourgeois democracy

It was also possible to launch a vast campaign concretely counterposing the principles of workers democracy to those of formal bourgeois democracy in the realm of news and information. This question was of the most burning importance, and such a campaign would have permitted both reaching the rank-and-file workers of the CP and SP and diffusing a conception different from that of the CP. First of all, it would have been easy to expose the real nature of the campaign about free expression the SP waged around República, for this time the Zenhas and Soareses were energetically supporting a censorship decree and a military occupation. This was especially true since even Jornal Novo, which is close to the SP, found itself compelled to print bands along its front pages reading "military censorship, day 1, day 2, etc." On the basis of the simple reaction of this daily it would have been easy to throw the Social Democratic leadership off balance.

Then, on October 1, when Jornal Novo was preparing production of a second edition reproducing the communiqué of the Soares leadership about the imminence of a mysterious far-left coup d'état, the night-shift workers of the Mirandella printshop refused to print that edition unless they could also print a communiqué of their own about this alleged coup. The Jornal Novo management preferred to forget about their second edition. Concurrently, at Emissora Nacional, there were two lists in an election to the workers commission. One list demanded the right of all currents of the workers movement to express their views on the broadcasts of the radio station. These two workers initiatives could have served as illustrations in a campaign demonstrating that socialist democracy can and must be a democracy that is qualitatively superior to bourgeois democracy and can and must assure greater liberties to the toiling masses.

This could have been combined with a campaign in de-



both being threatened by the government in the name of private property, which appears to the workers as an institution restricting their liberties. Moreover, all the workers commissions in the press industry have just met to plan out ways to defend Radio Renascença, which is now gagged. In addition, a small electronics company, Iberonica, where the workers expelled the employer a month ago, has offered its services to the Radio Renascença workers in establishing a broadcasting station of their own.

In spite of these missed opportunities and in spite of the absence of initiatives that could have inflicted an exemplary defeat on the government, the response of the soldiers did halt the offensive of Pinheiro de Azevedo and Costa Gomes.

The outcome of this confrontation, which turned out favorably for the working class, is part of a process of step-by-step revolutionary upsurge in which the workers have won victories without meeting any great resistance from the class enemy. This could create the false impression that the bourgeoisie is politically impotent and that it is definitively incapable of reconstituting a military striking force. This illusion fuels an ultraleftism that is translated into adventurism by the PRP-BR, which claims that "it is now time for the revolutionary forces and the workers to pose the problem of an insurrection" (Diário de Lisboa, September 30). This ultraleftism is reflected in the sectarian and triumphalist positions of virtually the entire far left toward the SP and the CP, which leads to the elimination of any united front tactic or else reduces such a tactic to frenetic ultimatism.

If the far-left groups continue to play this game, they could well be caught in the same trap the German Communists fell into in January 1919. But the development of the political situation, as illustrated by the latest events, can facilitate a process of clarification that would permit a response to the need for unity in action by the workers movement and for the centralization of the organs of "popular power."



SWEDEN AGAINST THE CHILEAN JUNTA!

On September 20 the village of Bastad, the most luxurious summer recreation spot of the Swedish bourgeoisie, was transformed into the assembly point for one of the most important Chile demonstrations ever held in Sweden. About 7,000 demonstrators came from all parts of the country: 1,200 from Stockholm, 375 miles away; 1,500 from Göteborg, 125 miles away; and even 100 from Umea, 850 miles away. In all, 100 buses of demonstrators invaded the small bourgeois paradise village. There were also 150 people from Denmark and smaller groups from Finland and Norway. Why Bastad? Because that is where the Swedish Davis Cup tennis team was playing the Chilean team. The Swedish authorities had refused to boycott the match, and that was seen by the Chile solidarity movement as a brazen provocation allowing the Chilean junta to score some propaganda points. In addition, one of the Chilean players, James

Fillol, was an active supporter of the far right even before the 1973 coup. Among other things, he gave large sums of money to the "strike" of truckowners shortly before the overthrow of the Unidad Popular government.

The mobilization was made possible by the continued existence in Sweden of a strong Chile solidarity movement. This had already been shown on September 11, the second anniversary of the coup, when 7,000 demonstrated in Stockholm and 8,000 more in other places throughout the country. The Chile committees used these demonstrations to mobilize for the following weekend, under the slogan, "Stop the Match." This slogan and related questions (the situation in Chile, for example) became the most hotly debated political question in the press and on radio and television for a month before the match was held. There was a special reason

for this. In May 1968 the far left stopped a game against a Rhodesian team by invading the stadium; there was a violent clash with the police. One of the results of that action was that nobody continues to say that politics and sports are separate affairs except for a few rather stupid conservatives to whom nobody listens anyway. This time, the bourgeois press and the Social Democrats decided to confront the solidarity movement with a more subtle argument: "Of course, we all agree that the regime in Chile is awful and we have to show our distaste by demonstrating against the match. But you are terrorists who say you will use violence to stop the match. You are thus violating the democratic right to hold meetings (the match, that is!), and this shows your own antidemocratic character." With this argument the Social Democrats accused the Chile committees of splitting the solidarity movement and called for their own demonstration to be held two days before the match. This was an attempt to split and confuse the mobilization.

But this was supplemented by a second and more vigorous argument: 1,500 cops with horses, dogs, riot equipment, and helicopters were sent to the village of Bastad. The government announced that there could be no guarantees against grave injuries and even deaths, thus trying to frighten people away from the demonstration of the Chile committees. But the twofold tactic of the Social Democratic government failed completely. This can be seen in a number of respects:

1. Everybody in Chile itself was informed about the solidarity mobilization. The slogans, many of them in Spanish, could be heard on the Chilean television coverage of the match. Several hundred large red balloons, each inscribed with the name of a Chilean murdered by the junta, were released by the demonstrators, and the Chilean television commentator was forced to explain that a big demonstration against the match was going on — organized, he said, by "paid Marxists." The junta's press tried to line up the petty bourgeoisie in a nationalist campaign against Sweden as a whole, but it can be assumed that the information the junta had to give to explain this campaign was an encouragement to all the oppressed workers in Chile.
2. Pressure on the Swedish government to take concrete measures against the junta increased. At the moment, it is only the harbor workers who are boycotting Chilean material.
3. Even though the demonstration did not succeed in stopping the match (because of the massive police mobilization), the mobilization was seen by everybody as a victory. The tennis match became a side issue. "The demonstrators won the match" was the headline of Dagens Nyheter, the largest bourgeois daily. Some bourgeois commentators even asked if it was correct to have spent \$1 million mobilizing such a large police force against demonstrators who had already said before the demonstration that they were not going to Bastad to fight the police.

4. The Social Democrats' split maneuver failed completely. Only 1,000 turned out to their demonstration two days before the match. It received scarcely any press coverage. The problem of the Social Democrats was nicely summed up by one of the Social Democratic reporters: "We have bad contacts with the youth. Our meetings and demonstrations consist mostly of a bunch of pensioners."

5. The demonstration was also a victory for those with a correct view of unity in action, which is extremely important given the sectarian tradition among the revolutionary left established by the large Maoist groups and even the CP. This time, the sectarian maneuvers of the Maoists and the CP were bypassed. The Maoist group SKP (Sveriges Kommunistiska Parti — Communist party of Sweden) gave an extraordinary performance during the weeks leading up to the demonstration. They changed their line three times. At first, they argued that Chile was a "legitimate state" and that the match should therefore be held. The main enemy, they said, was the two superpowers, and the mobilization was a diversion from the struggle against these superpowers. After being completely discredited by this position, the SKP leaders decided that although the match should be held, there should after all be a demonstration against it. But this position did not relieve the pressure they were feeling from their own rank and file and from the mobilization itself; at the last minute they argued that the match should be stopped.

The CP also made some sectarian maneuvers. The CP leaders participated in the propaganda and mobilization calling for the match to be stopped, but at the last minute they made a splitting maneuver. The pressure from the Social Democrats and the bourgeoisie, which were accusing the CP of participating in preparing a demonstration in which violence would be used, induced the CP to split from the Chile committees over the question of whether the marshalls for the demonstration should be armed with sticks and wear helmets. The CP accused the Chile committees of using a tactic that could provoke the police and the local reactionaries. Instead, they wanted to have totally unprotected marshalls, which would have meant giving the reactionary gangs a real possibility of attacking. The CP could not understand that it was the presence of the demonstrators that constituted the provocation in the eyes of the local reactionaries and the car-gangs from the neighboring towns. The result of the CP policy was a separate demonstration 200 yards from the main demonstration; the CP drew a total of 1,000 people.

The defeat of the sectarian practices of the Maoists and the CP represented an important victory for the anti-Stalinist left in Sweden and especially for the Revolutionära Marxisterna Förbundet (Revolutionary Marxist League), Swedish section of the Fourth International, which was one of the main forces in the mobilization. ■

MANDEL TOURS MEXICO

In the beginning of September 1975 the Grupo Comunista Internacionalista (GCI — Internationalist Communist Group), a Mexican sympathizing organization of the Fourth International, organized three successful public meetings for Ernest Mandel, a member of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International. On September 17 in the town of Pueblo, Mandel addressed about 800 people on the crisis of the bourgeois university and the role of students and intellectuals in furthering the socialist revolution. A representative of the

Mexican CP intervened in the discussion. On September 18 more than 1,200 people packed a meeting hall in Mexico City, where the GCI had organized a debate on the balance-sheet of the Chilean revolution and counterrevolution. Comrades from the Chilean SP and the MIR participated in the ensuing discussion.

On September 19 some 2,500 people attended a meeting on the Portuguese revolution. It was held at the University of Mexico.

Protest Against Murders in Argentina

The following letter protesting the murderous repression against the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores in Argentina was sent to Italo Luder, "interim" president of Argentina, by a number of groups and individuals in the workers movement in Québec. It is dated September 22. We urge other comrades around the world to follow this example of the Québécois comrades in expressing their solidarity with the PST and all other victims of fascistic terror in Argentina.

Mr. Luder,

The undersigned vigorously protest against the recent murder of eight members of the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores (PST). The bodies of Adriana Zaldua, Ana Maria Lorenzo, Lidia Agostini, Hugo Frigeria, and Roberto Loscertales were found September 5 in an automobile near La Plata. The following day, the bodies of three more PST members were found in the same region: Patricia Susanna Claverie, Carlos Enrique Povedano, and Oscar Lucatti.

This brings to fifteen the number of PST members who have been murdered by rightist terrorists since the Peronist government acceded to power. In addition, many other opponents of the government have been murdered and political headquarters have been attacked. Everyone knows that the rightist terrorists act under government protection.

We demand that the government take all necessary measures to stop the attacks of rightist terrorists. We demand the release of all political prisoners, especially those imprisoned by virtue of the state of siege. We demand that those responsible for the murders perpetrated against the members of the PST and other revolutionary and trade-union militants be brought to justice.

Signatures:

Comité Québécois pour la Défense des Prisonniers Latino-Américains (Québécois Committee for the Defense of Latin American Political Prisoners)
Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire (Revolutionary Marxist Group)
Ligue Socialiste Ouvrière (Socialist Workers League)
Michel Chartrand, President, Conseil Central des Syndicats Nationaux de Montréal (Montréal Central Council of National Trade Unions)
Jacques Beaudoin, President, Syndicat des Travailleurs de Garage et d'Entretien de la Commission de Transport de la Communauté Urbaine de Montréal (Garage and Maintenance Workers Union of the Transport Commission of the Montréal Urban Area)
Pierre Lemaire, President, Alliance des Professeurs de Montréal
Céline St-Pierre, Professor, Université du Québec, Montréal